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# SILVER BULLET BRIEFS

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Resolved: On balance, the benefits of  
urbanization in West Africa outweigh the harms.





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# WHY SBB?

As debaters and coaches, we have always hunted for the “silver bullet” that will slay our debate monsters: the perfect meta-analysis, the unbeatable narrative, or the argument that is so inherently true that there is no response. We learned that the elusive silver bullet was as much a myth as the monsters that it was designed to slay, but the aspiration of finding it pushed us to gain a deeper understanding of every topic. Thus, we created Silver Bullet Briefs with two goals in mind:

First, debate provides an invaluable opportunity to learn, and we hope to advance that opportunity. Debate teaches competitors not only to research and prepare, but to think on their feet and consider solutions to real-world problems. It teaches young people the significance of viewpoint diversity and gives them an awareness of real-world issues. Most importantly, it leaves competitors with the power and confidence to advocate for themselves – to argue for the things in which they believe. Silver Bullet is an extension of debate. We believe that true success does not come from the evidence that a debater reads. Instead, it stems from the knowledge that a debater can reap from that evidence, and the story that they can tell using it. SBB is not meant to provide an endless stream of redundant evidence, but to give debaters a deeper understanding of each topic and the real-world issue behind it.

Second, we hope to level the playing field. Debate is an unequal activity. Gender minorities are less likely to win rounds and participate in the activity in the first place. The same is true for black and Hispanic debaters, as racial stereotypes and implicit biases limit their success. The structure of the activity has also made debate increasingly inaccessible. Tournament entry fees, travel and hotel expenses, private coaches, summer camps, and even tournament attire are only available to those with the means to afford them. While the advent of online competition has alleviated some of these problems, it has created others. Competition now requires stable internet connection and access to a personal computer. All of these factors have made debate inaccessible for many.

Doing our part: We created Silver Bullet Briefs as a way to increase accessibility to debate. Therefore, while SBB intends to sell debate briefs to those who can afford them, we will provide our briefs at a reduced cost to those who cannot, **AND** we will donate **100%** of the profits from the sale of these briefs to organizations that increase equity and access within the debate community, such as the National Association of Urban Debate Leagues.

Let's make a difference together.

# ABOUT US

**Maggie Mills** competed in Public Forum debate for Chagrin Falls High School for all four years of high school. Maggie served as President and Vice President of Chagrin Falls High School's Speech and Debate team. Throughout her four-year career, she and her partner, Sasha, qualified for the Ohio state speech and debate tournament four times and for the Tournament of Champions three times. During her senior year, Maggie and Sasha won the Ohio state tournament without dropping a ballot. In June, the team won the 2020 NSDA national championship. Maggie plans to study Economics and Political Science as a member of the University of Chicago's class of 2024.

**Sasha Haines** competed in Public Forum Debate for Chagrin Falls High School for four years and was a co-captain of the team during her junior and senior year. Sasha often competed nationally, reaching elimination rounds at numerous national tournaments including the Sunvitational, the Season Opener at UK, UPenn, and Stanford. Throughout her career, Sasha qualified three times to the Gold division of the Tournament of Champions, was the Ohio State Champion and won the 2020 NSDA Nationals. Sasha plans to study Public Affairs and Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at The Ohio State University.

**Albi Manfredi** did Public Forum Debate for five years at Lake Mary Prep in Orlando, Florida. Throughout his time as a competitor, he amassed a total of 17 bids to the Tournament of Champions, semi-finaled at the Yale Invitational and the Tournament of Champions, was the Florida State Runner-Up, and championed the Blue Key Round Robin, the Crestian Tradition, and the Sunvitational. Individually, he achieved top speaker at the Blake Tournament, Emory's Barkley Forum, and Florida States. He finished his career placing 5th at NSDA Nationals. As a first year out, Albi has been a successful coach, most recently helping Sasha and Maggie win the prestigious NSDA national tournament. Albi is a sophomore at the University of Pennsylvania studying Chemical and Biomolecular Engineering and Legal Studies.

**Ana Kevorkian** competed in Public Forum debate for Chagrin Falls High School for 3 years. During her senior year, she served as Secretary of the school's Speech and Debate team, handling tournament registration and results reporting. She also founded the Ohio chapter of Beyond Resolved and served as the organization's first Director of Research and the Director of the Clothing Drive Initiative. In high school, she was a National Merit Scholar, National AP Scholar, AP Capstone Diploma recipient, and graduated Cum Laude. Ana spent the fall organizing on a Senate campaign and is currently on a gap year.

**Richard Haber** has been the Coach of Public Forum Debate at Chagrin Falls High School for 8 seasons. He first became involved as a debate coach when his daughter Victoria began competing as a freshman in High School. Leveraging his 30 years as a trial lawyer, he continued to coach even after Victoria graduated because he believed in the value of the activity. As an accomplished trial lawyer, Richard has been honored as an Ohio Super Lawyer® from 2004 to the present; as one of the top 100 lawyers in the state of Ohio from 2010 to 2017; and has been named from 2010 to the present in The Best Lawyers in America® published by Best Lawyers in conjunction with U.S. News Media Group. As a debate coach, Richard has coached two teams to state championships in the last 3 years; qualified three teams to NSDA Nationals, coached teams to four Tournament of Championship qualifications in the last three years and along with Albi Manfredi coached Maggie and Sasha to the 2020 National Speech and Debate Association Public Forum Championship. Richard is a devout advocate of traditional public forum debate and helped found Silver Bullet Briefs to promote this style of debate.

# TOPIC ANALYSIS

## History and Context

West Africa is a region of many different countries with contrasting physiography. Contained within West Africa are arid regions in Western Sudan, the valleys of Senegal, mountainous terrain in Guinea and Niger, and much more<sup>1</sup>. Its diverse range of environmental factors make it home to thousands of species of flora and fauna.

*(It would be impossible to recount all of West Africa's rich history within our topic analysis, so we encourage debaters to do as much supplemental background reading as possible. For the sake of this analysis, we'll focus on recent history and its legacy on the West Africa we see today.)*

West Africa was one of the first parts of the African continent to face invasion and colonization by European powers. European sea traders first arrived on the coastlands of Guinea in the 15th century. In 1471, Portuguese sailors reached present-day Ghana and began to trade cloth and other goods for the gold possessed by people residing in the region. This earned West Africa's coast the nickname "The Gold Coast." After decades of Portuguese presence, other European powers began to arrive and establish their own trading posts.

As early as the 1440s, Portuguese and other European colonizers began to sell African slaves to plantations in the Caribbean. Throughout the next few centuries, thousands of slaves were taken from their countries and forced into labor in the Americas. Throughout this time period, European powers were vying for power and were often involved in skirmishes and wars. These countries brought their rivalries to the highly valued Gold Coast region, all attempting to expand hegemony by increasing their trade and military presence. Colonization ran rampant in West Africa, and some speculate that the region lost up to 20% of its population to the slave trade. For European powers, Africa represented a land of vast profit, and throughout the 1800s, European powers marched through Africa, claiming territory in what is now called the "Scramble for Africa." France and Britain emerged as the predominant colonial powers, but other countries like Germany and Portugal maintained control of smaller swaths of land.

After the Great Depression in the 1930s, British and French holds on Africa began to weaken. Gradually, through political movements and other forms of

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<sup>1</sup>"West Africa: Land Use and Land Cover Dynamics. Physical Geography." *USAID and US Geological Society*.  
<https://eros.usgs.gov/westafrica/physical-geography>



resistance, West African states began to gain independence from colonizers. However, centuries of oppression left West Africa with rampant income inequality and poverty, insufficient infrastructure, and ill-prepared education systems. Thus, the modern-day urbanization of West Africa is shaped by the legacies of slavery and colonization<sup>2</sup>.

## Analysis of the Resolution

### “Resolved: On balance, the benefits of urbanization in West Africa outweigh the harms.”

The first thing to notice about this resolution is the statement “On balance.” On balance resolutions directly ask debaters to use a cost-benefit analysis when comparing arguments. The resolution itself concedes that the topic, in this case urbanization, produces both positive and negative outcomes. It is the debater’s job to not only explain the pros or cons of a resolution, but to convince the judge that the benefits outweigh the costs, or vice versa. This means weighing, specifically impact calculus and comparison between warrants and impacts.

The second key word is “urbanization.” Urbanization, simply put, is the process by which a region becomes more urban. When a region urbanizes, the percentage of that region’s population that lives in an urban area increases<sup>3</sup>. In most places, urbanization coincides with industrialization. As businesses convene in urban areas, populations in rural areas will leave to seek better opportunities in these growing cities.

The third key term is “West Africa.” West Africa is a region comprised of 16 independent countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte D'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Saint Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Throughout the duration of this topic, it is important for debaters to keep in mind the specificity that “West Africa” connotes. West Africa - - culturally, ethnically, economically -- differs from other regions in Africa. It is important to tailor any argument to fit the specific characteristics of West Africa; general arguments about Africa could easily be dismissed due to their lack of specificity. That being said, debaters can use evidence about urbanization that pertains to other countries. Certain trends manifest basically wherever urbanization occurs (for example, income inequality increases), so debaters can use broader information when

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<sup>2</sup> (Used throughout “History” section). McCaskie, T.C. “Western Africa.” *Encyclopedia Britannica*. <https://www.britannica.com/place/western-Africa/Decolonization-and-the-regaining-of-independence>

<sup>3</sup> “Urbanization.” *National Geographic*. <https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/urbanization/>

it comes to warranting their arguments. However, it is vital that debaters tie general information back to the specific problems facing West Africa.

## Why are we debating this resolution now?

Urbanization is a step towards development for any nation. Not only do cities serve as hubs for business, innovation, and economic growth, but they serve as forums for global interaction and foreign direct investment (FDI). Africa is the most rapidly urbanizing place on the planet, and the GDPs of African countries have skyrocketed as a result<sup>4</sup>. However, urbanization comes with its drawbacks, drawbacks that are exacerbated by West Africa's legacies of slavery and colonialism discussed above. While urbanization has caused economic growth in some in West Africa's cities, rates of inequality have skyrocketed (a startling 60 percent of its population lives in extreme poverty<sup>5</sup>). When urbanization occurs too rapidly, inequalities only worsen; without infrastructure, proper sanitation, good education systems, living wages, and so on, wealthy business owners accumulate wealth while the working class is condemned to a life of poverty. For example, in African cities, overall economic prosperity has increased, but 65% of urban populations live in slums and only 25% have access to clean drinking water<sup>6</sup>. On one hand, some believe that the destitution and inequalities that arise from urbanization make it unsustainable. Others argue that urbanization is the only way for Africa to join the global economy and thrive. Regardless of whether or not urbanization is beneficial, it is inevitable: Africa's population is predicted to double by 2050, with much of that population growth occurring in cities<sup>7</sup>.

## Argument Rundown

Pro arguments on this topic mainly focus on how cities can be places of growth and opportunity. The first major theme between pro arguments is that cities provide increased access to resources. Urban areas offer higher wages, more job opportunities, and better amenities than most rural areas. These factors all make cities drivers of economic growth. Another economics-focused argument is that globalization

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<sup>4</sup> Campbell, John. "Africa is the Fastest Urbanizing Place on the Planet." *Council on Foreign Relations*. 12 September 2018. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/africa-fastest-urbanizing-place-planet>

<sup>5</sup> "West Africa: extreme inequality in numbers." *Oxfam International*. <https://www.oxfam.org/en/west-africa-extreme-inequality-numbers>

<sup>6</sup> Pinault, Nicolaus. "Rapid Urbanization Presents New Problems for Africa." *VOA*. 20 May 2019. <https://www.voanews.com/africa/rapid-urbanization-presents-new-problems-africa>

<sup>7</sup> Muggah, Robert and Katie Hill. "African cities will double in population by 2050. Here are 4 ways to make sure they thrive." *World Economic Forum*. 27 June 2018. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/06/Africa-urbanization-cities-double-population-2050-4%20ways-thrive/>

increases and helps West Africa prosper. When cities grow, global interest in the region grows as well. Cities provide a stage for international business dealings and foreign direct investment, which can boost the domestic economy.

In addition to helping the economy, cities also benefit quality of life. Firstly, healthcare is more readily accessible in urban areas. Rural areas face doctor shortages and underfunded hospitals, whereas urban areas have more clinics and doctors available. Secondly, cities can propel democracy. Urban density makes it easier for citizens to rally, protest injustices, and make their grievances known. On top of that, increased globalization can expose citizens to different ideas of governance, prompting a reevaluation of existing political systems. Improved internet access in cities can also act as a launchpad for democracy as citizens can share grievances and beliefs more easily. Urban areas make life better for urban residents but can benefit quality of life for rural residents as well. Cities increase demand for food and other goods, improving business for small-scale farms.

Con arguments revolve around the harms that globalization can do to the economic wellbeing and social standards of a region. Regarding economics, urbanization can lead to globalization, as discussed above. However, the argument can be made that globalization is actually a bad thing; too much FDI can stifle local business, and in many cases, only wealthy business owners benefit from increased trade. The other main economic argument on the con side is that urbanization increases income inequality. While cities boost GDP and provide economic opportunity for some, low wages and high living costs often mean that only a small percentage of the population actually benefit from this increased wealth. Over the course of the past few years, income inequality in West Africa has grown in tandem with urbanization. Urbanization also contributes to the “urban-rural divide,” meaning that rural West African areas remain poor while cities see economic growth. Income inequality relegates many city dwellers to slums and enforces generational cycles of poverty.

Though in many ways, urbanization improves quality of life, it can also harm it. Firstly, urbanization can harm public health. Because most West African cities have poor infrastructure and sanitation systems, many low-income urban residents live in densely populated areas with little access to clean water. These places serve as breeding grounds for diseases, an especially relevant issue in the time of COVID-19 (while many wealthy nations now have access to vaccines, West Africa is months away from gaining access<sup>8</sup>). Secondly, urbanization harms the environment. Urban populations use more resources than rural ones, so as urbanization increases, so does deforestation and habitat destruction. Cities are also major producers of pollution, and

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<sup>8</sup> Paquette, Daniel. “Coronavirus vaccinations have started. But people in Africa face a much longer wait.” *The Washington Post*. 17 December 2020. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/africa-coronavirus-vaccines/2020/12/16/9696e228-3bc2-11eb-8328-a36a109900c2\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/africa-coronavirus-vaccines/2020/12/16/9696e228-3bc2-11eb-8328-a36a109900c2_story.html)

air pollution alone causes hundreds of thousands of deaths in Africa each year. Thirdly, urbanization can lead to political instability. Strained infrastructure and overpopulation lead to social tensions. Additionally, corruption runs rampant in urban areas, as high land prices and plentiful business opportunities lead government officials to illegally sell land and make under-the-table deals.

# **PRO ARGUMENTS**

# SPREADING DEMOCRACY

## What's the argument?

Africa's urban areas act as hubs of democracy and allow for the expansion of democratic ideals (Anku and Tochi). Urban residents are generally better educated and have increased access to infrastructure. Urban dwellers also "tend to care more about structural economic and governance issues than their rural counterparts" (Anku and Tochi). Urban density allows for greater accountability, as it's easier for citizens to rally, protest, and make their grievances known (Anku and Tochi). Glaser and Steinberg elaborate on this idea, explaining that urban areas enhance "the power of organized action" and give voice to the demands of citizens. Governments can easily disperse rural protests, but large swaths of people are harder to control. Overall, the authors conclude that urban areas make the survival of non-democratic regimes difficult when compared to rural areas.

Globalization stemming from urbanization can also spread democratic values. According to Griswold, the gradual urbanization of the planet has increased the level of democracy. He writes that "countries that are relatively open to the global economy are much more likely to be democracies that respect civil and political liberties than those that are relatively closed."

Urban areas are also more likely to possess internet access, which also aids for the spread of democratic ideals (Craig). Media use can encourage citizens to demand for democracy and can foster political interest. In Africa, internet access has already fostered interest in democracy (Nisbet).

## Why does the argument matter?

West Africa is currently facing the erosion of its democratic systems, as the region showed "the fastest decline in political rights and civil liberties" in the world (Temin and Lizner). According to Hegre, democracies have less political violence than autocracies, and Bollyky writes that democracies have higher overall life expectancies.

## Main Players

West African governments and their citizens

## Strategy Considerations

In the real world, this argument is an incredibly important one. Democracy is critical to preserving individual rights and protecting the freedoms of individuals. That being said, many of the benefits of democracy are intangible. It is difficult to terminalize the impact, because it's impossible to mathematically capture the effect that "freedom" or "representation" can have on a person's wellbeing, be that on a physical, emotional, or even spiritual level. Impacts to health and quality of life, like the ones mentioned above, are good jumping off points, but debaters must be prepared to explain why the intangible concepts protected by democracy outweigh the very tangible threats of climate change, poverty, etc. likely used by the con side.

# Evidence for Spreading Democracy

## Africa's urban areas act as catalysts for democracy

Anku, Amaka and Tochi Eni-Kalu. "Africa's slums aren't harbingers of anarchy—they're engines of democracy." *Foreign Affairs*. 16 December 2019.

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2019-12-16/africas-slums-arent-harbingers-anarchy-theyre-engines-democracy>

Often overlooked in this debate is the role that electoral politics will play in shaping the future of African cities. As people move from the countryside to the cities, political power will move with them, transforming how the continent's democracies are governed. Historically, urbanization has spurred

demands for political accountability. The U.S. civil rights movement was made possible in part by the migration of black Americans to cities, where denser social networks made it easier to organize protests. The Arab uprisings of 2010–11 coincided with North Africa's attainment of majority urban status. Sub-Saharan Africa will soon cross the same threshold. The transition will bring a host of social, political, and environmental problems—but it also has the potential to improve governance across the continent. Urban residents are, on average, better educated than rural dwellers and more exposed to contrasting political views. They also have better access to infrastructure, such as roads, electricity, potable water, and Internet connectivity—even in poorly resourced slums such as Ajegunle. (Many Nigerians, particularly

in rural parts of the north, have no access to electricity at all.) In part because of these quality-of-life differences, urban voters tend to care more about structural economic and governance issues than their rural counterparts, who are typically more concerned with basic social welfare needs.

Afrobarometer survey data from South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya—three of the most populous democracies in sub-Saharan Africa—bear out these trends. The three countries are at quite

different stages of urbanization: South Africa (66 percent urban) has long been one of the continent's most urbanized countries; Nigeria (50 percent urban) achieved rural-urban parity only last year; and Kenya (27 percent urban) is still about three decades away from rural-urban parity. But in all three countries, city dwellers are more likely to identify corruption and economic

management as core concerns, whereas people in rural areas are more likely to cite food and water shortages and inadequate infrastructure. Because Africa has long been majority rural (it remains 60

percent rural today despite rapid urbanization over the past 50 years), politicians have historically taken their cues from rural dwellers, promising to meet voters' immediate, basic needs rather than articulating clear policy visions for the future. But as the share of rural voters across sub-Saharan Africa shrinks, demands for improved governance in the cities will become more and more difficult to ignore. The notion that urbanization is undesirable for developing countries, particularly in Africa, first took hold in the colonial era. European colonial administrators, fearing that dense urban areas would be difficult to control, often limited investment in city infrastructure to discourage migration from the countryside. This was particularly true in countries under indirect rule, such as Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria, where colonial administrations focused on maximizing the extraction of raw materials. Upon independence, the level of urbanization on the continent was extremely low: in 1960, only 15 percent of sub-Saharan Africans lived in urban areas, compared with 34 percent globally. The only countries with reasonably developed urban infrastructure, such as South Africa, tended to be places where greater numbers of European settlers had prompted colonial administrations to make the requisite investments.

...

By increasing political pressures for accountability, urbanization complements two other recent trends that augur well for African governance: rapid demographic change and growing political competition. Across the continent, governments have long been dominated by politicians who were either actively involved in their countries' independence struggles or took the reins soon afterward. Those veterans are now well past retirement age and slowly losing their grip on local political structures—a trend accelerated by the generational shift underway among voters: 60 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's population is under 25. The combined effect of these changes has been to erode the old consensus among political elites, typically focused on uniting the political class against a common enemy such as colonialism, apartheid, or military rule. More than 60 years since the first African countries gained independence and over two decades since military regimes fell out of favor, the unifying power of such "us versus them" narratives has faded. As a result, previously dominant parties have lost their grip on power or succumbed to infighting, opening up space for new political entrants. For example, incumbents in Senegal and Nigeria were voted out of office for the first time in 2012 and 2015, respectively—in both cases after internal disagreements led previously dominant political blocs to splinter. In South Africa, the ruling African National Congress has lost close to 50 parliamentary seats in the 400-seat National Assembly since 2004 amid infighting between feuding factions of the party. Altogether, over 20 sub-Saharan African nations, including those under long-standing authoritarian rule such as Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and Sudan, have had a transfer of power, often as a



result of a competitive election, in the past four years alone. Greater competition and accountability are, of course, no panacea. As the Brexit debacle in the United Kingdom; the revolutions in Egypt, Libya, and Syria; and the recent turmoil in many other Western countries have driven home, demands for accountability do not always deliver political stability or continuity. The same will be true in sub-Saharan Africa, where more competitive election cycles will exert pressure on the public purse as administrations invest in tangible projects to sway voters and in building or strengthening political coalitions to ward off rivals. At the same time, faster turnover in government could result in greater policy volatility. In the long term, however, such risks are a small price to pay for the benefits of increased accountability. Urban density will make it easier to mobilize popular support for or against policies, ideas, or regimes in democratic and nondemocratic countries alike, improving both the quality and the responsiveness of governance. In the Yoruba language, Ajegunle roughly translates to “the place where riches dwell.” For most of the slum’s impoverished residents, the name remains an aspiration. But as Nigeria grows more urban, and the concerns of Ajegunle become the concerns of the country, it may well become a reality.

## Urbanization promotes democracy by enabling uprisings, strengthening protests, and forcing an increase in government accountability

Glaser, Edward L. and Bryce Millett Steinberg. “Transforming cities: Does urbanization promote democratic change?” *National Bureau of Economic Research*. 23 November 2016. <https://www.nber.org/papers/w22860>

The paper proceeds by discussing three ways in which urbanization relates to regime change and democracy. First, urbanization may enable uprisings and revolution by facilitating coordination and enhancing the power of organized action. A crowd in Cairo’s Tahrir Square packs far more political punch than a group of farmers in a remote farming village. Wallace (2014) provides compelling empirical work showing that dictatorships face a far higher risk of regime change in urbanized societies. Second, urbanization may increase the demand for democracy. To understand why populations may favor democracy or dictatorship, one can follow the framework of Djankov et al. (2003) which emphasizes that different systems offer a tradeoff between losses from overly strong governments, termed “dictatorship,” and losses from overly weak governments, termed “disorder.” Cities enable trade and facilitate innovation, both of which can be stifled by dictatorial regimes. These upsides of urban existence should push residents to favor more democracy. Yet cities also facilitate negative social interactions, including crime and the spread of contagious disease. The need to reduce those threats should increase the demand for dictatorship. Finally, this article discusses the possibility that urbanization may promote the social skills and connections that collectively compose “civic capital”: the ability of citizens to improve the quality of their government. Yet there is currently little empirical support for the view that civic capital is higher in cities.

...

Cities have often played a role in the toppling of dictatorial regimes. Urban proximity enables collaboration, and uprisings require people to act and plan together. As Blanksten (1960) writes, “few interests arising in rural areas are capable of making themselves heard in politics,” but in cities “interest groups form more readily and give voice to the demands of urbanized sectors of the population.” A successful protest or revolution depends upon assembling enough participants, and cities make it easier to mass rebels. Just as cities enable marriage markets (Costa and Kahn, 2000), cities enable revolutionary partnerships to emerge and grow. The partnership between John Hancock and Samuel Adams grew in pre-revolutionary Boston. Cities both lower travel costs and enable people with idiosyncratic preferences, such as the urge to topple the regime, to find each other. In principle, urban concentration could also make it easier for dictators to monitor their own citizens. Yet while such effective surveillance may be possible in highly capable dictatorships, such as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union at its height, such competence is beyond most modern developing world dictators. The typical despot, both today and in history, lacks the capacity to

effectively patrol the hidden nooks and crannies that always exist in large cities. Cities can also abet revolt by reducing the risks to protesters. The costs of protesting or revolting, like the costs of rioting, decline as the number of protesters increase because larger crowds make it harder for the police to target any individual protester (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1997). Rural mobs are easy for the army to disperse or destroy. Urban mobs are harder to dislodge, partially because an abundance of urban structures make it harder for tanks and cavalry to maneuver. Agrarian repression occurs far from the censoring attention of the world. Protests in large cities are particularly effective when cities are highly visible to the local and global press, and when the army actually cares about avoiding opprobrium, which appears to have been the case in Cairo in 2011. Urban proximity can also increase the efficacy of an uprising, if long-term urban contact between soldiers and citizenry has increased the army's sympathy for the protesters.

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Djankov et al. (2003) argue that countries can only shift the IPF downward if the level of "civic capital" increases, where civic capital represents the capacity of the country to work collaboratively to produce effective government and to produce socially beneficial outcomes even in the absence of state action. Education is one part of civic capital. Years of schooling are reliably correlated with better functioning governments, both across countries (La Porta et al., 1999) and across U.S. states (Glaeser and Saks, 2005). Education increases the capacity of individuals to understand their governments and to work together (Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer, 2007). This sub-section discusses the hypothesis that city living may also create civic capital. Interactions are the point of urban density. Cities enable and often require people to work together with others. By collaborating, people learn how to collaborate. For example, Fossett and Kiecolt (1989) show that support for racial integration is higher in larger cities and smaller among people with farm origins. Abrahamson and Carter (1986) document a broad correlation between tolerance and city size. As Wirth (1930) famously wrote "If the individual would participate at all in the social, political, and economic life of the city, he must subordinate some of his individuality to the demands of the larger community and in that measure immerse himself in mass movements." Cities can enhance what Robert Putnam calls "bridging social capital," the connectivity across different types of people, in at least two ways. First, there can just be learning by doing. By working with diverse people throughout a city, people may learn how to bridge social divides and create functional relationship despite differences in religion or ethnicity. Second, people can consciously invest in their ability to deal with different people in order to take advantage of the opportunities. They can learn different languages, or at least understand the idiosyncratic features of different ethnicities.

...

In the developing world, revolutions have also often had a distinctly urban component. Democratic movements in erstwhile African colonies like Zimbabwe often began in cities (Scarnecchia, 2008). French control over Algeria was shaken by urban guerilla warfare carried on Algiers by the National Liberation Front. The People Power Revolution, largely in Manila, led to an end to the Marcos Regime. The occupation of prominent urban spaces like Tahrir Square ultimately led to the end of several authoritarian governments in the Arab Spring. This anecdotal evidence is also supported by the empirical work of Wallace (2014), who looks at the link between urban size and the survival of non-democratic regimes. He finds that "for the 235 regimes with urban concentration levels about the mean level in the data, the mean duration is 8.6 years and the annual regime death rate is 9.1 percent," but "for the 198 regimes characterized by low levels of urban concentration, the incidence rate is only 5.7 percent and the mean duration is 12.2 years." The impact of urbanization on regime survival is large and statistically significant, and remains effectively unchanged when he controls for a bevy of other variations. The impact of very large cities is particularly striking. There is an older literature on revolutions and coups that finds significantly more mixed results on the link between urbanization and uprisings. Wallace's finding that "large cities are dangerous for non-democratic regimes," is at odds with studies that found that urbanization was either irrelevant or actually promoted executive stability (Auvinen, 1997). That previous work typically focused on revolutions everywhere, not just in non-democratic regimes. Since urbanites can effect political change at the

ballot box in a democracy, there is far less reason for them to revolt. Consequently, one should expect big cities to lead to revolt primarily in non-democratic polities, which is exactly what Wallace finds. Our reading of this evidence is that the theoretical arguments that urbanization destabilizes autocracies, discussed above, have reasonable support in history and more modern statistical work.

## Globalization due to urbanization spreads democratic values

### Globalization helps to spread democracy

(See “Increasing Globalization” pro argument for comprehensive links between urbanization and globalization)

Griswold, Daniel. “Globalization, Human Rights, and Democracy.” *Cato Institute*. 11 August 2006. <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/globalization-human-rights-democracy>

As theory would predict, trade, development, and political and civil freedom appear to be tied together in the real world. Everyone can agree that the world is more globalized than it was 30 years ago, but less widely appreciated is the fact that the world is much more democratized than it was 30 years ago. According to the most recent survey by Freedom House, the share of the world’s population enjoying full political and civil freedoms has increased substantially in the past three decades, as has the share of the world’s governments that are democratic. In its annual survey, released in December 2005, the human rights research organization reported that 46 percent of the world’s population now lives in countries it classifies as “Free,” where citizens “enjoy open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media.” That compares to the 35 percent of mankind that enjoyed a similar level of freedom in 1973. The percentage of people in countries that are “Not Free,” where political and civil liberties are systematically oppressed, dropped during the same period from 47 percent to 36 percent. The percentage of the population in countries that are “Partly Free” has remained at 18 percent. Meanwhile, the percentage of the world’s governments that are democracies has reached 64 percent, the highest in the 33 years of Freedom House surveys. Thanks in good measure to the liberating winds of globalization, the shift of 11 percentage points of the world’s population in the past three decades from “Not Free” to “Free” means that another 650 million human beings today enjoy the kind of civil and political liberties taken for granted in such countries as the United States, Japan, and Belgium, instead of suffering under the kind of tyranny we still see in the most repressive countries. Within individual countries, economic and political freedoms also appear to be linked. A 2004 study by the Cato Institute, titled “Trading Tyranny for Freedom,” found that countries that are relatively open to the global economy are much more likely to be democracies that respect civil and political liberties than those that are relatively closed. And relatively closed countries are far more likely to deny systematically civil and political liberties than those that are open.

## Internet access from urbanization aids democracy

**Internet access increases along with urbanization, as a 1% increase in urbanization corresponds with a 3.37% increase in internet connections**

Craig, Steven G. et al. "The impact of the internet on urban vitality: Does closeness in cyberspace substitute for urban space?" *Universities of Houston and Colorado*.

[https://www.uh.edu/~kohlhase/CraigHoangKohlhase\\_internet\\_WP\\_Oct\\_2014.pdf](https://www.uh.edu/~kohlhase/CraigHoangKohlhase_internet_WP_Oct_2014.pdf)

The primary result is that high speed internet connections are very elastic to the degree of urbanization within a state. The coefficient of 3.37 suggests that for each 1% increase in the degree of urbanization that the number of high speed internet connections rises by 3.37%. The highly elastic result suggests that urban dwellers have a much higher interest in internet connections than do residents outside of the city. Consistent with the discussion above, we interpret this result to say that urban residents have a higher demand for connectivity than do rural residents, because most evidence suggests the price difference is quite small (Sinai and Waldfogel, 2004). The interpretation of the coefficient on urban population as being driven by demand is reinforced by the findings for the second variable in the table, the share of the urban population in the largest city. This coefficient is also positive and significantly different from zero, suggesting that if a larger share of the urban population is in the largest city, that internet demand is even higher. Larger cities are generally found to have both higher benefits to their populations than smaller cities, while also with higher costs (generally as a consequence of congestion). The empirical non-linearity greater than that found in the log specification of the urban population share is consistent with an interpretation of the internet as providing a complement to urban benefits. It is also possible that, to the extent the largest cities are associated with the most innovation, that innovation provides an additional component to the desire to be connected.

## **Internet access in Africa encourages democratic values**

Nisbet, Erik et al. "Internet use and democratic demands: A multinational, multilevel model of internet use and citizen attitudes about democracy." *Journal of Communication*. 16 March 2012. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01627.x>

The success of a democracy depends, in part, on public demand for democratic institutions. How does Internet use shape citizens' preferences for regime type? Combining individual public opinion data from Africa and Asia with country-level indices, we test a multilevel model examining the relationship between Internet penetration, individual Internet use, and citizen demand for democracy across 28 countries. We find that Internet use, but not national Internet penetration, is associated with greater citizen commitment to democratic governance. Furthermore, greater democratization and Internet penetration moderates the relationship between Internet use and demand for democracy.

...

From a communication viewpoint, previous scholarship has demonstrated that media use in transitioning or democratizing societies encourages citizen demand for democracy by teaching citizens about democratic norms, values, and practices and by creating spaces for open political expression (Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Nisbet, 2008; Schmitt-Beck & Voltmer, 2007). For example, mobilization theory argues that media pluralism furthers citizen political knowledge, which in turn increases both cognitive and behavioral political participation (Newton, 1999). Diffusion of information via the media may foster political interest, discussion, and ideological sophistication (Dalton, 1996). Scholars have also found that media furthers

civic and political education (McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Norris, 2000; Scheufele, Hardy, Brossard, Waismel-Manor, & Nisbet, 2006) and political participation (Lemert, Mitzman, Seither, Cook, & Hackett, 1977; McLeod et al., 1996; Norris, 2000).

...

Our results provide some insights into the role the Internet plays in democratization. First, individual Internet use was associated with increased citizen demand for, or commitment to, democratic governance while national Internet penetration had a null relationship with citizen demand. These findings identify an additional theoretical mechanism by which Internet penetration may promote democratic outcomes—by influencing citizen attitudes. Our study also highlights the need for scholarship examining the relationship between ICTs and democratic governance to account for individual Internet use, rather than focus entirely on macro or institutional-level relationships, to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of how Internet penetration promotes democracy. Second, the strength of our multilevel approach is that we can empirically examine how the relationship between Internet use and citizen attitudes may vary by context. For instance, consistent with Groshek's (2009) study, the multilevel model suggests the relationship between Internet use and citizen demand is more robust in democratic states than nondemocratic states. Furthermore, the negative relationship between democratization and demand in the model shows that citizens in less democratic countries profess a higher demand for democracy than citizens in more democratic countries, where democratic governance may be taken for granted. Taken together, these findings suggest that Internet use may play a more meaningful role in strengthening and enhancing young democracies through impacting citizen attitudes rather than promoting outright democratic transitions among autocratic regimes. Our results are also consistent with the work of other scholars (e.g., Mozorov, 2011; Stockman & Gallagher, 2011) who have demonstrated the potential for authoritarian regimes to limit the democratic potential of the mass media and/or Internet. Third, Internet use was also found to be more strongly associated with citizen demand in countries where the communicative potential of the Internet, in terms of number of users and broadband width, is greatest. Although the effect size of Internet use was rather modest in our analysis, this finding suggests that the democratic potential of the Internet may grow disproportionately in countries with high access, as Boulian (2009) found in the United States. This democratic potential remains large within our sample of countries as the mean percentage of the population that were Internet users was only 14% compared to an estimated 80% of the current population in the United States. By considering our measures of Internet penetration and mean demand for democracy together, it is possible to identify countries where growing Internet use may be most likely to play a role in democratization. This can be seen in Table 2 where the 28 countries studied are arrayed in terms of the combined measure of Internet use and country penetration and the demand for democracy. For each country, the category of current freedom is also displayed. For example, e, states that have a moderate to high level of Internet penetration, in which the population on average expresses a high demand for democracy, and enjoy at least a partly democratic political regime are contexts where increasing Internet use is more likely to promote democratic change. Kenya, Senegal, Singapore, and Zambia may be good examples of such a process. Likewise, increased Internet use by citizens in countries such as Benin, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Thailand, countries with high level of Internet penetration, a moderate amount of demand for democracy, and some freedoms, are also more likely to experience political change as citizen Internet use deepens and expands. In contrast, countries that are highly authoritarian, or not free, such as Vietnam or Zimbabwe, are likely to limit the democratic potential of the Internet regardless of the degree of Internet penetration or level of demand. Current levels of Internet use, similarly, are less likely to promote democratic change in countries with a low to moderate level of demand for democracy and low Internet penetration. However, in partly free countries such as Burkino Faso, Malawi, Mozambique, and Tanzania, where citizen demand for democracy is currently low, increases in the communicative potential of the Internet and individual Internet use may foster greater demand for democracy over time that will lead more citizens to critically assess the degree of democracy their governments provide, and in turn challenge autocratic governing institutions. From a policy perspective, whether to focus on improving access to the Internet and/or developing citizens' abilities to use the Internet effectively for political change in these countries is an important strategic choice for policy-makers and democracy promoters to consider (Epstein, Nisbet, & Gillespie, 2011).



## Impact of increased democracy

### Democracy in West Africa is already slipping away, giving rise to extremism and crises

Temin, Jon and Isabel Lizner. "West Africa's Democratic Progress is Slipping Away, Even as Region's Significance Grows." *Freedom House*. 19 March 2020.

<https://freedomhouse.org/article/west-africas-democratic-progress-slipping-away-even-regions-significance-grows-0>

Rising authoritarianism is curtailing individual freedoms around the globe. But in an alarming development, the region that showed the fastest decline in political rights and civil liberties last year was West Africa, which had long been a driver of democratic gains. In fact, over the last quarter century, no region in Africa has made more democratic progress. Generally open elections and regular leadership transitions were becoming close to the norm in West Africa. The reversal of this trend has stark implications. Freedom House's newly released Freedom in the World report, which we helped produce, provides striking evidence of the problem. Of the 12 countries with the largest year-on-year score declines around the world in 2019, no fewer than five are in West Africa—Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Nigeria. In Freedom House's taxonomy of Free, Partly Free, and Not Free countries, Senegal and Benin fell from Free to Partly Free status, leaving Ghana and the island nation of Cabo Verde as the only Free countries in the region. Benin alone lost 13 points on the report's 100-point scale, a remarkable drop for any democracy. Throughout the region, flawed elections in 2019 took their toll.

National- and state-level elections in Nigeria were deeply troubled; the election commission postponed the first round of voting hours before polls were to open, and the balloting that eventually took place featured widespread irregularities. Opposition parties in Benin were effectively excluded from competing in parliamentary elections, and an internet shutdown and violent state repression of protests further marred the lopsided vote. In Senegal, the two most prominent opposition politicians were barred from the presidential election due to criminal cases that were widely viewed as politically motivated. In each of these instances, the problems were predictable. In 2018, there were politically motivated prosecutions in Benin, lawmakers made problematic changes to candidacy requirements in Senegal, and Nigeria's president rejected multiple attempts at electoral reform. But the warning signs failed to spur corrective action.

Meanwhile, the expanding reach of armed extremist groups, especially in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria, is sharply reducing physical security, free movement, freedom of expression, and access to government services.

But heavy-handed responses by security forces have too often done just as much damage to individual freedoms, as authorities mete out collective punishment to groups perceived to be responsible for violence and use instability to justify antidemocratic legislation or regulation. The Nigerian government, for example, is pursuing social media legislation that would allow arrests for posting online content that is perceived to threaten national security. Extremist groups are now creeping south from the Sahel toward coastal countries such as Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, raising concerns that excessive state responses there could similarly compound the problem.

Few regional heads of state are positioning themselves as defenders of democratic governance.

Former presidents such as Olesegun Obasanjo in Nigeria or Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in Liberia were generally willing to defend democratic norms, and in the case of Nigeria, to deploy troops in West Africa to support the restoration of democratic governance. But today's leaders seem more technocratic than visionary, and they tend to prioritize domestic economic agendas. Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari evinces little interest in regional issues, even as his military battles Boko Haram militants who routinely cross national borders. The leaders of Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire—Nana Akufo-Addo and Alassane Ouattara—come from economic and legal backgrounds, preside over fast-growing economies, and are seeking to accelerate adoption of a regional currency, but they have not articulated a parallel political agenda for the region. For years the regional grouping known as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) outpaced other regional organizations in Africa in its support for

democratic norms, coming close at one point to institutionalizing a two-term limit for all West African heads of state. But such an initiative is hard to imagine now, especially given that Nigeria, the regional heavyweight with great influence over ECOWAS, is increasingly consumed by internal challenges. Democratic norms may erode further in 2020. Already, Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé claimed victory in an election undermined by interference with election monitoring efforts, authorities' refusal to allow domestic election observers, and the blocking of some social media and messaging apps on election day, presumably at the government's behest. Guinean President Alpha Condé, whose mandate ends in October, is seeking to modify the constitution to allow him to run for a third term despite substantial grassroots resistance. Gambia, where ECOWAS intervened in 2017 to enforce voters' ouster of a longtime dictator, risks losing some of its hard-won progress as President Adama Barrow drops his previous commitment to serve only three years as a transitional leader. In an encouraging development in Côte d'Ivoire, President Ouattara, after months of flirting with a third-term bid, recently announced that he will not contest elections later this year. The fundamental rights of West Africa's nearly 400 million people are in jeopardy at a time when the geopolitical significance of the region is growing. Europe, recognizing West Africa as a major source of migration, has sought to bolster job creation in migrants' home countries. Current U.S. policy is focused on great power competition with China and Russia, and emphasizes economic partnerships through the Prosper Africa initiative. Post-Brexit Britain is rushing to solidify trade relations with Africa, including through a recent gathering of African heads of state in London. But time and again, undemocratic partners have proven to be unreliable partners, and West Africa is unlikely to be different. Repressive, corrupt, and unresponsive governments foster the economic and security conditions that drive migration and allow extremist groups to flourish. Such governments are also more receptive to opaque deal-making with authoritarian powers, and as seen in other parts of the world, they tend to mimic and create cover for one another's abuses. Failure by the United States, European nations, and other external partners to match their economic and security priorities with robust support for democratic governance and individual freedoms, through diplomatic efforts as well as partnerships at the grassroots level, is ultimately shortsighted.

