# February PF 2021


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# Background

# Urbanization Background

## Africa's population will double and 2/3 will move to cities

**Kanos 20** [Kanos, David. 07-16-2020. "Figures of the Week: Africa's Urbanization Dynamics," Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/07/16/figures-of-the-week-africas-urbanization-dynamics/]

The pace of urbanization and urban population growth in Africa has changed significantly across the continent generally as well as within its various regions, says a recent report by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), "Africa's Urbanization Dynamics 2020: Africapolis, Mapping a New Urban Geography." According to the report, **Africa is one of the least urbanized places in the world, and its urbanization rate will continue to grow among the fastest of the world regions in the coming years.** Indeed, 1950 Africa's urban population was 27 million people, a minute fraction of today's urban population of roughly 567 million people. Notably, the OECD report argues that since 1990, Africa's rapid growth in urbanization has been driven primarily by high population growth and the reclassification of rural settlements. It also predicts that Africa's population will double between now and 2050, and two-thirds of this population increase will be absorbed by urban areas.

## Some African countries more urbanized than others

**Kanos 20** [Kanos, David. 07-16-2020. "Figures of the Week: Africa's Urbanization Dynamics," Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/07/16/figures-of-the-week-africas-urbanization-dynamics/]

As of 2015, 50 percent of Africa's population lived in one of 7,617 urban agglomerations. With 78 percent of its citizens in urban areas, North Africa is the most urbanized region. Indeed, according to the report, within North Africa, Egypt and Libya stand out as the most urbanized countries with urbanization levels of 93 and 81 percent, respectively. In contrast Niger (at 17 percent), Burundi (21 percent), and Eritrea (24 percent) have some of the lowest levels of urbanization in the region.

## Most of West African population growth is in cities

**Walther 19** [Walther, Oliver J; Villalón, Leonardo A.; Trémoliéres. 2019. "Mapping Urbanization in West Africa." Sahel Research Group, University of Florida. https://sahelresearch.africa.ufl.edu/research/mapping-urbanization-in-west-africa/]

Population dynamics and urbanization will continue to figure among the major transformations affecting West Africa. Between 2015 and 2040, the population of West Africa will double and cities will absorb most of this demographic growth. There is a continuous need to understand urbanization, including the urban network and the regional economy; relations and interactions between cities and rural areas; and the **impact of urbanization on gender and access to social services.** One of the key features of the West African urban network is that it is cross-border in nature. Close to one-fifth of its urban population lives less than 50 km from a land border. In 2015, these urban border populations consisted of more than 27 million people living in 681

cities of quite diverse size and significance. Recent research by the OECD shows for example that border cities have experienced higher rates of growth than other cities in the region and specialize in commercial activities that stimulate growth and foster higher densities.

## Definitions of Urban

**Moriconi-Ebrad et. al 20** [Moriconi-Ebrard, Francois; Heinrigs, Philipp; Trémolières, Marie. 02-07-2020, "Africa's Urbanisation Dynamics 2020 - AFRICAPOLIS, MAPPING A NEW URBAN GEOGRAPHY," West African Studies, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)]

Currently accepted definitions of urban phenomena can be grouped into three categories: cities, agglomerations and metropolitan regions (Moriconi-Ebrard, 2000). These definitions differ by country and result in extremely diverse urban statistical outcomes in terms of number of units identified, population sizes, population densities, socio-economic characteristics, etc. The city, a politico-administrative entity The concept of the city generally refers to a politico-administrative unit of which the boundaries and statutory jurisdiction are defined by the state according to various administrative, political and functional criteria, contexts and objectives. Historically, the "city" refers to a well-defined territory where the inhabitants had freed themselves from the power of landowners; and that enjoyed separate judicial structures. This politico-administrative approach to the city underpins the majority of definitions used around the world (China, Germany, Egypt, Japan, India, Iran, Russia, the United States, etc.). It is the foundation of most of the francophone nations in Africa; the first "cities" emerged from agglomerations endowed with the status of "communes" during the colonial period. Whether the approach is administrative or functional — taking into consideration the flows related to human mobility, notably commuting — it results in a paradox: the limits of a city are not necessarily visible on the ground. Its boundaries can be drawn across continuously built-up areas creating an invisible separation between cities and suburbs. Conversely, a city can encompass, in addition to a main agglomeration, towns, fields, forests, or even several distinct agglomerations of equal importance. **Population growth encourages the emergence of new urban centres in addition to the expansion of existing ones.** However, the number of administrative units does not change unless they are dismantled to create new jurisdictions that reflect the realities of urban growth. In Egypt, the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) defines a "city" (madina) as any governorate (muhafaza) or district (markaz) capital. Because the creation of new markaz is limited, the number of "cities" has remained practically unchanged since the 1960s census. Since cities are already densely populated, growth often occurs outside of the "official" urban perimeter. As a result, the country's official level of urbanisation has remained stagnant at around 43% for a half century. This same phenomenon can be observed in all countries in which functional criteria underpin the definition of cities, such as in Guinea and Malawi. Agglomeration: A morphological approach based on land use An agglomeration is an area defined as an ensemble of dense constructions; density can be measured either by number of inhabitants per unit of surface or as a maximum distance between buildings or clusters of buildings. Urban agglomerations conform to several criteria: • A **minimum population**, which varies significantly between countries; • Sometimes, a certain percentage of non-agricultural households, which also varies by country; • The **presence of certain infrastructure, services** (health, culture, education, transportation, security, etc.) and **administrative functions** (headquarters) are included in some definitions. If one or several of these criteria are fulfilled, the status of urban agglomeration is applied generally to the entirety of the city or cities that make up the built-up area. This approach prevails in several West African countries but with different population thresholds (1 500 inhabitants in Guinea-Bissau, 2 500 inhabitants in Sierra Leone and Liberia, 5 000 in Ghana and Algeria, 20 000 in Nigeria). Historically, the notion of agglomeration related to the concept of urbs, literally "urban". In the contemporary era, the first occurrence of an official national definition was in the 1841 English census. At the time, statisticians were preoccupied with determining the "real" size of London, as the majority of urban development occurred in the

"suburbs" outside of the official boundaries of "the city". The metropolitan region: A functional approach This approach is based on flows of people (generally commuting patterns), goods, and services, and sometimes on the density of networks. A metropolitan region is therefore neither a city nor an agglomeration but a collection of more or less polarised flows. The concept appeared for the first time in the 1950 census in the United States setting off the counter-urbanisation debate. Statisticians became eager to show that the sphere of influence of large cities did not end at the limits of the agglomeration but extended to satellite localities sometimes rather distant from, though functionally connected to, the centre.

## Urbanization breakdowns and factors that influence urbanization

**Moriconi-Ebrad et. al 20** [Moriconi-Ebrard, Francois; Heinrigs, Philipp; Trémolières, Marie. 02-07-2020, "Africa's Urbanisation Dynamics 2020 - AFRICAPOLIS, MAPPING A NEW URBAN GEOGRAPHY," West African Studies, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)]

In 2015, half of Africa's population (50.4%) lived in an urban agglomeration with more than 10 000 inhabitants. North Africa is the continent's most urbanised region (78%), and Egypt and Libya the two countries with the highest levels of urbanisation1 with 93% and 81% respectively (Map 2.1). The other two countries with a level of urbanisation above 80% are Gabon (81%) and Sao Tome and Principe (80%). The countries with the lowest levels are Niger (17%), Burundi (21%), Eritrea (24%), Lesotho (26%) and South Sudan (27%) (Annex D). Outside Africa the only other large countries with similar low levels of urbanisation are Nepal, Cambodia and Sri Lanka. Overall in 2015, 22 countries have a level of urbanisation exceeding 50%. Overall, countries with higher income levels tend to have higher urbanisation levels. The only two low-income countries (Gross National Income per capita) with a level of urbanisation above 50% are Rwanda, the country with the highest population density and Gambia, a country with one of the smallest land areas. Similarly, the countries with the highest levels of urbanisation, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon and Libya, are all middle-income countries, and countries whose land areas are almost entirely desertic or with large forest areas, like Gabon. In these countries the share of the agricultural population—the main activity of the rural population— is low. The size of the agricultural population also decreases with income level due to mechanisation and intensification of production, as in South Africa where the level of urbanisation is 70%. The ten countries with the lowest levels of urbanisation are all low-income countries, except Lesotho and Eswatini. Urbanisation dynamics are influenced by a variety of **structural and socio-economic factors**, such as geography and climate, population growth, size and **density, income levels and economic structure, policies and institutions and cyclical factors such as environmental disasters, conflict and economic cycles**. These factors are not of equal importance and vary over time depending on country contexts and interrelations. Certain factors are more important at lower levels of urbanisation in contributing to urbanisation than when countries are more developed (Bairoch and Goertz, 1986; Farrell, 2018). Also, the diversity in observed outcomes and trends highlights the decisive importance of states, institutions and national contexts on observed dynamics. Hence, while there are general trends, contextual and structural analyses remain necessary to grasp the drivers of urbanisation dynamics at country level. The pace of urban transition in Africa A key feature of Africa's urbanisation dynamic is the pace of the ongoing transformation. In 1950, most African countries were essentially agrarian societies with a few urban centres acting as trading, administrative, religious and cultural hubs. Only eight countries had a level of urbanisation above 20%, while in 26 out of 50 countries the level of urbanisation was less than 10% (Map 2.2). In particular, the last 25 years have seen spectacular transformations. For the continent as a whole, the level of urbanisation increased from 31% in 1990 to 50% in 2015. In 1990, 31 countries still had a low level of urbanisation below 33%, 17 of which were below 20%. By 2015 this dropped to 11 countries, with only Niger below 20%. Rwanda went from only 5% of its population living in urban agglomerations to an urbanisation level of 56%, a level similar to Morocco. Kenya's level of urbanisation increased by 49 percentage points, from 16% to 65%, and Angola's by 37 percentage points, from 26% to 63% in only 25 years (Figure 2.1). Since the 1990s the major driver of urbanisation has been **high population growth** which **contributes directly to the natural increase of urban populations.** However, indirect contributions in terms of reclassification of rural settlements – through the growth of rural settlements beyond the urban population threshold, through absorption of rural population by the expansion of urban areas and by merging of settlements and through their cumulative

contributions - explain a significant part of the growth. For instance, Rwanda's population density doubled between 1990 and 2015, favouring the widespread merging of settlements and the reclassification of rural areas. As a result, the increase in the level of urbanisation was strong and non-gradual. Similar dynamics are observed across the continent, notably in parts of Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda. The importance of rural reclassification in recent urban transitions has also been documented in other parts of the World. In China for instance, the reclassification of rural areas as urban is estimated to have accounted for 40% of total urban population growth between 1978-1990 (Farrell, 2017). In contrast, the absence of accounting for rural reclassification can in some cases explain stationary official levels of urbanisation and large differences with Africapolis data, as in the case of Egypt where official urban parameters have not changed since the late 1960s.

## Urbanization largely in small and medium size cities

**Güneralp et. al 17** [Güneralp, Burak; Lwasa, Shuaib; Masundire, Hilary; Parnell, Susan; Seto, Karen C. December 2017, "Urbanization in Africa: challenges and opportunities for conservation," IOP Publishing, Environmental Research Letters, Vol. 13, No. 1, https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa94fe]

Africa's move into the 'urban age' is projected to be without precedent in its swiftness. While the continent is still largely rural, it is one of the fastest urbanizing regions around the world. **Africa's urban population is expected to more than triple over 40 years, from 395 million in 2010 to 1.339 billion in 2050, corresponding to 21% of the world's projected urban population** [1]. Currently, the continent has seven megacities, that is citieswith populations over10million:Cairo,Kinshasa, Lagos, Accra, Johannesburg–Pretoria, Khartoum, and Nairobi. In 15 years, Luanda and Dar es Salaam will be added to this list. Natural increase is estimated to be a more dominantfactorintheincreasein urban populationsinmany African countries comparedtomigration [2, 3]. Urbanization projectionsindicate a slowing rateinAfricafrom the 1990s high rates of up to 8% down to a range of 1.9%−2.2% from 2020−2050, with significant variation across its countries [3]. The total population in the continent is projected to reach almost 2.5 billion people by 2050 with about 55% living in urban areas (figure 1). This is a significant increase given that less than 10% of Africa's population resided in urban areas in 1950. Most of the increase in urban population is taking place in small- and medium-sized cities in midlatitudinal Africa. The growth of existing villages and towns is also transforming rural landscapes into urban areas [4, 5]. Yet, despite clear physical evidence of urbanization, it must be noted there are large uncertainties in Africa's population projections [6]. National censuses, demographic and health survey data, and population databases are sources of population projections, and each of these have significant uncertainties

# AFF

# Cultural Diversity

## Urbanization creates a cultural melting pot

Africa.com, 2019, Pros & Cons of the Rapid Growth of African Cities, https://africa.com/pros-cons-of-the-rapid-growth-of-african-cities/

Most African countries are largely divided among ethnocultural and religious lines. Urbanisation is bringing people from different ethnocultural backgrounds and different religious beliefs, who have a common goal of economic pursuits, from rural areas to urban centres, and, in the process of attaining economic pursuits, they learn to live with people of other beliefs. **Large cities are mostly places where cultural diversity flourishes**. **African cities are there to exemplify the cultural, social, and religious diversity that is seen as fundamental characteristics of countries that will develop economically and socially in an era when the global world is interdependent**. While on economic pursuit, integration occurs in workplaces, schools, neighbourhoods, streets, shopping malls, and soccer fields. These African cities are like focal points in these developing countries in which adaptation to new ways, new consumption, new technology and production patterns, as well as new social institutions could be evolved. Historically, cities have been the seats of learning and education; cities have been the centres of governmental and administrative organizations, and they have also performed the function of cultural or religious rallying points. Innovations through partnerships and interdependence of various cultural groups in cities have contributed immensely to improving the quality of life of urban populations and to enhance the critical and catalytic roles of urban centres in rural development and transformation. With sustained urban-rural links, a development pipeline will flow from both sides, thereby making them interdependent in numerous ways.

**Wang 07** [Wang, Yi. 2007, "Globalization Enhances Cultural Identity." Harbin Engineering University**.** Journal of Intercultural Communications Studies**]**

Nowadays, globalization is an overwhelming world trend. Advocates of Anti- globalization view globalization as homogenization. In fact**, globalization is not simply homogenization; on the contrary, it enhances cultural identity.** First, People are not mere objects of cultural influences, but subjects who can reject or integrate culture. Besides**, with the development of science and technology, people are closer than before. The sense of "togetherness" brought with globalization is not at all in conflict with diversity. In the new era of globalization, people become much more concerned about the uniqueness and particularity of their own culture not about adopting other cultures.** Cultural identity provides the global significance of local knowledge and the sense of self, community and nation. In terms of science, technology and economic development, globalization reflects somewhat the theory of convergence and hegemonic control, but in deeper sense, it promotes cultural identity. This paper tries to explain how globalization and cultural identity can form a fruitful interaction. If globalization is viewed in terms of togetherness, the world is more diverse and more "together"." Analysis: Through globalization, people are brought closer together as a result of technological development. The PRO should argue that this sense of togetherness brings people with similar cultures together from around the globe, uniting them in their common interests and allowing them to both adapt to the new global climate, but also maintain their traditional heritages with a larger access to support systems due to connections through technology.

# Democracy Promotion

## Urbanization spurs democratization

**Glaeser & Miillett 16** [Glaeser, Edward L.; Millett Steinberg, Bryce. November 2016, "TRANSFORMING CITIES: DOES URBANIZATION PROMOTE DEMOCRATIC CHANGE?" National Bureau of Economic Research, http://www.nber.org/papers/w22860]

While urban density is associated with higher incomes, contagious disease, crime, traffic congestion and high housing prices can also be features of urban life. The negative externalities that come with crowding typically require public management, but developing-world cities often have governments that are neither democratic nor competent. Poor-world cities will only become pleasant when their governments improve to the point where they can deliver clean water, public safety and reasonable commutes. Will developing-world urbanization generate the political change that can help make developing-world cities more livable? At a purely statistical level, countries that were more urbanized in 1960 experienced more democracy after that year, holding the initial level of democracy constant. This effect is particularly strong among countries that initially had low levels of democracy. The idea that cities promote democracy is termed the "Boston Hypothesis," reflecting the seminal role that the city of Boston played in generating the American Revolution and the republic that followed. Yet this correlation may be spurious or a side effect of rising incomes in more urbanized places. To better understand whether urbanization will improve government or promote democracy, the channels through which urban density can promote regime change are analyzed. The paper proceeds by discussing three ways in which urbanization relates to regime change and democracy. **First, urbanization may enable uprisings and revolution by facilitating coordination and enhancing the power of organized action.** A crowd in Cairo's Tahrir Square packs far more political punch than a group of farmers in a remote farming village. Wallace (2014) provides compelling empirical work showing that dictatorships face a far higher risk of regime change in urbanized societies. **Second, urbanization may increase the demand for democracy.** To understand why populations may favor democracy or dictatorship, one can follow the framework of Djankov et al. (2003) which emphasizes that different systems offer a tradeoff between losses from overly strong governments, termed "dictatorship," and losses from overly weak governments, termed "disorder." **Cities enable trade and facilitate innovation, both of which can be stifled by dictatorial regimes.** These upsides of urban existence should push residents to favor more democracy. Yet cities also facilitate negative social interactions, including crime and the spread of contagious disease. The need to reduce those threats should increase the demand for dictatorship.

## Global democratic consolidation solves war, proliferation, and ethnic cleansing

**Diamond 95** [Diamond, Larry, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, "Promoting Democracy in the 1990s," December 1995, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.html]

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional **threats** to security **are associated with or aggravated by** the weakness or **absence of democracy**, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. **Countries that govern themselves in a** truly **democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors** to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

# Economic Growth

## African urbanization is inevitable by 2050 and drives continent's economic growth

**Haas 19** [Haas, Astrid R.N., Senior Country Economist (Cities) and Manager of Cities that Work, International Growth Centre, November 1, 2019, Quartz Africa, African countries keep building new cities to meet rapid urbanization even if people won't live in them, https://qz.com/africa/1740068/african-countries-keep-building-cities-to-meet-rapid-urbanization/ ]

By 2050 an estimated 2.5 billion more people will be added to urban areas, with 90% of this growth taking place in Africa and Asia. According to Nobel Prize winning economist, Paul Romer, this will mean the building of more urban areas in the next 100 years than currently exist today. If managed effectively, Africa's cities will drive the continent's economic growth, and thereby help reduce poverty. To date, however, Africa has yet to realize the positive gains of rapid urbanization experienced elsewhere. Instead, increasingly concentrated populations have become a major stress on the limited infrastructure and services, such as housing, employment, health, education, and safety.

## Urbanization key to industrialization & poverty reduction

Africa.com, 2019, Pros & Cons of the Rapid Growth of African Cities, https://africa.com/pros-cons-of-the-rapid-growth-of-african-cities/

Urbanization is key to **economic growth and development**. Most major cities usually go through the industrialization stage. African cities can provide access to a **large pool of labour, cost-effective access to suppliers, and specialized services to firms**, which, as a result, makes these cities attractive to more firms and can also raise the income levels in these cities. These cities can help firms lower transaction costs and create information-sharing opportunities, and create an atmosphere that enables innovation. These cities have the benefits of providing adequate labour (cities have it easy attracting people with skills), material inputs and premises that match the unique needs of firms. Majority of the population can become engaged in high productivity activities moving away from low-productivity agriculture in the rural area. As a result of all these things, there can be economic growth. Allowing history to guide us, in the 18th and 19th centuries, **urbanization and industrialization propelled Europe and the United States to prominence and spurred economic transformation;** it transformed these regions into economic powers. These can be the case for Africa if the rapid growth in these cities is accompanied by the right policies. It's more like a win-win situation when growth is accompanied by good government policies. It often translates into improved living standards and higher quality of life. Economic dividends from cities can be passed down to rural areas as businesses and individual consumers in the city **demand more agricultural products,** which, in turn, could **reduce poverty in these rural areas.**

## Cities are ripe for private investment & economic activity—demand for consumer products, need for infrastructure, etc.

Africa.com, 2019, Pros & Cons of the Rapid Growth of African Cities, https://africa.com/pros-cons-of-the-rapid-growth-of-african-cities/

African businesses can **generate new revenue streams from actively getting involved and creating new business models** that can cater to the needs of the increasing city-dwellers. **Businesses** can address areas of need for city-settlers like health, housing, water supply, energy, connectivity, and education. These **infrastructural challenges are immediate needs that need heavy investments across African cities**, and governments cannot take on these projects alone — they will need private partnerships. This is where these infrastructural challenges become opportunities for investors. Some investors would even be able to secure first-mover benefits in these new markets. **New markets would not only arise in infrastructural needs**. The **increasing size of these African cities has economic benefits that would translate into rising income for the consuming class**. There will be a growing consumer class that will drive the demand for goods and services. Spending on clothes and other basic necessities will be fueled by low-income households, who will make up the majority of these African cities. Companies will need to understand their target market to take advantage of the population and know that most African cities are filled with 'young entry-level consumers.'

