


Joint Publication 3-53



Joint Military Information Support Operations



11 October 2024



PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance to plan, execute, and assess military information support operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces of the United States in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the achievement of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, the National Guard Bureau, and combat support agencies.

b. This doctrine constitutes official advice concerning the enclosed subject matter; however, the judgment of the commander is paramount in all situations.

c. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication takes precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance, or the Secretary of Defense has directed otherwise. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States unless they conflict with

this guidance. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with United States law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



DAGVIN R.M. ANDERSON
Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force
Director for Joint Force Development

**SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JP 3-13.2
DATED 21 NOVEMBER 2014**

- **Changes nomenclature from Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.2 to JP 3-53 and retitles as *Joint Military Information Support Operations*.**
- **Reflects changes to align with joint doctrine capstone, keystone, and core publications, specifically the competition continuum, joint campaigns and operations, joint planning, information joint function, and information integration.**
- **Adds clarity to considerations for military information support operations (MISO) authorities.**
- **Updates roles and responsibilities to address MISO in joint special operations forces, joint force, and interagency environments.**
- **Expands joint MISO planning and planner's responsibility and integration with operations in the information environment.**
- **Updates and merges enablers with MISO planning.**
- **Adds more detailed discussion on MISO seven-phase process.**
- **Adds Chapter V, "The Future of Military Information Support Operations."**
- **Adds appendices to address MISO Internet activities, assessment, MISO estimates, interagency coordination and concurrence, and terminology for congressional reporting requirements.**
- **Deletes command and control chapter and information specific to the Services' capabilities.**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- Discusses military information support operations across the competition continuum and the future operational environment
- Provides key considerations for effective military information support operations
- Describes roles, responsibilities, and relationships to plan, execute, and assess military information support operations
- Examines joint planning and military information support operations planning considerations
- Presents the military information support operations seven-phase process of planning; target audience analysis; series development; product development and design; approval; production, distribution, and dissemination; and assessment

Overview

Introduction

Military information support operations (MISO) are **planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objective.** Combatant commanders (CCDRs), joint force commanders (JFCs), and joint task force commanders use MISO to influence foreign audiences' policy, decisions, ability to govern, ability to command, will to fight, will to comply, and will to support.

General

The information environment (IE) is complex and fluid. Friendly, neutral, hostile, and unknown entities use information to inform and influence a broad range of audiences' perceptions of local, regional, and world events, including United States Government (USG) activities. The net result may adversely influence neutral and undecided audiences, boost support of those who oppose the United States and its allies, and undermine those who would support the United States and its allies and partners.

Service organizations that are trained and equipped to conduct MISO rely on the MISO process to affect the behavior of target audiences (TAs). A TA is an individual or group selected for influence. In the context of MISO, TAs are always foreign governments, organizations, groups, or individuals.

***Statutory, Policy, Execution,
and Budgetary Authority
Considerations***

MISO are conducted in accordance with applicable United States (US) law, regulations, Department of Defense (DoD) policy, applicable international agreements, treaty law, and customary international law that are binding on the United States. There are four distinct types of authority relevant to MISO: statutory, policy, execution, and budgetary. The JFC's staff judge advocate advises the JFC and staff on legal authority and constraints on all operations. Planners should consider the following specific legal issues during planning and execution:

- The authority and permission to communicate the messages and execute actions that support approved MISO programs.
- Compliance with US copyright law and other statutes and regulations.
- Compliance with international law, such as The Hague Conventions, which prohibits treachery or perfidy.
- International agreements with host nations (HNs) (e.g., status-of-forces agreements) may limit information activities.

***Military Information
Support Operations Across
the Competition Continuum***

The joint force campaigns and operates across the competition continuum to create the conditions to achieve US objectives. Campaigning is often a long-term endeavor. MISO can enhance JFCs' efforts to deepen ties with a partner or impose costs so that the competitor's short-term success becomes their long-term loss. During campaigns and operations, the JFC is likely to cooperate with allies and partners, compete against adversaries, and fight enemies concurrently in the same operational environment (OE). MISO provide the President, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), JFCs, and, when directed, chiefs of mission with an information capability to compete in a contested OE.

***Key Considerations for
Effective Military
Information Support
Operations***

- Early planning and sustained employment
- Unified action and MISO
- Use of non-DoD assets
- Utilizing existing networks
- Command emphasis and resourcing
- Intelligence gain and loss estimates
- Responsive series approval process
- Assessment
- Dissemination options and means

Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships

Roles and Responsibilities

SecDef:

- Approves all MISO programs submitted as stand-alone MISO programs or part of a combatant command campaign plan (CCP) or operation plan (OPLAN).
- Provides execution authority through execute orders (EXORDs) and deployment orders.
- Through an EXORD, delegates MISO series and product approval to the appropriate level for operational and tactical operations.

Secretaries of the Military Departments. In accordance with DoD Directive 5100.01, *Functions of the DoD and Its Major Components*, organize, train, and equip forces to contribute unique Service capabilities to the JFC to conduct MISO throughout the OE.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

- Serves as the senior military advisor to SecDef on MISO matters.
- Provides advice, information, support, and guidance on policy and issues pertaining to North Atlantic Treaty Organization psychological operations (PSYOP). Represents the United States at North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other multinational regional PSYOP or MISO fora.

CCDRs:

- Develop MISO and conduct MISO in support of CCPs. These programs may be either a (MISO tab) part of a CCP developed for SecDef approval.
- Coordinate and deconflict transregional MISO with all commanders where effects could reasonably cross within their area of responsibility (AOR). CCDRs hold the risk for all military operations within their AOR, and are consulted prior to the execution of MISO that could impact their operating environment.
- Coordinate MISO plans and activities with all appropriate members of the US country team, and as appropriate, the Department of State regional bureaus for each country where a TA can be reasonably expected to be affected.

Commander, United States Special Operations Command is the joint proponent for MISO and responsible for leading the collaborative development, coordination, and integration of MISO across DoD.

Commander, United States Cyber Command, in addition to responsibilities assigned to CCDRs:

- Provides cyberspace operations (CO) support and access to cyberspace capabilities to support MISO.
- Provides measures of performance related to cyberspace-enabled delivery and dissemination capabilities for MISO and reactions and behavioral changes, observable in cyberspace.

Military Departments and Services. When directed by SecDef, provide global force management of forces to support the MISO plans, programs, and activities of the combatant commands (CCMDs) and other USG departments and agencies.

Relationships

Because public affairs (PA) and MISO are distinct capabilities, commanders should ensure that there is a general compatibility of messages within the broader communication effort. To this end, **it is critical that all public DoD information activities are conducted in a manner that reinforces the credibility and legitimacy of DoD and USG activities.**

Communication synchronization consists of a focused USG effort to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, and series synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.

Operations in the information environment (OIE) are military actions involving the integrated employment of multiple information forces (e.g., forces that conduct MISO, civil-military operations, PA, electromagnetic spectrum operations, CO, and space operations) to affect drivers of behavior by informing audiences; influencing relevant actors; attacking and exploiting relevant actor information, information networks, and information systems; and protecting friendly information, information networks, and information systems. JFCs integrate OIE into operations, as main or supporting efforts, or conduct OIE as a stand-alone effort.

MISO and CO. Cyberspace capabilities are key enablers for MISO access and dissemination, target development, and delivery of MISO products. Defensive CO are essential for protection of information sources and are a key element of CCMD operations security. Offensive CO are rarely conducted unilaterally and often are an enabling action within an overall OIE plan, or the main effort of a concept of operations (CONOPS) where MISO are a supporting effort. Coordination and deconfliction in cyberspace enhance both CO and MISO.

MISO and Civil Affairs. Civil affairs are actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness of, and manage the interaction with, the civil component of the OE; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government.

MISO and Space Operations. Space operations are those operations impacting or directly utilizing space- and ground-based capabilities to enhance the potential of the United States and multinational partners.

MISO and Deception Activities. Deception activities are actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.

MISO and PA. PA are communication activities with US and foreign audiences. MISO TAs and PA foreign audiences are often the same and may be reached through different ways and means to achieve the same objective.

Planning

Joint Planning

MISO planning begins at the CCMD with integration of MISO into campaign and contingency plans regardless of the level of detail (commander's estimate, base plan, concept plan, OPLAN). MISO planners develop and later integrate MISO and supporting activities into CCPs, contingency plans, crisis plans, theater campaign orders, and ongoing operations and exercises; participate in plans to preempt malign influence efforts; support the planning and execution of the information joint function; staff and obtain approval of MISO program and series; and identify required information forces, OIE unit capabilities, and requests for forces.

MISO planning identifies desired behavioral changes and objectives, along with the specific messages and actions to affect those changes. In planning MISO, the following terms are used:

MISO Program. A program is Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-approved per OSD policies that provide the parameters for the conduct of MISO.

MISO Plan. Any CCMD executing MISO under an approved program develops a MISO plan, further refining the delegated authority.

MISO Objective. MISO objectives are usually broad in scope. They are approved per OSD policies.

Supporting MISO Objective. Supporting MISO objectives are specific observable and measurable

behavioral responses desired from the TA to accomplish a given MISO objective.

MISO Series. A series contains all actions and products developed in support of the combination of a single supporting MISO objective and a single TA.

TA. A TA is an individual or group selected for influence.

Attribution. Attribution is the ability to identify the source of an action or a message—either determinatively or through plausible inference.

MISO planners participate in the joint planning process (JPP). They collaborate with the staff to develop and plan activities that leverage the influence of joint force operations.

Throughout the JPP steps, MISO tasks that may occur in joint campaigns and operations include:

- US and friendly focused efforts
- Competitor, adversary, and enemy focused efforts
- Population and HN focused efforts

Planning Considerations

MISO are executed under an approved program and are subject to the MISO review and approval process. To maximize support and ensure continuity of operations, programs are best when centrally planned, developed, and approved. To amplify effectiveness, however, the execution for MISO is best when decentralized. MISO planning, program approval, authorities, and execution timeliness are crucial to improve the chances for success. Therefore, to maximize agility and maintain localized impacts the MISO series should be approved at the lowest authorized level.

Cooperation: Military Engagement, Security Cooperation (SC), and Humanitarian Assistance. MISO are always conducted in accordance with applicable law and policy documents, and approved programs. MISO conducted in support of other USG departments and agencies require interagency coordination. Activities that can be applied to meet military engagement, SC, and deterrence objectives and can employ MISO include foreign internal defense

(FID), security force assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, antiterrorism, DoD support to counterdrug operations, show of force operations, and arms control.

Competition: Adversarial and Strategic Competition. US strategic rivals seek leverage and influence over other nations and geographic regions in pursuit of economic, diplomatic, or military advantage. Most adversaries endeavor to avoid war with the United States and our allies to advance their objectives and instead focus on competition below the level of armed conflict to include legitimate methods such as economic agreements and public diplomacy as well as illegitimate methods such as promoting instability and coercion of political institutions. The associated general strategic and operational objectives are to protect US interests or deter escalation toward conflict. MISO programs support US strategic goals and objectives by degrading an adversary's influence and imposing costs on adversary actions.

Conflict and War: Major Operations and Campaigns. When required, the US national leadership may direct a major operation or campaign involving large-scale combat. In such cases, the general goals are to compel the enemy as quickly as possible; conclude hostilities; and establish conditions favorable to the HN, allies, the United States, and its multinational partners. MISO contribute to the establishment of these conditions by influencing TAs' attitudes, values, beliefs, and behavior in a manner favorable to US objectives.

Interagency Coordination Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military instrument of national power and the economic, diplomatic, and informational instruments of national power, as well as the efforts of nongovernmental organizations and international organizations.

Support of Irregular Warfare

MISO and Irregular Warfare (IW). IW operations and activities include MISO, unconventional warfare, FID, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stabilization activities (in the context of IW, establishing or re-establishing order in a fragile state or territory), countering threat networks (includes counter threat finance and counter transnational organized crime), civil affairs operations, and military engagement activities

(SC, civil-military operations). The joint force conducts IW operations and activities as part of integrated campaigns to achieve favorable strategic outcomes in pursuit of US national interests.

Support of Armed Conflict

Whether categorized as crisis response, limited contingency operations, or large-scale combat operations, the general strategic and operational objectives that MISO support include:

- Preventing further conflict.
- Preventing surprise attack.
- Protecting US interests.

The JFC's MISO planners conduct analysis of the human, informational, and physical aspects of the environment to understand and account for the impact of relevant populations on operations. The JFC's MISO planners account for the blending of the two types of warfare in JPP outputs including programs, estimates, tabs, and orders.

Plan for Enablers

Intelligence. PSYOP personnel require an in-depth understanding of the behavior of select TAs and their behavioral motivation. Intelligence analysis, capabilities, and processes are necessary for gaining an appreciation of those aspects of the OE that can affect TA behavior.

Network Analysis. Network analysis can provide a better understanding of the audience, increasing the likelihood of successfully influencing them. Network analysis can provide a method to visualize, measure, and understand the TA, which can aid analysts in crafting effective strategies.

Logistics. MISO execution during sustained operations requires logistics support. The CCMD or appropriate Service component staff integrates logistics support into planning.

Military Information Support Operations Process

General

The MISO process consists of seven phases: **planning; target audience analysis (TAA); series development; product development and design; approval;**

production, distribution, and dissemination; and assessment.

MISO are continuously analyzed, assessed, and refined, based on the changing OE and IE. Throughout the seven-phase MISO process, MISO planners continuously conduct four primary tasks: analyze, advise, plan, and assess.

Phase I: Planning

The goal of planning is to integrate MISO, and all DoD influence activities, into the commander's vision and CONOPS. Programs initiate as a result of the first phase of the seven-phase MISO process. The executing element leverages approved MISO programs which continue through subsequent phases. PSYOP staff planners adjust the plan, as required, to achieve the commander's objectives.

Phase II: Target Audience Analysis

During TAA, planners analyze approved groups and individuals by following the TAA model. Accurate and meaningful TAA requires research and in-depth analysis of large amounts of information coupled with language and sociocultural knowledge at native or near-native level. Much of the data required to initiate and complete a thorough analysis derives from the supported commander's collection efforts, to include publicly available information.

Phase III: Series Development

In developing series, MISO planners design multiple actions and products, determine the appropriate types and mix of delivery means, and develop an execution plan. **Each series focuses on a single supporting MISO objective and a single TA combination.** The size (number of products or actions) of the series is determined by what is required to change the behavior of the TA.

Phase IV: Product Development and Design

The work completed during the planning, TAA, and series development phases is vital for devising effective psychological actions (PSYACTs) and designing individual products in a series. There are three basic categories of products: visual, audio, and audiovisual.

Phase V: Approval

During phase V, PSYOP officers and noncommissioned officers evaluate the potential of the series to achieve the desired objective and the continuity of messages and media. The potential for any collateral effects, exposure

to unintended audiences, or other unintended consequences is also evaluated. Once the designated PSYOP officer approves, developers submit the series package to obtain approval for production and execution.

Phase VI: Production, Distribution, and Dissemination

Phase VI consists of the production, distribution, and dissemination of products and PSYACTs in a series and the subsequent post-testing of these products. The approved series helps guide PSYOP leaders in the establishment of priority for products production.

Phase VII: Assessment

Assessment is the process for evaluating the achievement of supporting MISO objectives and for assessing the overall impact of a series on TA behavior. Assessing the effects of messages and actions relies on impact indicators and analyses produced in earlier phases.

PSYOP personnel assess MISO effectiveness within the context of competing information and influence efforts, spontaneous events, and other uncontrollable environmental and psychological factors that shape behavior. Unanticipated and spontaneous events can potentially influence a group's behavior and contribute to or undermine objective accomplishment.

The Future of Military Information Support Operations

Anticipation, Technology, and Force Development

The joint force faces revolutionary technologies that will impact how militaries use information and change the character of war. These changes impact, accelerate, and expand requirements so that JFCs will have to consider how these fundamental shifts affect their concepts of operations to meet the challenge of the expanding OE.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance to plan, execute, and assess MISO.

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CHAPTER I OVERVIEW

“Modern war has become a struggle for men’s minds as well as for their bodies.”

Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, United States Army, 1944-1953

1. Introduction

a. Military information support operations (MISO) are **planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objective.** Combatant commanders (CCDRs), joint force commanders (JFCs), and joint task force (JTF) commanders use MISO to influence foreign audiences’ policy, decisions, ability to govern, ability to command, will to fight, will to comply, and will to support. CCDRs should consider and integrate MISO with campaign plans and subordinate operations. MISO can be a critical capability for a commander to employ informational power to gain and maintain an information advantage.

b. MISO, as part of operations in the information environment (OIE) or as stand-alone operations, are coordinated with other United States Government (USG) departments and agencies by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict to ensure USG communications and actions share a consistent narrative and are conducted in a manner that supports the credibility and legitimacy of the United States and its allies and partners. The Department of State (DOS) is the USG’s lead for implementing the nation’s foreign policy. DOS establishes the primary narrative and tenor for formal USG messaging through its public diplomacy and public affairs (PA) activities, which are truthful, timely, accurate, and attributable. MISO are integrated with the chief of mission’s (COM’s) activities who is usually the United States (US) ambassador, and CCDR’s priorities and objectives to shape the operational environment (OE).

c. JFCs use the joint functions to synchronize, integrate, and direct joint operations. The information joint function is the management and application of information to change or maintain perceptions, attitudes, and other drivers of behavior and to support human and automated decision making; and consists of the intellectual organization of the following tasks required to use information during operations: understand how information impacts the OE, support human and automated decision making, and leverage information. JFCs conduct OIE, which deliberately leverages information in planning of operations and activities.

d. OIE are military actions involving the integrated employment of multiple information forces to affect drivers of behavior by informing audiences, influencing relevant actors, attacking and exploiting relevant actor information and information

systems, and protecting friendly information. MISO, along with other information activities such as civil-military operations (CMO), PA, cyberspace operations (CO), operations security (OPSEC), deception activities, and the integration of the inherent informational aspect of operations, provide the ways and means to influence relevant actors.

e. Those Service-provided organizations that are trained and equipped to conduct MISO are referred to as psychological operations (PSYOP) units. In the context of this joint publication (JP), PSYOP forces include all MISO-capable forces.

2. General

a. The information environment (IE) is complex and fluid. Friendly, neutral, hostile, and unknown entities use information to inform and influence a broad range of audiences' perceptions of local, regional, and world events, including USG activities. The net result may adversely influence neutral and undecided audiences, boost support of those who oppose the United States and its allies, and undermine those who would support the United States and its allies and partners. While these activities do not necessarily have to be coordinated and synchronized, their frequency and volume ensure the information is available for discovery by any audience. The USG integrates and synchronizes the instruments of national power, based on a common narrative, to achieve national strategic objectives. As the military instrument of national power, the Department of Defense (DoD) communicates strategically with internal and external audiences and aligns its actions with those communications. MISO provide CCDRs a means to support the intended ends of the USG's use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. CCDRs integrate and synchronize MISO with broader USG policy and strategy to ensure that they support and achieve USG objectives.

See Chapter II, "Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships," for additional clarification of DoD information activities.

b. Service organizations that are trained and equipped to conduct MISO rely on the MISO process to affect the behavior of target audiences (TAs). A TA is an individual or group selected for influence. In the context of MISO, TAs are always foreign governments, organizations, groups, or individuals. When Service information forces are brought together to form a joint functional component command or other task-organized formation in support of a CCDR or other JFC, the MISO process provides the set of linked activities to be accomplished. The process phases support operational art and align with operational design. The process consists of seven phases: planning; target audience analysis (TAA); series development; product development and design; approval; production, distribution, and dissemination; and assessment. See Chapter IV, "Military Information Support Operations Process," for details on the process.

c. MISO can contribute to the success of campaigns by using information to influence at the global and local level, garnering global support for US and partner efforts, building trust and addressing concerns for legitimacy, and influencing local opinion against the

adversary and countering its propaganda. Integration of MISO into campaigns facilitates iterative and repeatable messaging and counter-messaging and across combatant commands (CCMDs), interorganizational, and multinational coordination to leverage influence against the adversary.

(1) CCDRs integrate MISO into campaign plans as unilateral operations, as the main effort of OIE, as an integrated effort in OIE, or to support other operations. To achieve behavioral objectives, CCDRs conduct a range of activities, including military engagement, security cooperation (SC), crisis response (as a branch or sequel in the combatant command campaign plan [CCP]), deterrence, and compellence. While the primary military objective is constrained to a single TA, the range of activities occur with, through, and to a variety of actors in different geographical areas, as the means to influence a TA is not constrained geographically. MISO provide a bridge between all of these activities by supporting, amplifying, and consolidating their effects incrementally until the ultimate objective is reached.

(2) As CCDRs execute and modify campaign plans, they do so, whether as a stated objective or not, with the goal of achieving influence with the relevant actors in their area of responsibility (AOR). Influence is one of the four core elements of competition and is necessary to achieve and leverage advantages. Through global campaign plans, CCDRs help the USG accumulate influence with other nations. CCDRs frame their campaign plan objectives against the strategic relationships described in the competition continuum, and MISO-capable and other information forces contribute to the understanding and shaping of these relationships. The information joint function provides the intellectual framework to aid commanders in exerting influence; setting conditions to avoid armed conflict and ensuring the joint force postures to respond to adversary actions and execute operations. MISO are ongoing in every theater, supporting campaign plans by accumulating and wielding influence to affect foreign TA behavior and achieve objectives and enduring outcomes. Campaign plans account for simultaneous interaction with the same strategic actor at different points along the competition continuum as well as accounting for interaction with all strategic actors that affect US interests in the AOR. Within the element of cooperation, MISO staff planners contribute to the planning and execution of cooperative activities by:

(a) Identifying the conditions JFCs can create within the environment that protect US interests.

(b) Describing the state and character of US relationships with partners.

(c) Forecasting our partners' propensity, likelihood, and capacity to act in a manner aligned with our interests.

(d) Describing allies' and partners' issues, goals, influence, vulnerabilities, and opportunities relative to specific situations and actors.

(e) Communicating other USG departments' and agencies' interests, objectives, and priorities with respect to the specific circumstance.

(f) Analyzing how the joint force can apply existing authorities and resources to the specific area and issue.

(g) Identifying gaps in authorities and resources and recommending solutions.

(3) In adversarial competition, MISO planners support the CCDR by integrating MISO to prevent hostilities and advocate peaceful resolution. MISO can advance US efforts to deter aggression and shape the OE to mitigate or negate malign influence. MISO can set conditions to prevail in armed conflict, sway neutral actors, and strengthen relationships with partner information activities that influence relevant populations whose access to, possession, or control of significant areas provide either side an operational advantage.

(4) Whether executed as a branch or sequel within a CCP, or as a separate operation or campaign, armed conflict leverages previously consolidated gains to contribute to success. To prevail in armed conflict/war CCDR's MISO planners update MISO objectives and priorities; obtain new authorities and resources as required; recommend task organization of OIE units within the designated joint force; confirm decision points for mobilization of Reserve Component information forces; identify and prioritize targets; ensure MISO are integrated to increase United States combat power; identify strategic risks relative to MISO; integrate MISO to reduce operational risk; and identify how MISO can avoid, reduce, and mitigate collateral damage.

(5) MISO planners facilitate campaigning throughout the transition from armed conflict to competition. They update objectives and priorities for MISO; obtain new authorities and resources as required; identify, update, and prioritize TAs; confirm desired psychological effects; integrate MISO to reduce adversaries' willingness to engage in malign or antagonistic behavior; integrate MISO into transition plans; and update campaign plan objectives.

3. Statutory, Policy, Execution, and Budgetary Authority Considerations

a. MISO are conducted in accordance with applicable US law; regulations; DoD policy; applicable international agreements, treaty law, and customary international law that are binding on the United States. There are four distinct types of authority relevant to MISO: statutory, policy, execution, and budgetary. Figure I-1 provides brief descriptions of these authorities. The JFC's staff judge advocate advises the JFC and staff on legal authority and constraints on all operations. Planners should consider the following specific legal issues during planning and execution:

(1) The authority and permission to communicate the messages and execute actions that support approved MISO programs.

(2) Compliance with US copyright law and other statutes and regulations.




Figure I-1. Four Types of Authorities

(3) Compliance with international law, such as The Hague Conventions, which prohibits treachery or perfidy.

(4) International agreements with host nations (HNs) (e.g., status-of-forces agreements) may limit information activities.

b. Statutory Authority Considerations. Statutory authority is primarily derived from Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 164, which gives the CCDRs the statutory authority to use their forces to accomplish assigned missions, including MISO. MISO, and all traditional military activities, must undergo review by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) legal office. The authority granted to CCDRs in Title 10, USC, Section 164, does not preclude establishment of DoD policy related to specific missions. DoD approval authorities for MISO programs are found in policies such as Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5111.01, *Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))*; DoDD 5111.10, *Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict*; DoDD 5143.01, *Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S))*; and Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 0-3607.02, *Military Information Support Operations (MISO)*.

c. Policy Considerations

(1) All MISO comply with US policies regarding the scope, content, and execution of MISO programs. Executive-level policies reflect US law and provide USG departments and agencies with guidance requiring the coordination of MISO and civil authority information support -related policy, plans, and programs in support of US

national security strategic objectives. Collectively, these policies assign responsibilities, guide MISO planning and execution, and prompt the integration of MISO into military operations and other USG activities.

For more information, see DoDI 0-3607.02, Military Information Support Operations (MISO).

(2) Many different national security policies provide guidance to military leaders and planners. These policies focus on countering issues such as terrorism; trafficking illegal drugs, arms, or humans; and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. When integrated with other US capabilities, MISO help achieve US objectives that address these and other global issues.

(3) Planners prepare and integrate MISO programs during joint planning. Programs may be integrated in a variety of ways; they may be part of joint force or Service component-plans, executed in support of other USG departments' or agencies' operations, global campaign plans integrated into a CCP, or executed independently. Importantly, the existence of an approved program that complies with US policy guidance does not constitute the authority to execute MISO. Approved programs are executed through a deployment order or dictated within the execute order (EXORD) for an operation.

See Chapter III, "Planning," for information on MISO programs.

d. Execution Authority Considerations

(1) Execution authority is derived from the executive branch and held by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). Typically, the authority to execute MISO is granted in a SecDef-signed deployment order. Deployment orders processed by the Joint Staff in SecDef's Orders Book typically reference the policy guidance under which the orders are issued. When SecDef signs a deployment order, this order essentially instructs the PSYOP force to conduct the mission in accordance with the referenced policy authority.

(2) An EXORD may reference a previously approved MISO program (much like a deployment order) or contain program-level details. If an EXORD contains all the program details, it need not reference an overarching program and constitutes sufficient authority to execute the program.

e. Budgetary and Funding Considerations

(1) The authority to fund MISO is derived from an annex to the annual DoD appropriations act. These funds may only be used to conduct MISO. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 enacted the DoD's new approach to MISO budgeting by utilizing a central fund within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

(2) OSD manages centralized MISO funding within DoD and prioritizes the distribution of MISO funds in alignment with DoD priorities per OSD policies.

For more information, see DoDD 5111.01, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)).

(3) CCDRs are responsible for requesting funding for MISO. CCDRs submit their MISO resource request(s) through the Joint Staff J-3 [Operations Directorate] for DoD validation and approval. In addition to staffing these requests through the Joint Staff J-3, CCMDs comply with the following reporting requirements:

(a) Quarterly and annual expenditures to Congress.

(b) Quarterly and annual assessments of progress toward MISO program objective accomplishment.

For more information, see Appendix F, “Example of Requirements for Joint Military Information Support Operations Coordination, Concurrence, and Report to Congress.”

(4) The authority of CCMDs to spend appropriated funds is limited by:

(a) The approved purpose.

(b) The time limits of the appropriation.

(c) The amount distributed to the CCMD.

(5) OSD MISO operations and maintenance funds are typically used to fund operations to compete with peer or near-peer competitors, promote stability and security, shape various regions, position the United States as the trusted partner, promote US commitment to allies and partners, deter/counter malign influence, and degrade violent extremist organizations.

(6) Contingency operations and other activities (e.g., DoD Rewards Program, building partner’s capacity) not traditionally funded by OSD MISO operations and maintenance funds require the CCMD’s judge advocate to analyze the mission authority flowing from (or through) the CCDR and funding authorities to determine the proper funds. These operations and activities may include:

(a) Building and funding multinational partners (build partner capacity [e.g., train and equip], special operations forces training with friendly foreign forces).

(b) DoD aid and assistance to foreign civilians (e.g., humanitarian and civic assistance, demining).

(c) Contingency operations (e.g., DoD Rewards Program, Commander’s Emergency Response Program).

(d) Property disposal activities (e.g., foreign excess personal property, Defense Logistics Agency Disposition Services) with an emphasis on the purpose of the operation or activity.

See Appendix A, “Authority Consideration,” for additional clarification of statutory, policy, execute, and budgetary authority matters.

See Appendix D, “Assessment of Military Information Support Operations,” for details on assessments.

See the Fiscal Law Deskbook 2022, by the Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, for more information on the relationship between mission/operational authority, funding authority, and proper funds to conduct operations and missions.

4. Military Information Support Operations Across the Competition Continuum

a. The joint force campaigns and operates across the competition continuum to create the conditions to achieve US objectives. Campaigning is often a long-term endeavor. MISO can enhance JFCs’ efforts to deepen ties with a partner or impose costs so that the competitor’s short-term success becomes their long-term loss. During campaigns and operations, the JFC is likely to cooperate with allies and partners, compete against adversaries, and fight enemies concurrently in the same OE. MISO provide the President, SecDef, JFCs, and, when directed, COMs with an information capability to compete in a contested OE. Figure I-2 depicts MISO integration across the competition continuum.

b. Cooperation includes mutually beneficial relationships between actors with compatible interests. Although interests are rarely perfectly aligned, cooperative relationships that promote shared security objectives underpin the international order, enhance collective security, help to ensure access to portions of the OE, enable burden-sharing, facilitate adversarial competition, and deter or mitigate armed conflict. Military engagement, SC, and humanitarian assistance enhance collective security and can deter conflict. MISO play an important role during cooperation; MISO enable CCDRs and COMs to shape the OE and help them achieve US objectives. They inform and influence TAs by building trust and confidence, sharing information, coordinating mutual activities, and promoting the United States as the partner of choice in maintaining country and regional security and economic prosperity. MISO should be planned in conjunction with, fully integrated into, and submitted as part of the CCPs or DOS integrated country strategies.

(1) Military engagement is the routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of DoD and those of another nation’s armed forces or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies. The purpose is to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. PSYOP forces routinely engage with foreign partners and allies’ PSYOP forces.




