




Symmetric Cryptography



Symmetric Cryptography



Alternative names: private-key, single-key or secret-key cryptography.




Problem Statement:

- 1) Alice and Bob would like to communicate via an unsecure channel (e.g.,
- 2) A malicious third party Oscar (the bad guy) has channel access but should not be able to understand the communication.

Symmetric Cryptography (cont.) Georga State University





- x is the plaintext
- y is the ciphertext
- K is the key
- Set of all keys {K1, K2, ..., Kn} is the key space

Symmetric Cryptography (cont.)



- Encryption equation y = e_K(x)
- Decryption equation $x = d_K(y)$
- Encryption and decryption are inverse operations if the same key K is used on both sides:

$$d_K(y) = d_K(e_K(x)) = x$$

- Important: The key must be transmitted via a secure channel between Alice and Bob.
- The secure channel can be realized, e.g., by manually installing the key for the Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) protocol or a human courier.
- However, the system is only secure if an attacker does not learn the key K!
- ⇒ The problem of secure communication is reduced to secure transmission and storage of the key K.

Brute-Force Attack against Symmetric Cipher



- Treats the cipher as a black box
- Requires (at least) 1 plaintext-ciphertext pair (x₀, y₀)
- · Check all possible keys until condition is fulfilled:

$$d_{K}(y_{0}) \stackrel{?}{=} x_{0}$$

· How many keys should we need ?

| Key length in bit | Key space | Security life time (assuming brute-force as best possible attack) |
|----------------------|------------------|--|
| 64 | 2 ⁶⁴ | Short term (few days or less) |
| 128 | 2128 | Long-term (several decades in the absence of quantum computers) |
| 256 | 2 ²⁵⁶ | Long-term (also resistant against quantum computers – note that QC do not exist at the moment) |

Important: An adversary only needs to succeed with **one** attack. Thus, a long key space does not help if other attacks (e.g., social engineering) are possible..



Substitution Cipher

Substitution Cipher



Idea: replace each plaintext letter by a fixed other letter.

| Plaintext | | Ciphertex |
|-----------|---------------|-----------|
| Α | \rightarrow | k |
| В | \rightarrow | d |
| С | \rightarrow | w |

for instance, ABBA would be encrypted as kddk

• Example (ciphertext):

iq ifcc vqqr fb rdq vfllcq na rdq cfjwhwz hr bnnb hcc hwwhbsqvqbre hwq vhlq

How secure is the Substitution Cipher? Let's look at attacks...

Attacks against Substitution Cipher



Attack: Exhaustive Key Search (Brute-Force Attack)

- Simply try every possible substitution table until an intelligent plaintext appears (note that each substitution table is a key)...
- · How many substitution tables (= keys) are there?

$$26 \times 25 \times ... \times 3 \times 2 \times 1 = 26! \approx 2^{88}$$


Search through 2⁸⁸ keys is completely infeasible with today's computers! (cf. earlier table on key lengths)

- Q: Can we now conclude that the substitution cipher is secure since a brute-forece attack is not feasible?
- · A: No! We have to protect against all possible attacks...

Letter Frequency Analysis



- Letters have very different frequencies in the English language
- Moreover: the frequency of plaintext letters is preserved in the ciphertext.



Letter Frequency Attack



- · Let's return to our example and identify the most frequent letter:
- $\label{eq:condition} \begin{tabular}{ll} iq ifcc vqqr fb rdq vfllcq na rdq cfjwhwz hr bnnb hcc hwwhbsqvqbre hwq vhlq \\ \end{tabular}$
- We replace the ciphertext letter q by E and obtain:
- iE ifcc vEEr fb rdE vfllcE na rdE cfjwhwz hr bnnb hcc hwwhbsEvEbre hwE vhlE
- By further guessing based on the frequency of the remaining letters we obtain the plaintext:

WE WILL MEET IN THE MIDDLE OF THE LIBRARY AT NOON ALL ARRANGEMENTS ARE MADE

Letter Frequency Attack (cont.)



- In practice, not only frequencies of individual letters can be used for an attack, but also the frequency of letter pairs (i.e., "th" is very common in English), letter triples, etc.
- Important lesson: Even though the substitution cipher
 has a sufficiently large key space of appr. 2⁸⁸, it can
 easily be defeated with analytical methods. This is an
 excellent example that an encryption scheme must
 withstand all types of attacks.



