
#### **Interdomain Routing**



#### **AS Numbers (ASNs)**

ASNs are 16 bit values. 64512 through 65535 are "private"

#### Currently around 30,000 in use.

• Level 3: 1

• MIT: 3

Harvard: 11

• Yale: 29

• Princeton: 88

• AT&T: 7018, 6341, 5074, ...

• UUNET: 701, 702, 284, 12199, ...

• Sprint: 1239, 1240, 6211, 6242, ...

• ...

ASNs represent units of routing policy

### **Challenges for Interdomain Routing**

Scale

- Prefixes: 250,000, and growing

- ASes: 30,000, and growing

- Routers: at least in the millions...

Privacy

ASes don't want to divulge internal topologies

- ... or their business relationships with neighbors

Policy

- No Internet-wide notion of a link cost metric

- Need control over where you send traffic

- ... and who can send traffic through you

### **Policy-Based Path-Vector Routing**

#### **Path-Vector Routing**


- · Extension of distance-vector routing
  - Support flexible routing policies
  - Reduce convergence time (avoid count-to-infinity)
- · Key idea: advertise the entire path
  - Distance vector: send distance metric per dest d
  - Path vector: send the entire path for each dest d




# Faster Loop Detection Node can easily detect a loop Look for its own node identifier in the path E.g., node 1 sees itself in the path "3, 2, 1" Node can simply discard paths with loops E.g., node 1 simply discards the advertisement "d: path (2,1)" "d: path (3,2,1)"

#### **Flexible Policies**


- · Each node can apply local policies
  - Path selection: Which path to use?
  - Path export: Whether to advertise the path?
- Examples
  - Node 2 may prefer the path "2, 3, 1" over "2, 1"  $\,$
  - Node 1 may not let node 3 hear the path "1, 2"






#### **Border Gateway Protocol**

- Prefix-based path-vector protocol
- · Policy-based routing based on AS Paths
- Evolved during the past 18 years
  - 1989 : BGP-1 [RFC 1105], replacement for EGP
  - 1990 : BGP-2 [RFC 1163]
  - 1991 : BGP-3 [RFC 1267]
  - 1995 : BGP-4 [RFC 1771], support for CIDR
  - · 2006 : BGP-4 [RFC 4271], update




#### **Incremental Protocol**

- A node learns multiple paths to destination
  - Stores all of the routes in a routing table
  - Applies policy to select a single active route
  - ... and may advertise the route to its neighbors
- · Incremental updates
  - Announcement
    - Upon selecting a new active route, add node id to path
    - ... and (optionally) advertise to each neighbor
  - Withdrawal
    - · If the active route is no longer available
    - send a withdrawal message to the neighbors




#### **BGP Policy: Applying Policy to Routes**

- · Import policy
  - Filter unwanted routes from neighbor
    - E.g. prefix that your customer doesn't own
  - Manipulate attributes to influence path selection
    - E.g., assign local preference to favored routes
- · Export policy
  - Filter routes you don't want to tell your neighbor
    - E.g., don't tell a peer a route learned from other
  - Manipulate attributes to control what they see
    - E.g., make a path look artificially longer than it is




#### **Import Policy: Local Preference**

- · Favor one path over another
  - Override the influence of AS path length
  - Apply local policies to prefer a path



- Import Policy: FilteringDiscard some route announcements
  - Detect configuration mistakes and attacks
- · Examples on session to a customer
  - Discard route if prefix not owned by the customer
  - Discard route that contains other large ISP in AS path




#### **Export Policy: Filtering**

- · Discard some route announcements
  - Limit propagation of routing information
- Examples
  - Don't announce routes from one peer to another




#### **Export Policy: Filtering**

- · Discard some route announcements
  - Limit propagation of routing information
- Examples
  - Don't announce routes for network-management hosts or the underlying routers themselves




#### **Export Policy: Attribute Manipulation**


- · Modify attributes of the active route
  - To influence the way other ASes behave
- · Example: AS prepending
  - Artificially inflate the AS path length seen by others
  - To convince some ASe Send traffic another way





#### **BGP Policy Configuration**

- Routing policy languages are vendor-specific
  - Not part of the BGP protocol specification
  - Different languages for Cisco, Juniper, etc.
- · Still, all languages have some key features
  - Policy as a list of clauses
  - Each clause matches on route attributes
  - ... and either discards or modifies matching routes
- · Configuration often done by human operators
  - Implementing the policies of their AS
  - Biz relationships, traffic engineering, security, ...









#### **Routing Attributes and Route Selection**

BGP routes have the following attributes, on which the route selection process is based:

- Local preference: numerical value assigned by routing policy. Higher values are more preferred.
- AS path length: number of AS-level hops in the path
- Multiple exit discriminator ("MED"): allows one AS to specify that one exit point is more preferred than another. Lower values are more preferred.
- Shortest IGP path cost to next hop: implements "hot potato" routing
- Router ID tiebreak: arbitrary tiebreak, since only a single "best" route can be selected

**Other BGP Attributes** 




- **Next-hop:** IP address to send packets en route to destination.
- Community value: Semantically meaningless. Used for passing around "signals" and labeling routes. More in a bit.