Figure I-2. Competition Continuum

(2) SC is the DoD's interaction with foreign security establishments to build relationships that promote specific US security interest, develop allied and partner military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and partners. A CCDR may conduct MISO to support or reinforce the impact of an SC activity by shaping the IE. Conversely, SC activities may be conducted as part of a larger MISO effort to influence a TA. Through both engagement and development activities, SC and MISO can enhance all joint operations. MISO can amplify security assistance programs funded through DOS, to be administered by DoD, such as counterdrug operations, building partner nations' (PNs') influence capability, and information sharing and collaboration. Other activities can include combined exchange training, subject matter expert exchange, and support to international military training and education programs.

(3) Foreign humanitarian assistance is DoD activity conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. MISO can amplify the effects of military operations, give guidance or reassurance to isolated or disorganized audiences, and project a favorable image of US actions and commitment to other countries.

c. **Competition** exists when two or more state or non-state actors have incompatible interests but neither seeks armed conflict. US competitors and adversaries may use military activity below the violence threshold of armed conflict to secure their interests.

Misinformation refers to inaccurate information that is not intended to cause harm.

Disinformation refers to inaccurate information that is intended to manipulate, cause damage, or guide people, organizations, and countries in the wrong direction.

Adversaries conduct malign activities below the level of direct armed conflict to undermine US influence and pose a threat to US interests without escalating to a conventional military response. In conjunction with its interorganizational partners, the joint force creates competitive opportunities by using military capabilities to probe adversary systems for vulnerabilities; establish behavioral patterns joint forces can exploit to conceal US intentions until it is too late to respond to them effectively; shift the competition to sub-areas that favor US influence, advantages, leverage, and initiative; and divert adversaries' attention and resources to sub-areas of secondary or tertiary importance to the United States. MISO support US, allied, and partners' strategic and operational objectives to deter adversaries from escalating toward conflict. PSYOP forces provide critical capability in strategic and operational competition. While PA is the primary capability employed to counter competitors and adversaries' malign influences, disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda, MISO can be similarly effective, and practitioners should be cautious of being consistently reactionary versus proactive in setting and maintaining the desired narrative. This approach can cede the initiative to the adversary and keep information forces in a perpetual state of reaction. Adversaries can dictate the timing and tempo of how JFCs apply limited MISO resources by developing incendiary disinformation activities, detracting from JFC campaigns. MISO support can include the following:

- (1) Overcoming censorship, illiteracy, or interrupted communication systems.
- (2) Informing and influencing TA in limited access or denied areas.
- (3) Influencing the design of foreign strategy, operations, and tactics.
- (4) Arousing HN/PN public opinion or asserting political pressure against US competitors' or adversaries' operations objectives.
- (5) Countering adversaries' malign information.

d. **Armed conflict/war** occurs when an actor uses lethal force as the primary means to satisfy its interests; it is the sustained application of military force of an intensity, scale, and duration that exceeds the isolated and sporadic use of armed violence. It can be described as situations in which joint or multinational forces take actions against an enemy state or non-state actor in pursuit of policy objectives in which law and policy permit the employment of military forces in ways commonly employed in declared war or hostilities. Armed conflict involves the strategic use of military force and it varies in intensity that ranges from **limited contingency operations to large-scale combat operations**. During

armed conflict, MISO add operational and tactical objectives to strengthen allies and partners, compel enemy actions, and exploit the enemy's information weaknesses.

(1) A **limited contingency operation** can be a single, small-scale, limited-duration operation that may or may not involve combat, or a significant part of a major operation of extended duration. The objectives are to protect US interests and prevent surprise attack or further conflict. Included are operations to ensure the safety of US citizens and interests while maintaining and improving US ability to operate with multinational partners to deter the hostile ambitions of potential aggressors. MISO are employed for success in contingency operations and best positioned when tasked to support in advance of pending crisis or contingency. MISO can magnify the effects of diplomatic activities, military flexible deterrence and response operations, and economic sanctions. To maximize the effectiveness of MISO, they are integrated, coordinated, and synchronized with the other information capabilities, as well as other USG departments and agencies, multinational partners, and international organizations, as part of the JFC's communication synchronization efforts. MISO support JFC's objectives by bolstering PN and US embassy programs and supporting the legitimacy of foreign institutions. Preapproved MISO programs grant policy authority to CCDRs and allow CCDRs the flexibility to rapidly employ MISO in concert with the other joint force capabilities.

See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.05, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan, for additional clarification of authorities and preapproved MISO programs.

(2) **Large-scale combat operations** feature simultaneous balancing of offensive, defensive, and stabilization activities through the course of a joint operation. Military intervention could involve the conduct of major campaigns and operations. Campaigns may be global or theater in nature. A campaign generally involves large-scale combat, but it can also involve limited combat, noncombat, and long-term stabilization activities of extended duration to achieve theater and national objectives. As large-scale combat abates, stabilization activities increase to assert transitional military authority within the occupied territory, provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. MISO enhance the effectiveness of other combat capabilities in large-scale military combat operations and stabilization activities. MISO potentially reduce casualties (friendly, civilian, enemy) by making combatants aware of opportunities to cease hostilities. MISO can also help the JFC to build popular support by informing civilians of US intentions and objectives, areas to avoid, and programs designed to assist the population. JFC and PSYOP staff planners should factor in the activation and mobilization of the Reserve Component PSYOP forces to conduct tactical operations with conventional forces in large-scale combat operations.

(3) **Campaigning through armed conflict** includes operations against violent extremist organizations and other irregular threats such as insurgents in direct armed conflict with US forces. MISO are a vital capability of the JFC in the struggle for legitimacy, credibility, and influence over the affected population. The military defeat and political capitulation of an irregular threat is unlikely unless the indigenous population

turns against the threat and cooperates with the central government and the US and PN forces supporting the central government.

e. **Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).** The joint force may employ PSYOP forces to conduct civil authority information support as a subset of DSCA, using all available media, when authorized by SecDef or a designated representative. The joint force may support a lead federal agency by disseminating public information and safety messages within the United States and its territories. This is typically conducted during natural disaster relief or national security actions following domestic incidents. PSYOP forces executing civil authority information support during a domestic crisis are not executing MISO or restricted by MISO program requirements.

For additional details on the competition continuum, see JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations.

5. Key Considerations for Effective Military Information Support Operations

a. Early Planning and Sustained Employment

(1) In the capacity as information planners on staff, PSYOP officers integrate MISO at the initial stages of planning in operational design and throughout the joint planning process (JPP). This enables the JFC to shape the IE and OE for initial and subsequent military engagement activities. This also enables the commander to consider the potential psychological impacts of other lines of effort. Early planning increases the potential to influence TAs within the area of interest. Throughout the JPP, planners should actively participate in and nominate MISO targets within the joint targeting cycle, ensuring they are prioritized appropriately and remain on the joint integrated prioritized target list. This facilitates the intelligence process to better support MISO, while assisting with interagency coordination and deconfliction of efforts throughout the DoD.

(2) MISO require sustained application as part of broader USG communication synchronization efforts. The most effective MISO are proactive and help the JFC set and sustain conditions for achieving subsequent objectives. MISO may be executed throughout the competition continuum, in all phases of military operations and, in some situations, may be the JFC's main effort.

b. **Unified Action and MISO.** JFCs plan, synchronize, coordinate, integrate, and assess MISO with other USG and multinational partner communications efforts. Synchronization of MISO with other actions precludes DoD messages or actions, and other agencies' messages and actions, from contradicting or weakening each other.

c. **Use of Non-DoD Assets.** Planners consider the use of non-DoD resources to mitigate constraints (e.g., personnel caps), increase TA receptivity, increase credibility, and reinforce legitimacy. Limitations such as denied areas, logistics lines, and TA access to media, may constrain or negate the use of non-DoD resources during specific phases or entire operations. PN and commercial assets outside the operational area may mitigate some of the limitations. Indigenous resources, including production, distribution, and

dissemination assets, may increase TA receptivity to messages; reduce military footprint; increase credibility of messages; and reinforce the legitimacy of the HN government, allies, and other agencies. Planners ensure risk assessments regarding the use of non-DoD resources and associated mitigation planning are performed and reported.

d. Utilizing Existing Networks. Planners should use network engagement techniques when deciding where to direct MISO efforts. Network engagement activities consist of interactions with friendly, neutral, and threat networks conducted continuously and simultaneously at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. They are employed through existing human and functional networks, which have previously established trusted relationships among themselves. These networks can disseminate MISO-developed messages and themes to its network. This can give TAA a more nuanced focus.

For further details concerning network engagement, refer to JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks.

e. Command Emphasis and Resourcing. Commanders emphasize the importance of MISO. The commander's intent, lines of effort, and allocation of resources convey this importance. While MISO are both force multiplier and economy of force activities, this does not mean MISO are not resource intensive. Examples include prioritization in the time-phased force and deployment data, the allocation of resources in the sustainment plan, and allocation of network resources. When wargaming courses of action (COAs), MISO and the potential psychological effects are a consideration in selecting COAs. Commanders emphasize MISO by including information requirements in the commander's critical information requirements.

f. Intelligence Gain and Loss Estimates. MISO often target relevant actors to the intelligence community or disseminate information by means that could complicate the collection of intelligence. MISO planners should familiarize themselves and integrate into the deconfliction processes established within the intelligence community so JFCs can make informed decisions on the risk to the loss of intelligence collection versus the probability the effects created outweigh the lost intelligence.

g. Responsive Series Approval Process

(1) Proactive and engaged staff planners have a critical role in the timeliness of this process, including developing influence narratives, themes to emphasize or avoid, and messages in all concept plans. Front-end efforts in planning, integrating, and including an influence narrative in all concept plans provide a valuable foundation as future operations or emerging crises develop. A rapid product approval process is crucial for responsive MISO. Stand-alone MISO programs, and MISO programs submitted as part of the CCDR's operation plan (OPLAN) or CCP, are approved per OSD policies. Approval of the program and execution, and the series approval authority is issued to the CCDR in the EXORD. Unless otherwise specified in the program, the CCDR can delegate the series approval authority to the lowest practical level in accordance with SecDef's guidance. Planners should make recommendations to delegate after thoroughly assessing the risk and

developing risk mitigating measures. Once approval authority is delegated to a subordinate commander, the approval process belongs to that commander. The delegated commander's internal staffing process should be comprehensive without including extraneous staffing requirements that complicate the process, which may delay approval.

For more information, see DoDI 0-3607.02, Military Information Support Operations (MISO).

(2) The JFC may delegate authority but retains the responsibility and risk. MISO planners provide recommendations and oversight to assist the JFC in managing risk. When delegating approval authority to multiple subordinate commands, the JFC planners mitigate this risk by synchronizing, deconflicting, and integrating MISO across the area of operations with subordinate headquarters. The JFC planners oversee the MISO process, enforce policy, and conduct quality control to manage the commanders' risk.

h. Assessment

(1) It is essential that assessment planning begin in the planning stages of each MISO series. Assessment plans consider how measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are evaluated and quantified and the periodicity with which data, or indicators, are collected to determine progress toward an objective or analyze trends over time. The single greatest hindrance to successful assessment of MISO is the failure to enable collection of baselines for later comparison by developing sufficient assessment criteria and plans prior to dissemination.

(2) During assessment plan development, valid measures should be selected to inform the effects of MISO series. This means that the selected TA should be reasonably expected to be influenced on those measures toward the achievement of the stated objectives as a result of MISO being executed. Requisite time and attention should be given to determining these measures in early planning stages. Next, baseline data should be collected. A baseline is the "time zero" measurement of selected TA on the criteria selected as a MOE. This establishes a starting point to use as a comparison to determine whether effects are being created once MISO has been disseminated. Of note, the vast majority of assessment is completed before any MISO are ever disseminated for a series. Once a series is in execution, assessment only requires subsequent data collection on measures already identified (i.e., percent change or correlational/statistical analysis). MISO effects should never be determined from non-rigorous assessment methods or haphazardly collected data.

(3) Assessing influence is complex and nuanced. Unlike operations and activities that create lethal effects, the behavioral outcomes of operations and activities to influence with desired effects can sometimes take weeks, months, or even years. To measure effects on TA's progress toward a desired behavior, commanders and planners utilize observable and measurable indicators as they may be predictive of desired behaviors. This not only assists MISO planners in determining whether they are successfully progressing toward the

desired behavioral change, but also affords better quality information to support refined MISO products.

(4) Assessments require resources. MISO planners account for the resources needed to conduct the assessments throughout operations including for fiscal requests and the labor required to collect, process, and analyze the data for an effective assessment. The planners ensure the right skillsets required to conduct assessments are on staff to provide the expertise and scientific rigor required. Planners need to factor these resource requirements into the risk of the overall mission.

i. **Dissemination Options and Means.** Technological advances continue to provide innovative media platforms and dissemination methods to convey messages to the TA. Planners identify the appropriate media platform and dissemination methods to successfully influence specific TAs. Planners include the dissemination means in the MISO program. Planners should clearly articulate any gaps in existing policy or authorization for emerging or new medium types, delivery, or dissemination methods to facilitate the authorization and approval process. Figure I-3 depicts potential means of dissemination available to MISO.




Figure I-3. Potential Means of Dissemination

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CHAPTER II

ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND RELATIONSHIPS

“Entirely as a private opinion I think that propaganda is quite a good thing; I regard it as more humane to change a man's mind by reasoning with him, working on his emotions, or even by deceiving him, than it is to change his mind by the unkind and expensive process of shooting him through the head. Shooting certainly does change the mind, but the mind, you will agree, is not much use after that.”

**Paul M. A. Linebarger, Naval War College Information Service for Officers,
March 1951, Vol. 3, No. 7 (March 1951), pp. 19-47,
US Naval War College Press**

1. General

The *Unified Command Plan* and CJCSI 3110.01, (U) *2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP)* [short title: JSCP], provide direction and guidance to CCDRs on joint planning and their respective responsibilities. The roles, responsibilities, and relationships delineated in this chapter reflect general guidance derived from these documents, as well as directives, instructions, joint and Service doctrine, and current practices within DoD.

2. Roles and Responsibilities

a. SecDef

(1) Approves all MISO programs submitted as stand-alone MISO programs or part of a CCP or OPLAN.

(2) Provides execution authority through EXORDs and deployment orders.

(3) Through approved MISO programs, delegates MISO series and product approval to the appropriate level for operational and tactical operations.

(4) Provides strategic MISO advice to USG departments and agencies and multinational partners.

(5) Establishes MISO policy per OSD policies.

(6) Coordinates MISO policy, programs, and plans with other USG departments and agencies as appropriate.

For more information on MISO policies, see DoDD 5111.01, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and DoDD 5111.10, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. For more information, see DoDI 0-3607.02, Military Information Support Operations (MISO).

b. Secretaries of the Military Departments

(1) In accordance with DoDD 5100.01, *Functions of the DoD and Its Major Components*, organize, train, and equip forces to contribute unique Service capabilities to the JFC to conduct MISO throughout the OE.

(2) Incorporate MISO into Service training and education programs in accordance with DoDI O-3607.02, *Military Information Support Operations*.

(3) Include MISO capabilities and operations requirements in program objective memorandum submissions to SecDef in accordance with DoDI O-3607.02.

(4) Provide intelligence oversight training to PSYOP personnel and units in accordance with DoD 5240.01-R, *Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons*.

c. CJCS

(1) Serves as the senior military advisor to SecDef on MISO matters.

(2) Provides advice, information, support, and guidance on policy and issues pertaining to North Atlantic Treaty Organization PSYOP. Represents the United States at North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other multinational regional PSYOP or MISO fora.

(3) Facilitates incorporation of MISO concepts into joint professional military education programs and the joint exercise and experimentation program.

(4) Provides guidance for the integration of MISO into planning and operations.

(5) Reviews MISO plans, programs, activities, and force requests of the CCDRs.

(6) Develops for SecDef approval MISO programs applicable to multiple CCMDs.

For further guidance, see CJCSI 3110.05, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan.

d. CCDRs

(1) Develop MISO and conduct MISO in support of CCPs. These programs may be either a (MISO tab) part of a CCP or a separate MISO program developed for approval per OSD policies.

For more information, see DoDD 5111.01, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)).

(2) Coordinate and deconflict transregional MISO with all commanders where effects could reasonably cross within their AOR. CCDRs hold the risk for all military operations within their AOR and are consulted prior to the execution of MISO that could impact their operating environment.

(3) Coordinate MISO plans and activities with all appropriate members of the US country team, and as appropriate, the DOS regional bureaus for each country where a TA can be reasonably expected to be affected.

(4) Deconflict MISO with ongoing or planned operations conducted by other USG departments and agencies.

(5) As appropriate, CCDRs with AORs obtain the concurrence of the COM and relevant DOS regional bureaus prior to the execution of MISO outside an area of ongoing hostilities involving Armed Forces of the United States.

(6) CCDRs without AORs, or whose effects occur in the geographic responsibility of another CCMD, coordinate MISO with the DOS through the CCDRs with an AOR to preserve the relationship and responsibilities those commands have for all military operations.

(7) As required, submit additional MISO programs through the Joint Staff J-39 [Deputy Director for Global Operations] to OSD for approval.

(8) Review approved MISO programs at least every two years and, if revisions are appropriate, submit those revisions to the Joint Staff J-39 for coordination and approval per OSD policies.

For more information, see DoDD 5111.01, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), and DoDI 0-3607.02, Military Information Support Operations (MISO).

(9) Include approved MISO plans and activities in program objective memorandum submissions to the Secretary of the Military Department concerned.

(10) Ensure MISO are properly attributed in accordance with established policy.

(11) Prepare program and budget input to fund approved MISO programs. Coordinate with the CJCS, Service Chiefs, and the other CCDRs to ensure that all MISO and support requirements are addressed.

(12) Synchronize the deployment and employment of PSYOP forces with United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the Services.

(13) Maintain qualified PSYOP officers assigned to the staff to plan, review, approve, manage, and provide oversight for all MISO within the AOR. Designate a PSYOP-qualified officer assigned to the CCMD headquarters as the command MISO

program officer. The command MISO program officer oversees the execution of all MISO, develops MISO policy and budgetary recommendations, and plans and executes MISO in accordance with the command's plans and operations. The program officer works to ensure all component MISO plans are in accordance with command and DoD guidance and policy. The MISO planner plans and executes MISO plans within their organization.

(14) Synchronize and deconflict the planning and execution of MISO with other information activities, particularly key leader engagement and PA, across the competition continuum.

(15) Prioritize CCMD intelligence resources to provide effective collection, analysis, and assessment support to MISO.

(16) If MISO are delegated to subordinate commands, provide oversight, synchronization, and deconfliction of all MISO conducted within the AOR. The approval of MISO may be delegated, but the risk and responsibility are retained.

(17) Conduct intelligence gain/loss estimates with the intelligence community before conducting MISO activities, where appropriate.

(a) Coordinate and deconflict human-derived information gathering activities in support of MISO with DoD human intelligence and related-intelligence activities in accordance with DoDD S-5210.36, *(U) Provision of DoD Sensitive Support to DoD Components and Other Departments and Agencies of The United States Government*.

(b) Coordinate and deconflict MISO products disseminated over technical means with the intelligence community; and deconflict intelligence-derived technical means of dissemination for potential loss of collection to make a risk-informed decision before dissemination.

(18) Serve as the coordinating authority of the global campaign plans, which include guidance on the role of MISO in integrated campaigning.

e. **Commander, USSOCOM** is the joint proponent for MISO and responsible for leading the collaborative development, coordination, and integration of MISO across DoD. Commander, USSOCOM has the following responsibilities in addition to those detailed under the CCDR responsibilities above:

(1) Develops and maintains PSYOP forces and capabilities sufficient to conduct and support ongoing and planned MISO of the CCMDs.

(2) Serves as the joint proponent for development and implementation of MISO joint doctrine, training, education, and combat development.

(3) Assists the CCMDs in planning and conducting MISO in support of CCPs and other CCDR missions.

(4) Develops joint MISO programs of instruction, and when directed, trains DoD and foreign military personnel in MISO and influence techniques and procedures.

(5) Recommends MISO policy guidance to the CJCS, Service Chiefs, and US military commanders, as required.

(6) Develops and validates priorities for training, intelligence, and military requirements and provides these to the CJCS to support Service, CCMD, and Joint Staff responsibilities as they relate to MISO.

(7) Provides visibility of MISO issues, activities, tasks, and capabilities to the CJCS, Service chiefs, and commanders at other US military command levels.

(8) Coordinates with the Joint Staff and other CCDRs to integrate MISO into joint training and concept development plans and programs.

(9) Develops concepts to support national security objectives, reviews Service doctrine development for consistency with joint doctrine, and ensures that joint and Service MISO training supports national objectives.

(10) Serves as the coordinating authority for the planning and execution of Internet-based MISO.

For more information on coordinating authority, see JP 1, Volume 2, The Joint Force.

(11) In collaboration with the Service Chiefs, provides for the education and training of DoD forces to enable the CCMDs to conduct MISO.

(12) Synchronizes deployment and employment of PSYOP special operations forces and conduct of MISO in support of the appropriate CCMDs.

(13) Provides intelligence oversight training to USSOCOM PSYOP personnel.

f. **Commander, United States Cyber Command**, in addition to responsibilities assigned to CCDRs:

(1) Provides CO support and access to cyberspace capabilities to support MISO.

(2) Provides MOPs related to cyberspace-enabled delivery and dissemination capabilities for MISO and reactions and behavioral changes, observable in cyberspace.

g. **Military Departments and Services**. When directed by SecDef, provide global force management of forces to support the MISO plans, programs, and activities of the CCMDs and other USG departments and agencies.

(1) Provide trained PSYOP forces to support SecDef and the CCDRs.

(2) Prepare and provide assigned PSYOP forces to the CCDRs and USG lead agencies, when directed by SecDef.

h. JFCs Serving in Multinational Commands

(1) Implement multinational MISO plans to the extent consistent with international law, including the law of war, and treaty/international agreement obligations with the governments of countries where US forces are assigned.

(2) Request guidance from SecDef on implementation of multinational policies and objectives, as appropriate.

(3) Coordinate joint MISO planning with appropriate multinational and PN force commanders.

i. Other USG Departments and Agencies

(1) During cooperation and adversarial competition below armed conflict, the COM provides overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interagency activities in their respective country. The COM may restrict MISO within their assigned country or areas.

(2) Interagency coordination of DoD responsibilities is accomplished by the CJCS in the National Security Council system. As the principal military advisor to the President, the CJCS represents the CCDR's requirements and interests at the National Security Council Principals Committee.

(3) Other USG departments and agencies impacted by MISO may provide recommendations to joint planners to facilitate unity of effort.

3. Relationships

a. **General.** The JFC may leverage information capabilities, to include MISO, to create a desired effect in support of operational objectives.

(1) Because PA and MISO are distinct capabilities, commanders should ensure that there is a general compatibility of messages within the broader communication effort. To this end, **it is critical that all public DoD information activities are conducted in a manner that reinforces the credibility and legitimacy of DoD and USG activities.**

(2) PA and MISO are governed by policy and practice in terms of audiences, focus, and scope. DoD communication synchronization integrates with various instruments of national power and other activities across the USG to synchronize central themes, messages, images, and actions. DoD communication synchronization supports the continuity of DoD strategic- and operational-level messages and actions with overall USG policy and themes.

b. MISO and Communication Synchronization

(1) Communication synchronization consists of a focused USG effort to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, and series synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.

(2) MISO support joint operations by influencing audiences in support of US objectives. Given its focus on foreign TAs, MISO training provides personnel with an understanding of the language and sociocultural dimensions of the TA. This knowledge is utilized in the preparation of messages and actions.

c. MISO and Information in Joint Operations

(1) The joint force leverages information to assure, deter, compel, and force relevant actor behaviors to align with or support US interests. The application of informational power expands commanders' range of options for action across the competition continuum. The application of informational power may be the primary option available to a JFC during long-duration cooperation and competition short of armed conflict, where the use of physical force is inappropriate or restricted. All DoD activities that use MISO to influence the behavior of audiences are governed by MISO policy.

(2) OIE are military actions involving the integrated employment of multiple information forces (e.g., forces that conduct MISO, CMO, PA, electromagnetic spectrum operations, CO, and space operations) to affect drivers of behavior by informing audiences; influencing relevant actors; attacking and exploiting relevant actor information, information networks, and information systems; and protecting friendly information, information networks, and information systems. JFCs integrate OIE into operations, as main or supporting efforts, or conduct OIE as a stand-alone effort. To ensure unity of effort among different commands, each JFC considers and communicates how the informational aspects of their planned activities and operations may impact the factors that make up the IE to affect other OEs.

(3) MISO are among the essential means for planning and conducting the influence task during OIE. The purpose of the influence task is to affect the human aspect of the OE: perceptions, attitudes, and other drivers of relevant actor behavior. The information joint function, in combination with the other joint functions, provides the ways for JFCs and their staffs to synchronize, integrate, and direct joint operations with and including MISO.

(4) A JFC can establish a functional component command or functional task force for information (referred to here for consistency and clarity as an information functional component command or information task force) and usually the Service or command that provides the preponderance of forces is designated the component or task force commander for that effort. Likewise, the JFC can establish a functional component command or task

force for MISO, such as psychological operations task force (POTF). That functional command or task force may be directly subordinate to the JTF, to the information task force, or to a service component or other functional component commander. Given JFCs' inherent needs to conduct OIE, an information task force may have as its primary focus coordinating JTF operations across the joint force that fall within OIE. Alternatively, the information task force may be responsible for executing operations, including MISO. Joint doctrine does not distinguish the unique differences between theaters and their subordinate component commands; therefore, it is incumbent upon those commanders and their staffs to consider organization and the command relationships of their assigned and attached forces.

For further information regarding OIE, refer to JP 3-04, Information in Joint Operations.

(a) **MISO and CO.** CO are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Cyberspace is the global domain within the IE consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. A cyberspace capability is a device or computer program, including any combination of software, firmware, or hardware, designed to create an effect in or through cyberspace. Cyberspace capabilities are key enablers for MISO access and dissemination, target development, and delivery of MISO products. Defensive CO are essential for protection of information sources and are a key element of CCMD OPSEC. Offensive CO are rarely conducted unilaterally and often are an enabling action within an overall OIE plan, or the main effort of a concept of operations (CONOPS) where MISO are a supporting effort. Coordination and deconfliction in cyberspace enhance both CO and MISO. PSYOP staff planners can support CO with messages and actions to deter TAs from threatening DoD cyberspace.

For further details concerning CO, refer to JP 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations.

(b) **MISO and Civil Affairs.** Civil affairs are actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness of, and manage the interaction with, the civil component of the OE; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. JFCs conduct CMO across the competition continuum. CMO are those activities performed by military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and local populations and institutions by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or HN. During planning, CMO and MISO can be planned to create interdependence and amplify the effects of each operation. When CMO or MISO are the primary effort, either can play a supporting operation role in the plan.

For further details concerning CMO and civil affairs operations, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

(c) **MISO and Space Operations.** Space operations are those operations impacting or directly utilizing space- and ground-based capabilities to enhance the potential of the United States and multinational partners. Space capabilities provide CDDRs with near-worldwide coverage and access to otherwise denied areas. Space operations support the flow of information and decision making and may also serve as an activity essential to the delivery of specific information.

(d) **MISO and Deception Activities**

1. Deception activities are actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. When properly integrated with OPSEC, OIE, and the observable activities of the joint force and its components, deception activities can be a decisive tool in altering how the adversary views, analyzes, decides, and acts in response to friendly military operations. This idea is inherent in the “see, think, do” methodology that guides deception planning, execution, and assessment. PSYOP forces provide the JFC capabilities that can deceive the enemy and facilitate mission accomplishment. MISO can play a supporting role to deception activities when friendly or neutral audiences are addressed. Synchronized deception activities and MISO can influence various audiences to take specific actions or not react. While MISO may support deception activities, the MISO approval process mitigates risk to the overall MISO program and capabilities. PSYOP forces, therefore, could be conducting both deception activities and MISO simultaneously and the specific actions taken would need to ensure that proper authorities were being leveraged, and proper approval processes were being followed in both cases.

For additional information, see DoDI S-3604.01, (U) Department of Defense Deception Activities.

2. MISO support to deception activities is considered by the commander and staff, weighing the potential benefits of a deception operation against USG credibility with media and TAs, collateral effects, and exposure to unintended audiences.

3. The TA of a MISO series may also be a target for deception. The deception operations working group, in which members of the deception planning cell and MISO planners participate, provide the venues and processes to deconflict, synchronize, and integrate these efforts.

(e) **MISO and PA.** PA are communication activities with US and foreign audiences. MISO TAs and PA foreign audiences are often the same and may be reached through different ways and means to achieve the same objective. As the IE becomes more contested, the overlap of audience, resources, data, and information used by PA and MISO are becoming more aligned. As described in preceding paragraphs, the information joint function, integrating processes, and working groups provide ways to synchronize desired effects from different operations. A key consideration in coordinating MISO and PA is

maintaining consistency with the DoD principles of information. Chapter III, “Planning,” discusses specific considerations, including PA guidance, attribution, and integrating PA with MISO.

For further details concerning PA and the principles of information, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

CHAPTER III PLANNING

“A strategist should think in terms of paralyzing, not killing. Even on the lower plane of warfare, a man killed is merely one man less, whereas a man unnerved is a highly infectious carrier of fear, capable of spreading an epidemic of panic. On a higher plane of warfare, the impression made on the mind of the opposing commander can nullify the whole fighting power that his troops possess. And on a still higher plane, psychological pressure on the government of a country may suffice to cancel all the resources at its command—so that the sword drops from a paralyzed hand.”

**B. H. Liddle Hart,
Strategy, 1968**

1. Joint Planning

a. General

(1) Joint planning integrates US military operations with other instruments of national power and multinational partners to achieve specified objectives. Commanders and their staffs employ operational art to connect tactical actions to strategic objectives. Joint planning consists of campaign plans and contingency plans which result in operation orders to execute joint operations. Campaign planning represents the art of linking major operations, battles, and engagements in an operational design to achieve theater strategic objectives. The purpose of a campaign is to shape the OE, deter aggressors, mitigate the effects of a contingency, and, when necessary, execute combat operations in support of the overarching national strategy. Contingency plans are typically prepared in advance to address an anticipated crisis and are modified during execution to respond to conditions at the time of execution. Campaign and contingency planning are not separate planning types or processes.

(2) MISO planning begins at the CCMD with integration of MISO into campaign and contingency plans regardless of the level of detail (commander’s estimate, base plan, concept plan, OPLAN). MISO planners develop and later integrate MISO and supporting activities into CCPs, contingency plans, crisis plans, theater campaign orders, and ongoing operations and exercises; participate in plans to preempt malign influence efforts; support the planning and execution of the information joint function; staff and obtain approval of MISO program and series; and identify required information forces, OIE unit capabilities, and requests for forces. PSYOP units available for theater planning purposes may be identified in the Apportionment Tables per the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance.