## Democracies have less political violence than autocracies

Hegre, Havard. "Democratization and political violence." *United Nations University*. 15 May 2014. <https://ourworld.unu.edu/en/democratization-and-political-violence>

Democracies are at a disadvantage relative to non-democracies in two respects when it comes to countering political violence and insurgencies. First, they are accountable to a large citizenship. If terrorist activity succeeds in increasing the risk of death, it can create a widespread feeling of insecurity. Because democratic governments are expected to safeguard the lives and property of all of their citizens, they must respond in some way to this increased risk. At the same time, democracies are legitimate only to the extent that they protect individual freedoms and handle perpetrators through the legal system. Terrorism, then, may also undermine government support if authorities respond to threats too forcefully. Provoking such over-reactions may even be an aim of some terrorist groups. This means that democratic political systems provide more opportunities for the use of political violence than authoritarian systems. Indeed, comparative research shows that democratic governments experience more transnational terrorism than other governments. Rebel groups fighting democracies in civil wars target civilians more often than those fighting non-democracies, often using terrorism to complement guerilla warfare and other military challenges to government troops. Armed conflicts also tend to last longer in democracies than in non-democracies, possibly because counter-insurgency efforts are less brutal and hence less effective in restricting opportunities for violent political opposition. Well-established democracies such as France or Japan, however, experience considerably less political violence than non-democracies. This is true for domestic terrorism as well as for internal armed conflicts and civil wars. The rare internal conflicts these democracies experience (such as the Basque conflict) tend to lead to fewer casualties, in part because democratic governments are typically more restrained in their use of violence against civilians. Democratic governments may be at a disadvantage when it comes to countering insurgencies through force, but they also attract less violent opposition. Democratic institutions provide peaceful channels for resolving political conflict and a legally constrained government's response to a protest is often seen as more legitimate. In such systems, a much smaller segment of the population has a strong motivation to engage in political violence. Generally speaking, many forms of political violence are most likely to occur in political systems where repression is 'incomplete' – where

### opportunities to organize political violence exist and ineffective institutional channels provide the motivation for doing so.

Because democracies rarely outlaw political groups, except for those (such as the Baader-Meinhof group in Germany in the 1970s) that use illegitimate methods, political violence in democracies tends to occur where institutional channels are ineffective. This is why non-state parties to armed conflict in democratic states (such as the IRA in Northern Ireland and the various separatist groups of North-East India) disproportionately seek territorial autonomy rather than to challenge the central government. In some cases, demands for autonomy are made by opportunistic actors with narrow objectives, such as the separatists in Eastern Ukraine. More often, however, these demands are rooted in real grievances that arise because centralized decision-making favors the national majority rather than the local one, as was initially the case with the conflict in Sri Lanka. Internal conflict also tends to be more frequent in low- and middle-income democracies than in high-income ones. While India, Sri Lanka, and Colombia have experienced long insurgencies, the industrialized democracies of Europe have largely been spared. This vulnerability can probably be explained by the combination, in low-income countries, of stronger incentives to use violence for political goals and characteristic deficiencies in democratic governance – including corruption, weaker legal systems, ineffective bureaucracies and electoral irregularities. Insurgencies and other forms of political violence also disproportionately occur in political systems that mix democratic and non-democratic features. Traditionally, these semi-democratic systems – such as South Africa under apartheid and Israel, as long as it retains control over the occupied Palestinian territories – have had well-functioning institutions from which a large part of the population was excluded. In another form of semi-democracy that is becoming more common, leaders and representatives are elected by a majority of the population but face few institutional constraints once in office. The presidents of many African countries rule with little interference from their parliaments or judiciaries, allowing them greater opportunities to reward their political base and enrich themselves. This makes the stakes of elections much higher, and the use of violence to gain office more attractive. The widespread violence surrounding several Kenyan elections, for example, clearly had a basis in such calculations.

## Democracies have higher life expectancies than other forms of governance

Bollyky, Thomas et al. “The relationships between democratic experience, adult health, and cause-specific mortality in 170 countries between 1980 and 2016: an observational analysis.”

*The Lancet*. 13 March 2019. [https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736\(19\)30235-1/fulltext](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(19)30235-1/fulltext)

Previous analyses of democracy and population health have focused on broad measures, such as life expectancy at birth and child and infant mortality, and have shown some contradictory results. We used a panel of data spanning 170 countries to assess the association between democracy and cause-specific mortality and explore the pathways connecting democratic rule to health gains. We extracted cause-specific mortality and HIV-free life expectancy estimates from the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study 2016 and information on regime type from the Varieties of Democracy project. These data cover 170 countries and 46 years. From the Financing Global Health database, we extracted gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, also covering 46 years, and Development Assistance for Health estimates starting from 1990 and domestic health spending estimates starting from 1995. We used a diverse set of empirical methods—synthetic control, within-country variance decomposition, structural equation models, and fixed-effects regression—which together provide a robust analysis of the association between democratisation and population health. HIV-free life expectancy at age 15 years

improved significantly during the study period (1970–2015) in countries after they transitioned to democracy, on average by 3% after 10 years. Democratic experience explains 22·27% of the variance in mortality within a country from cardiovascular diseases, 16·53% for tuberculosis, and 17·78% for transport injuries, and a smaller percentage for other diseases included in the study. For cardiovascular diseases, transport injuries, cancers, cirrhosis, and other non-communicable diseases, democratic experience explains more of the variation in mortality than GDP. Over the past 20 years, the average country's increase in democratic experience had direct and indirect effects on reducing mortality from cardiovascular disease (–9·64%, 95% CI –6·38 to –12·90), other non-communicable diseases (–9·14%, –4·26 to –14·02), and tuberculosis (–8·93%, –2·08 to –15·77). Increases in a country's democratic experience were not correlated with GDP per capita between 1995 and 2015 ( $\rho=-0\cdot1036$ ;  $p=0\cdot1826$ ), but were correlated with declines in mortality from cardiovascular disease ( $\rho=-0\cdot3873$ ;  $p<0\cdot0001$ ) and increases in



government health spending ( $p=0.4002$ ;  $p<0.0001$ ). Removal of free and fair elections from the democratic experience variable resulted in loss of association with age-standardised mortality from non-communicable diseases and injuries. When enforced by free and fair elections, democracies are more likely than autocracies to lead to health gains for causes of mortality (eg, cardiovascular diseases and transport injuries) that have not been heavily targeted by foreign aid and require health-care delivery infrastructure.

International health agencies and donors might increasingly need to consider the implications of regime type in their efforts to maximise health gains, particularly in the context of ageing populations and the growing burden of non-communicable diseases.

# GLOBALIZATION GOOD

## What's the argument?

Urbanization allows developing African nations to participate in the global economy on an enormous scale. This is because cities are “powerful engines of growth” and are “home to the very forces that shape or drive globalization—finance, production, marketing, information, and knowledge production” (Cheru). Worldwide, cities have become the hub of global activity rather than the countries themselves (Commentary). This means that, in order to compete, Africa must continue to urbanize as well (Clark). If they fail to continue to innovate or fall behind, entire nations can be locked out of the global economy.

Luckily, Africa's urbanization has allowed it to participate on a global scale. This provides myriad benefits to both the economy on the whole, as well as the poorest, most vulnerable residents.

## Why does the argument matter?

Globalization provides several benefits to individual nations. First, it fuels economic growth, in turn decreasing poverty because “when countries open up to trade, they tend to grow faster and living standards tend to increase” (Pavnick). Concurrently, trade has been shown to increase income, as average income rose by 24% during the period of rapid globalization from 1988 to 2013 (Revenga and Gonzalez). Worldwide, globalization is a “golden opportunity for... a major reduction of poverty” (Nissanke and Thorbecke).

## Main Players

Multinational corporations, poor workers, government officials

## Strategy Considerations

Teams are unlikely to contest the fact that urbanization leads to globalization - it is generally accepted that the two go hand in hand and even reinforce one another. Thus, it is important for teams to develop a clear, coherent narrative as to why that is either good or bad, respective of which side of the debate they are on. This facilitates a clash-heavy debate and weighing becomes critical.

# Evidence for Globalization Good

## Urbanization causes globalization

### Urbanization leads to globalization

Cheru, P. "Globalization and uneven urbanization in Africa: the limits to effective Urban governance in the provision of basic services." *UCLA Center for Near East Asian Studies*. 18 May 2005. <https://www.international.ucla.edu/cnes/article/107324>

Historically, cities have occupied an important role in national development. Cities are powerful engines of growth, in many cases more powerful than national economies. Cities are centers of innovation by the very fact that they are home to the very forces that shape or drive globalization—finance, production, marketing, information, and knowledge production (Sassen, 1991; Gilbert and Gugler, 1992:64). The characteristics of cities—both infrastructural, regulatory and legal environment and the quality of human capital—in turn, help shape globalization. Over the past 25 years, increased in economic productivity, improvements in literacy, health status, and life expectancy have in most countries resulted from urban-generated economic surpluses. At the present moment, two types of urbanization processes can be observed: 'urbanization with development' and 'urbanization without development' (or limited development). Urbanization with development occurs when national economic growth and development are present at the same time, including a national policy that integrates economic and spatial planning; a productive agricultural sector; growth of secondary cities and market towns to facilitate rural-urban interactions; thus leading to a manageable levels of rural-urban migration.\_

### Cities, not countries, are the new hubs of global activity

Commentary. "Nations are no longer driving globalization—cities are." *Quartz*. 3 May 2013. <https://qz.com/80657/the-return-of-the-city-state/>

Today, numerous cities have substantially more economic weight, international connectivity, and diplomatic influence on the world stage than dozens of nations. The rise of cities as transnational actors is thus driven not only by urbanization and globalization, but also a third nearly irreversible phenomenon: devolution. The period since the end of the Cold War has witnessed not only a major wave of new state births stemming from the collapse of the Soviet Union and disintegration of Yugoslavia, but a much broader entropy as sub-state and provincial authorities leverage the forces of transparency, identity, and connectivity to push for greater autonomy. Quebec, the Basque country, Flanders, Greenland, Scotland, and Catalonia are among the hundreds of examples of provincial entities asserting their domestic autonomy and international credentials. Australia and Canada have also witnessed the conspicuous rise of local councils such as the City of Sydney or Vancouver City Council, both now far more advanced in developing integrated environmental strategies than their respective federal governments. Quite a few other non-capital cities such as Lagos or Mumbai have substantial international presence despite the dysfunction of their home nations. Over the past decade, most Indian and Chinese provinces have also set up their own trade and investment promotion offices worldwide, often as non-diplomatic and purely commercial ventures to attract tourism and investment. Taken together, the separatist movements mentioned above and the sub-national economic diplomacy conducted from within even great powers point to a growing desire of urban-regions to be identified more as "global cities" than as subservient to national states. (Only in very few cases, such as Singapore or Monaco, do these conveniently come together.) The rise of the place-branding industry, which encompasses national Olympic bids, tourism and investment promotion, and increasingly city-specific public diplomacy campaigns, provides further evidence of how local governments and marketers are teaming up to boost their image beyond their national geographies. Increasingly this involves

partnerships with blue-chip academic institutions. The widely discussed case of the Yale-National University of Singapore College for Liberal Arts, multi-metropolis business programs such as the TRIUM Global Executive MBA across Paris, London and New York, all signal how inter-city academic partnerships are forming the new basis of professionally relevant global education.

## Cities have become increasingly important to globalization

Clark, Greg, "How cities took over the world: a history of globalisation spanning 4,000 years." *The Guardian*. 1 December 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/dec/01/how-cities-took-over-the-world-a-history-of-globalisation-spanning-4000-years>

The most recent cycle of globalisation has seen the start of a new wave of distinctive, specialised and globally aspirational cities. Many of them are higher-income cities within their respective regions and seek to leverage their efficient infrastructure, improved quality of life, and better security and environmental performance compared to the larger megacities. Cities in this wave are less likely to have major political or institutional functions. Rather, they are competing in more dynamic and fast-moving global industries where opportunities have arisen for greater market share. Among this group are Brisbane, San Diego, Shenzhen, Santiago de Chile and Stockholm. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis and its impact on public sector finances, the ability of cities to find new sources and tools for investment has been a key enabler for globalising cities since 2008. Brisbane is an example of a city that has been able to globalise with the help of a large and financially astute city government, which has used the surplus from its recent commodities boom to erect a more international model of economic development.

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Not all of today's leading cities were destined to play key roles in the global economy. Many started out from an unpromising or uncompetitive situation because of either internal weaknesses or external disadvantages. Sometimes cities have endured long periods of global isolation, and begin to internationalise only when geopolitical changes occur and foreign investment arrives. This was certainly the case in the 20th century, and in the 21st century it is visible in many other cities outside the established west. Equally, the ebb and flow of cities' fortunes means that some cities we take for granted today as global will likely be much less globally oriented in future. History shows this is a risk if cities lose competitiveness in traded sectors, fail to embrace innovation or to project influence, are closed to immigration and entrepreneurship, or are unable to adapt to a changing geopolitical or geoeconomic centre of gravity. The ingredients of today's most successful cities are sometimes hard for other cities to emulate directly, and so alternative strategies and pathways to global engagement have arisen. Over time, these alternative pathways result in very different kinds of global cities.

## Impacts of globalization

### Globalization causes economic growth

Pavnick, Nina. "How has globalization benefited the poor?" *Yale Insights*. 28 April 2009. <https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/how-has-globalization-benefited-the-poor>

Economic growth is the main channel through which globalization can affect poverty. What researchers have found is that, in general, when countries open up to trade, they tend to grow faster and living standards tend to increase. The usual argument goes that the benefits of this higher growth trickle down to the poor. It has been a bit trickier, especially with aggregate data, to pinpoint how exactly the poor have been benefited. One challenge is that when trade or globalization happens, many other factors are changing, such as technology and macroeconomic conditions. Another challenge is that high-quality data on the well-being of the poor is often not available. It is thus really hard to tease out the effects of

globalization on poverty in a broad sense. But, that said, it is virtually impossible to find cases of poor countries that were able to grow over long periods of time without opening up to trade. And we have no evidence that trade leads to increases in poverty and declines in growth.

## Trade raises incomes and reduces poverty

Revenge, Ana and Anabel Gonzalez. "Trade has been a global force for less poverty and higher incomes." *World Bank Blogs*. 2 February 2017.

<https://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/trade-has-been-global-force-less-poverty-and-higher-incomes>

In the ongoing debate about the benefits of trade, we must not lose sight of a vital fact. Trade and global integration have raised incomes across the world, while dramatically cutting poverty and global inequality. Within some countries, trade has contributed to rising inequality, but that unfortunate result ultimately reflects the need for stronger safety nets and better social and labor programs, not trade protection. Merchandise trade as a share of world GDP grew from around 30 percent in 1988 to around 50 percent in 2013. In this period of rapid globalization, average income grew by 24 percent globally, the global poverty headcount ratio declined from 35% to 10.7%, and the income of the bottom 40 percent of the world population increased by close to 50 percent.

## Globalization decreases poverty

Nissanke, Machiko and Erik Thorbecke. "The Impact of Globalization on the World's Poor." *United Nations University*. 2004. <https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/impact-globalization-world's-poor>

The process of globalization provides a golden opportunity for mankind to contribute to a major reduction of poverty world-wide.

While the potential for poverty reduction is great, the extent of it will depend on many factors including, in particular, the pattern of growth followed by the developed and developing countries and the overall global policy framework. A question that is often raised is whether the actual distribution of gains is fair and whether the poor benefit less than proportionately from globalization—and could under some circumstances actually be hurt by it. The risks and costs brought about by globalization can be significant for fragile developing economies and the world's poor. The downside of globalization is most vividly epitomized at times of periodical global financial and economic crises. The costs of the repeated crises associated with economic and financial globalization appear to have been borne overwhelmingly by the developing world, and often disproportionately so by the poor who are the most vulnerable. On the other hand, benefits from globalization in booming times are not necessarily shared widely and equally in the global community.

# HELPING THE ECONOMY

## What's the argument?

Generally speaking, people move to cities because they are hubs of economic prosperity, have greater job opportunities, and provide access to more and higher quality amenities. These motivating factors are universal and are the primary driver behind urbanization in West Africa. Studies show urbanization directly correlates with an increase in GDP per capita (Chen). Thus, the reason people are moving into cities in the first place is an inherent benefit of urbanization.

Workers often move into urban centers in search of better jobs, both in the form of higher wages and more generous benefits. Statistically speaking, this pans out in West African cities. On average, “urban areas offer better amenities and pay higher wages than rural areas” and “consumption per individual (a common proxy for income) is about four times higher in urban areas than in rural areas in the average developing country” (Gollin, Kirchberger, and Lagakos). In fact, “living standards are higher in towns and villages than in rural locations, and they appear to improve even further in cities compared to lower-density towns”, meaning the benefits of urbanization spill over, albeit to a lesser extent, into suburban areas (Gollin, Kirchberger, and Lagakos). Studies find that economic growth, driven by an increase in income, raises quality of life (“Growth: Building Jobs... Countries”). Additionally, life expectancy is higher in wealthier countries, meaning the economic growth driven by urbanization could raise the average lifespan (Biciunaite).

## Why does the argument matter?

Studies find that economic growth, driven by an increase in income, raises quality of life (“Growth: Building Jobs... Countries”). Additionally, life expectancy is higher in wealthier countries, meaning the economic growth driven by urbanization could raise the average lifespan (Biciunaite). Specifically, the urbanization in West Africa likely caused a substantial increase in life expectancy. Since 2000, life expectancy “surged by between 20 and 42 per cent” (Johnson).

## Main Players

Small business owners, unemployed rural workers

## Strategy Considerations

This is likely the most straightforward argument on pro - it is intuitive and relatable even to those who have never been to West Africa, as the logic applies to nearly any urban center. This makes it extremely easy for pro to run, as teams can construct a clear narrative and emphasize their impacts throughout the entire round. However, con teams will likely (and should) emphasize the fact that this argument relies on the ability of infrastructure in urban areas to keep up with the migration, something that, unfortunately, does not appear to be happening in many West African cities.

# Evidence for Helping the Economy

## Urbanization causes growth

### Urbanization correlates with an increase in GDP per capita

Chen, Mingxing et al. "The Global Pattern of Urbanization and Economic Growth: Evidence from the Last Three Decades." *PLoS One*. 6 August 2014.

[www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4123908/](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4123908/)

We calculated the value of the average GDP per capita in different groups by considering GDP per capita and the total population of any given country, which provided an accurate description of real development level. Figure 2b shows that **urbanization level is closely linked to level of GDP per capita** in 1980 and 2011. **A higher urbanization level means a higher level of economic development in general**, which is similar to what has been reported in previous studies [16], [18], [19]. Moreover, economic growth shows a clear accelerating trend, while the growth in urbanization level increases in each 10% band by between 0% and 70%. In other words, growth of GDP per capita is modest between 0% and 40%, but dramatic between 40% and 70%. It is interesting to note, however, that the average value of GDP per capita is only 3344 dollars in the 40–50% urbanization level group in 2011, even lower than the average value (5507 dollars) in the same group in 1980. There was a similar phenomenon in the 50–60% urbanization level group. We reasoned that, if the urbanization process can drive economic growth, we should observe a higher value of GDP per capita in 2011 in the same urbanization group, at least as large as the original value in 1980. This indicates that the goals of economic growth are often not attained, although some developing countries expect to speed up economic growth via accelerated urbanization, and urbanization level targets are reached. Additionally, the level of GDP per capita in the higher urbanization groups (60–100%) has shown significant growth trends over the last 30 years, while the lower urbanization groups (0–50%) demonstrate a more complicated change in level of GDP per capita. This shows that the gap between countries with higher urbanization levels and countries with lower GDP per capita has been widening during the last three decades.

### Cities fuel economic growth

Pilling, David. "African cities surge to top of global growth league." *Financial Times*. 11

September 2018. <https://www.ft.com/content/9d457d54-b272-11e8-8d14-6f049d06439c>

Karim Kane is a carpenter, not a speculator. But the plot of land he bought a decade ago is worth nearly 25 times what he paid for it. In 2007, the village chief sold it to him for the equivalent of about \$450. Mr Kane built a house for his wife and six children on land that today he reckons is worth nearly \$11,000. The area where Mr Kane lives is little more than muddy hills with scattered plots of land given over to cows and goats. Pedlars lead donkey carts loaded with plastic jerry cans of potable water. But despite its semi-rural appearance Mr Kane has no doubt that he is now a resident of Mali's capital. "I'm a Bamakois," he says, using the French word for a citizen of Bamako. Almost unnoticed, Africa has become the world's most rapidly urbanising continent. From 2018 to 2035, the UN predicts that the world's 10 fastest growing cities will be African. It's a trend that has already enveloped Mr Kane, whose land has been swallowed up by Yirimadio, the fastest-growing part of Bamako, which may itself be the fastest-growing city in Africa. In parts of the neighbourhood, shacks built by people recently arrived from the countryside jostle with houses being constructed by Bamakois who are snapping up cheaper plots of land on the city edge. As Bamako has grown exponentially it poses huge logistical problems for the cash-starved authorities that are replicated across the continent. According to a World Bank study, 472m people in sub-Saharan Africa live in cities. High birth rates and migration from the countryside mean that by 2040 Africa's urban population will more than double to 1bn, it says, a rate that far outpaces urbanisation elsewhere in the world. Tann vom Hove, a senior fellow at City Mayors, which puts Mali's capital at the top of the list with an annual expansion rate of 4.5 per cent, says the trend is more important than the precise ranking. Estimates from the UN say other cities, including Dar es Salaam, a city of nearly 5m in Tanzania, are growing even faster than Bamako. Some of Africa's megacities, including Lagos, Nigeria's commercial capital of 21m people, and Kinshasa, the chaotic capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo, are sucking in hundreds of thousands of new people each year. Smaller cities, such as Yaounde in Cameroon, are growing almost as fast. **Urbanisation is what helped ignite the "Africa rising" narrative** promoted by the likes of McKinsey, a consultancy, whose 2016 **Lions on the Move II report highlighted cities as an engine of productivity. From 2015 to 2045,** McKinsey found, 24m more Africans would be living in cities each year, compared to 11m in India and 9m in China. **"Urbanisation**



has a strong correlation with the rate of real GDP growth,” it said, adding that “productivity in cities is more than double that in the countryside”. The World Bank estimates Bamako’s population today at 3.5m, more than 10 times its size at independence in 1960. But managing urban growth, with its associated problems of service provision, housing, crime and congestion, has become one of the biggest policy challenges on the continent. “For me this is a catastrophe foretold,” says Issa N’Diaye, a professor of philosophy at the University of Bamako, of his city’s untrammelled growth. “Bamako is a time-bomb.” Bamako, he says, and by implication many other cities in Africa, lacks the resources and institutional capacity to cope with explosive growth. There is not even a proper land registry, he says, meaning multiple claims on the same plot can be tied up in court for years. Skyrocketing land prices have led to rampant corruption, Mr N’Diaye says, alleging that land allocated for schools in his own neighbourhood has been sold off by unscrupulous officials. Rapid urban expansion has also left people bereft of services, he says. “There’s been no planning whatsoever of the road system, water drainage, electricity or urban transport. The city is becoming more and more unlivable.”

## Urbanization raises incomes

### Urban incomes are higher than rural incomes and amenities are better

Gollin, Douglas, Martina Kirchberger, and David Lagakos. “Measuring living standards in African cities and rural areas.” *VoxDev*. 10 February 2017. <https://voxdev.org/topic/labour-markets-migration/measuring-living-standards-african-cities-and-rural-areas>

It’s no wonder that people are moving to cities. Urban areas offer better amenities and, on average, pay higher wages than rural areas. In most developing countries, rural incomes appear to be far lower than urban incomes. For example, Young (2014) shows that consumption per individual (a common proxy for income) is about four times higher in urban areas than in rural areas in the average developing country. Similarly, Gollin et al. (2014) show that value added per worker is at least twice as high in the non-agricultural sector than the agricultural sector. Herrendorf and Schoellman (2016) find a similar result for wages. Considering so much of the developing world’s population lives in rural areas and works in agriculture, these spatial gaps in income are crucial for understanding why developing countries have such low aggregate income levels. One tempting interpretation of these rural-urban wage gaps is that they reflect a spatial equilibrium, in which the higher wages of cities are offset by fewer (or worse) non-monetary amenities. The idea of a spatial equilibrium is that the mobility of people across locations leads to a relatively fine balance, in which overall utility (i.e. well-being) is equalised across locations. The idea of a spatial equilibrium is one of the simplest and most appealing ways urban economists have used to think about how economic agents locate through space (Rosen 1979, Roback 1982, Glaeser and Gottlieb 2009). The rationale is simple: if any region offered a better combination of consumption and amenities, then agents would move to avail themselves of these benefits. As more people move, growing congestion and other problems will tend to reduce the attractiveness of the ‘better’ location, leading to an equilibrium in which well-being is equalised across locations. Academic researchers have used the notion of a spatial equilibrium fruitfully to analyse a number of economic issues with a spatial dimension, such as the distribution of wages and sizes across US cities (Baum-Snow and Pavan 2012, Desmet and Rossi Hansberg 2013), the welfare effects of improvements in transportation infrastructure (Allen and Arkolakis 2014, Donaldson and Hornbeck 2016), and the aggregate impacts of regional development policy (Kline and Moretti 2014). On the policy front, the view that cities in the developing world offer higher wages but lower amenities is embraced by some, as in the claim that “in developing countries, the urban poor are often as bad as, or worse off than, the average rural family, and for many rural families, moving to the city may result in more - rather than less - hardship” (Save the Children 2015). Is it systematically true that amenities of cities are worse than those of rural areas? If so, exactly which amenities of urban life offset the substantially higher incomes of urban areas? In a recent paper (Gollin et al. 2017), we set out to answer these questions by measuring amenities across space in 20 African countries, which together cover around three quarters of Africa’s population (which is currently more than one billion people). We focus on measures of health, public goods, crime and pollution. These are commonly cited amenities that differ across space in the developing world. They are also measures for which high-quality data are available at a highly disaggregated spatial level. We base our analysis on detailed micro data from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), from which we have comparable responses for nearly 300,000 households. We combine the DHS data with survey data from Afrobarometer, and also include some observations that come from satellite imagery (e.g. of particulate air pollution). Our data allow us to distinguish not only between rural and urban areas, but between more densely populated rural areas and less densely populated rural areas. What we find is that in almost every country, amenities are similar or better in cities than in rural areas, and they are also fairly systematically better in more densely populated rural areas than in less densely populated locations. In other words, living standards are higher in towns and villages than in rural locations, and they appear to improve even further in cities compared to lower-density towns.

## Impact of economic prosperity

### Economic growth improves quality of life

“Growth: Building Jobs and Prosperity in Developing Countries.” *OECD*.

<https://www.oecd.org/derec/unitedkingdom/40700982.pdf>

**Economic growth is the most powerful instrument for reducing poverty and improving the quality of life in developing countries.**

Both cross-country research and country case studies provide overwhelming evidence that rapid and sustained growth is critical to making faster progress towards the Millennium Development Goals – and not just the first goal of halving the global proportion of people living on less than \$1 a day. **Growth can generate**

**virtuous circles of prosperity and opportunity.** Strong growth and employment opportunities improve incentives for parents to invest in their children’s education by sending them to school. This may lead to the emergence of a strong and growing group of entrepreneurs, which should generate pressure for improved governance. Strong economic growth therefore advances human development, which, in turn, promotes economic growth. But under different conditions, similar rates of growth can have very different effects on poverty, the employment prospects of the poor and broader indicators of human development. The extent to which growth reduces poverty depends on the degree to which the poor participate in the growth process and share in its proceeds. Thus, both the pace and pattern of growth matter for reducing poverty. A successful strategy of poverty reduction must have at its core measures to promote rapid and sustained economic growth. The challenge for policy is to combine growth promoting policies with policies that allow the poor to participate fully in the opportunities unleashed and so contribute to that growth. This includes policies to make labour markets work better, remove gender inequalities and increase financial inclusion. Asian countries are increasingly tackling this agenda of ‘inclusive growth’. India’s most recent development plan has two main objectives: **raising economic growth and making growth more inclusive, policy mirrored elsewhere in South Asia and Africa.**

### Economic prosperity increases life expectancy

Biciunaite, Audre. “Does economic growth raise life expectancy?” *Euromonitor International*.

14 March 2014. <https://blog.euromonitor.com/economic-growth-and-life-expectancy-do-wealthier-countries-live-longer/>

The relationship between income and life expectancy has been demonstrated by a number of statistical studies. **The** so-called **Preston curve**, for example, **indicates that individuals born in wealthier countries, on average, can expect to live longer than those born in poor countries** [1]. It is not the aggregate growth in income, however, that matters most, but the reduction in poverty. This article explores how the connection between per capita GDP and life expectancy weakens after reaching a certain level, and looks at examples where income gains did not translate into life expectancy improvements. **The most obvious explanation** behind the connection between life expectancy and income **is the effect of food supply on mortality**. Historically, there have been statistically convincing parallels between prices of food and mortality [2]. **Higher income** also **implies better access to housing, education, health services and other items which tend to lead to improved health, lower rates of mortality and higher life expectancy**. It is not surprising, therefore, that aggregate income has been a pretty good predictor of life expectancy historically. If we look at the world today, however, the relationship between income and life expectancy begins to weaken once income reaches a certain level. This is well illustrated in the developed countries example in Figure 2. The Preston curve for developed countries (IMF definition) is much leaner compared to that of total number of countries. In 2012, a child born in Hong Kong could expect to live for 83.6 years, the longest in the world. The next countries in the longevity list were Italy, Switzerland, Japan and France, all of which have a rather significant variation in income. One of the biggest outliers among developed countries was the US – high per capita GDP but rather low life expectancy. The three Eastern European countries – the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Estonia – recent entrants to the developed countries list, have comparably lower incomes and also lower life expectancy.

# INCREASING ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE

## What's the argument?

Unfortunately, many rural residents in West Africa lack access to high quality healthcare. Globally, 56% of rural residents do not have access to healthcare, compared to 83% in Africa (“Rural health... decisions”). Moreover, only 23% of health workers are deployed to rural areas, and, in Nigeria, “the country’s rural population fares worse than the urban population on the indicators of staff access deficit, financial deficit, and maternal mortality” (“Rural health... decisions”; Strasser, Kam, and Regalado).

This deficit is especially pronounced in low-income and developing countries like many of those in West Africa, meaning that the health status of rural residents is worse than urban residents (Strasser, Kam, and Regalado). Furthermore, while three-fourths of urban zones have health clinics, just half of rural zones do, meaning “for many rural residents, obtaining care may involve greater effort and transport costs” (Armah-Attoh, Selormey and Houessou). In fact, the urbanization in West Africa likely caused a substantial increase in life expectancy. Since 2000, life expectancy “surged by between 20 and 42 per cent” (Johnson).

## Why does the argument matter?

In addition to the empirical increase in life expectancy by up to 42% that happened alongside urbanization, precedent proves that increasing access to healthcare improves outcomes for vulnerable populations. This is largely due to the increased ability to identify previously undiagnosed illnesses such as hypertension. In a study done across the continent of Africa, awareness of chronic disease doubled (7% to 14%) in the program group, the group which gained access to healthcare, while remaining constant in the control group. Additionally, blood pressure decreased significantly in the program group when compared to the control group, showing that increased access to healthcare improves health outcomes (“The Impact of ...Africa”).

## Main Players

Healthcare workers, people with chronic illnesses

## Strategy Considerations

This argument is pretty straightforward and easily weighed on scope, as it impacts nearly everyone in West Africa. It also outweighs most economic impacts regarding poverty and income inequality, as regardless of whether poverty changes or not, pro is more likely to stop poor people from dying. Thus, you have a direct path to the ballot and avoid a lot of clash that will likely happen on this topic.

# Evidence for Increasing Access to Healthcare

## Rural communities have less access to healthcare than urban areas

### 56% of people in rural Africa do not have access to healthcare

“Rural health inequities: data and decisions.” *The Lancet*. 9 May 2015.

[https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736\(15\)60910-2/fulltext](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(15)60910-2/fulltext)

70% of the world's 1.4 billion people who are extremely poor live in rural areas. A new report released on April 27 by the UN International Labour Organisation (ILO), Global evidence on inequities in rural health protection: new data on rural deficits in health coverage for 174 countries, presents the first global, regional, and national data on the extent and major causes of rural–urban inequities in coverage, and access to health care. **56% of rural residents worldwide are without legal health coverage** (defined as

protected by legislation or affiliation with a health insurance scheme)—compared with 22% of the urban population. **83% of Africa's rural population have no entitlements to health care**, yet the most extreme rural–urban inequities in legal coverage occur in Asia and the Pacific. Reflected in the context of equity and universal health coverage (UHC), the report abruptly reminds us that the global community, despite all good intentions, are still doing too little too late for the health of rural populations. Although inequities in health protection are recognised within UHC debates, data about the rural–urban divide are weak and fragmented, with a complete absence of disaggregated data within countries, regions, or globally. Policy makers tend to respond to what is presented to them. The absence of disaggregated data influences decisions on national resource allocation, and in turn perpetuates the neglect of systematic planning for rural populations in many countries. This report is the first step to rectify the gap in evidence by using five proxy indicators, measuring key dimensions of coverage and access to health care: legal coverage, staff access deficit, financial deficit, out-of-pocket spending, and the maternal mortality ratio (MMR). The report highlights that virtually all rural–urban differences in health staffing, financing of services, and legal coverage occur in rural populations. Health worker shortages are unsurprisingly extreme in rural areas worldwide.

**Although half of the world's population live in rural areas, only 23% of health workers**

**globally are deployed there**, with an estimated seven million health workers missing globally in rural areas compared with 3 million in urban dwellings. **63% of the world's rural population do not access health care because of**

**underfunding of global health financing**, compared with 33% of the urban population. Out-of-pocket payments inequities are, at first glance, relatively smaller globally in rural populations, with lower out-of-pocket payments in rural than in urban

populations in Africa, Latin America, and central and eastern Europe. Yet **the lower out-of-pocket payments in many countries indicates an exclusion of rural populations from access to health care**. The

harsh reality in rural areas is that what does not exist (eg, health workers, clinics, transport) cannot be paid for, and therefore no cost accrued. Across all regions except Europe and North America, rural MMR is at least double urban MMR, with Africa reporting the highest MMR regional level of 55 deaths per 10 000 live births. Country case studies from Cambodia, Mexico, Nigeria, and Zambia reports using the same five indicators to highlight the main challenges to improve health coverage and access. **In Nigeria, the country's**

**rural population fares worse than the urban population on the indicators of staff access deficit, financial deficit, and maternal mortality**. This situation exists despite rapid urbanisation and a high but

inequitable supply of human resources for health relative to other countries. Zambia, with a largely rural population and an urban population reliant on private sector services, has higher out-of-pocket payments in urban than in rural areas. Mexico, with a mostly urbanised population, also reported higher out-of-pocket payments in urban areas—both illustrations of when services remain limited or completely inaccessible for rural populations. Cambodia performed better than the other countries on the MMR indicator, reflecting maternal health efforts. The ILO report leaves no doubt that the urban–rural gap in access to health care exists. The question is more about the size of the deficit and what can be done. The conclusion that only a comprehensive and systematic approach can address these inequities cannot be overstated, and must be acted on. No single action focusing on one of the indicator areas is enough to achieve UHC. A country's approach must systematically and simultaneously address legal coverage and rights, health-worker shortages, extension of health-care protection, and quality of care. Only then can equitable access for all be fully achieved.

## Healthcare is significantly more accessible in urban areas than rural

Strasser, Roger, Sophia Kam, and Sophie Regalado. "Rural Health Care Access and Policy in Developing Countries." *Annual Review of Public Health*. 6 January 2016.

<https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-032315-021507>

The World Health Organization (WHO) report A Universal Truth: No Health Without a Workforce was prepared for the Third Global Forum on Human Resources for Health held in November 2013 in Recife, Brazil. This report confirmed that there is a deficit in health care professionals all over the world, which is especially pronounced in rural areas of developing or low-income countries (21). Compared to their urban counterparts, rural and remote inhabitants experience lower life expectancy and poorer health status (6, 79). Socioeconomic differences, poverty, and lower levels of employment together with service-, resource-, and transportation-related imbalances result in the social exclusion of rural dwellers (1, 2, 10, 13, 39, 46, 52, 60, 65). Although the deficit in health professionals exists worldwide, nowhere is this deficit, number-wise and skill-wise, more significant than in rural areas (70, 71). When developing a rural health policy, countries face major challenges in service delivery, human resources, governance, transportation, financing, communication, and in some regions corruption. In every country, the health status of rural dwellers is worse than that of their urban counterparts (6, 9, 15, 76, 79). Limitation in access to health care is a major contributor to this situation, particularly in low-income or developing countries (15, 46, 61, 71, 76, 95). Even in countries where the majority of the population lives in rural areas, the resources are concentrated in the cities (2, 9, 30, 51, 61, 76, 79, 88, 91, 95, 100, 101). All countries experience difficulties with transport and communication between rural areas and large population centers, and they all face the challenge of shortages of doctors and other health professionals in rural and remote areas (9, 13, 15, 22, 30, 31, 39, 46, 51, 61, 67, 74, 95). Rural community health and health workforce planning, supply, and distribution have been widely discussed, and a growing body of literature defines and analyzes the key issues affecting access to and improvement of health services for diverse populations in rural underserved areas. Predominantly absent from these discussions is an exploration of the need to prioritize health workforce training programs throughout the educational pipeline (from undergraduate to continuing education and professional development) and to ensure the successful production of health workers within systems built on comprehensive primary health care, which includes public health (88). The sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region includes a disproportionately large number of developing countries compared to other global regions, and it shows a growing gap between health workforce demand and supply. Consequently, this article explores the situation in SSA in depth as an example of the limitations of rural health care access and policy in developing countries. The framework that guides this exploration consists of the following concepts: access to primary health care services, sustainable rural health service models, rural health workforce supply, and policy implications as exemplified by the success or failure of the initiatives designed to address these issues. The next four sections present a review of the published academic and gray literature on rural health care, access, and policy in SSA. The second section, Methods, defines the keywords that are pertinent to this discussion and outlines the approach used to select search terms and the relevant literature. The third section presents the findings from the review of the literature, and the fourth section, Discussion and Recommendations, discusses the implications of the literature findings and offers recommendations for further policy development. The final section summarizes the discussion and concludes with specific recommendations.

## Rural areas have fewer health clinics than urban areas

Armah-Attoh, Daniel, Edem Selormey, and Richard Houessou. "Despite gains, barriers keep health care high on Africa's priority list." *Afrobarometer*. April 2016.

On average across 36 countries, Afrobarometer fieldworkers found health clinics in 62% of all survey enumeration areas (EAs). While three-fourths (74%) of urban zones have health clinics, only about half (53%) of rural zones do, which makes it harder and more expensive for rural residents to obtain

care. Almost half (49%) of Africans say they or a family member had to go without medicine or medical care at least once in the year preceding the survey. Across 18 countries tracked since 2005, the proportion of Africans going without care has decreased by 10 percentage points. Among those who accessed health care during the previous year, four in 10 (42%) found it "difficult" or "very difficult" to get the care they needed. One in seven (14%) of those who accessed health services paid a bribe or did a favour to obtain the needed service. Across 36 countries, close to half (46%) of citizens say their government is performing "fairly badly" or "very badly" in improving basic health services. In 18 countries tracked since 2005, negative evaluations have increased by 13 percentage points over the past decade. On average across 36 countries, Africans consider health care their second-most important problem (after unemployment). In 31



of 36 countries, health care ranks either first or second on the list of citizens' priority sectors for additional government spending. Nearly half (45%) of Africans are opposed to paying more taxes or user fees in exchange for increased government spending on health care. By itself, higher presence of health clinics does not appear to improve citizens' experiences and perceptions of health-care service delivery. As part of the data collection process, Afrobarometer field teams make on-the-ground observations in each census enumeration area (EA) they visit about services and facilities that are available in the area or within "easy walking distance." Since the EAs visited are selected to represent the population of the country as a whole, these data provide reliable indicators of infrastructure and service availability. On average across 36 countries, field teams found that health clinics are easily accessible to almost two-thirds (62%) of EAs. Clinics are most widely present in Cameroon (accessible in 96% of EAs), Egypt (92%), Botswana (89%), Algeria (88%), Mauritius (85%), and Nigeria (83%).

