



## Audit Report for ICHI oneToken - May 24, 2021

### Summary

Audit Report prepared by Solidified covering the ICHI oneToken smart contracts.

### Process and Delivery

Three (3) independent Solidified experts performed an unbiased and isolated audit of the code below. The debrief took place on May 3, 2021, and the results are presented here.

Fixes have been supplied and were reviewed, with a final debrief on 24 May.

### Audited Files

The source code has been supplied in a private source code repository:

<https://github.com/ichifarm/ichi-oneToken/>

Latest Commit: `11c210ee87509128f35ed6636f0cb3d77733e74b`

### Intended Behavior

ICHI is a DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organization) governed by the community of ICHI token holders. ICHI provides a stablecoin service to other crypto communities through its oneToken Factory.

The oneToken Factory enables the creation of oneTokens (ERC20 tokens collateralized by a blend of stablecoins and member coins, designed to always maintain a peg to one USD). It is a generalized contract designed to produce upgradeable oneToken instances each with distinct governance and internal logic within boundaries defined by ICHI.



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### Findings

Smart contract audits are an important step to improve the security of smart contracts and can find many issues. However, auditing complex codebases has its limits and a remaining risk is present (see disclaimer).

Users of a smart contract system should exercise caution. In order to help with the evaluation of the remaining risk, we provide a measure of the following key indicators: **code complexity**, **code readability**, **level of documentation**, and **test coverage**.

Note, that high complexity or lower test coverage does not necessarily equate to a higher risk, although certain bugs are more easily detected in unit testing than a security audit and vice versa.

Criteria	Status	Comment
Code complexity	Low	-
Code readability and clarity	High	-
Level of Documentation	High	-
Test Coverage	High	-

## Issues Found

Solidified found that the ICHI oneToken contracts contain no critical issues, 1 major issue, 6 minor issues, and 5 informational notes.

We recommend issues are amended, while informational notes are up to the team's discretion, as they refer to best practices.

#	Description	Severity	Status
1	ICHICompositeOracle.sol: Incorrect implementation for oracle function amountRequired()	Major	Resolved
2	StrategyCommon.sol: Function closeAllPositions() will always fail after a large enough number of assets have been added	Minor	Resolved
3	Arbitrary.sol: Function executeTransaction() does not refund extra ETH sent	Minor	Resolved
4	UniswapOracleSimple.sol: Oracle does not enforce that indexToken is a USD stablecoin	Minor	Acknowledged
5	OneTokenV1Base.sol: Function removeStrategy() does not close the strategy	Minor	Resolved
6	Incremental.sol: Zero value logic mismatch for stepSize	Minor	Resolved
7	OneTokenV1.sol: Function redeem() does not check if the liabilities of the collateral token exceed the contract's balance, which could prevent the user from withdrawing the collateral token afterwards	Minor	Acknowledged
8	OneTokenV1.sol: Two-step withdrawal process is redundant	Note	Resolved
9	OneTokenV1Base.sol: Redundant call to _transferOwnership() in init()	Note	Resolved
10	OneTokenV1.sol: Function redeem() assumes one to one ratio between collateral token and oneToken	Note	Acknowledged



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11	OneTokenV1.sol: Collateral tokens which charge transfer fees are not compatible with the accounting of collateral balances	Note	Acknowledged
12	OneTokenV1Base.sol: setStrategyAllowance() amount parameter documentation is incorrect	Note	Resolved

## Critical Issues

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No critical issues have been found.

## Major Issues

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### 1. ICHICompositeOracle.sol: Incorrect implementation for oracle function `amountRequired()`

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Function `amountRequired()` incorrectly returns a value that is 1:1 pegged to the given `amountUsd`. This results in `ICHICompositeOracle` always returning the wrong result for any given `amountUsd`.

#### Recommendation

Have the function fetch all the pairs from the `oracleContracts` oracle chain (in their respective order), then use these values to correctly compute `amountUsd`.

#### Status

Resolved

## Minor Issues

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### 2. StrategyCommon.sol: Function `closeAllPositions()` will always fail after a large enough number of assets have been added

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Since function `closeAllPositions()` iterates over all `OneTokenV1Base` assets, its gas consumption will exceed the block gas limit after a large enough number of assets have been added. This will cause the function to always fail when called.

**Recommendation**

Implement a cap on the number of assets that can be added to `OneTokenV1Base` that won't exceed the block gas limit.

**Status**

Resolved

### 3. `Arbitrary.sol`: Function `executeTransaction()` does not refund extra ETH sent

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Function `executeTransaction()` does not refund any extra ETH sent that exceeds the `value` parameter.