(3) Joint MISO planning for a campaign is generally the same for contingencies, though the level of detail in the output differs depending on the level of contingency planning and scope and complexity of the operation. Though MISO planners contribute to

many staff products, the output of joint MISO planning results in a MISO staff estimate, the MISO tab to OPLANs and operation orders, and, where necessary, a MISO program for SecDef approval.

(4) Throughout the range of tactical and operational level operations, MISO can have significant impacts on the JFC objectives if they evolve into the need to influence or mobilize the civilian population, while simultaneously isolating the adversary or enemy to take away its ability to wield influence or muster popular support. During the planning of joint operations, assigned MISO planners plan, integrate, coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize MISO to support the JFC's objectives. MISO planners may plan MISO to support ongoing joint operations, or as a part of a larger OIE plan or as a standalone MISO plan. Depending on the capabilities employed, these operations may not involve traditional PSYOP forces or components, though they usually do.

For additional details on planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

(5) MISO planning identifies desired behavioral changes and objectives, along with the specific messages and actions to affect those changes. In planning MISO, the following terms are used:

(a) **MISO Program.** A program is OSD-approved per OSD policies that provide the parameters for the conduct of MISO. An approved program is required prior to the execution of MISO and provides a framework for program execution. Programs include MISO objectives, potential TAs, themes to stress and avoid, means of dissemination, attribution plan, designated approval authority, CONOPS, concept for assessment, assessment of the potential for collateral effect and exposure to unintended audiences, assessment of risk by the execution of planned MISO, and CCMD-proposed PA guidance. A program supports military objectives and is approved per OSD policies. In general, each distinct campaign or contingency plan contains one or more programs, under which all MISO are executed. Changes to the programs (i.e., objectives, TAs, attribution, and themes) can be approved for amendment by the original approving authority.

(b) **MISO Plan.** Any CCMD executing MISO under an approved program develops a MISO plan, further refining the delegated authority. MISO plans are coordinated with DOS and the CIA to ensure visibility by the responsible offices and present an opportunity for interagency stakeholders and regional offices to provide input to CCMD-level planning. MISO plans include supporting MISO objectives, the alignment of approved TAs to those supporting MISO objectives, specific MOEs, and the delegated approval authority for each MISO series within the plan. MISO plans also address countries of interest, languages under consideration, and topics to avoid. Interagency partner concurrence is not required, but CCMDs should make every effort to address DOS or CIA concerns. CDRs are the approval authority for their MISO plans.

(c) **MISO Objective.** MISO objectives are usually broad in scope. They are approved by per OSD policies. A MISO objective is a general statement of measurable response that reflects a desired behavioral change of TAs. A MISO objective supports the

accomplishment of the stated military mission as part of either a campaign or joint operation and ensures the MISO program is appropriately scoped. For example, a supported commander's critical task may be to "create a safe and secure environment in country X." A corresponding MISO objective would be "decrease violence in country X," which clearly describes an intended direction of behavioral change and is measurable.

For more information, see DoDD 5111.01, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), and DoDI 0-3607.02, Military Information Support Operations (MISO).

(d) **Supporting MISO Objective.** Supporting MISO objectives are specific observable and measurable behavioral responses desired from the TA to accomplish a given MISO objective. Supporting MISO objectives are written using a "subject – verb – object" structure. The subject is always "TA." TAs are not specified in the supporting MISO objectives because often multiple TAs are selected to accomplish the desired behavioral change. The "verb – object" combination describes the desired behavioral change. For example, if the MISO objective is "increase support for the provisional government," the supporting MISO objectives might be "TA reports insurgent activity to local authorities."

(e) **MISO Series.** A series contains all actions and products developed in support of the combination of a single supporting MISO objective and a single TA. During the MISO process, series development is a complex, creative, and collaborative process that forms synergy between multimedia products and actions to achieve the desired behavior change for a single TA. The goal of changing this behavior is to support the accomplishment of a supporting MISO objective. A TA is best influenced by a consistent and coordinated series of multiple products and actions that incorporate an appropriate mix of media. As an example, a supporting MISO objective of "TA utilizes reporting hotline to report crime" might employ a variety of actions and products such as "wanted" posters, informational "tip-line" cards, radio broadcasts, Internet-based media (social media), and direct appeals to community leaders or individuals who can influence a key segment or human network of a society. All of these would be considered part of the same series.

(f) **TA.** A TA is an individual or group selected for influence. The potential list of TAs enables senior decision makers to understand who may be targeted through conduct of MISO. This understanding is necessary so that the MISO program can be coordinated and deconflicted with other USG departments and agencies. TAs can be very broad (e.g., all the people in country X) or very specific (e.g., prominent citizens or trade union leaders in village Y) or even tangential to the supporting objective (e.g., key spiritual or cultural figures that hold sway with another TA). A relevant actor is an individual, group, population, or automated system whose capabilities or behaviors have the potential to affect the success of a particular campaign, operation, or tactical action. Relevant actors targeted for influence become TAs.

(g) **Attribution.** Attribution is the ability to identify the source of an action or a message—either determinatively or through plausible inference.

For further details on MISO attribution, see CJCSI 3110.05, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan.

b. Planning

(1) **MISO Planners.** Planners in PSYOP units available to CCMDs comprise both active and reserve component personnel trained and equipped to conduct MISO throughout the competition continuum. A MISO planner is a type of information planner on a CCMD or JFC staff that participates in the JPP. They have subject matter expertise with MISO capabilities, experience working with and in OIE units, and understand the informational impact of other units (e.g., a bomber task force or a carrier strike group executing a show of force, an armored task force conducting a feint). MISO planners can also advise the commander on methods of leveraging informational power to gain and maintain information advantage. They develop integrated MISO and supporting activities into CCPs, contingency plans, crisis plans, theater campaign orders, and ongoing operations; participate in planning to preempt or mitigate malign influence efforts; support execution of the information joint function; develop, staff, and obtain approval of a MISO program and series; and identify required information forces and OIE unit capabilities for submission through the global force management process. MISO planners assist other joint planners in incorporating their understanding of how information impacts the OE to identify how to best leverage MISO to achieve the JFC's objectives during operations.

(2) MISO planners collaborate with the staff to develop and plan activities that leverage the influence of joint force operations. They consider the impacts of other joint force functions on MISO and conversely the potential impacts MISO activities may have on the overall operation. Considerations and procedures may be different given the level at which the JPP is conducted. **Development and submission of a MISO program may be required as an output of the mission analysis to create authorities for the joint force to execute MISO.** Facilitating JTF operations and tactical execution may not require the submission or modification of a program, just the continuation of a previously approved program.

(3) MISO planners have an integral role in operational design. Operational design is the analytical framework that underpins planning and supports commanders and planners in understanding the JFC's OE as a complex interactive system. Operational design is interwoven within the planning process to provide a framework that enables planners to address the complexity of a commander's OE, support mission analysis and COA development, and develop a CONOPS with the highest likelihood of success. Operational design is continuous and cyclical in that it is conducted prior to, and during, joint operations. As commanders and staffs apply the operational design methodology to develop their operational approach, they account for how information impacts the OE. By planning, MISO planners gain an understanding of relevant actors and how MISO could affect their behavior.

(4) The MISO planner integrates into the joint planning group, associated operational planning teams, and the information cross-functional team to provide expertise

on the IE. Information developed during operational design is integral to future steps in the JPP as well as the MISO process. Analysis in operational design may set up the joint headquarters, components, and PSYOP forces for success and expedites their integration and plans development into the joint operations plan. Shortcomings in the operational design process leave gaps in perspective for the IE and how operations shape the cognitive impacts on relevant actors by PSYOP forces.

(5) JPP and operational design are aligned with phase I (Planning) of the seven-phase MISO process. The following planning steps provide some considerations for what may be important to a MISO planner. Figure III-1 illustrates joint planning overview.

(6) **Operational Design Methodology.** For an overview of planning for information activities, see JP 3-04, *Information in Joint Operations*.

(a) **Mission Narratives.** MISO planners assist the information cross-functional team to develop the operational or tactical mission narrative. In conjunction with the information cross-functional team, MISO planners develop the themes tied to the OE and specific mission that will guide MISO forces; in particular, MISO Internet activities, as thematic guidance. These themes are tied to strategic context impacts on the OE.

(b) **Understand the Strategic Environment.** MISO planners analyze the IE using several analytical processes and models. Those analyses provide conclusions about how information in the strategic environment is likely to impact the JFC's OE and operational approach and how joint force operations are likely to impact the strategic environment. The MISO planners provide the conclusions to the joint planning group for consideration in the final product.

(c) **Understand the OE.** MISO planners assist in analyzing the informational, physical, and human aspects of the environment: identifying and describing relevant actors and their drivers of behavior; and determining the most likely behaviors of relevant actors.

(d) **Characterize the OE's Human, Informational, and Physical Aspects.** The joint intelligence preparation of the OE process provides the basis for understanding information and how it affects the JFC's OE. Even though the intelligence directorate of a JFC's staff manages the joint intelligence preparation of the OE process, other directorates and agencies contribute valuable expertise to develop and assess the complexities of the JFC's OE. MISO planners use their specific expertise to assist the planning team to:

1. Identify credible from noncredible sources of information.
2. Identify likely adversarial information production and consumption capability, vulnerability, requirements, and intent.




Figure III-1. Joint Planning Overview

3. Identify initial TAs in accordance with MISO objective and support MISO objective development.

4. Develop initial IE-specific collection plan.

5. Develop initial Internet access and cyberspace capability recommendations for MISO operators.

(e) MISO Considerations During Center of Gravity (COG) Analysis.

Identification and analysis of friendly and adversary COGs is a key step in operational design and informs the JPP and MISO. A COG is a primary source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. COGs can be a military force, an alliance, political or military leaders, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will. Success requires protecting the friendly COGs while defeating the enemy COGs. The protection of friendly strategic COGs, such as public opinion and US national capabilities, typically requires efforts and capabilities beyond those of just the supported CCDR. COG analysis is a holistic effort led by the intelligence directorate of a joint staff, with inputs from other directorates and agencies.

1. COG analysis is used to identify potential threat and friendly COGs, identify critical capabilities, identify critical requirements for each critical capability, and identify critical vulnerabilities for each critical requirement. Based upon how the threat organizes, fights, makes decisions, and uses its physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses, planners identify the threat's and joint force's COGs for further analysis. Planners should recognize that relevant actors may be a COG or key factor for an operation and that using information or denying information to deceive, confuse, or disrupt the ability of the relevant actor to sense and make sense of the situation may be a decisive factor in that operation. Planners analyze COGs within a framework of three critical factors: capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities. A COG for human networks is often difficult to target directly, due to complexity and accessibility. Further, as networks adapt to friendly activities and changes in the OE, their COGs may change along with their adaptations.

For further details concerning network engagement, refer to JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks.

a. Identify Critical Capabilities. A critical capability is a means that is considered a crucial enabler for a COG to function as such and is essential to the achievement of the specified or assumed objective(s). MISO planners identify critical capabilities by analyzing each COG to determine what primary abilities or functions are possessed by both friendly and threat forces that can prevent the joint force or the threat from understanding how information impacts the JFC's OE, supporting its decision making, or effectively leveraging information. To test the validity of a critical capability, the staff asks, "Is the identified critical capability a primary ability in context with the given missions of the threat or the joint force? Is the identified critical capability directly related to the COG?"

b. Identify Critical Requirements for each Critical Capability. MISO planners analyze each critical capability to determine what conditions, resources, or means enable the friendly or threat critical capability. To test the validity of a critical requirement, the staff asks, "Will an exploitation of the critical vulnerability disable the associated critical capability? Does the joint force have the resources to affect the identified critical vulnerability?" If either answer is no, then the MISO planner reviews the threat's identified critical factors for other critical vulnerabilities or reassess how to

attack the previously identified critical vulnerabilities with additional resources. MISO planners also look at the critical requirements for friendly capabilities to identify any relevant actors critical to the success of the mission that may require a behavior change to contribute to the JFC's objectives. For instance, for friendly critical vulnerabilities, planners can identify access, basing, and overflight requirements for the campaign or joint operation. Critical requirements for insurgent groups may be recruitment of fighters from among the population. Certain refined demographics of the population may become relevant actors. In phase II TAA, MISO planners determine which relevant actors should be prioritized and approved for targeting, and become a TA.

c. Identify Critical Vulnerabilities for each Critical Requirement. Planners then analyze each critical requirement to identify its vulnerability to attack. MISO planners help identify critical vulnerabilities that do the most decisive damage to a COG's ability to access, generate, share, and restrict access to information.

d. Additionally, MISO planners help identify critical vulnerabilities associated with a COG's critical capabilities associated with the ability to leverage information to affect behavior. However, in selecting those critical vulnerabilities, planners also compare their criticality with their accessibility, redundancy, resiliency, and impact on other military and national objectives. If the exploitation of a critical vulnerability would disable the associated critical requirement, MISO planners determine if the joint force has sufficient resources to leverage information to affect identified vulnerabilities.

e. Critical factors analysis is a framework to assist in analyzing and identifying a COG and to aid operational planning.

2. MISO planners do not conduct a separate COG analysis but actively participate in and contribute subject matter expertise to the joint force, intelligence directorate-led COG effort. Additionally, information planners use their understanding of relevant actors to reduce the potential for inadvertently injecting internal biases such as mirror imaging.

3. MISO planners carry forward relevant actors to mission analysis. As MISO planners understand the criticality of certain relevant actors, they may nominate them for influence and they become TAs. MISO planners prioritize the relevant actors in order of importance to the accomplishment of the JFC's mission, and make recommendations on which should become a MISO TA.

c. The **JPP** is an orderly, analytical process that consists of a logical set of steps to analyze a mission, select the best COA and produce a campaign or joint OPLAN or order. Like operational design, it is a logical process to approach a problem and determine a solution. It is a tool to be used by planners but is not prescriptive. Throughout the JPP steps (see Figure III-1), MISO planners assist other joint planners in incorporating their understanding of how information impacts the OE to identify how to best leverage MISO to achieve the JFC's objectives during operations. The result of the JPP is a plan or order

that clearly specifies how the joint force will use and leverage information as part of the overall operation. There are information considerations for each of the JPP steps that are covered in the remainder of this chapter. JPP steps:

(1) **Step 1—Planning Initiation.** During planning initiation, MISO planners assist the joint planning group to:

(a) Monitor the situation, receive initial planning guidance for MISO-related activities and specified tasks that impact planning. Review staff estimates from applicable plans.

(b) Identify current and planned operations or activities within the operational area.

(c) Identify external stakeholders that the joint force should collaborate with for planning and executing MISO (e.g., DOS Global Engagement Center, country teams, joint interagency task force or joint interagency coordination group [JIACG]).

(d) Identify current and planned operations or activities within the operational area.

(e) Gauge initial scope of MISO required for the operation.

(f) Identify information required for mission analysis and COA development.

(g) Identify planning support requirements (including staff augmentation, support products, services, language/regional/cultural expertise) and employ commercial contracts to meet requirements, as necessary.

(h) Gather and analyze the information required to plan operations that affect relevant actor behavior and identified networks.

(i) Validate, initiate, and revise priority intelligence requirements and requests for information, keeping in mind the long lead times associated with satisfying MISO requirements.

(2) **Step 2—Mission Analysis.** The JFC and staff develop a restated mission statement that enables subordinate and supporting commanders to begin their own estimates and planning efforts for higher headquarters' concurrence. The joint force's mission is the task or set of tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. Mission analysis is used to study the assigned tasks and to identify all other tasks necessary to accomplish the mission. Mission analysis focuses the commander and the staff on the problem at hand and lays a foundation for effective planning.

(a) Analyze Higher Headquarters' Planning Directives and Strategic Guidance

1. MISO planners contribute to the analysis of strategic guidance and higher headquarters' planning directives by understanding and advising the JFC on how national leadership and higher headquarters intend for the military to support the informational instrument of national power. In particular, MISO planners determine higher headquarters' perspective of how the military leverages information to achieve national strategic and military objectives, what behaviors higher leadership wants from relevant actors to support those objectives, and what role the joint force has in leveraging information to obtain those desired behaviors.

2. During this step of mission analysis, CCMD and operational-level headquarters staffs use strategic guidance to begin developing the operational mission narrative. The operational mission narrative includes themes and messages that nest under the strategic mission narrative. The development of the operational mission narrative is a collaborative effort that should include MISO planners with regional and cultural expertise. Operational mission narratives focus on the theater/region and seek to advance the legitimacy of the mission while countering adversary narratives. A compelling narrative at this level guides planning, targeting, and execution. Likewise, the joint force should make every effort to ensure operations, activities, words, and images are perceived as being consistent with the narrative, thereby preventing audiences from perceiving a conflict between the joint force's actions and its words.

3. When developing the operational mission narrative, planners should recognize that narratives are not created in a vacuum. There are pre-existing narratives in the OE and others may emerge. These narratives may be from adversaries, friendly forces, or relevant neutral groups. These other narratives may reinforce or run counter to the joint force narrative. Awareness of these narratives leads to greater understanding of how to leverage operations and messaging activities to achieve friendly objectives.

4. Analyzing existing narratives provides insight into the messages that relevant actors are conveying, how they are disseminated and propagated, how the intended audiences and relevant actors react to the themes and messages in those narratives, and potential avenues for influence. In addition to informing mission analysis and the development of the operational mission narrative, the results from narrative analysis are incorporated into joint intelligence preparation of the OE and operational assessment processes.

5. Additionally, MISO planners identify current operations worldwide and ongoing broader military or MISO activities that limit the JFC's range of possible COAs, as well as impact plans and operations. This awareness of other ongoing operations and activities includes those of multinational partners.

6. Finally, as part of mission analysis, MISO planners identify existing authorities and permissions and what additional authorities and permissions the JFC

requires for the conduct of MISO. This is done as early as possible in the JPP because of the time required to obtain those additional MISO authorities and resources. Use of some capabilities or activities to affect behavior may require unique authorities and approval. Joint force planners should also review the authorities for the use of capabilities and conduct of activities in their own AOR that could affect the OEs of other JFCs through the IE. Achieving a shared understanding of authorities vertically across echelons of command and horizontally across mission partners is key to successful execution. MISO planners can advise the planning team on which MISO authorities may require additional time, legal review, or subject matter expertise to request.

(b) **Review Commander's Initial Planning Guidance.** MISO planners use the commander's initial planning guidance as the basis for continuing the analysis of the OE begun during operational design, which focused on describing the relationship between the informational, physical, and human aspects of the environment and on identifying and describing relevant actors and their range of potential behaviors.

(c) **Participate in COG Analysis.** Assist the joint staff's operations and intelligence directorates in identifying friendly and adversary COGs and critical factors (i.e., critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities).

(d) **Determine Known Facts and Develop Planning Assumptions.** MISO planners provide facts and assumptions related to the OE to conduct MISO. Potential facts and assumptions include:

1. The identity of relevant actors and why they are relevant to the JFC's mission. MISO planners should reference the COG analysis to prioritize relevant actors that play a significant role in the adversary or friendly critical capabilities.

2. The degree to which the joint force understands the perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and other drivers of relevant actor behaviors.

3. The access that the joint force has to humans to affect the behavior of relevant actors.

4. The impact that joint force operations may have upon the OE and relevant actors. This includes the range of potential and likely behaviors of relevant actors in response to joint force or others' activities.

5. The ability of relevant actors to attack or exploit the joint force's information.

6. The ability of the joint force to affect relevant actor behavior within the parameters of the mission. In other words, can the joint force change relevant actor behavior to the degree necessary and in sufficient time to support the achievement of the JFC's objectives?

7. How does weather and terrain affect the conduct of MISO?
8. The impact of culture, religion, and demographics on joint operations. Are there cultural no-go areas?
9. The availability of media infrastructure to support MISO.
10. The availability and capacity of specialized capabilities for the joint force to conduct MISO, to include those of mission partners.
11. The authorities available to the joint force to use specialized capabilities, to target specific relevant actors, and to undertake MISO.

(e) **Determine and Analyze Operational Limitations.** Some operational limitations may arise due to the inherent informational aspect of military activities, the effects of which are not geographically constrained or limited to a joint force's intended audiences. The joint force cannot control the spread of information or its impact on audiences, within or beyond their specified OE. This may restrict a commander's freedom of action if the informational aspect of a COA undermines higher-priority national objectives or negatively impacts the operations of other JFCs. Based upon their understanding of how information impacts the OE, MISO planners work with the other joint planners to develop a list of limitations related to relevant actors, the employment of specialized capabilities or conduct of MISO, and the use of specific themes and messages. Many of these limitations are specified in authorities from national level leaders or from higher headquarters.

(f) **Develop Military Objectives.** Each military objective establishes a clear goal toward which all the actions and effects of a lines of operation or line of effort are directed. While military objectives commonly describe the condition or the relative position of the joint or enemy forces, the JFC may also express objectives as a particular desired behavior. MISO planners work with the rest of the staff to determine attainable behavioral goals that are based upon the analysis of the OE, including the previously identified potential behaviors in response to joint force or others' activities. MISO planners use these objectives to develop MOEs and MOE indicators to assess how well the JFC's operations are achieving the desired behavior change. These include identifying and incorporating indicators of trending success or failure into the monitoring and assessment plan before finalization of the plan. Planners should keep in mind that it may take a considerable amount of time to observe the effects of MISO and cause and effect relationship may be difficult to assess.

(g) **Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks and Develop the Mission Statement.** The commander and staff review the planning directive's specified tasks and discuss implied tasks during planning initiation, then confirm the tasks during mission analysis. MISO planners identify specified and implied tasks to understand how information impacts the OE. MISO planners identify other implied tasks based upon their analysis of the informational, physical, and human aspects of the OE and on an understanding of the relevant actors and how to affect their drivers of behavior. From the

lists of specified and implied tasks, the commander and staff determine the essential tasks and use them to develop the mission statement. Planners can support or amplify MISO activities through other actions. MISO planners should identify the specified or implied tasks for those activities (e.g., PA, CO, civil affairs, maneuver, fires) that directly support the JFC's objectives through integrated operations in the IE.

(h) **Conduct Initial Force and Resource Analysis.** During mission analysis, the commander and staff team begin to develop a list of required forces and capabilities necessary to accomplish the specified and implied tasks. MISO planners contribute to this list by identifying those forces and capabilities required to understand how information impacts the OE, and plan and conduct MISO. In resource-constrained environments, military forces or capabilities may be unavailable or not readily available to meet all requirements. As part of their initial force and resource analysis, MISO planners should consider:

1. The lead time to deploy PSYOP forces into theater or direct support to the joint force from a home location.
2. The lead time to coordinate approval of MISO authorities.
3. Request for forces for personnel with unique skills such as linguists, sociocultural experts, social media experts, experts in analyzing publicly available information.
4. Collaborating with mission partners who have PSYOP forces and specialized capabilities and the capacity to fill joint force resource gaps.
5. The availability and quantity of MISO funds.
6. Current capabilities operated by or available to the command.
7. The ability to contract commercial capabilities not organic to the PSYOP force.
8. Appropriate requirements against existing or potential contracts or task orders to determine if a contracted support solution can meet the requirement.

(i) **Develop COA Evaluation Criteria.** MISO planners help develop evaluation criteria that measure the relative effectiveness and efficiency of a COA to address threats and avoid or mitigate hazards in or through the IE. Potential evaluation criteria may include whether and how well the COA:

1. Aligns planned actions with strategic and operational mission narratives to establish the legitimacy of the joint force mission and actions with relevant actors.

2. Includes MISO focused on producing the desired behaviors in prioritized relevant actors.

3. Includes MISO that protect the joint force from adversary attempts to undermine the joint force narrative or the legitimacy of the joint force mission and actions.

4. Identifies and accounts for the potential second- and third-order effects and potential risks to enduring strategic objectives.

5. Accounts for the potential impacts on the joint force from the activities that resonate in and through the IE.

(j) **Develop Risk Assessment.** Risk assessments should explain the greatest possible risk; making a determination of high, significant, moderate, or low risk; and provide any proposed mitigation steps. When specific activities are deemed high-risk, the level of approval for MISO should be elevated and mitigation measures established to address the increased risk. Leaving how high-risk is determined to the CCMDs inadvertently incurs risk across the joint force; what one command assumes as low risk may be high risk to other CCMDs and potentially (and unintentionally) expose other CCMDs' MISO. MISO planners characterize the risk of obstacles or actions having effects in and through the IE that could preclude mission accomplishment. This includes joint force actions conflicting with the established narrative (known as the "say-do gap"). MISO planners carefully articulate this risk characterization so that commanders have a clear understanding of the potential benefits and dangers associated with MISO. Many of these impediments can be derived from an examination of friendly strategic and operational COGs and include, but are not limited to, the following:

1. Likelihood and impact of allied or PN withdrawing support from a multinational operation.

2. Likelihood and impact of the collateral effects of joint force actions (e.g., civilian casualties, economic hardship, cultural offense) undermining the strategic or operational narrative or legitimacy of the joint force operation.

3. Likelihood and impact of adversary propaganda efforts undermining joint force strategic or operational narrative or legitimacy of the joint force operations.

4. Likelihood and impact of friendly force casualties undermining domestic support for joint force operations.

5. Likelihood and impact of international pressure causing cessation of joint force operations prior to strategic objectives being achieved.

See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3105.01, Joint Risk Analysis Methodology, for additional information and guidance on risk determination.

(k) Determine Initial Commander's Critical Information Requirements.

Commander's critical information requirements identify key elements of MISO the commander identifies as being critical to timely decision making.

1. MISO planners should consider the following as potential priority intelligence requirements:

a. Intelligence required to resolve any remaining assumptions related to adversary actions or capabilities, relevant actors, or unresolved assumptions regarding the IE.

b. Intelligence required to detect the existence of any obstacles or any adversary actions that were characterized during risk assessment as moderate or higher risk.

c. Intelligence about pending or current activities by adversaries or other actors that could create effects in and through the IE that may affect the JFC (e.g., an adversary's announcement that they will withdraw forces from a contested area, a political announcement that would cause PN to doubt US or joint force resolve to continue operations, corruption in a supported government causing locals to oppose government and the joint force).

2. MISO planners focus on the following as potential friendly force information requirements:

a. Information required to resolve any remaining assumptions related to the availability and capabilities of friendly PSYOP forces or of authorities to employ those capabilities or conduct MISO.

b. Any change in status of OIE units or MISO capabilities, to include multinational force partners conducting information activities.

c. Any change in the authorities to employ specialized capabilities or conduct MISO.

d. Information on the planned or actual conduct of activities by other commands that could create effects in and through the IE that will likely impact the JFC's or strategic objectives.

e. Planned or actual activities by or related to mission partners that would undermine the composition or cohesiveness of the multinational forces (e.g., political developments in a PN that could jeopardize continued support by forces from that nation, operations by the forces of one mission partner that are publicly opposed by another).

f. Loss of access to social media or other outlets the joint force is using to understand, inform, and influence relevant actors.

g. Loss of critical access point or other conduit the joint force is using to engage relevant actors.

(l) Prepare Staff Estimates

1. The MISO planners produce the MISO staff estimate in conjunction with OIE units and Service component MISO planners, and provide critical input to the overall information staff estimate. The MISO staff estimate includes the status and capabilities of MISO forces, contracted MISO support functions, or other forces tasked with executing a MISO task(s) for the purpose of behavior change.

For a sample template of an information estimate, see Appendix B, “Military Information Support Operations Staff Estimate Format Example.”

2. The intelligence estimate includes an information section. This section should include relevant aspects of the IE, such as:

a. The identification of key individuals and groups having influence over the local population, as well as the source of their influence (e.g., social, financial, religious, political).

b. Those likely and dangerous transitions of enemy, adversary, or competitor behavior that challenge US objectives. This section enables planners to estimate the interests, intent, capability, capacity, and likely disruptive actions of relevant actors to support or counter USG interests.

For additional information on the intelligence estimate, refer to CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance, and the Joint Guide for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

(m) Prepare and Deliver Mission Analysis Brief

1. Upon conclusion of the mission analysis, the staff presents a mission analysis brief to the commander.

2. A key portion of the MISO planners’ input to the mission analysis briefing is the development of the operational mission narrative. The operational mission narrative immediately follows the commander’s intent in the final plan or order. The commander’s intent describes the desired outcome, and the operational mission narrative communicates the “why,” “how,” and “by whom” of an operation. A well-crafted mission narrative and commander’s intent provides coherence to military actions and activities and facilitates synchronization of communications and actions. Tactical units use the commander’s intent and the operational mission narrative to align tactical actions, images, and words that lend continuity to operations and communication.

(3) **Step 3—COA Development.** A COA is a potential way to accomplish the assigned mission. After the mission analysis briefing, the JFC staff begins developing COAs for analysis and comparison based on the commander's intent, operational mission narrative, restated mission, and planning guidance. A good COA accomplishes the mission within the commander's guidance, advances the narrative, provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution, and positions the joint force for future operations. There are many methods to engage the TAs. In addition to the force size and task organization to accomplish the mission, the TA and the objective may drive the development of MISO COAs to support the JFC COA.

(a) MISO planners use their expertise to:

1. Advise how the joint force can leverage the informational aspects of activities to create or shape the desired perceptions.
2. Advise how to integrate actions in joint operations such as psychological actions (PSYACTs), CO, and electromagnetic spectrum operations.
3. Identify threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities in the IE.
4. Determine how to task-organize and employ PSYOP forces in support of objectives.
5. Identify critical capabilities required to influence relevant actors.
6. Determine communication channels that are most credible to and are most effective for reaching the selected audiences.
7. Identify how to integrate lethal and nonlethal actions required to create specific effects in and through the IE (e.g., destruction of a radio tower) into existing targeting and fires planning processes.

(b) **Review objectives and tasks and develop ways to accomplish tasks.**

During COA development, planners review and refine objectives from the initial work done during the development of the operational approach. Information planners determine the tasks required to effectively leverage information to achieve the refined objectives. These objectives and tasks are assigned in plans or orders to joint force units, including OIE units or POTFs.

(c) **Select and prioritize audiences, TAs, and targets.**

MISO planners and other information planners participate in the joint targeting process during COA development to identify and prioritize relevant actors with whom the joint force will interact. Relevant actors are categorized as audiences, TAs, or targets depending upon their relationship to a threat and the means with which the joint force will interact with them (i.e., whether through lethal or nonlethal engagement). MISO planners prioritize

relevant actors identified during COG analysis to focus limited resources to generate effects impactful toward the achievement of the JFC's objectives.

