



Coinsult

Advanced Manual Smart Contract Audit



Project: Aptos Chain

Website: -

Low-Risk

6 low-risk code
issues found

Medium-Risk

0 medium-risk code
issues found

High-Risk

0 high-risk code
issues found

Contract Address

0x72c863C31cF59abd4820b1D04026DFFe08486B98

Disclaimer: Coinsult is not responsible for any financial losses. Nothing in this contract audit is financial advice, please do your own research.

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Coinsult is not responsible if a project turns out to be a scam, rug-pull or honeypot. We only provide a detailed analysis for your own research.

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Tokenomics

| Rank | Address | Quantity (Token) | Percentage |
|------|--|------------------|------------|
| 1 | 0xecbc0c45df202b01fa180e5c71820d24e9c43eb1 | 5,500,000 | 55.0000% |
| 2 | 0x267c69f35a95da03db3e90d900e6d3aae9bd295f | 4,500,000 | 45.0000% |

Source Code

Coinsult was comissioned by Aptos Chain to perform an audit based on the following smart contract:

<https://bscscan.com/address/0x72c863C31cF59abd4820b1D04026DFFe08486B98#code>

Manual Code Review

In this audit report we will highlight all these issues:

Low-Risk

6 low-risk code
issues found

Medium-Risk

0 medium-risk code
issues found

High-Risk

0 high-risk code
issues found

The detailed report continues on the next page...

● **Low-Risk:** Could be fixed, will not bring problems.

Contract contains Reentrancy vulnerabilities

Additional information: This combination increases risk of malicious intent. While it may be justified by some complex mechanics (e.g. rebase, reflections, buyback).

More information: Slither

```
function _transfer(address sender, address recipient, uint256 amount) private returns (bool) {

    require(sender != address(0), "ERC20: transfer from the zero address");
    require(recipient != address(0), "ERC20: transfer to the zero address");
    require(!_bAddress[sender] && !_bAddress[recipient], "ERC20: transfer from | to bAddress");

    if(inSwapAndLiquify)
    {
        return _basicTransfer(sender, recipient, amount);
    }
    else
    {
        if(!isTxLimitExempt[sender] && !isTxLimitExempt[recipient]) {
            require(amount = _minimumTokensBeforeSwap;

            if (overMinimumTokenBalance && !inSwapAndLiquify && !isMarketPair[sender] &ai
            {
                if(swapAndLiquifyByLimitOnly)
                    contractTokenBalance = _minimumTokensBeforeSwap;
                swapAndLiquify(contractTokenBalance);
            }
        }
    }
}
```

Recommendation

Apply the check-effects-interactions pattern.

Exploit scenario

```
function withdrawBalance(){
    // send userBalance[msg.sender] Ether to msg.sender
    // if mgs.sender is a contract, it will call its fallback function
    if( ! (msg.sender.call.value(userBalance[msg.sender]))() ) ){
        throw;
    }
    userBalance[msg.sender] = 0;
}
```

Bob uses the re-entrancy bug to call withdrawBalance two times, and withdraw more than its initial deposit to the contract.

● **Low-Risk:** Could be fixed, will not bring problems.

No zero address validation for some functions

Detect missing zero address validation.

```
function setMarketingWalletAddress(address newAddress) external onlyOwner() {  
    marketingWalletAddress = payable(newAddress);  
}
```

Recommendation

Check that the new address is not zero.

Exploit scenario

```
contract C {  
  
    modifier onlyAdmin {  
        if (msg.sender != owner) throw;  
        _;  
    }  
  
    function updateOwner(address newOwner) onlyAdmin external {  
        owner = newOwner;  
    }  
}
```

Bob calls updateOwner without specifying the newOwner, so Bob loses ownership of the contract.

● **Low-Risk:** Could be fixed, will not bring problems.