Conversely, only about one in four EAs have clinics within easy walking distance in Namibia (25%) and Swaziland (29%) (Figure 1). Only about half (53%) of rural EAs have a nearby health clinic, suggesting that for many rural residents, obtaining care may involve greater effort and transport costs. Urban areas are more likely to have easily accessible health clinics (74%). The urban-rural gap (21 percentage points on average) is most pronounced in Morocco (72 points), followed by Mali (46 points) and Malawi (41 points). Clinics are about equally common in rural and urban areas in Sierra Leone and Cameroon, and in South Africa rural areas have slightly better access (Table 1).

## *Impact of increased access to healthcare*

### **Life expectancy in Africa surged alongside urbanization**

Johnson, Steve. "Africa's life expectancy jumps dramatically." *Financial Times*. 26 April 2016.

<https://www.ft.com/content/38c2ad3e-0874-11e6-b6d3-746f8e9cdd33>

**Life expectancy in a swath of African countries since 2000 surged by between 20 and 42 per cent,** providing an upbeat counterpoint to the gloom increasingly enveloping the continent. The "Africa Rising" narrative has

increasingly been called into question in the past year, with the International Monetary Fund predicting that economic growth across sub-Saharan Africa will slow to 3 per cent this year, the weakest pace of growth since 1999 and barely more than the population growth of 2.5 per cent. This is likely to be the first year this millennium when Africa grows more slowly than the rest of the world, the IMF predicts. With the respected Ibrahim Index of African Governance suggesting that standards of governance have declined since the global financial crisis, and the IMF having warned that too few countries used the boom years to improve their public finances, a picture emerges of a continent that has largely squandered its commodity-led windfall. The recent slowdown has also led to the perception that the entire Africa rising phenomenon was driven more by the cyclical upswing in commodity prices than any longer-lasting structural improvements in African economies. However, dramatic rises in life expectancy suggest many governments, aided by external donors such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, have been able to improve their health systems and the wellbeing of their populace. Malawi has led the way, with life expectancy at birth rising 42 per cent from 44.1 years in 2000 to 62.7 in 2014, according to data from the World Bank. Zambia and Zimbabwe have both seen rises of 38 per cent over the same period, with longevity in Rwanda, Botswana and Sierra Leone up more than 30 per cent. Uganda, Ethiopia, the Republic of Congo, Niger and Kenya have all witnessed rises of more than 20 per cent. Overall, of the 37 countries to have seen life expectancy rise by more than 10 per cent since 2000, 30 are in sub-Saharan Africa, including the 15 with the biggest gains, as the table below shows. **Not one sub-Saharan country saw life expectancy fall between**

**2000 and 2014,** with war-torn Syria the only state to suffer this fate. Aside from Swaziland (where longevity rose only 0.4 per cent), the smallest improvement was the 2.5 per cent in South Africa, where life expectancy of 57.2 years now trails that found in dozens of poorer sub-Saharan states. Africa, of course, had more scope to raise life expectancy, given most its countries were starting from a lower base than typically found elsewhere in the world. However **the figures are a marked contrast from the 1990s, when**

**life expectancy fell sharply** in countries such as Zimbabwe, Botswana, the Republic of Congo, Kenya, Namibia and the Central African Republic, and only edged up in many others. The HIV/Aids epidemic was a major killer then, and efforts to prevent infection and prolong the lives of those infected have played a part in the subsequent rebound in longevity since 2000. Yvonne Mhango, sub-Saharan economist at Renaissance Capital and a native of table-topper Malawi, says: "When I was growing up in the 1980s and 1990s, HIV/Aids killed a lot of the working-age population. "It hasn't been eradicated but the introduction of antiretroviral [drugs] that are affordable and accessible to low-income people has helped to lengthen their lives. They are able to work and look after their families. That has made a big difference." Ms Mhango also points to wider availability of cheaper generic drugs, often sourced from low-cost countries such as India, and improvements in preventive medicine, such as measures to reduce the incidence of malaria. John May, visiting scholar at the Population Reference Bureau in Washington DC, believes **the key to improved longevity has been a "rapid decline" in infant and child mortality.** "We have seen a lot of programmes and interventions, such as impregnated bed

nets [to combat malaria], immunisation campaigns and also a strong commitment on the part of Africa's leadership to really push for a survival revolution," he says. Across sub-Saharan Africa, deaths before the age of 12 months per 1,000 live births have fallen from 138 in 1970 to 67 as of 2013, according to USAID, although that still compares badly with a developed world average of five deaths per 1,000 births. Although Mr May is sceptical that the improvement has been quite so pronounced, citing concerns about the quality of data collection, he does nevertheless believe the improvement has been "dramatic". William Jackson, senior emerging markets economist at Capital Economics, argues the impressive rises in life expectancy suggest Africa has managed to make a big stride forward since 2000, despite the current doom and gloom. **"From a macroeconomic perspective, the last decade has been pretty good, even if the Africa rising story is reversing," he says. "There have been significant rises in income across the region and more money for governments to spend on areas such as healthcare, as well as better medicine and better planning. Governance in Africa has improved quite significantly over the past decade."** Charles Robertson, global chief economist at Renaissance Capital, cites a refocusing of international aid on areas such as education and healthcare for part of the gains. Moreover, he argues the data give the lie to the argument that the commodity-based wealth that rolled into Africa during the good years was largely siphoned off by a cabal of well-connected locals and foreigners intent on "stripping Africa of its resources". With many of the easy gains made, it is logical to think that further improvements in life expectancy will slow from here.

## Expanding healthcare access in Africa improved identification of chronic disease

"The Impact of Access to Quality Healthcare in Africa." *Amsterdam Institute for Global Health and Development*. February 2015. <https://www.aighd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/The-Impact-of-Access-to-Quality-Healthcare-in-Africa-Research-findings-on-Health-Insurance-Fund-supported-programs.pdf>

The impact on the program was very similar for each of those questions. Figure 5 shows the results for chronic diseases. At baseline, awareness about having a chronic disease is rather low: 8% in the control group and 7% in the program area. It remains low in the control group, but **after four years has increased to 14%** in the program area. Clearly, in an environment with limited access to quality healthcare a major part of the burden of disease goes unnoticed, and thus untreated. In the program area, this situation has significantly improved, thanks to the intervention. Cardiovascular disease (CVD) is the leading cause of adult mortality in low-income countries, but data on the prevalence of cardiovascular risk factors such as hypertension are scarce. In a study using data from Namibia, Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania, Hendriks et al. show that age adjusted prevalence of hypertension ranges from 19.3% in rural Nigeria to 38.0% in urban Namibia (see Figure 6). Despite these high levels of prevalence, there is very low awareness of the disease and very few people do get the necessary treatment. In a follow up study, Hendriks et al. tests whether the implementation of the dual intervention in Kwara State (health insurance plus facility upgrades) is successful in providing care and controlling hypertension for those living in the treatment area. Figure 7 shows that systolic blood pressure (SBP) decreased in both the treatment and the control area from 2009 to 2011 and then increased again in 2013. Overall **the decrease in blood pressure was greater in the program area**

**compared to the control area**. It was possible to attribute 5.5 mmHg of the decrease in SBP from 2009 to 2011 and 5.0 mmHg of the decrease in SBP from 2009 to 2013 to the HCHC program. In respondents with severe hypertension at baseline, systolic blood pressure decreased in both areas from 2009 to 2011, but more so in the program area. In 2013, **the decrease in blood pressure was sustained in the program area, but blood pressure rose substantially in the control area**. This resulted in a program impact of -9.4 mmHg SBP (non-significant) in 2011 and -16.4 mmHg SBP (significant) in 2013. In other words, **the impact of the program on systolic blood pressure in respondents with severe hypertension increased over time**.

The same trend of an increasing impact can be seen in respondents with moderate hypertension at baseline. At the same time, the program impact on respondents with mild hypertension at baseline decreased over time. As part of the HCHC program, staff in the program area were trained in guideline-based care. Due to raised awareness, healthcare professionals may have been more likely to also treat people with mild hypertension, resulting in the initial improvement among respondents of this subgroup. The effect of the awareness raising may have faded over time, both in patients as well as in healthcare providers. Treatment fatigue is a known phenomenon and this may apply especially to people with mild hypertension. This could explain the diminished effect on respondents with mild hypertension in the longer term, and also explains that the impact on all hypertensive respondents is slightly lower in 2013 compared to 2011, as respondents with mild hypertension at baseline make up more than half of the total hypertensive cohort. Diastolic blood pressure (DSP) decreased in both areas from 2009 to 2011 as well as from 2009 to 2013. **The decrease in blood pressure was greater in the**

**program area compared to the control area**. It was possible to attribute 2.9 mmHg of the decrease in DBP from 2009 to 2011 and 1.8 mmHg of the decrease in DBP from 2009 to 2013 to the HCHC program (see Figure 8). In respondents with severe hypertension at baseline, diastolic blood pressure decreased in both the control and program area from 2009 to 2011, but decreased slightly more in the program area. In 2013, the decrease in blood pressure was sustained in the program area, but blood pressure increased



slightly in the control area. This resulted in a program impact of -2.7 mmHg DBP in 2011 (non-significant) and -5.7 mmHg DBP in 2013 (borderline significant). As was the case for systolic blood pressure, the impact of the program on diastolic blood pressure increased over time for respondents with moderate or severe hypertension at baseline and decreased over time for respondents with mild hypertension at baseline. **Thus increased access and improved quality of care resulted in a decrease in the prevalence of one of the most important risk factors for CVD, namely hypertension.** It is also noteworthy that the enrollment percentage in insurance is relatively high among those with hypertension (42 percent 32). Clearly, when people become more aware of their need for medical care, health insurance becomes more attractive.

# HELPING AGRICULTURE AND RURAL AREAS

## What's the argument?

This argument centers around the ripple effects creating urban centers has on the broader, specifically more rural, economy. Creating cities drives up demand for food and raw materials, while the globalization that comes from developing cosmopolitan urban areas brings new technologies and innovation that both significantly impact the rest of the economy.

First, urbanization helps small, rural farmers by changing diets and creating a greater demand for foods to open up markets and businesses (Djurfeldt and Jirstorm). For instance, during Nigeria's rapid urbanization in the early 1990s, the demand for basic staple goods increased by 4.8% every year during the period. (de Nigris). Small farmers have access to growing markets in cities that are import-dependent on food supplies. This also transforms the agricultural sector from one that is more subsistence-based and seasonal, to one that is commercial, creating entirely new, emergent markets within the rural economy to provide new economic opportunities (Tirschley).

The second reason why urbanization benefits rural economies is because it helps diffuse new forms of agricultural technology that boosts crop yields and productivity. Instead of traditional rural farming tactics, modern agricultural techniques include methods like mycoprotein fertilization, organo-pesticides, and other scientifically proven practices that maximize agrarian output. Most agricultural land in West Africa was underutilized, so modern agricultural approaches promise huge development to reduce harvest loss, improve food safety, and electrify rural economies (Ali).

## Why does the argument matter?

Helping rural areas in West Africa is probably one of the best impacts on the topic. In terms of scope,  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the world's population living in extreme poverty are rural farmers, making agriculture the most important sector when it comes to poverty reduction (Fugile). West Africa is no exception, agricultural innovation with programs like the West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program (or WAP) has increased average incomes by 30% (Ehui). The improvement of the agricultural economy and rural areas is quintessential in providing economic resources to the populations who need it most. As a final example of the sheer impact this effect has, between 2000 and 2010, when

200 million people migrated to urban centers, rural areas saw water access increase to over 50% (Awumbila).

## Main Players

Small farmers, rural West Africans, international food distributors, agro-tech companies

## Strategy Considerations

This argument is an excellent strategic choice for rounds because it already offers an important stance on what will most likely be a huge point of clash on this topic: the rural-urban divide. Con teams are likely to have strong impacts pertaining to rural areas and vulnerable populations, so this gives pro teams a strong path to the ballot on what is most likely considered “con” ground. Building this argument into a case also offers several areas for nuanced reasons outside of just migration to cities and opens the door for several complex economic literature that could be used to persuasively beat out con arguments. In terms of scope and magnitude, rural areas are where the most vulnerable sections of the population are and could be the key to solving global extreme poverty. It also is a huge first step in creating meaningful and equitable economic development and is how previously developing economies have transitioned so fast to developed ones. This makes it very easy to weigh later in the debate seeing as it has both history and impact calculus on its side.

# Evidence for Helping Agriculture and Rural Areas

## Urbanization changes diet patterns and creates demand for urban agriculture

Andersson Djurfeldt, Agnes and Magnus Jirstrom. "Urbanization and changes in farm size in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia from a geographical perspective, a review of the literature." *Lund University*. 2013. [https://portal.research.lu.se/portal/en/publications/urbanization-and-changes-in-farm-size-in-subsaharan-africa-and-asia-from-a-geographical-perspective-a-review-of-the-literature-a-foresight-study-of-the\(0b507cdf-95e7-41c2-a24d-303dd17b49ff\).html](https://portal.research.lu.se/portal/en/publications/urbanization-and-changes-in-farm-size-in-subsaharan-africa-and-asia-from-a-geographical-perspective-a-review-of-the-literature-a-foresight-study-of-the(0b507cdf-95e7-41c2-a24d-303dd17b49ff).html)

Given the linkages between the non-agrarian and agrarian sectors of the economy, either directly through market based interactions, or indirectly through largely invisible household transfers of food and remittances, the effects of urbanization and changing farm sizes are likely to be felt both in rural and urban areas. Three broad effects of urbanization and changing farm sizes can be discerned in urban areas, with possible repercussions also for agriculture in rural areas. Firstly, changing urban dietary patterns as part of the nutrition transition and evolving gender roles affects urban food security directly, especially in the context of growing import dependency. Secondly, the importance of urban agriculture as a source of food and income needs to be considered as a "ruralisation" of urban landscapes and livelihoods. Finally, the role and resilience of informal safety nets and rural urban linkages as sources of food should also be acknowledged. In the rural areas a number of effects on land use patterns and production systems can be noted: Urban land use conversion may lead to more intensive production of remaining agricultural land while urban growth may encourage urban and peri-urban cultivation to supply expanding urban markets with perishable goods. In the South Asian context, migration to urban areas has been noted to ease land constraints among landless households. The rising importance of convenience foods in urban settings and the increased role of supermarkets and fast food chains as suppliers of such foods to urban consumers also carry implications for smallholders. Growing demand for high value crops arising from higher incomes in urban areas is noted as an important source of rising smallholder incomes in a number of countries both in Africa and South Asia. Domestic urban markets provide more stability than global markets. While production of perishables for urban markets has clear spatial limits, especially in areas with poor infrastructure, the dietary shift towards vegetable oils and sweeteners as part of the nutrition transition may contain some prospects for widening smallholder involvement, for instance in palm oil and soybean and sugar cane production also in less well-connected areas.

## Urbanization and income growth shifts farm labor downstream creating new commercial markets for small farmers

Tirschley, David. "Feeding Africa's Cities: Opportunities, Challenges, and Policies for Linking African Farmers with Growing Urban Food Markets." *Africa Agriculture Status Report*. 2020. <https://agritrop.cirad.fr/596464/1/Chap2-AASR-2020-Feeding-African-Cities.pdf>

This same research also shows that engagement in the off-farm portion of the agri-food system increases as a household resides in more densely populated areas (Figure 2.5). They do this by applying the same classification scheme used by IFAD (2019) and Arslan et al. (2020) and found that the share of FTEs dedicated to post-farm agrifood system (AFS) work (including wage and selfemployment) in the 6 African countries increases from 22% in the rural hinterland (the least densely populated rural areas) to 25% in intermediate zones, 26% in peri-urban areas, and 31% in urban areas. The share of farming falls across these zones from 57% to 38% to 28% before dropping all the way to 7% in fully urban areas. Work shares entirely outside the agri-food system (non-agri-food wage plus non-agri-food self-employment) rise from 22% in the hinterland to 47% in peri-urban and 62% in urban areas. This more disaggregated view of rural spaces is better suited to the

population settlement patterns previously reviewed, where we showed that much of “rural” Africa is relatively densely populated.

**Summarizing, urbanization and income growth in Africa have already driven a dramatic shift of labor effort off the farm and into the midstream and downstream of the agri-food system (25% of all labor today in the 6 countries analyzed) and outside the agri-food system (39%). Continued urbanization and income growth can be expected to continue this process, with the prospect that in 5–10 years roughly two-thirds of all labor even in rural areas will take place off the farm.**

The new demand patterns of consumers lead increasingly to changes in the structure (scale) and behavior of FSCs that pose major challenges for smallholder farmers. In the emerging modernized food systems of Africa, agribusiness firms want quality, regularity of delivery, demonstrable safety, and scale to reduce unit costs. These requirements are most predominant in perishable supply chains such as fresh fruit and vegetables and animal products. The early supermarket literature (Minten et al., 2009; Neven et al., 2009; Weatherspoon & Reardon, 2003) highlighted the broad exclusion of smallholder farmers from supermarket fresh produce supply chains, except to the extent that these chains purchased from wholesale markets (though even there, it is the upper quarter or less of smallholder farmers that supply the vast majority of fresh produce). Reardon, Barrett, Berdegue, and Swinnen (2009) concluded that smallholder farmers can be included but in small numbers and not those in hinterland areas or that are asset poor.

**Tschirley et al. (2018) reviewed the evidence and food system transformation in Africa and suggested that 10–30% of the “commercial farmer” households (already better equipped and more market-oriented) and a smaller portion of the “pre-commercial” households might be able to compete in these emerging markets in the medium-term.**

The major role that medium-scale farmers have played in rising production in seven countries spread across West, Central, East, and Southern Africa, as documented by Jayne et al. (2019) and reviewed in this chapter (section 5.2), suggests that the turn towards larger, better capitalized farmers is already well underway.

## Demand for food increased 4.8 percent (Nigris 1996)

de Nigris, Maurizio. “Urbanization and Food Demand in Africa.” *FAO Food Supply and Distribution to Cities in Francophone Africa*. 1996.

<http://www.fao.org/tempref/docrep/fao/003/x6986e/x6986e00.pdf>

The paper examines, on the basis of the UN long-term demographic projections to 2025, **urbanization trends and problems of achieving food security for African urban dwellers.**

It focuses on the identification and broad quantification of expected levels and patterns of food requirements by the year 2010 and 2025, in the light of projection studies undertaken by the FAO Commodities and Trade Division. Meeting urban food demand in years to come appears a formidable task for the region. **The demand for basic staple foods is expected to increase at a rate of 4.8 per cent per year during the period.**

Similar or higher growth in demand is projected to occur for more “expensive” foods such as meat, fats and oils. This would require corresponding increases in food supplies which would also need to be distributed in such a fashion as to allow urban consumers to receive an adequate ration to meet their basic needs. The paper concludes that a better understanding of the process of change in food demand and nutrition taking place in connection with urbanization and of associated problems, such as the strain likely to be imposed on the marketing systems of African countries, is of primary importance for the formulation of appropriate food policies and public action programmes.

## Africa saw 200 million people migrate from rural to urban areas and access to water increased to 50% in Rural Areas

Awumbila, Mariama. “Linkages between Urbanization, Rural–Urban Migration and Poverty Outcomes in Africa.” *World Migration Report*. 2015.

[https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our\\_work/ICP/MPR/WMR-2015-Background-Paper-MAwumbila.pdf](https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/ICP/MPR/WMR-2015-Background-Paper-MAwumbila.pdf)

Migration is a significant contributor to urbanization, as people move in search of social and economic opportunities or as a result of environmental deterioration. In 2010, more than 200 million people, equal to about 3 percent of the world's population, lived in a country different from the one in which they were born, and migration within countries continues at high levels. Migration is often equated with international movement, but migration within countries, primarily from rural to urban areas, accounts for a much greater share of human population movements. In Africa, while international migration has received more attention in recent debates on migration, internal migration is far more significant in terms of the numbers of people involved and perhaps even the quantum of remittances and their poverty reduction potential (UNDP, 2009). People who leave the countryside to find better lives in the city often have no choice but to settle in shanty towns and slums, where they lack access to decent housing, sanitation, health care and education, in effect, trading in rural poverty for urban poverty. Given the significant number of people moving to new countries in some regions, migration will shape future demographic trends. Much of this rapid urban growth, however, has been accompanied by a high level of poverty and inequality, rather than by economic and inclusive growth, as has occurred on other continents. Specifically, unlike in all other global regions, urbanization in Africa has not contributed (through economies of scale and value added production chains) to overall growth in GDP. Therefore, the prevailing global view that cities are engines of growth and human development may very well be challenged by the unfolding realities in Africa, unless the urban economic and general developmental progress is translated into more broadly shared well-being among countries' socioeconomic strata. World Bank projections demonstrate that urbanization in Africa is taking place without development due to inadequate investment in basic infrastructure (Sharma et al., 1996). In the year 2000, about 30 per cent of the population living in urban areas in Africa lacked access to a safe water supply. If current investment patterns continue, the figure will grow to almost 50 per cent by 2020. However, the percentage of rural Africans with access to potable water is projected to increase from about 38 per cent in 2000 to over 50 per cent by 2020 (Sharma et al., 1996).

## Urbanization has improved food safety, reduced harvest lost, and raised productivity bringing in modern agricultural approaches

Ali, Zakari. "Long-term impact of West African food system responses to COVID-19" Nature Food Magazine. 19 November 2020. <https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-020-00191-8>

West Africa's abundant supply of sunlight and agriculturally underutilized land (in mostly rural settings) is ripe for development – including rural development opportunities<sup>18</sup> that improve food safety, reduce post-harvest losses and increase food storage to raise productivity for farmers; with appropriate infrastructural planning and mandated safeguards to protect nature. Modern agricultural approaches – including urban farming of vegetables and novel foods including mycoproteins, insects for animal and human consumption and cellular agriculture<sup>19</sup> – are expanding rapidly with the potential for acceptability testing and adoption. Supporting these new approaches may provide multiple benefits including urban and peri-urban food production (with clear employment opportunities for growing urban populations) and strengthen important food supply chains. Peri-urban food production has many potential benefits, including shorter supply chains that may be particularly useful during infection-control enforcement, income generation possibilities, and opportunities for the greater engagement of women<sup>20</sup>. Governments should design 'smart' agriculture insurance programmes that can reduce inefficiencies and be cost effective in supporting agricultural investments<sup>21</sup>. The conversion of urban and peri-urban waste into fertilizer<sup>22</sup> to support food production (with the potential to reduce environmental pollution in cities and prevent infectious diseases) could be a 'low-regret' option to consider. Despite the many expected benefits of food system expansion, decision-making on how and to what extent to expand production should be based on a full evidence map of potential benefits and trade-offs. While successful urban production can efficiently complement rural production<sup>23</sup>, the possibility to reduce the demand of similar products from rural farmers needs consideration. Furthermore, the expansion of agricultural land could bring several environmental risks, including substantial negative impacts on biodiversity and deforestation. West Africa's experience with Ebola virus and its link to agricultural land conversion<sup>24</sup> makes it important to plan production to minimize zoonotic spillover and protect the territorial rights of indigenous communities.



## ⅔ of global poor earn livings farming - agricultural productivity has largest impact of any sector on poverty reduction

Fuglie, Keith. "Harvesting Prosperity: Technology and Productivity Growth in Agriculture" *The World Bank Group*. 2020.

<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/32350/9781464813931.pdf>

Continuing to make improvements to agricultural productivity, especially in low income nations, is necessary to ensure sufficient food for an increasing global population and to traverse the last mile toward eliminating extreme poverty in developing nations: ■ Two-thirds of the global extreme poor earn their livelihood in farming and productivity growth in agriculture has the largest impact of any sector on poverty reduction. Rising agricultural productivity in China and other countries of East Asia has contributed to impressive reductions in poverty, but has been too low to have similar impacts in Africa and in South Asia, precisely where the largest remaining pockets of extreme poverty are to be found. The modest expansion of urban manufacturing and service sectors is unlikely to provide alternative income sources over the medium term. ■ Despite increases in world agricultural productivity over the past few decades, global undernourishment remains significant, affecting 821 million people as of 2017, and is on the rise, driven by conflict and worsening climatic evolution. ■ Climate change will hit agriculture hard, particularly where large numbers of poor and vulnerable people live. Climate change models suggest warming of 1 to 2 degrees Celsius (C) from the preindustrial level by 2050. For every 1-degree C increase, average global cereal yields are expected to decline 3 percent to xxii Executive Summary: The Elusive Promise of Productivity 10 percent, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization estimates. In addition, a deteriorating natural resource base reduces the resilience of the production system to climate variability and depresses future productivity. ■ Agricultural productivity is lower and is growing more slowly in poor countries, impeding their convergence to the advanced economies. Over four decades, crop yields in Sub-Saharan Africa have barely doubled, even as they tripled in South Asia and increased about six-fold in East Asia.

## Agricultural Innovation in West Africa has increased average incomes 30%

Ehui, Simeon. "Scaling up innovations in agriculture: Lessons from Africa." *World Bank Blogs*.

31 January 2019. <https://blogs.worldbank.org/nasikiliza/scaling-up-innovations-in-agriculture-lessons-from-africa>

At the same time, climate change impacts mean that food insecurity is becoming a bigger challenge, especially in hot spots such as the Sahel, the Great Lakes region, and the Horn of Africa. But we're also seeing evidence of agricultural transformation due to rising food demand, increased urbanization of the continent and an emerging middle-class in search of new investment opportunities. Some of the transformative trends I'm especially excited about include: rapid growth in per-capita income in Sub-Saharan Africa, Africa's agricultural growth rate averaging out to an impressive 4.6% between 2000-2017, the rise of commercially-oriented African investor farmers who are entrepreneurial, educated and capitalized, and more investment by African entrepreneurs into agricultural value chains. But these trends could be scaled up for a wider impact. So, what's the World Bank doing to advance agricultural transformation in Africa? Here are three examples that I want to share with you: The generation, dissemination and adoption of improved seeds across West Africa through the West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program (WAAPP). The

relatively small size of African countries prevented economies of scale in agricultural research to develop improved crop varieties and share them across borders to boost agricultural productivity. The WAAPP developed National Centers of Specialization to focus research on specific commodities such as maize and aquaculture, and harmonized regulations to facilitate the movement of improved crop varieties across borders. After starting in just three countries, the project has been expanded to 13 countries. The results speak volumes about the power of scaling up. WAAPP has benefited about nine million beneficiaries on about 4.8 million hectares of land with about 200 improved technologies adopted. Average incomes have increased by more than 30%, and more than 1,000 young scientists were awarded scholarships for master's and PhD degrees.



# CON ARGUMENTS

# GLOBALIZATION BAD

## What's the argument?

In essence, this argument revolves around the premise that rapid urbanization and globalization can exacerbate existing inequalities. Before delving into whether urbanization is good or bad, debaters must understand why urbanization leads to globalization in the first place. Because cities are hubs of information, innovation, and economic growth, they act as forums for international business, trade, and political engagement (Cheru; Quartz). On the pro side, teams may argue that globalization spurs economic growth and prosperity. On the con side, debaters can focus on the opposing view, which is supported by a few specific warrants:

First, globalization increases inequality as high-income individuals are more likely to benefit from increased trade than low-income ones ("Globalization and Poverty"). In West Africa specifically, increased globalization has cemented colonialist frameworks and undermined the sovereignty of African states (Ibrahim). Ibrahim concludes that "Globalization has, on the whole, reinforced the economic marginalization of African economies... This has, in turn, accentuated poverty and economic inequality as well as the ability of the vast number of Africans to participate meaningfully in the social and political life of their countries." On a macro level, globalization widens inequalities between rich and poor nations, as wealthier, developed countries can profit more off of trade and manufacturing exchanges (Nwanunobi). As opposed to helping Africa develop, globalization has caused "incidence and depth of poverty has risen in the region" (Nissanke and Thorbecke).

Second, globalization increases FDI, which can harm local businesses. FDI, which stands for "Foreign Direct Investment," occurs when a company or individual from one country invests in assets or businesses in another country. Urbanization and globalization provide "greater inter-connectedness among markets around the world," opening the door for FDI (Hall). Statistically, globalization increases the amount of FDI inflows that a country receives (Reeshan and Hassan). While FDI can spur economic growth, in developing nations, it often stifles growing domestic business. FDI creates strong competition against domestic firms and skims employees from the domestic workforce, and statistically, a 10% increase in FDI inflows decreases the entry rate of domestic firms by 7% (Baker).

## Why does the argument matter?

Both income inequality and weakened local business can have massive impacts on the future of a developing nation. Income inequality hinders economic growth and leaves millions of people in poverty. Small businesses provide a necessary foundation of employment and capital for towns and cities. Empirically, a “one percent increase in foreign inflows bring about 0.6% increase in poverty” (Nishat).

## Main Players

Local business owners, multinational corporations, foreign investors, the domestic workforce

## Strategy Considerations

This argument is a strategic one because many pro cases will likely include arguments about why globalization is good. Including a globalization bad argument will provide debaters ample opportunities to control the narrative of the round. If debaters can convince the judge that their version of globalization is the more likely one, they can take out their opponents’ case while bolstering their own. However, nuance in this argument is important. There are many benefits from globalization, and it will be difficult to refute them outright. Debaters should be prepared to weigh their warrants against their opponents’ warrants. Yes, globalization may provide access to technology, innovation, or investment, but why does access to those things not matter against the backdrop of weakened domestic business and increased income inequality?

## Evidence for Globalization Bad

Urbanization leads to globalization, and globalization reinforces the problems that exist when urbanization occurs too rapidly

Cheru. "Globalization and uneven urbanization in Africa: the limits to effective Urban governance in the provision of basic services." *UCLA Center for Near East Asian Studies*. 18 May 2005. <https://www.international.ucla.edu/cnes/article/107324>

Historically, cities have occupied an important role in national development. Cities are powerful engines of growth, in many cases more powerful than national economies. Cities are centers of innovation by the very fact that they are home to the very forces that shape or drive globalization—finance, production, marketing, information, and knowledge production (Sassen, 1991; Gilbert and Gugler, 1992:64). The characteristics of cities—both infrastructural, regulatory and legal environment and the quality of human capital—in turn, help shape globalization. Over the past 25 years, increased in economic productivity, improvements in literacy, health status, and life expectancy have in most countries resulted from urban-generated economic surpluses. At the present moment, two types of urbanization processes can be observed: 'urbanization with development' and 'urbanization without development' (or limited development). Urbanization with development occurs when national economic growth and development are present at the same time, including a national policy that integrates economic and spatial planning; a productive agricultural sector; growth of secondary cities and market towns to facilitate rural-urban interactions; thus leading to a manageable levels of rural-urban migration. Urbanization without development (or limited development), on the other hand, occurs when overall national economic growth and development are inadequate to meet the needs of a growing population. This type of urbanization takes place in sub-Saharan Africa, low-income Asia and Central America. The key characteristics of urbanization without development are: weak agricultural sector; poor national economic performance; lack of national policy that integrates economic and spatial planning; relative absence of intermediate cities and market towns; over migration leading to growth of mega-cities with poor economic bases and poor municipal capacity to provide minimum basic services. If we follow the above categories of urbanization, we can clearly see that the effects of economic globalization (both good and bad) manifest themselves in different ways in different countries and different cities within them, depending on the quality of institutions, human resources, infrastructure, and the predictability and stability of policies guiding national and municipal development. Although many of the constraints in African cities have been historically determined, globalization tends to reinforce them, or instigate new contradictions and fragmentations. The extreme urban concentration found in many developing countries does not have the same economic and institutional foundations that one observes in cities of developed economies. The rapid growth of cities in Africa is associated with absence of many of the benefits of accelerated growth in cities in the West. Many African cities cannot boast high levels of economic development or high standards of health, life expectancy or education. Poor agricultural performance, the lack of coherent national policy that integrates economic and spatial planning; poor municipal services and fragile fiscal base are characteristic more in line with 'urbanization without development'. Yet, Africans continue to be drawn to cities because they hope for a better job opportunities and education. Contrary to the school of thought that sees globalization and urbanization as mutually reinforcing processes, many scholars now argue that pre-existing inequalities produced by the process of urbanization are further reinforced by macroeconomic and fiscal policies that accompany economic globalization (Beall, 2002). The 'spatial reordering' of economic activities—production, distribution, services, finance—is reshaping social relations, residential patterns, property values, labor markets, forms of urban governance, and

access to essential services. Shanty towns are found a stone-throw away from gleaming skyscrapers and glittery shopping malls. These changes occur not only in cities that hosts the control centers of globalization, but also in those cities that play a subordinate role in global and local economy. This is particularly evident in the provision of basic services such as water and sanitation that were the domain of governments until recently.

...

Like many other regions in the world, sub-Saharan Africa is confronted with the challenge of rapid urbanization in the context of economic stagnation, poor governance, and fragile public institutions. By the year 2010, it is estimated that approximately 55% of Africans will be residing in cities (UNDP, 1991: 1). This rapid urban growth has brought with it a host of problems, including unemployment and underemployment, a burgeoning informal sector, deteriorating infrastructure and service delivery capacity, overcrowding, environmental degradation, and an acute housing shortage. The rapid expansion in urban population has occurred without the needed expansion in basic services and productive employment opportunities. The problem is compounded by weak urban government structures with very limited capacity to stimulate economic growth, mobilize resources and provide the most basic services. Since the early 1980, large numbers of African countries have had to implement market-oriented economic and institutional reforms under the watchful eyes of the IMF and the World Bank. Public provision of basic services—the hallmark of the developmentalist theories of the 1950-1970s—has particularly been targeted for major restructuring, bringing it in line with a market-oriented approach. On the pretext of increasing efficiency and reducing cost, such reforms were used to dismantle the historic construct of the state as a developer (World Bank, 1993). Yet, the promised advantages of economic restructuring and integration into global markets have not been borne out in the majority of developing countries. Most obviously, poverty, mass unemployment, and inequality have mushroomed alongside recent advancement in technological developments and the rapid expansion of trade and investment. Most cities in Africa are experiencing deepening and cumulative patterns of inequality. These inequalities predate the current phase of globalization, but are further reinforced by globalization processes of the post-1980s. Increased competition among cities to attract capital and businesses for generating employment and sources of tax revenues has led to widening inequalities between cities and social groups within cities (Hoogevelt, 1997).

## Cities, not countries, are the new hubs of global activity

Commentary, “Nations are no longer driving globalization—cities are.” *Quartz*. 3 May 2013.  
<https://qz.com/80657/the-return-of-the-city-state/>

Today, numerous cities have substantially more economic weight, international connectivity, and diplomatic influence on the world stage than dozens of nations. The rise of cities as transnational actors is thus driven not only by urbanization and globalization, but also a third nearly irreversible phenomenon: devolution. The period since the end of the Cold War has witnessed not only a major wave of new state births stemming from the collapse of the Soviet Union and disintegration of Yugoslavia, but a much broader entropy as sub-state and provincial authorities leverage the forces of transparency, identity, and connectivity to push for greater autonomy. Quebec, the Basque country, Flanders, Greenland, Scotland, and Catalonia are among the hundreds of examples of provincial entities asserting their domestic autonomy and international credentials. Australia and Canada have also witnessed the conspicuous rise of local councils such as the City of Sydney or Vancouver City Council, both now far more advanced in developing integrated environmental strategies than their respective federal governments. Quite a few other non-capital cities such as Lagos or Mumbai have substantial international presence despite the dysfunction of their home nations. Over the past decade, most Indian and Chinese provinces have also set up their own trade and investment promotion offices worldwide, often as non-diplomatic and purely commercial ventures to attract tourism and investment. Taken together, the separatist movements mentioned above and the sub-national economic diplomacy conducted from within even great powers point to a growing desire of urban-regions to be identified more as “global cities” than as subservient to national states. (Only in very few cases, such as Singapore or Monaco, do these conveniently come together.) The rise of the place-branding industry, which encompasses national Olympic bids, tourism and investment promotion, and increasingly city-specific public diplomacy campaigns, provides further evidence of how local governments and marketers are teaming up to boost their image beyond their national geographies. Increasingly this involves partnerships with blue-chip academic institutions. The widely discussed case of the Yale-National University of Singapore College for Liberal Arts, multi-metropolis business programs such as the TRIUM Global Executive MBA across Paris, London and New York, all signal

how inter-city academic partnerships are forming the new basis of professionally relevant global education.

## Cities have become increasingly important to globalization

Clark, Greg, "How cities took over the world: a history of globalisation spanning 4,000 years."

*The Guardian*. 1 December 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/dec/01/how-cities-took-over-the-world-a-history-of-globalisation-spanning-4000-years>

The most recent cycle of globalisation has seen the start of a new wave of distinctive, specialised and globally aspirational cities. Many of them are higher-income cities within their respective regions and seek to leverage their efficient infrastructure, improved quality of life, and better security and environmental performance compared to the larger megacities.

Cities in this wave are less likely to have major political or institutional functions. Rather, they are competing in more dynamic and fast-moving global industries where opportunities have arisen for greater market share. Among this group are Brisbane, San Diego, Shenzhen, Santiago de Chile and Stockholm. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis and its impact on public sector finances, the ability of cities to find new sources and tools for investment has been a key enabler for globalising cities since 2008. Brisbane is an example of a city that has been able to globalise with the help of a large and financially astute city government, which has used the surplus from its recent commodities boom to erect a more international model of economic development.

...

Not all of today's leading cities were destined to play key roles in the global economy. Many started out from an unpromising or uncompetitive situation because of either internal weaknesses or external disadvantages. Sometimes cities have endured long periods of global isolation, and begin to internationalise only when geopolitical changes occur and foreign investment arrives. This was certainly the case in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and in the 21<sup>st</sup> century it is visible in many other cities outside the established west. Equally, the ebb and flow of cities' fortunes means that some cities we take for granted today as global will likely be much less globally oriented in future. History shows this is a risk if cities lose competitiveness in traded sectors, fail to embrace innovation or to project influence, are closed to immigration and entrepreneurship, or are unable to adapt to a changing geopolitical or geoeconomic centre of gravity. The ingredients of today's most successful cities are sometimes hard for other cities to emulate directly, and so alternative strategies and pathways to global engagement have arisen. Over time, these alternative pathways result in very different kinds of global cities.

## Globalization causes income inequality

### Globalization can lift some out of poverty but increases income inequality overall

"Globalization and Poverty." *National Bureau of Economic Research*. Issue No. 3, March 2007. <https://www.nber.org/digest/mar07/globalization-and-poverty>

Many of the studies in Globalization and Poverty in fact suggest that globalization has been associated with rising inequality, and that the poor do not always share in the gains from trade. Other themes emerge from the book. One is that the poor in countries with an abundance of unskilled labor do not always gain from trade reform. Another is that the poor are more likely to share in the gains from globalization when workers enjoy maximum mobility, especially from contracting economic sectors into expanding sectors (India and Colombia). Gains likewise arise when poor farmers have access to credit and technical know-how (Zambia), when poor farmers have such social safety nets as income support (Mexico) and when food aid is well targeted (Ethiopia). The evidence strongly suggests that export growth and incoming foreign investment have reduced poverty everywhere from Mexico to India to Poland. Yet at the same time currency crises can cripple the poor. In Indonesia, poverty rates increased by at least 50 percent after the 1997 currency crisis in that country, and the poor in Mexico have yet to recover from the pummeling of the peso in 1995.

The evidence strongly suggests that export growth and incoming foreign investment have reduced poverty everywhere from Mexico to India to Poland. Yet at the same time



currency crises can cripple the poor. In Indonesia, poverty rates increased by at least 50 percent after the 1997 currency crisis in that country, and the poor in Mexico have yet to recover from the pummeling of the peso in 1995. Without doubt, Harrison asserts, globalization produces both winners and losers among the poor. In Mexico, for example, small and medium corn growers saw their incomes halved in the 1990s, while larger corn growers prospered. In other countries, poor workers in exporting sectors or in sectors with foreign investment gained from trade and investment reforms, while poverty rates increased in previously protected areas that were exposed to import competition. Even within a country, a trade reform may hurt rural agricultural producers and benefit rural or urban consumers of those farmers' products.

## Globalization in West Africa has increased income inequality and upheld existing colonialist frameworks

Ibrahim, A.B. et al. "Globalization and the Future of West African Development: Issues, Challenges, Prospects and options." *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*. Volume 25, Issue 1, Series 7, January 2020. DOI: 10.9790/0837-

2501072632. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338954802\\_Globalization\\_and\\_the\\_Future\\_of\\_West\\_African\\_Development\\_Issues\\_Challenges\\_Prospects\\_and\\_options](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338954802_Globalization_and_the_Future_of_West_African_Development_Issues_Challenges_Prospects_and_options)

Since the beginning of modern globalization, the question of West African development has not

been resolved, as post independence race for modernization and development persist among developing countries, some of the developing countries were able to record remarkable successes in terms of development with the exception of West African sub-region which finds it difficult to take advantage of globalization for its development as other part of the world did. Globalization is said to have transformed West African economy into an import oriented economy, which forced West African States into an economic role where they export raw materials in exchange for finished goods. This process could not give the region the tentacles to compete with the rest of the world in development; the region as a result is characterized by social vices, poverty, cultural confusion, political instability, social instability, among other impediments to development.