Shift (or Caesar) Cipher (1)



Shift (or Caesar) Cipher and Affine Cipher

- Ancient cipher, allegedly used by Julius Caesar
- Replaces each plaintext letter by another one.
- Replacement rule is very simple: Take letter that follows after k positions in the alphabet



Shift (or Caesar) Cipher (2)



Needs mapping from letters → numbers:

| I | Α | В | С | D | Е | F | G | Н | 1 | J | K | L | М |
|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
| | N | 0 | Р | Q | R | S | Т | U | ٧ | W | Х | Υ | Z |
| | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 |

Example for k = 7

Plaintext = ATTACK = 0, 19, 19, 0, 2, 10

Ciphertext = haahjr = 7, 0, 0, 7, 9, 17

Note that the letters "wrap around" at the end of the alphabet, which can be mathematically be expressed as reduction modulo 26, e.g., $19 + 7 = 26 \equiv 0 \mod 26$

Shift (or Caesar) Cipher (3)



Elegant mathematical description of the cipher.

Let k, x, y in {0,1, ..., 25}

• Encryption: $y = e_k(x) \equiv x + k \mod 26$

Decryption: $x = d_k(x) \equiv y - k \mod 26$

- Q: Is the shift cipher secure?
- A: No! several attacks are possible, including:
 - Exhaustive key search (key space is only 26!)
 - Letter frequency analysis, similar to attack against substitution cipher

Affine Cipher





- Extension of the shift cipher: rather than just adding the key to the plaintext, we also multiply by the key
- We use for this a key consisting of two parts: k = (a, b)

Let k, x, y in {0,1, ..., 25}

- Encryption: $y = e_k(x) \equiv a x + b \mod 26$
- Decryption: $x = d_k(x) \equiv a^{-1}(y b) \mod 26$
- Since the inverse of a is needed for inversion, we can only use values for a for which:

$$gcd(a, 26) = 1$$


There are 12 values for a that fulfill this condition. aa-1 = 1 mod 26

- From this follows that the key space is only 12 x 26 = 312
- Again, several attacks are possible, including: exhaustive key search and letter frequency analysis, similar to the attack against the substitution cipher

Stream Ciphers

Stream Ciphers in Cryptology






Stream Ciphers were invented in 1917 by Gilbert Vernam

Key Idea of Stream Ciphers



- · Encrypt bits individually
- Usually small and fast → common in embedded devices (e.g., A5/1 for GSM phones)



Encryption & Decryption



Plaintext x_i , ciphertext y_i and key stream s_i consist of individual bits



- · Encryption and decryption are simple additions modulo 2 (aka XOR)
- · Encryption and decryption are the same functions

Encryption: $y_i = e_{si}(x_i) = x_i + s_i \mod 2$, $x_i, y_i, s_i \in \{0, 1\}$

Decryption: $x_i = e_{si}(y_i) = y_i + s_i \mod 2$

Why is Modulo 2 Addition?



- Modulo 2 addition is equivalent to XOR operation
- For perfectly random key stream s_i, each ciphertext output bit has a 50% chance to be 0 or 1
 - → Good statistic property for ciphertext
- Inverting XOR is simple, since it is the same XOR operation

| X _i | Si | y _i |
|----------------|----|----------------|
| 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 |

22

Example




- Encryption of the letter A by Alice
- A is given in ASCII code as 65₁₀ = 1000001₂.
- Let's assume that the first key stream bits are $\Rightarrow z_1, \dots, z_7 = 0101101$
- · Encryption by Alice:
 - plaintext x_i : 1000001 = A (ASCII symbol)
 - key stream z_i: 0101101
 - ciphertext y_i : 1101100 = I (ASCII symbol)
- · Decryption by Bob:
 - ciphertext y_i: 1101100 = I (ASCII symbol)
 - key stream z_i: 0101101
 - plaintext x_i: 1000001= A (ASCII symbol)

Data Encryption Standard (DES)

6

DES in the Field of Cryptology





Block Cipher vs. Stream Cipher



- · Stream Ciphers
 - Encrypt bits individually
 - Usually small and fast → common in embedded devices
- · Block Ciphers:
 - Always encrypt a full block (several bits)
 - Are common for Internet applications



Block Cipher: Confusion & Diffusion Georga Market



Claude Shannon: There are two **primitive operations** with which strong encryption algorithms can be built:

- Confusion: An encryption operation where the relationship between key and ciphertext is obscured.
 Today, a common element for achieving confusion is substitution, which is found in both DES and AES.
- Diffusion: An encryption operation where the influence of one plaintext symbol is spread over many ciphertext symbols with the goal of hiding statistical properties of the plaintext.
 A simple diffusion element is the bit permutation, which is frequently used within DES.

