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# Computer and network security Sicurezza nelle reti e nei sistemi informatici Crittografia e sicurezza delle reti

Exam of 13 January 2016, a.y. 2015-16. Time: 2 hours

FOR NON-ENGLISH: 2 penalty points (only applicable to **Computer and network security**) FOR UNREADABLE WRITING: arbitrary penalty points

## Q1: Perfect ciphers

- Q1.1 [1/30] Define what a *perfect cipher* is. [If definition is wrong subsequent questions cannot be correctly answered]
- Q1.2 [2/30] Prove that the property that defines what a perfect cipher is also holds if we exchange the roles of ciphertext and plaintext.
- Q1.3 [2/30] Prove that a cipher cannot be perfect is the size of its key space is less than the size of its message space.
- Q1.4 [2/30] *Describe* the Vernam Cipher (a.k.a. One Time Pad) and *clearly state* the property that must hold for it being a perfect cipher.

## Q2: Meet in the middle

With reference to a symmetric-key block-ciphering algorithm, answer the following:

- Q2.1 [2/30] Describe the so called *Meet-In-The-Middle* attack (*not to be confused with Man-In-The-Middle*) as well as a possible scenario where Meet-In-The-Middle can be used by an attacker.
- Q2.2 [2/30] Give a rough estimation of the max key-length that can be successful attacked by Meet-In-The-Middle, assuming an adversary using 2 hours computation time of a 64GB RAM machine (and negligible external storage), capable of encrypting/decrypting a block in 20ns (for any key of reasonable length) and of accessing a RAM word in 4ns. *Ignore CPU time that you can assume involving simple arithmetics on cache; also assume that block size is 128b.*

#### Q3: The birthday attack

- Q3.1 [3/30] Illustrate the so-called *birthday paradox* and describe what type of attack (*birthday attack*) can be prepared by exploiting this property.
- Q3.2 [2/30] Is the birthday bound affected by the quality of the hash function (cryptographic or non-cryptographic). Elaborate.
- Q3.3 [2/30] Is keyed hashing making the birthday attack harder? Elaborate.

#### Q4: The HRU model

- Q4.1 [3/30] With reference to the Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman model illustrate the concepts of *subject*, *object*, *primitive operation*, *command*, *protection system*, *leakage* of a right and *safety* of a protection system. State *decidable* and *undecidable* questions about safety.
- Q4.2 [2/30] Explain why the HRU model is unable to protect against Trojan horses.
- Q4.3 [2/30] Is the HRU model a DAC or a MAC model? Elaborate.

### Q5: Digital signatures

- Q5.1 [2/30] Illustrate the (generic) processes for generating/verifying *digital signatures*.
- Q5.2 [2/30] Define the *existential forgery* attack and point out the steps whose bad implementation

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can	easier an existential fo	rgery.			
Q6.1 [1/3 Q6.2 [2/3 this Q6.3 [2/3	eous  Swers to the following  O] Explain the differen  O] Is TLS is said to give  case.  O] Given primes 11 and  O] Describe what port	tice between packet we end-to-end secur d 5 find $\alpha > 1$ such	ity. Carefully <i>explai</i> that $\alpha^5 = 1 \mod 11$ .	in what end-to-end me (No calculators allowed)	
HAVE YOU SEN	NT 2015-16 HOMEWO	ORKS? YES/NO ( <u>c</u>	ircle your answer)		
If YES: I hereby confirm	that I sent the followin	ng contributions (st	ate HW and Q numl	bers):	
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