## Urbanization has reduced absolute poverty globally by 150 million people

**Ravallion et. al 07** [Ravallion, Martin; Chen, Shaohua; Sangraula, Prem. 2007. "New Evidence on the Urbanization of Global Poverty." Research Group http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2008/Resources/2795087-1191427986785/RavallionMEtAl_UrbanizationOfGlobalPoverty.pdf]

The poor are urbanizing faster than the population as a whole, reflecting a lower-thanaverage pace of urban poverty reduction. One's concern about the seemingly low pace of urban poverty reduction in much of the developing world must be relieved by the fact that it has come with more rapid progress against rural poverty. Over 1993-2002, while 50 million people were **added to the count of $1 a day poor in urban areas**, the aggregate count of the poor fell by about 100 million, thanks to a **decline of 150 million in the number of rural poor**. Although our analysis has been descriptive, rather than attempting to draw causal inferences, the empirical findings are broadly consistent with the view that the urbanization process has played a quantitatively-important positive role in overall poverty reduction, by providing new opportunities to rural out-migrants (some of whom escape poverty in the process) and through the second-round impact of urbanization on the living standards of those who remain in rural areas. What we see here is suggestive of a compositional effect on the changing urban population, whereby the slowing of urban poverty reduction is the "other side of the coin" to what is in large part a poverty-reducing process of urbanization. Nor do we find any sign of adverse distributional effects of urbanization; instead it seems that the main channel linking population urbanization to poverty reduction is the rate of economic growth. Yes, the poor are gravitating to towns and cities, but more rapid poverty reduction through economic growth will probably entail an even faster pace of urbanization. We find some marked regional differences in a number of respects. The majority of Latin America's poor live in urban areas, while it is less than 10% in East Asia (due mainly to China). The pattern of falling overall poverty with urbanization is far less evident in SubSaharan Africa, where the population (including the poor) has been urbanizing, yet with little reduction in aggregate poverty. There are also exceptions at the regional level to the overall pattern of poverty's urbanization; indeed,

we find signs of a ruralization of poverty in China and in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Our results also have implications for assessments of overall progress against poverty. Compared to past estimates ignoring urban-rural cost-of-living differences, we find a somewhat higher aggregate poverty count for the world, and a somewhat lower pace of poverty reduction. These differences stem from the higher cost-of-living and the slower pace of poverty reduction in urban areas revealed by our study.

## Urbanization brings people together which is key to economic activity

**World Bank 13** [World Bank. 04-17-2013. "Developing Countries Need to Harness Urbanization to Achieve the MDGs: IMF-World Bank report." World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/04/17/developing-countries-need-to-harness-urbanization-to-achieve-mdgs-imf-world-bank-report]

Large cities and smaller towns are fast becoming home to the world's largest slums [2], with Asia home to 61 percent of the world's 828 million slum dwellers, Africa 25.5 percent and Latin America 13.4 percent. The developing world's urban centers are expected to burgeon, drawing 96 percent of the additional 1.4 billion people by 2030. To cope with urban growth, a coordinated package of essential infrastructure and services is needed. Only by meeting essential needs related to transportation, housing, water and sanitation as well as education and healthcare can cities avoid becoming hubs of poverty and squalor, the report says. "**Agglomeration, or the clustering of people and economic activity, is an important driver of development and evidence suggests that it can have high pay offs, particularly for countries on the lower rungs of development**," said Lynge Nielsen, Senior Economist in IMF's Strategy, Policy and Review Department and co-author of the GMR. At the same time, stepped up efforts are also needed to improve development in rural areas, where 76 percent of the developing world's 1.2 billion poor live, with inadequate access to the basic amenities defined by the MDGs. Rural poverty rates far exceed those of urban areas across all regions of the world. The report further finds that rural women are hurt the most by poor infrastructure, because they perform most of the domestic chores and often walk long distances to have access to clean water, and lower levels of education attainment. Although tackling rural development challenges will not be easy, it can be done with complementary rural-urban development policies and actions by governments to facilitate a healthy move toward cities without short-changing rural areas, says the report. "Urbanization does matter. However, in order to harness the economic and social benefits of urbanization, policy-makers must plan for efficient land-use, match population densities with the required needs for transport, housing and other infrastructure, and arrange the financing needed for such urban development programs," said Jos Verbeek, Lead Economist at the World Bank and lead author of the GMR.

## Urbanization drives economic growth and poverty reduction

**Lall 20** [Lall, Somik K, Global Lead on Territorial Development Solutions and Lead Economist for Sustainable Development in Africa - World Bank, 01-21-2020, "Prerequisites to getting Africa's urbanization 'right'", Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/01/21/prerequisites-to-getting-africas-urbanization-right/]

The rapid growth of cities in Africa is presenting the continent with a major opportunity to enhance productivity and living standards. In most parts of the world, rapid city growth has triggered economies of scale and specialization along with knowledge spillovers, thereby boosting productivity. **International evidence suggests that doubling of a city's size boosts income per capita between 3 percent and 8 percent**. In fact, countries that are more developed have more urbanization, and countries that switch from slow economic development to rapid economic development also switch from slow urbanization to rapid urbanization. Somik V. Lall Somik V. Lall Global Lead on Territorial Development Solutions and Lead Economist for Sustainable Development in Africa - World Bank somikcities In contrast, African countries are not making much of the opportunity of urbanization. Only a handful of countries—such as Ghana, Namibia, Rwanda, and Togo—have been relatively successful in translating urbanization into poverty reduction. Notably, the agglomeration of urban economic activity is lower in Africa than elsewhere, while the potential returns in labor productivity growth are the highest. Unfortunately, neither markets nor the policy environment have coordinated decisions that yield satisfactory outcomes in the living or working environment.

## Urbanization increases income levels

**Glaeser & Miillett 16** [Glaeser, Edward L.; Millett Steinberg, Bryce. November 2016, "TRANSFORMING CITIES: DOES URBANIZATION PROMOTE DEMOCRATIC CHANGE?" National Bureau of Economic Research, http://www.nber.org/papers/w22860]

Urbanization is also correlated with income growth across countries. Appendix Table 1 shows the basic patterns using data from the World Bank. The first two regressions show the correlation between urbanization and the logarithm of per-capita gross domestic product.3 The coefficient of 5.26 implies that a **20 percentage point increase in urbanization is associated with more than a doubling of income. In** the second regression, which controls for total years of schooling and for continent, the coefficient drops to 3.5. To examine growth effects, regression (3) relates per-capita growth between 1960 and 2010 with urbanization in 1960. The coefficient of 1.8 suggests that a **ten percentage point higher urbanization rate in 1960 is associated with about 20 percent greater income growth between 1960 and 2010.** Regression (4) includes controls for initial income, initial schooling and continent dummies. The coefficient is essentially unchanged. These growth regressions do not imply that urbanization always generates growth. Omitted area-level variables may well explain this correlation. Yet the relationship is sufficiently strong that it is certainly plausible that urbanization might aid country-level growth. Cities might speed new idea formation and knowledge accumulation, especially by enabling the flow of technology across continents.4 Urbanization may also promote growth by improving the quality of government

## Growth in the incomes of the rich reduces the effects of poverty more than increases in the incomes of the poor.

**Norton 02** [Norton, Seth W. Fall 2002, "Economic Growth and Poverty: In Search of Trickle-Down," Cato Journal, Vol 22, No. 2 ]

"The more relevant issue is the role of economic growth in reducing poverty. The trickle-up contention and the jaundiced view of trickledown—the trickle is just a small trickle—rest strongly on the contention that it is the "quality of growth" and the redistribution of the benefits of growth, not growth itself, that leads to the elimination of poverty. The results documented in Tables 2 and 3 challenge that assertion. For example, suppose the poor countries of the world experienced average economic growth of 5 percent per annum. After 5 years, the compounded income would result in an increase of about 27.62 percent. Ignoring the effect of the other income group, the impact of the richstratum's income growth would decrease the death rate ("Deathby 40") by about 3.76 percent, whereas an increase in the income of the poor stratum would reduce the death rate by about 2.55 percent.4 Thus, in the ceteris paribus sense, **the poverty reduction by growth of the richest class's income would generate a greater effect than the poverty reduction attributable to the growth of poor class's income.** However, incomes of the rich and poor do not grow in a ceteris paribus sense. The incomes of the rich and the poor actually grow together as Table 1 clearly documents. More importantly, the data show that **poverty falls as the rich get richer.** Thus, **economic growth should enhance the well-being of the poor as well as the rich**."

## Growth decreases poverty

Roemer, Michael; Kay Gugerty, Mary. April 1997 "Does Economic Growth Reduce Poverty?" CONSULTING ASSISTANCE ON ECONOMIC REFORM.

The study examines the question of whether economic growth tends to reduce poverty, where Poverty is measured by the incomes of the poorest 20% and 40% of a population. Using the most recent data available, the paper shows that **an increase in the rate of GDP growth translates into a direct one-for-one increase in the rate of growth of average incomes of the poorest 40%**. **GDP growth of ten percent per year is associated with income growth of ten percent for the poorest 40% of the population.** For the poorest 20% the elasticity of response is 0.921; GDP growth of 10% is associated with income growth of 9.21%. These results give strong support to the proposition that growth in per capita GDP can be and usually is a powerful force in reducing poverty

# Internet Expansion

## Urbanization creates digital transformation

Africa.com, 2019, Pros & Cons of the Rapid Growth of African Cities, https://africa.com/pros-cons-of-the-rapid-growth-of-african-cities/

African cities can lead the digital transformation of Africa. In most cities in Africa, we are seeing entrepreneurs **leveraging internet infrastructures** to deliver value in a new way to urban dwellers. Easier access to the internet has been a major driver of the **e-commerce boom in many Kenyan** (and African) **cities**, triggering an emergence in online retailing. The growth in that market has, in turn, led to the demand for postal services and logistics. Most of these entrepreneurs are benefiting from shared services and infrastructure because of the scale of activity going on in cities.

## Internet use growth happening in Zimbabwe

**Mananga 12** [Manganga, Kudakwashe, 2012, "The Internet as Public Sphere, A Zimbabwean Case Study (1999-2008)" Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa]

Despite the Zimbabwean economic crisis, there has been a notable growth of Internet usage in the country. Internet use increased from 50 000 users or 0.3 per cent of the population in 2000, to 820 000 or 6.7 per cent of the population in 2005 and to 1 351 000 users or 10.9 per cent of the population in March 2008 (internetworldstats 2004). Similarly, the number of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) grew from less than 6 in 2003 to 27 in 2008. However, while only 10 percent of Zimbabwe's estimated population of 12.4 million in 2008 had access to the Internet, the figure represented one of the highest Internet usage rates in Africa.

## Internet expansion key to economic growth and higher wages

**Todd 14** [Todd, Jonathan H. 07-07-2014. "Can Zuckerberg's Universal Internet Solve Income Inequality?," http://www.jonathanhtodd.com/2014/07/07/income-inequality-and-the-level-of-internet-connectivity/]

When people have access, they not only connect with their friends, families and communities, they also gain the opportunity to participate in the global economy. Research by McKinsey & Co. in 2011 shows that the Internet already accounts for a larger share of economic activity in many developed countries than agriculture and energy, and over the previous five years created 21% of GDP growth. Access to online tools lets people use information to do their jobs better and in turn

create even more jobs, business and opportunities. The Internet is the foundation of this economy. Of course, Zuckerberg has a product to sell, but his point is relevant – how well does internet connectivity create economic opportunity? While Zuckerberg focuses on less developed economies, can the same gains be made in the developed world? Or better yet, can internet connectivity solve the growing income inequality issue in developed economies? Acting FCC Chairwoman Mignon Clyburn thinks so. In a recent a blog post, Crossing the Digital Divide, she argues that being connected online is essential to offline success. She writes, As one speaker noted that more and more educators are using the Internet to assign and accept the very homework that these kids will have to complete once all the guests have left their Club. Now, more than ever, being online means being in line, along the pathway to better **education, healthcare, job opportunities and information**. I also noted that while progress has been made in closing the digital divide, with broadband adoption increasing from about 60 percent in 2008 to 70 percent today – **too many families, roughly one third or 100 million people, still don't have access to the Internet at home. And unfortunately, certain populations find themselves disproportionally represented in those numbers.** Fifty percent of rural Americans, 65 percent of the elderly, 58 percent of people living with disabilities, 41 percent of African Americans and 51 percent of Latinos don't have broadband at home. Barriers such as affordability, lack of digital literacy and a failure to recognize the value of broadband keep these numbers high. While I have not heard an argument that there is a market failure to lack of internet access – for example, just walk to your local library, if not Starbucks or McDonald's, and connect – Clyburn's point does seem to insinuate that lack of online connectivity is a driver of income inequality and/or wealth inequality. That is actually a reasonable argument, at least according to the paper The Skill Complementary of Broadband Internet by economists Anders Akerman, Ingvil Gaarder, and Magne Mogstad. Mogstad and company argue that adoption of broadband internet impacts the productivity and labor incomes of different types of workers. They write, We find that broadband adoption favors skilled labor by increasing its relative productivity. The increase in productivity of skilled labor is especially large for college graduates in fields such as science, technology, engineering and business. By comparison, broadband internet is a substitute for workers without high school diploma, lowering their marginal productivity. Consistent with the estimated changes in labor productivity, **wage regressions show the expansion of broadband internet improves (worsens) the labor outcomes of skilled (unskilled) workers.** If that is correct, it seems pretty clear that internet access has a high social utility, might closing the digital divide, as Clyburn describes it, be a fairly simple, straightforward way of improving the economic outcomes of those groups have fallen behind due to their lack of connectivity? If larger groups of people were connected online, might that somewhat help close the income inequality gap?

## Internet Infrastructure creates new jobs and prerequisite to meaningful economic growth

**Qiang 11** [Qiang, Christine Zhen-Wei. 2011. "Broadband Infrastructure Investment in Stimulus Packages: Relevance for Developing Countries." (2011): n. pag. World Bank, 2011. Web. 21 Mar. 2016. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINFORMATIONANDCOMMUNICATIONANDTECHNOLOGIES/Resources/282822-1208273252769/Broadband_Investment_in_Stimulus_Packages.pdf]

While some of the plans have been in the works for months or years, and the share of the broadband components in the total stimulus package varies significantly from country to country, it is no coincidence that so many of the stimulus packages have a **focus on building broadband networks**. In response to the financial crisis, **infrastructure expenditure** can play a major role as a fiscal stimulus by **helping to create new jobs**. In particular, new broadband infrastructure investment projects can be **initiated relatively quickly**, are la**bor intensive and hence have considerable short-term employment generation potential.** Some estimations predict that $5 billion stimulus would create almost 100,000 new jobs directly in short term and almost 2.5 million jobs as network effects (Communications Workers of America, 2008). Others announce almost 500,000 jobs retained or created directly under a broadband subsidy of $10 billion (Atkinson, Castro, and Ezell 2009). Germany, Ireland, Republic of Korea, Spain and the US specifically mentioned job creation in their broadband plans. More importantly, government spending

in broadband infrastructure is expected to have impact on long-run productive activities in other sectors of the economy. Network investments are typical examples of productive government investment because of the positive externalities they provide. ICT especially is a General Purpose Technology that facilitates great leaps of innovation and results in substantial restructuring of the economy. It is proven to contribute to virtually every sector in the economy through productivity gains. Therefore, investments in broadband infrastructure may have spillover effects and increase payoffs of investments in other sectors. In addition, broadband infrastructure, like all telecommunications networks, also has network effect (also referred to as positive network externalities) where the overall value of a network increases as the number of consumers goes up. An increasing number of countries now see **high-speed internet access as essential infrastructure to take a global edge in productivity and long-term competitiveness, and a prerequisite for a return to sustainable growth and prosperity**. For instance, the British government considers digital networks as the ―backbone of the economy in the decades ahead‖ (Daily Yonder, 2009). Other economic benefits of broadband, highlighted in these plans, include lower costs, new economic opportunities, significant consumer benefits, innovation, and increased trade and exports. Some feel that they ―cannot afford the luxury of not making the telecommunications industry the main driver of economic recovery‖ (International Herald Tribune 2009). Finally, broadband investment is more fiscally sound than other public spending stimulus options, in the sense of coming closer to, or in some cases actually being, self-financing. The financing of the broadband plans is mostly market-led—much of the advocated funding is expected to come from the private sector. In Britain, for example, a strategy group is being formed to assess the case how far the market will take the country in terms of rollout and likely take-up, and whether government funding would be required.

## Broadband investment raises income 7.5%

**Galperin & Mariiscal 14** [Galperin, Hernán, and Judith Mariscal. The Internet and Poverty: Real Help or Real Hype? London: Panos Institute, 2014. University of San Andres, July 2014. http://dirsi.net/web/files/files/Opening_the_Black_Box.pdf

The methodology favored a quasiexperimental approach, which took advantage of the increased availability of disaggregated data on ICT adoption and use in several countries. This data was combined with multiple other sources such as household surveys, school censuses and standardized test scores for K-12 students. In general the results corroborate the positive contribution of broadband to overall economic growth (what we call the growth effect), but the impact is significantly more modest than previously estimated – as much as five times lower than the more optimistic estimations. The results also corroborate the presence of a positive income effect associated with **broadband availability at the local level, which raises labor incomes by as much as 7.5% over a two-year period in some estimates**. This benefit was found to accrue to all workers regardless of whether they in fact adopted broadband, thus Traconfirming earlier results about the spillover effect of broadband.

# Trade

## Cities help facilitate cross-border trade and distribution of resources

**OECD 19** [OECD (2019), "Accessibility and Infrastructure in Border Cities", West African Papers, No. 23, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi-org.proxy.library.nd.edu/10.1787/04fbebef-en.]

The access to goods and services provided by urban centres is a key variable in West Africa's socio-economic development. Cities that are well connected to transport networks serve as markets for local agricultural products and as hubs for regional trade. The products available in these cities are more numerous and diverse, as well as lower in cost than in towns that are less accessible, due to the competition between traders and because they can more easily source their products from outside of the region. Cities that are well connected to transport networks also foster social interaction between people with different ethnic, national and linguistic backgrounds. They provide more direct access to **medical and educational services as well as cultural activities than do isolated towns**. Distance is the most decisive factor when it comes to urban accessibility. Due to sparse settlement patterns and the relatively new urbanistion process, **West African cities are often separated by significant distances which impose considerable constraints on transporters and passengers.** Nearly 1400 kilometres lie between Niamey and Diffa in Niger, for example, which represents a two-day trip given the driving conditions. Travelling long distances limits interactions between urban centres, increases transport costs and reinforces the marginalisation of regions located furthest from the capital cities

## Increased trade can help alleviate poverty.

**Goldin & Reinert 12** [Goldin, I.; Reinert, K. (2012). "Globalization for Development : Meeting New Challenges." Oxford University Press, https://global.oup.com/academic/product/globalization-for-development-9780199645565?cc=us&lang=en&]

Trade has been a powerful force for poverty alleviation in a number of ways. **Exports can expand markets, helping to generate incomes for the poor.** Both **imports and exports can promote competition, lowering consumption and production costs. . . and. . . can support productivity improvements through access to new machinery and contact with** discerning **international customers. Imports are also important for health** aspects of human development**, because many medical supplies need to be imported**. . . In each of these areas, empirical evidence suggests **that trade can play a positive role in helping poor people to better their lives.**

## Free trade benefits the poor.

Aisbett, Emma and Harrison, Ann and Zwane, Alix (2006): Globalization and poverty: what is the evidence? Published in: Trade, Globalization, and Poverty (December 2007): pp. 33-61. http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36595/

The standard story is the following: **the poor are assumed to be owners of** (generally unskilled) **labor, but not of capital. Thus, trade will benefit the poor if it increases the relative return to labor**: real wages. [. . . ] **when a developing country increases its trade with a richer, relatively more capital abundant country, the less skilled in the developing country should gain relative to the more skilled.**

**Overwhelming empirics affirm-globalization launches the poor into the middle class by strengthening industry. Prefer this evidence over their analytic and speculative claims.**

**Meredith 07** [Meredith, Robyn. 03-30-2007, "Why Globalization is Good" Forbes Magazine http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2007/0416/064.html]

A ragtag army of save-the-world crusaders has spent years decrying multinational corporations as villains in the wave of globalization overwhelming the Third World. This ominous trend would fatten the rich, further impoverish and oppress the poor and crush local economies. The business-bashing group Public Citizen argued as much in a proclamation signed by almost 1,500 organizations in 89 countries in 1999. Whereupon hundreds of protesters rioted outside a conference of the World Trade Organization in Seattle, shattering windows, blocking traffic and confronting cops armed with tear gas and pepper spray. Six hundred people were arrested. Cut to 2007, and **the numbers are in**: The protesters and do-gooders are just plain wrong. It turns out **globalization is good**–and not just for the rich, but **especially for the poor. The booming economies of India and China**–the Elephant and the Dragon–**have lifted 200 million people out of abject poverty** in the 1990s **as globalization took off, the I**nternational **M**onetary **F**und **says. Tens of millions more have catapulted** themselves far ahead **into the middle class.** It's remarkable what a few container ships can do to make poor people better off. Certainly more than $2 trillion of foreign aid, which is roughly the amount (with an inflation adjustment) that the U.S. and Europe have poured into Africa and Asia over the past half-century. **In the next eight years** almost **1 billion people** across Asia **will** take a Great **Leap** Forward **into a new middle class. In China middle-class incomes are set to rise threefold**, to $5,000, predicts Dominic Barton, a Shanghai managing partner for McKinsey & Co.