Both operations by themselves cannot provide security. The idea is to concatenate confusion and diffusion elements to build so called *product ciphers*.

Product Ciphers



- Diffusion 1

 Confusion 1

 y'

 Diffusion 2

 Confusion 2
- Most of today's block ciphers are product ciphers as they consist of rounds which are applied repeatedly to the data.
- Can reach excellent diffusion: changing of one bit of plaintext results on average in the change of half the output bits.

Example:






DES Facts




- · Data Encryption Standard (DES) encrypts blocks of size 64 bit.
- Developed by IBM based on the cipher Lucifer under influence of the National Security Agency (NSA), the design criteria for DES have not been published
- Standardized 1977 by the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) today called National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
- Most popular **block cipher** for most of the last 30 years.
- By far best studied symmetric algorithm.
- Nowadays considered insecure due to the small key length of 56 bit.
- But: 3DES yields very secure cipher, still widely used today.
- Replaced by the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in 2000



- Symmetric cipher: uses same key for encryption and decryption
- Uses 16 rounds which all perform the identical operation
- Different subkey in each round derived from main key

DES Feistel Network (1)






- DES structure is a Feistel network
- Advantage: encryption and decryption differ only in keyschedule

DES Feistel Network (2)






- Bitwise initial permutation, then 16 rounds
- Plaintext is split into 32-bit halves L_i and R_i
- R_i is fed into the function f, the output of which is then XORed with Li
- Left and right half are swapped

DES Feistel Network (3)






Each round *i* can be expressed as:

$$L_i = R_{i-1},$$

$$R_i = L_{i-1} \oplus f(R_{i-1}, k_i)$$

DES Feistel Network (4)







Initial and Final Permutation


- Bitwise Permutations.
- Inverse operations.


 Described by tables IP and IP-1.




The f-Function · main operation of DES f-Function inputs: R_{i-1} and round key k_i • 4 Steps: 1. Expansion E 2. XOR with round key 3. S-box substitution 4. Permutation









MSB Coorga State University Georga State University Georga State University Georga State University Formula State University Georga State University Formula State University A specific of the DES is 64 bit. (56 bit key) A specific of the DES is 64 bit. (56 bit key) A specific of the DES is 64 bit. (56 bit key) A specific of the DES is 64 bit. (56 bit key) A specific of the DES is 64 bit. (56 bit key) A specific of the DES is 64 bit. (56 bit key) A specific of the DES is 64 bit. (56 bit key) A specific of the DES is 64 bit. (56 bit key) A specific of the DES is 64 bit. (56 bit key)

P


P

P = parity bit


Key Schedule (2)





• Parity bits are removed in a first permuted choice *PC-1* (note that the bits 8, 16, 24, 32, 40, 48, 56 and 64 are not used at all)



| | | | РC | − 1 | | | |
|----|----|----|----|-----|----|----|----|
| 57 | 49 | 41 | 33 | 25 | 17 | 9 | 1 |
| 58 | 50 | 42 | 34 | 26 | 18 | 10 | 2 |
| 59 | 51 | 43 | 35 | 27 | 19 | 11 | 3 |
| 60 | 52 | 44 | 36 | 63 | 55 | 47 | 39 |
| 31 | 23 | 15 | 7 | 62 | 54 | 46 | 38 |
| 30 | 22 | 14 | 6 | 61 | 53 | 45 | 37 |
| 29 | 21 | 13 | 5 | 28 | 20 | 12 | 4 |







Decryption

In **Feistel ciphers** only the keyschedule has to be modified for decryption.