1. Audiences. Audiences are a broadly defined group that contains stakeholders or publics relevant to military operations. Audiences are not the enemy and do not directly perform a function for the enemy. Key leader engagement, PA, and CMO are examples of activities that use the term audiences to characterize the relevant actors selected for engagement. Information planners aid in selecting and prioritizing audiences to ensure activities are synchronized and deconflicted and to prevent or mitigate any negative effects caused by fires or other information activities.

2. TAs. Individuals or groups are designated as TAs when a change in their behavior is necessary to achieve the commander's objectives. TAs sometimes also meet the criteria of a target if they perform a function for a threat, whether they do so knowingly or not, willingly or unwillingly. In those cases, TAs are included on one of the joint target lists to be prioritized, vetted, and approved in accordance with JFC priorities; legal, political, and operational constraints; rules of engagement; collateral damage restrictions; political considerations; and operational requirements.

3. Targets. A target is an entity or object that performs a function for the threat considered for possible engagement or other action. A TA may be a target if it is the adversary or performs a function for the adversary. A target's importance derives from its potential contribution to achieving a commander's objective(s) or otherwise accomplishing assigned tasks. Offensive military activities (e.g., electromagnetic attack, cyberspace attack, MISO) should be coordinated and deconflicted within the joint targeting process. Information planners participate in the targeting working groups and boards to nominate targets, identify targets for inclusion in the joint restricted fires list, and evaluate targets for their psychological impact on relevant actors. The traditional methodology of identifying target systems, sets, components, and their critical elements remains valid for OIE. Some capabilities used for OIE may require long lead time for development of the joint intelligence preparation of the OE and release authority and should be identified as early in the target process as possible.

(d) Identify the sequencing (simultaneous, sequential, or a combination) of actions for each COA. Understand which resources become available and when during the operation or campaign. Resource availability significantly affects sequencing operations and activities. Sequencing of inform, influence, and attack tasks relies on the relevance of the information in relation to the timing of an event. Any gap between publicized information and performance of an activity has the potential to undermine the intent of the activity and negatively affect the achievement of objectives. MISO planners consider how the sequencing of activities impacts the informational aspects of each COA. This includes consideration of how MISO are synchronized with other activities to enhance the effectiveness of the COA. The timing and synchronization of activities of each COA should consider how it can pre-empt, undermine, or counter adversary and enemy use of narratives, especially those that convey misinformation or disinformation. This is critical due to the difficulty in changing minds or beliefs, even when presented with facts and

evidence once an audience has been influenced by misinformation or disinformation. Therefore, the goal is to provide accurate and useful information to relevant actors in a timely manner to increase its credibility and relevance. MISO planners can advise on how each COA can communicate information in a timely fashion, multiple times, and from multiple sources to create the desired effects.

(e) Refine themes to stress and avoid.

(f) Based on the COA, develop the MISO series task list matching selected TAs to the MISO objective and supporting MISO objectives, and align the appropriate subordinate command with the corresponding mission. Recommend the tasks to the operations director.

(g) Develop MOEs, MOPs, and indicators in conjunction with intelligence and mission assessment teams.

(h) Recommend information capabilities (e.g., CO, electromagnetic spectrum operations) that may contribute or complement MISO tasks for each COA.

(i) Recommend any MISO-specific supplemental rules of engagement.

(j) Determine appropriate attribution method.

(k) Identify desired and possible unintended effects that support or degrade JFC's efforts.

(l) Identify additional operational risks and controls/mitigation.

(m) Recommend PSYOP force command and control (C2) and alignment of forces to meet the requirements of the COA.

(n) Recommend MISO series and product and action approval authorities.

(o) Develop the MISO CONOPS narrative/sketch, to include assessment criteria, in the staff estimate for each COA. (The method, size, and type of Reserve Component PSYOP forces incorporated into the mission create planning considerations; therefore, deciding when the Reserve Component PSYOP forces integrate into an operation also influences, directly or indirectly, each COA.)

(4) Step 4—COA Analysis and Wargaming. COA analysis is the process of closely examining potential COAs to reveal details that enable the commander and staff to tentatively evaluate COA validity and identify the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed friendly COA. Wargaming is a primary means for COA analysis. Wargames are representations of conflict or competition in a synthetic environment, in which people make decisions and respond to the consequences of those decisions.

(a) During COA analysis and wargaming, MISO planners examine how well each COA leverages MISO to achieve objectives. Wargaming helps the staff to visualize the flow of the operation and, in doing so, facilitates understanding the effects of the joint force's leveraging of information. During wargaming, planners also examine the extent to which joint force activities align with and support JFC's operational mission narrative. MISO planners examine friendly and adversary MISO activities (i.e., influence relevant actors) to determine their potential effects in relation to the objectives. To the extent possible, those personnel or organizations tasked to conduct such activities participate in the wargaming process. Wargaming might identify activities not previously identified. During COA analysis and wargaming, MISO planners help the staff:

1. Determine the likelihood that joint force activities will affect relevant actor behavior.
2. Determine the relative importance of relevant actors and identify the potential emergence of new relevant actors.
3. Identify high-value targets.
4. Identify decision points related to the joint force's ability to change or maintain perceptions, attitudes, and other drivers of relevant actor behaviors.
5. Identify how the joint force reacts to threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities in the environment.
6. Identify and recommend adjustments to MISO tasks conducted by PSYOP forces, including OIE units.
7. Recommend adjustments to task organization of joint force to better leverage information and the informational aspects of activities.
8. Identify and provide time, space, and purpose input for synchronization matrices or other decision-making tools.
9. Identify tasks that leverage information for branches and sequels.
10. Identify priority intelligence requirements and friendly force information requirements.
11. Refine information concept of support (the description of how MISO support the CONOPS).
12. Refine sequencing and timing of MISO activities.

13. Refine risks associated with joint force use and leveraging of information.

14. Review and update the MISO estimate.

(b) COA analysis and wargaming benefits from the participation of red teams, green cells, and white cells. Because they bring a different perspective into COA analysis and wargaming, these elements help joint planners reduce mirror-imaging and better understand and evaluate the potential actions and reactions of relevant actors. Subject matter experts for red teams, and for green and white cells may include multinational partners, behavioral scientists, international law experts, and cultural anthropologists. If not resident to the core planning staff, these experts may be available through reachback support or contracted support.

(5) **Step 5—COA Comparison.** COA comparison is both a subjective and objective process, whereby COAs are considered independently and evaluated/compared against a set of criteria that are established by the staff and commander. COA comparison starts with staff elements analyzing and evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of each COA from their respective viewpoints. Each of the COA evaluation criteria should contain MISO considerations. During mission analysis, MISO planners helped develop the evaluation criteria used in COA to measure the relative effectiveness and efficiency of a COA to address threats and avoid or mitigate hazards in or through the IE. How well the joint force uses MISO and leverages information may indirectly affect the rating of that COA evaluation criteria. For instance, if “speed of movement” is specified as an evaluation criteria and a COA is relying on deceiving an enemy decision maker to facilitate unimpeded movement, that COA is dependent upon the ability of the joint force to leverage information to affect behavior. If only one of multiple COAs is relying on deception, then the ability of the joint force to leverage information to affect behavior impacts the rating of that criteria for that one COA more significantly than the others.

(6) **Step 6—COA Approval.** In this JPP step, the staff briefs the commander on the COA comparison and the analysis and wargaming results and provides the commander with a recommended COA. The commander combines personal analysis with the staff recommendation, resulting in a selected COA. It gives the staff a concise statement of how the commander intends to accomplish the mission and provides the necessary focus for planning and plan development. The MISO planner helps the staff refine the commander’s COA selection into a clear decision statement, then completes the commander’s estimate. The commander’s estimate provides a concise statement of how the commander intends to accomplish the mission and provides the necessary focus for campaign planning and contingency plan development. The commander’s estimate includes the refined commander’s intent along with the commander’s operational mission narrative.

(7) **Step 7—Plan or Order Development.** This final JPP step includes development of the CONOPS and publication of a plan or order. During plan or order development, the staff further develops and refines component missions and tasks that specify how the joint force uses MISO and leverage information to achieve objectives. The

final plan or order assigns those missions and tasks to OIE units and PSYOP forces. MISO planners develop the MISO tab (tab A [MISO] to appendix 3 [Information Operations] to annex C [Operations]) of a joint plan and also contribute with other information force planners to develop annex Y (Commander's Communication Strategy).

For additional information, refer to CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance.

d. MISO tasks that may occur in joint campaigns and operations include the following:

(1) US and Friendly Focused Efforts

- (a) Increase support for the US, PN, and participating nations' actions.
- (b) Publicize the USG and PN's narrative and objectives.
- (c) Illustrate the legitimacy and credibility of joint force and PN actions. Support flexible deterrent options.
- (d) Deter acquisition, proliferation, and use of weapons of mass destruction.
- (e) Mitigate unintended or negative effects of multinational or JTF operations.
- (f) Lessen external support for a competitor, adversary, or enemy.
- (g) Reduce interference with US and multinational operations.
- (h) Increase rejection of adversary or enemy presence and activities by the local populace in stabilized areas.
- (i) Create the element of surprise and combat initiative for friendly forces.
- (j) Exploit tactical and operational successes on the battlefield.
- (k) Reduce casualties and collateral damage, and hasten a transition to post-conflict operations.

(2) Competitor, Adversary, and Enemy Focused Efforts

- (a) Highlight enemy atrocities to reduce populace support.
- (b) Decrease combat effectiveness of enemy forces.
- (c) Create tension and stress within enemy TAs in anticipation of combat.

(d) Degrade enemy combat power by encouraging desertion, surrender, malingering, and creation of dissension in the ranks.

(e) Degrade an enemy's decision-making abilities and operational effectiveness.

(f) Reduce the enemy will to resist.

(g) Counter competitor, adversary, or enemy information (misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda) activities.

(h) Prevent armed involvement by neutral or hostile neighboring states.

(i) Support to flexible deterrent operations.

(3) **Population and HN Focused Efforts**

(a) Prevent interference by civilians during military operations.

(b) Isolate enemy and criminal elements capable of destabilizing the area.

(c) Promote support for HN government and institutions.

(d) Reinforce HN efforts to physically, virtually, and psychologically isolate internal defense threats from the population.

(e) Reinforce HN respect for human rights and compliance with international law.

(f) Assist in the development of HN infrastructure for executing inform and influence activities.

(g) Gain and hold the population's trust and confidence in HN military and paramilitary forces.

(h) Deter interference with HN security operations.

(i) Support JFC civilian harm mitigation and response efforts from planning through execution and assessment.

2. Planning Considerations

a. **General.** MISO planned or executed by non-PSYOP-trained personnel and units represents significant risk to the overall mission as well as US presence in the operational area. All MISO is properly planned, synchronized, and executed under supervision of trained and qualified personnel. MISO are executed under an approved program and are subject to the MISO review and approval process. To maximize support and ensure

continuity of operations, programs are best when centrally planned, developed, and approved. To amplify effectiveness, however, the execution for MISO is best when decentralized. MISO planning, program approval, authorities, and execution timeliness are crucial to improve the chances for success. Therefore, to maximize agility and maintain localized impacts the MISO series should be approved at the lowest authorized level. Planners should understand communication synchronization as a means to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated actions and messages, consistent themes, plans, programs, and activities synchronized with other instruments of national power. In addition, they coordinate and synchronize MISO with other information capabilities to ensure that consistent messages are communicated to TAs. Lessons learned in planning MISO include:

(1) Integrated planning best occurs at the onset of the planning stage of operations and continues throughout the remaining stages of an operation to ensure MISO are considered, and executed appropriately throughout the operation. For examples of MISO planning considerations, refer to Figure III-2.

Military Information Support Operations Guidance and Planning Considerations

- Plan for the early conduct of military information support operations (MISO) and, if required, use of host-nation resources military assets for media production, and dissemination of products.
- Assist multinational military and/or civilian governmental organizations in developing coordinated influence programs.
- Use host-nation and United States (US) country teams to gain local support.
- Maintain the capability to accomplish US-only objectives when forces are provided to multinational commands.
- Consider the effects of terrain, weather, and other environmental factors on forces, equipment, and the planned method for dissemination of products.
- Coordinate plans with staff elements or agencies involved with public information or other information-related capabilities.
- Integrate tactical exploitation of national capabilities and assets before and during mission execution.
- Establish a MISO reporting system to provide relevant information about:
 - Enemy influence efforts.
 - Measures of performance and effectiveness.
 - Any anticipated changes to ongoing activities.
- Consider operations to counter the effects of enemy influence efforts.

Figure III-2. Military Information Support Operations Guidance and Planning Considerations

(2) Information should be shared between agencies and with multinational partners so that MISO are part of a well-orchestrated influence effort that generates consistent messages across multiple sources, platforms, and media outlets.

b. Cooperation: Military Engagement, SC, and Humanitarian Assistance

(1) MISO are always conducted in accordance with applicable law and policy documents, and approved programs. MISO conducted in support of other USG departments and agencies require interagency coordination. Activities that can be applied to meet military engagement, SC, and deterrence objectives and can employ MISO include foreign internal defense (FID), security force assistance (SFA), humanitarian and civic assistance, antiterrorism, DoD support to counterdrug operations, show of force operations, and arms control.

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN PERU

Military Information Support Team (MIST) Peru has been employed in various military operations, including stabilization and counterterrorism activities, security cooperation, humanitarian assistance, counterdrug, and counter-illicit trafficking. Under the delegated operational control of United States Special Operations Command South, the MIST, with the support of the Cultural Intelligence Center analysts from 1st Military Information Support Battalion (Airborne), worked to enhance regional stability by assisting the Government of Peru in dealing with internal and external threats to security.

In the past, the MIST was aligned with the Peruvian military, law enforcement, and governmental and nongovernmental agencies to craft a variety of informative and persuasive messages. One of the overarching themes was to change the negative perceptions of the Peruvian government. Messages were crafted in Spanish and in Quechua, a native language spoken in the Andes of South America, to publicize the government's efforts to support impoverished communities. Messages imprinted on novelty and utility type items were left behind after Peruvian-sponsored humanitarian assistance projects in 2012 and 2013. Messages were disseminated on radio, handbills, and posters to inform the populace of dates and times of future humanitarian assistance to supplement the leave-behind products. These messages demonstrated the Peruvian government and nongovernment entities' resolve to assist the challenged communities as they faced financial hardships.

Another example of the messages conveyed to target audiences with a measurable effect was the correlation between the drug trade and associated violent crime committed by terrorists. The messages urged the public to make the community safer for their families and children by reporting terrorist crimes to the local authorities and potentially receiving a monetary reward for information. Posters, handbills, flyers, leaflets, newspaper inserts, and radio messages advertising rewards were delivered by the Peruvian National Police and military throughout the

interior and coastal areas of the country. During several rewards-for-information payments, informants reported print and radio messages encouraging them to call the police about narcoterrorist-type activities as the reason they provided information.

A third example of messaging appealed to members of the Shining Path, or Sendero Luminoso (SL) in Spanish, SL sympathizers, and illegal traffickers. The SL is the largest terrorist organization in Peru. A wide variety of radio, television, newspaper, military and police community outreach events and print products conveyed the stiff price one will pay for engaging in terrorism.

During 2012-2013, as a result of the combined efforts of the MIST, the Peruvian military, and the Peruvian law enforcement, several terrorists were captured or killed in Peru, rendering the SL faction in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) ineffective. Notably, the Regional Commander of the SL in the UHV, Florindo Eleuterio Flores-Hala, aka "Artemio," was captured by authorities for crimes of terrorism in February 2012, subsequently sentenced to life in prison, and ordered to pay 500 million Peruvian Nuevo Soles for civil reparations. A few months after the capture of Artemio, his successor was also captured. The capture of several leaders within its organization severely degraded the SL in the UHV.

Various Sources

(2) SC strategies and implementation plans integrate diplomatic, informational, military, and economic activities involving other nations intended to shape the security environment and assure allies and partners. Based on guidance from SecDef and the CJCS, and intergovernmental coordination guidance, the CCDRs develop plans and employ forces to protect and promote US interests and strategic objectives. The CCDRs, Services, and DoD agencies develop or update SC strategies annually or every two years. The Services and DoD agencies coordinate their strategies with the CCDRs to ensure that they support and complement the CCDRs' strategies and implementation plans. CCDRs submit MISO programs to the Joint Staff as stand-alone documents or as part of a CCP or other plan for approval per OSD policies. During cooperation, the synchronization of information or MISO with interagency partners can gain positive advancement and advantage for theater and DOS regional desk strategies. Consistent influence toward USG efforts, strategies, and diplomacy are best when MISO are coordinated with interagency organizations conducting their own influence efforts.

For more information, see DoDD 5111.01, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), and DoDI 0-3607.02, Military Information Support Operations (MISO).

For further details concerning SC planning, refer to the JSCP; JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations; JP 3-20, Security Cooperation; and JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

c. **Competition: Adversarial and Strategic Competition.** US strategic rivals seek leverage and influence over other nations and geographic regions in pursuit of economic, diplomatic, or military advantage. Most adversaries endeavor to avoid war with the United States and our allies to advance their objectives and instead focus on competition below the level of armed conflict to include legitimate methods such as economic agreements and public diplomacy as well as illegitimate methods such as promoting instability and coercion of political institutions. The associated general strategic and operational objectives are to protect US interests or deter escalation toward conflict. MISO programs support US strategic goals and objectives by degrading an adversary's influence and imposing costs on adversary actions. MISO can increase positive perceptions of the United States and negative perceptions of adversaries and their efforts. MISO can also support countering malign influence through promoting awareness, resiliency among vulnerable audiences, or inoculation to adversary misinformation, disinformation, or propaganda narratives. MISO support allies and partners to complement and enhance joint and multinational activities conducted during adversarial competition to include cooperative security actions or agile deterrent actions. The joint force depends on allies and partners to apply capabilities across the competition continuum. The joint force builds the capability and capacity of PN through SC and security forces assistance activities enabling PN to perform roles in support of US objectives. In operations involving security escalation or threat of force, MISO offer SecDef or the JFC options for engagement that potentially avoid the employment of additional combat forces; reduce the period of confrontation; and enhance the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. Examples are shown in Figure III-3.

For further details concerning crisis response and limited contingencies, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations.

d. **Conflict and War: Major Operations and Campaigns.** When required, the US national leadership may direct a major operation or campaign involving large-scale combat. In such cases, the general goals are to compel the enemy as quickly as possible; conclude hostilities; and establish conditions favorable to the HN, allies, the United States, and its multinational partners. MISO contribute to the establishment of these conditions by influencing TAs' attitudes, values, beliefs, and behavior in a manner favorable to US objectives. Major operations and campaigns typically are planned and executed in multiple phases. CCDR activities, including MISO, executed during cooperation and competition assist in determining the preparation for future operations. A MISO program approved as part of the CCP may be leveraged as part of a major operation to assist the JFC to prevail or gain the advantage against the enemy by degrading the enemy's combat power, reducing civilian interference and support, minimizing collateral damage, and increasing the population's support for the operation or campaign. The conduct of MISO is the responsibility of JFCs within their respective operational areas to shape and influence relevant actors in the OE.

e. **Interagency Coordination**

(1) Military operations are synchronized with the operations of other USG departments and agencies, as well as with foreign forces, nongovernmental organizations,

Examples of Military Information Support Operations

Cooperation:

- Influence the behavior of selected target audiences toward United States (US) and partner capabilities.
- Support the peacetime elements of US national policy objectives, national security strategy, and national military strategy.
- Support the combatant commanders' security cooperation objectives.
- Support the commander's objectives to include support to military deception and operations security.
- Promote the ability of the host nation to defend itself against internal and external insurgencies and terrorism by fostering reliable military forces and encouraging empathy between host-nation armed forces and the civilian populace.

Adversarial Competition Below Armed Conflict:

- Mobilize popular support for US and partner military operations.
- Gain and sustain popular belief in, and support for, US and partner political systems (including ideology and infrastructure) and political, social, and economic programs.
- Attack the legitimacy and credibility of the adversary political systems.
- Publicize beneficial reforms and programs to be implemented after defeat of the adversary.
- Shift the loyalty of adversary forces and their supporters to the friendly powers.
- Deter adversary powers or groups from initiating actions detrimental to the interests of the United States, its partners, or the conduct of friendly military operations.
- Promote cessation of hostilities to reduce casualties on both sides, reduce collateral damage, and enhance transitions to post-hostilities.

Armed Conflict / War:

- Explain US policies, aims and objectives.
- Arouse foreign public opinion or political pressures for or against a military operation.
- Amplify economic and other nonviolent forms of sanctions against an enemy.
- Undermine confidence in the adversary leadership.
- Lower the morale and combat efficiency of adversary soldiers.
- Increase the psychological impact of US and partner combat power.
- Support military deception and operations security.
- Counter adversary information activities.

Figure III-3. Examples of Military Information Support Operations

international organizations, commercial entities, and regional organizations, for the purpose of achieving objectives. Success depends on the ability to integrate and engage all instruments of national power. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military instrument of national power and the economic, diplomatic, and informational instruments of national power, as well as the efforts of nongovernmental organizations and international organizations. Successful interagency coordination enables agencies, departments, and organizations to mount a coherent and efficient collective operation.

(2) MISO are coordinated with relevant interagency partners to support the accomplishment of assigned military missions. Interagency coordination should occur at all levels and often involves OSD, Joint Staff, CCMDs, theater special operations commands, and country teams. Thorough coordination with other USG departments and agencies ensures operations are mutually supportive and complementary. MISO should be coordinated with other USG departments and agencies, as appropriate, including the CIA; International Broadcasting Bureau; United States Agency for Global Media; Departments of State, Commerce, Homeland Security, Transportation, Energy, and Justice; the Drug Enforcement Administration; and the United States Coast Guard. MISO should also coordinate with the DOS's Global Engagement Center that directs, leads, synchronizes, integrates, and coordinates efforts of the USG to recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining or influencing the policies, security, or stability of the United States, its allies, and PNs.

(3) Interagency coordination of influence activities occurs throughout the competition continuum to synchronize activities intended to align the perceptions of TAs. Strategy and policy integration at the strategic level is accomplished through high-level interagency coordination committees and working groups. CCDRs link national policy to the tactical and operational levels of military operations by using their JIACG, the US country team, and subordinate joint force headquarters as coordinating staff sections. Planners coordinate and deconflict multiple USG messages spanning multiple CCMDs by coordinating with the appropriate staff elements, such as the JIACG. Staff planners provide the JIACG with timely information to assist in the coordination process.

(4) **Civilian and Military Operational Planners.** The JIACG assists the JTF, when formed, to provide interagency connectivity by either deploying forward to the JTF location or by providing a reachback point of contact at the CCMD location. Planners at the JTF level coordinate with other government departments and agencies through the JIACG or designated staff organizations. The JIACG does not veto or approve plans but provides input and assists with coordination of those plans.

(5) **DOS.** DOS is the USG lead agency for foreign affairs. CCDRs with geographic responsibilities, in coordination with the DOS regional bureaus, align military activities with diplomatic activities in their assigned AORs by integrating efforts with that country's COM. The COM, normally the US ambassador, and the corresponding country team are in charge of diplomatic-military activities in their assigned country. Coordination with DOS should include policy bureaus, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and other bureaus addressing economic and security stability or conflict resolution. The United States Agency for International Development is another key player that planners should seek to coordinate with, especially in conflict or post-conflict regions. PSYOP forces coordinate MISO and obtain concurrence from the responsible COM prior to the execution of MISO outside an area of ongoing hostilities involving Armed Forces of the United States. Achieving COM concurrence is essential—especially in assessing risks and ensuring that the proposed activities are aligned with and advance US policy objectives.

The most important role that DOS and COMs play is to assess the risks and the possible outcomes, ensuring that the risks are justifiable.

f. **Combined or Multinational Operations.** SecDef may provide PSYOP forces for participation in combined or multinational military operations. PSYOP forces may remain under operational control of a US commander or, upon consideration and approval of SecDef, may be assigned through transfer of authority procedures to a non-US commander. Operational control of PSYOP forces is generally the same as other US forces participating in the operation. SecDef normally transfers operational control of PSYOP forces to the CCDR in the EXORD and may authorize the CCDR to transfer operational control to the JFC, to the senior US military officer involved in the operation, or to a non-US commander. However, US MISO are approved in US channels, regardless of the composition of the multinational force chain of command.

For further details concerning multinational operations, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

For further information on the MISO tab format, see CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance.

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN GUATEMALA

During June and July 2012, a five-person military information support team (MIST) from the 1st Military Information Support Battalion (Airborne) began operations in Guatemala, during OPERATION MARTILLO, in support of Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South, a component of the United States Southern Command. The MIST was composed of four soldiers and one civilian Cultural Intelligence Center analyst. OPERATION MARTILLO was a cooperative military and law enforcement effort among the United States, Guatemala, and several other partner nation countries, to halt the flow of illicit cargo, drugs, and weapons through Central America and into the United States (US). OPERATION MARTILLO aimed to stifle the drug proceeds of Central American cartels.

The MIST, along with three United States Marines from the Marine Corps Information Operations Center, augmented OPERATION MARTILLO's efforts in Guatemala with the planning and development of five radio messages. Radio is an important communication medium in Guatemala and throughout Central America to broadcast positive government messages to the masses, as nearly every household owns a radio. Radio messages were disseminated over several radio stations, including Emisoras Unidas, one of the most popular radio stations for news and entertainment in Guatemala.

The radio messages were developed to inform the population in and around the coastal areas that the governments of the United States and

Guatemala were working together to deter criminal organizations' ability to utilize Guatemalan shipment routes for movement of narcotics, weapons, and other contraband. The radio messages conveyed the international ties between the United States and Guatemala and their commitment to end the narcoterrorists' threats to national, regional, and international security. Indirectly, the radio messages also served to nullify previously disseminated opponent propaganda that attempted to convince Guatemalans that the US military was there to invade Guatemala, not to support regional security.

Successfully planned and executed radio messaging during OPERATION MARTILLO was a key element to the success of increasing the stability and security of Guatemala and Central America. Positive effects from the messaging were seen within weeks of the radio dissemination. Citizens within Guatemala and the coastal areas of Central America were alerted to the ongoing operations connected with OPERATION MARTILLO, triggering a pattern shift of the drug smugglers through Central America and a decrease in propaganda against the United States. Additionally, OPERATION MARTILLO fostered a positive relationship between two US Services to win the information fight; JIATF-South, in conjunction with partnered forces, intercepted several fast boats, bulk cash, and multiple tons of cocaine destined for the United States.

Various Sources

3. Support of Irregular Warfare

a. **General.** Irregular warfare (IW) is a form of warfare where state or non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities. MISO capabilities are applicable to both conventional warfare and IW, but their role in IW can be proportionally greater.

For more information on IW, see JP 1, Volume 1, Joint Warfighting.

(1) IW is a political-military struggle for legitimacy and influence through indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, to erode an adversary's power, influence, and motivation. IW may be between states, between state and non-state actors, or between non-state actors with no state involvement. Nation-states or non-state actors may conduct IW as an element of competition between adversaries, as a component of armed conflict, as an application of contingency response, or as a distinct armed conflict. During conventional warfare, state actors may employ state forces or non-state actors in an irregular capacity. Armed conflicts may include phases of IW or include IW in specific locations during operations. In IW, a less powerful adversary seeks to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and advantages of a more powerful military force. Weaker adversaries may use IW approaches to disrupt or neutralize the security provided by the military and other security forces of an

established political authority. Stronger adversaries may utilize IW approaches indirectly through proxies to achieve their strategic objectives while avoiding escalation to direct armed conflict between each other.

(2) The primacy of information and influence in IW, combined with pervasive and connected IE, drives all IW to be transnational in nature. Success in competition requires the joint force to deny adversaries the ability to achieve their objectives short of direct armed conflict, and to set the condition for crisis response, if it becomes necessary. The joint force conducts IW as part of globally integrated operations in concert with all elements of national power and by, with, and through allies and partners.

(3) In adversarial competition, IW may involve strengthening allies and partners, expanding the competitive space, creating dilemmas, and imposing costs that coerce an adversary into changing unacceptable behavior.

(4) During large-scale combat operations, IW may contribute to the military defeat of an enemy and subsequent stabilization of the operational area. Conversely, adversaries may employ IW to contribute to the military defeat of US or partner forces and increase instability in the operational area and costs of US operations.

b. **MISO and IW.** IW operations and activities include MISO, unconventional warfare (UW), FID, counterterrorism (CT), counterinsurgency, stabilization activities (in the context of IW, establishing or re-establishing order in a fragile state or territory), countering threat networks (includes counter threat finance and counter transnational organized crime), civil affairs operations, and military engagement activities (SC, CMO). The joint force conducts IW operations and activities as part of integrated campaigns to achieve favorable strategic outcomes in pursuit of US national interests. The ideological and political factors associated with IW create opportunities and necessity for the execution of MISO. Examples of applications to selected operations and activities within IW are:

(1) **FID.** MISO executed as part of FID center on enhancing a PN's ability to integrate security or military forces with other national-level capabilities to eliminate internal threats and prevent the emergence of new threats. MISO are employed to prepare TAs for US FID operations and to assist the PN in establishing an environment that promotes internal stability and security. MISO can increase PN support for programs that provide positive populace control and protection from adversary activities. PSYOP forces advise, train, and assist HN counterparts and government agencies to develop and implement information activities. PSYOP forces may conduct subject matter expert exchanges with PN forces that do not reach the threshold of building partner capacity. These exchanges share techniques and procedures between the two forces for the purpose of interoperability and familiarization. At CCMD level, MISO plans and activities are coordinated through the US country team.

For further details concerning FID, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

(2) **SFA.** SFA is DoD activities that support the development of the capability and capacity of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. The United States

conducts SFA as the military component to security sector assistance, which is used to leverage alliances and partnerships to jointly respond to shared security threats. Regarding MISO, a CCDR may conduct SFA to support or reinforce the impact of MISO, or conversely, the commander may conduct MISO to support a larger SFA effort to successfully develop partner capabilities.

For further details concerning SFA, refer to JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.

(3) **CT.** CT operations and activities can be executed simultaneously across the competition continuum. Information activities are key to influencing the TA and bolstering the legitimacy of combating terrorism. These operations and activities help isolate terrorists from the public. PSYOP forces are one capability for CT, particularly, in application of the indirect approach to shape, stabilize, and influence the environment in which violent extremist organizations operate. Terrorist groups gain sympathy and support of moderate audiences through disinformation and highlight of friendly force miscues and abuses of power.

For further details concerning CT, refer to JP 3-26, Joint Combating Terrorism.