# Answer to Negative Arguments

# Answer to Deforestation

## Movement away from rural areas decreases deforestation

**Güneralp et. al 17** [Güneralp, Burak; Lwasa, Shuaib; Masundire, Hilary; Parnell, Susan; Seto, Karen C. December 2017, "Urbanization in Africa: challenges and opportunities for conservation," IOP Publishing, Environmental Research Letters, Vol. 13, No. 1, https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa94fe]

Africa has several regions with exceptional biodiversity [18] and is dotted with protected areas (PAs) with varying levels of protection status. The PAs cover an area of about 4.5 million km2 across the continent [19]. As recently as 2000, Africa was sparsely urbanized with only about 500 km2 of urban land within the boundaries of its PAs (table 1). In contrast, by 2030, total urban extent within 50 km of PAs onthe continent is expected to reach more than 140 000 km2. In midlatitudinal Africa, the nearly 20 fold increase in urban extent, the largest forecasted proportional increase in the vicinity of PAs across the world [17], will pose especially acute challenges for governance and management of PAs and the surrounding lands in this region. While large urban centers such as Nairobi, Kenya and Ibadan, Nigeria dominate the continent's urban expansion patterns (figure 2), the ecological impacts of the smaller cities and towns across Africa are also considerable. This is even the case for smaller cities such as Gaborone and Windhoek, the capitals of, respectively, Botswana and Namibia. Both cities are located in resource-poor areas and experience recurrent severe shortages of water [20]. Gaborone, with a population of 232 000 in 2011 [21], relies, in part, on water supplied from the Letsibogo Dam on the Motloutse River, via a 400 km long pipeline. An extension of this North–South Water Carrier is planned that will bring waters from the Zambezi River—about 500 km from Gaborone—to the relatively small but growing city. Such long-distance water transfers are likely to become more widespread as growing cities in Africa will seek new sources to meet their increasing demand for water [22]. It is often assumed that migration from rural to urban areas and the resulting concentration of populations in cities would ease the pressure on natural habitats. In many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, the **migration and subsequent concentration of people in urban areas has indeed reduced rural populations, thus leading to reduced rates of deforestation** [23].

# Answer to Disease

## Urbanization lowers the risk of disease in West Africa—better health care facilities, improved sanitation, and decreased travel

**Levy et. al 18** [Levy, B., Odoi, A., & Frost, S. (2018). "Exploratory investigation of region level risk factors of Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa," PeerJ, 6(11), e5888. https://doi.org/10.7717/peerj.5888]

More **urbanized areas have improved infrastructure** and therefore **better access to modern toilets**, and residents have increased access to schools which leads to a higher overall education level (Valeri et al., 2016). Local industry and employment opportunities are also related to the level of urbanization in a given region. Male employment is categorized in three ways in our dataset: those related to agriculture, upper-level professional positions, and entry-level jobs that are not related to agricultural and do not require an education. Professional occupations require a certain level of education such as managerial and technical jobs while entry-level positions include manual labor, clerical positions, sales positions and other ''blue collar'' jobs. While agricultural jobs are more prominent in rural locations, there are more professional and entry-level positions in cities. Increased urbanization is therefore associated with each of the significant variables in our multivariable negative binomial model. However, regions with higher average education level were associated with higher risks of EVD in our model while the other predictors were negatively associated with Ebola risk. These results may indicate that the percentage of individuals living in an urban area, average education level, percent of households without a flush toilet, and percent of men with blue collar jobs may be proxy measures for other factors in urban areas. This reiterates what several studies have already stressed, that there is a great need to better understand the unique nature of social and work-related interactions in rural areas, especially as they relate to urban areas and the existence of superspreaders (Brainard et al., 2016; Richards et al., 2015). The **well-established mode of transmission for Ebola is contact with bodily fluids of an infected individual** (Reza et al., 2015; World Health Organization, 2015). There is also agreement among studies at the individual level about contact-related risk factors that increase the likelihood of contracting and spreading EVD. These risks include direct care for individuals with the disease, traveling long distances, and attending funerals of those who have died of Ebola (Agua-Agum et al., 2016; Brainard et al., 2016; Francesconi et al., 2003; Victory et al., 2015). These activities are deeply rooted in cultural practices and are important parts of West African culture. Several of these activities, such as caring for sick individuals and attending funerals, are especially important and therefore pronounced in rural communities, further emphasizing the need to study these areas in more depth (Lau et al., 2017; Richards et al., 2015). Regions with **higher levels of urbanization were associated with lower risk of EVD** probably because of **improved access to health care facilities and decreased individual travel**, each of which have been shown to **protect against the disease** (Agua-Agum et al., 2016; Brainard et al., 2016).

## Big Data solves disease

**Dolley 18** [Dolley, Shawn, management consultant in public health for Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 2018. "Big Data's Role in Precision Public Health," Frontiers in Public Health, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5859342/#__ffn_sectitle]

Precision public health is an emerging practice to more granularly predict and understand public health risks and customize treatments for more specific and homogeneous subpopulations, often using new data, technologies, and methods. Big data is one element that has consistently helped to achieve these

goals, through its ability to deliver to practitioners a volume and variety of structured or unstructured data not previously possible. **Big data has enabled more widespread and specific research and trials of stratifying and segmenting populations at risk for a variety of health problems**. Examples of success using big data are surveyed in surveillance and signal detection, **predicting future risk, targeted interventions, and understanding disease**. Using novel big data or big data approaches has risks that remain to be resolved. **The continued growth in volume and variety of available data, decreased costs of data capture, and emerging computational methods mean big data success will likely be a required pillar of precision public health into the future**.

## Empirically correct. Google and Facebook use big data to fight against coronavirus

**Newman of Forbes in 2020** [Newman, Daniel, 04-22-2020, "Privacy Pros And Cons As Apple And Google Look Into Using Data To Trace COVID-19", Forbes Magazine, https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielnewman/2020/04/22/privacy-pros-and-cons-as-apple-and-google-look-into-using-data-to-trace-covid-19/#2d9196e251fa]

Already, tech giant Google has been gathering location data from users to create COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports that offer anonymized data regarding whether we (as in, all of the **people in 131 countries and all 50 U.S. states**) are socially distancing and staying home to prevent the spread of coronavirus. At the same time, Facebook—a company that's already proven to have a spotty track record when it comes to user privacy—is working to create its open reports about how well users are doing at sheltering in place. And now, both Google and Apple are working together to help authorities trace exposure of COVID-19 through Bluetooth. The technology enables contact tracing, which will identify people who have been exposed to the virus and those they've been in contact with. Feeling a little nervous about technology's intrusion into the public health space? It's understandable. And while this partnership was announced and well-covered over the past week or so, I wanted to spend some time to think critically and reflect on the impact of such partnerships and the important implications on privacy. The following are a few pros and cons of using AI and data capture in the name of public health. Capturing User Data for COVID-19: Pros The most obvious pro of allowing companies like Google, Apple, and Facebook to capture our data during the coronavirus crisis has the potential to save lives. After all, the data can be used to predict upcoming hotspots, prepare hospitals to ensure they have the supplies they may need, and create trend models that could help determine when we will be able to open the country back up again. Companies like analytics software provider SAS are already using data from the supply chain to help hospitals and healthcare institutions better understand how and where their supplies are being used. They're also using predictive models that help organizations determine what supplies they're going to need in the coming weeks based upon expected changes in case volume. What if that data wasn't a prediction, but was accurate? What difference could that make in the supply chain? We can certainly say that models in the case of COVID-19 have struggled significantly due to a lack of precise data to build the models—Would people be happier if the data was more accurate? But at what cost? Which brings up the second pro: using this type of data could help us open the country up sooner. Contact tracing is going to be crucial if we want to return to normal life sooner rather than later. Giving up your data to be able to know how the virus is spreading seems like a fair trade-off. Whether people shelter in place more seriously because they know they are being tracked, or the data itself helps health authorities stay better prepared for the cases—either way, we could be seeing a far shorter period of isolation with the help of AI, data, and other technology than we would without.

## Turn. Cities improve the ability to detect and report disease outbreaks – preventing the exponential spread

**Uche 12** [Uche, Anumba, 2012 "The Impact of Globalization on Public Health and Infectious Diseases" Nnamdi Azikiwe University**.** Academia.edu. http://www.academia.edu/4454478/THE_IMPACT_OF_GLOBALIZATION_ON_PUBLIC_HEALTH_AND_INFECTIOUS_DISEASES]

Huge increases in economic and industrial activities have led to unprecedented effects in air, land and water environments and the resulting changes have important wide ranging implications facing varying degrees of vulnerability to positive and negative impacts. Certain infectious diseases, particularly vector-borne infections have either been increased, rare or entirely absent in most high income countries during the last 100 years. I "Also cases of certain infectious diseases, particularly vector-borne infections have either been increased, rare or entirely absent in most high income countries during the last 100 years (Murray & Lopez, 1996). **Important shifts in political and economic values have led to a shift in resources for infectious disease control particularly in low and middle income countries (Lee, 2003). Similarly, the potential**

**capacity to detect and report disease outbreaks has quickened due to the advent of global information and communication systems."**

## Urbanization solves malnourishment. Outweighs disease

**Diaz-Bonilla 02** [Diaz-Bonilla, Eugenio. "GLOBALIZING HEALTH BENEFITS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES." International Food Policy Research Institute. December 2002.]

The number of malnourished children under five (a better indicator of food problems than average food availability, because it captures directly income distribution effects) has **declined between 1970 and 1997 by about 37 million**, and the incidence of malnutrition dropped from 46 percent to 31 percent in the same period (Smith and Haddad, 2000). However, although food security has improved in general, some regions and countries are at risk, and some have become more food insecure. Average food availability is still low for regions such as sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and for the least-developed countries (LDCs). More distressing, the number of malnourished children under the age of five has actually increased in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) from 1970 to 1997 by 14 million, and the incidence of malnutrition is still very high there and in South Asia (Smith and Haddad, 2000).

# Answer to Environmental Degradation

## The Kuznets Curve means economic growth solves back the problem of increased pollution because economic growth decreases pollution

**Stern 03** [Stern, David I. June 2003, "The Environmental Kuznets Curve," International Society for Ecological Economies, http://isecoeco.org/pdf/stern.pdf]

The environmental Kuznets curve is a hypothesized relationship between various indicators of environmental degradation and income per capita. **In the early stages of economic growth degradation and pollution increase, but beyond some level of income per capita** (which will vary for different indicators) **the trend reverses, so that at high-income levels economic growth leads to environmental improvement.** This implies that the environmental impact indicator is an inverted U-shaped function of income per capita. Typically the logarithm of the indicator is modeled as a quadratic function of the logarithm of income. An example of an estimated EKC is shown in Figure 1. The EKC is named for Kuznets (1955) who hypothesized income inequality first rises and then falls as economic development proceeds.

## Globalization allows investment in green technologies and the spread of those technologies and attitudes to developing countries

**Huward & Verdier 13** [Huwart, Jean-Yves;Verdier Loïc. (2013), "What is the impact of globalisation on the environment?", in Economic Globalisation: Origins and consequences, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264111905-8-en

**The globalization of trade and research also applies to green technologies**. Industry, global capital movements, and globalized research and innovation, can help **promote sources of "green growth"** and are particularly effective instruments to fight pollution and climate change on a global scale. Public and private international investments in environmental technologies are ever higher. **In late 2008, US venture capital funds had invested close to USD 2.8 billion in green technologies around the world** – a record, despite difficult market conditions. **Biofuels, renewable energy, wind energy and above all solar energy are on a roll. Between July and September 2008, total venture capital invested in solar energy amounted to USD 1.5 billion**. In parallel, public investment in environmental technology research increased. **The dynamism of "green" research and industry is promising: the quest for environmental solutions fosters new activities and new products, but also new production processes, which globalization's trade and production network can help circulate quickly.**

Independently of these mechanisms (which require some kind of preliminary institutional framework) **corporate globalization promotes clean technology transfers from developed to developing countries**. MNEs, which for a long time didn't worry much about the environment, can also be precious allies in combating global warming. As they are knowledgeable about environmental standards and practices in developed countries, **they are important vectors for transferring green technology and good-practice. Today, major European companies equip Chinese megalopolises with wastewater treatment plants and waste collection and recycling systems using cutting-edge technologies**.

## Poverty is a root cause of climate change – the causation works the other way

**Hassoun 08** [Hassoun, Nicole. Oct. 2008, "Free trade, Poverty, and the Environment." Carnegie Mellon University Research Showcase. http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1352&context=philosophy]

Conversely, those who care about the environment have reason to care about poverty. **The poor, collectively, contribute a lot to environmental problems like climate change by using scarce sinks (like forests) and other non-renewable resources**. Swidden, or **slash and burn, agriculture**—usually **employed by poor farmers** who want to plant crops or raise cattle on marginal lands—**causes immense deforestation**. **Poor people, who do not have access to electricity or gas, burn a lot of wood and coal to cook their meals and heat their homes**. Moreover, as developing countries start using more fossil fuel, their emissions will rise. **Developing countries are expected to emit more carbon dioxide than industrialized countries by about 2018**. Those who care about environmental problems, like climate change, have reason to care about poverty.

# Answer to Obesity

**Even if obesity increases, malnourishment decreases. Malnourishment is worse and causes more deaths.**

**Diaz-Bonilla et. al 02** [Diaz-Bonilla, Eugenio; Babinard, Julie; Andersen, Per-Pinstrup; Thomas, Marcelle. December 2002. "GLOBALIZING HEALTH BENEFITS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES." International Food Policy Research Institute. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6388585.pdf]

**The number of malnourished children under five (a better indicator of food problems than average food availability, because it captures directly income distribution effects) declined between 1970 and 1997 by about 37 million, and the incidence of malnutrition dropped from 46 percent to 31 percent in the same period** (Smith and Haddad, 2000). However, although food security has improved in general, some regions and countries are at risk, and some have become more food insecure. Average food availability is still low for regions such as sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and for the least-developed countries (LDCs). More distressing, the number of malnourished children under the age of five has actually increased in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) from 1970 to 1997 by 14 million, and the incidence of malnutrition is still very high there and in South Asia (Smith and Haddad, 2000).

# Answer to Poor Infrastructure

## Problem is not poor infrastructure, but not enough infrastructure—investment over time will solve

**Glaeser 09** [Glaeser, Edward L. "Why Has Globalization Led to Bigger Cities?" The New York Times. N.p., 19 May 2009]

But there is no future in rural poverty. Nehru, in his response to Gandhi, had it right: a village, normally speaking, is backward intellectually and culturally and no progress can be made from a backward environment. The slums of Mumbai attract hundreds of thousands of migrants because they offer more hope than the static, backward-looking world of rural India. The millions of poor people who choose to live in Mumbai, and Bangalore, reflect the strength of these cities, which offer economic opportunity not found in Gandhi's beloved villages. **The right response to the problems of megacities is not to get misty-eyed about village life, but rather to work to improve the quality of infrastructure in those growing urban areas.**

## Investment overtime solves poor infrastructure

**World Bank 18** [World Bank Group. 2018. The Challenges Urbanization in West Africa. AFCW3 Economic Update;. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/30042]

Bamako, Conakry, and Niamey have a narrow window of opportunity to coordinate and invest in reforms, infrastructures, and institutions, with far-reaching consequences in the future. Sunk investments made (or facilitated) by the government can be a signaling mechanism for longer-run coordinated investments in a city. **Coordinated reforms and investments such as land use planning supplemented by investments in urban infrastructure can help households and firms respond efficiently to the city's growth patter**n. Bamako must focus on retrofitting existing structures and coordinating land redevelopment alongside infrastructure investments. Conakry must focus on better connectivity within the city and to the periphery. Niamey must lay the ground for future urban development. Getting these choices right, with urbanization in its incipient stages, will be critical. All three cities – Bamako, Niamey, and Conakry – have the potential to **become productive and livable cities.** They are currently grappling with the effect of institutions and investments, often a function of past decisions. The cost of correcting the dysfunctions is very high, especially in cities that are growing rapidly. The analyses highlighted in this article build upon in-depth analyses conducted in each of these cities and lay out detailed recommendations for reforms and policies tailored to their individual context. The conclusion, drawn from the commonalities and differences noted, is that all three cities have a narrow window of opportunity to invest in building institutions and infrastructures that will **lay the foundations for Adurable urban development in the future.**

# Answer to Rural Poverty

## Urbanization decreases rural poverty

**Cali & Menon 13** [Cali, Massimiliano; Menon, Carlo. January 2013 "Does Urbanization Affect Rural Poverty? Evidence from Indian Districts." : Policy Research Working Papers. The World Bank, http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-6338]

Do the poor in rural areas benefit from the population growth in urban areas? If so, what is the size of the benefit? Despite the importance of these questions, little empirical evidence is available to provide adequate answers. We have attempted to address this gap by analyzing the effects of urbanization on rural poverty. Using data on Indian districts from 1983 to 1999, we find that **urbanization has a significant poverty-reducing effect on the surrounding rural areas. The results are robust to the inclusion of a number of controls and to the use of different types of specifications.** The results of the IV estimation suggest that the effect is causal and that the failure to control for causality downwardly biases the coefficient of urbanization. **We find that an increase in the urban population of 200,000 determines a decrease in rural poverty in the same district of between 1.3 (lower bound) and 2.6 percentage points.**

# Answer to Slums

## Policy reforms solves the problem of urbanization moving forward

**Lall 20** [Lall, Somik K, Global Lead on Territorial Development Solutions and Lead Economist for Sustainable Development in Africa - World Bank, 01-21-2020, "Prerequisites to getting Africa's urbanization 'right'", Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/01/21/prerequisites-to-getting-africas-urbanization-right/]

At the Lack of registration affects 24 percent of land-owning households in Nairobi same time, the difficulty of registering property has contributed to a growing informal housing supply in urban areas. The capital value forgone by not developing Kibera (1,000 acres of land near Nairobi city center) amounts to $1 billion, $466 per person in greater Nairobi, or 70 percent of Kenya's GDP per capita in 2014. In Tanzania, only 10 percent of land is registered, and it takes 65 days to transfer property. These inefficiencies reduce incentives for formal land development. Enhance land use planning: Also**, better land use planning will enable cities to put in early and coordinated infrastructure investments that allow for well "formed" urban development**. As Africa's cities clarify land rights and strengthen land use planning, they will encourage economic growth. They will also lay the foundations to expand domestic revenue mobilization, as revenues from appreciation in land values can help finance much-needed urban infrastructure. Embrace the benefits new technologies offer: Disruptive technologies that combine data with automation present an incredible opportunity to reshape notions of density and economic geography. Add to the mix the gig economy (based on flexible, temporary, or freelance jobs) and sharing economy (involving short-term, peer-to-peer transactions), and we can have vibrant communities that do not need lumpy "grid" infrastructure. In fact, Africa's cities may be able to leapfrog the current development path and be highly livable, productive, and sustainable. However, this accomplishment will require the basics of land management as well as aggressive investment in human capital.