Generate the same 16 round keys in reverse order. (for a detailed discussion on why this works see Understanding Crptography Chapter 3)

Reversed key schedule: As D_q = D_{16} and C_q = C_{16} the first round key can be generated by applying PC-2 right after PC-1 (no rotation here!). All other rotations of C and Dcan be reversed to reproduce the other round keys resulting

- No rotation in round 1
- One bit rotation to the right in rounds 2, 9 and 16.
- Two bit rotations to the right in all other rounds.

Security of DES





Key space is too small (2⁵⁶ keys)

- S-box design criteria have been kept secret: Are there any hidden analytical attacks (backdoors), only known to the NSA?
- Analytical Attacks: DES is highly resistent to both differential and linear cryptanalysis, which have been published years later than the DES. This means IBM and NSA had been aware of these attacks for 15 years!

 So far there is no known analytical attack which breaks DES in relief to exercise. in realistic scenarios.
- Exhaustive key search: For a given pair of plaintext-ciphertext (x, y) test all 2⁵⁶ keys until the condition DES_k⁻¹(x)=y is fulfilled.

 ⇒ Relatively easy given today's computer technology!

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

Some Basic Facts




- · DES is not secure
- · AES is the most widely used symmetric cipher today
- The algorithm for AES was chosen by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in a multi-year selection process
- · The requirements for all AES candidate submissions were:
 - Block cipher with 128-bit block size
 - Three supported key lengths: 128, 192 and 256 bit
 - Security relative to other submitted algorithms
 - Efficiency in software and hardware

Chronology of the AES Selection



- The need for a new block cipher announced by NIST in January, 1997
- 15 candidates algorithms accepted in August, 1998
- 5 finalists announced in August, 1999:
 - Mars IBM Corporation
 - RC6 RSA Laboratories
 - Rijndael J. Daemen & V. Rijmen
 - Serpent Eli Biham et al.
 - Twofish B. Schneier et al.
- · In October 2000, Rijndael was chosen as the AES
- AES was formally approved as a US federal standard in November 2001

AES: Overview (1)




The number of rounds depends on the chosen key length:

| Key length (bits) | Number of rounds |
|-------------------|------------------|
| 128 | 10 |
| 192 | 12 |
| 256 | 14 |

AES: Overview (2)

- Iterated cipher with 10/12/14 rounds
- The whole block is encrpted in each round
- Each round consists of "Layers"



Internal Structure of AES (1)



- AES is a byte-oriented cipher (1 byte = 8 bits)
- The state A (i.e., the 128-bit data path) can be arranged in a 4x4 matrix:


| A_0 | A_4 | A ₈ | A ₁₂ |
|----------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|
| A ₁ | A ₅ | A_9 | A ₁₃ |
| A_2 | A ₆ | A ₁₀ | A ₁₄ |
| A_3 | A ₇ | A ₁₁ | A ₁₅ |

with $A_0, ..., A_{15}$ denoting the 16-byte input of AES

Internal Structure of AES (2)



Round function for rounds 1,2,...,n_{r-1}:



· Note: In the last round, the MixColumn tansformation layer is omitted

54

Byte Substitution Layer



- The Byte Substitution layer consists of 16
 S-Boxes with the following properties:
 - the S-Boxes are
 - Identical: ByteSub(A_i) = B_i
 - Only nonlinear elements of AES, i.e.,
 ByteSub(A_i) + ByteSub(A_j) ≠ ByteSub(A_i + A_j), for i,j = 0,...,15
 - bijective, i.e., there exists a one-to-one mapping of input and output bytes
 - ⇒ S-Box can be uniquely reversed
- In software implementations, the S-Box is usually realized as a lookup table

Example: S-Boxes




- Realize S-Box as a 256-by-8 bit lookup table
- · Substitution values are in hexadecimal form for input byte (xy)