The paper traces the antecedents of West Africa's quest for development in the light of trending globalization, the paper adopted the dependency theory as a framework for the analysis, the paper calls on the need for West African countries to manage its relations with the rest of the world through protectionism of indigenous industries, domestic values and cultures as a promising strategy to overcome the threats of globalization to the region.

...

What we describe today as West Africa does not exist as one entity during the pre-colonial days. The various communities which make up West Africa today were developing in their own ways before the colonial factors intervene.

Indeed, what existed then were various types of state organizations at various stages of development. These included empires, kingdoms, clans/villages, organizations among others. Such communities have already had their developmental process socially, economically, politically and medically but retarded by the European imperialism, which has manifested itself now in the form of political globalization.

Those that adopt political approach tend to emphasize the near importance of the state in the era of globalization. According to Ugwukah and Michael, (2010) the tread of globalization in its dynamics, in the integration of capital, goods and services is likely to undermine not only the sovereignty of states, but also make it less important in the conduct of foreign relations the universalization of western form of democracy



has increasingly become the final form of government across the globe. This can also be demonstrated in series of protests demanding for democratic government against military regimes in the region. In addition and related to the above, is that the rise in importance of such transnational bodies as World Bank, IMF, UN and AU, ECOWAS introduces new agents into decision making process of which the nation-states have to negotiate and contend with. Thus, the incursions of international organizations upon national sovereignty are restricting the ability of the state to uphold its own fundamental values which of course is the situation in West Africa.

...

Economically, the growing global economy which was fastened mostly by international trade has no doubt created a dual phenomenon where regions continued to experience economic development at the expense of the others. As a result of colonial legacies African countries could not have the man power and technological development to take advantage of globalized

trade; hence the region's economy did not change even after independence as the region continued to be a producer of primary products and importer of finished goods, this system of in balance trade by implication made the region a home of poverty to the extent that some of the countries in the region are among the poorest in the world.

Because of the economic situation in the region, the region could not have control over the agents of globalization (media, ICT, telegram, telecommunication, internet, multinational cooperation's, international financial regulatory agencies, among others). Thus the region is not a seller (profiting) but an end user of globalization and the implication of this is the region continue to boost the economy of the developed world while letting home in absolute poverty. Again the disparity evident between the rich and poor countries in terms of development demonstrates that globalization is in favor of the capitalist imperialist world and not the developing world that has little goods and services to offer in the system. There is no doubt that globalization has "created a vast chasm between the North and the South" (Tandon 1998). This is particularly identifiable from the UNDP's Human Development Report of 1996 contains the fact that: "the gap in per capital income between the industrial and developing worlds tripled from \$5,700 in 1960 to \$15,400 in 1993 (UNDP, 1996:2)." Globalization has, on the whole, reinforced the economic marginalization of African economies and their dependence on a few primary goods for which demand and prices are externally determined. This has, in turn, accentuated poverty and economic inequality as well as the ability of the vast number of Africans to participate meaningfully in the social and political life of their countries. Economic and social stagnation has also triggered a substantial brain- drain from Africa, further weakening the ability of African countries to manage their economies efficiently and effectively.

...

Finally, It is apparent that, the globalization process is more symmetrical to the "origin and development of the neo-colonial states (in Africa)" which were "determined by the nature and structures of the colonizing countries" (Akindele, 1990, Adebo and Akindele, 1990) rather than according to a concretely established philosophy or determination to get Africa out of lingering crises. Thus, globalization is a form of entrapment for Africa. Apart from its evocation of powerlessness already analyzed, it creates a process through which the "poor countries (in Africa) are dominated and exploited by the rich countries (Wohlcke, 1993; 56) and, a vicious circle of vulnerability of African governments" to outside parasitic economic maneuvering as does the lack of capacity for independence of socio-political, cultural and psychological thinking relative to concrete actions (see Barrett and Carter, 2000). Unless, as earlier stated, its one-arm banditry is understood, concretely discerned and checkmated, globalization will lead Africa to "increased penury". This can be better understood in the context of the fact that, the "heavy burden of foreign debt has greatly eroded their capacity to run their own affairs and respond to the demands of the people" (SAPEM, 1996: 2). This unwholesome development has created a legitimacy crisis for most African governments and turned the African continent into an Empire of Chaos.

**Globalization helps rich nations and hurts poor ones**

Nwanunobi, C.O. and Peter Ezeah. "Globalization, migration and underdevelopment in West Africa." *Journal of Religion and Human Relations*. Vol. 7 No. 2, 2015. <https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jrhr/article/view/119699>

Migration is not a new phenomenon. However, globalization has put a new spin on migration, which results in greater economic

opportunities for the developed nations to the disadvantage of developing nations of Africa. Globalization implies and does entail free movement of goods and ideas between and across borders, trade liberalization, movement of capital for greater and speedier returns and repatriation of profits from quick yielding investments from the developing to the developed nations. The consequence is that, globalization exacerbates inequality between the developed and the developing nations.

This paper demonstrates the various ways by which globalization impacts on migration and in the process engenders underdevelopment in West Africa. In the first place, the unencumbered movement of capital, trade and technology accompanied by capitalists "experts" from the developed nations into Africa has led not only to disruptions in African economies but also contributed to the high level of unemployment especially of the youth, wage decline, job insecurity and general poverty in the continent. In West Africa, agriculture is rendered purposeless on account of the massive agricultural subsidies enjoyed by the developed nations thereby increasing the tendency to dump their agricultural products in the sub-region. The migration of the disadvantaged and economically displaced peoples of Africa to the developed nations is a natural response to the severe pains and plunder inflicted on the continent by the forces of globalization and capitalism. In an attempt to address the imbalance created by globalization and to prevent Africans seeking economic refuge by migrating to their countries, the developed nations dangle such palliatives as debt relief and development aid that provide only cosmetic solutions to the problems of underdevelopment in West Africa that generates migration in the first place. The question is: What are West African leaders doing to contend with the challenges posed by globalization and migration in the West African sub-region? Finally, the paper examines policy contradictions within the global system towards migration and recommends a more integrated approach.

...

Liberalization that is normally linked with globalization gives rich nations terrific advantages over poorer countries by enabling them to flood poorer countries with mass produced goods at the same time as the disadvantages world barely has items for worthwhile exchange. Worse still, in the context of the so-called liberalization, the rich parts of the world till retain policies that work against liberalization in the international trade. Put together, these are factors that create and intensify unemployment in Africa leading to migration of the able bodied for economic survival.

Awowole (2007) noted that the current unemployment rate in Africa is 10.3 per cent compared to the global average of 6.3 per cent in 2006. To reduce Africa's unemployment rate to the world average of 6.3 percent by 2015 would require an increase in employment of around 11 million per year. The deadline for achieving the Millennium Development Goals aimed at reducing poverty by half). (Awowole, 2007). It is in this context that we respectfully part company with Akindele et al (2002:1) that globalization "is a positive or powerful force for improved material well-being of human kind that will aid developing countries to 'create' better economic environment...." We rather argue that by the way it has operated; globalization could better be seen as a neutral force having potentials for positive and or negative effects particularly in connection with developing countries. This is because while it could be argued that the consequences for the industrialized world, 'order givers' may be predicted in their invariably asymmetrical relationship with 'order takers' in the economic realm, for the powerless sections of the world, globalization could have dire consequences, and this is the gravamen of our present task.

...

This paper has demonstrated the various ways in which globalization impact on migration and in the process engenders underdevelopment in West Africa. The unhindered movement of capital, trade and technology from the

developed nations in West Africa has not only disrupted the economies of West Africa but also contributed to the high level of unemployment especially of the youth. Wage decline, job insecurity and general poverty have also been intensified in the region.

The paper notes that commercial agriculture has been rendered purposeless in West Africa on account of the massive subsidies enjoyed by agricultural sector of the developed nations of the world that increasingly dump their own agricultural products in the region. The migration of the disadvantaged and economically displaced peoples of West African nations is thus a natural response to the severe economic hardship inflicted on the African continent by globalization and the accompanying forces. Unfortunately, West African leaders presently seem incapable of doing much to contend with the challenges posed by globalization and migration. The economic policies enunciated by ECOWAS, NEPAD and other bodies drastically fall short of expectations in addressing the challenges posed by globalization in West Africa. Unemployment as a major driving force in migration is not given prominence in policy formulations by West African leaders to tackle underdevelopment and poverty in the region. Until the issue of unemployment is squarely addressed, poverty and underdevelopment will continue to stare Africa in the face. So too will migration remain a crucial matter touching the soul of West Africa.

## African countries have not benefited from globalization, resulting in increased poverty and income inequality

Nissanke, Machiko and Erik Thorbecke. "Globalization, Growth, and Poverty in Africa." *United Nations University*. 2007. <https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/globalization-growth-and-poverty-africa>

African countries have benefited relatively less from the positive effects of globalization than other parts of the world in terms of economic growth and development. Following largely an inward-oriented development strategy in the early decades of the post-independence period, the majority of African countries failed to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the dynamic growth impetus associated with globalization in the 1970s and 1980s. Instead of becoming more integrated into the world economy, they were largely marginalized and experienced slow growth and stagnation. As a result the incidence and depth of poverty has risen in the region.

The number of poor, measured in income poverty based on the US\$1 a day international poverty line, increased in Africa, almost doubling from 164 million in 1981 to 313 million in 2001. In terms of the headcount ratio, the poverty incidence in Africa is 46 per cent in 2001—the highest in the world. Poverty in Africa is both most prevalent and severe in rural areas. Poverty measured in terms of nonincome indicators such as health and education has not improved much either over the past 15-20 years in the region. The overall picture gives little cause for optimism that Africa will soon reap the benefits of the process of globalization, unless it scales up efforts in a number of fronts including adopting a more pro-poor pattern of growth and increasing the provision of public services in the social sector. Further, the degree of income inequality in Africa

has increased sharply in the last two decades. Today, many countries in Africa suffer from a relatively high intra-country inequality which is among the highest in the world. With growing recognition of the need to grow faster, most African countries have increasingly searched for ways to accelerate their participation in the global economy over the past two decades. Indeed, most economies in Africa significantly liberalized their trade and investment policy regimes as part of Structural Adjustment Programs since the mid-1980s. However, in spite of this Africa's share of total world trade has fallen between 1980 and 2002: Africa's share of world exports falling from about 6 per cent to 1.5 per cent, and imports from 5 per cent to 1.5 per cent. Many countries in Africa have also intensified their efforts to attract foreign direct investment with various fiscal and other incentive measures. Yet, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to the region so far have been largely limited to extraction of oil and other natural resources. Africa attracted only around 6 per cent of total net FDI inflows to developing countries in 2000-4.

## *FDI Bad*

## Globalization connects markets

Hall, Mary. "Globalization and International Investment." *Investopedia*. 12 May 2018.

<https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/022615/what-effect-has-globalization-had-international-investments.asp>

Globalization has resulted in greater inter-connectedness among markets around the world and increased communication and awareness of business opportunities in the far corners of the globe. More investors can access new investment opportunities and study new markets at a greater distance than before.

Potential risks and profit opportunities are within easier reach thanks to improved communications technology. Countries with positive relations between them are able to increasingly unify their economies through increased investment and trade. Products and services previously available within one country are made more readily available to new markets, resulting directly in improved economic opportunities for workers in those economies and leading to improved household incomes. For investors, these opportunities present a wider range of investment options and new ways to profit. Investment in

global markets is possible for the investing public through stock purchasing, as most brokerage firms are able to access international stock markets and provide their clients with the opportunity to purchase shares in companies around the world.

## FDI increases when globalization increases

Reeshan, Aisath and Zubair Hassan. "Impact of Globalization on Economic Growth Among Developing Countries." *International Journal of Accounting and Business Management*, Vol. 5 No. 1, April 2017. <https://www.ftms.edu.my/journals/pdf/IJABM/Apr2017/164-179.pdf>

The paper examined the impact of overall, political, economic and social globalization on economic growth of 86 developing countries for the year 2015. This research employed causal research design with 86 countries using cross sectional approach. The data reliability and validity is tested using correlation and descriptive statistical means and standard deviation. The study used Gross Domestic Product and Foreign Direct Investments as dependent variables. Multiple regressions were used to analyze the casual impact of globalization on economic growth. The result indicated that overall globalization, political globalization and social globalization have a negative and non-significant impact on economic growth. **However, economic globalization has a significant and positive impact on inward Foreign Direct Investments though it has a negative and non-significant impact on economic growth.** However, economic globalization has a significant and positive impact on inward Foreign Direct Investments though it has a negative and non-significant impact on Gross Domestic Product suggesting a partial impact on economic growth. This means that more economic integration through globalization encourage Foreign Direct Investment. Therefore, policy makers should emphasis on economic integration that enables Foreign Direct Investment inflows to create more job opportunities and economic growth.

...

Table 9 shows that Economic Globalization beta coefficient is 0.396 and has the greater and positive impact on FDI as compared to political and Social globalization suggesting that **Economic Globalization highly contributed to the FDI among the developing countries.** According to the above table 9, Economic globalization is supported by the regression analysis of as the t-values and p-values meets it set criteria, where t-value of the coefficient of beta of Economic Globalization is more than +1.96 ( $t = 3.053$ ) and p-value is lower than 0.05 ( $P = 0.003$ ) Hassan, Nareeman & Pauline, (2013) suggesting that economic globalization has a significant and positive impact on FDI (Nareeman, Pauline and Hassan, 2013). This suggests that as Economic globalization increases, FDI net inflows increases and as economic globalization decreases, it will reduce FDI net inflows to the country. Therefore, the hypothesis, H3: "Economic globalization have significant and positive impact on economic growth" is accepted.

## FDI crowds out domestic business

Baker, Kaen. "Does Foreign Direct Investment Crowd Out Domestic Entrepreneurship?" *Review of Industrial Organization*. February 2003.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/41799141?seq=1>

The results in table 3 support the hypothesis that international competition hinders the formation of domestic entrepreneurs. The negative and significant coefficients of IMPGROWTH and FORENTRY clearly suggest that **import competition and the inflow of FDI have a negative effect on the entry of domestic entrepreneurs. Strong import competition causes prices to fall on product markets and discourages domestic entrepreneurs to enter the shrinking the domestic market.** The immediate negative effect of import competition on domestic entry is -0.091 (-0.099\*0.921) while the total effect through the partial adjustment process is -0.131 (-0.099\*0.921/0.695). The negative effect of foreign entry is significantly larger, suggesting that **the inflow of FDI impedes the entry of domestic entrepreneurs because of stronger competition on the product market as well as skimming off the (best) workers on the labor market.** The immediate effect of foreign entry is -0.214 (= -0.237\*0.921), while the total response of domestic entry on foreign entry is -0.702 (= -0.237\*0.921/0.305). As the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities, **an extra FDI inflow of 10% would then cause, ceteris paribus, the entry rate of domestic firms to fall with 7% in the long run.** The insignificant coefficient of FOREXIT suggests that new domestic firms do not easily replace foreign firms leaving Belgium. **The results for the domestic exit-equation also support the crowding out effect of domestic firms** by foreign firms and to a lesser extent

by import competition. The positive coefficient of FORENTRY demonstrates that the inflow of FDI forces domestic entrepreneurs to exit, because of lower prices on product markets and/or higher wages on the labor market (encouraging domestic entrepreneurs to become wage workers). The positive albeit insignificant coefficient of FOREXIT in this equation may reflect that the exit of foreign firms directly results in the exit of domestic supplying/buying firms, however further evidence is necessary in order to validate this explanation.

## Increased FDI leads to increased poverty

*(Note: this study was conducted in Pakistan, so it is not directly related to West Africa. However, like the majority of countries in West Africa, Pakistan is a developing nation that shares many economic characteristics with West African nations.)*

Nishat, Muhammad. "Do Foreign Inflows Benefit Pakistani Poor?" *The Pakistan Development Review*. Winter 2009. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41261343?seq=1>

Pro-Public government expenditures are recognized in different categories in the literature. Verschoor (2002) identified the strongest candidates to be classified as pro-poor expenditures as the social sector expenditures (health, education and sanitation) while McGillivray (2004) included the expenditure on rural roads, micro-credit and agricultural extension and technology in the list of pro-public expenditures as they may also be beneficial to the poor. Literature gives us evidence that incidence of pro-public expenditures is progressive i.e. marginal pro- public spending is progressive. Thus, it can be said that expenditures, particularly on health and education, increases human welfare (Gomanee et al 2003). In addition to the impact on the welfare of the individuals, it is also necessary to make sure that distribution of such impacts is desirable. There is a possibility that rich quintile of the population gets the maximum out of public expenditures. Castro- Leal et al (1999) proved the same by showing that there is a least possibility that poor will benefit from education and health expenditures. In another research<sup>1</sup>, it is shown that there is a weak link between expenditures on health and education and poverty i.e. government social spending does not necessarily benefits the poor; hence such expenditures may not reduce poverty. On the other hand, this does not mean to reduce such expenditures as they may not benefit all the poor but the public as a whole do get the benefit (Gomanee et al 2005). More specifically, in long-run one percent increase in foreign inflows bring about 0.6% increase in poverty while in short-run, 1% increase in foreign inflows brings about 0.4% increase in poverty. We also found that remittances had insignificant impact on poverty reduction reason may be, as discussed by Jongwanish, (2007), the cost associated with migration due to which poor are not usually the beneficiaries if foreign remittances.



# CAUSING POLITICAL INSTABILITY

## What's the argument?

The first link into political instability is simply the rapidity of which West Africa is changing. In just a few years, countries have gone from being overwhelmingly rural to having the most rapidly growing cities in the world. Many experts contend that this social upheaval translates into political upheaval and instability.

This is unique to West Africa, where the rate of urbanization far exceeds what can be sustained by existing infrastructure. For example, the capital of Mali, Bamako, has seen its population grow 10-fold since its independence in 1960. Thus, like many other cities in the region, it “lacks the resources and institutional capacity to cope with explosive growth” (Pilling). The issue continues to grow as rural migrants continue to flow into West African cities, further straining infrastructure and urban resources (Todaro).

The second link into political instability is the growth of the informal job sector, which is the primary source of employment for the influx of rural migrants (Rukmana). This leads to a large informal sector being a defining characteristic of rapid urbanization (Avis). Unfortunately, wages are significantly lower in the informal sector (Meghir, Narita, and Robin). In fact, in every West African capital, at least 40% of informal workers earn less than minimum wage, with the proportion reaching 61% in Burkina Faso (Mbaye and Gueye). This causes political instability as workers struggle to make ends meet.

The third link into political instability is the propensity for government corruption. Due to the skyrocketing land prices in rapidly growing urban centers, local governments have begun selling land designated for schools at inflated prices (Pilling). More generally, experts write that West African governments have attained a level of corruption and theft that alienates the people from their government, increasing political instability and leading to military takeovers in some states, such as Ghana (Mondays).

## Why does the argument matter?

The impacts of political instability are two-fold. First, instability hinders economic growth. Studies show that “social unrests in these [West African] countries

have undermined economic growth either through increased uncertainty regarding returns on investment, destruction of livelihoods, lack of social cohesion and mistrust in the society, and the inefficient distribution of productive resources” (Okafor). This lack of investment furthers the cycle of poor economic prospects for these developing nations. Second, of a higher magnitude, neonatal mortality is concentrated in countries with higher levels of political instability. In fact, “countries with high levels of political instability account... for approximately... 31% [of neonatal deaths]” (Wise and Darmstadt).

## Main Players

Local government officials, unemployed West Africans, workers in the informal job sector

## Strategy Considerations

This argument is strong because there are several distinct, legitimate links from which con can build a case. Additionally, there are plenty of historical examples of social change leading to political instability, allowing for valid probability weighing on con. This can function as a turn to economic benefits read by the pro, as the development that pro discusses causes the problems that trigger instability.

The easiest link for pro to attack is that which leads to the impact - there is a difference between discontent due to government corruption and a military takeover, and con teams will likely struggle to access the full magnitude of their impact. Emphasizing this and weighing against it is the easiest way for pro to win the argument.



# Evidence for Causing Political Instability

## Urbanization far outpaces the capacity of existing infrastructure

### Urbanization poses logistical problems in major African countries

Pilling, David. "African cities surge to top of global growth league." *Financial Times*. 11

September 2018. <https://www.ft.com/content/9d457d54-b272-11e8-8d14-6f049d06439c>

Karim Kane is a carpenter, not a speculator. But the plot of land he bought a decade ago is worth nearly 25 times what he paid for it. In 2007, the village chief sold it to him for the equivalent of about \$450. Mr Kane built a house for his wife and six children on land that today he reckons is worth nearly \$11,000. The area where Mr Kane lives is little more than muddy hills with scattered plots of land given over to cows and goats. Pedlars lead donkey carts loaded with plastic jerry cans of potable water. But despite its semi-rural appearance Mr Kane has no doubt that he is now a resident of Mali's capital. "I'm a Bamakois," he says, using the French word for a citizen of Bamako. Almost unnoticed, Africa has become the world's most rapidly urbanising continent. From 2018 to 2035, the UN predicts that the world's 10 fastest growing cities will be African. It's a trend that has already enveloped Mr Kane, whose land has been swallowed up by Yirimadio, the fastest-growing part of Bamako, which may itself be the fastest-growing city in Africa. In parts of the neighbourhood, shacks built by people recently arrived from the countryside jostle with houses being constructed by Bamakois who are snapping up cheaper plots of land on the city edge. As Bamako has grown exponentially **it poses huge logistical problems for the cash-starved**

**authorities that are replicated across the continent.** According to a World Bank study, 472m people in sub-

Saharan Africa live in cities. High birth rates and migration from the countryside mean that by 2040 **Africa's** urban population will more than double to 1bn, it says, a **rate that far outpaces urbanisation elsewhere in the world.** Tann vom Hove, a senior fellow at City Mayors, which puts Mali's capital at the top of the list with an annual expansion rate of 4.5 per cent, says the trend is more important than the precise ranking. Estimates from the UN say other cities, including Dar es Salaam, a city of nearly 5m in Tanzania, are growing even faster than Bamako. Some of Africa's megacities, including Lagos, Nigeria's commercial capital of 21m people, and Kinshasa, the chaotic capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo, are sucking in hundreds of thousands of new people each year. Smaller cities, such as Yaounde in Cameroon, are growing almost as fast. Urbanisation is what helped ignite the "Africa rising" narrative promoted by the likes of McKinsey, a consultancy, whose 2016 *Lions on the Move II* report highlighted cities as an engine of productivity. From 2015 to 2045, McKinsey found, 24m more Africans would be living in cities each year, compared to 11m in India and 9m in China. "Urbanisation has a strong correlation with the rate of real GDP growth," it said, adding that "productivity in cities is more than double that in the countryside". The World Bank estimates Bamako's population today at 3.5m, more than 10 times its size at independence in 1960. But managing urban growth, with its associated problems of service provision, housing, crime and congestion, has become one of the biggest policy challenges on the continent. "For me this is a catastrophe foretold," says Issa N'Diaye, a professor of philosophy at the University of Bamako, of his city's untrammelled growth. "Bamako is a time-bomb." Bamako, he says, and by implication many other **cities** in Africa, **lack the resources and institutional capacity to cope with explosive growth.**

### The existing infrastructure and economy cannot sustain the influx of rural migrants

Todaro, Michael P. "Urbanization, unemployment and migration in Africa: Theory and policy." *Population Council*. 1997.

[https://knowledgecommons.popcouncil.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1247&context=departments\\_sbsr-pgy](https://knowledgecommons.popcouncil.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1247&context=departments_sbsr-pgy)

A central question related to the unprecedented size of these urban agglomerations is how African cities will cope—economically, environmentally, and politically—with such acute concentrations of people. Whereas cities offer the cost-reducing advantages of agglomeration economies and economies of scale and proximity as well as numerous economic and social externalities (for example, skilled workers, cheap transport, social and cultural amenities), the social costs of a progressive overloading of housing and social services, not to

mention increased crime, pollution, and congestion, tend gradually to outweigh these historical urban advantages. Former World Bank president Robert McNamara expressed his skepticism that huge urban agglomerations could be made to work at all: These sizes are such that any economies of location are dwarfed by costs of congestion.

The rapid population growth that has produced them will have far outpaced the growth of human and physical infrastructure needed for even moderately efficient economic life and orderly political and social

relationships, let alone amenity for their residents. Along with the rapid spread of urbanization and the urban bias in development strategies has come the prolific growth of huge slums and shantytowns. From the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro and the *pueblos jóvenes* of Lima to the *bustees* of Calcutta and the *bidonvilles* of Dakar, such makeshift communities have been doubling in size every five to ten years. Today slum settlements represent more than one-third of the urban population in all developing countries; in many cases they account for 60 percent or more of the urban total (as shown in Table 4). During the late 1980s, fully 72 of every 100 new households established in urban areas of developing countries were located in shanties and slums. In Africa, the number was 92 out of every 100. Most of the settlements lack clean water, sewage systems, and electricity. For example, metropolitan Cairo is attempting to cope with a population of 10 million people with a water and sanitation system built to serve 2 million. Thirty percent of the population of Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire lives without piped water and 70 percent without sewers. Similar conditions can be found in Nairobi, Lusaka, Kinshasa, Dakar, and Lagos where economic decline over the past decade has led not only to falling incomes and rising unemployment but also to a breakdown in urban services and rising social tensions.

## Urbanization grows the informal job sector

### Rural migration forces workers into the informal sector

Rukmana, Deden. "Urban Planning and the Informal Sector in Developing Countries."

*Planetizen*. 7 May 2007. <https://www.planetizen.com/node/24329>

The growth of the urban informal sector is also nourished by the influx of migrants from rural regions surrounding urban agglomerations in search of work. With the formal sector unable to accommodate such

large numbers of workers, the informal sector becomes the primary source of employment.

Without the economic opportunities generated by such activities, the poor would certainly become a larger burden for the urban authorities.

### Urbanization is characterized by a large informal sector

Avis, WR. "Urban Governance." *University of Birmingham*. 2016. [https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/UrbanGov\\_GSDRC.pdf](https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/UrbanGov_GSDRC.pdf)

A defining feature of rapid urbanisation in developing countries has been the growth of the informal economy

and settlements. Certain groups suffer disproportionately from informal arrangements, most notably migrants, women, the disabled and children. Children, for example, are particularly vulnerable with mortality rates exceptionally high in informal settlements. Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2012) note that in certain informal settlements in Nairobi (Kenya) child mortality rates are twice as high as the national average. In terms of employment, poor women are often concentrated in low-wage, low-skilled and home-based jobs in the informal sector. They face unique barriers in accessing health and other services, denying them the advantages associated with urban living (UNFPA, 2014b). Informality of all types is a sensitive political issue. Efforts to provide or improve housing for those living in informal settlements, or to bring informal workers into the formal economy by introducing new regulations and taxes, may be undermined by politicians pursuing political support (Goodfellow & Titeca, 2012).

## Informal jobs pay lower wages and have worse working conditions

### The formal sector pays higher wages than the informal sector

Mbaye, Ahmadou Aly and Fatou Gueye. "Labor Markets and Jobs in West Africa." *African Development Bank Group*. June 2018.

[https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/WPS\\_No\\_297\\_Labor\\_Markets\\_and\\_Jobs\\_in\\_West\\_Africa\\_B.docx.pdf](https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/WPS_No_297_Labor_Markets_and_Jobs_in_West_Africa_B.docx.pdf)

To better estimate informal employment in Senegal, Golub and Mbaye took the working-age population, estimated at 9 million, and subtracted the number of people in formal employment (those covered by IPRES, Senegal's social security system).<sup>31</sup> There were only about 300,000 formal jobs, or just 3.8 percent (Figure 12). Average **formal sector wages are much higher than informal wages in West Africa** (Table 7). Formal private sector salaries and benefits tend to follow public sector standards, while **informal wages are often below subsistence**. Alongside the usual distinction between formal and informal enterprise wages, a fairly clear distinction appears between large informal and small informal enterprise wages (see Table 7).<sup>32</sup> **Libreville, Gabon** is noteworthy: it **has the highest average formal sector wage, but also the lowest average informal sector wage**. It also has the highest income inequality. The 1–2–3 survey data from seven West African economic capitals confirm these trends. In all of them, over **40 percent of informal sector employees earn less than the minimum wage, and in Burkina Faso, the proportion reaches 61 percent** (Figure 13). The precariousness of informal activities also appears in working conditions (Figure 14). Between 80 and 100 percent of informal enterprises lack basic services—water, electricity, or telephone service. These results confirm previous findings.<sup>33</sup> Similarly, about 80 percent of informal enterprise employees have no social security or no medical service, and even fewer have paid leave (Figure 15). Supply and demand are imbalanced in Africa's labor market, with high levels of unemployment and underemployment, and few high-quality formal jobs. The business environment explains why the formal sector is struggling to grow and failing to generate good jobs. The business environment affects both large and small businesses, and it affects informal as well as formal employment because managers of informal sector enterprises are counted among informal employees. Rising labor incomes are normally the primary way economic growth translates into higher living standards and lower poverty rates, in a trickle-down effect. The size of an economy's formal private sector is correlated with an economy's ability to generate decent jobs. But Africa's informal production is symptomatic of a jammed structural transformation, in which labor should first migrate from agriculture to industry and second, as industrial growth slows and industrial employment falls, to a growing service sector.

### Informal wages are lower than formal wages

Meghir, Costas, Renata Narita, and Jean-Marc Robin. "Wages and Informality in Developing Countries." *National Bureau of Economic Research*. August 2012.

[https://www.nber.org/system/files/working\\_papers/w18347/w18347.pdf](https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w18347/w18347.pdf)

A key feature of the equilibrium we describe is that given productivity, both formal and informal firms can coexist. This can have important policy implications. Policies that reduce informality will not necessarily shut down all jobs in this part of the productivity distribution; on the other hand this should not be taken to imply that such an exercise will be costless, because lower levels of productivity may be able to sustain only smaller and fewer formal firms, given the amount of competition for workers and the overall regulatory costs. We consider these issues by first describing the equilibrium that results from our estimates and subsequently by counterfactual simulations. Based on the estimates we can back out the implied allocation of workers to the formal and the informal sector for different levels of productivity, as well as the pay structure. The results are presented in Tables 10 and 11 for low education males, and in Tables 12 and 13 for low education women, in Sao Paulo and Salvador, respectively. For males the lowest point of support of the productivity distribution is similar for both Sao Paulo and Salvador. However, all other percentiles are lower in Salvador, reflecting lower productivity and lower wages. In Sao Paulo there is less than six percent of firms in the formal sector below the 10th percentile of the productivity distribution. In Salvador formal firms start operating at a level of productivity above the 25th percentile. In both markets, informality is to be found at decreasing rates at all levels of productivity, but the size of formal firms increases rapidly. One of the most interesting features of the model is the implied wage structure. First, comparing wages and productivities the implied rents are quite high and particularly so for low productivity firms. In both labor markets frictions imply substantial rents accruing to firms, which of course can motivate welfare improving policies. Second, the results

justify two seemingly contradictory statements. Wages are on average higher in the formal sector than in the informal one, because the formal firms become increasingly large as productivity increases and wages increase with productivity (as indeed in the standard Burdett and Mortensen model): this is a composition effect. However, given productivity, for the most part formal firms pay less than informal ones: this is a compensating differential for the UI, pension entitlements and severance pay, although frictions and different job arrival rates will imply that the relationship is not one-to-one with these benefits. This differential declines and even gets reversed at the highest levels of productivity. The overall picture is similar for women with some small differences: first formal firms in Salvador start operating at a higher point of the distribution of productivity like in the male market; second the wage structure is different and the distribution of productivities do have different shapes. Comparing the wage structures is not straightforward because of the differing productivities of the jobs they tend to work and the resulting changes in composition. However, male wages in the formal sector are more dispersed than those of females in both regions. Table 14 presents male and female wages for the two regions by sector and overall, at the same productivity level. In all cases, but the informal sector of Salvador, women are paid more conditional on productivity, for lower productivity levels. This is reversed at the higher productivity levels. Thus women in most cases seem to work in more competitive labour markets with lower monopsony power for firms. However, on average women are paid less than men because most of them work in lower productivity (and hence lower paid) jobs. In other words the model interprets discrimination as being due to the type of jobs in the female labour market.

## Government corruption runs rampant and erodes public trust

### Skyrocketing land prices cause government to sell public land for profit

Pilling, David. "African cities surge to top of global growth league." *Financial Times*. 11

September 2018. <https://www.ft.com/content/9d457d54-b272-11e8-8d14-6f049d06439c>.

Urbanisation is what helped ignite the "Africa rising" narrative promoted by the likes of McKinsey, a consultancy, whose 2016 *Lions on the Move II* report highlighted cities as an engine of productivity. From 2015 to 2045, McKinsey found, 24m more Africans would be living in cities each year, compared to 11m in India and 9m in China. "Urbanisation has a strong correlation with the rate of real GDP growth," it said, adding that "productivity in cities is more than double that in the countryside". The World Bank estimates Bamako's population today at 3.5m, more than 10 times its size at independence in 1960. But managing urban growth, with its associated problems of service provision, housing, crime and congestion, has become one of the biggest policy challenges on the continent. "For me this is a catastrophe foretold," says Issa N'Diaye, a professor of philosophy at the University of Bamako, of his city's untrammelled growth. "Bamako is a time-bomb."

Bamako, he says, and by implication many other cities in Africa, lack the resources and institutional capacity to cope with explosive growth. There is not even a proper land registry, he says, meaning multiple claims on the same plot can

be tied up in court for years. Skyrocketing land prices have led to rampant corruption, Mr N'Diaye says,

alleging that land allocated for schools in his own neighbourhood has been sold off by unscrupulous officials. Rapid urban expansion has also left people bereft of services, he says. "There's been no planning

whatsoever of the road system, water drainage, electricity or urban transport. The city is becoming more and more unlivable."

### Corruption erodes trust in government, increasing political instability

Mondays, Samuel. "Corruption and State Instability in West Africa: An Examination of Policy Options." *Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre*. December 2007.

<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/9BD8A1F729CEB5B8C125746C0049D740-kaiptc-dec2007.pdf>

Since their inception, West African states have been facing corruption as a major problem. In some cases, it has attained levels of gross and egregious theft, for which no possible moral or historical justification can be advanced, and which has played a major role, both in the impoverishment of the region as a whole and specifically in the alienation of its people from their rulers. The existence of widespread corruption, especially in societies beset by mass poverty and very high levels of unemployment, has a deeply corrosive effect on trust in government and contributes to crime and political disorder. In the political realm, corruption undermines democracy and good governance by flouting or even subverting formal processes. Corruption in legislative bodies reduces accountability and distorts representation in policymaking; corruption in the judiciary compromises the rule of law; and corruption in public administration results in the unequal distribution of services. More generally, corruption erodes the institutional capacity of government as procedures are disregarded, resources are siphoned off, and public offices are bought and sold. At the extreme, unbridled corruption can lead to state fragility and destructive conflict, and plunge a state into “unremitting cycle of institutional anarchy and violence”. In as much as corruption destroys the legitimacy of government in the eyes of those who can do something about the situation, it contributes to instability. In Ghana and other West African states, corruption and embezzlement of public funds have often been cited among the reasons for military takeovers. For the past two decades, internal conflicts with spillover effect have severely disrupted West African social and economic development. The states of the Mano River Union – Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone – have been embroiled in civil wars that have had negative impact on their neighbours. Low intensity conflict in the Casamance region of Senegal has intermittently engaged The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, and Senegal for the past decade, while the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula has been the source of conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria.

## *Impact of political instability*

### Instability and poor governance hinder economic growth

Okafor, Godwin. “The impact of political instability on the economic growth of ECOWAS member countries.” *Defence and Peace Economics*. 9 October 2015.

<https://dora.dmu.ac.uk/handle/2086/17007>

The first hypothesis tested the relationship between terrorism and economic growth. The findings revealed a negative relationship between terrorism and economic growth with the result of the GMM estimation being significant. ECOWAS member countries have become a hub of terrorist activities in the past decade and are characterised by some of the factors which brood terrorism such as poverty, inequality, diverse ethnicity and youth unemployment. These findings further confirm that terrorism hampers economic growth in West African countries possibly through loss of available workforce, decreased investment, and reduction in physical and human capital accumulation. Results of the second hypothesis showed that poor governance has a negative and significant relationship in all of the estimations. This suggests that the poor level of governance obtainable in these countries has an adverse effect on economic growth. The poor quality of governance meant that ECOWAS member countries have experienced a cut into government revenues, unproductive spending, and weakening macroeconomic positions. It has also hampered the effectiveness of government institutions in providing basic public services such as education, health, and infrastructure which are necessary for economic growth. The third hypothesis on the relationship between social unrest and economic growth showed a negative but insignificant relationship. The factors captured into social unrest have undermined the economic growth potential of West African countries. Social unrests in these countries have undermined economic growth either through increased uncertainty regarding returns on investment, destruction of livelihoods, lack of social cohesion and mistrust in the society, and the inefficient distribution of productive resources. The test for the fourth hypothesis showed that youth unemployment is negative and significantly related to economic growth in all the estimations. These findings are in support of the general assumption that unemployment impedes economic growth through the loss in potentials regarding the factors of production. Also, youth unemployment has been identified as one of the main causes of instability in the West African countries as it makes the costs of



rebellion very cheap. Findings of the fifth hypothesis showed a negative relationship between death rate and economic growth with the result of the GMM model being significant. Life expectancy in these countries is very low partly due to incidences of conflicts and violence. The high levels on death rate in these countries affect economic growth through low human capital accumulation, lack of productivity, and the depletion of productive workforce. Finally, the sixth hypothesis revealed a negative but insignificant relationship between natural resource rent and economic growth. The negative relationship can be attributed to a number of factors. First, wealth from natural resources in these countries is often times mismanaged and inequitably distributed. Second, there is evidence of the links between natural resources, armed conflicts, and rebellion in West African countries. Third, lack of proper check-and-balance mechanisms needed for the reinvestment of resource rents into productive sectors such as education and health. The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political instability on the economic growth of member countries in ECOWAS. To achieve this objective, panel data techniques (fixed effects and GMM) were employed on a sample of 15 ECOWAS member countries for the period 2005-2012. By focusing specifically on ECOWAS member countries, the study contributes to what is known on the literature of political instability and economic growth as West Africa is the riskiest sub-region in Africa. The findings of the investigation revealed that **terrorism, poor governance, social unrest, youth unemployment, crude death, and natural resource rent have negative relationships with economic growth.** These findings are in accordance with the hypotheses. Another interesting aspect of this study is the policy implications deduced from the findings. These policy implications could not have been timelier considering the recent surge of instability in West African countries.

## Political instability increases neonatal mortality

Wise, Paul and Gary Darmstadt. "Strategic governance: Addressing neonatal mortality in situations of political instability and weak governance." *Seminars in Perinatology*. August 2015. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0146000515000555>

**Neonatal mortality is increasingly concentrated globally in situations of conflict and political instability.** In 1991, **countries with high levels of political instability accounted for approximately 10% of all neonatal deaths worldwide;** in 2013, this figure had grown to **31% [of neonatal deaths]**. This has generated a "grand divergence" between those countries showing progress in neonatal mortality reduction compared to those lagging behind. **We present new analyses demonstrating associations of neonatal mortality with political instability ( $r = 0.55$ ) and poor governance ( $r = 0.70$ ).** However, heterogeneity in these relationships suggests that progress is possible in addressing neonatal mortality even in the midst of political instability and poor governance. In order to address neonatal mortality more effectively in such situations, we must better understand how specific elements of "strategic governance"—the minimal conditions of political stability and governance required for health service implementation—can be leveraged for successful introduction of specific health services. Thus, a more strategic approach to policy and program implementation in situations of conflict and political instability could lead to major accelerations in neonatal mortality reduction globally. However, this will require new cross-disciplinary collaborations among public health professionals, political scientists, and country actors.

# INCREASING INCOME INEQUALITY

## What's the argument?

Urbanization is a broad process whose success or failure is determined by the details in how it occurs. No one would argue against the growing of cities and increased economic opportunities in a vacuum, but when looking at the context around it, urbanization can be a fragile process that can very easily make countries worse off if it is rushed and ineffective. This is where the case for income inequality comes into play. Unfortunately for West Africans, urbanization has been exploited by those in power to only benefit the top 1%. The lack of infrastructure and high cost of living means that most assets that generate economic growth are in the hands of the wealthiest, whereas new city-goers are relegated to live in urban slums with little to no socio-economic mobility. Markets for land are one-sided, and weak city planning exclude non-wealthy individuals from economic growth (Lall).

Because of this, despite swaths of economic growth there has been no poverty reduction and the top 1% own more of the combined wealth than everyone else in the region (Campbell). Most critics of income inequality argue that, despite the fact that growth is unequal, it doesn't actually leave middle and lower classes worse-off, but that argument falls when looking at West African urbanization. 60% of the urban population live in slums and only move down social classes because of the significant lack of economic opportunity and long-term generational poverty (Lall).