# Neg

# China Fill In

## Infrastructure expansion in cities means foreign investment and China gaining a hold in Africa

Wade ShepardContributor, October 3, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2019/10/03/what-china-is-really-up-to-in-africa/?sh=333254ab5930, **What China Is Really Up To In Africa**

Africa has become the fastest urbanizing region of the world, with rural migrants moving into cities a clip that has even surpassed that of China and India, as the continent becomes one of the final frontiers of the forth industrial revolution. This rapid transition presents big challenges but also offers big rewards for countries willing to risk billions in an infrastructure building revolution unlike anything the world has seen before – and no country has answered Africa's call **quite like China**. By 2050, Africa's 1.1 billion person population is slated to double, with 80% of this growth happening in cities, bringing the continent's urban headcount up to more than 1.3 billion. The population of Lagos alone is growing by 77 people per hour. According to McKinsey, by 2025 more than 100 cities in Africa will contain over a million people. With this breakneck pace of urbanization comes many unprecedented economic opportunities. The IMF recently declared Africa the world's second-fastest growing region, and many are predicting that it is well on its way to becoming a $5 trillion economy, as household consumption is expected to increase at a 3.8% yearly clip to $2.1 trillion by 2025. The attention of the world is now drifting towards Africa, with comparisons to 1990s-era China are no longer coming off as radical projections. China has likewise become a central player in Africa's urbanization push, as a huge percentage of the continent's infrastructure initiatives are being driven by Chinese companies and/or backed by Chinese funding. "Right now you could say that any big project in African cities that is higher than three floors or roads that are longer than three kilometers are most likely being built and engineered by the Chinese. It is ubiquitous," spoke Daan Roggeveen, the founder of MORE Architecture and author of many works on urbanization in China and Africa. Construction site for new building with chinese cooperation, Addis abeba region, Addis ababa, Ethiopia ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA - MARCH 07: Construction site for new building with chinese cooperation, addis ... [+] CORBIS VIA GETTY IMAGES MORE FOR YOU Jack Ma's $7 Billion Loss Is China's, Too. And A Growing One Tony Fernandes's AirAsia Cuts Stake In India Joint Venture With $38 Million Sale To Tata Sons In Year Of Surprises, China's Bottled Water King Overtook Jack Ma As Its Richest Person Even before the Belt and Road was formally announced in 2013, China was making major strides into Africa's urban development sphere. When the Communist Party of China first came to power in 1949, it was virtually completely unrecognized by pretty much every other country in the world — most of whom favored the Republic of China, the former government that the Red Army chased away to Taiwan. But China began lobbying Africa extensively, getting the People's Republic recognized one country at a time. Before long, these political commitments were being repaid in concrete and steel, as China started building railroads, hospitals, universities, and stadiums throughout the continent. However, there were other reasons for China's early partnerships with Africa: even though the colonial powers were largely gone or on the way out, the continent was still the same stockpile of natural resources it's always been, and China wasted no time stepping into the power vacuum, laying the political and economic inroads that have given Beijing the advanced position it has there today. China is now Africa's biggest trade partner, with Sino-African trade topping $200 billion per year. According to McKinsey, over 10,000 Chinese-owned firms are currently operating throughout the African continent, and the value of Chinese business there since 2005 amounts to more than $2 trillion, with $300 billion in investment currently on the table. Africa has also eclipsed Asia as the largest market for China's overseas construction contracts. To keep this momentum building, Beijing recently announced a $1 billion Belt and Road Africa infrastructure development fund and, in 2018, a whopping $60 billion African aid package, so expect Africa to continuing swaying to the east as economic ties with China become more numerous and robust. Nothing without infrastructure NIGERIA-BUSINESS-REAL-ESTATE A caterpillar erects revetment for the Great Wall of Lagos, to give a sustainable and permanent ... [+] AFP/GETTY IMAGES As Chinese President Xi Jinping once pointed out, "Inadequate infrastructure is believed to be the biggest bottleneck to Africa's development." Collectively, the countries of Africa would need to spend $130-170 billion per year to meet their infrastructure needs, but, according to the African Development Bank, they are coming up $68-$108 billion short. Closing Africa's infrastructure gap has been the obsession of multiple waves of colonists, and China is the

next in line to reach into the heart of the continent with railroads, highways, and airports. "Europeans built infrastructure in Africa at the turn of the century, purportedly also for local economic development, but in essence the projects were used for natural resource extraction. The predecessor of both the Nairobi-Mombasa and Addis Ababa-Djibouti railways can be categorized as such. Both connect inland regions with mineral deposits with major ports on the Indian Ocean," wrote Xiaochen Su on The Diplomat. **Infrastructure is what Africa needs most and infrastructure is what China is most equipped to provide. It is not lost on many African leaders that hardly 30 years ago China was in a similar place that they are now — a backwater country whose economy made up hardly two percent of global GDP**. But over the past few decades China shocked the world in the way that it used infrastructure to propel economic growth, creating a high-speed rail network that now tops 29,000 kilometers, paving over 100,000 kilometers of new expressways, constructing over 100 new airports, and building no less than 3,500 new urban areas — which include 500 economic development zones and 1,000 city-level developments. Over this period of time, China's GDP has grown more than 10-fold, ranking #2 in the world today. ICOAST-CHINA-ECONOMY-TRANSPORT Chinese and Ivorians technicians work on the construction site of a new container terminal at the ... [+] AFP/GETTY IMAGES It is precisely this kind of infrastructure-induced economic growth that Africa is looking for right now, and many African leaders are looking to China to bring their experience to their countries. The central players in many of Africa's biggest ticket infrastructure projects — including the $12 billion Coastal Railway in Nigeria, the $4.5 billion Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway, and the $11 billion megaport and economic zone at Bagamoyo — are being developed via Chinese partnerships. Since 2011, China has been the biggest player in Africa's infrastructure boom, claiming a 40% share that continues to rise. Meanwhile, the shares of other players are falling precipitously: Europe declined from 44% to 34%, while the presence of US contractors fell from 24% to just 6.7%. "The Chinese SOEs they are really taking over the market of infrastructure projects in Africa. It's true to say that everywhere you go in East Africa you see Chinese construction teams," said Zhengli Huang, a research associate at the University of Sheffield who has carried out extensive case studies on urbanization in Nairobi. The reasons for this ubiquitous presence are rather straight forward, as Roggeveen points out: many African contractors simply don't have the capacity for major development projects, "so if you want to do large-scale construction you either turn to a western firm or to a Chinese firm, but the Chinese firm is always able to undercut you on price." Debt trap? Workers from China and Burkina Faso empl Workers from China and Burkina Faso employed by Sinohydro, a Chinese state-owned hydropower ... [+] AFP/GETTY IMAGES When we look at Africa, we see many countries chasing dreams of a better economic future while burying themselves in massive amounts of infrastructure-induced debt that they may not be able to actually afford. There have already been warning signs: the $4 Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway ended up costing Ethiopia nearly a quarter of it's total 2016 budget, Nigeria had to renegotiate a deal with their Chinese contractor due to their failure to pay, and Kenya's 80% Chinese-financed railway from Mombasa to Nairobi has already gone four times over budget, costing the country upwards of 6% of it's GDP. In 2012, the IMF found that China owned 15% of Africa's external debt, and hardly three years later roughly two-thirds of all new loans were coming from China. This has some analysts issuing warnings about debt traps – with some even going as far as calling what China is doing a new form colonialism. What does China get out of this? ICOAST-CHINA-ECONOMY-TRANSPORT Chinese and Ivorians technicians work on the construction site of a new container terminal at the ... [+] AFP/GETTY IMAGES China needs what Africa has for long-term economic and political stability. **Over a third of China's oil comes from Africa, as does 20% of the country's cotton. A**frica has roughly half of the world's stock of manganese, an essential ingredient for steel production, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo on its own possesses half of the planet's cobalt. Africa also has significant amounts of coltan, which is needed for electronics, as well as half of the world's known supply of carbonatites, a rock formation that's the primary source of rare earths. However, there is a common misconception that all Chinese projects in Africa have the backing of Beijing. More often than not, Chinese SOEs are operating in Africa on purely for-profit ventures that don't have the ambitions of their government in mind. However, it can be difficult to separate China's commercial intentions in Africa from the strategic, as, in many cases, the two inevitably overlap. The internationalization of Chinese construction firms and IT companies as well as the building of infrastructure to better extract and export African resources, are key concerns for Beijing. So while the infrastructure being built on the ground may not necessarily be orchestrated by Beijing it does ultimately play into China's broader geo-economic interests.

# Concentration of Poverty/Urban Slums

## Rural to urban migration results in the creation of urban slums

**Marx et. al 13** [Marx, Benjamin; Stoker, Thomas; Suri, Tavneet. Fall 2013, "The Economics of Slums in the Developing World." Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economiic Association, Vol. 27, No 4, https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.27.4.187]

Urban populations have skyrocketed globally and today represent more than half of the world's population. In some parts of the developing world, this growth has more-than-proportionately involved rural migration to informal settlements in and around cities, known more commonly as "slums"—densely populated **urban areas characterized by poor-quality housing, a lack of adequate living space and public services, and accommodating large numbers of informal residents with generally insecure tenure**.1 Worldwide, at least 860 million people are now living in slums, and the number of slum dwellers grew by six million each year from 2000 to 2010 (UN-Habitat 2012a). In sub-Saharan Africa, slum populations are growing at 4.5 percent per annum, a rate at which populations double every 15 years. The prevalence of slums is highest in sub-Saharan Africa, where slum dwellers represent 62 percent of the urban population. Absent or defificient water and sewage systems translate into a broad range of health and sanitation issues, whether through direct exposure to bacterial agents, contaminated drinking water, or other channels. Duflflo, Galiani, and Mobarak (2012) described the disease burden arising from the unsanitary living conditions in slums. In the slums of Tongi and Jessore in Bangladesh, 82 percent of respondents report any household member being sick in the past 30 days. In Kibera, 16 percent of our respondent households have at least one member chronically ill in the previous three months. In Sierra Leone, a country whose slums routinely experience cholera outbreaks, **slum households exhibit poorer health outcomes than their rural counter- parts**. The prevalence of underweight, stunting, and wasting (acute malnutrition) is in fact greater in the slum outskirts of the capital Freetown than in rural areas nation- wide, as children under fifive living in slums have signifificantly lower weight-for-age and weight-for-height indexes than children under fifive in rural areas.

## West African urbanization is characterized by urban slums—concentration of poor in urban areas with little access to resources.

**Adegbye et. al 18** [Adegbye, OluTimehin; Aki-Sawyerr, Yvonne; Lumumba, Jane; Lowanson, Taibat. 2018, "Urbanization in West Africa." Vol 6, No. 3, Center for Democracy and Development. https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Urbanization-in-westafrica_1_XYt3baU.pdf]

UN Habitat predicts that before 2050, the total urban population in Africa will grow from the current estimate of 400 million to excess of 1.26 billion. By 2036, the urban population of West Africa will range from 46.2% (Guinea) to 63.1% (Ivory Coast); percentages, which firmly places half of the

region's population in **currently, undeserved, overstretched cities**. Somik Lall, an urban specialist with the World Bank, described the continent's urbanization problems in a 2017 lecture as a trifecta. African cities are **densely populated** with people, **but** are comparatively **starved of capital and other economic resource**s including goods and services for international trade; they are disconnected and lack social cohesion, due in part to badly-conceived and delivered physical transportation infrastructure, and they are expensive. The lack of infrastructural development combined with a weak social contract between the state and most urban dwellers means that it is often private citizens who provide healthcare, education, housing, and 'public services.' It is they who must parcel out significant portions of their income to cover basic amenities like housing, water, and sanitation. West Africa's urban poor, like most of their counterparts in the developing world, are forced to develop adaptive and resourceful responses to the problems that they face. Across the region, informal settlements of all kind have sprung up in response to the acute absence of broad-based access to formal housing. Many of these settlements are unimaginatively lumped together as 'slums', primarily denoting the services and regulatory standards that they lack, rather that the social support, economic opportunities, and housing stability they offer.

## Slums fail to alleviate poverty by stagnating investment into public projects

**Marx et. al 13** [Marx, Benjamin; Stoker, Thomas; Suri, Tavneet. Fall 2013, "The Economics of Slums in the Developing World." Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economiic Association, Vol. 27, No 4, https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.27.4.187]

There is a wide literature on poverty traps, **including a theoretical literature high- lighting the specific mechanisms leading to poverty traps** (for excellent defifinitions and reviews, useful starting points include Basu 2003, Matsuyama 2005, and Bowles, Durlauf, and Hoff 2006). The literature has also described spatial poverty traps, but mostly in rural settings ( Jalan and Ravallion 2002; Golgher 2012). We argue that urban slums present a different challenge to communities and governments administering them, and that **the very nature of life in the slums makes it diffificult to achieve improvements in standards of living through marginal investments in housing, health, or infrastructure alone**. We now discuss some of the mechanisms relevant to slum contexts that may lead to poverty traps.

## Concentrating poverty in urban areas results in intergenerational poverty with little likelihood of upward mobility

**Sharkey 06** [Sharkey, Patrick. 2006 "Neighborhoods and the Black-White Mobility Gap." Pew Research Center.]

**Growing up surrounded by neighborhood poverty strongly increases the risk of falling down the income ladder and may reduce the likelihood of upward mobility**. The results in figure 3 look at only three levels of neighborhood poverty, and because those three neighborhood types are examined separately (and separately by race), it is difficult to draw reliable conclusions about how mobility is affected by neighborhood poverty. Figure 4 shows

results from multivariate models that attempt to overcome the imprecision in figure 3 by looking at all neighborhoods and all people together. Figure 4 illustrates how the risk of downward mobility from the top and the chance of upward mobility from the bottom are affected by Neighborhood Poverty. In Neighborhoods Where The Poverty Rate Was Under 10 Percent, 42 Percent Of Children (Regardless Of Race) In The Top Three Quintiles were downwardly mobile. Had the neighborhood poverty rate been 20 to 30 percent instead, 64 percent would have fallen down a quintile or more. In other words, **an increase in neighborhood poverty from under 10 percent to 20 to 30 percent increases the likelihood of downward mobility by 52 percent.**

## Urban slums take away any potential for economic growth

Chonghaile 16 [Chonghaile, Clár, Ní. "Frica's urbanisation 'megatrend' needs to deliver growth, says report," The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/jun/07/africa-urbanisation-megatrend-needs-to-deliver-growth-says-report#:~:text=Africa's%20urbanisation%20'megatrend'%20needs%20to%20deliver%20growth%2C%20says%20report,-This%20article%20is&text=%E2%80%9CAs%20two%2Dthirds%20of%20the,transformation%2C%E2%80%9D%20the%20report%20said ]

More than half of all Africans are expected to live in cities by 2050, so policymakers must ensure this "megatrend" acts as a catalyst for development and growth, and does not result in millions of people eking out precarious existences in slums, according to the latest African Economic Outlook. The study (pdf), produced by the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the UN's Development Programme, said authorities must create inclusive growth, jobs, better housing and social safety nets, and improve links with rural areas to boost development in urban areas, now home to about 472 million Africans. "As two-thirds of the investments in urban infrastructure to 2050 have yet to be made, the scope is large for new, wide-ranging urban policies to turn African cities and towns into engines of sustainable structural transformation," the report said. "In order to seize this 'urbanisation dividend', a number of bold policy reforms are necessary." We have one generation to save our cities, global engineering firm warns Read more In 1950, 14% of Africans lived in urban areas compared with 40% today. By the mid-2030s, half are expected to live in cities and towns, with the proportion peaking at 56% around 2050. To put this in a historical context, it took Europe 110 years to move from 15% urban dwellers in 1800 to 40% in 1910. Many urban dwellers are young – more than half of Africa's population (pdf) are under the age of 18.5 and 19% are aged between 15 and 24 years old. Young people have been variously described as a reason for hope or a potential source of instability. The report said nine out of 10 working young people in sub-Saharan Africa are poor or near poor, and yet the working-age urban population now supports more family members than comparative populations elsewhere. Advertisement Mario Pezzini, director of the OECD's development centre, said urbanisation could drive development if there is simultaneous job creation and infrastructure investment. "It is not possible to separate these issues … What we are really talking about is how do you create conditions and services, not only to provide a better quality of life, which is crucial, but also to create opportunities for economic development … If you don't create infrastructure, the jobs will not be there," he said. **African cities**, unlike other agglomeration economies, often **fail to reap the benefits that come when firms and people locate near one another**, he added. "Particularly in Africa, the problem is that you move people from rural areas to the cities and they remain in the same conditions … but now living in slums … If there are no advantages for people moving, urbanisation will not be synonymous with transformation." Despite a slowdown in growth after the commodity-led boom of recent years, Pezzini said the window of opportunity to get urbanisation right had not yet closed, noting that African growth rates are still relatively high. But investment is needed to turn youthful urban populations into a resource, rather than a risk. "How do you break this cycle of marginalisation, that is putting people outside the mainstream, transforming them into agents against change?" Pezzini said.

## Urbanization means high land prices and corruption

**Campbell 18** [Campbell, John. 09-12-2018. "Africa is the Fastest Urbanizing Place on the Planet," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/africa-fastest-urbanizing-place-planet]

The Financial Times recently published a balanced report on the pros and cons of rapid African urbanization. It focuses on Bamako, Mali, as an example of the continent-wide phenomenon. It cites a World Bank estimate that Bamako's population today, at 3.5 million, is 10 times larger than it was at independence in 1960. A professor at the University of Bamako comments that that the city's growth is a "catastrophe foretold," that "Bamako is a time-bomb." Among other shortcomings, the professor notes that the city lacks a land registry even as real estate booms. The exploding population growth translates into high land prices that encourage corruption. Peppered through the Financial Times piece are arresting statistical notes. For example, a World Bank economist observes that Africa is now 40 percent urban with a per capita GDP of $1,100. By the time Asia reached that level of urbanization, its per capita GDP was $3,500.

## Urbanization means slums, poor education, water shortages, unemployment

**Campbell 18** [Campbell, John. 09-12-2018. "Africa is the Fastest Urbanizing Place on the Planet," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/africa-fastest-urbanizing-place-planet]

Statistics about Africa are generally weak, but for frequent travelers to Africa, the explosion of the urban population is obvious. So, too, are the slums, the lack of schools, water shortages, and unpaved roads. Unemployed male youth are ubiquitous and do, indeed, constitute a potential time bomb with respect to political instability.

## Urbanization cannot be reversed

**Campbell 18** [Campbell, John. 09-12-2018. "Africa is the Fastest Urbanizing Place on the Planet," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/africa-fastest-urbanizing-place-planet]

Experience shows that urbanization cannot be reversed, as few residents are willing to return to the countryside unless compelled to do so, as occurred in Chairman Mao's China or Pol Pot's Cambodia. But no African state has comparable means of repression should it wish to reduce its urban population. African urbanization will continue and public authorities having few tools with which to manage it.

## Sub-Saharan urbanization now, lots of slums

Nicolas Pinault, May 20, 2019, Rapid Urbanization Presents New Problems for Africa, https://www.voanews.com/africa/rapid-urbanization-presents-new-problems-africa

In sub-Saharan Africa, the urban population has doubled since the mid-1990s, and reached 400 million people in 2016. According to experts, 40 percent of the region's total population resides in cities, compared to 31 percent in 2000. During the next 15 years, the United Nations predicts the world's 10 fastest-growing cities will be in Africa. However, the **development of infrastructure and industries has not kept pace with the growth in urban population. Sixty percent of city dwellers in sub-Saharan Africa live in slums, and only 25 percent have access to safe drinking water.**

## Lack of access to land results in creation of urban slums in cities

**Lall 20** [Lall, Somik K, Global Lead on Territorial Development Solutions and Lead Economist for Sustainable Development in Africa - World Bank, 01-21-2020, "Prerequisites to getting Africa's urbanization 'right'", Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/01/21/prerequisites-to-getting-africas-urbanization-right/]

Markets for land are generally dysfunctional, product markets are fragmented, and weak city planning and limited finance hobble urban development. In fact, very few large African cities have substantial own-source revenues, and tax mandates are often related to having regional government status: consider Kampala, where per capita revenue was $59 for the 2014 fiscal year, much higher than $26 for the rest of the country. But more broadly, urbanization has been driven by a lack of opportunity in the countryside as agricultural activity has declined and, without the accumulated savings to make significant investments in housing, the **default option has been to build shacks**. Consequently, 60 percent of the region's urban population lives in slums. With Africa's urban population likely to double over the next 25 years, there is an urgent need to make cities livable, productive, and sustainable

# Congestion

## Urbanization means traffic jams

Africa.com, 2019, Pros & Cons of the Rapid Growth of African Cities, https://africa.com/pros-cons-of-the-rapid-growth-of-african-cities/

"We have to be impatient in moving Africa forward," says Adewunmi Ayodeji Adesina, the President of African Development Bank. Africa needs infrastructure like a lost traveller needs a drink in the middle of hot Sahara. The African Economic Outlook 2016 estimated that, on average, African countries would need to spend 5-7% of the gross domestic product, or a minimum of $100bn a year on public infrastructure. Going back to my street in my area in Lagos, even though it has more than doubled in economic and social activities and the population has also doubled, the infrastructure has largely remained the same — even become worse in some cases. The road has gradually become worse, and public water supply is totally unavailable. The rapid growth is largely leading to overburdening of infrastructures, leading to low-quality life for most people. Also, the traffic congestion at peak hours of the day in African cities is a big problem. Traffic congestion worsens with more people moving into these cities. Let me help you understand this with my experience of going to work in the morning in the city of Lagos. The traffic is mostly at a standstill for hours. It's not just because there are so many people going to work in the morning, which, of course, is part of the reason, but because of the bad roads in some places. Also, whenever there's traffic, transport cost is usually doubled. Earlier this year, Nairobi, Kenya was ranked the 2nd worst city in the world on traffic congestion. **Traffic in cities is a result of urbanization**, and African cities must also react by building better roads and developing a better transport system that can cater to a large number of people already living in these cities and those that would surely move in. So, what we have is the few infrastructures already in place in health, education, roads, etc., being unable to cater to people currently in most of these cities, and might just lead to utter collapse when more people pour in from rural areas (where most also lack basic infrastructures). Mario Pezzini, director of the OECD's Development Centre, said, "It is not possible to separate these issues…What we are really talking about is how do you create conditions and services, not only to provide a better quality of life, which is crucial, but also to create opportunities for economic development…If you don't create infrastructure, the jobs will not be there."