| | | | | | | | | | v | | | | | | | | |
|-----|----|----|------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|---------------------------|
| | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | Α | В | C | D | E | F | |
| 0 | 63 | 7C | 77 | 7B | F2 | 6B | 6F | C5 | 30 | 01 | 67 | 2B | FΕ | D7 | AB | 76 | For example, |
| 1 | CA | 82 | C9 | 7D | FA | 59 | 47 | F0 | AD | D4 | A2 | AF | 9C | A4 | 72 | C0 | |
| 2 | B7 | FD | 93 | 26 | | | | CC | | A5 | E5 | F1 | 71 | D8 | 31 | 15 | $A_i = (11000010)_2$ |
| 3 | 04 | C7 | 23 | C3 | | | | 9A | | 12 | 80 | E2 | EB | 27 | B2 | 75 | = (C2) _{hex} |
| 4 | 09 | 83 | 2C | | | - | | A0 | | 3B | D6 | В3 | 29 | E3 | 2F | 84 | (- /ilex |
| 5 | 53 | D1 | | | | | | 5B | | | BE | 39 | 4A | 4C | 58 | CF | $S(A_i) = S((C2)_{hex})$ |
| 6 | D0 | EF | AA | | | | | | | | 02 | | 50 | 3C | 9F | A8 | |
| 7 | 51 | A3 | 40 | 8F | | 9D | 38 | F5 | BC | B6 | DA | 21 | 10 | FF | F3 | D2 | = (25) _{hex} |
| X 8 | CD | 0C | 13 | EC | - | 97 | 44 | 17 | C4 | Α7 | 7E | 3D | 64 | 5D | 19 | 73 | = (00100101) ₂ |
| 9 | 60 | 81 | 4F | | 22 | | | 88 | | EE | B8 | 14 | DE | 5E | 0B | DB | = B _i |
| Α | E0 | 32 | | | | | | 5C | | D3 | AC | | 91 | 95 | E4 | 79 | |
| В | E7 | C8 | 37 | | | | | A9 | | | F4 | EA | 00 | 7A | AE | 00 | |
| C | BA | 78 | (25) | | | | | | | DD | 74 | 1F | 4B | BD | | 8A | |
| D | 70 | 3E | B5 | 66 | 48 | 03 | F6 | 0E | 61 | 35 | 57 | B9 | 86 | Cl | 1D | 9E | |
| Е | E1 | F8 | 98 | 11 | 69 | D9 | 8E | 94 | 9B | 1E | 87 | E9 | CE | 55 | 28 | DF | |
| F | 8C | Αl | 89 | 0D | BF | E6 | 42 | 68 | 41 | 99 | 2D | 0F | B0 | 54 | BB | 16 | |

Hexadecimal

Diffusion Layer



- · Provides diffusion over all input state bits
- · Consists of two sublayers:
 - ShiftRows Sublayer: Permutation of the data on a byte level
 - MixColumn Sublayer: Matrix operation which combines ("mixes") blocks of four bytes
- Performs a linear operation on state matrices A, B, i.e.,
 DIFF(A) + DIFF(B) = DIFF(A + B)

Diffusion Layer: ShiftRows Sublayer



Rows of the state matrix are shifted cyclically:

| | B ₀ | B_4 | B ₈ | B ₁₂ |
|--------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Input matrix | B ₁ | B ₅ | B ₉ | B ₁₃ |
| • | B ₂ | B ₆ | B ₁₀ | B ₁₄ |
| | Ba | B- | В., | B ₁₆ |

| Output matrix | B ₀ | B_4 | | B ₁₂ | |
|---------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------------------|
| | B ₅ | B_9 | B ₁₃ | B ₁ | ← one position left shift |
| Output matrix | B ₁₀ | B ₁₄ | B ₂ | B_6 | ← two positions left shift |
| | B ₁₅ | B ₃ | B ₇ | B ₁₁ | ← three positions left shift |

58

Diffusion Layer: MixColumn Sublayer



- Linear transformation which mixes each column of the state matrix
- Each 4-byte column is considered as a vector and multiplied by a fixed 4x4 matrix, e.g.,

$$\begin{pmatrix} C_0 \\ C_1 \\ C_2 \\ C_3 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\ 01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\ 01 & 01 & 02 & 03 \\ 03 & 01 & 01 & 02 \end{pmatrix} , \begin{pmatrix} B_0 \\ B_5 \\ B_{10} \\ B_{15}, \end{pmatrix}$$

where 01, 02 and 03 are given in hexadecimal notation

 All arithmetic is done in the Galois field GF(2⁸), containing 256 elements

Key Schedule (1)




- Subkeys are derived recursively from the original 128/192/256-bit input key
- · Each round has 1 subkey, plus 1 subkey at the beginning of AES

| Key length (bits) | Number of rounds | Number of subkeys |
|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| 128 | 10 | 11 |
| 192 | 12 | 13 |
| 256 | 14 | 15 |