**Recommendation**

Either refund ETH that exceeds `value` or eliminate `value` altogether and use `msg.value` instead.

**Status**

Resolved

### 4. `UniswapOracleSimple.sol`: Oracle does not enforce that `indexToken` is a USD stablecoin

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The documentation states that `indexToken` must be a USD token, however, the contract's constructor implementation does not enforce that.

**Recommendation**

Create a whitelist of ICHI supported USD tokens and have the constructor verify that the given `indexToken` address is in the whitelist.

**Note**

Same issue is also present in `ICHICompositeOracle`.

**Status**

**Acknowledged.** ICHI oneToken team response:

*"UniswapOracleSimple is compatible with non-USD stable coins. It can, for example, function as an interim Oracle for an ICHICompositeOracle. Only collateral-indexed oracles should be*

*admitted into the factory. Verifying that Oracles are indexed by USD stable coins on admission is problematic. It is therefore a Governance responsibility to admit only Oracles that return values that are proxies for US Dollars”.*

## 5. OneTokenV1Base.sol: Function `removeStrategy()` does not close the strategy

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The documentation of function `removeStrategy()` states that it should close the strategy, however this is not implemented.

### Recommendation

Have the function call `closeStrategy()`.

### Status

Resolved

## 6. Incremental.sol: Zero value logic mismatch for `stepSize`

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The value of `stepSize` can be assigned to zero in `setParams()`, but is not allowed to be so in `setStepSize()`.

### Recommendation

Resolve mismatch between the two functions.

### Status

Resolved

## 7. OneTokenV1.sol: Function `redeem()` does not check if the liabilities of the collateral token exceed the contract's balance, which could prevent the user from withdrawing the collateral token afterwards

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Function `redeem()` does not check if the liabilities of the collateral tokens exceed contract's balance. For instance, in case several collateral tokens are used, the user calling `redeem()` for certain collateral will not be informed if the collateral is not available to withdraw.

#### Status

**Acknowledged.** ICHI oneToken team response:

*"Available funds might limit the user's ability to withdraw collateral in the desired form. Pre-checking availability of the requested type of collateral will be implemented as a user-interface concern".*

## Informational Notes

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### 8. `OneTokenV1.sol`: Two-step withdrawal process is redundant

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Although the current two-step withdrawal process does indeed protect from flash loan attacks, there is virtually very little that can be done with a flash loan that cannot be done with an attacker that has a large amount of liquidity (e.g. a whale). In that case, the two-step withdrawal process will be of little help.

Furthermore, the current implementation of `UniswapOracleSimple` should not suffer from these kinds of attacks. `ICHICompositeOracle` should be safe as well, provided that all `oracleContracts` are either `UniswapOracleSimple` or `ICHIPeggedOracle` contracts.

#### Recommendation

Eliminate two-step withdrawal to improve user experience.

#### Status

**Resolved**



## 9. OneTokenV1Base.sol: Redundant call to `_transferOwnership()` in `init()`

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Function `init()` calls both `initOwnable()` and `_transferOwnership()`, which is redundant.

### Recommendation

Remove the call to `_transferOwnership()`.

### Status

Resolved

## 10. OneTokenV1.sol: Function `redeem()` assumes one to one ratio between collateral token and `oneToken`

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Arbitrage opportunities might exist when oneToken is not on an exact 1:1 peg with its collateral.

### Status

**Acknowledged.** ICHI oneToken team response:

*"We are NOT checking the oneToken or collateral pegs, by design. Mint/Redemption fees can repel possible arbitrage".*

## 11. OneTokenV1.sol: Collateral tokens which charge transfer fee are not compatible with the accounting of collateral balances

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The actual collateral balances in contract will be lower than accounted for in case a collateral token charges a transfer fee.

### Status

**Acknowledged.** ICHI oneToken team response:

*"Collateral tokens that charge a transfer fee should not be accepted. ICHI Governance can prevent OneToken governance of any oneToken instance from using such tokens".*

## 12. OneTokenV1Base.sol: `setStrategyAllowance()` `amount` parameter documentation is incorrect

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The `amount` parameter is incorrectly documented.

Status

Resolved



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## Disclaimer

Solidified audit is not a security warranty, investment advice, or an endorsement of ICHI oneToken or its products. This audit does not provide a security or correctness guarantee of the audited smart contract. Securing smart contracts is a multistep process, therefore running a bug bounty program as a complement to this audit is strongly recommended.

The individual audit reports are anonymized and combined during a debrief process, in order to provide an unbiased delivery and protect the auditors of Solidified platform from legal and financial liability.

*Solidified Technologies Inc.*