## Congestion in Bamako limit opportunities and economic growth

**World Bank 18** [World Bank Group. 2018. The Challenges Urbanization in West Africa. AFCW3 Economic Update;. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/30042]

**In Bamako, accessibility is constrained by low population densities and high congestion levels on the main arterial roads**. Peak population density in Bamako is around 37–45 per hectare.30 This order of magnitude is lower than in the highest densities found in Nairobi (315/ha), Dakar (315/ha), Dar Es Salaam (280/ha), and to a lesser extent Addis Ababa (200/ha). This means that on average, people must travel longer distances to reach the same number of jobs than in denser cities. In addition, the conversion of agricultural land to building land on the periphery of Bamako over the last 30 or more years means that the average distance to the more central locations, where job density is high, has increased (Figure 20). This contributes to constrains on accessibility levels despite slight overall densification. **Congestion also plays a powerful role in limiting access to opportunities in the city as the River Niger creates a natural bottleneck for people commuting from the south bank** (with mainly residential neighborhoods) **to the north bank (with the highest job densities**)

# Crime

## Urbanization creates crime and security problems

Africa.com, 2019, Pros & Cons of the Rapid Growth of African Cities, https://africa.com/pros-cons-of-the-rapid-growth-of-african-cities/

Talking about jobs – Security definitely goes hand-in-hand with infrastructure. Without adequate infrastructures, you have a problem with security. Infrastructure and security determine productivity. Research has it that there are many young city dwellers. It says more than half of Africa's population are under the age of 18, and 19% are between the ages of 15 and 24 years old. Without infrastructure, there can't be jobs for these vibrant youths, and without jobs, there would likely be a rise in crime and other nefarious activities. We all know who makes work for idle hands. For those who don't, it's the devil. The Arab Spring in North African cities, the xenophobia in South Africa, and the cases of kidnapping in major cities in Nigeria earlier this year are some of the results of population growth that has been met with lack of jobs. Many of the youth in these cities are plugged into social media and know what they are missing out on. These things will lead to restlessness and would result in higher crime rates. From rape and kidnapping to robbery cases in African cities, these are expected to continually rise if the growth in these cities doesn't commensurate with economic growth. Some of the cities with the highest crime rate include: Rustenburg City with 11,117 cases in 2015, according to Crime Statistics South Africa (crimes included household burglary, kidnapping, hijacking, and political violence). In Pietermaritzburg, the crime rate has been on the increase year-on-year. According to Crime Statistics South Africa, in 2013 there were 13,596 cases, which rose to 14,794 cases in 2014, while in 2015, there were 15,720 cases. Some of the other African cities with high crime rates are Benghazi, Libya; Johannesburg, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Durban in South Africa; Lagos, Nigeria (Street gangs dubbed "area boys" cause a lot of problems, while Lagos is also an internet scam hotbed – cyber criminals prey on innocent foreigners); Luanda, Angola (according to the UK Government service Gov.UK, crimes in the city include carjackings, assaults, homicides, muggings for valuables like mobile phones, armed robberies, and rape incidences both in nightlife areas and private homes; Nairobi, Kenya (the US Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) rates Nairobi's crime levels as being "critical"). Also, the security systems in most African cities are not so sophisticated to cater to the large population. This means **rapid growth in some of these African cities is only creating more criminals and endangered lives**. The future of African cities is binary as clearly seen from the opportunities and challenges highlighted. If African leaders remain headstrong in poor decisionmaking, they would simply ratchet up the problems plaguing African cities today and totally wipe out the advantages that could have been obtained from the growth in these cities. With quality leadership, with good vision, we can develop a blueprint on how to achieve the potentials of the rapid growth occurring in African cities. Africa is definitely at a tipping point; the coin is on its side and about to fall, but African leaders have the real chance to decide which side of this coin shows up.

# Disease

## Urbanization means disease spread

**Neiderud 15** [Neiderud, Carl-Johan, Department of Medical Sciences, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden, 2015, "How urbanization affects the epidemiology of emerging infectious diseases", https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/iee.v5.27060]

The world is becoming more urban every day, and the process has been ongoing since the industrial revolution in the 18th century. The United Nations now estimates that 3.9 billion people live in urban centres. The rapid influx of residents is however not universal and the developed countries are already urban, but the big rise in urban population in the next 30 years is expected to be in Asia and Africa. **Urbanization leads to many challenges for global health and the epidemiology of infectious diseases.** New megacities can be incubators for new epidemics, and zoonotic diseases can spread in a more rapid manner and become worldwide threats. Adequate city planning and surveillance can be powerful tools to improve the global health and decrease the burden of communicable diseases**.**

## Crowded cities in West Africa spread disease

**Bollyky 19** [Bollyky, Thomas J. 2019, "The Future of Global Health is Urban Health," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/article/future-global-health-urban-health]

There is limited health data on modern slums, however, and much progress is reported in averages that may mask disparities. There is some indication that the health benefits of urban life may not equally distributed to the poor residents of cities like Cairo, Dhaka, or Nairobi. There are also significant challenges ahead. Poor, **crowded cities with limited health systems are ideal incubators for outbreaks of emerging infections**, like the Ebola epidemics in West Africa in 2014 and the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2018. These cities are often larger and denser than Athens and the other urban centers of antiquity, which means diseases are more likely to spread and more likely to affect a larger number of people. Outbreaks that occur in today's cities can spread internationally faster and more easily, with the increased speed and volume of global trade and travel.

## Cities easily spread disease

**Perry 20** [Perry, Gad. 05-20-2020, "Urbanization in the Age of Pandemic," New Security Beat, https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2020/05/urbanization-age-pandemic/]

Other recent disease outbreaks have also thrived in urban settings. Zika, a mosquito-spread viral disease originally isolated in Uganda, spread explosively in two Brazilian cities in 2015, ultimately affecting an

estimated 1.5 million people and causing microcephaly in thousands of newborns. High human density and the presence of invasive species of mosquitos that arrived previously and were not considered a major threat but that can transmit the disease, unlike the native ones, allowed the disease to spread rapidly once it arrived in American cities, harming thousands. After spreading in China, **COVID-19 quickly emerged in urban centers around the world**. Genetic studies suggest that the cases reported in Washington state in late February had their source in China, although community spread was apparently already occurring in California at that point. By then the disease had also reached New York – via Europe. Soon it spread **to other urban centers, with cases traced to both internal movement and new arrivals from around the world.** U.S. residents were reminded that markets in faraway cities and students returning from study abroad can wallop health, cripple economies, and hurt national security. The connectivity within and among cities is key to "superspreading events" that boost the speed of the virus's infection rate. If COVID-19 had hit Wuhan a century ago, before the city became a hub for thousands of daily travelers heading near and far by train, bus, and air, COVID-19 would not have had such a rapid, global impact. Where effective human mobility control measures were put in place, the spread was mitigated. In contrast, a mass celebration in Milan, after Italian Atalanta beat Spanish Valencia in the UEFA Champions League, contributed to the explosive spread of COVID-19 following the return of Italian and Spanish fans to their home cities. Despite relatively little testing, the first US case in a rural county was confirmed in late February. Today, the disease has been confirmed in nearly every county in the United States and virtually every nation on the planet. John Donne was mostly correct: no man is an island – especially if s/he lives in or near a city. During the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, the United States devoted hundreds of millions of dollars to aid the fight. Billions of dollars are being allocated to COVID-19 and its near-future impacts, both domestically and globally. What of the long term? AIDS gave us Safe Sex domestically and the President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) abroad. What will COVID-19 teach us? Will people move away from big cities? The answers may depend on whether this is the "once-a-century threat" that a recent Wall Street Journal editorial called it, or recurring, as the World Economic Forum expects. A rare event might soon be disregarded, but cyclical pandemics will surely lead to long-lasting actions

## Urbanization spreads diseases

Science Daily, April 21, 2020, https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2020/04/200421112557.htm,

Expansion of world's cities creating 'new ecological niches' for infectious diseases Their study, a major literature review published in the academic journal Urban Studies, shows that urban expansion at the periphery of cities -- sometimes called 'extended urbanisation'- is fundamentally altering the spatial relationships which shape how millions of people live and interact with each other and with nature. In doing so, it is creating "new ecological niches" for the spread of infectious diseases, the researchers warn. Rapid urbanisation, particularly in developing nations of Asia and Africa, is creating fluid relationships between urban and rural environments with populations drawn to new types of suburban settlements on the periphery of cities. These might be in the shape of suburban neighbourhoods, informal self-built settlements, refugee camps, or communities of workers living near mines or factories. These suburban and 'peri-urban' areas are more likely than cities to be the source of new and re-emerging infectious diseases, the study explains. They are particularly vulnerable to diseases that jump the animal-to-human boundary (zoonosis), as they bring populations of humans and livestock into contact with displaced wildlife in a manner that does not happen in cities. They are often **densely populated, poorly planned, lacking health infrastructure and out of sight of government authorities.** Significantly for public health policy, they also serve as a conduit between city and countryside -- making municipal, regional and even national boundaries effectively "porous." The recent SARS and Ebola outbreaks are high profile examples of epidemics which originated in these new types of suburban hinterland before spreading into larger, established cities. The researchers say this **structural weak spot** to infectious disease outbreaks has largely been **overlooked in academic studies of the epidemiology of global urbanisation**, which instead have tended to focus on health inequalities linked with urban poverty, such as diseases caused by obesity. The researchers set out three key dimensions to understanding the link between urbanisation and infectious disease risk: the dynamics of population change, infrastructure and governance. They say further interdisciplinary research is needed in these fields -- especially as the world responds to the current COVID-19 pandemic which first emerged in Wuhan, China, in December. Without improved understanding, public health policymakers locally, nationally

and internationally will be ill-equipped to identify and mitigate the heightened risk of infectious disease outbreaks posed by suburban sprawl. Dr Creighton Connolly, an urban geographer from the School of Geography at the University of Lincoln and lead author of the paper, said: "Economic growth, changing labour markets and conflicts are driving urban expansion and migration from rural-to-urban in developing countries at unprecedented pace. "Improved transport infrastructure has cut journey times between countryside, suburbs and cities from days to hours**. However the infrastructure vital for good public health, like health clinics and clean water, often lags behind**. "Governance -- particularly the mechanics for responding rapidly to disease outbreaks -- are also weaker in these fringe communities in the so-called 'urban shadow' compared to established towns and cities, as jurisdictional responsibilities are often blurred."

## Poorly planned cities mean disease spread

**Dionne 20** [Dionne, Kim Y. 06-19-2020, "Africa is Urbaniziing. Here's what that means for politics," The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/06/19/africa-is-urbanizing-heres-what-that-means-politics/

The new U.N.-Habitat report on the coronavirus and its disease, covid-19, highlighted how the products of poor urban planning — widespread informal settlements, undersupply of services and infrastructure — can facilitate the spread of the virus and exacerbate its adverse impacts in African cities.

## Crowded cities mean more animals for food and more zoontic diseases

International Food Poliucy Research Insitute, April 7, 2020, https://www.ifpri.org/blog/africas-growing-risk-diseases-spread-animals-people, frica's growing risk of diseases that spread from animals to people

The outbreak of COVID-19 is a rude awakening to many who believed the era of infectious disease was over. In this post, Bernard Bett, Delia Randolph and John McDermott argue that not only are pandemics not over, they may be increasing in frequency; and while most originated in Asia in the past, Africa may be poised to become an important source of so-called "zoonotic pathogens"—with its popula**tion growth, rapid urbanization, and rising global integration offering promising vectors for outbreaks.**—Johan Swinnen, series co-editor and IFPRI Director General. Three-quarters of emerging human infectious disease outbreaks are "zoonotic," meaning they originate from viruses and other pathogens infecting animals that then "jump" species to infect people. This "species jump" by pathogens is not new—it has occurred throughout pre- and recorded history. But in the last half of the last century, with the widespread use of antibiotics and vaccines, many had begun to believe that the era of infectious disease was ending. The story of epidemics, however, is always evolving. As we see clearly now with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, which is believed to have originated from virus-infected meat or live animals sold in a traditional "wet" food market in Wuhan, China, our hopes for the end of infectious disease were badly misplaced. Over the last 100 years, in fact, there has been growing evidence of not less but more frequent emergence and greater spread of zoonotic pathogens in humans and animals. In recent decades, most of these zoonotic pathogens originated on the western seaboards of Europe and the United States. More recently still, Asia, Africa, and South America appear to be growing in importance as origins of zoonotic pathogens. For centuries, East and Southeast Asia have been the hotspots of influenza and other emerging zoonotic diseases with pandemic potential, but in this century it has also been the origin of novel coronaviruses causing both the 2002–2003 epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and the 2019 coronavirus disease dubbed 'COVID-19'. A major cause of the emergence of new influenzas is the increasing densities of people and their domestic animals. Greater human populations are also increasing human interactions with wild animals, which is speeding the acquisition of disease infections among people. Africa is now catching up to Asia as an infectious disease hotspot. Africa now has the

fastest-growing and youngest human population of any region in the world. In 1900, Africa south of the Sahara had around 100 million inhabitants; the population now stands at 1 billion and by 2100 is projected to grow to around 4 billion people. With increasing human populations and increasing demand for milk, meat and eggs due to rising urbanization and incomes, the densities of humans and domestic animals are also increasing—particularly in coastal West Africa and North Africa and the highlands of East Africa. Figure 1 compares the current human, poultry, pig, and ruminant populations across Africa and Asia. Regions of Africa are now approaching the high-density levels seen in Asia. In past centuries in Africa, animal pathogens jumping to humans almost always caused limited outbreaks—reflecting the comparatively low densities of people and animals and their relative isolation. However, this pattern is changing, with increases in both frequency of emergence and expanded spread in human populations. Here, we highlight key changes in human, animal, and environmental health drivers contributing to more frequent emergence and greater spread of emerging zoonoses in Africa, now and in the future. Understanding these changes is critical in developing preventive and rapid response strategies and capacities to mitigate the increasing risk of epidemics of emerging diseases in Africa. Regions that have high human populations in Africa include East and West Africa; in Asia, relatively high human populations occur in southeast China and India. In general, areas with high human populations also have high poultry and other livestock populations. Human population data were obtained from https://www.worldpop.org/geodata/listing?id=17; livestock data were obtained from https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/glw_3. Composition: Fred Oteino, ILRI Emergence and spread of zoonotic pathogens follow different patterns While there are commonalities, each outbreak/epidemic/pandemic has its own unique features. Tracing pathogen emergence from one host species to another has been greatly aided by the advent of genomic tools and improved but still limited sampling of the host species. These methods have helped us better understand the emergence of pathogens from primates (HIV-AIDS), bats (Ebola), and rats (Lassa fever) to humans. **Zoonotic pathogens can directly jump from an animal species to infect humans** (HIV-AIDS from primates) or through other animal species which either act as an intermediate connector host, or bridge, (SARS-Coronavirus and SARS-Coronavirus 2 that causes COVID-19, from bats through wildlife species then to humans) or as amplifier hosts of pathogens transmitted to humans (Nipah virus from bats, multiplied in pigs; influenza viruses mixing between human, pig, and poultry populations in East and Southeast Asia). While many new diseases originate in wildlife, for some of the most serious, livestock has been a connector or amplifier host. Prevention or failing that, rapid initial containment before the exponential growth of cases is the health goal. Low population density and stable societies serve as 'natural preventive measures. In Africa in past centuries, infectious pathogens jumping from animals to humans almost always caused limited outbreaks or "burned out." For example, simian immunodeficiency viruses have likely been transmitted from primates to humans from prehistoric times, but did not cause serious epidemics until the late 20th century. But the dramatic social, demographic, and health changes of late 19th century Africa helped to transform these occasional pathogenic wildlife-human spillovers into pandemics of human-to-human disease transmission, such as the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). This new pattern of disease emergence is unfortunately **likely to become increasingly common, given the dramatic rise in Africa's human population.**

## Poor lack access to health care facilities in Guinea

**World Bank 18** [World Bank Group. 2018. The Challenges Urbanization in West Africa. AFCW3 Economic Update;. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/30042]

Inadequate skills are also partly responsible for Guinea's poor health outcomes, which can be attributed to a weak public health system that is inaccessible, inequitable, and inefficient. The maternal mortality ratio stands at 679 per 100,000 live births, among the highest in the world. Only 45 percent of births are attended by a skilled professional, lower even than in many fragile countries in the region. The under-five mortality also remains among the highest, with just under 100 deaths per 1,000 live births. Although the chronic malnutrition rate (stunting) decreased from 47 percent in 2000 to 31 percent in 2012, it remains a concern, especially in rural areas, were 40 percent of children are stunted. **Access to healthcare facilities is hindered by high fees relative to incomes as well as distance, with wide disparities between rural and urban areas as well as across regions**. About 34 percent of sick individuals fail to visit a health center due to high fees. Setting up a powerful public health system was one of the main lessons learned from the recent Ebola epidemic. Such a system is necessary if the

economy is to become more resilient to health covariate shocks. This will also help households cope with the usual idiosyncratic health shocks that negatively affect workers' productivity and families' well-being

## Urbanization increases the probability of disease spread

The percentage of the world's population that lives in urban settings has increased explosively in recent years. In 1950, less than 30 percent of the world's population lived in urban areas. According to the World Bank, in 2003, that proportion had grown to 48 percent. The year 2008 witnessed a remarkable shift: for the first time, the majority of the world population lived in an urban setting. The Population Reference Bureau (September 2007) predicts that by the year 2030, roughly 60 percent of the world's population will live in urban areas. Because urban populations are characterized by much **higher densities of people**—meaning that more people are sharing the same spaces—**diseases are much more easily transmitted**. Almost all of the future growth of the world's urban centers will occur in the developing world, where health response systems are weakest. By the year 2050, the total world population is predicted to increase from 6.9 billion people (world population in 2010) to 9.3 billion people (http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm). In the same time period, the urban populations of less developed regions are expected to grow from about 2.5 billion to 5.2 billion people. The number of urban dwellers in more developed regions will increase by a much smaller amount: 930 million to 1.1 billion. This **population growth is therefore of particular concern because potential public health problems tend to be exacerbated by poverty in developing countries.** Many of these expanding cities are characterized by squalid conditions and sprawling shantytowns. In 2009, nearly two billion people, the equivalent of nearly 30 percent of the world's population, still lacked access to clean drinking water (http://www.americares.org/newsroom/news/2008-internationalwaterday.html ) **High densities of people combined with unsanitary conditions make for almost perfect breeding grounds for pathogens**. Of course, globalization cannot be said to have caused the move away from subsistence agriculture toward urbanization and industrialization. However, it may be working to accelerate this process in many countries, as international trade and investment create more formal sector jobs in developing countries. The creation of more jobs tends to lead to rising wages levels and inducing more people to move to cities in search of work

# Drug Trafficking

## Poverty in urban areas means heroin flourishes

**ISS 20** [No Author, August 13, 2020, "Heroin is now a major urban development challenge in Africa," Instiitue for Security Studies, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/heroin-is-now-a-major-urban-development-challenge-in-africa]

The rapid growth in the trade and consumption of heroin is having a direct and negative effect on urban politics and development in Africa. It is enabled by organised crime and corruption and has led to an 'untreated' public health crisis. Yet governments have scant understanding of the economic, security and social implications of an addictive substance being illegally peddled to vulnerable populations. Africa's east coast was for decades a secondary route for the international heroin trade, with its long coastline providing safe landing sites for Afghan heroin destined for markets in Europe and North America. The African route became more important as Middle East conflict and better enforcement shut down traditional access to Europe. Heroin then began to leak into African markets and a significant amount is now traded and consumed locally, with devastating impact. The United Nations estimates that **20 to 40 tons of heroin enter Africa annually, but the actual amount may be much higher.** Accurate figures are hard to determine. The shift in Africa's heroin economy is now about local markets and consumers New research by the ENACT transnational organised crime programme shows that as local consumption has grown, land transport and inland urban centres have become more important. Heroin hubs have developed around airports with regional and international connections. The drug also moves south and west along a web of roads, creating new markets and pulling in new users in small towns along the way. Overview of heroin trafficking on Africa's east coast Overview of heroin trafficking on Africa's east coast (click on the map for the full size image) The shift in the continent's heroin economy is now about local markets and African consumers. States should anticipate further massive growth in the drug trade alongside the rise of African megacities and expanding towns. In these rapidly growing urban nodes, inhabitants contend with inadequate provision of housing, transport, infrastructure, water and sanitation among other services. Local governments are frequently overwhelmed and lack experience and budgets to plan and develop healthy, secure and economically dynamic urban environments. With limited employment for young low-skilled migrants in cities and towns, and low levels of governance and investment, **urbanisation leads to concentrations of people vulnerable to the drug market.** The African heroin boom is enabled by unplanned urbanisation, weak governance and widespread corruption among police and politicians in Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa, the ENACT study found. This development challenge has coincided with criminal networks willing to exploit the growing availability of heroin. Drugs and corruption form damaging symbiotic relationships. The heroin trade uses unscrupulous officials to maximum advantage, who in turn actively seek to corrupt the mechanisms of enforcement and governance. ENACT found that in some instances criminal drug networks operate from inside local political systems. They take control of urban infrastructure provision, increasing development costs and obstructing efforts to regulate or upgrade services. Drug networks control urban infrastructure provision, increasing costs and blocking service upgrades As expanding illicit operations need more and more protection from investigation and arrest, so corruption climbs up the police hierarchy and transfers to elected officials. Politicians have been linked to these networks and drug money used to fund patronage and election campaigns. In some cases, drug business merges with grey markets, allowing criminal entrepreneurs to adopt a legal front. Because the heroin trade has played such a key underground role in urban development, **drug markets need to be understood as one of the challenges facing the improvement and governance of cities and towns**. And responses will need to be developmental – not just based on arrests and prosecutions.