- Key whitening: Subkey is used both at the input and output of AES
 ⇒# subkeys = # rounds + 1
- · There are different key schedules for the different key sizes


Key Schedule (2)

- Word-oriented: 1 word = 32 bits
- The length of k_i is 1 byte (i.e., 8 bits)
- Each k_i is derived recursively based on k_{i-1}
- 11 subkeys are stored in the key expansion array W[0]...W[3], W[4]...W[7], ..., W[40]...W[43]
- Subkey of round 0, W[0]...W[3], is the original AES key



Key Schedule (3)• Leftmost word of a subkey at round i, W[4i]: $W[4i] = W[4(i-1)] \oplus g(W[4i-1])$ • Remaining three words of a subkey: $W[4i+j] = W[4i+j-1] \oplus W[4(i-1)+j] \oplus W[4(i-1)+j] \oplus W[4i-j-1] \oplus W[4i-j$

Key Schedule (4)



⇒ Add nonlinearity to key schedule


 The round coefficient RC is only added to the leftmost byte and varies from round to round

⇒ Remove symmetry in AES

 $RC[1] = x^0 = (00000001)_2$ $RC[2] = x^1 = (00000010)_2$ $RC[3] = x^2 = (00000100)_2$

 $RC[10] = x^9 = (00110110)_2$

 $-x^{i}$ represents an element in a Galois field





 What we have learnt about block cipher by now?

DES, 3DES, and AES encrypt a block of data

- How to utilize a block cipher?
- How to encrypt long plaintexts with a block cipher?

Block Ciphers



- A block cipher is much more than just an encryption algorithm, it can be used ...
 - to build different types of block-based encryption schemes
 - to realize stream ciphers
 - to construct hash functions
 - to make message authentication codes
 - to build key establishment protocols
 - to make a pseudo-random number generator
 - ...
- · The security of block ciphers also can be increased by
 - key whitening
 - multiple encryption

Encryption with Block Ciphers




- There are several ways of encrypting long plaintexts, e.g., an email or a computer file, with a block cipher ("modes of operation")
 - Electronic Code Book mode (ECB)
 - Cipher Block Chaining mode (CBC)
 - Output Feedback mode (OFB)
 - Cipher Feedback mode (CFB)
 - Counter mode (CTR)
 - Galois Counter Mode (GCM)
- Goal: in addition to confidentiality, they provide authenticity and integrity:
 - Is the message really coming from the original sender? (authenticity)
 - Was the ciphertext altered during transmission? (integrity)

66

Electronic Code Book Mode (ECB)



- $e_k(x_i)$: the encryption of a b-bit plaintext block x_i with key k
- $e_k^{-1}(y_i)$: the decryption of b-bit ciphertext block y_i with key k
- Messages which exceed b bits are partitioned into b-bit blocks
- Each Block is encrypted separately




Decryption: $x_i = e_k^{-1}(y_i) = e_k^{-1}(e_k(x_i)), i \ge 1$

Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC)




- For the first plaintext block x_1 there is no previous ciphertext
 - An IV is added to the first plaintext to make each CBC encryption nondeterministic
 - The first ciphertext y_1 depends on plaintext x_1 and the IV
- The second ciphertext y₂ depends on the IV, x₁ and x₂
- The third ciphertext y₃ depends on the IV and x₁, x₂ and x₃, etc.



67

Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC)






 $\begin{array}{ll} \textit{Encryption (first block):} & y_1 = e_k(x_1 \oplus \text{IV}) \\ \textit{Encryption (general block):} & y_i = e_k(x_i \oplus y_{i-1}), \ i \geq 2 \\ \textit{Decryption (first block):} & x_1 = e_k^{-1}(y_1) \oplus \text{IV} \\ \textit{Decryption (general block):} & x_i = e_k^{-1}(y_i) \oplus y_{i-1}, \ i \geq 2 \\ \end{array}$

Output Feedback Mode (OFB)




- It is used to build a *synchronous* **stream cipher** from a block cipher
- Key stream is not generated bitwise but instead in a blockwise fashion
- Output of the cipher gives us key stream bits S_i with which we can encrypt plaintext bits using the XOR operation



Output Feedback Mode (OFB)