Outside of cities, urbanization also makes rural areas worse-off to contribute to the widening inequality gap in what has been referred to by scholars as the "rural-urban divide". Even if cities are economically better off and where somehow devoid of inequality, the rural poor are isolated from that economic activity and lack the ability to ever participate in it (Yabi). There is no trickle-down economics where the money does not circulate. To make this more concrete, there were 16 billionaires in 2014 and over 330 million people living in extreme poverty. To make matters worse, despite what economists have hoped for, rural areas are not catching up and are in fact falling further behind as urbanization increases (Tirschley). Clearly, when it comes to urbanization in West Africa, regardless of whether you look at cities or around them, growth is inequitable and, as a result, harmful.



## Why does the argument matter?

Income inequality generally is less tangible than other impacts like poverty or air pollution, but is just as important as other economic concepts. Inequitable growth can contribute to political, social, and other terrible forms of inequality and can make economic growth unsustainable. There is also plenty of literature quantifying its economic implications on more concrete variables. For example, one World Bank study estimates that every one percent increase in the Gini coefficient, which is a measure of economic inequality, increases poverty by 5.2% (Lopez). Income inequality is not something we can tolerate, because it does indeed make those who are not in the 1% worse off and can destroy the foundation of entire economies.

## Main Players

West African governments, global millionaires and billionaires, rural and urban poor

## Strategy Considerations

Income inequality is definitely one of the truest arguments on the con side, the facts speak for themselves. It is a bit more difficult to weigh later in the debate against some of the hard statistics on economic growth and takes a bit of persuading the judge to buy into the fact that rich people getting richer is not optimal. However, this argument can work well in higher level rounds that involve more complicated economic topics. Income inequality can oftentimes short circuit other forms of growth or other potential benefits. For instance, for any argument that deals with healthcare or education, if income inequality is rampant and the government is controlled by the top 1% there is no guarantee any of those programs will reach the areas who need it most. All in all, this is a very true argument that has a lot of potential to change the landscape of economic debates on the topic.

## Evidence for Increasing Income Inequality

Because of rapid, inequitable urbanization, 60% of the urban population live in slums

Lall, Somik V. “Prerequisites to getting Africa’s urbanization ‘right’” *Brookings Institute*. 21 January 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/01/21/prerequisites-to-getting-africas-urbanization-right/>

Unfortunately, neither markets nor the policy environment have coordinated decisions that yield satisfactory outcomes in the living or working environment. Markets for land are generally dysfunctional, product markets are fragmented, and weak city planning and limited finance hobble urban development. In fact, very few large African cities have substantial own-source revenues, and tax mandates are often related to having regional government status: consider Kampala, where per capita revenue was \$59 for the 2014 fiscal year, much higher than \$26 for the rest of the country. But more broadly, urbanization has been driven by a lack of opportunity in the countryside as agricultural activity has declined and, without the accumulated savings to make significant investments in housing, the default option has been to build shacks. Consequently, 60 percent of the region’s urban population lives in slums. With Africa’s urban population likely to double over the next 25 years, there is an urgent need to make cities livable, productive, and sustainable.

Despite swaths of economic growth, there has been no poverty reduction in West Africa and the top one percent own more than the combined wealth of everyone in the region

Campbell, John. “West African Governments Lack Commitment to Reduce Soaring Inequality.” *Council on Foreign Relations*. 11 July 2019. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/west-african-governments-lack-commitment-reduce-soaring-inequality>

Economic and social inequality is the elephant in the living room of the current American presidential election cycle. It also powers the yellow vest demonstrations in France, and is an important driver of Brexit sentiment in the United Kingdom. It turns out that it is—or should be—an issue in West Africa as well. Oxfam and Development Finance International (DFI) have developed the Commitment to Reducing Inequality Index (CRI). The index ranks 157 countries by their commitment to reducing inequality through increased spending on health and education, taxing the rich more than the poor, and paying a living wage. On July 9, they released their first CRI Regional Report [PDF]. It is critical of West African governments’ efforts to address social and economic inequality. The report starts with the arresting observation that six of the ten fastest growing economies in Africa were in West Africa in 2018: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Senegal. Three of them—Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Senegal—were among the ten fastest growing economies in the world. But, despite rapid economic growth there has been little or no reduction in poverty, and huge increases in economic inequality. The report concludes that the top one percent in West Africa own more than the combined wealth of everyone in the region.

## A one percent increase in the Gini coefficient<sup>9</sup> increases poverty by 5.2%

Lopez, Humberto. "Pro-growth, pro-poor: Is there a tradeoff?" *World Bank Publications*. 2004.

[https://books.google.com/books?id=qA9XeCYGxEIC&pg=PA7&lpg=PA7&dq=%22a+1+percent+increase+in+the+gini%22&source=bl&ots=R7igZ\\_IDmF&sig=SPqYqEQLQmG8tb-qbNowmRsvh18&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwihrPGNoO\\_YAhUFxmMKHTAcCywQ6AEIOTAF#v=onepage&q=%22a%201%20percent%20increase%20in%20the%20gini%22&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=qA9XeCYGxEIC&pg=PA7&lpg=PA7&dq=%22a+1+percent+increase+in+the+gini%22&source=bl&ots=R7igZ_IDmF&sig=SPqYqEQLQmG8tb-qbNowmRsvh18&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwihrPGNoO_YAhUFxmMKHTAcCywQ6AEIOTAF#v=onepage&q=%22a%201%20percent%20increase%20in%20the%20gini%22&f=false)

For example, for a country where the poverty line is 33 percent of per capita income and the Gini coefficient is .3, the growth elasticity of poverty would be -4 (i.e. growth of 1 percent of GDP would reduce poverty by 4 percent) whereas the inequality elasticity would be 5.2 (**a 1 percent increase in the Gini coefficient would increase poverty by 5.2 percent**). By contrast, in a country with the same income level but higher inequality, say a Gini of .6, the growth elasticity of poverty would be -.9, and the inequality elasticity would be 2. Thus, high initial inequality levels are likely to represent a barrier to poverty reduction, since both the impact of growth on poverty and the impact of progressive distributional change on poverty will be much smaller than in countries with a more equal income distribution. On the other hand, it is also the case that high initial poverty is also a barrier to poverty reduction. For example, consider the case of a country with a Gini of .4. If the country had per capita income levels that are six times the poverty line (row with the heading .16 in table 1) the growth elasticity of poverty would be -3.3, whereas if the country had income levels that are only one and half times the poverty line (row with the .66 heading in table 1), this same elasticity would only be -1.2. Thus this second (and poorer) country would have to achieve a growth rate that is more than twice that of the first (and richer) country to obtain the same rate of poverty reduction. Similarly, **a 1 percent decline in the Gini coefficient would lower poverty by .9 percent** when a country has a Gini coefficient of .4 and the poverty line is 66 percent of per capita income levels, but would have a much higher impact (7.7 percent) when the poverty line is 16 percent of per capita income.

## West Africa has a huge rural-urban divide: there are 16 billionaires and 330 million living in extreme poverty

Yabi, Gilles. "Inequalities in West Africa Urban-Rural and North-South Divides." *Ideas 4 Development*. 12 September 2017.

<https://ideas4development.org/en/inequalities-in-west-africa-north-south-divide/>

Inequalities are of a multifaceted nature via significant and visibly apparent income disparities in cities, but also in access to basic services, which remains a problem in rural areas. In cities, real slums are to be found in poor neighborhoods, where living conditions are extremely difficult, such as in the peri-urban areas of Nouakchott or Abidjan. There is a stark contrast with affluent neighborhoods, where luxury villas display the external signs of wealth. Very different worlds consequently coexist in cities in the subregion, some of which are among the most expensive in Africa (Lagos, Dakar or Conakry). **However, in West Africa, the greatest inequalities are first and foremost spatial: they exist between cities and rural areas. In urban areas, some of the money of rich people is used for goods and services which are offered by the less well-off (such as janitors, housekeepers, drivers, women stallholders on markets, etc.). In villages, however, the poor remain far from areas where money circulates.** Daily lives are marked by material deprivation and the absence of basic public services. In addition, for geographical and historical reasons related to the colonization and trade via ports, coastal cities are more developed than landlocked regions, hence the persistence of a divide, even within West African countries, between the North and South. This divide poses problems everywhere between the far north and south of the subregion, but the most striking example is Nigeria, located in the Gulf of Guinea. Statistics show horrendous differences in this country between the Federal States in the North-East, for example, and those in the South-West, both in terms of incomes and education and health indicators. Consequently, average national per capita income does not mean anything. The country has 15,700 millionaires, as well as a handful of billionaires, with over 60% living in Lagos. While it is true that Nigeria is perceived as a land of excesses in West Africa, its recent path, due to economic growth (prior to the collapse of oil prices), with an increase in inequalities, the trivialization of violence and the

<sup>9</sup> Note: the Gini coefficient measures levels of income inequality - the higher the coefficient is, the more unequal income distributions are in that country.

disconnection between extremely dynamic regions and dying peripheral areas, illustrates the realities of the entire region – which is not out of sync with the rest of Africa or the world in this respect. For the record, in Sub-Saharan Africa, absurd levels of wealth exist alongside unacceptable poverty, as the continent had 16 billionaires in 2014 and over 330 million people living in extreme poverty (less than 1,25 dollar a day). Four of these billionaires, including the first of them, Aliko Dangote, are Nigerian.

## Across Africa, rural areas are falling farther behind as the rural/urban divide increases

Tirschley, David. “Feeding Africa’s Cities: Opportunities, Challenges, and Policies for Linking African Farmers with Growing Urban Food Markets.” *Africa Agriculture Status Report*. 2020. <https://agritrop.cirad.fr/596464/1/Chap2-AASR-2020-Feeding-African-Cities.pdf>

evidence suggests that this urban advantage is not declining over time. On the first question, the World Bank provides rural/urban consumption expenditure estimates for 2010 across 36 African countries, based on nationally representative household consumption or expenditure survey data sets (Table 2.3). These data show that the ratio of urban-to-rural consumption expenditure is above 1.0 in every country, ranging from a low of 1.37 in Ethiopia (a 37% average income advantage for urban residents) to a high of 5.28 in Rwanda (a massive advantage for urban households, with average expenditure more than 5 times higher than rural). The populationweighted mean ratio is 2.08, meaning that the average urban resident enjoys more than double the consumption expenditure of the average rural resident. Sahn and Stifel (2003) show similar inequality between rural and urban areas in Africa, based on a multidimensional measure of poverty.

Across 6 countries, the smallest difference in asset poverty is 30%, and in half of the countries, asset poverty is more than 50% higher in rural areas than in urban areas.

Surprisingly, the study by Sahn and Stifel (2003) is the only one we find that explored whether urban–rural disparities are declining or rising over time. Their general conclusion is that there is no evidence of rural areas catching up in Africa.

Depending on the measure of welfare and which countries are examined, evidence can be strong that rural areas are falling further behind.

# HARMING PUBLIC HEALTH

## What's the argument?

By definition, urbanization leads to increased population density. While, in theory, health outcomes ought to be better in more developed areas, in practice this increase in density poses a major health risk. First, the overcrowding common in urban areas means diseases are much more transmissible (“Water sanitation hygiene”). This is especially relevant during the COVID-19 pandemic, as close proximity to others spreads the virus rapidly. Specifically, the increase in population density empirically harms health outcomes for children (Bradshaw). This harm is projected to increase as urbanization continues and the population continues to densify (Bradshaw).

Additionally, urban centers in West Africa suffer from poor sanitation. This is largely due to the rapid rate of migration and population growth, coupled with the lack of effective and efficient governance. Due to this combination, 72% of urban dwellers in sub-Saharan Africa live in slums, which are defined as “urban area[s] with a lack of basic services (sanitation, potable water, electricity), substandard housing, overcrowding, unhealthy and hazardous locations, insecure tenure and social exclusion”, and 45% lack access to improved sanitation (Ramin). Specifically, poor fecal sludge management techniques cause 115 deaths every hour, a problem that continues to skyrocket as the population grows and densifies (“Poor sanitation... African nations”).

## Why does the argument matter?

Poor sanitation is not only unpleasant, but it's fatal and costly. Over 315 thousand African children die every year due to diarrheal diseases caused by poor sanitation (Walker and Logan). Other estimates put the death toll at 115 per hour, quantifying the harms of this growing problem (“Poor sanitation... African nations”). These deaths cost African countries over US\$500 million each year, meaning saving these lives through improved sanitation is not only morally right but economically beneficial (Walsh).

## Main players

Local government officials, sanitation officials, poor urban dwellers, doctors

## Strategy Considerations

This argument is incredibly effective as it has clear links and tangible, high-magnitude impacts. However, teams must be careful not to drift into racist tropes when constructing their narrative - this isn't about individual hygiene, it's about governmental failure to provide adequate sanitation infrastructure. Be mindful of the history of colonization and violence that created many of the problems we see today.

# Evidence for Public Health

## Population density is a public health risk

### Overcrowding allows for easier transmission of disease

“Water sanitation hygiene.” *World Health Organization*.

[https://www.who.int/water\\_sanitation\\_health/emergencies/qa/emergencies\\_qa9/en/](https://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/emergencies/qa/emergencies_qa9/en/)

For communities, inadequate shelter and **overcrowding are major factors in the transmission of diseases** with epidemic potential such as acute respiratory infections, meningitis, typhus, cholera, scabies, etc. **Outbreaks of disease are more frequent and more severe when the population density is high.** Other public structures such as health facilities not only represent a concentrated area of patients but also a concentrated area of germs. In an emergency, the number of hospital-associated infections will typically rise. Decreasing overcrowding by providing extra facilities and a proper organization of the sites or services in health-care facilities is a priority.

### Population density worsens health prospects for children

Bradshaw, Corey et al. “Testing the socioeconomic and environmental determinants of better child-health outcomes in Africa: a cross-sectional study among nations.” *BMJ Open*. 1 February 2020. <https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/9/9/e029968.full>

A more general development goal to improve sustainable economies and societies (eg, Sustainable Development Goals 1: no poverty, 2: zero hunger, 8: decent work and economic growth, 12: responsible consumption and growth) measured by raising the per capita wealth of citizens of African nations (crudely measured by GDP), was also a strong predictor of child-health performance. Indeed, the wealthiest African countries as measured by per capita GDP had the best child-health outcomes on average. However, the relationship between wealth and health is at least partially circular, given that the status of health during childhood is an important determinant of productivity and earning prospects as an adult<sup>34</sup> and that at the scale of entire societies, improved health has a positive effect on economic growth.<sup>59</sup> Thus, failing to break out of the poverty trap is partially a result of poor health begetting lower economic performance, which itself erodes health outcomes.<sup>60</sup> In fact, it has been estimated that the African region will lose approximately 6% of its ‘non-health’ GDP (ie, the product of the number of discounted life years above the minimum employment age lost, per capita non-health GDP in purchasing power parity and total child deaths) from the future years of life lost from 3 million child deaths in 2013. **Dense living conditions can contribute to poor health outcomes for children**, especially in densely settled rural areas. As we predicted, **increasing household size, which we argue is a better indicator of the population-density conditions experienced by the average child than country-level population density itself, was correlated with worsening child health.** Family size is correlated with many different conditions, including maternal education level (which might explain in part the relationship we observed). Nevertheless, the negative relationship between human population density and environmental performance in Africa,<sup>29</sup> and projections showing that many African nations will increase rapidly in population size over the coming decades,<sup>9 11</sup> raise concerns that **increased population pressure will further compromise child health.** The relatively strong environmental signal we found is somewhat unexpected, given the anticipated lag between destructive actions like deforestation and pollution to be expressed in terms of human health.<sup>61</sup> In most regions of Africa, this result suggests that environmental degradation is possibly now already at a point where it is compromising food production, water or air quality or defence against infectious disease.<sup>61–63</sup> From a climate-change perspective, there is evidence that rainfall shocks associated with a more variable future climate at least temporarily increase stunting and the incidence of diarrhoea in children.



## Urban centers in West Africa suffer from poor sanitation

### The rapid rate of urbanization causes poor sanitation

Ramin, Brodie. "Slums, climate change and human health in sub-Saharan Africa." *World Health Organization*. December 2009. <https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/87/12/09-073445/en/>

Sub-Saharan Africa is the least urbanized region in the world. Only 39.1% of the region's population lives in cities. However, the region's urban population is projected to more than double to 760 million by 2030. The rate of urbanization makes it very challenging to manage.

A recent paper in the *New England Journal of Medicine* argued that urbanization is a "health hazard" for certain vulnerable populations, and this demographic shift threatens to create a humanitarian disaster.

Urbanization in Africa is linked to poverty. Globally, nearly 1 billion people live in slums, and this number is projected to double to 2 billion in the next 30 years.<sup>3</sup> The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UNHABITAT) defines

a slum as an urban area with a lack of basic services (sanitation, potable water, electricity), substandard housing, overcrowding, unhealthy and hazardous locations, insecure tenure and social exclusion. In sub-Saharan Africa, 71.8% of urban dwellers live in slums, the highest proportion in the world. Over the coming decades, the effects of climate change will also be progressively felt across the African continent. Climate change and urbanization will interact, with unpredictable effects. The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change stated that "urbanization and climate change may work synergistically to increase disease burdens."

A significant share of ill health in slums stems from poor access to sanitation and clean drinking water. In 2000, 30–50% of African urban dwellers lacked a safe water supply. Even where it is available, access to safe water is often unaffordable for the urban poor. Slum dwellers in cities in east Africa pay 5–7 times more for a litre of water than the average North American. Across Africa, 45% of the urban population lacked access to improved sanitation in 2000.<sup>4</sup>

### Poor fecal sludge management poses a major health risk

"Poor sanitation leading major health risks in African nations." Newsgram. 20 November 2020. <https://www.newsgram.com/poor-sanitation-leading-major-health-risks-african-nations/>

Poor sanitation continues to pose major health, environmental and socio-economic risks in many African countries, new research by the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) said on Thursday. The paper highlights ways to improve management, generate industry from human waste, and

improve sanitation for cities and households with poor fecal sludge management. The report's authors stress the need to invest in sanitation systems and mechanisms to improve fecal sludge management, as well as direct investments – especially to poor households – in order to tackle the global sanitation crisis and achieve Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 6: Water and sanitation for all by 2030.

The research paper 'Faecal sludge management in Africa: Socio-economic aspects, human and environmental health implications' was released on World Toilet Day, which celebrates toilets and raises awareness of 4.2 billion people without access to safely managed sanitation. It explores current trends in fecal sludge management and how they are impacting human and environmental health in the region and provides guidance on enhancing waste water management and sanitation services delivery across the continent. The analysis finds that sustainably managing fecal sludge is hindered by a number of factors, including population growth and urbanization; over-reliance on financial aid for the construction of

treatment plants; low revenue generation from users of treatment facilities; poor operation and maintenance; and inefficient institutional arrangements for fecal sludge management. COVID-19 shines a harsh light on the state of proper sanitation in many African countries. The authors call for better coordination of the roles and responsibilities of diverse actors involved in the processes. Poor fecal sludge management is a major contributor to the 115 deaths every hour from excreta-related diseases in Africa, while improved sanitation has been shown to decrease diarrhoeal disease by 25 percent. It also contributes to huge economic losses: On the continent, poor sanitation leads to losses of approximately one to 2.5 percent of a country's GDP. As population growth skyrockets – the continent's urban population is projected to triple by mid-century – so too does the volume of fecal sludge and wastewater. Across West African cities, one person produces between 20-150 liters of waste water per day. Considering an average daily generation of one liter of fecal sludge per person, a city of one million inhabitants will need to collect 1,000 m3 sludge every day. "The scale and threat of poor fecal sludge management can be turned on its head if we look at the government and business opportunities that can galvanize real change in health and livelihoods in marginalized communities in countries struggling with poor sanitation," said Habib El-Habr, Coordinator of the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities (GPA) at UNEP. The report recommends technical innovations for improving the capture, emptying, and treatment of sludge, highlighting good practices, including a program in Uganda, through which the Kampala City Council Authority worked with the private sector to improve fecal sludge management in the city. The program included a sanitation call center to strengthen the link between customers, the City Council, and private operators, and a GPS tracking system to improve service efficiency and avoid illegal dumping by private operators. Treatment plans can generate some revenue for countries and especially for poor communities, converting fecal sludge to compost or biochar for use as fertilizer, or converting to briquettes as fuel for industry. In 2017, Burkina Faso commissioned the first fecal sludge biogas plant in the country, generating electricity to feed the national grid. Olufunke Cofie, Principal Researcher and Country Representative for IWMI in West Africa said: "We are reaching a crucial point in managing fecal sludge on the African continent: There are feasible and affordable opportunities to further invest in inclusive fecal sludge management, and from feces capture to treatment. The report explores how transforming poop to useful products could help ease the crisis, as we are demonstrating in Ghana." (IANS)

## *Impact of poor sanitation*

### Over 300 thousand African children die every year due to poor sanitation and lack of clean water

Walker, Corah and Carolyn Logan. "Africa is failing to close the gap on providing water and sanitation." *The Conversation*. 9 June 2016. <https://theconversation.com/africa-is-failing-to-close-the-gap-on-providing-water-and-sanitation-58820>

The United Nations Sustainable Development Goal of ensuring access to clean water and sanitation for all by 2030 is an ambitious target for Africa. According to new research by non-partisan research network Afrobarometer, nearly half of Africans don't have access to clean water and two-thirds lack access to sewage infrastructure. Improvements in both of these areas have been made in the past decade, but huge numbers of Africans still live without these basic necessities. The lack of access to water and sanitation has not gone unnoticed by people living in Africa. Almost half of the continent's citizens are not happy with the way their governments are handling water and sanitation. The global Millennium Development Goals' target for drinking water was met in 2010. About 2.6 billion people have gained access to improved sources of drinking water since 1990. Five developing regions met the drinking water target, but the Caucasus and Central Asia, Northern Africa, Oceania and sub-Saharan Africa did not. In the area of sanitation, the target was missed by nearly 700 million people. The only developing regions to meet the sanitation target were the Caucasus and Central Asia, Eastern Asia, Northern Africa and Western Asia. Lack of access to water and sanitation is a matter of life and death.

Contaminated water and inadequate sanitation help transmit diseases like diarrhoea, cholera, dysentery and typhoid. In Africa, more than 315,000 children die every year from diarrhoeal diseases caused by unsafe water and poor sanitation. Globally, deaths from diarrhoea caused by unclean drinking water are estimated at 502,000 each year, most of them of young children. To assess the situation on the ground, the research looked at 36 African countries in 2014/2015 and asked nearly 54,000 citizens about their access to water and sanitation. This was in addition to recording direct observations in the

thousands of surveyed communities. We found that almost half (45%) of Africans went without enough clean water for home use during the past year, while one in five (19%) did so many times or always. One-third of surveyed communities (36%) lacked access to a piped-water system, and two-thirds (68%) lacked access to sewage infrastructure. The infrastructure situation has improved somewhat over the past decade. Across 18 countries that Afrobarometer has tracked since 2005, the share of communities enjoying piped-water supplies increased by 14 percentage points, and sewerage has been extended to an additional 8% of communities. Even for those who live in zones with the necessary infrastructure, however, access to clean water and toilets is often difficult. More than half (51%) of those surveyed said they had to leave their compound to access water. One in five had to leave their compound to use a latrine, and another 8% had no access at all to a latrine or toilet, even outside their compound. Rural residents are far worse off than their urban counterparts when it comes to access to water and sanitation. Two-thirds (66%) of rural respondents had to go outside their compound to access water, compared with 30% of urbanites. About 27% had to go outside the compound for a toilet and 11% had no access at all to a toilet. This is compared with 12% in urban areas, where just 3% had no access to toilet facilities. Experiences vary widely across countries. Almost 74% of citizens in Gabon and 72% in Liberia reported going without enough water at least occasionally, compared with 8% in Mauritius and 15% in Cape Verde. Going without enough water many times or always affected more than one-third of citizens in Madagascar (42%), Gabon (39%), Guinea (38%) and Togo (37%). By region, Central Africa had the highest proportion of respondents who said they went without enough water at least once (55%), while North Africa recorded the lowest (33%). Rural residents were more likely than their urban counterparts to experience water scarcity (50% vs 39%). Water supply ranked fifth in importance across 36 countries when citizens were asked about the most important problems facing their country. It followed unemployment, health, education and infrastructure/transport. But it was well ahead of concerns about political violence, corruption, electricity, crime and security, and agriculture. And water supply was the top problem identified in water-poor countries like Burkina Faso, Guinea and Niger. On average, a majority (55%) of citizens rated their government's performance in handling water and sanitation services as fairly bad or very bad. These negative appraisals were the majority view in all regions except North Africa, but even there, 46% rated their government's handling of water and sanitation services as bad. And public dissatisfaction is increasing. Across the 18 countries that Afrobarometer has tracked over the past decade, negative public ratings of government performance in providing water and sanitation services increased from 41% in 2005/2006 to 55% in 2014/2015. They worsened dramatically in Madagascar, where there was an increase of 47 percentage points in fairly/very bad ratings, followed by Ghana (28-point increase in negative ratings), Senegal (23 points), Botswana (16 points), Mali (15 points) and South Africa (13 points). These declining performance ratings should be a red flag for democratic governments that are still unable to provide their citizens with these most basic services. Safe and readily available water is a human right and an important contributor to public health. Improved access to safe water and sanitation boosts economic growth, contributes to poverty reduction, and is fundamental to achieving the goals of improved health and education, greater food security, and improved environmental sustainability. So modest improvements in coverage of water supply and sewerage systems are set alongside significant declines in government performance ratings. Perhaps this seeming incongruity indicates that citizens' expectations about the quality of infrastructure and services that they should receive (or even demand) from their governments are rising. Other questions still require further exploration, for example the question of whether progress can best be realised through local control and/or nongovernmental organisations or foreign investment, or whether centralised government investment, management and control of water infrastructure is the better approach.

## Poor sanitation costs African nations billions of dollars

Walsh, Christopher. "Inadequate sanitation costs 18 African countries around US\$5.5 billion each year." *The World Bank*. 16 April 2012. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2012/04/16/inadequate-sanitation-costs-18-african-countries-around-us55-billion-each-year>

WASHINGTON, April 16, 2012 – Eighteen African countries lose around US\$5.5 billion every year due to poor sanitation, with annual economic losses between 1 percent and 2.5 percent of GDP, says a new report by the World Bank's Water and Sanitation Program (WSP). "The 18 African countries represented in this study account for 554 million people—that's more than half of Africa's population," said WSP Manager Jaehyang So. "This is powerful evidence for Ministers that their countries will not be able to grow sustainably without addressing these costs." The study covered Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Republic of Congo, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. The desk study, *Economic Impacts of Poor Sanitation in Africa*, found the majority of these costs to production come from annual premature deaths, including children under the age of five, due to diarrheal disease. Nearly 90 percent of these deaths are directly attributable to poor water, sanitation, and hygiene. Other significant costs were productivity losses from poor sanitation, and time lost through the practice of open defecation. Adverse impacts of inadequate sanitation that are likely to be significant, but difficult and expensive to estimate, include the costs of epidemic outbreaks; losses in trade and tourism revenue; impact of unsafe excreta disposal on water resources; and the long-term effects of poor sanitation on early childhood development. The Africa country reports, part of the Economics of Sanitation Initiative (ESI) launched initially in East Asia in 2007, also found that open defecation alone accounts for almost US\$2 billion in annual losses in the 18 countries. Lacking alternatives, more than 114

million people still defecate in the open in the 18 countries surveyed; this is about half the number of people on the continent who have no latrine at all and almost 24 percent of the total population in the countries surveyed. Eliminating the practice of open defecation in these countries would require about 23 million toilets to be built and used. Open defecation costs more per person than any other type of unimproved sanitation. Time lost to finding a discrete location to use the toilet accounted for almost US\$500 million in economic losses. Women shoulder a huge proportion of this cost as they spend additional time accompanying young children or sick or elderly relatives. "Water and sanitation go hand-in-hand with human dignity. Our study finds that the heaviest burden of poor sanitation falls on poor people," says Jamal Saghir, World Bank Director for Sustainable Development in the Africa Region. "These findings make an irresistible case for greater investment in sanitation while removing the barriers to better sanitation services. Now is the time to tackle this urgent development priority once and for all." In most countries, current investments in sanitation are less than 0.1 percent of GDP. Only five of the 18 African countries surveyed invest between 0.1 percent and 0.5 percent of GDP in sanitation. Although African countries committed to increase their budgetary allocations for sanitation to at least 0.5 percent of GDP (eThekweni Declaration, 2008), none of the 18 countries surveyed has reached that target yet. The study follows yesterday's release of a separate WSP report that said Pakistan loses US\$5.7 billion annually from poor sanitation; and of a WHO/UN-Water report that says while access to water, sanitation and hygiene has considerably improved globally, services coverage could slip behind if adequate resources are not secured to sustain routine operations. It also comes ahead of the biannual high-level meeting of the Sanitation and Water for All partnership at the Spring Meetings of the IMF and World Bank, where Finance and Water Sector Ministers aim to identify steps to improve the use of existing funds and mobilize new resources for water and sanitation. The Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) is a multi-donor partnership created in 1978 and administered by the World Bank to support poor people in obtaining affordable, safe, and sustainable access to water and sanitation services. WSP's donors include Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and the World Bank. The World Bank Group is the largest external financier (US\$7.5 billion in fiscal year 2011) in water supply and sanitation, irrigation and drainage, water resources management, and other water-related sectors, and provides strong advisory and analytical support to client countries.

# HURTING THE ENVIRONMENT

## What's the argument?

Urbanization harms the environment in a few key ways.

First, it causes biodiversity loss. West Africa is a rich hub of biodiversity, but urbanization causes deforestation, resource depletion, and energy consumption (Ola and Benjamin). Increased demand for food and the expansion of transportation networks has forced farmers to ramp up production in already-deforested areas.

Second, urbanization contributes to air pollution. Most African cities lack regulation regarding air quality control, so some urban areas are hotbeds of pollution (Copley). Already, falling visibility has demonstrated the drastic increase in air pollution that African cities have experienced over the course of the last few decades ("Falling visibility shows African cities suffering"). According to Torrey, "urban populations consume much more food, energy, and durable goods than rural populations." In the West African country of Nigeria, urbanization has greatly increased air pollution and toxicity (Aliyu and Amadu).

## Why does the argument matter?

West Africa already faces severe environmental issues. Its natural resources are "poorly distributed" and deforestation is common ("West Africa Environmental Policy"). Unfortunately, the goods and services produced with the help of Africa's environmental system supports the livelihoods of about 80% of the West African population ("West Africa Environmental Policy"). Biodiversity loss in West Africa could threaten the existence of thousands of species of flora and fauna ("Biodiversity and Protected Areas"). Moreover, humans are affected by biodiversity loss, as the erosion of ecosystems can hurt humans' own food and water supplies ("Why Biodiversity Loss Hurts"). Air pollution kills around 712,000 Africans a year, and air pollution in West Africa specifically has already reached "a health-damaging level" (Chutel; Benedetti and Knippertz).

## Main Players

Farmers, city residents, flora and fauna

## Strategy Considerations

This argument is good because it is very difficult to disprove. Even without looking at any evidence, it makes sense that cities contribute to pollution. Population density, construction, infrastructure, and industry all take a toll on the environment. However, debaters will have to weigh these harms against the benefits of urban living. For example, urban populations eat more and expend more resources than rural ones, but that's likely because urban populations tend to have higher qualities of life than low-income rural populations. Debaters must be prepared to convince judges that environmental degradation outweighs any material benefits to individuals. Consider timeframe or magnitude weighing to emphasize the importance of protecting the environment.

## Evidence for Hurts the Environment

### West Africa faces severe environmental issues

“West Africa Environmental Policy.” *International Union for the Conservation of Nature*.

[https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/policy\\_brief\\_wa\\_environmental\\_policy.pdf](https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/policy_brief_wa_environmental_policy.pdf)

West Africa’s natural resources are considerable but poorly distributed, insufficiently known and under-developed. They need to be well managed and shared to support the well-being of the sub-region.

Today, natural resources and the entire environment in West Africa are characterised by strong trends of degradation and deterioration from natural and human factors that affect them. The region suffers from serious phenomena of all kinds of natural resource reduction and modification, which undermine its long-term development. In fact, West Africa’s environmental system produces diverse goods and services that often support the livelihoods of rural people or nearly 80% of the West African population.

These major environmental problems hinder sustainability of actions undertaken at regional, national and local levels. Among the major environmental problems the region is facing, it is important to first mention land degradation caused by erosion and negative traditional, customary or agricultural practices, aggravated by drought and desertification resulting in loss of large areas of arable land, in a region that is agriculture dependent. It is important to also include gradual biodiversity loss through deforestation, loss of tree

resources, degradation of pastoral resources, simplification and trivialisation of landscapes among the main environmental threats. This biodiversity loss is the result of recurrent phenomena such as bushfires, negative impact of armed conflict, inadequate knowledge of biodiversity species, poor knowledge of the real contribution of environmental goods and services to the national economy and particularly their contribution to the livelihood systems of grassroots communities. Biodiversity loss is also the result of

weak cooperation initiatives and joint management of transboundary forest ecosystems in the region. Water resource and aquatic ecosystems degradation is also a major environmental concern in ECOWAS countries given the vital role water plays in the economy in general, agricultural development and drinking water supply to cities in particular. The degradation of watersheds, drying up of spring sources, wild proliferation of invasive aquatic species, various types of pollution are all constant concerns of States and regional institutions. In the same light, coastal ecosystems are subject to various degradations among which we can mention the degradation of mangroves and coastal erosion that increasingly threaten arable coastal land and human infrastructure. Also, pollution and nuisances, whether urban or industrial, remain a major

concern in the region. States have difficulties to ensure sound management of urban and rural waste and provide the population with an adequate sanitation system. It is the same for the difficulty of satisfactorily managing industrial pollution and nuisances with all the associated health risks. Extractive industries are also a major environmental challenge due to their harmful effects on the environment. Many mines seriously affect availability of farmlands, contribute to destruction of vegetation and landscape degradation, and are major sources of pollution and nuisance due to the misuse of dangerous chemicals. Environmental risks related to extractive industries will in the years to come be all the more worrying given that there are major oil development prospects in the region given the immense reserves identified.



## West Africa faces environmental degradation and resource depletion

“Environment and Climate Change Response.” *USAID*. 23 November 2020.

<https://www.usaid.gov/west-africa-regional/environment>

USAID West Africa's Climate Change and Biodiversity efforts focus on (a) improving biodiversity conservation in terrestrial and mangrove ecosystems, (b) improving the sustainability of landscapes for human wellbeing by reducing deforestation and forest degradation, and (c) improving capacity for combating illegal wildlife trade.

**West Africa's natural and human systems are at serious risk from human-caused stresses. Direct drivers of natural resource degradation - conversion of land for agriculture, industrial mining, overharvesting, trafficking of wild animal and plant species, illegal logging, urbanization, and infrastructure development - are visible on the landscapes of West Africa.**

To be sustainable, effective, and impactful, natural resource management interventions must address both direct and indirect drivers of degradation, including changes in policy and enabling environments that produce tangible, on-the-ground results, as well as building capacity at all levels to fight wildlife crime. Through the West Africa Biodiversity and Climate Change Project (WA BiCC), USAID West Africa works to improve conservation and climate-resilient, low emission growth across West Africa. This project targets geographical areas within the region to improve governance and policy on critical natural and human systems. By working through regional partners, such as ECOWAS and the Mano River Union, and with targeted national and sub-national institutions, this activity increases the capacity of institutions at all levels in order to reduce wildlife trafficking, deforestation and forest degradation, as well as promote climate-resilient growth in coastal areas.

## *Urbanization decreases biodiversity*

### West Africa is already facing biodiversity loss

Ola, Oreoluwa Ola and Emmanuel Benjamin. “Preserving Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services in West African Forest, Watersheds, and Wetlands: A Review of Incentives.” *Forests Journal*, doi:10.3390/f10060479. 31 May 2019. <https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4907/10/6/479>

Biodiversity is described as a stock of living resources determined by nature as well as, to some extent, human activity [1,2]. Ecosystem services (ESs), on the other hand, are biodiversity flows beneficial to man. Ecosystem services include provisioning services (food, drinking water, medicine, and hydroelectric power), regulating services (carbon sequestration, climate regulation, and clean air and water), cultural services (tourism and religious and cultural benefits), supporting services (agriculture, soil formation, and flood and erosion control) [3]. **In West Africa, watersheds, wetlands, forest, and vegetation are biodiversity hubs** and primary providers of ESs. These hubs characterize the environmental landscape in West Africa and are crucial to the livelihood of its citizens.

However, the integrity of these biodiversity hubs is at serious risk. **Agricultural expansion, overexploitation of biological resources, population explosion, urbanization, and climate change is destroying biodiversity ecosystems [4].** The occurrence of invasive species as well as industrial and pesticide discharge are threatening the quality and volume of native flora and fauna species residing in watersheds and wetlands across sub-Saharan Africa [4,5]. Consequently, these have degraded and reduced the size of biodiversity hubs in parts of West Africa [3]. Close to 90% of West Africa's original forest has disappeared with small fragments of this natural forest existing in Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, and Cameroon [6]. Over-exploitation of forest resources, mining, agricultural expansion, hunting and population growth is fragmenting tropical forests and driving biodiversity losses [7].

**These losses threaten both wildlife as well as the current and future livelihoods of those individuals and communities that depend on ESs in West Africa.**

In response to these threats, governments, and private sector organizations in developing countries are implementing environmental conservation policies and programs to regulate and preserve biodiversity resources and raise awareness of threats facing biodiversity hubs. For instance, conservation programs such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), REDD+, Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), and Forests and National Park protections laws are increasingly being implemented to protect biodiversity spots and curtail the over-exploitation of forest resources. The + sign adds conservation and sustainable management of forest carbon stocks in developing countries to the existing REDD mandate [8–10]. Reviews of the implemented policies and programs are becoming common because programs and policies must adapt to the changing environmental, institutional, and economic conditions surrounding these programs. Findings from the reviews uncover up-to-date, comprehensive information and steers discussions absent in individual case study research [11]. The results of reviews, therefore, guide policymakers in the design and implementation of new programs as well as in

adjusting and scaling-up pilot programs. In Africa, the few reviews of ecosystem services and conservation programs in Africa concentrate mainly on Eastern and Southern Africa while it should be noted that there are fewer conservation programs in Africa compared to other developing regions of the world [5,11–14]. Sub-Saharan Africa lags behind other developing parts of the world in the implementation of conservation programs [11]. Furthermore, poverty alleviation and equity are dominant themes in conservation (watershed) programs in Africa [5]. Both studies demonstrated that strict regulatory requirements and poor technical knowledge limit opportunities for trading ecosystem services and implementing trading schemes in Africa. Sustainability in Africa depends on the assessment of ecosystem services, especially provisioning ecosystem services, and these assessments are dominant in conservation programs in Eastern and Southern Africa [14].

## Urbanization in West Africa threatens biodiversity

Güneralp, Burak. “Urbanization in Africa: challenges and opportunities for conservation.” *Environmental Research Letters*, Vol. 13, No. 1. 20 December 2017.

<https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa94fe>

Africa has several regions with exceptional biodiversity [18] and is dotted with protected areas (PAs) with varying levels of protection status. The PAs cover an area of about 4.5 million km<sup>2</sup> across the continent [19]. As recently as 2000, Africa was sparsely urbanized with only about 500 km<sup>2</sup> of urban land within the boundaries of its PAs (table 1). In contrast, by 2030, total urban extent within 50 km of PAs on the continent is expected to reach more than 140 000 km<sup>2</sup>. In mid-latitudinal Africa, the nearly 20 fold increase in urban extent, the largest forecasted proportional increase in the vicinity of PAs across the world [17], will pose especially acute challenges for governance and management of PAs and the surrounding lands in this region. While large urban centers such as Nairobi, Kenya and Ibadan, Nigeria dominate the continent's urban expansion patterns (figure 2), the ecological impacts of the smaller cities and towns across Africa are also considerable. This is even the case for smaller cities such as Gaborone and Windhoek, the capitals of, respectively, Botswana and Namibia. Both cities are located in resource-poor areas and experience recurrent severe shortages of water [20]. Gaborone, with a population of 232 000 in 2011 [21], relies, in part, on water supplied from the Letsibogo Dam on the Motloutse River, via a 400 km long pipeline. An extension of this North–South Water Carrier is planned that will bring waters from the Zambezi River—about 500 km from Gaborone—to the relatively small but growing city. Such long-distance water transfers are likely to become more widespread as growing cities in Africa will seek new sources to meet their increasing demand for water [22]. It is often assumed that migration from rural to urban areas and the resulting concentration of populations in cities would ease the pressure on natural habitats. In many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, the migration and subsequent concentration of people in urban areas has indeed reduced rural populations, thus leading to reduced rates of deforestation [23]. However, land speculation by wealthy urban residents has also driven—abetted by lack of land-use planning and control—loss and fragmentation of rangelands close to cities and towns in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda [24].