(4) **Stability.** The objective of a stabilization effort is to establish conditions, which permit a HN society to function in harmony: democratic governance through rule of law, effective public security, functioning judicial system, revitalized economy, and restored essential services. Successful execution of stabilization tasks depends on informing the local populace of ongoing efforts and influencing attitudes to secure the trust and confidence of the population. MISO can be used to connect populations to relief organizations. MISO can provide public information to support humanitarian activities, ease suffering, and restore or maintain civil order. PSYOP forces work with the US country team and their HN counterparts to develop, produce, and disseminate MISO products.

For further details concerning stability activities, refer to JP 3-07, Joint Stabilization Activities.

(5) **Counterinsurgency Operations.** MISO can influence the attitudes and behavior of a population to obtain compliance or noninterference with US military operations or interim military governance. In addition, PSYOP units conduct activities to legitimize a PN government directly supported by US military forces, to establish and maintain popular support for HN institutions, programs, and activities. At the same time, forces conduct activities that delegitimize the insurgency and decrease popular support for the use of violence to solve political grievances. In addition, MISO can provide information to support joint forces or HN humanitarian activities to ease suffering and restore or maintain civil order.

For further details concerning counterinsurgency, refer to JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

(6) **UW.** UW consists of activities conducted in a denied area to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or

occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force. The focus on populations and their connections to the insurgency makes MISO a vital component of any UW operation. MISO support resistance and UW to undermine the legitimacy of a hostile regime while simultaneously building the legitimacy and credibility of the resistance. By engaging the population, forces develop and maintain the capability and capacity of all three components of an insurgency—the guerrilla force, the underground, and the auxiliary.

For further details concerning UW, refer to JP 3-05, Joint Doctrine for Special Operations.

(7) **Network Engagement.** MISO are particularly well-suited to apply against relevant neutral and threat networks and their adherents. MISO provide JFCs with ways and means to influence political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure aspects of the OE that may be as critical to operational success across the competition continuum. MISO can degrade and counter a threat network's combat power, reduce civilian interference, minimize collateral damage, and increase the population's support for friendly operations. TAs may include threat, adversary, friendly, and neutral groups, networks, or populations. Additionally, network analysis can support understanding TAs, their relationships among multiple audiences, and tailoring of messages.

For further details concerning network engagement and countering threat networks, refer to JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks.

4. Support of Armed Conflict

a. Armed conflict occurs when a state or non-state actor uses lethal force as the primary means to satisfy its interests. Armed conflict may occur transnationally or within a single nation between state or non-state actors. International law distinguishes armed conflict from disturbances (e.g., riots, violent protests) by the intensity of the conflict, organization of the actors involved, and the capacity of each actor to sustain armed violence. For DoD, armed conflict involves two strategic uses of military force—compellence and forcible action. Armed conflict varies in intensity and ranges from crisis response and limited contingency operations to large-scale combat operations.

(1) In relation to a CCP, crisis response and limited contingency operations occur as branches or sequels. In support of the CCP, MISO address various objectives across a theater. The outcomes of these operations establish conditions for success should the situation fail to be resolved and large-scale combat operations are conducted as a separate campaign.

(2) Whether categorized as crisis response, limited contingency operations, or large-scale combat operations, the general strategic and operational objectives that MISO support include:

(a) Preventing further conflict.

(b) Preventing surprise attack.

(c) Protecting US interests.

b. Warfare is “the how”—the ways and means—of armed conflict against an enemy. Warfare is reflective of the variable character of war and is transformed by the instruments of national power and other social, infrastructure, physical, and chronological factors. MISO planners require understanding of how the changing character of war frames the context in which wars are fought. Likewise, the conventions by which wars are fought are continually changing.

c. MISO are executed in both forms of warfare—conventional and irregular. The forms of warfare are applied not in terms of an either/or choice, but in various combinations to suit a combatant’s strategy and capabilities. Both forms of warfare serve the same strategic purpose—to defeat an enemy—they take fundamentally different approaches to achieving their purpose, yet both also account for relevant populations. Conventional warfare is dependent on the degree that the people in the operational area accept the imposed, arbitrated, or negotiated result. IW seeks to erode an adversarial or hostile political authority’s legitimacy and influence and to exhaust its will—not to defeat its armed forces—while supporting the legitimacy, influence, and will of friendly political authorities engaged in the struggle. Warfare does not always fit neatly into these subjective categories, but rather blends the two forms to win. The blending of forms of warfare in armed conflict includes operations to ensure the safety of US citizens and interests while maintaining and improving US ability to operate with multinational partners to deter the hostile ambitions of potential aggressors.

d. The JFC’s MISO planners conduct analysis of the human, informational, and physical aspects of the environment to understand and account for the impact of relevant populations on operations. The JFC’s MISO planners account for the blending of the two types of warfare in JPP outputs including programs, estimates, tabs, and orders.

e. PSYOP units execute assigned missions, focusing on behaviors that contribute to objectives such as:

(1) Conducting successful personnel recovery efforts in all types of operations.

(2) Creating civilian interference with enemy operations.

(3) Creating the element of surprise and combat initiative for friendly forces.

(4) Degrading and destroying forces.

(5) Degrading enemy combat power.

(6) Degrading the decision-making abilities and operational effectiveness of the enemy.

- (7) Exploiting and amplifying enemy failures and actions.
- (8) Exploiting and amplifying friendly successes.
- (9) Exploiting the psychological effects of deception activities on enemy leaders and forces.
- (10) Minimizing civilian interference with friendly military operations.
- (11) Mitigating the unintended consequences of military actions.
- (12) Protecting key infrastructure critical to achieving military objectives.
- (13) Reducing friendly, civilians, and enemy casualties.
- (14) Reducing the will of the enemy to resist.

f. Understanding the relationships between the environment, populations, and operations facilitates transition to post-combat consolidation, stabilization, return to competition, and transition efforts required to translate military victory into enduring strategic objectives. MISO support the JFC's efforts for legitimacy, credibility, and influence over the affected population. Whether in armed conflict with the armed forces of a nation or violent extremist organizations and other irregular threats such as insurgents, relevant populations are targeted for influence by the PSYOP units conducting operations. The military defeat of a regular threat may be temporary if the population does not accept the result. In this case, the likelihood increases that the population will turn to irregular threats to find an acceptable outcome.

5. Plan for Enablers

a. Intelligence

(1) PSYOP personnel require an in-depth understanding of the behavior of select TAs and their behavioral motivation. Intelligence analysis, capabilities, and processes are necessary for gaining an appreciation of those aspects of the OE that can affect TA behavior. Further, assessing MISO effectiveness requires tailored, continuous intelligence support for the duration of the assessment, which begins with an integrated collection plan developed during the planning process.

(2) TAA includes a thorough examination of the political, military, economic, cultural, religious, psychological, and social conditions that shape the OE and influence the behavior of the individuals and groups within that environment. This information derives from integration in the intelligence process. MISO planners identify information requirements and use the intelligence process to request needed information used in conducting TAA.

(3) Intelligence plays a critical role in evaluation by providing input and data to assess MISO MOEs. These may include both quantitative and qualitative data such as changes in TA participation in the political process, increased surrenders, increased defections, or increased civilian cooperation with multinational requests or directives, as well as timely reporting and as appropriate release of source data to counter malign adversary disinformation and misinformation.

(4) MISO intelligence requirements include strategic assessments, running estimates, background studies, and target folders. Current cultural information, including language, literacy, historical context, group membership, and normative affiliation, is a critical information requirement that may or may not be readily available from intelligence sources but could originate from reports and information from DOS and partners and allies. Information on taboos, traditions, venerated figures, myths, affiliations, and current attitudes assists in planning efforts, as well as developing assessment criteria for MOEs. Each command evaluates its assigned missions and operational areas and identifies specific intelligence needs. The thoroughness of this evaluation and identification determine how well intelligence-gathering organizations can collect essential information and produce relevant intelligence products. **Development of MISO-related information should be predicated on a detailed collection plan with specific collection requirements to utilize all available sources and techniques.** It should include basic intelligence and country studies on foreign cultures and particular TAs, as well as current intelligence on foreign group capabilities, behavior, and motivation. An initial part of the collection plan is the inclusion of site exploitation to obtain collectible exploitable material. Collectable exploitable material includes the collection of biometrics in the area of operations, which assists in identifying the population to TAs and their associated networks. More importantly, document and media exploitation, such as cell phone and social media exploitation, provides details on the TA, such as how and with whom they communicate, as well as insights on threat messaging. The subsequent identity intelligence conducted on this collected exploitable material results in products that inform planning.

(5) MISO staff planners identify and provide mission-specific requirements for raw and finished intelligence products to the intelligence community so that time-sensitive requirements are prioritized, tasked, processed, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner.

(6) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. The theater intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance CONOPS fully integrates and optimizes the use of all national, multinational, allied, open-source, and other requested intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. MISO rely on theater intelligence products based on a whole-of-government approach that occurs within the intelligence community.

(a) These products are necessary to determine correlation, causality, general effectiveness of MISO, and collateral and other incidental risks.

(b) Allocation of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to collect MOE/MOP data takes place during planning.

For further detail concerning intelligence support to operations, refer to the JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

b. Network Analysis

(1) Network analysis can provide a better understanding of the audience, increasing the likelihood of successfully influencing them. Network analysis can provide a method to visualize, measure, and understand the TA, which can aid analysts in crafting effective strategies. An initial network diagram can provide an understanding of how the audience functions as a group. Some products that may be obtained from network analysis might include a diagram of TA's leadership relationships, a list of TA vulnerabilities, or an overlay that shows various nodes of an organization on a map.

(2) Network analysis enables identification of relations between actors that either constrain or enable the desired behavior based on the location of the actor in the network. This can include determining who within the network has the power and reach to achieve the desired objective. Certain actors within the network may be constrained because others prevent them from behaving in the desired manner. Conversely, actors on the periphery are less constrained by the network and may have the power to enact the desired behavior. Highly constrained actors have little ability to shift behavior due to too many connections, or connections that require some form of approval from other actors as in the operations network described earlier. Conversely, actors that lie between clusters or on the periphery of the network are less constrained and are probably more prone to outside influence.

(3) Network analysis can identify the ideal set of actors who can maximize information dispersal through a network, as well as identify nodes whose removal from the network provide optimal network fragmentation. Potential influencers can be identified through network analysis. Topographic analysis of social networks can identify characteristics like those who are most central or those who are information brokers. Once potential influencers are identified, further analysis would be implemented to assess the nature of the influencer's relationship with the desired audience(s). Geo-location data, event times, and change detection methods can be incorporated in network analysis to provide further insight on the network.

(4) There are several methods and products that can assist in network analysis (see Figure III-4). In all cases, network analysis is a continuous process that is never complete, and when new information on the audience is gained, it is appropriately updated and the measures recalculated.

For further information and details of different types of network analysis, refer to JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks.

c. Logistics

Methods of Network Analysis Summary

The following is a brief summary of the methods of network analysis. They are categorized in terms of how much information they typically provide as well as the level of effort they require to conduct.

Initial or Basic Analysis

Mapping the network - Understanding participants and general relationships.

Intermediate Analysis

Cell analysis and network function - Identify key network functions.

Analyzing node-link relationships - Qualitative or general understanding of relationships between nodes and roles individual nodes may play in the network.

Advanced Analysis

Social network analysis - Quantitative or computational understanding of network relationships, understanding of entire network structure, enables predictive analysis.

Critical factors analysis - Understanding of capabilities, linked to functions, and linked to vulnerabilities. Provides a framework for center of gravity identification and analysis required for operational planning against threat networks.

Figure III-4. Methods of Network Analysis Summary

(1) MISO execution during sustained operations requires logistics support. The CCMD or appropriate Service component staff integrates logistics support into planning. PSYOP units depend primarily on the supported unit for all classes of resupply, maintenance, base support, and dissemination contracting support. See Figure III-5 for MISO logistics requirements.

(2) MISO planners provide input to the supported unit on common and specialized sustainment requirements to enable continuous, responsive, and effective MISO. The supported unit forecasts procurement and sustainment. In addition, fixed-site facilities may also be required during extended operations to house and secure sizeable and highly technical equipment and electronic components used for large-scale production and dissemination of multimedia products.

(3) There are three main categories of MISO support requirements:

(a) **Service Common.** PSYOP forces use a broad range of equipment that requires service with common expendable and major end-item components from across the classes of supply. These assets are generally acquired and sustained through normal supply channels.

(b) **Specialized Support.** When established, the POTF can serve as a consolidated source of MISO unique repair parts and maintenance in theater. Supplies needed for production of MISO products can be procured through the supported unit or possibly purchased from HN vendors. Transportation assets for product distribution are

Military Information Support Operations Sustainment Requirements			
Types of Supplies or Services	Examples	Sources	When Used
Service Common	Vehicle and generator repair parts; maintenance; batteries; petroleum, oils, and lubricants; tactical radio and communications equipment; ammunition; rations; water; clothing and individual equipment; medical, dental, and mental health; optics and night-vision; personnel services; and access to operational communication networks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Supported unit Service common supply chain 	Upon formal attachment or designation of other support arrangement
Military Information Support Operations—Unique: Systems, Parts, Maintenance, and Expendable Supplies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Radio and television broadcast systems Audio-visual production systems Broadband secure satellite transmission systems Loudspeaker systems Print and copier inks, cleaners, and maintenance Digital media Leaflet boxes and static lines Specific weight bulk paper Leaflet canister 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordination through higher military information support operations component or headquarters Local contract for commercially available supplies and services 	Throughout the operation
Base Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Access-controlled workspace for product development and storage Climate-controlled work areas for print presses, production systems Voltage-regulated power source Classified material destruction Billeting; morale, welfare, and recreation; all other base services 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Supported unit 	When conducting extended operations in a fixed site
Contract Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Local production of unclassified products (print, radio, video, web, etc.) Polling to support measure of effectiveness analysis Linguist support Hiring of local writers, on-air personalities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Supported unit Higher military information support operations component or headquarters Host or partner nations 	As soon as operationally required or feasible

Figure III-5. Military Information Support Operations Sustainment Requirements

also arranged through the supported unit or from the HN. Long-term sustainment of production requirements and transportation through HN sources should be handled through a contract.

(c) **Operational Contract Support.** Operational contract support is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of CCDR-directed operations, as well as CCDR-directed, single-Service activities, regardless of designation as a formal contingency operations or not. PSYOP forces frequently utilize commercial services for a wide range of requirements, including

the production, distribution, and dissemination of multimedia products; allocation of linguists, writers, and research and polling; or specialized equipment repair.

For further details concerning operational contract support, see JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

(4) During planning, it is vital to consider the potential for MISO to rely on less sophisticated equipment found in various parts of the world. HN support may reduce the strain on US logistic systems. **Locally available resources for required supplies and services, whether through the HN government or commercial entities, should be identified in advance.** Early identification of HN support is critical to the establishment of agreements or contracts to provide needed supplies, equipment, and facilities for MISO.

(5) During multinational operations, US logistic systems, unless otherwise determined by agreements, directives, or approved OPLANs, support MISO integration and execution. HN forces involved in US-sponsored or US-supported MISO may provide some level of logistic support and should be identified in advance.

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CHAPTER IV

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS PROCESS

“There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five gives rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. There are not more than five primary colors, yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen. There are not more than five cardinal tastes, yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.”

Sun Tzu
The Art of War

1. General

a. The MISO process consists of seven phases: **planning; TAA; series development; product development and design; approval; production, distribution, and dissemination; and assessment.** This chapter provides an overview of the seven phases with the major steps or tasks in each one.

b. Joint MISO planners execute their responsibilities using the seven-phase MISO process. These responsibilities address important considerations and include activities to integrate MISO with the CCDR’s military strategy and mission. Figure IV-1 depicts the relationship between the process phases and planners’ responsibilities.

c. MISO are continuously analyzed, assessed, and refined, based on the changing OE and IE. Throughout the seven-phase MISO process, MISO planners continuously conduct four primary tasks: analyze, advise, plan, and assess. The first task, analyze, is a continuous activity that underlies and enables all other tasks and directly impacts the effectiveness of the seven phases. Without “analyze,” all other activities are deprived of vital and required information. Planners also advise the supported commander or COM about how best to align all influence efforts with their intent. Planning occurs continuously, both within the process and to integrate MISO with the supported unit’s or organization’s plan. Assessment occurs simultaneously and in parallel with planning, using a combination of MOPs, MOEs, and measures of indicator to determine effectiveness of the MISO and, if necessary, to refine ongoing MISO activities.

2. Phase I: Planning

a. The national security strategy, national military strategy, *Unified Command Plan*, and the JSCP provide guidance to all CCMDs with assigned AORs to develop theater strategies. Planners on the CCMD’s staff devise specific MISO programs and objectives that support the achievement of the objectives in the theater strategy.

b. PSYOP unit leaders and assigned planners advise commanders, COMs, and staffs to increase situational awareness and understanding of the effects individuals and groups have in the OE. They evaluate the psychological effects of military actions and country team or PN influence efforts to maximize effectiveness and minimize adverse impact and




Figure IV-1. Relationship of Military Information Support Operations Process Phases and Psychological Operations Core Tasks

unintended consequences. Planners also advise the commander on implementing the most streamlined MISO series approval process possible, while still maintaining the appropriate oversight of MISO in the AOR. US forces conduct military operations in areas that often include friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy civilian populations, as well as military and government organizations. It is important that JFCs understand the human aspect of military operations—how military operations affect individuals, groups, and even entire populations. PSYOP personnel advise Service component and joint component commanders and staffs on psychological aspects of the OE, to include:

- (1) Planning military operations that shape the attitudes and behavior of selected individuals, groups, and populations.
- (2) Targeting with actions and messages to create psychological effects.
- (3) Determining the best means to deliver messages to individuals and populations in the operational area.

- (4) Measuring the effectiveness of MISO.
- (5) Assessing competitor, adversary, and enemy influence capabilities.
- (6) Assessing the potential effects of competitor, adversary, and enemy influence activities.

c. A MISO program provides the required policy guidance. All actions and messages for psychological effect comply with the stated parameters in the approved program.

d. The goal of planning is to integrate MISO, and all DoD influence activities, into the commander's vision and CONOPS. Programs initiate as a result of the first phase of the seven-phase MISO process. The executing element leverages approved MISO programs which continue through subsequent phases. PSYOP staff planners adjust the plan, as required, to achieve the commander's objectives.

For more information about joint planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

e. CCPs reflect national security and defense strategies and planning guidance and focus on the CCDR's ongoing operations, military engagement, SC, deterrence, and other shaping or preventive activities. MISO planners devise programs to support both the CCDR's objectives in the region and the embassies' country plans. Planners typically submit MISO programs as part of a CCP. They may submit stand-alone programs to the Joint Staff for review but subsequently integrate the approved program into the overall CCP. The Joint Staff forwards proposed programs per OSD policies for review and interagency coordination. The Joint Staff provides CCMDs the approved MISO programs to execute.

f. Prior to conducting MISO, CCDRs have their MISO program(s) approved in accordance with DoD policy. To gain approval, the CCDR submits a proposed program(s) through the Joint Staff J-3 for Joint Staff coordination. Once complete, the program then goes to OSD for interagency coordination. MISO programs in a CCP, OPLAN, EXORD, JSCP, or a stand-alone program are approved per OSD policies. Although the format of a MISO program may vary depending on the scope or complexity of the program, **at a minimum, each program approval request addresses the following:**

For more information, see DoDD 5111.01, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), and DoDD 5111.10, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.

(1) **MISO Objectives.** These objectives are general statements of measurable response that reflect the desired behavioral change of TAs. MISO objectives support the accomplishment of the stated military mission and ensure the program is appropriately scoped. MISO objectives are written as a sentence using a verb-object structure (e.g., decrease the effectiveness of opposition forces or increase support for the provisional

government.). MISO objectives should be appropriately scoped to enable subsequent development of two or more supporting MISO objectives.

(2) **TAs.** The potential list of TAs enables senior decision makers to understand what networks and individuals may be targeted through conduct of MISO. This understanding is necessary so that the program can be coordinated and deconflicted with other USG departments and agencies.

(3) **Themes to Stress and Avoid.** Themes to stress are generalized statements that provide the broad thematic direction of the MISO program. Themes to avoid are generalized statements that capture prohibited topics or that jeopardize diplomatic relations or other USG equities. These statements, once approved, provide the program with administration policy for execution.

(4) **Means of Dissemination.** All means of dissemination that could be used to engage the program's TAs should be listed. By providing the possible dissemination methods for a program, senior decision makers better understand how TAs may be exposed to the information disseminated in support of the program's objectives. They can also better understand the breadth of the proposed MISO.

(5) **Attribution Plan.** The type of attribution desired (USG or partner attribution, or non-attribution) is stated and justified. If USG attribution is used, articulate if it is immediate or delayed. In either case, provide the detailed plan for making the MISO apparent or publicly acknowledged.

(6) **Designated Approval Authority.** CCMDs should state at what level they intend to delegate MISO series approval within their MISO program submission. They should also provide a justification for requests where series approval may reside at different echelons. Requests for designated approval authority for special categories of products (e.g., force protection) can also be included in the program submission.

(7) **CONOPS.** This concept provides sufficient detail for leaders to deconflict and synchronize the MISO program with other departmental and agency activities.

(8) **Concept for Assessment.** Assessments require time and resources and are accounted for early in the planning process. A concept of assessment is required to ensure assessments are coordinated and necessary data is made available to allow for assessment of objectives. The concept should have feedback mechanisms included so the program can be adjusted as needed. Furthermore, the concept of assessment should discuss how assessments are conducted at each level of a specific operation. For example, a concept of assessment should describe the methodology for aggregating multiple tactical engagements at the operational level, and how those operational assessments are subsequently combined into an overall theater-level assessment.

(9) **Assessment of Potential for Collateral Effects and Exposure to Unintended Audiences.** CCMDs provide a narrative description concerning the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3110.05, *Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan*, contains a list of preapproved military information support operations programs for use in Secretary of Defense-approved missions, operations, and *Unified Command Plan*-directed activities. These programs also include security sector assistance and operations such as maritime interdiction operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, foreign humanitarian assistance operations, introduction of United States forces into an area of responsibility/force protection, and personnel recovery.

likelihood and possible consequences of MISO causing collateral effects or being received by unintended recipients.

(10) **Assessment of Risk by the Execution of the Planned MISO.** This risk assessments should explain the greatest possible risk; making a determination of high, medium, or low risk; and provide any proposed mitigation steps.

(11) **CCMD Proposed PA Guidance.** The proposed PA guidance prepares the requesting command to discuss this MISO program when/if necessary. Figure IV-2 depicts the stand-alone program submission process per CJCSI 3110.05, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan, and DoDI O-3607.02, Military Information Support Operations (MISO).

g. CCDRs may also submit programs as part of their overall plans. After review, the Joint Staff forwards all plans to OSD for review, interagency coordination, and execution authority. MISO portions of the plans are reviewed and staffed per OSD policies through the interagency coordination process. SecDef normally approves the MISO program as part of the CCDR's plan. An EXORD is sent to the CCMD, containing approval for the program, execution authorities, the approval authority for actions and messages, and other related guidance. Figure IV-3 depicts an example of a program submission as part of a CCMD plan.

For more information, see DoDD 5111.10, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.

h. MISO programs become part of the CCP or OPLAN. Planners base subsequent operations and activities on the commander's objectives and take into account the key components of an approved program, including objectives, approval authorities, potential TAs (and any that are restricted), themes to stress and avoid, the appropriate attribution method, the delivery platforms for messages, and the choices of media authorized.

i. Once approved, MISO programs remain valid, in effect, and authorized unless otherwise stated in the program approval document or until they are rescinded by the approving authority. Changes in themes, objectives, TAs, means of dissemination, or attribution of an approved program require that program to be resubmitted for approval.





Figure IV-2. Stand-Alone Military Information Support Operations Program Submission Process

j. Supporting MISO Objectives. Once the program, and its MISO objectives are approved, PSYOP staff planners focus on developing supporting MISO objectives. Supporting MISO objectives are the specific behavioral responses desired from the TA to accomplish a given MISO objective. Each MISO objective should allow planners to develop two or more supporting MISO objectives that are written in a sentence using a subject-verb construct, with the subject being the generic term “TA” (e.g., The TA reports insurgent activity to local authorities.). Following the development of MISO objectives and supporting MISO objectives, planners identify potential TAs that planners initially assessed as having the ability to achieve the supporting MISO objectives. Figure F-1 depicts the hierarchy of MISO objective, supporting objective, series, and TA.

k. Initial assessment criteria development occur during the planning process and throughout the seven-phase MISO process. Assessment criteria are written as questions that, when answered, describe trends in behavior change (e.g., How many voting-age civilians registered to vote? How many voting-age civilians voted?). These behaviors should be measured during phase I so that over time, these trends help determine the degree of success in achieving the supporting MISO objective. They focus the MISO influence collection effort on areas that indicate to what extent supporting MISO objectives are being

Military Information Support Operations Program Submission Process as a Part of Combatant Command Plan



Legend

CCDR	combatant commander	OPR	office of primary responsibility
CCMD	combatant command	OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
EXORD	execute order	OUSD(P)	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
J-5	Strategic Plans and Policy	USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
JSCP	Joint Strategic Campaign Plan		
MISO	military information support operations		

Figure IV-3. Military Information Support Operations Program Submission Process as a Part of Combatant Command Plan

achieved. MISO planners determine the specific assessment criteria for each series during phase II of the process.

3. Phase II: Target Audience Analysis

a. TAA is the cornerstone of effective MISO. MISO are ineffectual or even detrimental to mission accomplishment without this critical analysis of the TA. TAA begins upon the completion or near-completion of MISO planning and network analysis. An approved program contains a list of MISO objectives and potential TAs. During TAA, planners analyze approved groups and individuals by following the TAA model. Accurate and meaningful TAA requires research and in-depth analysis of large amounts of information coupled with language and sociocultural knowledge at native or near-native level. Much of the data required to initiate and complete a thorough analysis derives from the supported commander's collection efforts, to include publicly available information. These requirements are determined early in planning, as intelligence organizations and other enablers provide much of the necessary data and information. Additional unclassified information can be obtained across the joint force (e.g., SC event records, CMO action,

engineer, and port structural assessments), actions done by allies and partners, and from other interorganizational entities. During TAA, MISO planners also evaluate the sources of information to determine their credibility, accuracy, and relevance.

For further guidance on publicly available information policy, see DoDD 3115.18, DoD Access to and Use of Publicly Available Information (PAI).

b. During TAA, MISO planners carefully analyze groups or individuals for their effectiveness (ability to achieve objectives), vulnerability and susceptibility to influence, and accessibility (best means of dissemination to reach the TA). Determining the conditions is the key to understanding the behavior of the TAs and influencing or changing that behavior. This phase also takes into account the potential for incidental and unintended consequences. Social network analysis, which is a network analytical approach distinct from social media, can support understanding non-intuitive or un-obvious influence relationships among individuals or groups, as well as help identify potential points of entry to social groups for messaging, whether threat, neutral, or friendly. The end product of TAA is the MISO overall argument and approach used to obtain the desired behavior from the TA as well as recommended PSYACTs the United States and its allies can take to influence the TAs.

For further information on social network analysis, refer to JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks.

c. TAA results provide the foundation for the remaining phases of the process. Analysis is ongoing and continuous throughout the entire operation, updating information as it is learned, as the environment changes and as changes in the OE require different TAs or planners select new ones. Detailed TAA facilitates the MISO series development and approval process because it yields substantial documentation outlining the rationale behind each series of products and actions. Figure IV-4 depicts the TAA model.

4. Phase III: Series Development

a. Series development is a complex, creative, and collaborative process that forms synergy between multiple MISO products and PSYACTs to achieve the desired behavior change for a single TA. Rarely does a single product change the behavior of a TA. TA behavior is best influenced by a consistent and coordinated series of multiple products and actions that incorporate an appropriate mix of media. The information gleaned as a result of TAA is used to develop series and products and actions to support the achievement of a supporting MISO objective. The PSYOP force core task of development encompasses phases III and IV and includes overall series development and individual message development.

b. In developing series, MISO planners design multiple actions and products, determine the appropriate types and mix of delivery means, and develop an execution plan. **Each series focuses on a single supporting MISO objective and a single TA combination.** The size (number of products or actions) of the series is determined by what




Figure IV-4. Target Audience Analysis in Relation to Phases I and III

is required to change the behavior of the TA. Planners periodically review series for their suitability, length or duration, potential to affect the TAs, effectiveness of actions for psychological effects, accuracy of persuasive arguments or techniques to influence behavior change, potential for incidental or unintended consequences, and the resources available to execute them. MISO planners establish an assessment plan accompanying each series to facilitate data collection and measure the effectiveness of each product and action. In terms of a specific process, there are five sequential tasks as depicted in Figure IV-5.

5. Phase IV: Product Development and Design

a. The work completed during the planning, TAA, and series development phases is vital for devising effective PSYACTs and designing individual products in a series. There are three basic categories of products: visual, audio, and audiovisual. Each type of product has specific considerations that are addressed during the development. Fixed and deployable US capabilities, PN capabilities, and commercial vendors provide the technical expertise and tools to design and create all types. The applicable MISO program lists the types of media, including the use of Internet-based media and electromagnetic spectrum dissemination platforms approved for production and delivery.




Figure IV-5. Phase III: Series Development Tasks

b. During phase IV, evaluating TA understanding and acceptance of the arguments conveyed in a message is a key supporting task for the overall development task. Pretesting products helps establish a baseline for conducting post-testing of the series after delivery. Figure IV-6 depicts steps in product development and design.

6. Phase V: Approval

a. A well-managed, responsive series approval process is fundamental to MISO efforts. During phase V, PSYOP officers and noncommissioned officers formally review series. Reviewers evaluate the potential of the series to achieve the desired objective and the continuity of messages and media. The potential for any collateral effects, exposure to unintended audiences, or other unintended consequences is also evaluated. Once the designated PSYOP officer approves, developers formally submit the series package to an established staffing chain to obtain final approval for production and execution. Figure IV-7 depicts an example series approval staffing chain.

b. As the series passes through the required staff sections, action officers responsible for obtaining approval at each echelon monitor progress until the packet returns to the originating unit. Series approval occurs at the lowest level of command SecDef authorizes. Approval authority may reside at the CCMD or may be delegated to a subordinate component, task force, or unit commander. Depending on the delegation authorized, series approval may reside with a designated member of the staff. Regardless of the level of approval, a PSYOP qualified officer should be in the approval chain. Approval is required before media production or the execution of actions for psychological effect can begin.