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


Encryption (first block): $s_1 = e_k(IV)$ and $y_1 = s_1 \oplus x_1$ **Encryption (general block):** $s_i = e_k(s_{i-1})$ and $y_1 = s_i \oplus x_i$, $i \ge 2$ **Decryption (first block):** $s_1 = e_k(IV)$ and $x_1 = s_1 \oplus y_1$ **Decryption (general block):** $s_i = e_k(s_{i-1})$ and $x_i = s_i \oplus y_i$, $i \ge 2$

Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB)



- It uses a block cipher as a building block for an **asynchronous stream cipher** (similar to the OFB mode), more accurate name: "Ciphertext Feedback Mode"
- Key stream S_i is generated in a blockwise fashion and is also a function of ciphertext
- · As a result of the use of an IV, the CFB encryption is also nondeterministic




 $\begin{array}{ll} \textit{Encryption (first block):} & y_i = e_k(IV) \oplus x_1 \\ \textit{Encryption (general block):} & y_i = e_k(y_{i-1}) \oplus x_i, \quad i \geq 2 \\ \textit{Decryption (first block):} & x_i = e_k(IV) \oplus y_1 \\ \textit{Decryption (general block):} & x_i = e_k(y_{i-1}) \oplus y_i, \quad i \geq 2 \\ \end{array}$

Counter Mode (CTR)



- It uses a block cipher as a stream cipher (like the OFB and CFB)
- The key stream is computed in a blockwise fashion
- The input to the block cipher is a counter which assumes a different value every time the block cipher computes a new key stream block
- Unlike CFB and OFB modes, the CTR mode can be parallelized since the 2nd encryption can begin before the 1st one has finished
 - Desirable for high-speed implementations, e.g., in network routers




Example: CTR



Assume the following implementation:

- Block cipher algorithm: AES (with 128 bits)
- · Initiation Vector (IV): 96 bits
- CTR: 128 96 = 32 bits
- Number of blocks for encryption with the same IV: 2³²
- Plaintext size: 16 * 2³² = 2³⁶ bytes



74

Galois Counter Mode (GCM) (1)




- It also computes a <u>message authentication code</u> (MAC), i.e., a cryptographic checksum is computed for a message
- By making use of GCM, two additional services are provided:
 - Message Authentication
 - the receiver can make sure that the message was really created by the original sender
 - Message Integrity
 - the receiver can make sure that nobody tampered with the ciphertext during transmission

Galois Counter Mode (GCM) (2)




For encryption (counter mode)

- An initial counter is derived from an IV and a serial number
- The initial counter value is incremented then encrypted and XORed with the first plaintext block
- For subsequent plaintexts, the counter is incremented and then encrypted



Galois Counter Mode (GCM) (3)






- 1. Derive a counter value CTR_0 from the IV and compute $CTR_1 = CTR_0 + 1$
- 2. Compute ciphertext: $y_i = e_k(\text{CTR}_i) \bigoplus x_i, i \ge 1$

Galois Counter Mode (GCM) (4)



For authentication

- · Protects authenticity of the plaintexts and the string additional authenticated data (AAD)
- · AAD is in clear (without encryption)
- · AAD may include addresses and parameters in a network protocols



Galois Counter Mode (GCM) (5)




For authentication

- · A chained Galois field multiplication is performed
- For every plaintext an intermediate authentication parameter g_i is derived
 - g, is computed as the XOR of the current ciphertext and the last g_{i-1} , and multiplied by the constant H
 - H is generated by encryption of the zero input with the block
- All multiplications are in the 128bit Galois field GF(2128)

Galois Counter Mode (GCM) (6)





- 1. Generate authentication subkey $H = e_k(0)$ 2. Compute $g_0 = AAD \times H$ (Galois field multiplication) 3. Compute $g_i = (g_{i-1} \oplus y_i) \times H$, $1 \le i \le n$ (Galois field multiplication)
- 4. Final authentication tag: $T = (g_n \times H) \oplus e_k(CTR_0)$

Galois Counter Mode (GCM) (7)



- Sender send the packet [(y₁, y₂, ..., y_n), T, AAD]
- Receiver
 - Decrypts (y₁, y₂, ..., y_n) by also using the counter mode
 - Checks the authenticity of data by computing an authentication tag T' with (y₁, y₂, ..., y_n) and AAD, which is exactly the same as the method used by sender
 - If T' = T, it was not manipulated