In Western Africa, the increased demand for food in the cities has incentivized farmers to convert forests to agricultural fields to meet this demand [25]. These examples suggest that any relief from pressure on habitats from rural–urban migration may be overtaken by the increased demand for food and other natural resources from rapidly growing African cities.

Furthermore, there are many instances of increasing deforestation in spite of a rise in a country's urbanization level as more complex dynamics—often involving long-distance actors—start to play more prominent roles [26, 27]. Importantly, there has been significant foreign direct investment (FDI) aimed at land purchases in the continent to help secure food production for urban residents in other parts of the world [28].

Therefore, conclusive evidence on ecological outcomes of rural–urban migration on the continent is yet to materialize [25]. Urbanization and economic development also drive expansion of the transportation network, which in turn often fragment habitats. Of particular

concern in the context of biodiversity conservation are the road and railroad infrastructure. Across Africa, there are 33 major development corridors, either proposed or already under construction [29]. If and when constructed, the road and railroad infrastructure in current plans would cut through over 400 PAs and could degrade about 2000 more. Moreover, large-scale changes in transportation networks such as the one proposed around the Serengeti may significantly influence future urban expansion patterns potentially increasing the vulnerability of the PAs in that region [30, 31]. Another example for the far and wide-reaching impact of urban residents is the bushmeat trade [32, 33]. Demand for bushmeat, a traditional source of animal protein for humans in much of Sub-Saharan

Africa is on the rise fueled by dietary preferences of urban residents that are shaped by a combination of urbanization and increased-income effects [34]. It is shown that the high levels of human density, characteristic of urban and peri-urban areas, are negatively correlated with bushmeat from ungulates and primates sold in markets [35]. However, the bushmeat trade is also linked to rural livelihoods [36]. Therefore, measures such as blanket bans are likely to be an ineffective approach to address this complex issue; a more balanced approach that safeguards sensitive species as well as the livelihoods of people that rely on bushmeat trade, and one that recognizes the role of bushmeat in providing nutrition to millions of people along the urban-rural spectrum is needed. The negative impacts of urbanization are evidenced in the expanding haloes of deforestation around cities and transportation routes [37]. Such exploitation of natural resources in expanding waves, progressively from the most highly valued to less, is observed both in large cities [38] and around smaller settlements [39]. Peri-urban agriculture, though important for food security in many Sub-Saharan African countries, can also contribute to loss and degradation of habitats around cities. Environmental degradation spreading out from an urban center can be significantly enhanced in both speed and intensity depending on the state of the transportation network [23, 37]. In the near future, the regions that may experience such degradation most rapidly and extensively are eastern and southern Democratic Republic of Congo and southern Cameroon, due to their high rural population densities and high foreign demand for their agricultural lands [37].

## Urbanization causes habitat degradation and produces environmental stressors

Elmqvist, Thomas et al. "Urbanization, Habitat Loss, and Biodiversity Decline: Solution pathways to break the cycle." Book published December 2015.

<https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315849256.ch10>

Urbanization and biodiversity interact in multifaceted and complex ways (McKinney 2002). Both the size and spatial configuration of urban areas matter for biodiversity (Alberti 2005; Tratalos et al. 2007). While some urban areas have high local species richness, this is typically at the cost of native species (McKinney 2002, 2006). Urban expansion may lead to habitat fragmentation, potentially resulting in genetic or demographic isolation of native species (Ricketts 2001). A major impact of the expansion of urban areas on native species is on their dispersal through changes in habitat configuration and connectivity (Bierwagen 2007). Urbanization is also a major threat to endemic species due to increased incidence of colonization by introduced species (McKinney 2006, 2008). Urbanization impacts biodiversity and ecosystem services both directly and indirectly. Direct impacts primarily consist of habitat loss and degradation, altered disturbance regimes, modified soils and other physical transformations caused by the expansion of urban areas. Indirect impacts include changes in water and nutrient availability, increases in abiotic stressors such as air pollution, increases in competition from non-native species, and changes in herbivory and predation rates (Pickett and Cadenasso 2009). The most obvious direct impact of urbanization on biodiversity is landcover change due to the growth of urban areas. Although urban areas cover less than 3 percent of the Earth's surface, the location and spatial pattern of urban areas have significant impacts on biodiversity (Muller et al. 2013). Worldwide, urban expansion occurs faster in low-elevation coastal zones, which are biodiversity-rich, than elsewhere. Although urban land occupies less than 1 percent of land in the majority of terrestrial ecoregions, it most heavily impacts ecoregions along coasts and on islands, affecting about 10 percent of terrestrial vertebrates found therein. Likewise, more than 25 percent of all endangered or critically endangered species will be affected, directly or indirectly, by urban expansion by 2030 (Giineralp and Seto 2013; McDonald et al. 2013). In a simple exercise, McDonald et al. (2014), assuming a linear species-area curve and using the expected amount of urban growth (and hence habitat loss) between 2000 and 2030, predict the expected number of endemic vertebrate species that might be lost due to urbanization (see Figure 10.1). They find that urban growth in 10 percent of all ecoregions would account for almost 80 percent of the expected loss in species. This implies that safeguarding species from urbanization in a relatively small number of ecoregions could have a disproportionately large benefit in terms of avoiding biodiversity loss. For example, cities have historically been concentrated along coastlines, on some islands and on major river systems, all of which are often areas of high species richness and endemism.

## Impact of biodiversity loss

### Biodiversity loss in West Africa could threaten the existence of thousands of rare or endangered species

“Biodiversity and Protected Areas in West Africa.” *USAID*.

<https://eros.usgs.gov/westafrica/biodiversity-protected-areas>

Biodiversity's importance in West Africa is well established. The various ecosystems, ranging from dry savanna to tropical forest, provide habitats to more than 2,000 amphibian, bird and mammal species (IUCN, 2015). The region's tropical forest, in the Upper Guinean countries, is the main locus for biodiversity. These lowland forests of West Africa are home to 320 mammal species (which represents more than a quarter of Africa's mammals), 9,000 vascular plant species, and 785 bird species (Conservation International, 2008). The Upper Guinean forest is renowned for its primate diversity, with nearly 30 distinct species, and has been identified as some of Africa's most critical primate conservation area.

The West African forest ecosystem is also home for two of Africa's great apes, including remaining scattered populations of the endangered western chimpanzees and a small population of western lowland gorillas on the Nigeria-Cameroon border. The West African countries are also home to a population of over 7,500 African elephants, although many groups reside in northern savannah habitats outside the forest ecosystems (Mallon and others, 2015). The Upper Guinean forest ecosystem of West Africa, however, is one of the most critically fragmented regions on the planet. Logging, mining, hunting and human population growth are placing extreme stress on the forests threatening species such as the Jentinka's duiker or the pygmy hippopotamus (Conservation International, 2008). Indeed, only 69,424 sq km, or 10 percent of its original dense forest cover remains. Much of this remaining forest is exploited for timber and does not represent intact habitat. Moreover, hunting and indiscriminate trapping are prevalent throughout the forest zone and accelerating harvest rates put increasing pressure on populations of primates and forest antelopes in particular. Similarly, hunting whether for meat, trophies or sport, has resulted in a catastrophic decline of large mammals across the Sahel and Sahara zones in the north of the region (Durant and others, 2014; Mallon and others, 2015). The reduced prey base adversely impacts carnivore numbers, such as the African lion, across the region. In West Africa today, most of the endangered species and highly biodiverse habitats are confined to protected areas. A total of 1,936 nationally protected areas have been identified in the region, currently covering around 9.6 percent of West Africa (see Protected Areas map above). Approximately 90 percent of these protected areas are small and dominated by forest reserves. In addition, 53 protected areas have international designations, including 17 Biosphere Reserves. Protected areas vary widely in size, from less than 1 sq km to 97,300 sq km. However, large protected areas, including clusters of sites, are critical to supporting viable populations of larger species or to ensure fully-functioning, dynamic ecosystems (Mallon and others, 2015). More extensive areas or buffer zones provide connectivity between habitats, safeguard dispersal corridors between core populations and natural migration routes, and enhance resilience to the effects of climate change (Mengue-Medou, 2002). Since international borders rarely coincide with ecosystem boundaries, transboundary sites and landscapes are of great importance. These better preserve ecosystem function, show the value of managing biodiversity conservation at a sub-regional in spite of institutional difficulties, engage local communities, and may lead to harmonization of legislation. For instance, Diawling National Park in Mauritania and Djoudj Bird Reserve in Senegal lie on opposite sides of the Senegal River Delta but the joint site is recognized as an International Biosphere Reserve. Similarly, the W-Arly-Pendjari complex (Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger) is a transboundary Biosphere Reserve which covers roughly 32,250 sq km, and protects a highly biodiverse savanna ecosystem.

### Biodiversity is critical to human health

“Why Biodiversity Loss Hurts Humans as Much as Climate Change Does.” *Ecowatch*. 6 May 2019. <https://www.ecowatch.com/biodiversity-loss-human-health-2636410357.html?rebelltitem=1#rebelltitem1>

They are the tireless stewards of the air, water and land from which we live. But the millions of species whose toil underpins our prosperity are gravely endangered by human activity, scientists say – and that imperils us in turn. Biodiversity loss is as big a threat to humans as climate change, said UN biodiversity chief Robert Watson last week at a conference in Paris to release a landmark report on global

biodiversity and ecosystems. **"The continuing loss of biodiversity will undermine our ability for poverty reduction, food and water security, human health and the overall goal of leaving nobody behind."** The report, the first of its kind since 2005 and published Sunday by the Intergovernmental Panel on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), warns of grave consequences to humanity from mass die-offs and degradation of nature. Drawing together the work of more than 400 experts, it paints a bleak picture of a world in which **essentials such as food and drinking water are endangered through species and ecosystem decline.** The unprecedented and accelerating deterioration of nature in the past 50 years has been driven by changes in land and sea use, exploitation of living beings, climate change, pollution and invasive species, the report found. These five drivers are, in turn, underpinned by societal behaviors ranging from consumption to governance. In a blow to human progress, damage to ecosystems undermines 35 of 44 UN sustainable development targets for poverty, hunger, health, water, cities climate, oceans and land, the authors found. Diplomats from 130 nations gathered in Paris last week to agree on the final wording of the report's summary for policymakers. "The loss of species, ecosystems and genetic diversity is already a global and generational threat to human well-being," said Watson. "Protecting the invaluable contributions of nature to people will be the defining challenge of decades to come."

## Urbanization increases pollution

### Most African cities lack environmental regulation

Copley, Amy. "Figure of the week: Pollution in African cities." *Brookings Institution*. 19 July 2017. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/01/19/figure-of-the-week-pollution-in-african-cities/>

At the same time, climate change and urbanization present a number of challenges to development in some cities, heightening environmental risks and degradation. When cities become more populated, crowded, congested, and industrialized, levels of pollution can increase, exposing residents to poor air quality levels. For example, the 2016 African Economic Outlook report stated that the human cost of air pollution is "abnormally high" in Africa, where an estimated 246,000 premature deaths in 2013 were caused by ambient particulate matter pollution. **The report also highlighted certain policies that can help curb pollution, including environmental protection acts targeting the transport sector—vehicle fuel parameters, the phase-out of lead from gasoline, emission standards, and air quality controls. Still, it noted that only eight countries in Africa have operational routine monitoring systems for air quality, limiting the measurement of pollution levels and enforcement of standards violations.** Figure 1 below, from this year's Foresight Africa report, illustrates the varying mean concentrations of particulate matter smaller than 10 microns in diameter—a common measure of pollution levels—of African cities compared to regional, global, and Southeast Asian averages. It indicates that the average African city has slightly higher levels of pollution than cities globally, however, on average, African levels of urban pollution remain below those of similarly developing Southeast Asian cities. Interestingly, population size does not necessarily determine pollution levels, as Kenya's Nairobi has a larger urban population (3.14 million people) and lower pollution levels than Uganda's Kampala with a population of 1.6 million.

### Pollution in African cities has increased along with urbanization

"Falling visibility shows African cities suffering major air pollution increases." *Science Daily* (reporting on a new study from the University of Birmingham). 23 July 2020. <https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2020/04/200423130444.htm>

**Falling visibility in three major African cities reveals that air pollution has increased significantly over the last 45 years -- leaving citizens facing further short-term increases in man-made pollution due to increasing urbanization and economic development,** a new study reveals. Africa is not well-equipped with air quality monitoring, so scientists have used visibility data for capital cities in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda as a substitute measurement. They discovered a significant reduction in visibility since the 1970s, where Nairobi shows



the greatest loss (60%), compared to Kampala (56%) and Addis Ababa (34%) -- due to increased particulate matter (PM) emissions from vehicles and energy generation. Correspondingly, PM pollution levels in the three cities are estimated to have increased by 182%, 162% and 62% respectively since the 1970s to the current period.

## General urbanization hurts the environment

Torrey, Barbara Boyle. "Urbanization: An Environmental Force to Be Reckoned With."

*Population Reference Bureau*. 23 April 2004. <https://www.prb.org/urbanization-an-environmental-force-to-be-reckoned-with/>

Urban populations interact with their environment. Urban people change their environment through their consumption of food, energy, water, and land. And in turn, the polluted urban environment affects the health and quality of life of the urban population. People who live in urban areas have very different consumption patterns than residents in rural areas.<sup>10</sup> For example, urban populations

consume much more food, energy, and durable goods than rural populations. In China during the 1970s, the urban populations consumed more than twice as much pork as the rural populations who were raising the pigs.<sup>11</sup> With economic development, the difference in consumption declined as the rural populations ate better diets. But even a decade later, urban populations had 60 percent more pork in their diets than rural populations. The increasing consumption of meat is a sign of growing affluence in Beijing; in India where many urban residents are vegetarians, greater prosperity is seen in higher consumption of milk. Urban populations not only consume more food, but they also consume more durable goods. In the early 1990s, Chinese households in urban areas were two times more likely to have a TV, eight times more likely to have a washing machine, and 25 times more likely to have a refrigerator than rural households.<sup>12</sup> This increased consumption is a function of urban labor markets, wages, and household structure.

Energy consumption for electricity, transportation, cooking, and heating is much higher in urban areas than in rural villages. For example, urban populations have many more cars than rural populations per capita. Almost all of the cars in the world in the 1930s were in the United States. Today we

have a car for every two people in the United States. If that became the norm, in 2050 there would be 5.3 billion cars in the world, all using energy.<sup>13</sup> In China the per capita consumption of coal in towns and cities is over three times the consumption in rural areas.<sup>14</sup> Comparisons of changes in world energy consumption per capita and GNP show that the two are positively correlated but may not change at the same rate.<sup>15</sup> As countries move from using noncommercial forms of energy to commercial forms, the relative price of energy increases. Economies, therefore, often become more efficient as they develop because of advances in technology and changes in consumption behavior. The urbanization of the world's populations, however, will increase aggregate energy use, despite efficiencies and new technologies. And the increased consumption of energy is likely to have deleterious environmental effects. Urban consumption of energy helps create heat islands that can change local weather patterns and weather downwind from the heat islands. The heat island

phenomenon is created because cities radiate heat back into the atmosphere at a rate 15 percent to 30 percent less than rural areas. The combination of the increased energy consumption and difference in albedo (radiation) means that cities are warmer than rural areas (0.6 to 1.3 C).<sup>16</sup> And these heat islands become traps for atmospheric pollutants. Cloudiness and fog occur with greater frequency. Precipitation is 5 percent to 10 percent higher in cities; thunderstorms and hailstorms are much more frequent, but snow days in cities are less common. Urbanization also affects the broader regional environments. Regions downwind from large industrial complexes also see increases in the amount of precipitation, air pollution, and the number of days with thunderstorms.<sup>17</sup> Urban areas affect not only the weather patterns, but also the runoff patterns for water. Urban areas generally generate more rain, but they reduce the infiltration of water and lower the water tables. This means that runoff occurs more rapidly with greater peak flows. Flood volumes increase, as do floods and water pollution downstream. Many of the effects of urban areas on

the environment are not necessarily linear. Bigger urban areas do not always create more environmental problems. And small urban areas can cause large problems. Much of what determines the extent of the environmental impacts is how the urban populations behave – their consumption and living patterns – not just how large they are.

## Example of pollution increasing in the West African country of Nigeria

Aliyu, Alhaji and Lawal Amadu. "Urbanization, Cities, and Health: The Challenges to Nigeria – A Review." *Annals of African Medicine*. October

2017. <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5676403/>

**Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases; carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide are increasing due to human activities such as fossil fuel combustion, land use changes, and agriculture**

The atmosphere is a natural laboratory, in which various gases, solid particles, and sunlight are involved in different chemical processes. The natural by-products of these processes are being profoundly altered by anthropogenic activities, especially in the urban areas. Before 1970s when urbanization and industrialization were at low levels in Nigeria, most cities in the country would have passed any safety standards with respect to air pollution. However, **the oil boom of the mid 1970s and rapid industrialization that followed to the present gradually made the problem of air pollution a fact to be reckoned with in the country, particularly in the industrialized cities**

For example, the air over Lagos where the 38% of the manufacturing industries in the country are located is credited with characteristic unpleasant odor with its skyline not becoming visible until around midday due to grayish industrial haze.[29] The effects of these chemical by-products can lead to economic effects from damage to materials, vegetations, and livestock. Human beings face the hazards of fumes emitted from vehicles, especially in urban centers with heavy road traffics, when air is stagnant exhaust gases from cars and generators will accumulate, leading to eye irritation, plant damage, and even fatalities. In large cities like Lagos, which suffer perennially from traffic congestion with peak hour operating speeds of <10 km/h, there is high-emission rate of carbon dioxide and sulfur dioxide from automobile exhaust. Values far >0.02 part per million limits recommended by the WHO have been reported for many cities in Nigeria. Several studies[44,45] from Nigeria have shown that the air in Nigerian environment is far from clean. Sources of pollution are dust particles and vehicular traffic. Emission rates of dust per vehicle-kilometer for paved and unpaved roads in all parts of Nigeria are higher when compared to 0.1 g per vehicle-kilometer for roads in London.

**The annual amount of dust kicked up in the air by motor vehicles in Nigeria was more than 612,000 and 187,000 tonnes for unpaved and paved roads, respectively.[29] In addition, more than 584,000 tonnes of smoke particles were estimated to be emitted into atmosphere for burning about 80 million m3 of fuelwood. The economic situation in Nigeria (1986–2008) has led to increased importation of used (Tokunbo) vehicles into the country. These used vehicles with outdated and battered engines emit obnoxious gases at levels higher than permitted.**[36]

Finally; up till now, Nigeria is among a few if not the only country in world where gas flaring with its disastrous consequences is still taking place. The gaseous emissions from flare mix with humid air to produce weak dilute solution termed acid rain with its effects on vegetations, clothing, and houses. Indoor air pollution can be traced to prehistoric times when man used fire for cooking and keeping warm. Today, urban residents rely heavily on unprocessed biomass fuels (wood, crop residues, animal dung, and coal) because of unavailability and cost of refined fuels (cooking gas, kerosene, and electricity). These fuels burn (uncleanly) indoors with high levels of air pollution thereby exposing the inhabitants of the dwellings, especially children and women to health hazards. Underpinning all these is poverty which has become a major barrier to use of cleaner fuels in urban areas. Many substances in biomass can damage human health and include particles, carbon monoxide, nitrous oxide, formaldehyde, and polycyclic organic matter.[46] It is reported that particles with diameter <10  $\mu$  (PM10) and those <2.5 (PM2.5) can penetrate lung tissues and have the potential to damage human health.[47]



## Impact of pollution in West Africa

### Air pollution in Africa kills 712,000 people annually

Chutel, Lynsey. “Scientists aren’t sure exactly how bad air pollution is in Africa but think it’s worse than we thought.” *Quartz*. 9 February 2017. <https://qz.com/africa/905656/air-pollution-is-increasing-in-africa-along-with-rapid-urbanization/>

In more industrialized countries, factories, cars and power stations are blamed for polluting the air. In Africa, the causes are subtler, hiding in plain sight. Kerosene, used in homes all over the continent to light homes and cook foods, is a deadly threat that many people simply didn’t know about (pdf), said Dora. Dirty air leads to the premature deaths of 712,000 Africans each year, more than unsafe water, malnutrition and unsafe sanitation. It is the impoverished areas on the outskirts of cities that are the worst affected, where city officials have not been able to provide services at the rate that these communities have grown. Here, where homes are built in close proximity, coal fires pose another danger, even when homes have chimneys or cook outdoors. Without proper waste removal, people often burn their garbage, emitting even more toxins into the air. Air pollution causes over a quarter of deaths by non-communicable diseases globally, causing a host of illnesses ranging from pneumonia to dementia. While public health strategies have been introduced to raise awareness and prevent the symptoms of non-communicable diseases, air pollution remains absent from that message especially in Africa. The annual number of deaths from outdoor or ambient air pollution rose sharply—by 36%—from 1990 to 2013 from what was a low base, according to the OECD. Indoor air pollution rose by 18% during the same period from what was already a relatively high base of 400,000 deaths in 1990. Dirty air has led to the premature deaths of 712,000 Africans each year, more than the toll of unsafe water, malnutrition and unsafe sanitation. In September last year, researchers calculated the monetary cost of air pollution in Africa for the first time: \$215 billion from outdoor pollution and \$232 billion from indoor pollution (based on 2013 figures). The solution to reducing air pollution, however, is complex, and requires everyone from urban planning, waste management to transport authorities to work together to address what is quickly becoming a health crisis. Renewable energy, said Dora, will be pivotal in reversing the damage of air pollution.

### Air pollution in West Africa has already reached a “health-damaging level”

Benedetti, Angela and Peter Knippertz. “The air that West Africa breathes.” *European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts*. 12 March 2019.

<https://www.ecmwf.int/en/about/media-centre/science-blog/2019/air-west-africa-breathes>  
The results show that air pollution has already reached a health-damaging level. During the dry season, the concentration of fine particles in the atmosphere is at its highest, as desert dust from the Sahara and smoke from fires in the savannah are mixed in the air in addition to the fine dust and anthropogenic particulate matter that originate in cities.

During the summer monsoon season, particulate matter from Central Africa, which can be transported thousands of kilometres by the prevailing southerly wind, appears in addition to local emissions. During the field surveys, 20 to 40 percent of the total particle counts over land were already detected above the ocean, indicating long-range transport. Due to the high humidity during the wet summer monsoon, the particles can absorb more water, which makes them more opaque and implies that less sunlight reaches the ground. This in turn influences air circulation, cloud formation and precipitation probability. If pollution continues to increase, a possible reduction of rainfall may eventually affect food production, water and electricity. Climate simulations by the DACCIIWA project team indicate that temperatures in West Africa are expected to increase by one to three degrees Celsius by 2050, depending on geographic location. In addition, the increased particle concentration in southern West African cities can entail significant risks to public health and increase respiratory, cardiovascular and skin diseases. For the first time, DACCIIWA research has shown that the number of hospital visits due to

these health problems is closely related to the concentration of particulate matter in the air. Especially during the rainy season, the number of known cases of illness increased, which may suggest that humidity amplifies the effects of air pollution on humans. With the new data and analyses, scientists can provide more accurate climate, weather and health forecasts, not only for West Africa, but also for regions further away. For example, we know that the West African monsoon can affect European weather and is an important factor for Atlantic hurricanes. DACCIIWA thus lays the foundations for more precise climate, weather and air quality models, which enable a more sustainable development policy.

## West African air pollution has increased by 36% since 1990

“In West Africa, air pollution kills but its extent is still unknown.” *Guapo*. 6 December 2019.

<https://www.guapo-air.org/en/resource-center/air-quality-monitoring/west-africa-air-pollution-kills-its-extent-still-unknown>

African and international experts, scholars and policymakers gathered on the 28th and 29th of November 2019 in Paris, for GUAPO's international seminar on air quality in West African cities, and set forth air pollution challenges in West Africa. Exacerbated by population growth and urban density, air pollution in West Africa is worsening and so are its effects on public health. According to a study by the OECD in 2016, premature deaths linked to air pollution increased by 36% between 1990 and 2013. In light of the seriousness of the situation, initiatives are emerging to monitor air quality in West Africa. Launched in 2016, the European research program DACCIIWA aimed to identify air pollution sources in different West African cities (Abidjan, Lomé, Accra and Cotonou). The results emphasize 5 main sources of pollution : domestic fires and wood combustion, waste burning, road traffic, food and chemical industries, and finally desert dust from the Sahara worsening air pollution, in particular during the dry season. Studies such as the DACCIIWA project show how essential data gathering and production of knowledge are to implement effective public policies against air pollution. Yet, existing data is still too limited to fully assess the extent of air pollution in the region. Lack of funding to acquire monitoring equipment and lack of local capacity are the main obstacles standing in the way of functioning air quality monitoring in West African cities. During the seminar, speakers proposed different responses to air pollution challenges in West Africa, such as the renewal of the car fleet, pedestrianization of roads, deployment of performing public transportation systems and awareness-raising on the threats of air pollution. Bernard Koffi, representative of ECOWAS Commission, also announced a meeting of member states' ministers of the environment in February 2020 to launch a project of regional air quality monitoring.

**A2 PRO**

# A2 SPREADING DEMOCRACY

## Globalization harms democracy by exacerbating income inequality

Weinert, Matthew. "Globalizing Democracy or Democratizing Globalism?" Book:

*Transnational Democracy: Political Spaces and Border Crossings*. 2002.

<https://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/volumes/2005/weinert-2005.pdf>

Monarchy, though, failed. British (and increasingly French) liberal sentiment, combined with the populist revolutions of 1848, challenged the legitimacy of monarchical absolutism and disposed of it in favor of more democratic constitutions. But, actions undertaken by the Concert powers were at least consistent with the express intent of the monarchical principle: buttressing monarchy over other forms of government in the interests of international order and stability. Oddly, compared to the monarchical principle, democracy appears incoherent and inconsistent with itself. That leading democracies have intervened in smaller democracies raises the dual specter that, on the one hand, while major democracies may be inherently peaceful with each other, they are not with regard to smaller democracies, and, on the other, major democracies often undermine the rule of law abroad, all the while championing it, for specious national security reasons. Further, alignment of the major democracies with globalization, or "the new capitalism" as Cox calls it (1996: 528), tends toward the re-privatization of the economic sphere, which then frees dominant economic actors "from any form of state control or intervention." Consequently, globalization undermines democracy by widening the gap between the rich and the poor; inducing a disproportionate relationship between finance and production, whereby the "symbolic economy" of money outstrips the "real economy" of production and distribution; and forcing underdeveloped countries to refinance old debt with new. Globalization restructures production which undermines the "power of labor in relation to capital;" stimulates migrations of people in search of better working conditions and higher wages; creates an "internal South" in the North, and "a thick layer of society [in the South] that is fully integrated into the economic North;" and encourages corporate welfare policies, which do little to improve on any substantial level the lives of workers or the environment (Cox 1996: 528).

## Large, non-democratic economic powers like China undermine globalization as a method to spread democratic values

Dalpino, Catherin. "Does Globalization Promote Democracy?: An early assessment."

*Brookings Institution*. 1 September 2001. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/does-globalization-promote-democracy-an-early-assessment/>

The logic, compelling in the long run, has short-term limits. In countries with enduring authoritarian regimes, leaders are more likely to accede to legal reform for pragmatic reasons?to improve economic conditions through increased international trade?so long as the reforms are not viewed by the populace as ideological capitulation. Leaders may also consider reforms pertaining to international trade to be easier to contain, because the initial focus is on commercial codes that primarily affect foreign business. Although it is possible to cordon off domestic populations in the early stages of such reform, the consequences of trade liberalization and marketization eventually require the regime to adopt a broader approach. But economic liberalization can also exacerbate problems that seem to outpace legal reform efforts and even encourage popular support for authoritarian or semi-authoritarian government. Russia's entry into the international economy has, in the minds of many Russians, worsened official corruption and economic crime. As long as these trends are perceived to be stronger than (even impervious to) reform, citizens are likely to tolerate less than democratic rule as a short-term solution. Moreover, some of the economic powers poised to enter international trade regimes, most notably China, could themselves affect the rules governing those regimes. Thus far, global trade rules have largely been written by Western democracies, whose combined economic power

has placed aspiring entrants in the role of supplicants. But the entry of more “mixed” economic powers? governments committed to market reform but not necessarily to Western-style democracy? may change these institutions. At the least, the link between trade preferences and transparent processes may weaken slightly, as may support for overt political conditionality linked to trade, in the mode of the European Union. At worst, global trade institutions could be rent with bloc behavior, not unlike that sometimes seen in the United Nations.

Technology's impact on democratization is likely to be more immediate, although not sufficient in itself to effect political change. Weak economies, along with government resistance, have contained the spread of technology in many Middle Eastern and some Asian states and will for the near future. But technology's advent has added a new dimension to the prospects for political change. The most dramatic episodes of popular resistance against authoritarian regimes in the past decade have featured prominent roles for technology. In Tiananmen Square in 1989, Chinese demonstrators communicated with one another and the outside world by fax. In Bangkok in 1992, Thai professionals, dubbed “mobile phone mobs,” coordinated antimilitary demonstrations with student leaders and one another by cellular phone. In Indonesia in 1998, anti-Suharto resistance was largely directed via the Internet. But for all these moments of high political drama, technology's greatest promise in promoting political openness lies in the everyday intercourse of civil and political life. In authoritarian societies, the Internet differs from print and electronic media, because no government-dominated media exist for the regime to use as a counterweight. From its inception, the Internet has been a freer form of communication than any other, at least for those able to obtain it. Modernizing authoritarian states often wish to expand the use of technology for economic development but also to keep citizens from using it for political purposes. Doing both, however, is increasingly difficult. China's ambitious plan to build a national computerized information infrastructure has spurred domestic telecommunications industry growth of 30-50 percent a year since 1989. At the same time the government registers all Internet users, is investing in technology to monitor and filter cyber communications, and regulates acceptable topics for online discussion. But Chinese Internet users have learned how to circumvent many of these restrictions using proxy servers, a sign that technology can usually outmaneuver attempts to control it. Today China's 17 million Internet users are a small fraction of the nation's population. But their number is increasing rapidly?growing 75 percent from 1997 to 1998 and then tripling in 1999. More important, political discourse in China has expanded despite state attempts to censor and prevent it. In the medium run, the effects of government efforts to control the Internet will depend in part on whether China can maintain brisk economic growth. If it does, Internet growth is likely to overwhelm attempts to control it. In the long run, the prognosis is favorable. In countries where technology is growing, control of global media may alternate between government and society, but the advantage will usually go to society in the end. But globalization can also hand authoritarian regimes an edge.

Regimes that accede to economic reforms most often allow openings they are confident they can control. If the immediate impact is favorable?an improved economy, greater access to modern technology and goods?the regime's popular legitimacy may be strengthened by the perception that it has delivered (or at least permitted) the improvements. Ironically, globalization can thus extend the longevity of the regime, at least in the short run. Conversely, bad economic times that are attributed, correctly or not, to globalization can also give authoritarian leaders a boost.

When disillusionment with economic reform sets in, Western policymakers' insistence on the link between reform and democratization can be used to authoritarian advantage. In the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98, Vietnam and Laos, which had begun very modest political reforms to accompany marketization, jettisoned these political moves when their trade with the countries hit hardest by the crisis declined. The failure of some of the region's fastest-growing economies?those linked most closely to the West?was taken as a warning of the dangers of globalization. Hard-liners eclipsed reformers in the early post-crisis years or replaced them altogether in the political structure. Globalization has also

helped sustain authoritarian regimes by feeding nationalism in some non-Western states. During the Asian economic crisis, anti-Western sentiments flared even in countries well on the road to democracy, such as Thailand, when catastrophic drops in currency values were popularly attributed to manipulation by Western traders. In more authoritarian countries such as Malaysia, leaders turned this new nationalism to their advantage by salting their political platforms with anti-Western (and anti-globalization) rhetoric and portraying themselves as national champions.

Technology too has fed the nationalist backlash against globalization. Democracy promoters have long heralded the “CNN effect,” in which television brings world events into the living rooms of people whose leaders would prefer to block such coverage. In Thailand in 1992, when the military government banned reports of Bangkok street demonstrations on government-owned television stations, coverage of the events (and the military crackdown on demonstrators) was transmitted to citizens through satellite television, creating a galvanizing force for resistance. In recent years, authoritarian regimes have used television to their own advantage. In 1999, satellite TV brought NATO's bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade into the homes of urban Chinese, who were quick to respond with public protests. During that same incident nationalists also made use of the

Internet. At the height of the protests, Chinese hackers broke into the website of the U.S. embassy in Beijing, in an eerie modern-day parallel to the 1900 Boxer Rebellion.

## Globalization by Western nations has been profit-motivated

“The Threat of Globalization.” *Global Policy Forum*.

<https://www.globalpolicy.org/globalization/defining-globalization/47948-the-threat-of-globalization.html>

AS THE GLOBALIZATION PROCESS HAS BEEN ENGINEERED BY CORPORATE ELITES, and serves their interests, they have successfully conveyed the impression that globalization is not only inevitable but has been a great success. This is fallacious. Even ignoring for the moment its distributional effects, globalization has been marked by substantial declines in rates of output, productivity, and investment growth. Under the new regime of enhanced financial mobility and power, with greater volatility of financial markets and increased risk, real interest rates have risen substantially. The average rate of the G-7 countries (U.S., Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Canada and Japan) has gone from 0.4%, 1971-82, to 4.6%, 1983-94. This has discouraged long term investment in new plant and equipment and stimulated spending on the re-equipment of old facilities along with a large volume of essentially financial transactions--mergers, buybacks of stock, financial maneuvers, and speculative activities. This may help explain why overall productivity growth<sup>3</sup> in the countries that are members of the OECD fell from 3.3%, 1960-73 to 0.8%, 1973-95, or by some 75%. Gross fixed investment fell from 6.1%, 1959-1970, to roughly 3.1% thereafter, or by half. OECD country annual rates of growth of real GDP fell from 4.8%, 1959-1970 to 2.8%, 1971-94, or by 42%. But the elites have done well despite the slackened productivity growth. Because globalization has helped keep wages down, while increasing real interest rates, the upper 5% of households have been able to skim off a large fraction of the reduced productivity gains, thereby permitting elite incomes and stock market values to rise rapidly. But it was a different story for the global majority. Income inequality rose markedly both within and between countries. In the United States, despite a 35% increase in productivity between 1973 and 1995, the median real wage rate was lower in the latter year. Inequality rose to levels of 70 years earlier, and underemployment, job insecurity, benefit loss, and worker speedup under “lean” production systems all increased.<sup>4</sup> Insecurity is functional. As Alan Greenspan complacently explained to Congress in 1997, wage rates were stagnant in this country because worker insecurity was high.<sup>5</sup> That this high insecurity level reduced the well-being of the affected workers did not bother Greenspan, or Congress and the mainstream media. The gap in incomes between the 20% of the world’s population in the richest and poorest countries has grown from 30 to 1 in 1960 to 82 to 1 in 1995, and Third World conditions have in many respects worsened. Per capita incomes have fallen in more than 70 countries over the past 20 years; some 3 billion people--half the world’s population, live on under two dollars a day; and 800 million suffer from malnutrition.<sup>6</sup> In the Third World, unemployment and underemployment are rampant, massive poverty exists side-by-side with growing elite affluence, and 75 million people a year or more seeking asylum or employment in the North, as Third World governments allow virtually unrestricted capital flight and seek no options but to attract foreign investment.<sup>7</sup> The new global order has also been characterized by increased financial volatility, and from the Third World debt crisis of the early 1980s to the Mexican breakdown of 1994-95 to the current Asian debacle, financial crises have become more and more threatening. With increasing privatization and deregulation, the discrepancy between the power of unregulated financial forces and that of governments and regulatory bodies increases and the potential for a global breakdown steadily enlarges. Only an elite perspective permits this record to be regarded as an economic success. **THE**

**GLOBALIZATION OF RECENT DECADES WAS NEVER A DEMOCRATIC CHOICE by the peoples of the world--the process has been business driven, by business strategies and tactics, for business ends. Governments have helped, by incremental policy actions, and by larger actions that were often taken in secret, without national debate and discussion of where the entire process was taking the community.**

In the case of some major actions advancing the globalization process, like passing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or joining the European Monetary Union (EMU), publics have been subjected to massive propaganda campaigns by the interested business-media elites. In the United States, public opinion polls showed the general public against NAFTA even after incessant propaganda, but the mass media supported it,<sup>8</sup> and it was passed. In Europe as well, polls have shown persistent majorities opposed to the introduction of the Euro, but a powerful elite supports it, so that it moves forward. This undemocratic process, carried out within a democratic facade, is consistent with the distribution of benefits and costs of globalization, and the fact that globalization has been a tool serving elite interests. Globalization has also steadily weakened democracy, partly as a result of unplanned effects, but also because the containment of labor costs and scaling down of the welfare state has required the business minority to establish firm control of the state and remove its capacity to respond to the demands of the majority. The mix of deliberate and unplanned elements in globalization’s antidemocratic thrust can be seen in each aspect of the attack process.

**ONE OF THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF TNC MOVEMENT ABROAD HAS BEEN to tap cheaper labor sources. Labor is often cheapest, and least prone to cause employer problems, in authoritarian states that curb unions and enter into virtual joint venture arrangements with foreign capital,** as in Suharto’s Indonesia and PRI’s Mexico. Capital moves to such friendly investment climates in an arbitrage process, shifting resources from the more expensive to the less costly locale, in a process that penalizes and thereby



weakens democracy. The actual shift of capital abroad, and the use of the external option to drive hard bargains at home, has weakened labor. Labor has also been weakened by deliberate government policies of tight money and restrictive budget policies to contain inflation, at the expense of high unemployment. These policies, and the incessant focus on labor market "flexibility" as the solution to the unemployment problem, reflect a corporate and antilabor policy agenda, fully institutionalized. There have even been more open and direct attacks on organized labor--both Reagan and Thatcher engaged in union busting, and the latter was quite explicit in her aim to weaken labor as a political force.<sup>9</sup> Democracy, according to pluralistic theory, is said to rest on the existence of intermediate groups, like labor organizations, that can bargain and work on behalf of an otherwise atomized population. The deliberate weakening of such groups is thus an attack on democracy.

## Internet authoritarianism is spreading in West Africa

Delsol, Gabriel and Claire M. Metelits. "A New Type of Threat: Russia, China and Digital Authoritarianism in West Africa." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*. 26 December 2020. <https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2020/12/26/a-new-type-of-threat-russia-china-and-digital-authoritarianism-in-west-africa/>

At a compound on the outskirts of Accra, Ghana, a group of people post messages to over 200 various social media accounts. Their goal is to spread disinformation about police brutality, LGBTQIA+ issues, and race. The target of this campaign is not the online Ghanaian community; the target is the American public, and the sponsor of this campaign is Russia. In recent years, Russia and China have increasingly engaged in digital authoritarianism in West Africa, polarizing national politics and undermining Western influence across the region. Yet these security issues often remain under-analyzed and unaddressed among US security policy officials. Worryingly, this shift coincides with the rumored drawdown of US troops in Africa.

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West African states face a new threat in the form of emerging information technologies, which risk amplifying existing security challenges and undermining democratic norms. The majority of these technologies exist to enable digital authoritarianism, which refers to the use of digital information technology to surveil, repress, and manipulate populations. Using techniques of surveillance, censorship, cyber-attacks, internet shutdowns, disinformation, or the purposeful dissemination of false information intended to mislead or harm, Russia and China export support for authoritarian and illiberal leaders in West Africa. Russia and China have different strategies and goals for their work in West Africa. Russia's model is relatively simple and involves disinformation and low-tech surveillance. Examples include disinformation campaigns to support the 2020 reelection bid of President Alpha Conde in Guinea and the undermining of public support for the presence of French security forces in Mali. Russia is testing grey zone tactics, notably disinformation, in West African contexts before exporting them to the United States. Following intensive coverage of foreign interference in the 2016 presidential election, Russian influence operations adopted a new approach of "franchising," collaborating with local disinformation producers to create content protected under domestic free speech laws. Throughout 2018, these tactics were deployed across West African states undergoing elections and were subsequently fine-tuned and redirected to American audiences ahead of the 2020 election. Meanwhile, China employs its advanced domestic technology sector and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—which has a significant digital component—to facilitate the sale of information technology such as smart city platforms, facial recognition systems, and smart policing. China uses these sales, and its pro-Beijing influence operations, to cultivate a positive self-image abroad and export its governance values of digital authoritarianism to like-minded states. However, given the role of the Chinese private sector in these transactions, a portion of this export strategy is profit-driven, as opposed to Russia's more overtly political and centrally-led objectives. While Russia and China are the primary exporters of tools for digital authoritarianism, and do so for a mix of political and economic reasons, there are other exporters whose goals are purely profit-driven. Israeli, French, British, and American firms, for example, enjoy a growing demand from West African leaders who favor the use of information technologies to consolidate their power and limit democratic space, especially ahead of elections. In terms of regional trends, states with weak rule of law and significant levels of military spending are most likely to invest in technologies of digital authoritarianism. While Russia's model will likely make further inroads, as its relatively low costs and high adaptability make it appealing for resource-poor governments, the cost of Chinese technology is expected to fall with technological innovation and complementarity with BRI projects.