## Globalization increases the drug trade

**Olcott 00** [Olcott, Martha. 2000, "Drug Trafficking on the Great Silk Road: The Security Environment in Central Asia," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/drugs.pdf]

The ongoing process of globalization only exacerbates many of the problems associated with the drug trade. Improved communication has increased human mobility and has spread the pattern of drugs to other regions. Also, diffusion of technical expertise facilitates production of drugs in remote places. **Growing integration of the financial system has made money laundering easier.** There is a tendency for drug dealers and traffickers in various countries to unite to create transnational crime organizations and divide up the territory.66 One group is responsible for transporting drugs from Tajikistan, and another group is in charge of the distribution. The number of criminal groups involved in drug trafficking is on the rise. In 1998 Kyrgyzstan had 64 drugtrafficking crime groups. During the first three months of 1999 law enforcement agents had already discovered 35 similar groups.67 The Kazakh Security Committee identified 125 organized crime groups operating in Central Asia, 30 of which were involved in drug trafficking in Kazakhstan alone.68 They are also becoming more sophisticated. If earlier truck drivers served as the main carriers of large quantities of drugs, now unmarked planes or helicopters move large loads. Customs officials are bribed or blackmailed with impunity. As a result, in many places there are no obstacles in the way of this dangerous cargo, and traffickers are continuously informed about law enforcement operations.

## Drug use increases poverty

**Kaestner 99** [Kaestner, Robert, January 1999, "Does Drug Use Cause Poverty?" University of Chicago Press, http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11165]

Figure 12.1 provides a simple overview of the various ways that drug use may affect poverty. In figure 12.1, poverty is primarily determined by labor market outcomes, but it is also affected by family composition. Family composition affects poverty by altering family size, and sources and quantity of nonearned income. Labor market outcomes are determined by a person's human capital, which in this case is summarized by a person's level of education and other human capital investments (e.g., training and health). Labor market outcomes may also be affected by family composition. For example, single parents may not be able to work as many hours as childless individuals.5 Drug use and poverty are related because drug use affects the determinants of poverty: education, human capital investments, marriage, and fertility. Finally, person- specific factors such as ability, preferences, and family background affect drug use, as well as educational achievement, skill accumulation, marriage, and fertility. In this paper, I have obtained a variety of estimates of the effect of marijuana and cocaine use on poverty using two national samples of young adults. A large preponderance of the estimates indicated that marijuana and cocaine use significantly increase the probability of being poor. Drug users had lower family incomes and were more likely to participate in public assistance programs than nonusers. In some cases, estimates were quite large, **implying 50 percent or higher increases in the rate of poverty, as measured in this paper.** These results indicate that drug use is a serious problem, and they suggest that public policies focusing on reducing drug use would have some positive economic effects on people's lives.

# Environmental Degradation

## West African urbanization destroys the environment resulting in 13,000 deaths a year

**Croitoru 19** [Croitoru, Lelia. The Cost of Coastal Zone Degradation in West Africa : Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal and Togo. The World Bank, 2019.]

West Africa's coastal areas host about one third of the region's population and generate 56 percent of its GDP. They are home for valuable wetlands, sheries, oil and gas reserves, and high tourism potential. However, these areas are affected by severe pressures: **rapid urbanization** along the coast has inc**reased the demands on land, water, and other natural resources; man-made infrastructure and sand extraction have con-tributed to signicant coastal retrea**t; moreover, climate change and disaster risks are exacerbating these threats. As a result, coastal areas are undergoing alarming environmental degradation leading to deaths (due to goods, air and water pollution), losses of assets (houses, infrastructure) and damages to critical ecosystems (mangroves, marine habitat).This study estimates in monetary terms the Cost of Environmental Degradation (COED) in the coastal areas of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, and Togo1. Specifcally, it values the impacts of degradation that occur during one year, as a result of three major factors: flooding, erosion, and pollution (from water, air and waste). Thenal results are expressed in 2017 prices. They are reflected in absolute (US$) and in rela-tive terms, as percentage of the countries' GDP. Overall, the COED of the four countries is estimated at about US**$3.8 billion2, or 5.3 per-cent of the countries' GDP in 2017**. Flooding and erosion are the main forms of degradation, accounting for more than 60 percent of the total cost (Fig-ure 1). Moreover, **coastal deg-radation causes over 13,000 deaths a year, primarily due to air and water pollution, and to floods.**

## Using conservative estimates, coastal degradation reduces GDP, results in excess death, and diminish quality of life across the region

**Croitoru 19** [Croitoru, Lelia. The Cost of Coastal Zone Degradation in West Africa : Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal and Togo. The World Bank, 2019.]

At the country level, coastal degradation imposes costs varying between 2**.5 percent of GDP in Benin to 7.6 per-cent of GDP in Senegal in 2017** (Figure 2 and Table 1).These estimates are the result of three major factors affecting the coastal area: » Flooding due to high rainfalls (pluvial floods) and overflowing rivers (pluvial floods) causes deaths and leads to major damage to houses, infrastruc-ture and critical ecosystems, such as beaches and mangroves. Floods are extremely damaging in Côte d'Ivoire, costing society US$1.2 billion per year, mainly due to large areas affected by pluvial floods (Table 1). In the other countries, flooded areas and the associated water depths are smaller,

leading to comparatively lower flooding costs. » Erosion is a result of both natural and human fac-tors. Some areas have no erosion at all, others have land losses (erosion), and others have land gains (accretion). About 56 percent of the coastline in Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and Togo is subject to an average erosion of 1.8 meters per year. **Erosion is the most damaging factor in Benin, Senegal, and Togo, primarily due to losses of high value urban land.** The highest cost, estimated at US$0.5 billion per year, occurs in Senegal. In all countries, the cost of erosion is expected to increase considerably in the future, as the phenomenon is likely to affect larger urban areas. » Pollution from air, water and waste mismanage-ment imposes an important toll on people's health and quality of life. It can reach as high as US$0.7 billion, in Côte d'Ivoire. In all countries, unsafe water, sanitation, and hygiene are particularly harmful, **causing more than 10,000 deaths per year**; they affect primarily Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, with more than 4**,000 deaths per country**. Air pollu-tion and waste mismanagement are also important forms of degradation, but are considerably under-estimated: the cost of air pollution (2,500 deaths) refers only to the impacts of ne particulate matter in the countries' capitals, while the cost of waste covers only the effects of insufficient collection and inappropriate disposal of municipal waste. Finally, it should be noted that data limitations pre-vented the estimation of several costs, related to air pollu-tion (e.g. the impacts of air pollution in other cities than the countries' capitals; of air pollutants other ambient PM2.5); water pollution (e.g. damages caused by the discharge of untreated agricultural and industrial wastewater); waste management (e.g. damages caused by inappropriate or insufficient disposal of medical, industrial, construction and demolition, e-waste); floods (e.g. damages caused by flooding from sea level rise and storm surges); and ero-sion (e.g. slower GDP growth in the future due to less real estate on the coastal area). **Therefore, the results of this study should be considered conservative estimates, which capture only partially the full COED.** To refine and complement these estimates, it would be important that future work cover the above aspects, as well as the effects of climate change on floods and erosion, and the com-bined impacts that erosion and climate change may have on water availability.The study demonstrates that erroding, erosion and pollu-tion are major challenges facing the West Africa coastal areas. **They cause death, decrease the quality of life of citizens and lead to substantial economic damages amounting to over 5.3 percent of the four countries' GDP.** Building coastal resilience early on will reduce these dam-ages and save billions of dollars in future damages. The recently established West Africa Coastal Areas (WACA) management program is designed to build resilient coastal communities. The program invests in seawalls, breakwa-ters, sand barriers, road protection, mangrove restoration, beach replenishment and pollution prevention.

## West African cities are heavily polluted resulting in preventative deaths

**Beneddit & Knippertz 19** [Benedetti, Angela; Knippertz, Peter. 03-12-2019, "The Air That West Africa Breathes," European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts. https://www.ecmwf.int/en/about/media-centre/science-blog/2019/air-west-africa-breathes]

Explosive population growth, urbanization and a growing economy have put the environment in West Africa under a lot of stress. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that each year, around **seven million people die from the effects of polluted air.** Each time people breathe in, they inhale an average of 500 ml of air. A healthy adult at rest takes about 8 million breaths per year, hence inhaling 4 million litres of air. Children inhale more air than adults do, relative to body surface area, breathing frequency, and heart rate. Around 21% of the air people breathe is oxygen, 78% is nitrogen. There are also tiny amounts of other gases called trace gases, some of which are poisonous like carbon monoxide. There is also what is called particulate matter, sub-micron particles of various species and composition which can travel undisturbed to the lungs and cause a series of problems such as respiratory, cardiovascular and skin diseases. In **West African cities, the concentrations of small particles are often a lot higher than the WHO recommended limits.** Some particles have their origin in human

activities: charcoal fires, waste combustion in cities, and savanna fires which emit fine particles into the air. Other particles are of natural origin, for example wind-blown dust from the Sahara Desert. Investigating causes and impacts The European-African consortium DACCIWA was coordinated by the KIT. ECMWF's role was to provide forecast data and conduct observation impact experiments and long-range simulations of the West-African environment. DACCIWA collected new data to investigate the causes and effects of air pollution by examining the entire chain of natural as well as human-made emissions for the first time, from formation and distribution to the impacts. DACCIWA scientists also examined the interaction of air composition and the summer monsoon.

## Urbanization and development threaten biodiversity losses across West Africa

**Güneralp et. al 17** [Güneralp, Burak; Lwasa, Shuaib; Masundire, Hilary; Parnell, Susan; Seto, Karen C. December 2017, "Urbanization in Africa: challenges and opportunities for conservation," IOP Publishing, Environmental Research Letters, Vol. 13, No. 1, https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa94fe]

However, land speculation by wealthy urban residents has also driven—abetted by lack of land-use planning and control—loss and fragmentation of rangelands close to cities and towns in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda [24]. In Western Africa, the increased demand for food in the cities has incentivized farmers to convert forests to agricultural fields to meet this demand [25]. These examples suggest that any relief from pressure on habitats from rural–urban migration may be overtaken by the increased demand for food and other natural resources from rapidly growing African cities. Furthermore, there are many instances of increasing deforestation in spite of a rise in a country's urbanization level as more complex dynamics—often involving long-distance actors—start to play more prominent roles [26, 27]. Importantly, there has been significant foreign direct investment (FDI) aimed at **land purchases in the continent to help secure food production for urban residents in other parts of the world** [28]. Therefore, conclusive evidence on ecological outcomes of rural–urban migration on the continent is yet to materialize [25]. Urbanization and economic **development also drive expansion of the transportation network, which in turn often fragment habitats**. Of particular concern in the context of biodiversity conservation are the road and railroad infrastructure. Across Africa, there are 33 major development corridors, either proposed or already under construction [29]. If and when constructed, the road and railroad infrastructure in current plans would cut through over 400 PAs and could degrade about 2000 more. Moreover, large-scale changes in transportation networks such as the one proposed around the Serengeti may significantly influence future urban expansion patterns potentially **increasing the vulnerability of the PAs in that region [**30, 31]. Another example for the far and wide-reaching impact of urban residents is the bushmeat trade [32, 33]. Demand for bushmeat, a traditional source of animal protein for humans in much of Sub-Saharan Africa is on the rise fueled by dietary preferences of urban residents that are shaped by a combination of urbanization and increased-income effects [34]. It is shown that the high levels of human density, characteristic of urban and peri-urban areas, are negatively correlated with bushmeat from ungulates and primates sold in markets [35]. However, the bushmeat trade is also linked to rural livelihoods [36]. Therefore, measures such as blanket bans are likely to be an ineffective approach to address this complex issue; a more balanced approach that safeguards sensitive species as well as the livelihoods of people that rely on bushmeat trade, and one that recognizes the role of bushmeat in providing nutritiontomillions of people alongthe urban-rural spectrum is needed. The negative impacts of urbanization are evidenced in the expanding haloes of deforestation around cities and transportation routes [37]. Such exploitation of natural resources in expanding waves, progressively from the most highly valued to less, is

observed both in large cities [38] and around smaller settlements [39]. Peri-urban agriculture, though important for food security in many Sub-SharanAfrican countries, can also contribute to loss and degradation of habitats around cities.

# Guinea

## Urbanization bad in Guinea—lack of urban planning, lack of infrastructure investment, and poor waste management

**World Bank 18** [World Bank Group. 2018. The Challenges Urbanization in West Africa. AFCW3 Economic Update;. World Bank, Washington, DC. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/30042]

Urbanization in Guinea has not been well managed, and the economic benefits of agglomeration have been elusive. Messy **urbanization has been characterized by deficient urban planning, lack of clear or rapid investment in infrastructure, and poor natural waste management**. The triple challenges of **congestion, urban slums, and pollution have hampered investment in real estate.** Failures in land regulation and weak land laws have compounded the problem. Employment in both tradables and non-tradables has not grown, and many of the migrants driven off the land by unproductive agriculture enter the informal, equally unproductive service sector in the cities. The spillover of Conakry across its peninsula and boundaries and the resulting large number of urban slums has made the delivery of basic urban services and the provision of infrastructure a real challenge. In a recent ranking of 231 cities by Mercer in their 19th Annual Quality of Living Survey, Conakry ranked 222nd in terms of quality of life. Furthermore, the country suffers from local government capacity constraints and a lack of municipal budgets with which to address the population's needs, the absence of a legal framework for managing land issues and other urban concerns, and a lack of regulation and safety standards for low-income urban housing and slums. At present, the cities have little capacity to absorb the pool of rural-to-urban migrants arriving from the hinterland.

# Housing Shortages

## Housing shortages in urban areas spread disease

**Gavin 20** [Gavin, Michael, 03-02-2020. "Africa's Urban Housinig Crisis," Think Global Health, https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/africas-urban-housing-crisis

Africa's urban housing crunch is already a serious problem, and without significant investments and policy interventions, it's likely to get far worse in the decade ahead. As the continent's booming youth population flocks to cities in search of work, many will struggle to find a place to call their own. The looming menace of major housing shortfalls in many African cities threatens urban health and safety. Infectious diseases are especially hard to contain in densely populated, informal settlements where residents may not have access to clean water, sanitation, adequate ventilation, and emergency health care when they become sick. In a region where respiratory infections, diarrheal diseases, and vector-borne infections are already among the leading causes of death, the prospect of persistent health crises in Africa's growing cities is a serious challenge for the future. For Africa's coastal cities, rising sea levels and climate change resilience imperatives add complexity to planning for future housing needs.

## Housing shortages lead to rebellions that are crushed by governments

**Gavin 20** [Gavin, Michael, 03-02-2020. "Africa's Urban Housinig Crisis," Think Global Health, https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/africas-urban-housing-crisis

Moreover, the urban housing crunch can fuel powerful social frustration, the psychological impact of butting up against social status ceilings. When young people find themselves priced out of their housing markets, they can become trapped in sociocultural limbo because they cannot attain the expected signifiers of adulthood. In the best-case scenarios, that frustration will find effective political expression in demands for more responsive and accountable governance aimed at improving urban conditions and expanding opportunities. But when popular demands go unmet, or are repressed by heavy-handed authorities, more violent confrontations are possible.

## New housing is not being built

Michael Gavin, March 2, 2020, Africa's Urban Housing Crisis, https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/africas-urban-housing-crisis

For decades, China has been the dominant force in building all kinds of African infrastructure, well before the formal launch of the Belt and Road Initiative. But affordable housing has not been a priority of Chinese investors, despite the high degree of Chinese penetration in the construction and real estate sectors on the continent. For all the evidence of booming construction in Africa's growing cities, affordable housing needs remain difficult to meet because of the pace of migration, the difficult economics, the complex risk involved in providing housing for the poorest urban newcomers, and the host of land tenure laws (which govern how land is owned, transferred, and used) and regulatory restrictions that constrain rapid construction of sustainable housing solutions. These last constraints can be taken up urgently by African technocrats to remove legal and zoning barriers to urban housing development, paving the way

for the substantial investments required to address the housing shortfall and keep up with projected demand. The simple necessity of addressing the looming crisis may stimulate innovative approaches to financing urban housing development. That will only happen, however, if leaders set the stage for success.

# Informal Labor

## Urbanization results in the expansion of informal labor and the informal economy

**Anyadike 17** [Anyadike, Obi, 12-11-2017, "African cities – time for urgent reform." The New Humanitarian, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2017/12/11/african-cities-time-urgent-reform]

African cities are also disconnected. They are collections of small, fragmented neighbourhoods poorly served by unreliable transportation. New development expands the margins of the cities, but poor roads makes commuting a test of resolve, reducing workers' access to job opportunities. African cities are also costly, both for residents and businesses. Lall argues this is a consequence of being inward-looking rather than export-orientated. **Low growth means urban-dwellers pay a third more for food than other low- and middle-income regions of the world, and through the nose for most other goods and services as well.** The degree to which private business has to be self-sufficient "in terms of providing the power, transport, and security services that local and national authorities should, is often not fully understood," a Zimbabwean research team points out. This drives up their costs and reduces profitability. **The size of the informal economy far outstrips the formal sector, allowing people to scrape a living.** Places like Mukuru are bustling with trade and artisanal services. But although the informal economy employs on average 60 percent of the urban workforce, it accounts for less than one quarter of economic growth, according to the Zimbabwean researchers. The informal economy is a survival strategy. It disguises unemployment, essentially acting as a safety net. It typically doesn't generate the public revenue required to address the needs of cities, and as a result the authorities tend to either ignore it, or periodically crackdown on its activities.

## Informal economy decreases wages and workers lack social benefits and educational programs

**Banchetta 09** [Bacchetta, Marc, Ekkehard Ernst, and Juana P. Bustamante. Globalization and Informal Jobs in Developing Countries. Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2009. Economic Research and Statistics Division World Trade Organization, 2009. https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/jobs_devel_countries_e.pdf]

Over the past decade, world trade has expanded signifi cantly. By 2007, global trade had reached more than 60 per cent of world GDP, compared with less than 30 per cent in the mid-1980s. Few would contest that increased trade has contributed to global growth and job creation. However, strong growth in the global economy has not, so far, led to a corresponding improvement in working conditions and living standards for many. Absolute poverty has declined, thanks to the economic dynamism of recent years, the efforts of private companies, migrant workers and their remittances and the international development community. Nevertheless, in many instances, labour market conditions and the quality of employment growth have not improved to the same degree. In many developing economies job creation has mainly taken place in the informal economy, where around 60 per cent of workers fi nd income opportunities. However, **the informal economy is characterized by less job security, lower incomes, an absence of access to a range of social benefits and fewer possibilities to participate in formal education and training programmes – in short, the absence of key ingredients of decent work opportunities**

## Informal economy is the root cause of inequality in the developing world

**Banchetta 09** [Bacchetta, Marc, Ekkehard Ernst, and Juana P. Bustamante. Globalization and Informal Jobs in Developing Countries. Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2009. Economic Research and Statistics Division World Trade Organization, 2009. https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/jobs_devel_countries_e.pdf]

**Pervasive inequality** is one of the most **signifi cant barriers to growth** in many developing economies (International Institute for Labour Studies, 2008; Kucera, 2002). The lack of access to basic private (e.g. fi nancial services) and public services (e.g. education and health care) as a result of unequal income and wealth distribution has prevented entrepreneurship from fl ourishing and sidelined many potentially productive individuals. In addition, political economy problems lead to a distorted redistribution in favour of more prosperous households. **Informality is at the centre of these inequality dynamics** (United Nations DESA, 2005). Indeed, it is one of the most critical channels through which informality affects both growth and stability. The link between informality and income inequality is by now well-established. Empirical studies have demonstrated persistently that standard measures of income inequality, such as the Gini coeffi cient, are highly correlated with the incidence of informal employment (Kucera and Xenogiani, 2008a; 2008b). This is the case even when controlling for various other factors, such as the quality of governance and government spending as a share of GDP, or when using different indicators to measure the size of the informal economy (Elbadawi and Loayza, 2008). More indirect measures concern the relationship between the incidence of poverty and informal employment. As demonstrated by Kucera (2008), standard poverty measures (such as the share of the population living below 2 US$ a day) are closely related to the share of informal employment in a cross-country analysis. Nevertheless, such an aggregate picture masks differences among informal workers at the microeconomic level as the measured wage gap varies substantially between different segments and tiers of the informal economy (Bargain and Kwenda, 2009). Indeed, depending on the type of informal work – informal employer, self-employed, casual worker or home worker – informal employment is remunerated at vastly different levels, further contributing to distributional concerns (Carr and Chen, 2002). The correlation that may be drawn from these studies is, however, no proof of causality. Indeed, recent analyses demonstrate that the link between inequality and informality is running in both directions. A higher incidence of informal employment is raising the degree of income inequality through a composition effect. At the same time, a higher degree of income inequality is increasing the size of the informal economy as individuals are prevented from joining the formal economy, due to a lack of either human or fi nancial wealth (Chong and Gradstein, 2007). **In cross-country regressions an increase in the size of the informal economy by 3 percentage points can be shown to raise income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient by as much as 8 percentage points**. Chong and Gradstein (2007) also show that the strength of this link depends on institutional quality, such as the degree of corruption, the integrity of the rule of law, government stability and democratic accountability. This result is also confi rmed by earlier studies which looked only at transition economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Rosser et al., 2000). Looking beyond the static picture of unequal income distribution, one can also draw inferences from studies analysing earnings mobility for workers transiting between different segments of the labor market.