Figure IV-6. Phase IV: Product Development and Design

7. Phase VI: Production, Distribution, and Dissemination

a. Phase VI of the MISO process begins once series approval is granted. This phase consists of the production, distribution, and dissemination of products and PSYACTs in a series and the subsequent post-testing of these products. The approved series helps guide PSYOP leaders in the establishment of priority for products production. The production process ranges from simple (hours) to complex (days/months). MISO planners and JFCs should be aware of the production timeline for the selected medias. The accuracy and timeliness of and the method selected for the dissemination of a series are critical in today's rapidly evolving IE. PSYOP units may deploy with organic production assets or utilize continental US-based operational support to coordinate for in-theater or regional support. They also have the ability to request other USG resources or to use locally contracted resources within theater. Once production is complete, the unit distributes products to lower echelon elements for dissemination to TAs.

b. Distribution is the movement of approved products, either physically (air or ground transport) or electronically (Internet or global communication systems), from the production location to the point of dissemination. Distribution may also involve the temporary storage of products for later dissemination.




Figure IV-7. Example of Series Concurrency Staffing Chain

c. Dissemination is the actual delivery of the message to the TA. With increased reliance on sophisticated near real-time media (Internet and smartphones) dissemination, information or sometimes the withholding of information is power. Once MISO arguments and messages have been chosen, the PSYOP unit commander decides what the most effective way to convey them to the TA. TAA and intelligence about the operational area determine the appropriate and most effective dissemination means. Radio and television broadcasts, the Internet, smartphones, text messaging, leaflet drops, and loudspeaker operations are some of the means used throughout the world to disseminate messages. Messages also are communicated through face-to-face contact with the local populace or with respected key communicators. Figure IV-8 depicts the sequence and significant aspects of production, distribution, and dissemination.

d. Phase VI is also when PSYACT plans are formalized or finalized, and final coordination is completed. PSYOP units may be the executors, but the command can also formally task any required capability or force to conduct required PSYACTs. The command tasks PSYACTs execution through the orders process.

e. Post-testing is conducted at key decision points during the series development and directly following series execution. During post-testing, MISO staff assess TA exposure to the series, as well as the understanding and acceptance of the MISO argument. Post-testing determines which products in the series are reaching the TA, what portions of the argument are resonating with the TA, and what degree of influence the series has on the TA. Post-testing also evaluates any collateral effects, exposure to unintended audiences, or other unintended consequences. The results of post-testing are evaluated to determine




Figure IV-8. Sequence and Significant Aspects of Phase VI

if the series requires improvements or modifications. Key difference between pretesting and post-testing are:

(1) Pretesting on a small population is used to refine products prior to large scale dissemination.

(2) Post-testing allows for the assessment of a TA to determine changes in desired cognitions, attitudes, and behaviors as they are assessed in a baseline measurement.

(3) Pretesting can be conducted with a small sample of the TA or a panel of experts or representatives—post-testing is always conducted with members of the TA.

For further details, see CJCSI 3110.05, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan.

8. Phase VII: Assessment

a. Assessment is the process for evaluating the achievement of supporting MISO objectives and for assessing the overall impact of a series on TA behavior. At any given time, a series is only one of numerous competing sources of influence on a TA's behavior.

Consequently, the assessment of MISO's impact on TA behavior is complex and requires that objective measures be supplemented by a degree of subjective analysis. Assessing the effects of messages and actions relies on impact indicators and analyses produced in earlier phases. Initial assessment criteria are established in phase I and are refined in phase II. Assessment criteria support the commander's MOEs and MOPs and help determine the effectiveness of an operation. Assessment criteria focus on TA achievement of supporting MISO objectives. Planners establish assessment methodology to analyze the effectiveness of influence efforts and continuously assess the effectiveness of MISO in achieving the commander's objectives.

b. PSYOP personnel assess MISO effectiveness within the context of competing information and influence efforts, spontaneous events, and other uncontrollable environmental and psychological factors that shape behavior. Unanticipated and spontaneous events can potentially influence a group's behavior and contribute to or undermine objective accomplishment. However, the impact of uncontrollable factors can be mitigated or controlled for with a scientifically rigorous assessment design and methodology. Series assessment assists in focusing assessment on the performance or effectiveness of a series and provides the basis to adjust or maintain the series. The results of the assessment are thus twofold, as they:

(1) Provide data-driven insights on the TAs' progress toward achieving supporting MISO objectives.

(2) Contribute data that are relevant for the commander's understanding of progress toward TA achievement of MOEs, MOPs, and overall MISO assessment.

c. Planners consider a wide variety of data sources to assess MISO effectiveness. Taken together, data sources such as intelligence products, public opinion data, focus groups, open-source data, surveys, social media and other web metrics, and key leader engagements provide evidence of effectiveness and yield more valid conclusions than those based on single sources of information. Assessment allows PSYOP forces to monitor behavior change in TAs and provide feedback to guide the influence effort. Assessment is challenging, and successful assessment relies on the involvement and judgment of the commander, comprehensive planning, research, coordination, and analysis. Assessment is even more challenging when it requires assessment of non-TAs, but this is necessary for PSYOP forces to understand any collateral effects, exposure to unintended audiences, or other unintended consequences that MISO may cause. Figure IV-9 depicts the assessment sequence.




Figure IV-9. Assessment Sequence

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CHAPTER V

THE FUTURE OF MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

1. Anticipating the Future Operational Environment

a. Introduction

(1) The world will continue to change but the tenets of global competition will not. Information has always been and will remain central throughout the competition continuum because the goal of any nation is to influence other actors to choose actions that favor its interests. Today, national leaders recognize the reemerging critical importance of information in securing and defending national interests. Leaders are also discovering the structural shortfalls in considering and wielding information to gain national advantage.

(2) The character of war is changing at an accelerating pace, especially in the information environment. The joint force faces revolutionary technologies that will impact how nations and militaries use information. For example, advancements in space, cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum, information digitization, and new methods are expanding the OE and creating new requirements. MISO applications will manifest through artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML), and a globally connected IE. These changes are impacting, accelerating, and expanding JFC's requirements. JFCs will have to consider how these fundamental shifts affect their concepts of operations to meet the challenge of the expanding OE. Current trends point to requirements for fast-paced, high-tech joint all-domain operations (JADO) that can address rapidly changing situations.

(3) The commander's expanded visualization of information as part of an OE is increasingly important to determine how a joint campaign or an individual operation can transform current conditions, secure future advantage, or win without fighting. This chapter offers insights and understanding of emerging MISO requirements and contributions to future campaigns and operations.

b. The Future OE

(1) The rapidly shifting information environment will pose opportunities and challenges to JFCs' global campaigns and CCPs. JFCs will continuously adapt to evolving adversary approaches to mitigate risks and seek advantage across the competition continuum. JFCs should reassess current C2 structures to keep pace with accelerating change in the information environment and better integrate information into campaigning. To supplement organizational change, JFCs should leverage emerging technological advancements and consider technology impacts on societal communication.

(2) Adversaries will likely expand use of malign influence to pursue their goals and objectives in an increasingly aggressive and hostile manner. JFCs should expect adversaries to deny access to information as well as spread misinformation and disinformation through propaganda and other deceptive means. Adversaries will increasingly seek advantage by conducting subversive and coercive competition activities

to wield the full weight of their influence short of armed conflict, while preparing options to escalate to violence if necessary.

c. Challenges, Threats, and Trends

(1) Adversaries in a multi-polar world are likely to continue to aggressively challenge the interests of the United States, allies, and partners short of armed conflict and compete to further their interests. Due to advancements and proliferation of technology and continued diffusion of diplomatic or political, hard and soft power, peer and near-peer challengers may increasingly gain confidence in their capabilities to prevail in armed conflict against the United States. Adversaries will employ both conventional and irregular activities as they seek to exploit opportunities and friendly vulnerabilities across multiple environments and all domains. Adversary actions are increasingly multi-modal and impact all domains. JFCs should expect peer, near-peer, state, and non-state actors to exhibit more complex approaches to information activities. Adversaries will present transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional dilemmas that challenge the United States' ability to advance shared interests with its allies and partners. The growing interconnectivity of geo-strategic, socioeconomic, and informational factors increasing complexity and uncertainty in the expanding OE.

(2) Integrated campaigning is essential to effectively address malign adversary activity. Adversaries will likely take small steps to avoid catastrophic triggers that lead to armed conflict. Adversaries will avoid armed conflict to reduce cognitive resistance to their activities and goals among the international community and create advantage. Therefore, the United States may struggle to effectively address small encroachments against established norms or US interests. JFCs will have to identify, contextualize, and respond with proportional actions aligned with national strategy and other instruments of national power. JFCs will also consider the risks of escalation management and desired outcomes of perception management. Failure to identify and respond to malign adversary activity over time will likely put the United States in a position of disadvantage. Disadvantages may manifest as adversaries building bases to expand their reach, a reduction in allied or partner support and basing for the United States, or a lack of support to the United States from the international community.

(3) JFCs campaign over various lengths of time, particularly for cognitive informational actions and effects. It is likely to take months or years for JFCs to convince audiences to change their understanding of a topic, their perceptions, and ultimately their behavior. Even if an audience does change, the ability of JFCs to detect that change will also vary over time. The planners' assessment of the effects created by the JFCs use of information can also take weeks or months even with substantial resources. This investment of time departs from historic examples of immediate battlefield damage assessments. Therefore, JFCs will shift mindsets and culture to see campaigning as an activity across multiple commanders' tenures and assessing the effects of preceding commanders.

(4) A wide variety of threats are emerging with the diffusion of power, challenging international rules and norms, and proliferating their technology. Adversaries

amplify these threats with their pervasive reach and influence. In the expanding OE, JFCs may be at a technological disadvantage in achieving MISO objectives with joint, national, and partners. To counter, JFCs should leverage US, allied, and partner values such as transparency and accountability to establish consistent narratives and bolster friendly credibility among audiences.

(5) Adversaries may use generative AI to create and disseminate deepfake video and audio content on the Internet that can undermine, degrade, and discredit the United States and its allies and partners. Adversaries may also employ ML techniques to evaluate populations and rapidly analyze large volumes of data to gain decision advantage. JFCs can expect that adversaries will merge new technologies with hostile techniques.

(6) Peer and near-peer adversaries and other malign actors will continue to exploit vulnerabilities to leverage their influence to weaken the United States' legitimacy and relationships with its allies and partners. Adversaries will continue to steal, surveil, and counter our technology and military advancements. They will develop and employ countermeasures against DoD technological advancements, new weapons systems, and innovative ways to employ their own OIE. As the OE becomes more saturated, more complex, more confusing, and more contested, adversaries will exploit the IE through disinformation, misinformation, and other activities to undermine the joint force operations, activities, and investments.

d. The Response for MISO

(1) The future joint force will have to exert effort to gain or maintain information advantage over the opponent. The United States and adversaries will compete through information activities enabling the fusion of physical and informational power. This includes understanding, disseminating, and acting on informational intelligence that enables JFCs' movement and maneuver of key elements, conduct of relevant civil-military engagements, and the exploitation of opportunities. As competitors seek advantage relative to specific interests, physical and informational power will converge. This convergence presents opportunities, and JFCs can maximize this integrated power by building in MISO and other information activities at the beginning of planning. The use of information by JFCs, allies and partners, adversaries, and neutral nations is becoming more complex with advances in technology driving rapid change in the information environment. JFCs should adapt their force structure accordingly to provide cohesive C2 for information, gain an information and decision advantage with information capabilities, and disseminate a shared understanding of the information in the OE. With these adaptations, commanders and staffs can use cohesive C2 of information to enhance friendly decision making and influence target audiences to achieve campaign and mission objectives.

(a) To maximize cohesive C2, the commander and staff integrate information into operations beginning with the joint planning process, monitoring the IE and adapting through implementation, and assessing both OIE and traditional military activities to reevaluate campaign approaches against desired outcomes. JFCs' C2 of information activities should help integrate information with the other joint functions such

as fires, maneuver, intelligence, and sustainment. In this way, JFCs empower and enable information forces such as MISO to be more effective and integrated by design.

(b) To effectively employ information, JFCs establish an all-domain information planning cell, center, or task force within their command to integrate specialized capabilities required for OIE. Historic examples of constructs include information task forces, units, or centers. However, many of these examples separated information planning from core campaign or mission planning leading to a lack of integration. Information is integral to any operation or campaign and JFCs cannot plan or execute information effects separately from traditional maneuver and fires. Effective integration of MISO generally requires a common understanding of other cognitive information capabilities such as PA, deception planners, civil affairs, and coordination with DOS and other relevant capabilities. In the farther future, JFCs might establish information centers dedicated to full-time OIE planning and assessment like air operations centers for the Joint Force Air Component Commander.

(c) To effectively respond to rapid changes in the IE, JFCs will likely need to adjust staff processes to account for OIE and its assessment to then feed back into decision making. JFCs may modify commander critical information requirements, reporting to higher headquarters, and battle rhythm events to both account for information and drive its integration. Additionally, JFCs may use information forces personnel to support JADO in non-traditional roles. Specific processes that could benefit from information personnel integration might include target development, mission or campaign assessment, and current and future operations planning. As the size, scope, and scale of the JADO mission increases, the JFC may implement a commensurate adjustment for the all-domain information planning cell. Leveraging the full range of skill, knowledge, experience, and judgment of the all-domain information planning cell enables the JFC to guide the command toward mission accomplishment.

(d) As the transmission and reception of information becomes more complicated, JFCs may augment existing force structure with a robust presence of human and machine participants to filter the abundance of misinformation and disinformation in the OE. Due to the expanding OE, human participants may also provide reachback support from global locations in the case a deployed force is not feasible. A JFC's headquarters organization must be able to C2 information forces to aggregate resources and necessary support with specialized capabilities (e.g., psychological operations forces, civil affairs personnel, MISO-capable units, PA organizations, electromagnetic spectrum operations elements, cyberspace forces, space operations elements) alongside other joint functions. These forces may implement AI and ML to leverage the vast amount of information and conduct activities central to OIE.

(e) Within JFC force constructs, MISO planners integrate and synchronize effort across the information forces supported by robust intelligence to achieve operational objectives.

(2) Unforeseen technological advancements may offer new opportunities and for MISO that JFCs and adversaries alike might leverage. As a result of adversary adaptation, JFCs may not accurately predict adversary reactions to MISO or other activities across the competition continuum. In the future, JFCs can adapt MISO as required based upon advancements in space, cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum, and information available within the OE. JFCs increase the probability of achieving their objectives by ensuring their MISO are adaptive.

(a) MISO planners should remain aware that emerging technologies are accelerating the spread of disinformation, exacerbating polarization, and contributing to growing confusion about the state of the world. New technologies such as generative AI can deceive even the most sophisticated information consumers. MISO activities are an essential role in promoting the JFCs' resilience. To enable operational success, JFCs continue to expose, disrupt, counter, and deter malicious information activities by adversaries.

(b) As the transmission and reception of information become more complicated, JFCs may augment existing force structure with a robust presence of human and machine participants to filter the abundance of misinformation and disinformation in the OE. OIE consist of a headquarters organization with C2 of information forces that aggregate resources and necessary support with specialized capabilities (e.g., psychological operations forces, civil affairs personnel, MISO-capable units, PA organizations, electromagnetic spectrum operations elements, cyberspace forces, space operations elements). These forces may implement AI and ML to leverage the vast amount of information and conduct activities central to OIE.

(c) MISO planners should deepen their understanding of the cultural impact of emerging technologies. Planners should stay informed of emerging research on technology-enabled social manipulation threats and the diminishing ability of audiences to accurately distinguish facts in an environment saturated with misinformation and disinformation.

2. Future Technology and Force Development

a. JFCs require resilient, reliable, and survivable information architectures that may only experience minimal degradation in contested environments. JFCs employ MISO force multipliers by converging new ideas with emerging and legacy technologies that build overmatch in contested environments. Low tech information capabilities remain critically relevant in a future environment characterized by disrupted or destroyed communications infrastructures. JFCs continue to ensure joint operations, activities, and investments are more informationally and physically integrated, adaptive, and resilient to enhance MISO capabilities. JFCs exploit advancements in MISO to maximize adversary perceptions and behaviors, shape the OE, and support overall mission, campaign, and operational objectives in an increasingly complex and contested global landscape.

b. **Advanced Technology Augmentations to MISO.** JFCs should harness the power of AI and ML for faster and more accurate collection and analysis of large datasets to

identify trends, sentiment, and emerging threats. MISO planners can explore personalized messaging using AI to tailor messages to specific individuals or groups to enhance the effectiveness of MISO and other information activities. Planners can leverage big data analytics and real-time monitoring that generate deeper insights into TAs' behavior and preferences. This information enables more focused and precise messaging or joint targeting. Additionally, JFCs conduct real-time monitoring for continuous analysis of social media and other digital platforms to assess the effectiveness of MISO.

(1) JFCs employ AI to increase the accuracy and timeliness of MISO assessments. MISO planners can use algorithms to forecast TA response and provide guidance to JFCs regarding acceptable levels of risk and risk-reduction strategies. Algorithms also assist in assessing MISO MOEs (e.g., by collecting social media data response of the TA communication platforms). JFCs should understand the importance of implementing technology to enhance MISO and enable planners to accurately articulate operational risks.

(2) The joint force should leverage advancements in AI and computing power to construct comprehensive models of entire societies. Planners may use these models to experiment or test various MISO scenarios. The predictive outcomes of these models enable JFCs to select appropriate scenarios while effectively managing risks. Additionally, MISO operators should be able to assess multiple scenarios and adjust variables against virtual TAs to enhance and refine their operations.

(3) As deepfake technology continues to improve, the joint force should retain the initiative in both creating and detecting deepfakes. Deepfakes can be employed at scale and have become increasingly realistic. Adversaries can use deepfakes with generative AI and ML algorithms to create or manipulate audio and video content. They pose significant risks in terms of fraud, manipulation, and disinformation. Organizations are now prioritizing deepfake detection and response strategies to mitigate these threats. The joint force should invest in technologies that can both identify and produce manipulated media.

c. **Low-Tech Expectations.** JFCs can employ both high-tech and low-tech methods to enhance TAs accessibility and message credibility that account for various sociocultural and communications systems. MISO planners follow the TAA process to determine how TAs receive, perceive, communicate, and share information. Often, communication with TAs requires low-tech approaches for dissemination or conducting assessments. However, adversaries can exploit this by transferring low-tech products onto high-tech information systems. For instance, they might capture printed materials using cell phone cameras and share them on social media platforms. This unintended exposure can compromise the effectiveness of MISO products, reaching audiences beyond their intended scope. Given the challenges of information sharing technologies, MISO planners should proactively consider and articulate the risks associated with the transfer of low-tech products to social media platforms and potential migration from the TA's area.

d. **Global Integration.** MISO programs have both regional and global effects. JFCs should ensure synchronization of MISO programs and series to ensure realization of potential positive effects and avoid negative impacts to other JFCs. This coordination

should take place during campaign plan development and throughout subsequent actions. It is essential to continually assess MOEs during operations.

(1) **Contested Information Advantage.** The future joint force may struggle to gain or maintain technological and information advantage. The Internet allows for near instant global communication, ideas sharing, and the ability to influence human behavior at unprecedented speeds. Many adversaries share concerns with the openness of Internet communication; as a result, those adversaries restrict and regulate internet access to prevent external influence.

(2) **Allied and Partner Considerations.** The combined force, led by PSYOP forces, work together to integrate, assist, and build partnerships to fortify alliances against adversaries. Future MISO planners should consider collaborating with allied authorities on MISO or related operations to enhance and bolster psychological operations aimed at shared enemies. Incorporating allies and partners' PSYOP activities enriches the cultural understanding for the MISO plan and series, while simultaneously decreasing adversaries' influence and presenting them with potential dilemmas.

(3) **Whole-of-Society Integration.** Aggressive actors and adversaries will challenge the resilience of partner nations and US efforts to support those partners. Efforts to develop partner resilience include a whole-of-society perspective where the government, military, police, and people of that nation band together to confront their adversary or threat during an impending loss of sovereignty. In the future, the joint force and MISO planners need to consider programs, plans, and series to support resilient partners that expands to a whole-of-society approach to deter and repel adversaries. MISO in the future OE should understand the value of integration with allied and partner nation commercial sector and seek access and coordination.

e. PSYOP Force Development

(1) **Empowering Joint Leaders.** Future leaders in the expanding OE require an understanding of emerging technologies that enhance MISO. It is important for leaders to recognize the value of MISO for JADO, as well as to understand, acknowledge, and mitigate risk. Specifically, leaders should understand how influencing TAs fits into the coordinated timing, phasing, and sequencing of campaigns and operations.

(2) **Enhanced Training and Education.** JFCs should establish advanced training programs for joint MISO via simulations, wargaming, and continuous learning. The joint force should utilize advanced simulations and wargaming to prepare MISO personnel for complex and dynamic IEs. Additionally, JFCs can utilize appropriate academic opportunities and private industry forums as means for enhanced MISO education and training.

(3) **Talent Management.** With the importance of information as an aspect of all joint operations, the joint and Service leaders should establish career trajectories that nurture talent, grounded in MISO education, to build a bench of officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted personnel adept at navigating across the competition continuum.

Similarly, to technological expertise, joint and Service leaders create initiatives to attract PSYOP professionals from the fields of commercial marketing and social media.

(4) **Doctrine.** Commanders will need to prioritize MISO doctrine as a key resource to inform and drive concepts of operations. MISO fundamentals, doctrine, and processes are adaptable and essential to the expanding OE and leaders at all levels must be familiar with their guiding principles. Knowing and following doctrine closely is vital for meeting JFC goals and for protecting the mission and the reputation of the United States. For effective MISO application now and in the future, it is important to explain how MISO empower and relate to other JFC activities. MISO planners must also be ready to let go of current practice and update doctrine to align with new technologies and other means of dissemination.

(5) **Public-Private Partnerships.** The joint force should collaborate with the technology industry to leverage modernization, innovation, and the establishment of innovation hubs. Partnerships with technology companies enable access to revolutionary innovations in AI and ML, cybersecurity, and data analytics for MISO.

3. Conclusion

a. The future OE demands a proactive approach where JFCs adapt their approaches and C2 to effectively protect, exploit, and attack information over time as part of a deliberate campaign. Trained and ready MISO forces will remain critical to success in the future OE. JFCs should keep pace with emerging technologies while balancing limited resources to acquire and develop the human capital to operationalize it.

(1) JFCs should maintain a thorough understanding of the legal and political implications when planning, executing, and assessing MISO to achieve operational objectives. MISO planners should integrate allied and partner information forces in the concept of operations to present a legitimate and unified narrative to accomplish shared goals.

(2) The joint force should embrace and utilize new technologies to improve the efficacy of MISO. The new technologies will require resilient and effective communications to perform with disruptions to support JADO. MISO activities require a timely approval process to secure an information advantage while also embracing associated risks and formulating strategies to mitigate them.

b. Future technologies offer advantages and present challenges. Joint and Services leaders must know and leverage MISO doctrine. MISO forces need to develop and maintain technological literacy to integrate quality control and assurance for future capabilities. Human-machine integration can enhance MISO and enable JFCs to keep up with rapid changes in operational contexts. The next generation of MISO planners require critical thinking to proactively foresee and adapt to the evolving character of warfare.

APPENDIX A

AUTHORITY CONSIDERATION

Several legal and policy documents establish authorization to execute MISO.

1. Overview

This appendix contains the specific legal and policy authorities for the implementation of MISO in a theater of operations and the integration, planning, and execution of DSCA. Commanders and their staffs should always consult the staff judge advocate to obtain the most current legal references and for expert interpretation of them. For more comprehensive information, refer to United States Army GTA [Graphic Training Aid] 33-01-004, *Military Information Support Operations Authoritative References*.

2. International Conventions, Treaties, and Customs

The United States is a party to numerous treaties and agreements with allied and friendly nations around the world. In accordance with CJCS policies, all OPLANs conform to domestic and international law, including the law of war, laws recognized by the United States as customary international law, and international agreements that are binding for the United States. The planning and execution of MISO are subject to these conventions, treaties, and laws. These include the Geneva Conventions, rules of customary international law, and other agreements that relate to the law of war.

3. United States Law

a. **Title 10, USC, Section 164**, gives CCDRs the statutory authority to conduct their assigned military missions, including MISO.

b. Title 10, USC, Sections 394 and 397 guide military CO and military operations in the IE. Title 10, USC, Section 394 authorizes the preparation of the armed forces to conduct military CO when authorized and define a clandestine military activity or operation in cyberspace as a traditional military activity. Title 10, USC, Section 397 grants SecDef the authority to appoint a principal information operations advisor who promulgates standards and policies regarding operations in the IE.

c. **Title 17, USC, Copyrights**. MISO use a variety of multimedia formats to influence TAs. Music, symbols, graphics, and messages are commonly incorporated into products. It is important to note that the products are required to adhere to the laws that protect published and unpublished works in a variety of forms and formats. Message content and format are subject to copyright restrictions under Title 17, USC.

d. **Title 50, USC, Section 3093**, states that any activity of the USG to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the USG not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, is a covert action and is only authorized pursuant to a presidential finding. This is considered during the identification of attribution

requirements of a MISO program and any attribution techniques other than US attribution be impacted. The law further states that traditional military activities fall outside of the definition of covert action.

4. United States Department of Defense Guidance

a. **DoDI O-3607.02, *Military Information Support Operations (MISO)*.** This instruction establishes the policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for MISO.

(1) The instruction specifies that all DoD activities that meet the definition of MISO are required to follow the procedures and policies for MISO, regardless of the organization conducting the activities.

(2) It emphasizes that the conduct of MISO is the responsibility of JFCs within their respective AOR to shape the OE in support of their assigned missions and is integrated into military operations as appropriate. Furthermore, MISO are conducted within the parameters of OSD policies.

For more information, see DoDD 5111.01, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)).

(3) Commander, USSOCOM is identified as the joint proponent for MISO.

(4) It includes the general provisions for MISO, including the use of any means of communication, restrictions on targeting journalists, and the ability to use capabilities to conduct DSCA within the United States and its territories.

(5) The instruction identifies the minimum requirements for a MISO program.

(6) The instruction clarifies the attribution requirements and specifically addresses public acknowledgment of the relationship between the entity conducting MISO and the TA.

b. **JSCP.** The JSCP provides the framework for military direction to the joint force, implementing and augmenting the President's and SecDef's guidance found in the *Unified Command Plan*, contingency planning guidance, national security strategy, national defense strategy, and the CJCS's guidance in the national military strategy. The JSCP, with all of its enclosures, is the DoD's 5-year strategic-level campaign plan. It tasks CCMDs, Military Departments, the Services, the Joint Staff and DoD agencies to prepare campaign and contingency plans in accordance with national defense strategy priorities. The JSCP identifies roles, responsibilities, and tasks to support globally integrated joint force planning, operations, and activities.

c. **CJCSI 3110.05, *Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan*.** This instruction contains supplemental guidance in

support of DoDI O-3607.02, Military Information Support Operations (MISO), and provides CJCS guidance for planning and conducting MISO. It applies to the Services, CCMDs, Joint Staff, other DoD agencies and activities, and contracts for conducting information activities to influence perceptions, attitudes, and behavior of audiences. This instruction provides strategic direction for the execution of MISO within DoD's overall contribution to USG communication strategies. CCDRs are responsible for integrating MISO into their planning and the Service Chiefs are responsible for ensuring PSYOP forces are properly trained and resourced, as tasked by the JSCP. The MISO supplement to the JSCP provides additional guidance on attribution, explains MISO authorities (statutory, policy, budgetary, and execution), interagency coordination, includes preapproved MISO programs, clarifies MISO as they relate to building partner capacity, addresses MISO series delegation approval, and provides assessment guidance.

d. MISO and Civil Authority Information Support

(1) CJCSI 3110.05, *Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan*, authorizes DoD components the use of PSYOP capabilities and equipment in support of DSCA, using all available media when authorized by SecDef or a designated representative. Forces and equipment are requested and approved using the same processes as any contingency operation. The instruction specifies that the use of these DoD assets does not constitute conducting MISO. MISO programs are not developed for civil authority information support missions, which is the use of PSYOP capabilities to conduct public information dissemination activities that support national security or disaster relief operations within the United States and its territories in a support of a lead federal agency. The appointed lead federal agency is the source of themes and messages and is the approval authority for all products conveying the lead agency messages.

(2) DoDD 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)*, establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for DSCA. It provides guidance for the execution and oversight of DSCA, when requested by civil authorities or qualifying entities and approved by the appropriate DoD official, or as directed by the President, within the United States and its territories. It authorizes commander's immediate response authority, as described in DoDD 3025.18 when requested by civil authorities in situations involving imminent risk of loss of life or destruction of property.

5. Authorizing Execution in a Theater of Operations

a. The President and SecDef approve the deployment of PSYOP forces and MISO execution in a theater of operations. Without an approved EXORD, CCDRs do not have the permission to execute MISO in theater.

b. **Plans and Orders.** The MISO tab (tab A [Military Information Support Operations] to appendix 3 [Information Operations] to annex C [Operations]) describes MISO integration to support the commander's intent and CONOPS. It synchronizes the execution of messages and actions in support of the commander's objectives. Plans and orders establish priorities of support to units for each operational phase and synchronize

MISO with JFC operations, other information capabilities, and the commander's communication synchronization.

For further information on the MISO tab to an OPLAN, see CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance.

c. **EXORD.** The CJCS provides SecDef-approved execution authority to CCDRs or JFCs through official message traffic in the form of an EXORD. The EXORD serves as the basis to begin mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment rotation, and demobilization activities in support of the OPLAN.

d. **Deployment Order.** After the issuance of the EXORD, the CJCS, by the authority and at the direction of the President or SecDef, issues a deployment order to transfer forces to the CCDR. The deployment order specifies the authority a gaining CCDR exercises over transferred forces and is required for the deployment or redeployment of forces. It contains vital information for units, such as the mission, approved MISO program, rules of engagement, funding, and required timelines.

APPENDIX B

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS STAFF ESTIMATE FORMAT EXAMPLE

Originating J-Directorate/Division, Issuing Headquarters (Notional)

Place of Issue:

Date-Time Group (zone), Month, Year:

MISO ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION NUMBER XXX

REFERENCES:

- a. List joint maps, charts, and joint publications.
- b. Include other relevant documents (country studies, intelligence estimates, network analysis).

*When the MISO estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the final page of the estimate is modified to include authentication by the originating section, division, or other official, according to local policy. Normally, MISO estimates are numbered sequentially within a calendar year.

1. Strategic Mission Narrative

a. The strategic mission narrative conveys the commander's reasons and desired outcomes for the campaign/mission/operation along with its supporting themes. The strategic mission narrative explains the use of the military and puts global operations in context. The commander's intent identifies the major unifying efforts during the campaign or operation, and where other instruments of national power play a central role. The intent enables decentralized execution, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders take actions that achieve the commander's objectives without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned.

b. MISO planners list themes and narrative tied to the strategic environment and mission that guide PSYOP forces, in particular MISO Internet activities. These themes are tied to the overall strategic impacts on the OE or specific to the joint operations area (JOA). An example would be People's Republic of China interests and potential impacts on joint operations in Africa. MISO planners tie themes to existing MISO objectives, or develop MISO objectives for staffing.