Functions that send Ether to arbitrary destinations

Unprotected call to a function sending Ether to an arbitrary address.

```
function addLiquidity(uint256 tokenAmount, uint256 ethAmount) private {
    // approve token transfer to cover all possible scenarios
    _approve(address(this), address(uniswapV2Router), tokenAmount);

    // add the liquidity
    uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(
        address(this),
        tokenAmount,
        0, // slippage is unavoidable
        0, // slippage is unavoidable
        marketingWalletAddress,
        block.timestamp
    );
}
```

Recommendation

Ensure that an arbitrary user cannot withdraw unauthorized funds.

Exploit scenario

```
contract ArbitrarySend{
    address destination;
    function setDestination(){
        destination = msg.sender;
    }

    function withdraw() public{
        destination.transfer(this.balance);
    }
}
```

Bob calls setDestination and withdraw. As a result he withdraws the contract's balance.

● **Low-Risk:** Could be fixed, will not bring problems.

Divide before multiply

Solidity integer division might truncate. As a result, performing multiplication before division can sometimes avoid loss of precision.

```
_minimumTokensBeforeSwap = supply.div(10000) * 10**_decimals;
```

Recommendation

Consider ordering multiplication before division.

Exploit scenario

```
contract A {  
    function f(uint n) public {  
        coins = (oldSupply / n) * interest;  
    }  
}
```

If n is greater than $oldSupply$, $coins$ will be zero. For example, with $oldSupply = 5$; $n = 10$, $interest = 2$, $coins$ will be zero. If $(oldSupply * interest / n)$ was used, $coins$ would have been 1. In general, it's usually a good idea to re-arrange arithmetic to perform multiplication before division, unless the limit of a smaller type makes this dangerous.

● **Low-Risk:** Could be fixed, will not bring problems.

Missing events arithmetic

Detect missing events for critical arithmetic parameters.

```
function updateKillBlockNum(uint num) public onlyOwner {  
    killBlockNum = num;  
}
```

Recommendation

Emit an event for critical parameter changes.

Exploit scenario

```
contract C {  
  
    modifier onlyAdmin {  
        if (msg.sender != owner) throw;  
        _;  
    }  
  
    function updateOwner(address newOwner) onlyAdmin external {  
        owner = newOwner;  
    }  
}
```

updateOwner() has no event, so it is difficult to track off-chain changes in the buy price.

● **Low-Risk:** Could be fixed, will not bring problems.

Redundant Statements

Detect the usage of redundant statements that have no effect.

```
function _msgData() internal view virtual returns (bytes memory) {
    this;
    // silence state mutability warning without generating bytecode - see https://github.com/ethereum
    return msg.data;
}
```

Recommendation

Remove redundant statements if they congest code but offer no value.

Exploit scenario

```
contract RedundantStatementsContract {

    constructor() public {
        uint; // Elementary Type Name
        bool; // Elementary Type Name
        RedundantStatementsContract; // Identifier
    }

    function test() public returns (uint) {
        uint; // Elementary Type Name
        assert; // Identifier
        test; // Identifier
        return 777;
    }
}
```

Each commented line references types/identifiers, but performs no action with them, so no code will be generated for such statements and they can be removed.

Owner privileges

- Owner cannot pause trading
- Owner can change max transaction amount
- Owner can set fees higher than 25%
- Owner can exclude from fees
- ⚠ Owner can disable wallet limits
- ⚠ Owner can exclude addresses from max transaction amount
- ⚠ Owner can set max wallet balance

Extra notes by the team

No notes

Contract Snapshot

```
contract APTOS is Context, IERC20, Ownable {

    using SafeMath for uint256;
    using Address for address;

    string private _name;
    string private _symbol;
    uint8 private _decimals;
    address payable public marketingWalletAddress;
    address payable public teamWalletAddress;
    address public immutable deadAddress = 0x00000000000000000000000000000000dEaD;
```

Project Overview

● Not KYC verified by Coinsult

Aptos Chain

Audited by Coinsult.net



Date: 23 August 2022

✓ Advanced Manual Smart Contract Audit