## Growth in the informal economy makes countries more vulnerable to economic shocks

**Banchetta 09** [Bacchetta, Marc, Ekkehard Ernst, and Juana P. Bustamante. Globalization and Informal Jobs in Developing Countries. Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2009. Economic Research and Statistics Division World Trade Organization, 2009. https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/jobs_devel_countries_e.pdf]

Informality is associated with increased vulnerability of countries to economic shocks. Moreover, informality raises the likelihood of being affected by such shocks. The combination of these two tendencies can create a vicious circle, weakening the long-term performance of a country, lowering the potential benefi ts it can derive from trade and reducing economic well-being. Volatility in growth performance and the frequency of extreme economic events (such as rapid growth spurts and sudden growth reversals) tend to rise with the size of the informal economy. **Countries with above average sized informal economies are almost twice as likely to experience extreme economic events, compared to countries with less informal employment.** Empirical evidence in the literature tends to confirm this adverse association between informality and business cycle volatility – informality both acts as a direct cause for higher business cycle volatility and represents a symptom for other institutional defi ciencies that render a country less resilient to shocks, such as the absence of automatic stabilizers or the presence of regulatory distortions. The study shows that high rates of informality drive countries towards the lower, more vulnerable end of global production chains. Economies with larger informal sectors may attract particular types of capital flows related to the existence of a large low-wage labour pool. Specifically, some emerging economies and developing countries seem to have tried in the past to use the size of their informal economy as an argument for international investors to take advantage of low labour costs. For instance it is sometimes argued that EPZs may lower labour costs compared to the rest of the economy through the selective or partial application of labour laws and regulations. On the other hand, governments may set up zones in areas and sectors most affected by high informality rates, with the objective of improving working conditions there. Empirical evidence suggests that this objective has not always been met. This is partly related to the fact that informal labour markets or EPZs often occupy the weakest place in the global production chain, which prevents fi rms operating in this area from appropriating a large enough share of international value added to grow and innovate. While local working conditions may improve to a certain extent in such circumstances – at least in comparison to the situation prevailing before trade and investment opening – these arrangements are unlikely to offer countries the opportunity to establish benefits from international integration. In the end, countries may be left with labour market conditions that are little better than those existing before economic opening. At the same time, the economy may have been rendered more vulnerable to international shocks.

## Economic shocks locks Guinea into cycles of poverty

**World Bank 18** [World Bank Group. 2018. The Challenges Urbanization in West Africa. AFCW3 Economic Update;. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/30042]

**Poverty is high and rising, affecting almost 60 percent of its population in 2014**. In 2015, Guinea ranked 182th out of 188 countries in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI). Life expectancy at birth was 59.2 years, and mean years of schooling was only 2.6 years. Access to basic services is low, with a small share of the population having access to electricity (28 percent), improved sanitation (20 percent), and improved water sources (77 percent). The 2017–2018 Global Competitiveness Report ranked Guinea 119th out of 137 countries, with wide gaps in the quality of institutions, infrastructure, health, education, and financial market development. Per capita growth is very low, averaging 0.6 percent during 1998–2016. Although agriculture is one of the main drivers of economic growth and employment, it suffers from very low productivity. As a result, the country faces severe challenges in translating its assets and opportunities into higher incomes for its citizens. Economic growth has been very low and volatile in contributing to poverty reduction on a sustained basis. The **economy is susceptible to fluctuations in commodity prices and health shocks (**e.g., the Ebola pandemic). Rapid growth is also hindered by low investment, lagging infrastructure, and limited financial intermediation and inclusion. The population's incomes are affected by a wide human capital deficit, low access to input

and output markets, low productivity in agriculture (the main source of income for the poor), and limited job opportunities outside of agriculture. Moreover, rapid and unplanned urbanization has created a chaotic urban environment, which faces pressure from a young unemployed population as well as rural migration. Gender inequalities are wide, especially in terms of access to justice, health, education, and access to credit.

## African cities hard to administer, can't survive disasters

**Kiogi 18** [Kiogi, Bob, June 2018, Urbanization dampens growth opportunities in West Africa, World Bank, https://africabusinesscommunities.com/africadata/urbanization-dampens-growth-opportunities-in-west-africa-world-bank/]

African cities are difficult to administer. They are dependent on government subsidies and often seemingly unwilling to change, typically ringfenced by archaic laws and vested interests. They are also among the most vulnerable in the world to disasters and the risks compounded by climate change. Informal settlements are usually in the most hazardous parts of the city such as steep hillslopes or floodplains, and these residents "are less likely to be served by risk-reducing infrastructure", notes a briefing by Urban Africa: Risk Knowledge. Rural-urban migration is not just to capital cities. Almost half of Africa's urban population – and a fifth of the total population – live in "small" urban centres or secondary cities. Here the provision of public services like water and sanitation is usually worse, and the municipal authorities even weaker, magnifying disaster risks. But despite the discouraging scale of the problems faced, there are many examples of cities trying to come to grips with their challenges.

## Growth in West African cities characterized by informality

**World Bank 18** [World Bank Group. 2018. The Challenges Urbanization in West Africa. AFCW3 Economic Update;. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/30042]

(b) Access to land and functioning of land markets The fragmented spatial form of West African cities prevents them from becoming productive and livable, and challenges in the land sector provide an important explanation. **Weak property right systems and poor land governance contribute to making access to land costly and insecure**, resulting in land misallocation and deterring productive investment. These are the predominant conditions under which urban land markets operate in West Africa, thus failing to provide the enabling environment needed to sustain productive urbanization without exerting a significant toll on the economy. The **rapid pace of urban expansion in West African cities has relied predominantly on informal processes for access to land for housing, urban services, and infrastructure**. Such informal spatial expansion (illustrated by the above-mentioned data on urban extensions and leapfrog development), in turn creates challenges for urban planning and infrastructure provision. Only a small proportion of the population holds formal land titles, leading to under-investment and inefficient land markets. At the core of these challenges is the coexistence of different land tenure regimes (referred to as "legal pluralism"), poor governance in the management of land at all levels of government, and a largely uncoordinated pattern of land use and land tenure transformation that has accompanied urban population growth and spatial urban expansion.

# Obesity

## Urbanization results in child obesity—less time for meal preparation, more expendable income for fast food, and changes in physical activity

**Bosu 15** [Bosu, William K. "An Overview of the Nutrition Transition in West Africa: Implications for Non-Communicable Diseases." The Proceedings of the Nutrition Society, vol. 74, no. 4, 2015, pp. 466–77, doi:10.1017/S0029665114001669.]

In contrast, with the slow decline in child undernutrition, **Africa is experiencing a rapid increase in childhood overweight**, with the prevalence rising from 4·0 % in 1990 to 8·5 % in 2010 and projected to reach 12·7 % in 2020(6) . Adult obesity has also increased in recent decades with an attendant increase in the burden of cardiometabolic diseases or chronic non-communicable diseases (NCD)(7) . Unhealthy diets along with physical inactivity, obesity and smoking are established risk factors for chronic diseases(8,9) . The present paper reviews evidence of changing diet practices in West Africa and examines some of its effects such as obesity, hypertension and diabetes. Urbanisation The urban proportion of the West African population doubled from 18·7 % in 1970 to 41·6 % in 2010 (Fig. 1) (10) . It is projected to reach 62·7 % by the year 2050, representing an 80 % increase in 50 years. West Africa is experiencing the most rapid increase in urbanisation in Africa (Fig. 1). The increase in population is derived from the natural increase within the urban centres and the in-migration from the rural areas. There are variations between and within countries. The fraction of the population living in urban areas in 2010 ranged from 17·5 % in Niger to 61·8 % in Cape Verde. **Urbanisation has been associated with changes in the quality and quantity of foods eaten, where meals are eaten with proportion to the cost of the foods**(11) . There are both demand-side and supply-side changes. The increased incomes, little time to prepare meals, and the individual preferences contribute to the **increased demand and consumption of energy-dense processed foods and fast foods which may be eaten inside or outside the home(**12) . In West Africa, the consumption of fast foods by children has also become a social class status symbol (13) . On the supply-side is the rapid increase in the number of fast-food chains, supermarkets and transnational food corporations as well as in the volume of food imports(14,15) . The marketing strategies have also evolved to become more aggressive. Unhealthy foods or drinks are sometimes presented as good or glamorous. Urbanisation is also associated with changes in stress and physical activity. As technology and labour-saving devices at the office, workplace, home and public spaces have increased**, urban residents have become less physically active**. These devices could be as innocuous as a remote control or a swivel chair or as sophisticated as motorised vehicles, escalators or washing machines.

## Urbanization and Trade liberalization increase access to fast food multinationals

**Bosu 15** [Bosu, William K. "An Overview of the Nutrition Transition in West Africa: Implications for Non-Communicable Diseases." The Proceedings of the Nutrition Society, vol. 74, no. 4, 2015, pp. 466–77, doi:10.1017/S0029665114001669.]

Transnational food companies such as supermarkets, fast-food chains and beverage industries have established themselves in most of the major cities of West Africa(46) . In several African companies such as Cape Verde, Kenya and Rwanda, transnational food corporations are among the top three largest companies(47) . As is the case elsewhere, their aim is to influence the food habits of consumers, particularly children in favour of processed foods, snacks, SSB and fast foods. The increased access of the urban population to these transnational companies has contributed to the nutrition transition in developing countries(48,49) . The number of local fast-food industries has also been increasing in the cities. The **transnational food corporations have the capacity to lower the prices of the fast foods or soft-drinks in order to make them more affordable and reach a larger segment of the marke**t(47) . This competitive edge leads to a situation in which healthier foods can be more expensive than unhealthier foods, as has been reported in urban poor South Africa(50) . The Euromonitor International database shows that Nigeria has been increasing importing most of its foods including beverages, cereal and cereal products, sugar products and honey, dairy products and fruit and vegetables(15) . Steep increases in imports were observed between 1998 and 2009. It was only with fruit and vegetables that Nigeria's exports matched its imports. The annual sales of grocery retailers increased from $10.1 billion in 2001–2003 to 26·8 billion in 2010–2012. The picture is quite different for Kenya which is a net exporter of several products such as beverages, fish, meat, dairy products, fruit and vegetables. Market deregulation has facilitated the spread of fast-food chains (51) . **Increased access to fast-food restaurants is associated with childhood obesity** (52) . It has been estimated that one unit increase in fast-food consumption is associated with an increase in the age-standardised per capita BMI of 0·023 kg/m2 in high-income countries(51) . Consequently, the researchers have called for a stricter control of the markets in order to control the obesity epidemic.

# Smart Cities

## New African cities are "smart cities"

**Haas 19** [Haas, Astrid R.N., Senior Country Economist (Cities) and Manager of Cities that Work, International Growth Centre, November 1, 2019, Quartz Africa, African countries keep building new cities to meet rapid urbanization even if people won't live in them, https://qz.com/africa/1740068/african-countries-keep-building-cities-to-meet-rapid-urbanization/ ]

The current wave of new city building is largely focused on leap-frogging economic development and moving Africa's cities directly into the age of futuristic, technologically advanced, so-called 'smart cities'. Plans for these types of cities are sprouting up across the continent; from Kenya, Mauritius and Senegal. Leading the way is Nigeria with five current on-going new city projects, which, when completed, are set to cover a landmass of 25 million square meters. The agenda of new city building is not only being pushed by governments, but by a vast array of construction, real estate and technology companies, who stand to profit from the city construction boom, as well.

## "Smart Cities" exclude the poor

**Haas 19** [Haas, Astrid R.N., Senior Country Economist (Cities) and Manager of Cities that Work, International Growth Centre, November 1, 2019, Quartz Africa, African countries keep building new cities to meet rapid urbanization even if people won't live in them, https://qz.com/africa/1740068/african-countries-keep-building-cities-to-meet-rapid-urbanization/ ]

Many of Africa's upcoming "smart cities" exhibit similar conceptualization flaws. Senegal's futuristic city Diamniadio, a core part of president Macky Sall's 2035 plan, is meant to be a "city of knowledge". It will comprise an industrial park with entertainment facilities and residential areas. However, when the city is completed, which is intended to be by 2035, it is unlikely that the majority of Senegalese will be able to afford to live there.

# Answers to Affirmative Arguments

# Answer to Democracy Promotion

## Democratization sparks ethnic conflict—empirically true in Africa

**Mansfield and Snyder 5** Professor of Political Science @ Penn, Professor of International Relations @ Columbia, Electing to Fight, pg. 5-7

Violence inside some unstable democratizing states also spilled across borders during the 1990s. Democratization played a catalytic role in the horrible slaughters that engulfed central Africa. The 1993 elections in Burundi – even though internationally mandated, free, and fair – intensified ethnic polarization between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, resulting in some 200,000 deaths. In **neighboring Rwanda, an internationally orchestrated power-sharing accord, which was intended to usher in more pluralistic and open politics, instead created the conditions for the 1994 genocide that killed nearly a million Tutsi** as well as some moderate Hutu. The Tutsi exile army based in Uganda invaded to stop the genocide. Its military victory forced Hutu refugees, including many of the genocide's perpetrators, into neighboring Congo, where further fighting involving the troops of several states has led to millions of additional deaths since 1998. Elsewhere, democratic transitions coincide with renewed or intensified secessionist wars. In East Timor, a favorable vote on independence from Indonesia in an internationally mandated 1999 referendum spurred Indonesian-backed Timorese militias to unleash large-scale backlash violence, creating an international refugee crisis. Newly democratizing Russia fought two wars against its breakaway province of Chechnya. Vladimir Putin won election in 2000 as Russia's president mainly on the popularity of his plan to invade Chechnya to clean out the supposed lair of terrorists and brigands. In all of these varied settings during the 1990s, the turbulent beginning phase of **democratization in states with weak political institutions contributed to cross-border violence.** WARS OF DEMOCRATIZATION AS A CHRONIC DANGER IN HISTORY War-prone transitions to democracy were not just an aberration of the 1990s. Since the origin of modern mass politics around the time of the French Revolution, virtually all of the great powers turned belligerent and fought popular wars during the early phases of their experiments with democracy. In eighteenth-century France, the popular patriotism unleashed by the revolution sustained a mass army that fought the revolution's perceived enemies all across Europe. This tragedy was, as Karl Marx put it, repeated as farce when Louis Napoleon, elected as the French president in 1849, touted his military victories to sustain his power in a constitutional, semi-electoral regime. Even in Britain's relatively painless transition to democracy, the urban middle class enfranchised by the Reform Bill of 1832 provided the enthusiasm that fueled both Palmerston's policy of commercial imperialism and the Crimean War. Germany's more tortured path toward democracy created the impetus toward its five aggressive wars between 1864 and 1939. As monarchical Prussia transformed itself into the democratizing German Empire, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck forged a war-prone political alliance between the nationalist middle classes and the militarist elites, embodied in a political system that combined a legislature elected by broad suffrage and governments appointed by the Kaiser. Japan's early phase of democratic politics was similarly marked by popular, militarized nationalism. When the Great Depression hit the democratizing Japan of the late 1920s, the democratic, free-trade coalition of workers and capital in export-oriented consumer industries was soon supplanted by an imperialist coalition that was led by the military and had strong electoral support. In the United States of the 1830s and 1840s, the Jacksonian reforms that installed mass democracy by reducing restrictions on suffrage and expanding the direct election of officials coincided with an upsurge of popular support in the slave states for a war to gain territory at Mexico's expense. As we show in our statistical analyses (presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6), this **historical pattern holds true not only for great powers, but also for states in general.** Although mature democracies have never fought a war against each other, incomplete **transitions from autocracy toward democracy are fraught with the danger of violent conflict in states whose political institutions are weak.**

## Democracy hasn't stopped war in Africa

**Gartzke and Weisiger '13** [Erik Gartzke, University of California, and Alex Weisiger 2013, University of Pennsylvania. "Permanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace" http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/publications/gartzke_weisiger_isq_2013.pdf]

The "autocratic peace" involves a class of arguments¶ about the conflictual consequences of regime similarity¶ and difference. Theories disagree over whether demo-¶ cratic and autocratic relations are distinct or equivalent.¶ Early studies of the autocratic peace typically focused on¶ certain geographic regions. Despite having little democ-¶ racy, low levels of economic development, arbitrary¶ national borders, and widespread civil conflict, Africa¶ experiences **surprisingly little interstate war.** Several stud-¶ ies attribute the "African peace" to historical norms and¶ to the **strategic behavior** of insecure leaders who recog-¶ nize that challenging existing borders invites continental¶ war while encouraging secessionist movements risks reci-¶ procal meddling in the country's own domestic affairs¶ (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Herbst 1989, 1990).¶ 6¶ How-¶ ever, these arguments fail to address tensions between¶ individual (state, leader) interests and social goods. The¶ security dilemma implies precisely that leaders act aggres-¶ sively despite lacking revisionist objectives (Jervis 1978).¶ Initial statistical evidence of an **autocratic peace**¶ emerged in a negative form with the observation that¶ **mixed democratic**¶ –¶ **autocratic dyads are more conflict**¶ **prone** than either jointly democratic or jointly autocratic¶ dyads (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Raknerud and Hegre¶ 1997). Studies have sought systematic evidence for or¶ against an autocratic peace. Oren and Hays (1997) evalu-¶ ate several data sets, finding that autocracies are **less war**¶ **prone** than democracy¶ –¶ autocracy pairs. Indeed, they find¶ that socialist countries with advanced industrialized econ-¶ omies are more peaceful than democracies. Werner¶ (2000) finds an effect of political similarity that coexists¶ with the widely recognized effect of joint democracy. She¶ attributes the result to shared preferences arising from a¶ reduced likelihood of disputes over domestic politics.¶ Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry (2002) break down the¶ broad category of autocracy into multiple subgroups and¶ find evidence that shared autocratic type (personalistic¶ dictatorships, single-party regimes, or military juntas)¶ reduces conflict, although the observed effects are less¶ pronounced than for joint democracy. Henderson (2002)¶ goes further by arguing that **there is no empirically verifiable democratic peace.** Instead, political **dissimilarity**¶ causes conflict. Souva (2004) argues and finds that simi-¶ larity of both political and economic institutions encour-¶ ages peace. In the most sophisticated analysis to date,¶ Bennett (2006) finds a **robust autocratic peace**, though¶ the effect is smaller than for joint democracy and limited¶ to coherent autocratic regimes. Petersen (2004), in con-¶ trast, uses an alternate categorization of autocracy and¶ finds no support for the claim that similarity prevents or¶ limits conflict. Still, the bulk of evidence suggests that similar polities are associated with relative peace, even¶ among nondemocracies.¶ The autocratic peace poses **unique challenges** for demo-¶ cratic peace theories. Given that the democratic peace¶ highlights apparently unique characteristics of joint¶ democracy, many explanations are predicated on attributes¶ found only in democratic regimes. An autocratic peace¶ implies that scholars should focus on corollaries or conse-¶ quences of **shared regime type,** in addition to, or perhaps¶ even **instead of democracy**. In this context, arguments¶ about democratic **norms** (Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon¶ 1994), improved democratic **signaling** ability (Fearon 1994;¶ Schultz 1998, 1999, 2001), the peculiar incentives imposed¶ on leaders by democratic **institutions** (Bueno de Mesquita¶ et al. 1999, 2003), and **democratic learning** (Cederman¶ 2001a) all invite **additional scrutiny**. While it is theoretically¶ possible that a democratic peace and an autocratic peace¶ could arise from independent causal processes, **logical ele-¶ gance** and the **empirical similarities** inherent in shared¶ regime type provide cause to explore theoretical argu-¶ ments that spring from regime similarity in general.¶

## And, democracies aren't peaceful – and every single democratic transition has involved bloody war

**Chibundu 06** [Chibundu, Maxwell O. Professor, University of Maryland School of Law, 2006, "POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AS A RELIGION: THE IDOLATRY OF DEMOCRACY, 6 U. Md. L.J. Race Religion Gender & Class 117]

Nor do the pedigrees of modem democracies bear out the norm of peaceably negotiated political arrangements among pluralist groupings. Far from it. The United Kingdom House of Commons which, by any measure, genuinely deserves its sobriquet as "the mother of parliaments" gained ascendancy over the governance of the United Kingdom only after prolonged civil wars that resulted in, among other things, the beheading of a king and the punishment of many of those who had been involved in that "regicide." French democracy may have its wellspring in the Revolution of 1789, but it took the humiliation of France by Prussia in 1871 to enshrine in practice the norms of the Revolution. And the 1789 revolution itself was characterized less by the practice of democracy than by that of the reign of terror, and the imposition over much of Europe of imperial Bonapartism. Americans, of course, like to believe that theirs is the complete and authentic democratic society with two centuries of occasionally polluted but otherwise progressive politics behind it. But while the country may have avoided the extreme form of the English practice of conditioning participation in the democratic process on the basis of property holdings, it engaged in the disenfranchisement of significant sections of the population on other grounds, notably race and alienage. It took a bloody civil war, and the passage of a Voting Rights Act a full century after the end of that war, for the democratic process in the country to approach anything that approximated fair representation of the general population in its democratic processes and institutions. In short, democratic participation in all of these societies was the product of prolonged and always bloody conflict, not the sublime enactment of moral preferences. If the paths to democracy by these three societies were strewn with violence and retreats, those for other societies were even less predictable. The German experience has been in fits and starts, and like Japan and Italy, its current form is as much the product of the exigencies of defeat in warfare as it is of belief in the intrinsic virtues of the democratic system. As for former colonial societies in Africa and Asia, these states, cobbled together for the convenience of European powers, have been expected to adopt and implement overnight systems of governance that it took Europeans centuries of experimentation, failure and bloodshed to fashion. Not surprisingly, many of them have not lived up to this expectation. 58 But rather than empathize with their difficulties, academics, mass media pundits and politicians, comfortably ensconced in the cocoons and redoubts of their tenured positions or gerrymandered dynastic electoral districts, sermonize about the inhumanities of the rulers of these societies, proclaim democracy as the unfailing panacea for their ills, and bluntly urge that military and economic might be deployed to bring about democratic revolutions in those non-democratic societies. But even the most cursory of reflections on the democratization process readily discloses that democratic institutions emerge as an integral part of the process by which societies create and replicate themselves. In no society have the institutions of democratic rule emerged overnight and independently of other social forces within that society.