2. Operational Mission Narrative and Unit Commander's Intent

a. The operational mission narrative nests under the strategic mission narrative. Operational mission narratives focus on the theater/region and seek to advance the

legitimacy of the mission while countering adversary narratives. From the current planning guidance or orders, each unit commander develops a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired outcomes.

b. MISO planners list here the themes and narrative tied to the OE and or mission that will guide MISO forces in a JOA; in particular, these will guide MISO Internet activities. These themes are tied to the concepts outlined in the OE or specific to the JOA. MISO planners tie themes to existing MISO objectives, or develop MISO objectives for staffing. MISO planners continually review and refine thematic guidance as the JFC gains greater understanding and conditions change. Commands may set a specific periodicity to review thematic guidance with the information cross functional team.

3. Desired State of the Joint Operations Area

Concisely express the desired state of the JOA within the expanded purpose statements as determined during operational design. Includes relevant aspects of the USG strategic narrative to inform JFC objectives. Military messaging guidance is normally a component of the national strategic narrative. The estimate includes behavioral objectives and conditions linked to the desired state of the JOA. Objectives are written so that they inform the development of commander's critical information requirements.

4. Area of Interest

Area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. The area of interest also includes areas where relevant actors reside that may not be adjacent to the JFC's JOA or area of interest but from which they have the potential to affect the success of the JFC's mission. Include those relevant actors linked by common language, religion, and other cultural factors (e.g., diaspora enclaves, co-religionists) or that may have other objectives (e.g., political interest, business interest) that have the potential to affect the JFC's mission.

5. Mission

a. State the mission of the command as a whole, taken from the commander's mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statements. Subordinate functional commands, such as OIE units or POTFs, may have a mission for that entity, tied to the mission of the supported command.

b. Describe the MISO mission to support the JFC's mission.

6. Centers of Gravity

a. The information cross functional team expands the COG analysis approach to describe and prioritize relevant actors, including the joint force itself. Representatives from each of the joint functions contribute to COG analysis (e.g., the sustainment staff conduct analysis of transportation methods, routes, and numerous business interests for contracting

within the JOA). The MISO planners consider sustainment input during COG analysis to gain an understanding of relevant actors, to include an assessment of their importance in achieving JFC's objectives, which then informs COA development, analysis, and selection. Based on COG analysis, planners recommend actions (to include external communication) the joint force should take and what actions they should avoid taking in support of the JFC's objectives. Planners could nominate multiple COGs for simultaneous targeting based on the critical vulnerabilities of each. The joint force leverages information, to include the informational aspects activities, to affect identified COGs. The joint force monitors COGs over time to gain a better understanding of how to attain enduring outcomes. The information cross functional team helps identify which USG and joint force activities require a sustained effort during COG analysis.

b. MISO planners nominate relevant actors for influence, and those relevant actors become potential TAs. MISO planners initially identify and continuously refine: the relevant actor; the importance of the relevant actor to the JFC's mission, the current behavior that impacts the critical capability, requirement, and or vulnerability; the drivers of the current behavior; the range of potential behavior; the desired effect MISO should create; and the desired behavior change. If this information becomes too cumbersome, consider annex or tab to this estimate.

7. Situation and Considerations

a. Characteristics of the Environment. Summarize the analysis of the informational, physical, and human aspects of the environment by describing the different characteristics of objects, activities, or actors in the context of one another and of the broader environment. This summary helps identify the relevant actors the joint force needs to affect, how to use information to effectively impact those relevant actors, and how MISO could be hindered or may leverage for effects on TAs. As a minimum, use the following as references: the current intelligence estimate, CMO estimate and military police estimate, and other MISO staff estimates from higher or adjacent commands, and or existing TAA. Depict the characterization in visual and narrative forms to communicate it to the commander, staff, and subordinate units.

(1) **Informational Aspects.** Describe how individuals, information systems, and groups communicate and exchange information. This description includes informational content that can be collected, transmitted, processed, stored, and displayed. Describe the formal and informal communication infrastructure and networks, kinship and descent relationships, licit and illicit commercial relationships, and social affiliations and contacts that collectively create, process, manipulate, transmit, and share information in an operational area and among relevant actors. These also include the inherent informational aspects of activities (i.e., the "body language" of activities). Describe the features and details, which include the size of a force and its types of capabilities; the communications about an activity (e.g., verbal and nonverbal communication, images, credible voice); and the duration, location, and timing of the activity. Specifically characterize the relevant information required for the planning and execution of MISO.

(2) **Physical Aspects.** Describe the material characteristics of the JOA, natural and manufactured, that inhibit or enhance communication between people and between information systems, the terrain or any weather considerations for that could impact MISO. This includes physical features such as terrain and lines of communication that impact the transmission and processing of information. Physical aspects include territorial boundaries associated with governments' obligations to provide security for their people. Physical aspects are critical elements of group identity and frame how tribes and communities form. Physical aspects also include the characteristics of the medium used in communication such as the material on which something is printed or the radio frequency and bandwidth used during broadcast. Other physical aspects are geographic features that can block or enable communication, provide protection, and obstruct or enable movement. Information infrastructure to include its capabilities, its organization, and how it impacts the content and flow of information, are also included in this description.

(3) **Human Aspects.** Describe how relevant actors (human) interact with each other and with their environment. Human aspects frame how relevant actors perceive a situation from their world view. This frame is the basis of their perspective, from which they derive meaning to what they observe to understand the context of the world around them. Human aspects may include the language, social, cultural, psychological, and physical characteristics that shape a relevant actor's behavior. Identify aspects that may be useful in anticipating how relevant actors in the JOA might behave under particular circumstances. Identify issues such as competition for territory and resources, contending wills, and injustice or lack of representation, which may be the root of the current problem or conflict. Identify the key linguistic, social, cultural, psychological, and physical elements that shape the behavior of relevant actors. This may include the character, tradition, and the objectives of relevant actors that suggest how they might behave under particular circumstances. Also included is identification of the key influencers within the area and known linkages to organizations and groups that may support or challenge the commander's objectives.

(4) **Synthesis of Aspects.** An environment is characterized by its informational, physical, and human aspects. Explain how these three aspects influence and interact with each other and are pertinent to the planning and execution of MISO. Include a description of likely methods of approach to gain access to communicate with the groups of interest. Through understanding relevant actor culture, economics, security, food, water, transportation, communication, relationships with other groups, and other relevant vulnerabilities and strengths, the joint force is more likely to gain and maintain communication with relevant actors. This approach leverages any means and combination of capabilities within the lawful parameters of the operation.

b. Enemy Forces

(1) **Strength and Disposition.** As a minimum, use the following as references to form a multisource description: the current intelligence estimate, CMO estimate, military police estimate, MISO estimate, and TAA.

(2) **Enemy Capabilities.** Describe enemy abilities to use information to reduce the effectiveness of friendly forces and inhibit the joint force from achieving its objectives, as well as impact the TAs. This includes enemy force's ability to disseminate propaganda, disinformation, and information activities. Describe the known and suspected reach of enemy and adversary relationships known to influence action of those groups that can support or challenge the commander's objectives.

(3) MISO planners describe and detail the existing adversary narratives and the impacts those may have on the JFC mission and TAs. Provide a description of the methods and an assessment of how well the narratives resonate with the TAs.

c. **Nonbelligerent Third Party** (United Nations, foreign workers, Red Cross, World Health Organization, and the media). List strength, composition, and capabilities.

d. **Competitors.** List allies, neutral countries, multinational corporations' strength, weakness, and capabilities.

e. **Friendly Forces**

(1) **Present Disposition of Major Elements.** Include estimates of force strengths for those capabilities, operations, and activities that leverage MISO, such as contracted and HN support. Disposition of PSYOP units. Describe current status of organic and external influence capabilities. Identify critical shortfalls such as information/intelligence needs for any existing or proposed MISO programs and ongoing TAA, availability of linguists, availability of indigenous personnel for employment with PSYOP personnel, or accessibility to reach selected TAs, and include COAs necessary to reduce their impact.

(2) **Own COAs.** State the proposed COAs under consideration; focus on the key tasks associated with the operations or plans. COAs are developed based on the operational mission narrative, restated mission, commander's intent, and planning guidance. Describe MISO planning, execution, and assessment activities for the operation in support of JFC objectives.

(3) **C2.** Considerations and recommendations for C2 of PSYOP forces, coordination, synchronization, and deconfliction procedures with higher and adjacent units.

(4) **Probable Tactical Developments.** Review major deployments and logistics preparations necessary in all phases of the proposed operation. Identify hostile, friendly, and neutral target sets for the COA.

(5) **Unit Status.** State known personnel, equipment, and training shortfalls, which may affect the ability to meet the developing situational requirements.

(6) **Assumptions.** State assumptions about the MISO situation made for this estimate. Do not repeat here the basic assumptions for the operation that have already been made and appear in planning guidance and in the plan itself. State certain assumptions that may have been made concerning potential or likely vulnerabilities in preparing this estimate (e.g., will the population be friendly or hostile? will the conduct of MISO be permitted?).

(7) **Special Features.** State here any special features not covered elsewhere in the estimate that may influence the MISO situation, such as themes and actions to be stressed or avoided. Requirements for indigenous personnel support. Peculiarities of operations to be supported that may have an impact on MISO such as planned use of deception measures within the appropriate classification guidance, and previous operations and their effects on the adversary's morale.

(8) **MISO Situation.** Describe the characteristics of the operational area from MISO perspective, the psychological impact of JFC's proposed COA, and key considerations for COA supportability. Include considerations such as occupied and liberated areas and any missions, directives, objectives, or guidance from higher authority. State known or anticipated MISO problems that may influence the selection of a specific COA and the MISO status. Describe status of approval process and authorities to execute MISO.

8. Analysis of Own Courses of Action

a. This paragraph is an orderly examination of the MISO factors influencing the proposed COAs to determine the manner and degree of the influence and to isolate the psychological implications that should be weighed by the commander in his or her own estimate of the situation.

b. Analyze each COA from the MISO point of view to determine its advantages and disadvantages for conducting MISO. The detail in which the analysis is made is determined by the level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and urgency of need. Be sure to address the expected impact of conventional operations on MISO and vice versa.

c. Examine each COA under consideration realistically from the standpoint of known and likely requirements versus available or programmed capabilities, climate and weather, hydrography, time and space, opponent capabilities, and other significant MISO factors that may have an impact on the information situation as it affects each COA. Throughout the analysis, the MISO planners keep MISO considerations foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision, but to ensure that all applicable MISO factors have been considered and are the basis of the comparison of own COAs and conclusions.

9. Comparison of Own Courses of Action

- a. Compare the proposed COAs to determine the one that offers the best chance of success from the MISO point of view. List the advantages and disadvantages of each COA affecting MISO.
- b. Develop and compare methods of overcoming disadvantages, if any, in each COA.
- c. State in a general conclusion on the COA that offers the best chance of success for MISO.

10. Conclusion

- a. State which COA under consideration that can best support from a MISO standpoint, ordering them from best to worst.
- b. State significant disadvantages that may make a COA less desirable or completely unsupportable from the MISO perspective.
- c. Review significant anticipated MISO problems, possible solutions, and limitation on COAs imposed by these problems.

(Signed) _____
J-3/MISO Staff Officer

Annexes: List by letter and title. Use annexes when the information is in graphs or is of such detail and volume that inclusion in the body makes the estimate too cumbersome.

Distribution: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters.)

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APPENDIX C

CONSIDERATIONS FOR TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO AN OPERATION PLAN EXAMPLE

The guidance in this appendix relates to the development of tab A (MISO) to appendix 3 (Information Operations) to annex C (Operations) for plans and orders.

References: List documents essential to this annex (such as MISO programs).

1. Situation

a. Overview

- (1) What is the situation relevant to MISO in the operational area?
- (2) What are the significant information, physical, and human aspects of the OE pertinent to MISO?
- (3) Strategic Narrative.
- (4) Operational mission narrative.
- (5) Tactical mission narrative (where appropriate).

b. Friendly Relevant Actors (TAs are identified below)

- (1) What groups can influence plans, decisions, and operational effectiveness in objective accomplishment?
- (2) How susceptible are these groups to influence?
- (3) What group behavior is favorable or harmful to objective accomplishment?
- (4) What are the apparent goals, motivations, drivers of behavior, range of potential behavior, and characteristics of each?
- (5) Who are the leaders who can cause these groups to behave in various ways?
- (6) What are the estimated background knowledge and desired and harmful appreciations for each group?

c. Neutral Relevant Actors (TAs are identified below)

- (1) What groups can influence plans, decisions, and operational effectiveness in objective accomplishment?

(2) What are the projected actions of the neutral populations under various circumstances?

(3) How susceptible are these groups to influence?

(4) What group behavior is favorable or harmful to objective accomplishment?

(5) What are the apparent goals, motivations, drivers of behavior, range of potential behavior, and characteristics of each?

(6) Who are the leaders who can cause these groups to behave in various ways?

(7) What are the estimated background knowledge and desired and harmful appreciations for each group?

(8) What activities and resources are available to these neutral intentions?

d. Enemy Relevant Actors (TAs are identified below)

(1) Adversary COG Analysis:

(a) What is the adversary COG?

(b) What are the adversary critical capabilities?

(c) What are the critical requirements and vulnerabilities of each?

(2) Relevant Actors: **Decision Makers and Staffs**

(a) What COAs might affect friendly task accomplishment?

(b) What resources are available to execute each COA?

(c) Who are the decision makers that can direct development or allocation of resources to COAs pertinent to the task assigned?

(d) What are the characteristics of adversary decision makers, their key advisors, and staff (particularly intelligence analysts)?

(3) Relevant Actors: **Intelligence Systems**

(a) What are the intelligence systems that support decision makers and their staffs?

(b) What are the intelligence systems' capabilities pertinent to the situation?

(c) What are the objective and subjective factors and the characteristics of collection planners and decision makers that affect their development and selection for use of information-gathering resources?

(d) What are the groups of related planner and decision maker critical information?

(e) What are the estimated background knowledge and desired and harmful perceptions of each group?

(4) Other Adversary **Relevant Actors**

(a) What groups can influence plans, decisions, and operational effectiveness in objective accomplishment?

(b) How susceptible are these groups to influence?

(c) What group behavior is favorable or harmful to objective accomplishment?

(d) What are the apparent goals, motivations, drivers of behavior, range of potential behavior, and characteristics of each?

(e) Who are the leaders who can cause these groups to behave in various ways?

(f) What are the estimated background knowledge and desired and harmful appreciations for each group?

2. Mission

Restated JFC mission.

3. Execution

a. CONOPS

(1) **Overview.** What is the JFC commander's intent?

(2) **MISO Concept of the Operation**

(a) What capability does the adversary have to interfere with the transmission and distribution of MISO products? Are alternative distribution methods available?

(b) How are MISO planned and conducted?

- (c) Who are the supported/supporting commands?
- (d) What is the overall concept for MISO task accomplishment, and what components are assigned which tasks?
- (e) What is the MISO program approved potential TA and refined TA (developed from COG) and set of MISO program objective and developed supporting MISO objectives, overall themes, any subgroups (to include their characteristics), and specific themes to stress for each subgroup?
- (f) What are the potentially conflicting MISO objectives in the operational area?
- (g) What are the approved MISO thematic guidance that includes the themes to stress to achieve strategic and theater MISO objectives?
- (h) What resources are required to plan and conduct MISO? Include civil capabilities and indigenous assets to support MISO.
- (i) What are the MISO themes and symbols to be avoided? Include indications of specific TA sensitivities that might occur if these themes and symbols are used.
- (j) What is the guidance for the conduct of military operations, actions, and personnel behavior to promote approved MISO themes?
- (k) What is the guidance for avoiding military operations, actions, and personnel behavior that would result in harmful TA attitudes and behavior?
- (l) What are the cultural and psychological characteristics of TAs that aid operational planners and personnel in selecting COAs and interacting with TA members?
- (m) Describe adversary and enemy propaganda (disinformation and misinformation).
- (n) What adversary and enemy propaganda could be directed at US personnel and at foreign groups in the operational area?
- (o) What is the guidance for countering such adversary operations?
- (p) What authorities and procedures are in place to enable timely countering of such adversary operations, especially declassification of attribution of adversary messaging?
- (q) What are the MISO-relevant targets for jamming, attacking, or protecting?

(r) When should MISO be executed to demoralize and disorganize opposing commanders?

(s) When should MISO be executed to reduce opposing operational effectiveness?

(t) When should MISO be executed to enhance the effectiveness of planned deceptions?

(u) What are the requirements for implementing schedules and series control sheets? Operation control sheets?

(v) What is the OPSEC planning guidance? Include planning for, preparing for, and conducting MISO to maintain essential secrecy for the commander's intent and to gain and maintain essential secrecy for OPSEC-sensitive MISO COAs. When should MISO be executed to support OPSEC to the maximum advantage?

(w) What types of attribution are authorized? Depending on the type of attribution used, what is the acknowledgement plan?

(3) Assessment Plan

(a) What is the overall assessment plan?

(b) How does assessment data feed the campaign and operational planning assessment?

(c) How is feedback provided to measure MISO effectiveness?

(4) Situation Monitoring

(a) How are intelligence, multidiscipline counterintelligence, security monitoring, and assessment provided?

(b) What is the requirement for running situation estimates; periodic estimates of TAs responsive to information, actions, and attitudes and behavior; and current reporting of intelligence and multidiscipline counterintelligence information, security monitoring results, and implementing actions?

(c) What resources are required? What is their availability?

(5) Coordinating Instructions

(a) Delegation of MISO series approval and approval process.

(b) Any retained authorities or risk-based approval stipulations.

- (c) Process for requests for support of nonorganic capabilities.
- (d) What are the information-cross functional team or MISO specific planning forums requirements?
- (e) How is control effected and implementation centrally coordinated? How is coordination, synchronization, and deconfliction of MISO conducted throughout the operation?
- (f) How are implementation planning and supervision of the planned action accomplished?
- (g) How is oversight of MISO conducted?
- (h) What is the need for specific MISO?
- (i) What coordination is required with adjacent commands and civilian agencies, including US diplomatic missions and United States Agency for International Development? What entities do or do not have direct liaison authority with agencies and coordination procedures for coordination through the identified direct liaison authority?
- (j) What coordination is required with deception activities, OPSEC, electromagnetic spectrum operations, CO, and space operations planners, and planners in the field of foreign, humanitarian assistance, PA, civil affairs, counterintelligence, legal, and operations?

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Logistics

- (1) What is the guidance for stocking materials and provisions to disseminating organizations?
- (2) What are the provisions for the supplies and maintenance of MISO-unique supplies and equipment?
- (3) What are the provisions for control and maintenance of indigenous equipment and materials?
- (4) What are the fiscal matters relating to special funds?
- (5) What are the personnel matters relating to indigenous personnel?

(6) What are the logistical requirements? Include production, distribution, and stocking of MISO products, transportation of products and personnel to operational areas, and their basing and support while conducting MISO; provisions for the supply and maintenance of US and indigenous products; and fiscal and personnel matters.

(7) What are the provisions for testing, producing, stocking, and delivering MISO products and for measuring MISO effectiveness?

b. Administration

(1) What are the requirements for special reports?

(2) What are the requirements for planning and operations in support of education programs regarding detainees?

5. Command and Control

a. Command

(1) What are the command relationships?

(2) Where are the command posts?

(3) What is the succession of command?

b. C2

(1) What is the C2 of PSYOP forces?

(2) What are the recognition and identification instructions (challenge and passwords)?

(3) What is the electromagnetic spectrum policy?

(4) What are the code words and call signs?

(5) What are the frequency allocations?

(6) How are frequencies disseminated (i.e., joint communications-electronics operating instructions, extracts)?

(7) What are the C2 support requirements and responsibilities for the POTF and liaison officers?

(8) What are the space operations support requirements such as satellite access, both military and commercial?

c. Refer to appropriate sections of annex K (Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems) and provide pertinent extracts of information included in the basic plan or annex K that are pertinent to MISO.

APPENDIX D

ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

1. Overview

To determine the effects of MISO, planners analyze the relationship between two things: MISO dissemination that occurred to influence a TA and the TA's progress toward stated objectives. Assessment is not just a demonstration of how successful (or not) a MISO series is. Assessment is critical to operations, as it enables refinement of series and targeted products based on insight into the TA's current cognitive, or behavioral status. Assessing MISO is a complex and nuanced task. It requires a detailed baseline (i.e., 'time zero' measurement) completed prior to any MISO being executed and a thoughtful and detailed assessment plan, which should be developed along with the actual plan itself. This appendix discusses the methodology for conducting MISO assessment.

2. Introduction to Assessment of Military Information Support Operations

a. Assessment of MISO begins with the development of the initial assessment criteria during planning. While all MISO are intended to affect a behavioral outcome in a TA, those behavior changes can sometimes take weeks, months, or even years to influence, particularly during competition against near-peer adversaries. It is essential that MISO assessment plans include measurement criteria that informs incremental progress toward identified objectives, such as cognitive, affective, or behavioral measures that show how the TA's thoughts, feelings, attitudes, and actions are changing over time as a result of MISO dissemination. Initial assessment criteria provide guidance in developing assessments requirements (intelligence, contracting, or other means) and assisting in the development of collection requirements.

b. While the vast majority of data collected to inform MISO assessment comes from contracted vendors, intelligence, and partners, MISO planners ensure that the assessment plan is, first and foremost, valid. This means verifying that the TA would reasonably be expected to progress on each identified MOE criteria as a result of MISO disseminated toward the achievement of the stated objectives. Further, the MISO planners ensure that indicators (i.e., data—the number that answers the MOE criteria question) are collected at regular, predetermined intervals to establish trend data. Changes in TA cognitions, attitudes, and behavior should never be represented by a static number or percentage. What is important is how the MOE indicators (data) have evolved over time since MISO series execution began.

3. Measures of Effectiveness and Measures of Performance

a. MOEs are objective measures to monitor and assess changes over time to determine the degree to which MISO have impacted TA behavior. Of note, social scientific quantitative methods, to include a variety of survey methods, objectively measure cognition and affect, and are important to include in the overarching assessment plan.

(1) MOEs are specific, measurable, and observable changes in a TA. These include cognitive changes (what the TA knows or thinks), affective changes (what the TA feels or prefers), and behavioral changes (what the TA intends to do and what the TA does).

(2) MOEs are decided upon before MISO are executed.

b. MOPs indicate what was done to influence a change in the TA for a specific series. That is, to get the TA from the current behavior to the desired behavior, what interventions did the PSYOP forces employ? This can range from the number of leaflets disseminated to the reach of an online audience on social media platforms.

c. Finally, to determine MISO effectiveness requires MISO planners to analyze the relationship between MOP and MOE. This enables the determination of whether changes in the identified MOE measures are correlated to or caused by MISO dissemination and, if so, how strong that relationship is. The stronger the correlation or causal effect is, the more support is demonstrated for the effects of series on the intended TA.

4. Measures of Effectiveness Development

The development of MOEs can be achieved by working through the following steps:

a. **Define objectives.** This is done through selecting a MISO objective in an approved MISO program and either selecting or developing a sufficiently scoped supporting MISO objectives. Some programs (generally those that are regionally aligned) include supporting MISO objectives. In other programs, the development of supporting MISO objectives is the responsibility of the CCMDs who may leverage the MISO plan. It is essential that supporting MISO objectives are developed at the CCMD level to ensure they are sufficiently nested with the CCP's objectives. A new supporting MISO objective should not be developed with the advent of each new MISO series, but rather a deliberate and planned approach at how the CCMD employs theater-wide operations within the scope of the commander's goals and intent.

b. **Determine a theory of change.** A theory of change is a framework that gives MISO planners a reason to believe the MISO planned for execution would reasonably influence the TA, and also provides a strategy by which influence can be conducted. These theories are generally based in psychology, sociology, communications, marketing and other social science research. A few examples of theories of change include the theory of planned behavior, cognitive dissonance theory, social cognitive theory, and the hierarchy of effects model. No single model is better than another—what is important is that model is selected to guide the employment and assessment of influence.

c. **Determine relevant contextual variables in the operating environment.** Once desired effects have been identified, significant external events that may impact the achievement of the effect need to be mapped and discussed. These could be macro factors (e.g., regional stability, economic activity), events (e.g., elections), or third-party activities (e.g., adversary information activities). It is not always possible to control the impact of

these variables, but they may help determine which impact indicators and interventions would be most effective by decidedly excluding certain options.

d. **Develop assessment criteria.** Assessment criteria are developed after having identified and sufficiently scoped the MISO objective, supporting MISO objectives, and requisite desired behaviors. To develop assessment criteria, MISO planners ask, “What data tells me whether my TA is achieving the desired behavior?” While the ultimate goal is behavior change, cognitive and affective measures are developed to inform progress toward the objectives over time and also to inform the domain in which the TA is to be influenced. For example, if the object is to influence a TA to vote, the MISO planner should understand whether the TA knows the election is occurring, understands the importance of voting, thinks voting is important, believes their vote matters, and intends to vote. The results learned from assessing the TA on cognitive and affective MOE influence the types of MISO disseminated as well as the lines of persuasion and arguments products leverage. It also affords insight into how MISO series are progressing over time, rather than waiting 6-12 months to count voter turnout.

e. **Identify potential data sources.** After having developed MOE, potential data sources are identified. These data sources collect data (indicators) that can be analyzed to determine effects. It is important to keep in mind that even if specific MOEs are developed for MISO functions, the data used to assess MOE do not necessarily have to be collected by MISO assets. Others can monitor their respective metrics and deliver data to the staff responsible for MOEs and analysis. It is essential that MISO planners are specific with what data they need collected as well as the periodicity.

f. **Identify suitable data methods.** For each indicator, suitable data collection methods should be noted. Ideally a number of data collection methods should be selected based on their suitability for the information sought; in the execution stage planners select methods based on available resources, current operating environment and context. See Figure D-1 for information on various data collection methods (the list in the table is not exhaustive).

g. **Establish a baseline.** Before the MISO series is executed, initial indicators (i.e., data) are collected for the final assessment plan. This serves as the “time zero” measurement, and establish indicators for comparison once dissemination has occurred. Without a baseline, planners are generally unable to suggest MISO had any effect (the exception to this would be the existence of a comparison group that was not exposed to the MISO disseminated).

h. **Consider spontaneous events.** Many of the events that influence TA behavior, or indicate strategic MISO objective achievement, are unanticipated and outside the control of MISO. These spontaneous events are taken into consideration when assessing the impact of actions and messages—however, they are not MOE. Instead, anecdotal data can be used to supplement the established MOE. If the unanticipated event is deemed important enough, and occurs regularly enough to be assessed over time, then it could be added into the assessment plan and included as a MOE for the remainder of the life of the

MISO series execution. Spontaneous events include any friendly, neutral, or hostile actions that affect the TA's behavior (other than the MISO series) or any events that can provide anecdotal nuance to MOE.