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## Higher local pref Primary Destination Lower local pref


- · Control over outbound traffic
- Not transitive across ASes
- Coarse hammer to implement route preference
- Useful for preferring routes from one AS over another (e.g., primary-backup semantics)


#### **Communities and Local Preference**



- · Customer expresses provider that a link is a backup
- · Affords some control over inbound traffic
- · More on multihoming, traffic engineering

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#### **Multi-Exit Discriminator (MED)**

- Hint to external neighbors about the preferred path into an AS
  - Non-transitive attribute
  - Different AS choose different scales
- Used when two AS's connect to each other in more than one place

Multiple Exit Discriminator (MED)


San Francisco

New York


MED: 20


Los Angeles

• Mechanism for AS to control how traffic enters, given multiple possible entry points.




# MED MED is typically used in provider/subscriber scenarios It can lead to unfairness if used between ISP because it may force one ISP to carry more traffic: ISP1 ISP2 ISP1 ignores MED from ISP2 ISP2 obeys MED from ISP1 ISP2 ends up carrying traffic most of the way






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


## Convergence Security Too easy to "steal" IP address space http://www.renesys.com/blog/2006/01/coned\_steals\_the\_net.shtml Regular examples of suspicious activity (see Internet Alert Registry) Hard to check veracity of information (e.g., AS path) Can't tell where data traffic is actually going to go Broken business models "Depeering" and degraded connectivity: universal connectivity depends on cooperation. No guarantees!

· Policy interactions

Oscillations





#### The Business Game and Depeering

- · Cooperative competition (brinksmanship)
- Much more desirable to have your peer's customers
  - Much nicer to get paid for transit
- · Peering "tiffs" are relatively common

31 Jul 2005: Level 3 Notifies Cogent of intent to disconnect.
16 Aug 2005: Cogent begins massive sales effort and mentions a 15 Sept. expected depeering date.
31 Aug 2005: Level 3 Notifies Cogent again of intent to disconnect (according to Level 3)
5 Oct 2005 9:50 UTC: Level 3 disconnects Cogent. Mass

5 Oct 2005 9:50 UTC: Level 3 disconnects Cogent. Mas hysteria ensues up to, and including policymakers in Washington, D.C.

7 Oct 2005: Level 3 reconnects Cogent

During the "outage", Level 3 and Cogent's singly homed customers could not reach each other. (~ 4% of the Internet's prefixes were isolated from each other)

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#### **Depering Continued**

#### Resolution...

Level 3 and Cogent Reach Agreement on Equitable Peering Terms

BROOMFELD, Colo, and WASSHNITOR, Cot. 28 /PDNewwineFestCaW — Lavel 3 Communications (Neindes) (ALT - News) and Copart Communications (Ares: COT - News) to though amounted that it compones to the agreed on times to continue to a schaping internal amongs and the compones to the agreed on times to continue to a schaping internal amongs and the compones to the continued as schaping of studies between the box companies? restricted, and includes commitments from each plury with respect to the characteristics an volume of traffic to be exchanged. Under the terms of the agreement, the companies have volume of traffic to the exchanged continued as companies to the volume of traffic to the exchanged continued as volume of traffic to the exchanged continued as volume of traffic to the exchanged continued as volume of traffic to the exchanged continued to volume of traffic to the exchanged continued to volume of traffic to the companies to volume of traffic to the companies to volume of traffic to the companies to volume of traffic to volume of traffic to volume of the companies to volume of traffic to volume of the companies to volume of traffic to volume of the companies to volume of traffic to volume of the companies to volume of traffic to volume of the companies to volume of traffic to volume of the companies to volume of traffic to volume of the companies to volume of traffic to volume of the companies to volume of traffic to volume of traffic to volume of traffic to volume of the volume of volume of traffic to volume of the volume of v

#### ...but not before an attempt to steal customers!

As of 5:30 am EDT, October 5th, Level(3) terminated peering with Cogent without cause (as permitted under its peering agreement with Cogent) even though both Cogent and Level(3) remained in full compliance with the previously existing interconnection agreement. Cogent has left the peering circuits open in the hope that Level(3) will change its mind and allow traffic to be exchanged between our networks. We are extending a special offering to single homed Level 3 customers.

Cogent will offer any Level 3 oustomer, who is single homed to the Level 3 network on the date of this notice, one year of full Internet transit free of charge at the same bandwidth currently being supplied by Level 3. Cogent will provide this connectivity in over 1,000 locations throughout North America and Europe.

#### **General Problems with BGP**

#### Security

- Too easy to "steal" IP address space
  - Happened again just yesterday
  - http://www.renesys.com/blog/2006/01/coned\_steals\_the\_net.shtml
- Hard to check veracity of information (e.g., AS path)
- Can't tell where data traffic is actually going to go


#### · Broken business models

 "Depeering" and degraded connectivity: universal connectivity depends on cooperation. No guarantees!

#### Policy interactions

Oscillations

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#### **Strawman: Global Policy Check**

- Require each AS to publish its policies
- · Detect and resolve conflicts

#### **Problems:**

- · ASes typically unwilling to reveal policies
- Checking for convergence is NP-complete
- · Failures may still cause oscillations

. .

#### **Think Globally, Act Locally**

- · Key features of a good solution
  - Safety: guaranteed convergence
  - Expressiveness: allow diverse policies for each AS
  - Autonomy: do not require revelation/coordination
  - Backwards-compatibility: no changes to BGP
- Local restrictions on configuration semantics
  - Ranking
  - Filtering

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