# Answer To Economic Growth

## Growth in cities does not correspond with increases in per capita GDP – empirical study of three largest cities in West Africa

**World Bank 18** [World Bank Group. 2018. The Challenges Urbanization in West Africa. AFCW3 Economic Update;. World Bank, Washington, DC. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/30042]

Unfortunately, rapid urbanization has not been accompanied by commensurate gains in per capita GDP. Urbanization is an important driver of economic and social development. Cities are where markets are denser, service delivery is cheaper, and rates of innovation are higher. **However, when compared to other developing countries, growth in the urban population of these three cities has not been accompanied by commensurate increases in GDP (Figure 7)**. The focus of this study is therefore to understand why urban growth in West Africa has not been associated with increases in urban development and how the capitals of Mali, Guinea, and Niger could become more productive and livable in the future

## No growth because the cities are overcrowded

**Haas 19** [Haas, Astrid R.N., Senior Country Economist (Cities) and Manager of Cities that Work, International Growth Centre, November 1, 2019, Quartz Africa, African countries keep building new cities to meet rapid urbanization even if people won't live in them, https://qz.com/africa/1740068/african-countries-keep-building-cities-to-meet-rapid-urbanization/ ]

If managed effectively, Africa's cities will drive the continent's economic growth, and thereby help reduce poverty. To date, however, Africa has yet to realize the positive gains of rapid urbanization experienced elsewhere. Instead, increasingly concentrated populations have become a major stress on the limited infrastructure and services, such as housing, employment, health, education, and safety.

## No growth and sanitation nightmare

**Anyadike 17** [Anyadike, Obi, 12-11-2017, "African cities – time for urgent reform." The New Humanitarian, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2017/12/11/african-cities-time-urgent-reform]

Africa is urbanising at an incredible rate, but its cities are not delivering the opportunities and better lives such dynamism deserves. Instead, slums are expanding, trapping their inhabitants in poverty and neglect. It doesn't have to be this way. African cities can reform if the right policies and institutions are in place and supported. Over the next 20 years the total number

of city dwellers across Africa will increase from around 400 million to more than 1.26 billion, according to UN Habitat. Lagos, for example, has surged from five million inhabitants in 1980 to around 20 million today – making it already one of the world's 10 mega-cities. People move to urban centres because that's where the income-earning opportunities are. That concentrated energy and potential should be what African cities need to catapult up the developmental ladder. Instead, the reality is urbanisation without economic growth, which translates into infrastructural decay and deprivation: more slums, and less security, happiness, and wellbeing. Take Mukuru, across a busy highway in Nairobi's industrial area. More than 100,000 families are packed onto the privately owned land: a concentration of 10x10-foot rented shacks without water or toilet facilities, and a constant fear of eviction. Sanitation is a horrendous problem. The unpaved rutted roads become cloying, waterlogged traps when it rains, and the heavily polluted river is prone to flooding. Mukuru is right next to the city's factories, automechanics, and spare parts dealerships, but there's little employment here. Community activist and filmmaker Julius Wainana estimates that out of every 10 friends, just two or three – those lucky enough to have made the right connections – have jobs. Mukuru slumObi Anyadike/IRIN "The others live with their mums, or wait for something to come up that lasts them a day or two [each month]," he told IRIN. Crime, alcohol, and drug abuse are inevitable problems, reinforcing the negative perceptions of the area. Three problems According to World Bank urban specialist Somik Lall, African cities share three features that frustrate their development. They are crowded "but not economically dense". That means low investment in infrastructure, business, and affordable housing. It's an urbanisation of people, not capital. Asian cities have ploughed double the rate of investment into roads, sewerage, policing, and healthcare than African countries have achieved over the past four decades.

## African cities have not produced economic growth

**Kiogi 18** [Kiogi, Bob, June 2018, Urbanization dampens growth opportunities in West Africa, World Bank, https://africabusinesscommunities.com/africadata/urbanization-dampens-growth-opportunities-in-west-africa-world-bank/]

While the cities of West Africa grapple with large migratory flows, consisting chiefly of young people, they must tackle the many challenges associated with this rapid urbanization and concentrate on building competitive economies and providing adequate urban services, says the World Bank's fifth edition of the Economic Update for Guinea, Mali and Niger. Focusing in particular on the three capitals, Bamako, Niamey and Conakry, the report, titled "The Challenges of Urbanization in West Africa," considers how the cities could harness and develop their potential for productivity growth and livability. These three cities contribute significantly to the national economy, with Bamako accounting for 34% of Mali's GDP, and Conakry and Niamey contributing approximately 27% of the GDP of Guinea and Niger. "Despite their importance to the national economy, Bamako, Niamey and Conakry are not true drivers of growth: in the three cities, labor productivity, calculated as gross value added (GVA) per capita, is low and has not risen in the last fifteen years, in contrast to the average of 15 other sub-Saharan African cities," said Meskerem Brhane, Task Team Leader of the World Bank urbanization programs in those countries and co-author of the report.

## Empirically, three biggest cities in West Africa experienced stagnant economic growth

**World Bank 18** [World Bank Group. 2018. The Challenges Urbanization in West Africa. AFCW3 Economic Update;. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/30042]

Yet despite their importance to the national economy, Bamako, Niamey, and Conakry are neither engines of growth nor of service delivery. All three cities need to make more progress on increasing their competitiveness over time or delivering on urban services for their citizens. **In all three, labor productivity calculated as gross value added (GVA) per capita is low and has remained stagnant over the last 15** or so years compared to the average for 15 cities in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Figure 2). Even more troubling is that urban service delivery in Mali, Guinea, and Niger as indicated by an index combining quality of access to water, electricity, and sanitation also continues to lag the Sub-Saharan average and shows no signs of catching up (Figure 3). Thus, these cities are failing to reap the benefits usually associated with urban growth.

# Answer To Ethnic Conflict

## Ghanna proves urbanization doesn't solve ethnic conflict

**Dionne 20** [Dionne, Kim Y. 06-19-2020, "Africa is Urbaniziing. Here's what that means for politics," The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/06/19/africa-is-urbanizing-heres-what-that-means-politics/

Ghana has established political parties, a peaceful history and a well-educated population. Urban Ghana's large middle class and high ethnic diversity should support a shift away from politics where a voter's ethnic identity predicts their vote choice. Nathan's book begins with the sober assessment that although these conditions would support transforming from a clientelistic system — one in which benefits from the state are tied to political support — toward more programmatic, policy-based elections, the evidence shows that ethnic competition and clientelism are still thriving in Ghana. Likewise, Paller's book opens with vivid narratives of the difficult conditions in some neighborhoods in and around Accra, Ghana's capital city. These difficult conditions and political clientelism persist despite the presence of highly competitive elections, active civil society organizations and communities regularly engaging in collective decision-making. Nathan attributes the persistence of clientelism and nonprogrammatic politics in Ghana to an "urban politics trap." In a compelling and elegant diagram in the first chapter, Nathan outlines the urban politics trap as a product of multiple forces: the state's inability to meet the service delivery challenges created by urbanization; low state capacity constraining politicians' ability to credibly commit to delivering programmatic policies; policy-oriented citizens opting out of voting in elections; and, subsequently, politicians incentivized to campaign on nonprogrammatic, often ethnic, appeals to voters.

# Answer To Infrastructure Development

## African cities fail to attract infrastructure investment

**Gutman & Patel 18** [Gutman, Jeffrey; Patel, Nirav. 01-26-2018, "Foresight Africa viewpoint – Urban Africa: Avoiding the perfect storm," Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/01/26/foresight-africa-viewpoint-urban-africa-avoiding-the-perfect-storm/]

About 40 percent of the population in sub-Saharan Africa, or nearly 1 billion people, live in an urban area today. Over the next 25 years, that number is expected to double, raising unprecedented challenges for the region. The **confluence of this rising urban population, relatively low income per capita, and a lack of infrastructure are serious causes for concern**. As the region already confronts critical deficits in infrastructure and related funding, the looming crisis in the provision of urban infrastructure, especially transport, requires particular attention. Projecting the level of infrastructure funding required for urban Africa is fraught with complexities. The continent requires an annual $93 billion to fund infrastructure needs, a large share of which is for urban areas. In fact, a 2016 African Development Bank study states that "two-thirds of the investments in urban infrastructure to 2050 have yet to be made." The infrastructure gap is notably reflected in the inadequacy of transport infrastructure in African cities. Compared with access to electricity, water and sanitation, and telecommunications, defining a target for urban transport access is not clear-cut. Yet, it is evident that African cities are physically fragmented and dispersed with a lack of connective infrastructure. Compared with Paris, for instance, much of the area surrounding the central business districts of many of Africa's largest cities are without paved roads (Figure 2.7). This poor infrastructure leaves people and firms disconnected, constraining their accessibility to economic opportunity. Such inefficiencies in the design of the city can make urban living costs burdensome and jeopardize the potential benefits of agglomeration. Africa's scope for public capital investment is well under what it ought to be if we compare it to other developing regions. **Urban income levels in Africa are well below the levels witnessed in other regions when those regions reached an urbanization rate of 40 percent** (Figure 2.8). When combined with the relatively high cost of living in African cities (Figure 2.9), there are very limited resources for public investment. This dearth is part of the reason that capital investment in Africa over the past 40 years has only averaged about 20 percent of GDP. In contrast, between 1980 and 2011, rapidly urbanizing countries in East Asia averaged capital investment above 40 percent of GDP, bringing many economic boons to the region and its cities. Without a substantive revenue source and ability to pay, there are limited options to fund and finance urban transport. Concessional resources from the donor community have traditionally shied away from urban capital investments nor are they of sufficient scale. More recent efforts to attract private capital are more difficult in urban transport because of the lack of a revenue stream. Private participation in infrastructure in Africa has been more directed at information and communications technology and, to a more limited degree, to energy and transport in terms of sectoral and country coverage.

## Infrastructure has little relevance to poverty – corruption, poor investment choices, and neglected maintenance

**Ali & Pernia 03** [Ali, Ifzal; Pernia, Ernesto M. 2003. “Infrastructure and Poverty Reduction - What is the Connection?” Asian Development Bank. http://hdl.handle.net/11540/613]

“On one hand, great importance was attached to physical infrastructure in the poverty reduction efforts of developing countries; on the other hand, many in the international development community viewed assistance for infrastructure with considerable skepticism on three grounds (DFID 2002). First, **though important for economic growth, infrastructure investment had little relevance to poverty reduction**. Second, actual benefits from infrastructure were significantly less than anticipated. Third, **weak governance and institutions gave way to corruption, distorted public investment choices, and neglected maintenance,** thereby **lowering infrastructure’s contribution** to economic growth **and diverting benefits intended for the poor**.” Nevertheless, there is now wider recognition, including in the international donor community, that if governance and institutional frameworks are strengthened, the linkage between infrastructure and reduction of poverty can be become stronger. Currently, almost 70% of infrastructure investment in developing countries is financed by governments or public utilities from their own resources or from nonconcessional borrowings, 3% from aid, and the balance from the private sector (DFID 2002). In a similar vein, ADB has invested (as of end 2000) a total of $15.9 billion in its developing member countriesí (DMCs) transport sectors, covering roads and road transport, ports and shipping, airports and civil aviation, and railways (ADB 2001). Of this amount, roads accounted for $11.2 billion, or 13% of ADBís total loan portfolio.

## Turn. Urban Development Causes Mass Displacement of the poor

**Terminski 15** [Terminski, Bogumil. Bogumil Terminski is a specialist in international human rights law and the social dimension of migration. May 2015 “Development-induced displacement and resettlement. Causes, Consequences, and Socio-Legal Context.” Yale University, ibidem Press. http://cup.columbia.edu/book/development-induced-displacement-and-resettlement/9783838207230]

Today, so-called 'development-induced displacement and resettlement' (DIDR) is one of the dominant causes of internal spatial mobility worldwide. Each year over 15 million people are forced to abandon their homes to make space for economic development infrastructure. The construction of dams and irrigation projects, the **expansion of communication networks, urbanization and re-urbanization, the extraction and transportation of mineral resources, forced evictions in urban areas, and population redistribution** schemes count among the many possible causes.Terminski aims to present the issue of development-caused displacement as a highly diverse, global social problem occurring in all regions of the world. As a human rights issue it poses a challenge to public international law and to institutions providing humanitarian assistance. A significant part of this book is devoted to the current dynamics of development-caused resettlement in Europe, which has been neglected in the academic literature so far.

## Problem is not lack of infrastructure but lack of access to that infrastructure

**Pouliquen 00** [Pouliquen, Louis. "INFRASTRUCTURE AND POVERTY." INFRASTRUCTURE AND POVERTY.” The World Bank, 12 Jan. 2000. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVERTY/Resources/WDR/Background/pouliquen.pdf >.

However, the link between infrastructure and poverty is no more obvious than that between famine and crop production. As pointed out by Amartya Sen, the key is entitlement and capacity. The most devastating famines were not primarily the result of inadequate

production but of inadequate entitlement to food. In infrastructure terms, entitlement translates into access. **For the poor, the most dramatic impact of inadequate infrastructure may be less the result of lack of infrastructure per se but more the lack of access to that infrastructure. What good is a road if it has no transport services or the poor can only afford to walk? What good is electrification if the poor can't afford to connect?** Given the inter-linkage between social and economic impact, lack of access results in overall exclusion from opportunity and development. Developing a clear picture of the mechanisms through which the poor are excluded from access to infrastructure is useful to understand better the link between poverty and infrastructure, and to develop more pro-poor infrastructure policies. 3 iv) Exclusion of the poor from access to infrastructure operates essentially in three ways; i) through location, ii) pricing, and iii) socio-political factors. The most trivial exclusion mechanism, and accordingly the one that gets the most attention is the shear availability of infrastructure: without roads entire regions can be cut-off from the economic development process, poor and less poor alike. The solution to this aspect of the exclusion problem is simply the provision of more infrastructure. Notwithstanding availability, the poor's ability to access available infrastructure services is a crucial issue.

## Limited access to infrastructure in West Africa

**World Bank 18** [World Bank Group. 2018. The Challenges Urbanization in West Africa. AFCW3 Economic Update;. World Bank, Washington, DC. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/30042]

Most people in Bamako, Niamey, and Conakry walk (Figure 10). **Over half the trips in the city are made on foot, suggesting a somewhat limited geographical range and thus limited access to the opportunities and services the city can offer.** In many cases, this is because they cannot afford motorized transportation on a regular basis. In terms of use of transportation services, each capital city is characterized by different modes. While 78% of trips in Conakry are made on foot, this mode represents only 57% of trips in Bamako. The rest consist of trips made by private car, minibus, or other motorized modes in the case of Niamey and Bamako, whereas in Conakry, a significant share of trips is made using shared taxis. The share of institutional transportation (large public bus companies) and of minibuses also varies significantly across the three cities but fails to account for more than 17–18% in any one of them. While walking to work is a great way to commute (and should be promoted), it also has **consequences for how many jobs and services can be reached in each time frame when transportation choices are thus constrained**. Assuming that individuals walks for one hour, they would be able to reach opportunities that lie within a 28-square kilometer radius (assuming a generous 3km/hour speed along a straight line). In 2015, this would cover only 10% of the urban area of Bamako. (Figure 11). Similarly, access to improved water sources is significantly higher in the city center and very limited in peripheral areas (especially in Bamako and Conakry). What is of concern is that areas that are densely populated are not necessarily well served in terms of access to public services when they are far from the city center. For instance, although access to electricity is systematically better in city centers, it does not appear to increase much along with increases in density (Figure 12).

### Infrastructure not repaired once built

**World Bank 18** [World Bank Group. 2018. The Challenges Urbanization in West Africa. AFCW3 Economic Update;. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/30042]

In Conakry, the city's geography, which consists of a peninsula constrained by the sea, mangroves, and mountains, has inevitably led to scarce land being used intensively. As a result, population and employment densities are high. Most economic activities heavily depend on the port, which is located in Kaloum, at the extreme point of the peninsula, and administrations are highly concentrated in the same area. Thus, jobs and populations are mismatched spatially, with a high concentration of jobs in Kaloum and populations increasingly settling further inland (see Figure 22, which displays travel flows across Conakry). Although this mismatch is not problematic in itself, when it is associated with limited transportation infrastructure and the absence of a mass transportation system, it creates challenges for reaching jobs and a massive commuting traffic pattern from the periphery to Kaloum, with associated externalities, including (among others) pollution and economic hardship. **This situation is worsened by the lack of transportation infrastructure in good condition and extreme congestion.** Moreover, there is an **inadequate match between the road infrastructure available and how it is used.** Evidence shows that 84% of motorized trips are completed in shared taxis), saturating the limited road space with vehicles, and another 15% in minibuses (76% of which are over 10 years old).31 Beside accessibility to employment, narrow secondary or tertiary roads, especially those in poor condition, also constrain access to services, including solid waste management. Whereas trash is directly collected on main arteries, inside neighborhoods, residents rely on pre-collection, a service often provided informally by groups of young people. Further, **crumbling transport infrastructure decreases accessibility to fixed urban and social services such as schools and hospitals.**

## Major bottlenecks exist in West Africa which prevent the realization of infrastructure investments—border delays, poor roads

**OECD 19** [OECD (2019), "Accessibility and Infrastructure in Border Cities", West African Papers, No. 23, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi-org.proxy.library.nd.edu/10.1787/04fbebef-en.]

The development policies implemented in West Africa must not overlook the accessibility of cities in general, and border cities in particular. The number of people that can be reached from urban centres in the region largely determines the development of trade and production activities. From that perspective, the interconnectedness and opening up of cities through transport networks adapted to suit West African climatic and environmental constraints plays a major role in the regional integration process (Deen-Swarray et al., 2014). The wait times observed at border crossings, the checks conducted on transport routes and the advanced deterioration of large portions of the road network constitute three major obstacles to market integration and the flow of people within the region. These obstacles, which have been quantified at the local and regional levels for the first time using an innovative accessibility model, call for differentiated political solutions. Border delays and "administrative hassles" are the products of corrupt practices and clientelistic arrangements negotiated between state employees and private-sector actors. Their resiliency testifies to the financial interests at play in the flow of goods and people within the region. The new infrastructure put in place by governments and regional organisations, aimed at improving the flow of these exchanges, must integrate interests that sometimes run contrary to the formalisation of the informal (see next chapter). The often-poor condition of the West African road network is the result of many decades of under-investment in infrastructure. A new wave of major projects backed by international institutions aims to improve this situation (Nugent, 2018) by injecting massive investments into transport corridors linking West Africa's major metropolises to each other and the rest of the continent.