## The internet has made it easier for African leaders to establish censorship and spread misinformation

Cheeseman, Nick and Lisa Garbe. "Digital democracy is still a long way off in Africa: it takes more than technology." *The Conversation*. 1 October 2020.

<https://theconversation.com/digital-democracy-is-still-a-long-way-off-in-africa-it-takes-more-than-technology-147038>

From the mid-2000s onwards, the digital revolution raised hopes of democratic transformation and strengthening in Africa. But it hasn't quite turned out like that. Now, almost a decade after the "Arab Spring", techno-optimism has given way to techno-pessimism. African leaders have proved able to blunt the transformative potential of smart phones through censorship and internet shutdowns. When the internet is on, social media attracts more attention for spreading fake news than preventing election rigging. What was once thought of as "liberation technology" has turned out to be remarkably compatible with the maintenance of the status quo. Or has it? Does this more pessimistic reading overlook

genuine progress? A new publication I co-edited with Lisa Garbe – *Decoding #DigitalDemocracy in Africa* – draws together the latest research on the extent to which digital technology has changed Africa ... and the ways in which Africa is changing digital technology. The articles show that we should not miss the wood for the trees: despite disappointment, digital technology has had profound impacts on African politics and society. But, they also highlight how much more needs to be known about digital technology on the continent. A lot of recent analysis has focused on the digital divide in Africa, and the many people excluded from online access by poverty and lack of coverage. Yet researchers have also found that closing this divide cannot be achieved by cheaper technology alone. Using digital technology to access information and resources is only possible when a set of political, legal, and economic conditions are in place. For example, the content that citizens can access increasingly depends on giant tech companies, especially for poorer citizens. In his contribution on Facebook's Free Basics – a service that provides basic online services without data charges – Toussaint Nothias explains that tech corporations' dominant position enables them to shape how individuals use the internet under the pretence of making it more affordable. This raises tough questions about whether multinational companies engage ethically in Africa. As Julie Owono's contribution points out, Facebook has been accused of "dumping" products such as Free Basics, stymieing the production of local alternatives. This has raised concerns of a fresh "scramble for Africa", with multinational companies expending more energy and resources in securing new users than tackling hate speech and misinformation. From the recent "virtual protest" in Zambia to #ZimbabweanLivesMatter, the potential of social media to empower dissenting voices is clear. Idayat Hassan and Jamie Hitchen's analysis of WhatsApp and Facebook use ahead of elections in The Gambia shows that even in rural areas with limited connectivity, social media content contributes to offline political mobilisation. It is important not to lose sight of this more positive impact amid the growing focus on fake news and hate speech. Sadly, though, further problems are on the horizon.

Azeb Madebo reveals how the Ethiopian diaspora has fuelled the polarisation between the Oromo community on the one hand, and the Ethiopian government and Ethiopian nationalists on the other. Not all fake news is believed of course, but when stories play into widely held fears, prejudices and assumptions, they can exacerbate distrust and encourage a cycle of violence. It is, therefore, significant that there is relatively little regulation of content moderation. Julie

Owono shows that in part this can be attributed to the limited local capacity of content providers such as Facebook or Twitter. Neither has invested heavily in African experts capable of identifying fake news and hate speech circulated on their platforms. In part, it is also rooted in the limited funding available for civil society groups, considerable linguistic diversity, and the volume of information being shared. As a result, organisations such as Africa Check highlight instances of fake news but cannot hope to cover all harmful content.

There are no easy answers to these problems though, because when governments do try and combat free speech, Ashwanee Budoo finds that misinformation is often abused as an excuse to clamp down on freedom of expression. While growing internet coverage has enabled citizens to challenge authoritarian rule, non-democratic leaders have also manipulated or disrupted online access. According to Lisa Garbe, internet shutdowns have become the "new normal" in some authoritarian states. This is especially so during

politically contested periods such as elections or major protests. Moreover, while internet shutdowns are important, they are the thin end of the wedge. A number of steps have been taken to prevent citizens from being able to express themselves online. There is a growing use of spyware across the continent to snoop on government critics. In

Tanzania, restrictive laws about what can be said online go hand in hand with government pressure. A prominent lawyer was recently fired because of her “activism”. Uganda, Benin and several other states have imposed a social media tax that has excluded many users. Meanwhile, those who can afford internet access still face restrictions on governments information. Thus, Lisa-Marie Selvik argues that digital technology has done little to give many African citizens the right to basic government information.

# A2 GLOBALIZATION GOOD

## Urbanization hasn't caused globalization in Africa, their share of the global economy is declining

Gustafson, Sara. "How well is Africa integrated into world trade?" *Agrilinks*. 5 June 2018.

<https://www.agrilinks.org/post/how-well-africa-integrated-world-trade>

In the Malabo Declaration of June 2014, African countries committed to tripling the level of intra-African trade in agricultural products and services by 2025, fast-tracking the establishment of a Continental Free Trade Area and adopting a continent-wide common external tariff. To accomplish these goals, African governments will need to consistently and accurately measure their participation in international trade. Experts continue to hotly debate the issue of under-trading by Africa. Some have found Africa's participation in world trade to be low. However, a relatively well-developed literature argues that Africa's trade has been in line with predicted trends and that the continent's participation in international trade reflects its level of economic activity. This continuing debate clearly shows that we need a solid benchmark to determine whether Africa is trading normally or is under-trading. Let us proceed in three steps. First, we examine recent trends. Africa's participation in world trade is clearly decreasing. Figure 1 shows the share of Africa and Sub-

Saharan Africa in world trade of goods and services from 1960 to 2016. The share for Africa as a whole was around 5.5 percent in 1960; it is now around 2.5 percent. The trend equation indicates that for every decade, Africa's overall share in world trade of goods and services declines by approximately 0.5 percent. Second, we attempt to define a benchmark of trade to which we can compare Africa's actual

level of trade. Through this comparison, we can determine whether Africa's level of trade is abnormally low or high. Gravity models offer a theoretical way to define a norm of trade between two countries. In a simple and symmetric form, a gravity equation relates bilateral trade to each country's economic activity and geographic distance. We can then use econometrics to estimate this reference of trade by evaluating the importance of the link between the explained variable (trade) and the explanatory variables (GDP, distance). Using annual trade data from 2005 to 2013 from BACI (CEPII, 2015), GDP data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017), and distance data from CEPII (2011), we evaluate countries' coefficients of multilateral trade resistance in Figure 2. These indicate whether countries' participation in world trade is abnormally high or low. Small Pacific islands have positive coefficients, indicating that these countries trade more than the norm defined by GDP and geographic distance. For African countries, the coefficients of countries' fixed effects

are often negative and significant, indicating that these countries trade less than the norm defined by GDP and geographic distance. Compared with the rest of the world, most African countries have a higher

resistance to trade, with the exception of coastal western African countries and southeastern Africa. Thus, the gravity equation confirms that African countries are globally under-trading, meaning that their actual level of trade is generally less than the norm defined by GDP and distance.

## Globalization reinforces inequality

Cheru. "Globalization and uneven urbanization in Africa: the limits to effective Urban governance in the provision of basic services." *UCLA Center for Near East Asian Studies*. 18 May 2005. <https://www.international.ucla.edu/cnes/article/107324>

Like many other regions in the world, sub-Saharan Africa is confronted with the challenge of rapid urbanization in the context of economic stagnation, poor governance, and fragile public institutions. By the year 2010, it is estimated that approximately 55% of Africans will be residing in cities (UNDP, 1991: 1). This rapid urban growth has brought with it a host of problems, including unemployment and underemployment, a burgeoning informal sector, deteriorating infrastructure and service delivery capacity, overcrowding, environmental degradation, and an acute housing shortage. The rapid expansion in urban population has occurred without the needed expansion in basic services and productive employment opportunities. The problem is compounded by weak urban government structures with very limited capacity to stimulate economic growth, mobilize resources and provide the most basic services. Since the early 1980, large numbers of African countries have had to implement market-oriented economic and institutional reforms under the watchful eyes of the IMF and the World Bank. Public provision of basic services—the hallmark of the developmentalist theories of the 1950-1970s—has particularly been targeted for major restructuring, bringing it

in line with a market-oriented approach. On the pretext of increasing efficiency and reducing cost, such reforms were used to dismantle the historic construct of the state as a developer (World Bank, 1993). Yet, the promised advantages of economic restructuring and integration into global markets have not been borne out in the majority of developing countries. Most obviously, poverty, mass unemployment, and inequality have mushroomed alongside recent advancement in technological developments and the rapid expansion of trade and investment. Most cities in Africa are experiencing deepening and cumulative patterns of inequality. These inequalities predate the current phase of globalization, but are further reinforced by globalization processes of the post-1980s. Increased competition among cities to attract capital and businesses for generating employment and sources of tax revenues has led to widening inequalities between cities and social groups within cities (Hoogevelt, 1997).

## Africa doesn't reap the benefits that globalization traditionally brings - instead it suffers worsened poverty and inequality

Nissanke, Machiko and Erik Thorbecke. "Globalization, growth, and poverty in Africa." *United Nations University*. 2007.

As a result [of globalization] the incidence and depth of poverty has risen in the region.

The number of poor, measured in income poverty based on the US\$1 a day international poverty line, increased in Africa, almost doubling from 164 million in 1981 to 313 million in 2001. In terms of the headcount ratio, the poverty incidence in Africa is 46 per cent in 2001—the highest in the world. Poverty in Africa is both most prevalent and severe in rural areas. Poverty measured in terms of nonincome indicators such as health and education has not improved much either over the past 15-20 years in the region. The overall picture gives

little cause for optimism that Africa will soon reap the benefits of the process of

globalization, unless it scales up efforts in a number of fronts including adopting a more pro-poor pattern of growth and increasing the provision of public services in the social sector. Further, the degree of income inequality in Africa has increased sharply in the last two decades. Today, many countries in Africa suffer from a relatively high intra-country inequality which is among the highest in the world. With growing recognition of the need to grow faster, most African countries have increasingly searched for ways to accelerate their participation in the global economy over the past two decades. Indeed, most economies in Africa significantly liberalized their trade and investment policy regimes as part of Structural Adjustment Programs since the mid-1980s. However, in spite of this Africa's share of total world trade has fallen between 1980 and 2002: Africa's share of world exports falling from about 6 per cent to 1.5 per cent, and imports from 5 per cent to 1.5 per cent. Many countries in Africa have also intensified their efforts to attract foreign direct investment with various fiscal and other incentive measures. Yet, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to the region so far have been largely limited to extraction of oil and other natural resources. Africa attracted only around 6 per cent of total net FDI inflows to developing countries in 2000-4. The recent upturn in economic growth recorded in many natural resource-rich economies in Africa is closely associated with the price hike of oil and mineral commodities in the world markets. The sustainability of growth rates of 6-7 per cent recently observed in these economies will be dependent on the degree to which commodity booms are used purposely for diversification and transformation of economic and trade structures. Indeed, today, several decades after gaining political independence, the high primary commodity-dependence remains one of most conspicuous characteristics of the trade pattern of countries in Africa with the rest of the world. The failure of these economies to diversify and undergo structural transformation, and hence, to benefit from the technology-driven, highly dynamic aspects of on-going globalization has entailed a high cost to the region not only in terms of low economic growth but also in

persistent poverty. In particular, the past neglect—if not overt exploitation—of agriculture in many African countries short-circuited the development process as agriculture is the only potential engine of growth at an early development stage. There is no doubt that sustained poverty reduction requires economic growth. However, the pattern of growth does significantly affect the rate of poverty reduction. In this context, it can be argued that Africa's growth has been distinctly against the poor not only in terms of its ability to deliver the required growth rate to ensure that the poor could benefit from economic growth, but also in terms of its structure. Economic growth in Africa, where it has occurred, has not been translated into significant poverty reduction. Critically, the nature and pattern of integration into the global economy in Africa as well as domestic conditions has not been conducive to generating virtuous cycles of globalization-induced growth as generally observed in Asia. Africa has paid a high price for its neglect of agriculture which continues to be the Achilles' heel hindering the takeoff into sustained growth in many of the poorest and least developed countries. In most of East Asia, the structural transformation of their economies has been considerably facilitated by the integration/globalization process (see Nissanke and Thorbecke 2008). The growth—accompanied by a substantial reduction of abject poverty—in East Asia can be explained in terms of the region-wide comparative advantage recycling in production and export of labour-intensive goods. The process involves a

strong demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labour, driven by exporting labour intensive goods and pro-trade FDI through effective technology, knowledge and skill transfer. Most of the East and South-East Asian economies have successfully gone through the structural transformation of their production and trade structures with continuous upgrading of their human skill endowments and technology/knowledge base. By relying on their dynamically evolving comparative advantages these countries were able to maximize the benefits from dynamic externalities. Specialization in sectors with large spillovers and dynamic externalities is more apt to engender a pattern of equalizing growth. Moreover, in most of East Asia, the pro-poor pattern of public expenditure in favour of the rural poor and the agricultural sector during early stages of development produced and sustained the 'shared' growth process. There were concerted efforts on the part of governments to facilitate building primary assets of the poor through such measures as an equitable distribution of land (through appropriate land reforms); extensive public provision of free and universal primary education; promotion of small-scale enterprises and development of rural infrastructure – roads, irrigation, schools, agricultural support outposts, health stations, and irrigation systems. In contrast, the high susceptibility and vulnerability to exogenous shocks through its fragile trade linkage may have left Africa behind and suffering from vicious cycles of globalization-induced decline. Many parts of Africa remain isolated from global markets and the global community as the region's access to information and technology is limited. There is some evidence to suggest that in Africa 'globalization may be associated with increasing inequality and (hence) with an increase in poverty' (see Round 2007). In short, while globalization has made some contribution to economic growth in Africa, it has not yet facilitated the process of structural transformation required for countries in Africa to reach the take-off stage and accelerate economic development and poverty reduction. Instead, globalization has tended to increase intra-country inequality and has done very little to reduce poverty. Naturally, the impact of globalization on poverty is extremely context-specific. In general, however, the limited scope of globalization in Africa appears to be the result of a combination of poor initial conditions, such as fundamental disadvantages of location (disease-prone tropical countries with a harsh environment); inadequate political institutions; extremely under-developed physical infrastructure, and a related high risk investment climate. Progress on all these fronts will be necessary if Africa is to enjoy the potential benefits of globalization.

# A2 HELPING THE ECONOMY

## The vast majority of the urban workforce in Africa is in the informal sector

Sow, Mariama. “Figures of the week: Informal employment in African cities.” *The Brookings Institute*. 1 June 2018. [www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/06/01/figures-of-the-week-informal-employment-in-african-cities](http://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/06/01/figures-of-the-week-informal-employment-in-african-cities)

The report states that supporting informal workers is key to enhancing the productivity of cities in the global south, as informal enterprises generate 25 to 50 percent of value added outside of agricultural activities. The report states that most of the urban workforce in the global south is informal, ranging from approximately 52 percent in developing Asia to 76 percent in Africa, largely surpassing the world average of 44 percent. While the figure below shows that Africa has the highest rate of informal employment in cities, the report notes that South Asian countries have an urban informal employment rate of 78 percent, surpassing Africa’s rate. (This is not visible in Figure 1 as South Asian countries are grouped in the Asia and Pacific category).

## Wages in the informal sector are much lower than those in the formal sector

Mbaye, Ahmadou Aly and Fatou Gueye. “Labor Markets and Jobs in West Africa.” *African Development Bank Group*. June 2018.

[https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/WPS\\_No\\_297\\_Labor\\_Markets\\_and\\_Jobs\\_in\\_West\\_Africa\\_B.docx.pdf](https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/WPS_No_297_Labor_Markets_and_Jobs_in_West_Africa_B.docx.pdf)

To better estimate informal employment in Senegal, Golub and Mbaye took the working-age population, estimated at 9 million, and subtracted the number of people in formal employment (those covered by IPRES, Senegal’s social security system).<sup>31</sup> There were only about 300,000 formal jobs, or just 3.8 percent (Figure 12). Average formal sector wages are much higher than informal wages in West Africa (Table 7). Formal private sector salaries and benefits tend to follow public sector standards, while informal wages are often below subsistence. Alongside the usual distinction between formal and informal enterprise wages, a fairly clear distinction appears between large informal and small informal enterprise wages (see Table 7).<sup>32</sup>

Libreville, Gabon is noteworthy: it has the highest average formal sector wage, but also the lowest average informal sector wage. It also has the highest income inequality. The 1–2–3 survey data from seven West African economic capitals confirm these trends. In all of them, over 40 percent of informal sector employees earn less than the minimum wage, and in Burkina Faso, the proportion reaches 61 percent (Figure 13).

## Urbanization causes poverty and unemployment

Todaro, Michael P. "Urbanization, unemployment and migration in Africa: Theory and policy." *Population Council*. 1997.

[https://knowledgecommons.popcouncil.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1247&context=departments\\_sbsr-pgy](https://knowledgecommons.popcouncil.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1247&context=departments_sbsr-pgy)

A central question related to the unprecedented size of these urban agglomerations is how African cities will cope—economically, environmentally, and politically—with such acute concentrations of people. Whereas cities offer the cost-reducing advantages of agglomeration economies and economies of scale and proximity as well as numerous economic and social externalities (for example, skilled workers, cheap transport, social and cultural amenities), the social costs of a progressive overloading of housing and social services, not to mention increased crime, pollution, and congestion, tend gradually to outweigh these historical urban advantages. Former World Bank president Robert McNamara expressed his skepticism that huge urban agglomerations could be made to work at all: These sizes are such that any economies of location are dwarfed by costs of congestion. The rapid population growth that has produced them will have far outpaced the growth of human and physical infrastructure needed for even moderately efficient economic life and orderly political and social relationships, let alone amenity for their residents.



# A2 INCREASING ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE

## Urbanization poses a health risk because of poor sanitation

“Poor sanitation leading major health risks in African nations.” *Newsgram*. 20 November 2020. <https://www.newsgram.com/poor-sanitation-leading-major-health-risks-african-nations/>

### Poor sanitation continues to pose major health, environmental and socio-economic risks in many African countries

new research by the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) said on Thursday. The paper highlights ways to improve management, generate industry from human waste, and improve sanitation for cities and households with poor fecal sludge management. The report’s authors stress the need to invest in sanitation systems and mechanisms to improve fecal sludge management, as well as direct investments – especially to poor households – in order to tackle the global sanitation crisis and achieve Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 6: Water and sanitation for all by 2030. The research paper ‘Faecal sludge management in Africa: Socio-economic aspects, human and environmental health implications’ was released on World Toilet Day, which celebrates toilets and raises awareness of 4.2 billion people without access to safely managed sanitation. It explores current trends in fecal sludge management and how they are impacting human and environmental health in the region and provides guidance on enhancing waste water management and sanitation services delivery across the continent. The analysis finds that sustainably managing fecal sludge is hindered by a number of factors, including population growth and urbanization; over-reliance on financial aid for the construction of treatment plants; low revenue generation from users of treatment facilities; poor operation and maintenance; and inefficient institutional arrangements for fecal sludge management. COVID-19 shines a harsh light on the state of proper sanitation in many African countries. The authors call for better coordination of the roles and responsibilities of diverse actors involved in the processes. Poor fecal sludge management is a major contributor to the 115 deaths every hour from excreta-related diseases in Africa, while improved sanitation has been shown to decrease diarrhoeal disease by 25 percent. It also contributes to huge economic losses: On the continent, poor sanitation leads to losses of approximately one to 2.5 percent of a country’s GDP. As population growth skyrockets – the continent’s urban population is projected to triple by mid-century – so too does the volume of fecal sludge and wastewater. Across West African cities, one person produces between 20-150 liters of waste water per day. Considering an average daily generation of one liter of fecal sludge per person, a city of one million inhabitants will need to collect 1,000 m3 sludge every day. “The scale and threat of poor fecal sludge management can be turned on its head if we look at the government and business opportunities that can galvanize real change in health and livelihoods in marginalized communities in countries struggling with poor sanitation,” said Habib El-Habr, Coordinator of the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities (GPA) at UNEP. The report recommends technical innovations for improving the capture, emptying, and treatment of sludge, highlighting good practices, including a program in Uganda, through which the Kampala City Council Authority worked with the private sector to improve fecal sludge management in the city. The program included a sanitation call center to strengthen the link between customers, the City Council, and private operators, and a GPS tracking system to improve service efficiency and avoid illegal dumping by private operators. Treatment plans can generate some revenue for countries and especially for poor communities, converting fecal sludge to compost or biochar for use as fertilizer, or converting to briquettes as fuel for industry. In 2017, Burkina Faso commissioned the first fecal sludge biogas plant in the country, generating electricity to feed the national grid. Olufunke Cofie, Principal Researcher and Country Representative for IWMI in West Africa said: “We are reaching a crucial point in managing fecal sludge on the African continent: There are feasible and affordable opportunities to further invest in inclusive fecal sludge management, and from feces capture to treatment. The report explores how transforming poop to useful products could help ease the crisis, as we are demonstrating in Ghana.” (IANS)

## Rapid urbanization hurts health outcomes

Boadi, Kwasi et al. "Urbanisation without development: Environmental and health implications in African cities." *Environment, Development, and Sustainability*. December 2005. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10668-004-5410-3>

Sustainable development advocates for a balance between socio-economic development and the environment in the pursuit of human advancement. In Africa, high population growth and inadequate infrastructure in urban areas exert pressure on the environment and this threatens the health and wellbeing of urban residents. The population of the African continent until the 1960s was predominantly rural. This scenario has taken a swift turn and some of the major shifts in the global urbanisation process are taking place on the continent. Factors including natural increase in the population, rural-urban migration, strife and hunger leading to the internal displacement of populations have exacerbated the urbanisation process in Africa. The situation has been worsened by the imposition of Western development policies, including structural adjustment programmes on African nations, which has eroded the subsistence base of rural agricultural communities and further ignited rural urban migration. The failure of industry to absorb the increasing labour force has created massive unemployment and deepening poverty crisis in urban centres. Inadequate provision of infrastructure and services to meet the growth in urban populations has resulted in inefficient spatial development of urban centres, the proliferation of squatter settlements, inadequate basic amenities including potable water, sanitation and waste disposal. Poor environmental sanitation has resulted in the upsurge of infectious diseases and deteriorating urban health. Urban populations in Africa are also the worst affected by newly emerging diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS. The poor bear a disproportionately large share of the problems due to their particular vulnerability to environmental and health risks.

# A2 HELPING AGRICULTURE AND RURAL AREAS

Urbanization excludes small farmers from urban markets - 80% of access points are wholesale supermarkets and multinational companies

Jerving, Sara. "5 ways urbanization is changing agriculture in Africa" *Devex*. September 9 2020. <https://www.devex.com/news/5-ways-urbanization-is-changing-agriculture-in-africa-98045>

Urban wholesale food markets are the "beating heart" of the whole system, Haggblade said.

These are big sites in cities, typically warehouses, where truckers and farmers bring in supplies of food in bulk. Millions of farmers reach millions of people across the continent through this funnel, he said. This is the access point at which about 80% of all food reaches urban areas, according to the report. And it's also how smallholder farmers access urban markets. "If these wholesale systems are clogged up, overrun, or poorly run, then the whole system functions poorly," Haggblade said. With the rapid speed of urbanization, these wholesale markets have often exceeded their capacity, creating the single biggest blockage in the food system. Because of this, smallholder farms stand to be excluded, even as business is booming. For instance, supermarkets will use these wholesale markets if they work well, but if not, they set up alternative supply sourcing systems that typically exclude smallholder farmers, Haggblade said. "If you want small farmers to have access to urban markets, you need efficient market structures and good management systems," he said.

Jayne, T.S. and Gustavo Anriquez. "African agriculture toward 2030: changes in urbanization and agricultural land dynamics and their implications for CGIAR research." *Independent Science and Partnership Council*. 27 February 2013.

<https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.365.7889&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

As will be shown below, farm size and urbanization issues in sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter SSA) are interrelated. Urban population growth is affected by the rate of rural-urban migration (about 35% of urban population growth is currently due to migration), which is influenced by policies affecting access to land and the returns to farming. Our treatment of urbanization underscores the changes it is bringing in food demand patterns, the sheer volume of increased marketed food supplies necessary to feed Africa's growing cities, the region's growing dependence on world food markets, and the potential contribution that CG system research can make to poverty reduction by focusing on means to reduce food production costs even in the world's main breadbasket areas outside of SSA. These global trends and are likely to affect African urbanization and land use patterns in ways that are beyond our disciplinary expertise; clearly multi-disciplinary teams are required to better tease out the precise questions emerging from these global trends. In addition to these overarching global drivers are endogenous local changes occurring in SSA. The implications of these interactions for CG research priorities are discussed in Section 4 and briefly summarized here.

The most important implications of urbanization in Africa concern the changes it is bringing in food consumption patterns, the demands it is placing on marketing systems to expand volumes to feed the region's growing cities, the region's growing dependence on world markets for food, the demands for water, coastal areas' vulnerability to increased flooding, and the likelihood that urban areas are likely to be the most severely affected by sudden migration influx as a response to sudden weather/environmental

**disturbances.** A considerable portion of SSA's urban populations, primarily men, are involved in circular migration, periodically returning to the village (Potts 2009), which impedes land consolidation and contributes to the feminization of rural areas.

## Urbanization hurts agricultural productivity because seizes agricultural land, empirically farming yields could fall by as much as 2.9% by 2050

Stage, Jesper, Jørn Stage and Gordon McGranahan. "Is urbanization contributing to higher food prices?" *International Institute for Environment and Development*. August 2009.

<https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10573IIED.pdf>

Productivity increases have been the lowest in Africa. Many African countries, where land ownership is not clearly defined, have insecure property rights. Among other things, this means that households moving into cities frequently cannot sell their land, and can only maintain claims to it by continuing to farm it on a part-time basis. This may create a situation where urbanization will lead to reduced food production, because households that have moved to urban areas will have less time available for farming activities. In addition to this, limited access to credit for investment and limited access to important inputs such as fertilizer (and, in some cases, limited access to output markets as well) mean that the economies of scale from larger farming units are not necessarily realized. In such cases, even if smaller plots are consolidated into larger units, productivity may not increase much. At worst, it may even decrease, because there is less labour available per hectare and because this labour cannot easily be replaced by other inputs. Concern has been raised that urbanization may lead to displacement of agricultural production through the expansion of urban areas into agricultural land, so that less land is available for farming. Yet the area devoted to urban settlement is small compared to the land available for agriculture. In the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (McGranahan et al., 2005), urban areas were estimated to cover about 7 per cent of the area within cultivated system boundaries.

Keith Fuglie. "Harvesting Prosperity: Technology and Productivity Growth in Agriculture" *The World Bank Group*. 2020.

<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/32350/9781464813931.pdf>

concentrated, and where agricultural growth remains driven mostly by factor accumulation—but also in South and East Asia, and parts of Latin America and the Caribbean, where the effects of climate change are expected to be felt most severely and large numbers of poor and vulnerable people still remain. In West Africa and India farming yields could fall by as much as 2.9 percent and 2.6 percent respectively by 2050, the FAO (2018b) predicts. All these trends speak to the compelling need for policies and options to accelerate agricultural productivity growth, in the interest not only of food security and incomes, but also of sustainability and social stability. Investments in research and development to generate new technologies and appropriate incentives for the private sector to innovate will be key to creating a sustainable food future (World Resources Institute 2019).

## Urbanization increases food prices and food insecurity because urbanization destroys agricultural land it creates dependence on foreign markets that are subject price shocks

Stage, Jesper, Jørn Stage and Gordon McGranahan. "Is urbanization contributing to higher food prices?" *International Institute for Environment and Development*. August 2009.

<https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10573IIED.pdf>

The same types of household expenditure surveys referenced earlier can be used to analyse the importance of food expenditure in household budgets; for many poor urban households, food accounts for over half of the household budget, even with the food prices that prevailed in the 2000–2005 period. Table 3 shows consumption patterns in Eritrea's urban areas; in some, the average household spends more than half its income on food, which of course means that the poorer households are likely to spend an even larger proportion of their income on food. Similarly, more detailed data from Namibia (Table 4) show that a quarter of urban households spend more than 40 per cent of their income on food. The proportion is even higher for rural households, but the crucial difference is that for them a large share of this 'expenditure' is consumption of own-produced food, rather than food purchased commercially at market prices. Tanzanian data (Table 5) show this difference between urban and rural dependence on commercial food sources in a glaring fashion: the average urban household spends about half of its income on food and acquires 90 per cent or more of it through commercial channels. The average rural household spends even more, almost two-thirds, of its income on food. However, almost half of this food is own production rather than commercially purchased. Rural households will of course also be tempted to hoard food if they believe that prices may go up in future. However, the effects of world market price increases on these households are less disastrous than they are for the urban poor; most rural households grow at least some of their food themselves, and additional food purchases are mostly made in local markets that are often poorly linked (at least in the short term) to the world market. Thus, the large increase in the number of urban poor, and the increase in the share of the world's poor living in urban areas, also increases the number and share of people who are sensitive to food price increases, and who may hoard food if they fear that prices will rise in the future. Urbanization has led to some building-over of agricultural land, and this land cannot easily be restored to agriculture. But the total agricultural production lost in this fashion corresponds to, at most, a few years' worth of normal productivity increases in agriculture. Moreover, since land prices are generally higher in urban areas, there is considerably more pressure for dense housing development in urban areas than in rural areas; similar amounts of land, and possibly even larger amounts, would probably have been lost if the people in question had chosen to live in rural areas instead. As we shall see in the next section, there is some indication that such hoarding, combined with the thin markets in several of the main food crops, may have played a role in the recent spike in food prices. However, urbanization has meant that a larger number of people than ever before now live in urban areas, and depend on commercial purchases as their main source of food; and as we have seen, food reserves have been reduced substantially, so that increases in world market prices for food will immediately translate into higher food prices in urban areas.

Urban households, especially the poorer ones, spend a large fraction of their income on food and are highly vulnerable to price increases. This can lead them to hoard food if they believe that prices will go up.

Rural areas are on net hurt by urbanization because it deepens income inequality and increasingly isolates and draws resources from rural areas

Yabi, Gilles. "Inequalities in West Africa Urban-Rural and North-South Divides." *Ideas 4 Development*. 12 September 2017. <https://ideas4development.org/en/inequalities-in-west-africa-north-south-divide/>

Inequalities are of a multifaceted nature via significant and visibly apparent income disparities in cities, but also in access to basic services, which remains a problem in rural areas. In cities, real slums are to be found in poor neighborhoods, where living conditions are extremely difficult, such as in the peri-urban areas of Nouakchott or Abidjan. There is a stark contrast with affluent neighborhoods, where luxury villas display the external signs of wealth. Very different worlds consequently coexist in cities in the subregion, some of which are among the most expensive in Africa (Lagos, Dakar or Conakry). However, in West Africa, the greatest inequalities are first and foremost spatial: they exist between cities and rural areas. In urban areas, some of the money of rich people is used for goods and services which are offered by the less well-off (such as janitors, housekeepers, drivers, women stallholders on markets, etc.). In villages, however, the poor remain far from areas where money circulates. Daily lives are marked by material deprivation and the absence of basic public services. In addition, for geographical and historical reasons related to the colonization and trade via ports, coastal cities are more developed than landlocked regions, hence the persistence of a divide, even within West African countries, between the North and South. This divide poses problems everywhere between the far north and south of the subregion, but the most striking example is Nigeria, located in the Gulf of Guinea. Statistics show horrendous differences in this country between the Federal States in the North-East, for example, and those in the South-West, both in terms of incomes and education and health indicators. Consequently, average national per capita income does not mean anything. The country has 15,700 millionaires, as well as a handful of billionaires, with over 60% living in Lagos. While it is true that Nigeria is perceived as a land of excesses in West Africa, its recent path, due to economic growth (prior to the collapse of oil prices), with an increase in inequalities, the trivialization of violence and the disconnection between extremely dynamic regions and dying peripheral areas, illustrates the realities of the entire region – which is not out of sync with the rest of Africa or the world in this respect. For the record, in Sub-Saharan Africa, absurd levels of wealth exist alongside unacceptable poverty, as the continent had 16 billionaires in 2014 and over 330 million people living in extreme poverty (less than 1,25 dollar a day). Four of these billionaires, including the first of them, Aliko Dangote, are Nigerian.

**A2 CON**



# A2 GLOBALIZATION BAD

## Urbanization hasn't caused globalization in Africa, their share of the global economy is declining

Gustafson, Sara. "How well is Africa integrated into world trade?" *Agrilinks*. 5 June 2018.

<https://www.agrilinks.org/post/how-well-africa-integrated-world-trade>

In the Malabo Declaration of June 2014, African countries committed to tripling the level of intra-African trade in agricultural products and services by 2025, fast-tracking the establishment of a Continental Free Trade Area and adopting a continent-wide common external tariff. To accomplish these goals, African governments will need to consistently and accurately measure their participation in international trade. Experts continue to hotly debate the issue of under-trading by Africa. Some have found Africa's participation in world trade to be low. However, a relatively well-developed literature argues that Africa's trade has been in line with predicted trends and that the continent's participation in international trade reflects its level of economic activity. This continuing debate clearly shows that we need a solid benchmark to determine whether Africa is trading normally or is under-trading. Let us proceed in three steps. First, we examine recent trends. Africa's participation in world trade is clearly decreasing. Figure 1 shows the share of Africa and Sub-

Saharan Africa in world trade of goods and services from 1960 to 2016. The share for Africa as a whole was around 5.5 percent in 1960; it is now around 2.5 percent. The trend equation indicates that for every decade, Africa's overall share in world trade of goods and services declines by approximately 0.5 percent. Second, we attempt to define a benchmark of trade to which we can compare Africa's actual level of trade. Through this comparison, we can determine whether Africa's level of trade is abnormally low or high. Gravity models offer a theoretical way to define a norm of trade between two countries. In a simple and symmetric form, a gravity equation relates bilateral trade to each country's economic activity and geographic distance. We can then use econometrics to estimate this reference of trade by evaluating the importance of the link between the explained variable (trade) and the explanatory variables (GDP, distance). Using annual trade data from 2005 to 2013 from BACI (CEPII, 2015), GDP data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2017), and distance data from CEPII (2011), we evaluate countries' coefficients of multilateral trade resistance in Figure 2. These indicate whether countries' participation in world trade is abnormally high or low. Small Pacific islands have positive coefficients, indicating that these countries trade more than the norm defined by GDP and geographic distance. For African countries, the coefficients of countries' fixed effects are often negative and significant, indicating that these countries trade less than the norm defined by GDP and geographic distance. Compared with the rest of the world, most African countries have a higher resistance to trade, with the exception of coastal western African countries and southeastern Africa. Thus, the gravity equation confirms that African countries are globally under-trading, meaning that their actual level of trade is generally less than the norm defined by GDP and distance.

## Globalization raises incomes and reduces poverty

Revenaga, Ana and Anabel Gonzalez. "Trade has been a global force for less poverty and higher incomes." *World Bank Blogs*. 2 February 2017.

<https://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/trade-has-been-global-force-less-poverty-and-higher-incomes>

In the ongoing debate about the benefits of trade, we must not lose sight of a vital fact. Trade and global integration have raised incomes across the world, while dramatically cutting poverty and global inequality. Within some countries, trade has contributed to rising inequality, but that unfortunate result ultimately reflects the need for stronger safety nets and better social and labor programs, not trade protection. Merchandise trade as a share of world GDP grew from around 30 percent in 1988 to around 50 percent in 2013. In this period of rapid globalization, average income grew by 24 percent globally, the global poverty headcount ratio declined from 35% to

10.7%, and the income of the bottom 40 percent of the world population increased by close to 50 percent.

## FDI is important for the economic prosperity of developing countries, especially ones in Africa

“World Investment Report 2018.” *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development*. 6 June 2019. [https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2018\\_overview\\_en.pdf](https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2018_overview_en.pdf)

We are at the dawn of a fourth industrial revolution, propelled by frontier technologies and robotization advances that make production better, cheaper and faster than ever before. This new industrial revolution offers enormous opportunities for economic growth and sustainable development with potential benefits on a scale that is difficult to imagine. New technologies promise possibilities of industrial upgrading and leapfrogging. Cheaper transportation and communication, coupled with more efficient logistics, can also help developing countries better link to global value chains. Some of the most advanced emerging economies are already on the verge of becoming global technological leaders in a number of industries. Yet, the new economic age and the accelerating pace of technological innovation could also result in serious economic disruption and more inequality. Existing investment patterns, for instance, might go through profound and far-reaching changes, in terms of both flows and content. Last year’s World Investment Report highlighted the emerging structural impact of the digital economy on foreign direct investment.

In this context, developing countries, and least developed countries in particular, face considerable challenges. They range from structural constraints, such as the lack of adequate infrastructure and scarce access to finance, to strategic issues. Offshoring and relocation towards destinations offering cheaper domestic labour become less relevant in a world of increasingly automated manufacturing. At the same time, improving living conditions requires creating jobs, which in turn still relies heavily on manufacturing. Developing countries with small markets face additional pressure on their investment policies as companies increasingly look for investment locations offering the best conditions to deliver new and high-quality products rapidly, close to the customer and through flexible production processes.

Challenges are particularly pronounced in Africa. Despite a period of strong economic growth, the level of economic transformation has been low. The share of manufacturing in the GDP of African countries is small, and it has further declined or stagnated over the past decade. However, manufacturing has the potential of creating a large number of jobs in the formal sector and therefore raising living conditions.

...

The sharp fall in global FDI contrasted with the trend in other cross-border capital flows. Total capital flows increased from 5.6 to 6.9 per cent of GDP, as bank lending and portfolio investment compensated for the FDI slump. Capital flows to developing countries increased modestly, from 4.0 to 4.8 per cent of GDP. FDI remains the largest external source of finance for developing economies. It makes up 39 percent of total incoming finance in developing economies as a group, but less than a quarter in the LDCs, with a declining trend since 2012.

The rate of expansion of international production is slowing down. The modalities of international production and cross-border exchanges of factors of production are gradually shifting from tangible to intangible forms. Sales of foreign affiliates continue to grow but assets and employees are increasing at a slower rate. This could negatively affect the prospects for developing countries to attract investment in a productive capacity.

## FDI creates millions of new jobs each year in developing economies

Hornberger, Kusi. "FDI is a global force, but is it a force for good?" *World Bank Blogs*. 24 March 2011. <https://blogs.worldbank.org/psd/fdi-is-a-global-force-but-is-it-a-force-for-good>

In addition, when economies compete for FDI by offering fiscal or tax incentives to potential investors, the case for clear welfare gains for the host economy is also less clear. There are many cases such as in Brazil where countries in the same region or states within the same country compete to attract FDI projects without coordinating their actions, allowing foreign companies to play the states against each other and gain huge—and in my view often unjustified—breaks, such as free land in perpetuity. Our work clearly shows that incentives only work in specific circumstances. But despite these anecdotes, there is clear evidence that FDI in a broad majority of cases is indeed beneficial to the recipient economy. According to data from fDi Markets, **FDI is responsible for an average of approximately 2 million new jobs a year in developing and transition economies**. The case is particularly strong when the FDI is supported by strong, transparent government institutions, focused in sectors that have high potential to link with the local economy, and takes advantage of a local labor force able to absorb knowledge and skills that can help spur a dynamic local industry. Consider some of the numerous examples: Fiesta Hotel Group (Spain) which invested \$230 million in city of Salvador (Bahia), Brazil to construct a new hotel creating 1441 new jobs in 2010. Hyundai Motor's (Korea) built a bus and truck assembly plant in Talgar, Kazakhstan (the company's first in Central Asia) 1197 new jobs. Coca-Cola (USA) invested \$200 million in town of Tepotzotlan, Mexico to build a Jugos del Valle juice manufacturing plant generating 1500 jobs. Mahindra & Mahindra (India) which built a tractor assembly plant in Kumasi, Ghana creating 1047 jobs. In sum I would argue FDI is not only a powerful force in developing countries, but a force for good. Yet we should not take for granted the benefits of FDI as a given. Positive development impact is not an automatic consequence of FDI in all cases. Our challenge in the decades to come will be to ensure that developing economies take advantage of its potential upside while also working to limit the potential risks FDI brings.