Data Collection Methods Matrix	
Face-to-Face Encounter	
Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encounters can be impromptu or planned • Can be accomplished by anyone at anytime • Much of information can be gathered in a timely manner • Collector is often familiar with neighborhood and locals • Collectors gather very recent data • Good for both nonverbal/verbal information
Weakness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collector bias • Limited sample size • Unstructured data • No opportunity to crosscheck data; trend analysis is difficult • Personality dependent • Responses are event driven and dependent on current environmental context • Difficult in uncertain or hostile environments
Opportunity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop a network of locals • Timeliness • Good information for future missions • Information collected can be used to assess the current opinion of population • Provides unofficial "grapevine" information relevant to the mood of the target audience (TA)
Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Response may be dependent on appearance • If there is a bond with locals, possible for interviewer to develop too much empathy • Locals can be untruthful or maliciously and intentionally withhold "grapevine" information • Possibly gaining a narrow view or opinion of the local population (depending on who is willing to interact with the task force and who is not)
Operational Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The characteristics of interpreters can be very important in getting subjects to cooperate (e.g., ethnicity, tribal group). • There is a difference between interpreters and translators – may need one of each to provide different things • It may be difficult to recruit professional interpreters and translators in operational circumstances • Electronic devices could be used to conduct basic translations
Structure Interview (Focused or Directive)	
Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Depth of information / resolution • Control over the information received • Can support quantitative analysis • Good for both verbal and nonverbal information • Has more scientific rigor than unstructured (due to repetitiveness) • Good to test both collective and individual effects • Access to subconscious effects (e.g., nonverbal behavior) • Access to both behavioral and attitudinal effects
Weakness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Difficult in uncertain or hostile environments • Timeliness • Can be biased by both the interviewer and interviewee • Costly in terms of financial and personnel resources • Does not allow large samples
Opportunity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can be contracted out (which has the potential to mitigate interviewee bias) • Can support trend analysis (can determine causality beyond correlation) • Choice of collectors • Potential influence opportunities • Possibility to preserve detailed records for future use

Figure D-1. Data Collection Methods Matrix

Structure Interview (Focused or Directive) cont'd	
Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resource limitations • Loss of flexibility • Freedom of expression (interviewer / interviewee) • Freedom of movement (interviewer / interviewee) • People may not want to participate because they are not allowed to have contact with task force.
Operational Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security situation is a big driver: access for civilian interviewers can be very difficult. • Need to understand the value of "group dynamics" before choosing between an individual or group collection forum. • Interviews can be used as a precursor or catalyst to get individuals to agree to participate in a focus group. • The characteristics of interpreters can be very important in getting subjects to cooperate (e.g., gender, ethnicity, tribal group) • There is a difference between interpreters and translators – may need one of each to provide different things. • It may be difficult to recruit professional interpreters and translators in operational circumstances. • Electronic devices could be used to conduct basic translations.
Unstructured Interview (Nondirective)	
Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Depth of information / resolution (even more than structured interviews) • Control over the information received • Can support qualitative analysis • Good for both verbal and nonverbal information • Good to test both collective and individual effects • Access to subconscious effects (e.g., nonverbal behavior) • Access to both behavioral and attitudinal effects (even more than structured) • Flexibility allows interviewer to engage in conversation outside of the scripted interview (e.g., follow-up questions, refute rebuttal statements, and pursue their intuition) • Freedom of expression and freedom of movement (interviewer)
Weakness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Difficult in uncertain or hostile environments • Timeliness • Can be biased by both the interviewer and interviewee (more than structured due to the level of flexibility) • Costly in terms of money • Does not allow big sample • Lack of scientific rigor, and consequently the process is not repeatable, thus making quantitative analysis difficult • May be difficult to analyze • Possibly need subject matter expert (SME) for analysis
Opportunity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consulting SME provides a better possibility of understanding your data • Choice of collectors • Intentional influence opportunities • Ability to record and analyze carefully
Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resource limitations • Difficult to hire an outside source to give an unstructured interview because may not gather all necessary data • Audience issues (linked to bias) • Freedom of expression and freedom of movement (interviewee)

Figure D-1. Data Collection Methods Matrix (cont'd)

Unstructured Interview (Nondirective) cont'd	
Operational Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Locally employed civilians may not be as skilled in these circumstances — collection may need to default to structured interviews instead The characteristics of interpreters can be very important in getting subjects to cooperate (e.g., gender, ethnicity, tribal group). There is a difference between interpreters and translators – may need one of each to provide different things It may be difficult to recruit professional interpreters and translators in operational circumstances Electronic devices could be used to conduct basic translations
Focus Group	
Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Depth of information Enable focus on specific groups Timeliness, a lot of information quickly Observation of and insight into group dynamics Allows gathering multiple opinions as well as discussions Good for both nonverbal/verbal information Cost effective in finances and resources
Weakness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Subjective/bias (interviewer) Not good for scientific rigor because focus groups are not repeatable due to unique group dynamics Members can inhibit each other from participating (sometimes due to hierarchical association) Never know who/how many will participate in advance Participants may not tell the truth because they are among others who may influence them Difficult in uncertain or hostile environments
Opportunity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase social network of the task force via supporters Understand and map layout of local social network Ability to collect longitudinal data Ability to collect repeatable measures with same individuals Focus group can be used to intentionally influence TA Multiple observers enable more reliable data Ability to record and analyze carefully
Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Level of hostility from the locals Some people may not want to participate in discussions (variety of reasons) Some participants may attend against their will Discussion leader (seemingly in authority) may ask leading questions or steer discussions/opinions
Operational Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There can be a significant administrative challenge/burden organizing focus group events Requires facilitators trained in conducting focus groups
Questionnaire	
Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Good for measuring attitudes Can be relatively inexpensive Can support quantitative analysis if appropriately designed Anonymity for respondents may elicit more truthful and accurate responses Can elicit both open and closed answers depending on design of questionnaire Can be used to question a large population sample, which can enhance validity and reliability
Weakness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The focus of questionnaire is biased by the agenda of the researcher Respondents may not respond to every question Response rates could be poor, particularly depending on distribution method, such as e-mail or handouts in the street Uncontrolled or unmonitored distribution of questionnaires may undermine validity and ability to conduct statistical analysis (e.g., one person may complete and return more than one questionnaire)

Figure D-1. Data Collection Methods Matrix (cont'd)

Questionnaire cont'd	
Opportunity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • They can be contracted, which can create job opportunities for local civilian companies. This also reduces the use of military resources. • They can be conducted without respondents knowing they are for the military • Alternatively, they can also be a visible way of showing the population that the military is interested in what they have to say
Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distribution and collection of questionnaires may be problematic or even dangerous, particularly in hostile environments. • Companies employed to administer questionnaires may be unable or unwilling to access the population sample • The military may have little or no choice over the caliber of the people administering questionnaires • Inappropriate collection practices may undermine validity. For example, people who are employed to administer questionnaires may complete the questionnaires themselves, rather than distribute them properly to the population sample • Questionnaires are a relatively "Western" data collection method; items may not mean the same to respondents as to the researchers who developed them.
Operational Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ability to post questionnaires on-line may be constrained by the availability of the Internet in the host country • Collection of questionnaires could be a security risk (e.g., collection box for questionnaire returns could be a target for a bomb)
Tally	
Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Noninvasive; no direct interaction with the subject of the tally required. This can mitigate the bias or the impact of the observer • It has a high level of objectivity • It can be conducted in uncertain or hostile environments (e.g., Service members can collect the data or others could be contracted) • Some things can be counted remotely (i.e., using satellite information) • Counting is independent of the TA, which means it is not dependent on their characteristics (e.g., literacy) • Counting can be conducted without specific skills or training • Can be relatively cheap if conducted with military resources • It can be used to measure the activities of all TAs (depending on the measures you choose) • Good for measuring directly observable behaviors • Can yield both quantitative and qualitative data • Data should be reliable, which can increase certainty in the analysis
Weakness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It can be time consuming to collect a significant amount of data each time. It can take time to actually see a change or trend • The amount of data points collected will be quite low • In order to determine what you want to count, you require a good understanding of the TA • Not suitable for measuring attitudes unless they are manifested in easily observable things
Opportunity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contracting counting to local contractors can bring employment opportunities and prosperity • A count can tally more than one thing at a time
Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It requires a high level of validity in your assumptions regarding the degree to which what you are counting is indicative of the effect that you think it demonstrates (the underlying effect you are really interested in) • What you want to count may not be observable • The number of uncontrollable variables may make correlating your count with an effect difficult • It can be difficult to discern a change where the number of observations is small • If the TA is aware they are being observed, they may behave differently, which can affect the validity of the count. The TA may also try to deceive (e.g., enemy might feint a retreat)

Figure D-1. Data Collection Methods Matrix (cont'd)

Tally cont'd	
Operational Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It may be difficult to get sufficient military resources (e.g., infantry) allocated to count things • If the indicators require Intelligence material to identify them, buy-in will be required from the collection agencies to get sufficient material collected over time • Requests for information (RFIs) to the intelligence collection agencies for relevant material will need an appropriate security classification • Security clearance may be an issue depending on what needs to be counted, for example, if the selected indicators are to be found in top secret intelligence material
Participant Observation	
Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provides direct access to a TA. This can be very useful for gaining more valid insights (e.g., culture) • May not require significant resources (e.g., can be done by one highly skilled individual) • The participant can "observe" both attitudes and behaviors (attitudes can be "observed" through communication with the observed individuals) • Can be a good way of identifying more subconscious attitudes, but only for a small sample size • The granularity, depth and richness of the data collected can be high • Supports qualitative analysis • There will be a higher degree of certainty due to the depth of information
Weakness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It is more difficult in an uncertain or hostile environment • Not all TAs are accessible • Can take a long time to gain access to a TA • There can be a long lead time from establishing the participant to gaining the data • Might require a highly skilled or trained individual to conduct the participation (e.g., linguistics skills) • Does not easily support quantitative analysis • It can take a long time to collect the information • The data will be less reliable because of the subjective nature of the collection • The participant needs to be suited to the environment they are observing. This may require very specific characteristics
Opportunity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participation can help build up a rapport with a TA over time • The data collected can be multi-purpose and support a range of different measures • The method is dynamic as the observer can be tasked to observe different things over time
Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There can be a physical threat to the participant in an uncertain or hostile environment, particularly if they are remote or isolated from their own side • A negative experience with participant observation might result in deterioration in the relationship with the TA • Resource costs to support a participant observer might be high
Operational Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The use of qualified anthropologists may be constrained by their cooperation with the military: anthropological community maintains a relatively negative perception of, and relationship with, the military • More feasible sources of participant observation in military operations may include key leader engagement (KLE) or regular routine patrolling
Request for Information	
Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There are multiple intelligence collection methods and sources, which can be drawn upon • RFIs can always be submitted (although the content in the returns may vary) • A large amount of information can be collected from one source • RFIs are cheap to the requester • Data will be more relevant for qualitative analysis • The data can be on both attitudes and behaviors

Figure D-1. Data Collection Methods Matrix (cont'd)

Request for Information cont'd	
Weakness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The availability of some sources will be limited by the permissiveness of the environment (e.g., human intelligence [HUMINT]) • The return may not be specifically tailored to your response. It may have been used to support multiple RFIs • Some TAs might be more difficult to collect info on than others • It can require specific resources such as satellites, or trained HUMINT collectors • It is important to ask the right questions in the first place • It can take time to collect information not already available • The data might be irrelevant by the time you receive it • By the time you have asked your question, the window for getting the data might have closed • The control of the requester over how the data is collected is limited
Opportunity	n/a
Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Timeliness: Possibility of intelligence community respondent sending information to solve the wrong problem
Operational Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See RFI issues under Tally above
Media Monitoring	
Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Availability is not very dependent on the nature of the environment. It is readily available. • Media output can be collected remotely and directly • More appropriate for collecting attitudinal data • It can be helpful for measuring subconscious attitudes if there is sufficient cultural info for "reading between the lines" • It can support both quantitative and qualitative analysis • The data results can be very timely • The reliability can be high – it can be a very structured and repeatable process • The collector variables should be irrelevant because it is remote (except for skills, etc. mentioned above)
Weakness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requires a good understanding of cultural norms and how to interpret foreign media output • Might require specialist capabilities to translate foreign language media output • It will likely be very resource intensive, often requiring particular software and specialist training, skills • It is time intensive • It will likely be expensive financially • The amount of data available and collected can be overwhelming • The validity could be questionable – media reports can be very subjective or even deliberately biased
Opportunity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The process can be automated if the software is available • The output could support a range of different measures
Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The media output might not represent "ground truth" (e.g., because of censorship) • The media output might not represent the views of all TAs. For example, it might represent that of the educated classes, rather than the working classes\ • It is difficult to determine which media output is important/available to the TAs
Operational Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Media monitoring can be a complex activity and time consuming activity – it could be useful to subcontract this to external agencies such as BBC Monitoring

Figure D-1. Data Collection Methods Matrix (cont'd)

Literature Review	
Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can be collected remotely • May not require many people to conduct it • It can provide the background historical information for the baselines against which attitudinal and behavioral change can be measured • Can provide detailed contextual info on a TA • May have both quantitative and qualitative insights • The process should be repeatable and the results should be reliable • The level of certainty should be high • Independent of collector characteristics
Weakness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can be difficult to collect information on a particular topic. It may not exist, it may not be in electronic format, it may not be available, etc. • Requires people with specialist skills (e.g., information specialists, translators) • Requires domain knowledge to investigate the appropriate areas (e.g., anthropology, psychology, country expertise) • Can be expensive • Will not provide current data for measuring any change
Opportunity	n/a
Threats	n/a
Operational Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Could be difficult to read and absorb large volumes of data in operational timeframes
Consulting Subject Matter Expert	
Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SMEs are typically remote from the environment (e.g., Diaspora, emigrants) can be good proxies for TAs in an uncertain or hostile environment • SMEs can be consulted on both attitudinal and behavioral effects • The data collected will be mostly for qualitative analysis • The data can be highly detailed and contextual • The data can be collected in a timely manner
Weakness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can be difficult to know who a suitable SME is. How do you identify experts? How do you judge expertise? • Can be difficult to access a SME in an uncertain or hostile environment • Valid knowledge of the TA may not exist, or can be hard to find • The SME will often be a member of the TA and will have their own point of view, which means their input may be biased • SME may not be trustworthy. This affects the reliability of data and may compromise the safety of the mission • Required SMEs may not exist • The data collected will be subjective • SMEs may not interact with some people, which would have an impact on the suitability of the collector (e.g., conservative Muslim man might not speak with a Western female)
Opportunity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SMEs can provide awareness of previously unknown information • SMEs can help open doors to other sources and increase your network • SMEs might suggest relevant measures that you had not thought of
Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interaction with a SME might compromise their neutrality, independence, etc. • Interaction with a SME might endanger their lives—they might be perceived as a collaborator • Data from the SME might compromise the safety of your mission (e.g., if it is very inaccurate or even malicious)
Operational Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The SME may not be an expert after all • May need multiple SMEs for cross-referencing • May need indigenous and nonlocal SMEs • There may be strict rules on what/who public money can be spent on

Figure D-1. Data Collection Methods Matrix (cont'd)

5. Analyze Military Information Support Operations Series Results

a. The vast majority of assessment design should be complete by the time series execution occurs. During execution, indicators (data) continue to be collected on the identified MOE criteria at intervals previously established in the assessment plan. Periodicity often ranges from daily (social media), to weekly (intelligence), to quarterly (surveys). There is not necessarily an ideal timeline for data collection—what is important is that the periodicity is established and maintained over time.

b. During execution, PSYOP forces conduct a series of interventions (actions and messages), to influence a TA's behavior, employing various data collection means to obtain MOP and MOE indicators (data). These are the same indicators that were used to establish a baseline. All indicators are analyzed first in comparison to the baseline to assess change over time, and second in relation to the MISO interventions introduced into the environment to determine if there is a correlation or causal relationship between the series and any changes in cognition, attitudes, or behavior exhibited by the TA. Through this analysis, PSYOP forces can evaluate to what extent objectives have been achieved and determine whether any adjustments are necessary.

c. It is the MISO planners' responsibility to ensure that any data collected or analyzed by various custodians answers the established assessment criteria. Often, additional data is collected and analyzed and, while helpful in understanding the TA, is irrelevant to the determined MOE and whether the TA is progressing toward the stated objectives. It is the role of the PSYOP force to distill the “noise” by adhering to the assessment plan.

The following terms and context are associated specifically with the combatant command (CCMD) military information support operations (MISO) activity types/reporting to the Joint Staff and the Office of Secretary of Defense in support of congressional reporting requirements:

MISO Program. An Under Secretary of Defense for Policy-approved document that provides policy authority for the conduct of MISO, within the bounds outlined in that document. There are global and theater-specific MISO programs. This is a policy document.

MISO Plan. A document produced by a CCMD that operationalizes MISO programs and is used to manage multiple MISO objectives. The MISO plan defines supporting MISO objectives and includes all the product and actions that are executed to change the behavior of multiple target audiences (TAs) in line with multiple MISO objectives. Thus, a MISO plan is made up of two or more MISO supporting plans.

MISO Supporting Plan. Includes all the products and actions that are executed to change the behavior of multiple TAs in line with one MISO objective. Thus, a MISO supporting plan is made up of two or more MISO efforts.

MISO Effort. All the products and actions that executed to change the behavior of multiple TAs in line with a singular supporting MISO objective. Thus, a MISO effort is made up of two or more series.

Series. All the products and actions that are executed to change the behavior of a single TA in line with a singular supporting MISO objective.

Admin. An administrative activity that needs to be reported because MISO funds are being used as it is in direct support of operations but is not accounted for in another category such as interpreter contracts, military information support team administrative, platforms, term personnel hires, or Joint Military Support Operations Web Operations Center's core.

Assessments. A MISO activity executed to assess measures of effectiveness (baseline data collection, interim data collection, post-series data collection, pre or post-tests of products, or other required MISO assessments). This includes quantitative (i.e., surveys) and qualitative (e.g., focus groups) data collection and analysis.

APPENDIX E

MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS INTERNET ACTIVITIES

1. General

a. The Internet is an instrument used by our competitors and adversaries to exploit and manipulate populations across the globe. MISO Internet activities are designed to strengthen partnerships and to counter regional and global threats, consistent with PN and US national security strategies and objectives, aiding operational efforts in response to competition and conflict. MISO planners coordinate MISO Internet activities with USG departments and agencies in accordance with established US laws and DoD policy and authority governing the conduct of MISO. **The Internet is one of many means of dissemination available.**

b. MISO Internet activities are more dynamic than other means of dissemination (e.g., radio, television, print) due to the evolution of technology and the ways in which TAs engage various online platforms. Internet activities are structured to provide flexibility and timely execution as conversations, topics, and trends shift the TAs' perception and behavior. Inability to keep pace with topics and trends degrades effectiveness.

c. This appendix provides additional details specific to planning, execution, and assessments of Internet activities. It highlights some unique aspects of the Internet and requirements in parallel with the seven-phase MISO process as discussed in Chapter IV "Military Information Support Operations Process." Figure E-1 describes in context common terminology for MISO Internet activities.

2. Considerations for Military Information Support Operations Internet Activities

a. **The seven-phase MISO process applies to the Internet as a means of dissemination.**

(1) The MISO plan, specifically series, should detail how Internet activities are inclusive of other products and PSYACTs.

(2) Due to the open and enduring nature of the Internet, planners should account for the possibility of the messaging spreading to unintended audiences. It is essential that the TA be sufficiently scoped and refined, since this affects the specific arguments, lines of persuasion, and other nuances of products. Refining TAs contributes to the ability to assess effects. **MISO planners should not preselect the Internet as the medium; rather, allow the TAA process to guide media selection.** If the Internet is selected as the means of dissemination, those products should be tied to other MISO actions and products within a particular series.

Military Information Support Operations Internet Activities Common Terminology

Term	Meaning / Context
Account	A profile an Internet user establishes in online communities, websites, social media, etc.
Amplification	Efforts intended to support and increase exposure to positive or friendly content.
Engagement	Any posted online content such as a post, reply, share, like, comment, retweet, or interaction with a social media posting.
Follow-back	A social media technique used to generate followers where an account will follow accounts that follow them. Typically associated with spam-like behavior. Accounts will use such phrases as "follow = follow back."
Initial Post	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The first time that a user ever posts on specific social media platform. It does not have to be original content and can include responses to messages. Original content posted by the distributor. 2. The first posting that initiates a thread.
Disruption	Content intended to reduce the influence of adversary disinformation efforts.
Dynamic Post	Posting for debate or to engage in conversation.
Static Post	Posting for nonengagement to present information to target audience but not engage in follow-on debate.
Validation	Timely review of military information support operations (MISO) for approval.
Narrative	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A way of presenting or understanding a situation or series of events that reflects and promotes a particular point of view or set of values. 2. A representation of a particular situation or process conveyed in such a way as to reflect or conform to an overarching set of aims or values. 3. A planning and execution document operationalizing a MISO program. The document consists of multiple MISO objectives, supporting MISO objectives, target audiences, and themes to stress and avoid.
Post	Text or image shared on social media through a user's profile. It can be as simple as a blurb of text, but can also include images, videos, and links to other content. Other users of the social network can like, comment, and share the post.
Reach	The total number of unique people who saw a post at least once; this includes scrolling past a content regardless of the interaction with the post.
Sentiment Analysis	The process of analyzing online content (text or images) to determine the emotional tone they carry, whether they are positive, negative, or neutral. Sentiment should be taken into consideration when conducting an initial/original post, retweet-post-share, and in the generated response(s) relation to measure of effectiveness assessment criteria.

**Figure E-1. Military Information Support Operations
Internet Activities Common Terminology**

(3) The MISO Internet activities process for product development and design has two distinctions: product and engagement. A posting on the Internet (e.g., posting of MISO product, article, blog, tweet, etc.) is considered an engagement. Internet products also differ in their dynamic nature, as each individual posting, article, or tweet could be unique. Products are routinely developed daily based on current conversations and context of the TAs. Just like face-to-face engagements, online engagements are planned and conducted within the limits of approved thematic guidance.

(4) A unique aspect of Internet engagement is the time-sensitive nature of the series/products approval for relevant real-time execution. Internet activities require modified MISO approval process with product approval occurring at delegated levels based on environment, mission, and risk. Products at times require continuous and rapid approvals with approval authority delegated to the appropriate level to ensure responsiveness to conditions.

(5) The Internet provides the ability to rapidly disseminate digital products and conduct engagements, seizing the initiative from competitors or adversaries. Engagements require special consideration for approval when employing contractors.

(6) Information collection can leverage a variety of data sources including sentiment tracking, shift in online narratives, and propagation of narratives. Data is collected, analyzed, and integrated into assessments.

(7) The Internet offers a low physical risk to the force.

b. Access to capabilities and tools are required to understand the impact of information in the OE to:

(1) Maintain situational awareness of daily conversations, existing narratives, and activities in the IE.

(2) Understand relevant actors and drivers of human behaviors.

(3) Analyze what is trending and if what is trending accurately portrays reality.

(4) Assess the impact of operations on the TA's behavior.

(5) Identify exposure of friendly critical information and indicators during ongoing operations.

c. Planners analyze and synthesize information to:

(1) Assist in the characterization of the strategic and operational environment.

(2) Facilitate shared understanding across the joint force.

- (3) Facilitate decision making and future allocation of resources.
- (4) Identify threats, vulnerabilities, and opportunities in the IE.
- (5) Inform future MISO execution.
- (6) In concert with joint military deception and OPSEC planners, develop plans to mitigate compromised friendly critical information and indicators during ongoing operations.

3. The Internet as Dissemination Means

a. MISO Internet activities are executed on or through websites, email, social media, blogs, chat rooms, web forums and bulletin boards, and other forms of Internet communication and emerging technologies.

b. Required capability and considerations associated with the Internet.

(1) The command responsible for the execution of MISO Internet activities withholds the authority to execute and manages risk. CCMDs consider the processes, permission, and authorities for execution and clearly articulate those in written orders. The approval processes (determined by the executing command) can be different than for other MISO products.

(2) Specialized equipment, site security requirements, and operators.

(3) TAA is a deliberate process that results in specific activities to create specific effects for a specified TA. These activities cannot be simply shifted to another TA to create a different or even the same effect. Doing so without conducting TAA results in loss of focus, wasted resources, including money and time, and may result in unintended consequences.

(4) Difficulty in reaching intended TA with limited Internet access or those whose usage is monitored or filtered.

(5) Consider accounting for a decentralized operations in the written order.

APPENDIX F

EXAMPLE OF REQUIREMENTS FOR JOINT MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS COORDINATION, CONCURRENCE, AND REPORT TO CONGRESS

1. General

DoD shall seek concurrence from the DOS and the CIA in advance of the execution of MISO outside areas of ongoing hostilities. MISO are conducted within the parameters of OSD policies. Once a MISO program is approved for areas outside of ongoing hostilities, MISO plans require coordination and MISO series require concurrence between departments and agencies prior to execution. This appendix clarifies the requirements for coordination, concurrence, and congressional reporting.

For more information, see DoDD 5111.01, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), and DoDI 0-3607.02, Military Information Support Operations (MISO).

2. Coordination for Military Information Support Operations Plans

a. Planning for MISO resides at the CCMD. Any CCMD executing MISO under an approved program develops a MISO plan, further refining the delegated authority. CCDRs are the approval authority for MISO plans.

b. CCMDs coordinate MISO plans with the DOS and CIA to ensure visibility by the responsible offices and present an opportunity for interagency stakeholders and regional offices to provide input to CCMD-level planning.

c. MISO plans include supporting MISO objectives, the alignment of approved TAs to those supporting MISO objectives, specific MOEs, and the delegated approval authority for each MISO series within the plan. MISO plans also address countries of interest, languages under consideration, and topics to avoid.

d. Interagency partner concurrence is not required, but CCMDs should make every effort to address DOS or CIA's concerns. CCMDs adjudicate all comments and transmit the CCMD-approved MISO plans to all parties for informational purposes. Coordination ensures alignment with administration policy, DOS public diplomacy informational lines of effort, and CIA mission center equities.

3. Concurrence for Military Information Support Operations Series

a. A MISO series is the level at which MISO is executed and includes all actions and products developed in support of a single supporting MISO objective and a single TA combination.

b. CCMDs, and their components, obtain COM or chief of station (COS) concurrence prior to series execution. Prior to submitting a series for concurrence, CCMDs conduct informal coordination with the United States mission country team and include DOS Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, CIA Associate Director for Military Affairs, Joint Staff J-39 [Deputy Director for Global Operations], and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. Series-level detail allows a commander and a COM or COS to understand the exact nature and timeline of a proposed MISO activity.

c. MISO series details include the specific behavioral change desired of the TA, lines of persuasion (supporting arguments), the number and type of products required, and the dissemination schedule.

d. The series should describe how decision points within the MISO series are handled between the approving authority (CCMDs or delegated representative) and the COM/COS. If applicable, series documentation includes the use of social media as individual products and includes the narrative guidance for multiple posts. The CCDR or delegated representative has final approval for MISO execution.

e. In the event the COM or COS non-concurs with comments, the responsible CCMD can refine the MISO series and resubmit for concurrence. If COM or COS again non-concurs, the CCDR may elect to terminate planning efforts for the series or request an appropriate DoD official elevate the disagreement for discussion between progressively more senior officials of DoD and the relevant other USG department or agency or to refer to the National Security Memorandum-2 process.

4. Congressional Reporting Requirements

The following terms and context are associated specifically with the CCMD MISO activity types/reporting to the Joint Staff and the Office of Secretary of Defense in support of congressional reporting requirements. Figure F-1 illustrates MISO activities reporting:

a. MISO program. Approved per OSD policies for the conduct of MISO. There are global and theater-specific MISO programs.

For more information, see DoDD 5111.01, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), and DoDI 0-3607.02, Military Information Support Operations (MISO).

b. MISO plan. A document produced by a CCMD that operationalizes MISO programs and is used to manage multiple MISO objectives. The MISO plan defines supporting MISO objectives and includes all the products and actions that are executed to change the behavior of multiple TAs in line with multiple MISO objectives. A MISO plan is made up of two or more MISO supporting plans.




Figure F-1. Military Information Support Operations Activity Reporting

c. MISO supporting plan. Includes all the products and actions that are executed to change the behavior of multiple TAs in line with one MISO objective. A MISO supporting plan is made up of two or more MISO efforts.

d. MISO effort. All the products and actions executed to change the behavior of multiple TAs in line with a singular supporting MISO objective. A MISO effort is made up of two or more series.

e. Series. All the products and actions that are executed to change the behavior of a single TA in line with a singular supporting MISO objective.

f. Administration. An administrative activity that is required to be reported because MISO funds are being used in direct support of military operations but are not accounted for in another category, such as interpreter contracts, military information support team

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administrative funding, platforms, term personnel hires, or Joint Military Support Operations Web Operations Center's Core.

g. Assessments. A MISO activity executed to assess MOE (baseline data collection, interim data collection, post-series data collection, pre or post-tests of products, or other required MISO assessments). This includes quantitative (i.e., surveys) and qualitative (e.g., focus groups) data collection and analysis.

APPENDIX G REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-53 is based upon the following primary references:

1. General

- a. Title 10, USC.
- b. Title 17, USC.
- c. Title 50, USC.
- d. National Security Decision Directive 130, *US International Information Policy*.
- e. National Security Decision Directive 77, *Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security*.
- f. National Security Directive 51, *US Government International Broadcasting*.
- g. National Security Strategy of the United States.
- h. Presidential Decision Directive-68, *International Public Information (IPI)*.

2. Department of Defense Publications

- a. Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Forces for Unified Commands Assignment Tables.
- b. DoDD 2311.01, *DoD Law of War Program*.
- c. DoDD 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW)*.
- d. DoDD 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)*.
- e. DoDD 3115.18, *DoD Access to and Use of Publicly Available Information (PAI)*.
- f. DoDD 3600.01, *Information Operations (IO)*.
- g. DoDD 5111.01, *Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))*.
- h. DoDD 5111.10, *Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict*.
- i. DoDD 5132.03, *DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*.

j. DoDD 5143.01, *Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S))*.

k. DoDD S-5205.61, *(U) DoD Cover and Cover Support Activities*.

l. DoDI 3115.12, *Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)*.

m. DoDI O-3607.02, *Military Information Support Operations (MISO)*.

n. DoD 5240.1-R, *Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons*.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

a. CJCSI 3110.01K, *(U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP)*.

b. CJCSI 3110.01K-1, *(U) Contingency Planning Supplement to the 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP)*.

c. CJCSI 3110.05G, *Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan*.

d. CJCSM 3130.03A, *Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance*.

e. JP 1, Volume 1, *Joint Warfighting*.

f. JP 1, Volume 2, *The Joint Force*.

g. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*.

h. JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations*.

i. JP 3-04, *Information in Joint Operations*.

j. JP 3-05, *Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*.

k. JP 3-07, *Joint Stabilization Activities*.

l. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation*.

m. JP 3-09, *Joint Fire Support*.

n. JP 3-12, *Joint Cyberspace Operations*.

o. JP 3-14, *Joint Space Operations*.

p. JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*.

- q. JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation*.
- r. JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*.
- s. JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*.
- t. JP 3-25, *Joint Countering Threat Networks*.
- u. JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*.
- v. JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.
- w. JP 3-31, *Joint Land Operations*.
- x. JP 3-33, *Joint Force Headquarters*.
- y. JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*.
- z. JP 3-60, *Joint Targeting*.
- aa. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*.
- bb. JP 3-68, *Joint Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*.
- cc. JP 3-85, *Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations*.
- dd. JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*.
- ee. JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*.
- ff. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications*.

4. United States Army Publications

- a. Field Manual 3-53, *Military Information Support Operations*.
- b. Field Manual 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*.
- c. Army Techniques Publication 3-53.1, *Military Information in Special Operations*.
- d. Army Techniques Publication 3-53.2, *Military Information in Conventional Operations*.
- e. Army GTA 33-01-004, *Military Information Support Operations Authoritative References*.

5. United States Navy Publications

- a. Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3434.1A, *Military Information Support Operations*.
- b. Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-13.5, *Navy Military Information Support Operations*.

6. United States Air Force Publication

Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-13, *Information in Air Force Operations*.

7. United States Marine Corps Publication

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 8, *Information*.

APPENDIX H

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-13.2, *Military Information Support Operations*, 21 November 2014.

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication, please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DoD system of record for lessons learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations, events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become

institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at <https://www.jllis.mil> (NIPRNET) or <http://www.jllis.smil.mil> (SIPRNET).

6. Releasability

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GLOSSARY
PART I—SHORTENED WORD FORMS (ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS,
AND INITIALISMS)

AOR	area of responsibility
AI	artificial intelligence
C2	command and control
CCDR	combatant commander
CCMD	combatant command
CCP	combatant command campaign plan
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CMO	civil-military operations
CO	cyberspace operations
COA	course of action
COG	center of gravity
COM	chief of mission
CONOPS	concept of operations
COS	chief of station
CT	counterterrorism
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense directive
DoDI	Department of Defense instruction
DOS	Department of State
DSCA	defense support of civil authorities
EXORD	execute order
FID	foreign internal defense
HN	host nation
IE	information environment
IW	irregular warfare
JADO	joint all-domain operations
JFC	joint force commander
JIACG	joint interagency coordination group
JOA	joint operations area
JP	joint publication

JPP	joint planning process
JTF	joint task force
MISO	military information support operations
ML	machine learning
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
OE	operational environment
OIE	operations in the information environment
OPLAN	operation plan
OPSEC	operations security
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	public affairs
PN	partner nation
POTF	psychological operations task force
PSYACT	psychological action
PSYOP	psychological operations (forces)
SC	security cooperation
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SFA	security force assistance
TA	target audience
TAA	target audience analysis
US	United States
USC	United States Code
USG	United States Government
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	unconventional warfare

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

1. JP 3-53, *Joint Military Information Support Operations*, 11 October 2024, Active Terms and Definitions


military information support operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called **MISO**. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary with JP 3-53 as the source JP.)

2. Terms Removed from the DoD Dictionary

- **Supersession of JP 3-13.2, *Military Information Support Operations*, 21 November 2014:** civil authority information support

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-53** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

