

#### Set-UID

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http://www.cis.syr.edu/~wedu/seed/

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#### SET-UID

- A process has three IDs
  - Real user ID, effective user ID, saved user ID
  - Real user ID: the real owner of the process
  - Effective user ID: the ID used for access control

```
$ cp /bin/id ./myid
$ sudo chown root myid
$ ./myid
uid=1000(seed) gid=1000(seed) groups=1000(seed), ...
```



#### SET-UID

We can use chmod to set UID for a program

```
$ sudo chmod 4755 myid
$ ./myid
uid=1000(seed) gid=1000(seed) euid=0(root) ...
```



### How SET-UID Program Works

A normal program cannot access /etc/shadow file


```
$ cp /bin/cat ./mycat
$ sudo chown root mycat
$ ls -l mycat
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root seed 46764 Feb 22 10:04 mycat
$ ./mycat /etc/shadow
./mycat: /etc/shadow: Permission denied
```

A Set-UID program can

```
$ sudo chmod 4755 mycat
$ ./mycat /etc/shadow
root:$6$012BPz.K$fbPkT6H6Db4/B8c...
daemon:*:15749:0:99999:7:::
```



## Attack Surface SET-UID Program





## User Inputs & System Inputs

- Buffer overflow of user inputs
  - We have discussed in previous class
- Program can get inputs from the system
  - Read a file -> symbolic link
    - Make /tmp/xyz -> /etc/shadow : race condition



#### Environments

We will discuss later



Unsafe way: System() function

```
system - execute a shell command

SYNOPSIS top

#include <stdlib.h>
int system(const char *command);
```

#### **DESCRIPTION** top

The **system**() library function uses fork(2) to create a child process that executes the shell command specified in *command* using execl(3) as follows:

```
execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", command, (char *) NULL);
```



- Unsafe way: System() function
  - Why? System uses /bin/sh to execute commands too powerful

```
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 char *cat="/bin/cat";
 if(argc < 2) {
   printf("Please type a file name.\n");
   return 1;
 }
 char *command = malloc(strlen(cat) + strlen(argv[1]) + 2);
 sprintf(command, "%s %s", cat, argv[1]);
 system(command);
 return 0 ;
```



```
$ gcc -o catall catall.c
$ sudo chown root catall
$ sudo chmod 4755 catall
$ ls -l catall
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root seed 7275 Feb 23 09:41 catall
$ catall /etc/shadow
root:$6$012BPz.K$fbPkT6H6Db4/B8cLWb....
daemon:*:15749:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:15749:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:15749:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:15749:0:99999:7:::
games:*:15749:0:99999:7:::
$ catall "aa;/bin/sh"
/bin/cat: aa: No such file or directory
         ← 得到了 root 权限的 shell!
# id
uid=1000(seed) gid=1000(seed) euid=0(root) groups=0(root), ...
```



Safe way: execve() function

#### **DESCRIPTION** top

execve() executes the program referred to by *pathname*. This causes the program that is currently being run by the calling process to be replaced with a new program, with newly initialized stack, heap, and (initialized and uninitialized) data segments.

pathname must be either a binary executable, or a script starting with a line of the form:

```
#! interpreter [optional-arg]
```



Safe way: execve() function

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 char *v[3];
 if(argc < 2) {
   printf("Please type a file name.\n");
   return 1;
 }
 v[0] = "/bin/cat"; v[1] = argv[1]; v[2] = 0;
 execve(v[0], v, 0);
 return 0;
```



All the inputs will be treated as arguments!

```
$ gcc -o safecatall safecatall.c
$ sudo chown root safecatall
$ sudo chmod 4755 safecatall
$ safecatall /etc/shadow
root:$6$012BPz.K$fbPkT6H6Db4/B8cLWb....
daemon:*:15749:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:15749:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:15749:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:15749:0:99999:7:::
games:*:15749:0:99999:7:::
$ safecatall "aa;/bin/sh"
/bin/cat: aa;/bin/sh: No such file or directory
                                                   ← Attack failed!
```