# A2 CAUSING POLITICAL INSTABILITY

## Amenities and living standards in urban areas are better than those in rural areas

Gollin, Douglas, Martina Kirchberger, and David Lagakos. "Measuring living standards in African cities and rural areas." *VoxDev*. 10 February 2017. <https://voxdev.org/topic/labour-markets-migration/measuring-living-standards-african-cities-and-rural-areas>

It's no wonder that people are moving to cities: Urban areas offer better amenities and, on average, pay higher wages than rural areas. In most developing countries, rural incomes appear to be far lower than urban incomes. For example, Young (2014) shows that consumption per individual (a common proxy for income) is about four times higher in urban areas than in rural areas in the average developing country. Similarly, Gollin et al. (2014) show that value added per worker is at least twice as high in the non-agricultural sector than the agricultural sector. Herrendorf and Schoellman (2016) find a similar result for wages. Considering so much of the developing world's population lives in rural areas and works in agriculture, these spatial gaps in income are crucial for understanding why developing countries have such low aggregate income levels. One tempting interpretation of these rural-urban wage gaps is that they reflect a spatial equilibrium, in which the higher wages of cities are offset by fewer (or worse) non-monetary amenities. The idea of a spatial equilibrium is that the mobility of people across locations leads to a relatively fine balance, in which overall utility (i.e. well-being) is equalised across locations. The idea of a spatial equilibrium is one of the simplest and most appealing ways urban economists have used to think about how economic agents locate through space (Rosen 1979, Roback 1982, Glaeser and Gottlieb 2009). The rationale is simple: if any region offered a better combination of consumption and amenities, then agents would move to avail themselves of these benefits. As more people move, growing congestion and other problems will tend to reduce the attractiveness of the 'better' location, leading to an equilibrium in which well-being is equalised across locations. Academic researchers have used the notion of a spatial equilibrium fruitfully to analyse a number of economic issues with a spatial dimension, such as the distribution of wages and sizes across US cities (Baum-Snow and Pavan 2012, Desmet and Rossi Hansberg 2013), the welfare effects of improvements in transportation infrastructure (Allen and Arkolakis 2014, Donaldson and Hornbeck 2016), and the aggregate impacts of regional development policy (Kline and Moretti 2014). On the policy front, the view that cities in the developing world offer higher wages but lower amenities is embraced by some, as in the claim that "in developing countries, the urban poor are often as bad as, or worse off than, the average rural family, and for many rural families, moving to the city may result in more - rather than less - hardship" (Save the Children 2015). Is it systematically true that amenities of cities are worse than those of rural areas? If so, exactly which amenities of urban life offset the substantially higher incomes of urban areas? In a recent paper (Gollin et al. 2017), we set out to answer these questions by measuring amenities across space in 20 African countries, which together cover around three quarters of Africa's population (which is currently more than one billion people). We focus on measures of health, public goods, crime and pollution. These are commonly cited amenities that differ across space in the developing world. They are also measures for which high-quality data are available at a highly disaggregated spatial level. We base our analysis on detailed micro data from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), from which we have comparable responses for nearly 300,000 households. We combine the DHS data with survey data from Afrobarometer, and also include some observations that come from satellite imagery (e.g. of particulate air pollution). Our data allow us to distinguish not only between rural and urban areas, but between more densely populated rural areas and less densely populated rural areas. What we find is that in almost every country, amenities are similar or better in cities than in rural areas, and they are also fairly systematically better in more densely populated rural areas than in less densely populated locations. In other words, living standards are higher in towns and villages than in rural locations, and they appear to improve even further in cities compared to lower-density towns.

## The informal job sector is not unique to urban Africa, it also generates a large proportion of income in rural areas

Weng, Xiaoxue. "The rural informal economy: Understanding drivers and livelihood impacts in agriculture, timber and mining." *IIED Working Paper*. April 2015.

<https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/16590IIED.pdf>

**Rural informality** merits urgent attention from development researchers, practitioners and policymakers for at least five reasons:

First, it **provides a critical livelihood option for the rural poor**. Most farmers across sub-Saharan Africa rely on informal networks to access their markets. Communities also increasingly diversify their income beyond farming; non-farm work, mostly in **the informal sector**, now **accounts for 40–45 per cent of the average rural household**

**income** in the region (Start 2001). As non-farm work is associated with higher income and wealth, informal activities may offer 'a pathway out of poverty' in rural Africa (Barrett et al. 2001, p.2). It also presents employment opportunities to the rural youth among whom unemployment is high and livelihood options scarce (Palmer 2007). Second, sustainability and environmental degradation are key areas of concern because the rural economy hinges on natural resources such as land, timber and minerals (Scoones 2009). Whereas government has regulatory power over companies in the formal economy (at least in theory), controlling the activities of informal sector enterprises, for instance mercury use in mining and chainsaw use in logging, is a formidable task due to the dispersed and at times clandestine nature of their operations. Third, communities have long developed informal rules to manage resources; this traditional informality is now increasingly coalescing with regional and global markets. **Informality is nothing new to rural populations; they have**

**over centuries developed customary – today considered 'informal' – norms and**

**institutions to govern land and resources** (Richards 1997; Agrawal & Gibson 1999). A prime example is customary land rights, which predate colonial land titling and allocation. Rural communities engaged in agriculture, forestry or mining, hardly questioned the legitimacy of their activities. But globalisation and economic development increasingly link Africa's remote areas with urban and global markets through better infrastructure, efficient technology, outside investors and demand for cheap products. The increased value of trades also attracts the state and its governing elites to sanction, tax and regulate the economic activities of the countryside. As a result, the traditional informal practices of rural communities now interface with the rules and regulations of urban and global markets. The age-old informality rooted in customary norms now coevolves with formal rules; together they form a resilient rural informal economy parallel to – and interacting with – the formal economy. This has important implications for rural development in sub-Saharan Africa.

## The 'political instability' that results from urbanization promotes democracy and topples dictators

Glaeser, Edward and Bryce Millett Steinberg. "Transforming Cities: Does Urbanization Promote Democratic Change?" *National Bureau of Economic Research*. November 2016.

[https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/glaeser/files/transforming\\_cities\\_does\\_urbaniz\\_promote\\_dem\\_change\\_nberwp.pdf](https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/glaeser/files/transforming_cities_does_urbaniz_promote_dem_change_nberwp.pdf)

This section explores the Boston Hypothesis – the possible link between urbanization and democracy. It first notes the empirical link between urbanization in 1960 and increases in democracy after that point. It then turns to why **urbanization may actually lead to democracy, by enabling regime change, increasing the demand for democracy and building civic capital**.

Appendix Table 1, Panel B, examines the link across countries between urbanization in 1960 and democracy between 1960 and 2000. Regressions (1) and (2) control only for democracy in 1960 and urbanization in 1960. Regressions (3) and (4) also control for 1960 per capita GDP, education and oil production. Regressions (1) and (3) show results for all countries. Regressions (2) and (4) show results only for initially less democratic countries. Countries that were more urbanized in 1960 have higher Polity IV democracy scores between 1960 and 2000, conditional on democracy score in 1960. This relationship holds particularly strongly for countries with low levels of democracy in 1960 (democracy index < 8). The results weaken when other characteristics are controlled for, but the coefficient on urbanization remains sizable and statistically significant at the 90 percent level. If income and education are partially the result of urbanization, then the results without controls may be more relevant than the results with the added controls. While these results are hardly conclusive, they lend some credence to the idea that urbanization might be a contributing factor in any move towards democracy.

**Cities have often played a role in the toppling of dictatorial regimes. Urban proximity enables collaboration, and uprisings require people to act and plan together.** As

Blanksten (1960) writes, “few interests arising in rural areas are capable of making themselves heard in politics,” but in cities “interest groups form more readily and give voice to the demands of urbanized sectors of the population.” A successful protest or revolution depends upon assembling enough participants, and cities make it easier to mass rebels. Just as cities enable marriage markets (Costa and Kahn, 2000), cities enable revolutionary partnerships to emerge and grow. The partnership between John Hancock and Samuel Adams grew in pre-revolutionary Boston. Cities both lower travel costs and enable people with idiosyncratic preferences, such as the urge to topple the regime, to find each other. In principle, urban concentration could also make it easier for dictators to monitor their own citizens. Yet while such effective surveillance may be possible in highly capable dictatorships, such as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union at its height, such competence is beyond most modern developing world dictators. The typical despot, both today and in history, lacks the capacity to effectively patrol the hidden nooks and crannies that always exist in large cities. Cities can also abet revolt by reducing the risks to protesters. The costs of protesting or revolting, like the costs of rioting, decline as the number of protesters increase because larger crowds make it harder for the police to target any individual protester (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1997). Rural mobs are easy for the army to disperse or destroy. Urban mobs are harder to dislodge, partially because an abundance of urban structures make it harder for tanks and cavalry to maneuver. Agrarian repression occurs far from the censoring attention of the world. Protests in large cities are particularly effective when cities are highly visible to the local and global press, and when the army actually cares about avoiding opprobrium, which appears to have been the case in Cairo in 2011. Urban proximity can also increase the efficacy of an uprising, if long-term urban contact between soldiers and citizenry has increased the army’s sympathy for the protesters.<sup>5</sup> Probably the most important impact of urban size on revolutionary success occurs in capital cities, where urban protesters are close to the seat of power. Consequently, protests have more ability to threaten or disrupt the existing government.<sup>6</sup> Even when revolution sparks in an outlying city, such as Sidi Bouzid in the Tunisian interior, governments rarely fall until the capital itself rises. President Ben Ali only left Tunisia after large protests and violence in Tunis itself. These channels collectively make cities handmaidens to regime change, but even if a revolution starts with dreams of democracy, there are many cases, including the French and Russian Revolutions, in which an initially more democratic regime yields to a more authoritarian counter-coup. A post-revolutionary shift to democracy may not occur because the ambitions of a few may trump the desires of the many, or because postrevolution, the population might decide that authoritarianism was better than its disorderly alternative. The next section turns to the question of whether a revolution leads to democracy, and it will take the optimistic view that a democratic outcome is somewhat more likely if the benefits of democracy are larger.

## A2 INCREASING INCOME INEQUALITY

Urbanization is not responsible for income inequality, it's the lack of government oversight and investment in things like infrastructure to redistribute gains and improve productivity. Infrastructure comes with the construction of cities and urbanization, empirically a 1% increase in infrastructure reduces income inequality by 12.6%

Raychaudhuri, Ajitava and Prabir De. "Trade, infrastructure and income inequality in selected Asian countries: An empirical analysis online" 2010. *Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade*. <http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/AWP%20No.%2082.pdf>

Third, column 3 shows similar results as in the first regression, except that this regression shows that (a) countries do not have any specific individual effect, and (b) better infrastructure reduces inequality. Here, the constant value again plays an important positive and significant role. However, in this case, global policies play a more important role than country-specific policies. The R2 value is much lower in this case than in the other cases. As expected, the per capita GDP has a similar impact as that in trade openness and, since they move together, inequality is certainly exacerbated as countries have more openness. Fourth, infrastructure stock is significant in two of the three models. The estimated coefficients of infrastructure stock clearly indicate that infrastructure improvement reduces income inequality, all other things being equal. Controlling for country fixed-effects 1 per cent improvement in infrastructure would lead to a fall of 4 per cent to 12.6 per cent in inequality for Asian and Pacific countries. A rise in infrastructure stock helps countries to increase income in the medium to long term, thus generating scope for redistribution of income, both within and across countries. At the same time, the quality of infrastructure is very important. All the estimated coefficients of the variable infrastructure quality are significant at the 5 per cent-10 per cent levels. The estimated coefficients of infrastructure quality (represented here by transmission and distribution loss of electricity) indicate that quality deterioration of infrastructure facilities (e.g., a rise in transmission and distribution loss of electricity) would lead to a rise in income inequality. It is intuitive that higher losses in transmission and distribution of electricity lead to less availability of electricity for users, causing a disadvantage for the poorer income groups. This may well lead to inequality in income distribution as the latter is disadvantaged with regard to one crucial input in the production of goods and services.



The impact of income inequality is not that significant: it does not accurately capture households' standards of living nor their true incomes. The standard of living still rises for the whole economy with urbanization.

Mathur, Aparna. "Income inequality isn't as bad as you may think" *The Hill*. 12 January 2018.  
<https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/368687-income-inequality-isnt-as-bad-as-you-may-think>

But the reality is not that simple. A growing literature in economics has identified problems with measuring income accurately and completely in various datasets. If income is under-reported, particularly for low-income workers, then we may overstate the rise in inequality. Moreover, income does not fully capture a household's standard of living. Among other issues, at very young or very old ages, individuals may borrow or rely on lifetime savings to maintain their standard of living. Income may not perfectly capture how well off people are at different points in the life cycle. Let's begin with the measurement issues. Research in economics has shown that when households are surveyed, individuals don't always accurately report benefits and transfer payments such as Medicare, Medicaid and Food Stamps. However, such programs have grown in importance over the last several decades precisely to supplement incomes at the bottom of the distribution. Economists Bruce Meyer and James Sullivan show that when comparing data from the Current Population Survey to administrative data aggregates (the most accurate data), the ratio of reported benefits to actual benefits is 0.6 for Food Stamps and 0.5 for TANF. In other words, receipts reported on household surveys are more than 40- to 50-percent lower than those in administrative data. Hence, measurement issues explain much of why trends in income inequality vary widely across different studies. A second reason not to rely exclusively on income data is that income is not a great measure of welfare for most households. For one, it underrepresents the ability of households to rely on assets or savings in times of low income and the ability to save when incomes are high. In other words, people may be better off than their incomes would suggest because their standard of living is propped up and smoothed over time by their assets and savings. More importantly, in light of the fact that income data often miss households' ability to access the government safety net, consumption may better reflect households' overall access to cash and benefits.

Chen, Mingxing et al. "The Global Pattern of Urbanization and Economic Growth: Evidence from the Last Three Decades." *PLoS One*. 6 August 2014.

[www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4123908/](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4123908/)

We calculated the value of the average GDP per capita in different groups by considering GDP per capita and the total population of any given country, which provided an accurate description of real development level. Figure 2b shows that urbanization level is closely linked to level of GDP per capita in 1980 and 2011. A higher urbanization level means a higher level of economic development in general, which is similar to what has been reported in previous studies [16], [18], [19]. Moreover, economic growth shows a clear accelerating trend, while the growth in urbanization level increases in each 10% band by between 0% and 70%. In other words, growth of GDP per capita is modest between 0% and 40%, but dramatic between 40% and 70%. It is interesting to note, however, that the average value of GDP per capita is only 3344 dollars in the 40–50% urbanization level group in 2011, even lower than the average value (5507 dollars) in the same group in 1980. There was a similar phenomenon in the 50–60% urbanization level group. We reasoned that, if the urbanization process can drive economic growth, we should observe a higher value of GDP per capita in 2011 in the same urbanization group, at least as large as the original value in 1980. This indicates that the goals of economic growth are often not attained, although some developing countries expect to speed up economic growth via accelerated urbanization, and urbanization level targets are reached. Additionally, the level of GDP per capita in the higher urbanization groups (60–100%) has shown significant growth trends over the last 30 years, while the lower urbanization groups (0–50%) demonstrate a more complicated change in level of GDP per capita. This shows that the gap between countries with higher urbanization levels and countries with lower GDP per capita has been widening during the last three decades.

## Urbanization helps to close the urban-rural divide by helping rural areas and granting them access to new markets and resources

Awumbila, Mariama. "Linkages between Urbanization, Rural–Urban

Migration and Poverty Outcomes in Africa" World Migration Report. 2015.

[https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our\\_work/ICP/MPR/WMR-2015-Background-Paper-MAwumbila.pdf](https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/ICP/MPR/WMR-2015-Background-Paper-MAwumbila.pdf)

Migration is a significant contributor to urbanization, as people move in search of social and economic opportunities or as a result of environmental deterioration. In 2010, more than 200 million people, equal to about 3 percent of the world's population, lived in a country different from the one in which they were born, and migration within countries continues at high levels. Migration is often equated with international movement, but migration within countries, primarily from rural to urban areas, accounts for a much greater share of human population movements. In Africa, while international migration has received more attention in recent debates on migration, internal migration is far more significant in terms of the numbers of people involved and perhaps even the quantum of remittances and their poverty reduction potential (UNDP, 2009). People who leave the countryside to find better lives in the city often have no choice but to settle in shanty towns and slums, where they lack access to decent housing, sanitation, health care and education, in effect, trading in rural poverty for urban poverty. Given the significant number of people moving to new countries in some regions, migration will shape future demographic trends. Much of this rapid urban growth, however, has been accompanied by a high level of poverty and inequality, rather than by economic and inclusive growth, as has occurred on other continents. Specifically, unlike in all other global regions, urbanization in Africa has not contributed (through economies of scale and value added production chains) to overall growth in GDP. Therefore, the prevailing global view that cities are engines of growth and human development may very well be challenged by the unfolding realities in Africa, unless the urban economic and general developmental progress is translated into more broadly shared well-being among countries' socioeconomic strata. World Bank projections demonstrate that urbanization in Africa is taking place without development due to inadequate investment in basic infrastructure (Sharma et al., 1996). In the year 2000, about 30 per cent of the population living in urban areas in Africa lacked access to a safe water supply. If current investment patterns continue, the figure will grow to almost 50 per cent by 2020. However, the percentage of rural Africans with access to potable water is projected to increase from about 38 per cent in 2000 to over 50 per cent by 2020 (Sharma et al., 1996).

# A2 HARMING PUBLIC HEALTH

## Access to clean water is increasing, the problem is being solved

Armah, Frederick et al. "Access to improved water and sanitation in sub-Saharan Africa in a quarter century." *Heliyon*. 16 November 2018.

<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6240801/>

The realization of the scale, magnitude, and complexity of the water and sanitation problem at the global level has compelled international agencies and national governments to increase their resolve to face the challenge.

There is extensive evidence on the independent effects of urbanicity (rural-urban environment) and wealth status on access to water and sanitation services in sub-Saharan Africa. However, our understanding of the joint effect of urbanicity and wealth on access to water and sanitation services across spatio-temporal scales is nascent. In this study, a pooled regression analysis of the compositional and contextual factors that systematically vary with access to water and sanitation services over a 25-year time period in fifteen countries across sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was carried out.

On the whole, substantial improvements have been made in providing access to improved water sources in SSA from 1990 to 2015

unlike access to sanitation facilities over the same period. Households were 28.2 percent and 125.2 percent more likely to have access to improved water sources in 2000–2005 and 2010–2015 respectively, than in 1990–1995. Urban rich households were 329 percent more likely to have access to improved water sources compared with the urban poor. Although access to improved sanitation facilities increased from 69 percent in 1990–1995 and 74 percent in 2000–2005 it declined significantly to 53 percent in 2010–2015. Urban rich households were 227 percent more likely to have access to improved sanitation facilities compared with urban poor households. These results were mediated and attenuated by biosocial, socio-cultural and contextual factors and underscore the fact that the challenge of access to water and sanitation in sub-Saharan Africa is not merely scientific and technical but interwoven with environment, culture, economics and human behaviour necessitating the need for interdisciplinary research and policy interventions.

## Healthcare is significantly more accessible in urban areas than rural

Strasser, Roger, Sophia Kam, and Sophie Regalado. "Rural Health Care Access and Policy in Developing Countries." *Annual Review of Public Health*. 6 January 2016.

<https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-032315-021507>

The World Health Organization (WHO) report A Universal Truth: No Health Without a Workforce was prepared for the Third Global Forum on Human Resources for Health held in November 2013 in Recife, Brazil. This report confirmed that there is a deficit in health

care professionals all over the world, which is especially pronounced in rural areas of developing or low-income countries (21). Compared to their urban counterparts, rural and remote

inhabitants experience lower life expectancy and poorer health status (6, 79). Socioeconomic differences, poverty, and lower levels of employment together with service-, resource-, and transportation-related imbalances result in the social exclusion of rural dwellers (1, 2, 10, 13, 39, 46, 52, 60, 65). Although the deficit in health professionals

exists worldwide, nowhere is this deficit, number-wise and skill-wise, more significant than in rural areas (70, 71). When developing a rural health policy, countries face major challenges in service delivery, human

resources, governance, transportation, financing, communication, and in some regions corruption. In every country, the health status of rural dwellers is worse than that of their urban counterparts (6, 9, 15, 76, 79).

Limitation in access to health care is a major contributor to this situation, particularly in low-

income or developing countries (15, 46, 61, 71, 76, 95). Even in countries where the majority of the population lives in rural areas, the resources are concentrated in the cities (2, 9, 30, 51, 61, 76, 79, 88, 91, 95, 100,

101). All countries experience difficulties with transport and communication between rural areas and large population centers, and they all face the challenge of shortages of doctors and other health professionals in rural and remote areas (9, 13, 15, 22, 30, 31, 39, 46, 51, 61, 67, 74, 95). Rural community health and health workforce planning, supply, and distribution have been widely discussed, and a growing body of literature defines and analyzes the key issues affecting access to and improvement of health services for diverse populations in rural underserved areas. Predominantly absent from these discussions is an exploration of the need to prioritize health workforce training programs throughout the educational pipeline (from undergraduate to continuing education and professional development) and to ensure the successful production of health workers within systems built on comprehensive primary health care, which includes public health (88). The sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region includes a disproportionately large number of developing countries compared to other global regions, and it shows a growing gap between health workforce demand and supply. Consequently, this article explores the situation in SSA in depth as an example of the limitations of rural health care access and policy in developing countries. The framework that guides this exploration consists of the following concepts: access to primary health care services, sustainable rural health service models, rural health workforce supply, and policy implications as exemplified by the success or failure of the initiatives designed to address these issues. The next four sections present a review of the published academic and gray literature on rural health care, access, and policy in SSA. The second section, Methods, defines the keywords that are pertinent to this discussion and outlines the approach used to select search terms and the relevant literature. The third section presents the findings from the review of the literature, and the fourth section, Discussion and Recommendations, discusses the implications of the literature findings and offers recommendations for further policy development. The final section summarizes the discussion and concludes with specific recommendations.

## Life expectancy in Africa surged alongside urbanization

Johnson, Steve. "Africa's life expectancy jumps dramatically." *Financial Times*. 26 April 2016.

<https://www.ft.com/content/38c2ad3e-0874-11e6-b6d3-746f8e9cdd33>

### Life expectancy in a swath of African countries since 2000 surged by between 20 and 42 per cent.

providing an upbeat counterpoint to the gloom increasingly enveloping the continent. The "Africa Rising" narrative has increasingly been called into question in the past year, with the International Monetary Fund predicting that economic growth across sub-Saharan Africa will slow to 3 per cent this year, the weakest pace of growth since 1999 and barely more than the population growth of 2.5 per cent. This is likely to be the first year this millennium when Africa grows more slowly than the rest of the world, the IMF predicts. With the respected Ibrahim Index of African Governance suggesting that standards of governance have declined since the global financial crisis, and the IMF having warned that too few countries used the boom years to improve their public finances, a picture emerges of a continent that has largely squandered its commodity-led windfall. The recent slowdown has also led to the perception that the entire Africa rising phenomenon was driven more by the cyclical upswing in commodity prices than any longer-lasting structural improvements in African economies. However, dramatic rises in life expectancy suggest many governments, aided by external donors such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, have been able to improve their health systems and the wellbeing of their populace. Malawi has led the way, with life expectancy at birth rising 42 per cent from 44.1 years in 2000 to 62.7 in 2014, according to data from the World Bank. Zambia and Zimbabwe have both seen rises of 38 per cent over the same period, with longevity in Rwanda, Botswana and Sierra Leone up more than 30 per cent. Uganda, Ethiopia, the Republic of Congo, Niger and Kenya have all witnessed rises of more than 20 per cent. Overall, of the 37 countries to have seen life expectancy rise by more than 10 per cent since 2000, 30 are in sub-Saharan Africa, including the 15 with the biggest gains, as the table below shows.

### Not one sub-Saharan country saw life expectancy fall between 2000 and 2014,

with war-torn Syria the only state to suffer this fate. Aside from Swaziland (where longevity rose only 0.4 per cent), the smallest improvement was the 2.5 per cent in South Africa, where life expectancy of 57.2 years now trails that found in dozens of poorer sub-Saharan states. Africa, of course, had more scope to raise life expectancy, given most its countries were starting from a lower base than typically found elsewhere in the world. However

### the figures are a marked contrast from the 1990s, when life expectancy fell sharply

in countries such as Zimbabwe, Botswana, the Republic of Congo, Kenya, Namibia and the Central African Republic, and only edged up in many others. The HIV/Aids epidemic was a major killer then, and efforts to prevent infection and prolong the lives of those infected have played a part in the subsequent rebound in longevity since 2000. Yvonne Mhango, sub-Saharan economist at Renaissance Capital and a native of table-topper Malawi, says: "When I was growing up in the 1980s and 1990s, HIV/Aids killed a lot of the working-age population. "It hasn't been eradicated but the introduction of antiretroviral [drugs] that are affordable and accessible to low-income people has helped to lengthen their lives. They are able to work and look after their families. That has made a big difference." Ms Mhango also points to wider availability of cheaper generic drugs, often sourced from low-cost countries such as India, and improvements in preventive medicine, such as measures to reduce the incidence of malaria. John May, visiting scholar at the Population Reference Bureau in Washington DC, believes

### the key to improved longevity has been a "rapid decline" in infant and child mortality.

"We have seen a lot of programmes and interventions, such as impregnated bed nets [to combat malaria], immunisation campaigns and also a strong commitment on the part of Africa's leadership to really push for a survival revolution," he says. Across sub-Saharan Africa, deaths before the age of 12 months per 1,000 live births have fallen from 138 in 1970 to 67 as of 2013, according to USAID, although that still compares badly with a developed world average of five deaths per 1,000 births. Although Mr May is sceptical that the improvement has been quite so pronounced, citing concerns about the quality of data collection, he

does nevertheless believe the improvement has been “dramatic”. William Jackson, senior emerging markets economist at Capital Economics, argues the impressive rises in life expectancy suggest Africa has managed to make a big stride forward since 2000, despite the current doom and gloom. “From a macroeconomic perspective, the last decade has been pretty good,” even if the Africa rising story is reversing,” he says. “There have been significant rises in income across the region and more money for governments to spend on areas such as healthcare,” as well as better medicine and better planning. Governance in Africa has improved quite significantly over the past decade.” Charles Robertson, global chief economist at Renaissance Capital, cites a refocusing of international aid on areas such as education and healthcare for part of the gains. Moreover, he argues the data give the lie to the argument that the commodity-based wealth that rolled into Africa during the good years was largely siphoned off by a cabal of well-connected locals and foreigners intent on “stripping Africa of its resources”. With many of the easy gains made, it is logical to think that further improvements in life expectancy will slow from here.

# A2 HURTING THE ENVIRONMENT

Urbanization leads to better productivity and urban density, both of which help the environment

Wan, Guanghua. "Why urbanization may benefit the environment." *Asian Development Bank*. 23 January 2013. <https://www.adb.org/news/op-ed/why-urbanization-may-benefit-environment-guanghua-wan>

Urbanization degrades the environment, according to conventional wisdom. This view has led many developing countries to limit rural - urban migration and curb urban expansion. But this view is incorrect. There are a number of reasons urbanization can be good for the environment, if managed properly. First, urbanization brings higher productivity because of its positive externalities and economies of scale. Asian urban productivity is more than 5.5 times that of rural areas. The same output can be produced using fewer resources with urban agglomeration than without. In this sense, urbanization reduces the ecological footprint. The service sector requires urbanization because it needs a concentration of clients. As services generally pollute less than manufacturing, this aspect of urbanization is also beneficial to the environment. Second, for any given population, the high urban density is benign for the environment. The urban economics literature shows that compactness is a key determinant of energy use. High density can make public transport more viable and reduce the length of trips. Urban living encourages walking and cycling rather than driving. Third, environment-friendly infrastructure and public services such as piped water, sanitation, and waste management are much easier and more economical to construct, maintain, and operate in an urban setting. Urbanization allows more people to have access to environment-friendly facilities and services at affordable prices. Fourth, urbanization drives innovation, including green technologies. In the long term, environment-friendly equipment, machines, vehicles, and utilities will determine the future of the green economy. Green innovations in Asia's cities will be supported by the region's vast market as the billions of people who will be buying energy-efficient products will create opportunities and incentives for entrepreneurs to invest in developing such products. Finally, the higher standard of living associated with urbanization provides people with better food, education, housing, and health care. Urban growth generates revenues that fund infrastructure projects, reducing congestion and improving public health. Urbanization fosters a pro-environment stance among property owners and the middle class, which is crucial for the introduction and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations. Of course, urbanization also comes with costs. Millions of people are migrating to Asian cities and companies are locating there to employ them. Urban sprawl and industrial activities, such as power generation, transportation, construction, garbage and waste disposal, harm the environment. An assessment of the impact of urbanization on the environment must balance its benign and adverse effects.



## African cities have begun to adopt frameworks to prevent climate change

Goyal, Radhika and Amadou Sy. "Mobilizing Africa's rapid urbanization for sustainable climate change." *The Brookings Institution*. 2 December 2015.

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2015/12/02/mobilizing-africas-rapid-urbanization-for-sustainable-climate-change/>

This is the opportunity to successfully implement sustainable urban management policies. Huge and long-lasting investments are pouring into infrastructure for cities in Africa—making cities, energy grid systems, and land use policies open to opportunities and risk. There is an urgent need to emphasize the increasing dangers of delay to avoid high-carbon lock-in of capital and infrastructure investments. The recently adopted Sustainable Development Goals include a goal that advocates making cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable with a more specific focus on decreasing the impact of disasters and reduction in the adverse per capita environmental impact of cities. Urban planners are increasingly concerned about the issue as well—assistance for climate projects was among the top concerns for city officials according to a World Bank Institute's Municipal Finance Self-Assessment exercise. The global cities response on climate change has been gaining momentum, although rather slowly. In the lead up to COP21, 10 cities worldwide, including Cape Town, announced that they had met all planning and reporting requirements of the Compact of Mayors (the world's largest coalition of city leaders addressing climate change by pledging to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions). The compact enables cities to publicly commit to deep carbon dioxide emissions reductions, improve transparency of targets, and move to global reporting standards. To date, 165 cities, out of which 30 are African, have committed to the compact. Given the comparatively late onset of urban growth in Africa, there is potential for recognizing these challenges at an early planning stage and embracing new urban paradigms that are more conducive to building green cities that support positive economic, social, and environmental links. Investment in labor productivity, greener solutions, vulnerability reduction, public health hazard mitigation, social integration, and technological innovation will ensure that sustainable urbanization and economic development of African cities does indeed go hand in hand. In his message on World Cities Day, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon emphasized the importance of design as a strong participatory tool for cities that are designed to "live together" to create opportunities, enable connection and interaction, and facilitate sustainable use of shared resources.

## African urbanization can help preserve biodiversity

Güneralp, Burak et al. "Urbanization in Africa: challenges and opportunities for conservation." *IOP Science*. <https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa94fe>

It is often assumed that migration from rural to urban areas and the resulting concentration of populations in cities would ease the pressure on natural habitats. In many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, the migration and subsequent concentration of people in urban areas has indeed reduced rural populations, thus leading to reduced rates of deforestation [23]. However, land speculation by wealthy urban residents has also driven—abetted by lack of land-use planning and control—loss and fragmentation of rangelands close to cities and towns in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda [24]. In Western Africa, the increased demand for food in the cities has incentivized farmers to convert forests to agricultural fields to meet this demand [25]. These examples suggest that any relief from pressure on habitats from rural–urban migration may be overtaken by the increased demand for food and other natural resources from rapidly growing African cities. Furthermore, there are many instances of increasing deforestation in spite of a rise in a country's urbanization level as more complex dynamics—often involving long-distance actors—start to play more prominent roles [26, 27]. Importantly, there has been significant foreign direct investment (FDI) aimed at land purchases in the continent to help secure food production for urban residents in other parts of the world [28]. Therefore, conclusive evidence on ecological outcomes of rural–urban migration on the continent is yet to materialize [25].

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Encroachment of urban areas towards natural habitats and increasing demands of growing urban populations on natural resources put direct and indirect pressures on ecosystems. Notwithstanding the physical expansion of urban areas, concentration of people in urban areas would seem to ease off the pressure on natural habitats; yet, the effect of urban residents can be far and wide-reaching, e.g. through extension of transportation network, transfer of water over long distances, and increased demand for bushmeat. Supra-national or regional

bodies have the potential to contribute to ecological governance in Africa, though understandably given Africa's economic challenges, much of the current focus is on opportunities that urbanization can deliver for structural transformation. Still, urbanization in Africa, if well managed, can act as a catalyst to move the local, regional, national, and international governance mechanisms in the continent towards more effective conservation of biodiversity. The continent, having several regions with exceptional biodiversity, has much to offer to its urban populations in terms of recreation, a legacy of natural history, and a source of national pride. Its biodiversity and ecosystems can also serve as foundations for green infrastructure that can meet the needs of burgeoning urban populations while not ravaging these very ecosystems on which both rural and urban livelihoods ultimately depend.

## Urbanization has spurred urban farming, which reduces poverty and makes use of urban waste

Beach, Michelle. "Urban Agriculture Increases Food Security for Poor People in Africa." *Population Reference Bureau*. 4 April 2013. <https://www.prb.org/urban-agriculture-poor-africa/>

Sub-Saharan Africa's annual urban growth rate is 3.6 percent, almost double the world average.<sup>1</sup> With high levels of rural-to-urban migration, many now-urban residents hold on to their agricultural heritage through urban agriculture. In Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, urban gardens in some communities resemble those found in the rural areas of Tanzania from which migrants emigrated. An urban garden might resemble a traditional garden made by the Haya ethnic group from northwestern Tanzania—a garden close to the house that includes bananas mixed with coffee or other fruit trees.<sup>2</sup> Many urban dwellers tend home-based gardens primarily for household food. In Lusaka, Zambia, over half of residents practice urban agriculture to grow their own food.<sup>3</sup> In other regions such as Kampala, Uganda, and Yaounde, Cameroon, many urban households raise livestock including poultry, dairy cattle, and pigs.<sup>4</sup> On the edges of cities, large commercial plots are being created on undeveloped land. Within cities, small plots are located along roadsides and rivers, under power lines, and on land occupied by educational and administrative institutions.<sup>5</sup> Because these locations are quite visible, farmers are more vulnerable to eviction, especially in places like Dar es Salaam, where growing crops within 14 meters of roads or within 15 meters of riverbanks is illegal.<sup>6</sup> But landowners do sometimes accommodate farmers: A railroad company in Dar es Salaam long ago gave urban residents permission to plant crops on unused land. Yet after 30 years, the railroad unexpectedly sold part of the cultivated land to a private investor, taking that land away from the farmers and calling into question the future of the rest of that plot.<sup>7</sup> Food security means that safe and nutritious food is consistently available, accessible, and reasonably priced. Urban agriculture improves food security by providing healthy and plentiful substitutes for purchased food, especially for poor households. Households that practice urban agriculture are also more likely to have access to a wider variety of nutritious foods such as vegetables and animal products. In Kampala, Uganda, urban agriculture has been linked with improved nutritional status in children.<sup>8</sup> Urban agriculture can also provide people with a primary or supplemental income. Income from urban agriculture is particularly high in many African cities. In Bamako, Mali, and Dar es Salaam, the economic return to urban farmers has been estimated to be comparable to the income of unskilled construction workers.<sup>9</sup> And in some areas, urban farming can be even more lucrative. For example, during the dry season in Yaounde, Cameroon, farmers using wastewater irrigation can sell vegetables at more than double the wet-season price, and urban agriculture incomes were estimated to be 50 percent above minimum wage.<sup>10</sup> Collective benefits from urban agriculture include solving transportation problems and converting urban waste into fertilizer. Cities have more fresh produce and fewer perishable agricultural products coming from rural areas. For example, in Cameroon, almost all the leafy vegetables consumed by poor urban residents in Yaounde are grown in the valleys surrounding the city. Livestock in Yaounde produce more than 20,000 tons of manure per year, two-thirds of which is used as fertilizer by farms. These locally available farm "inputs" reduce the need for purchasing more-expensive commercial supplements.



# **INDICTS TO PRO EVIDENCE**

## A2 ROSENTHAL

A city doubling in size increases incomes per capita between 2 and 8 percent<sup>10</sup>

There are several problems with applying this study to urbanization in West Africa. First and foremost, this study analyzes urbanization and migration patterns in the United States, nowhere near comparable to West Africa. West African emerging cities are at the mercy of international economic imperialism and lax regulations, factors that make it difficult for urbanization to occur in similar patterns to urbanization in the U.S. Secondly, the economic dataset analyzed is over 45 years old, meaning that digitization and the effect of the internet and other technologies on urban development are not accounted for. These technologies have vastly altered the ways in which countries, businesses, and individuals share information and engage in trade and commerce. Finally, the study only looks at situations in which a city's size doubled, which means that in these cities, infrastructure was already in place and the urban area expanded geographically. The urbanization that West Africa is experiencing is more concentrated and lacks critical forms of infrastructure.

Rosenthal, Stuart. "Evidence on the Nature and Sources of Agglomeration Economies." *Handbook of Regional and Urban Development*. 2004.

<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1574008004800063>

The degree of concentration of economic activity is striking. Roughly 75% of Americans live in cities as defined by the Census Department, and yet cities occupy only 2% of the land area of the lower 48 states. A similar story could be told for any other developed country: labor and capital are both heavily concentrated in cities

Sections 2 and 3 review an econometric literature that is only about thirty years old. This literature has made substantial progress, especially in recent years as more refined data have become available. This has allowed researchers to ask questions that could not have been asked with more aggregate data. For example, evaluating the geographic extent of agglomeration economies is not possible without geographically refined data. Access to better data has also enabled researchers to answer old questions with greater precision, such as whether agglomeration economies are industry-specific or extend to the entire city. Despite the impressive record of progress of this program of formal econometric work, we believe there is much to be learned from less formal research. In Section 4, we consider some representative case studies. This is obviously a much older way to understand the facts that bear on agglomeration than through regression analysis. Even so, we believe it is an important part of the entire empirical story, both confirming and placing in context the formal empirical work and identifying important details in the big picture of agglomeration that the formal work misses.

<sup>10</sup> Rosenthal, Stuart. "Evidence on the Nature and Sources of Agglomeration Economies." *Handbook of Regional and Urban Development*. 2004.

<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1574008004800063>

## A2 GLAESER

### Urbanization promotes democracy<sup>11</sup>

This study offers an interesting argument that is rooted in history; however, it has significant shortcomings when being applied in a debate round. The first glaring problem is that the author's conclusion quite literally says that it is inconclusive: "The question of whether urbanization increases the demand for democracy is also unresolved." Furthermore, the argument is rooted in Western history, like 14th century urbanization and 19th century American urbanization, and it concedes that research is lacking in developing countries like West Africa. Even if democracy increases along with urbanization in developed nations like the United States, developing nations like those in West Africa may not experience the same outcomes. Finally, the study offers several interesting hypotheses but offers no empirical data or evidence to support them. All in all, this paper is more of an interesting thought experiment and less of a concrete analysis to use in a debate round.

Glaeser, Edward. "Transforming Cities: Does Urbanization Promote Democratic Change?" *National Bureau of Economic Research*. November 2016.

[https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/glaeser/files/transforming\\_cities\\_does\\_urbaniz\\_promote\\_dem\\_change\\_nberwp.pdf](https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/glaeser/files/transforming_cities_does_urbaniz_promote_dem_change_nberwp.pdf)

#### We also need to better understand the downsides of density in the developing world.

What interventions can improve housing quality cheaply in the slums of poor world mega-cities? What public health interventions can effectively improve longevity? What transportation innovations are effective at reducing hellish commutes? This paper emphasized the role that cities can play in fomenting political change, but acknowledged that this is a hypothesis, not a fact. This paper highlighted three primary channels through which urbanization might promote democracy and good government. All three merit further investigation. Despite Wallace (2014), there is little consensus that urbanization promotes regime change among dictatorships. The question of whether urbanization increases the demand for democracy is also unresolved. This paper presented some suggestive evidence, but since cities can also require firm management there are surely cases where urbanization increases the demand for dictatorship. In this case, it is important to map out when urbanization has made democracy more appealing and when city size has strengthened the hands of despots. Finally, the speculative question was raised of whether urban life increases civic capital, defined as the capacity and taste for organized political action. The modest amount of existing evidence does not support this claim, yet it still seems possible to us that cities are more likely than subsistence farms to produce effective political actors. The world is rapidly urbanizing and it is necessary to better understand the widespread effects of that change.

<sup>11</sup> Glaeser, Edward. "Transforming Cities: Does Urbanization Promote Democratic Change?" *National Bureau of Economic Research*. November 2016.

[https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/glaeser/files/transforming\\_cities\\_does\\_urbaniz\\_promote\\_dem\\_change\\_nberwp.pdf](https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/glaeser/files/transforming_cities_does_urbaniz_promote_dem_change_nberwp.pdf)



## A2 WORLD BANK

Urbanization has the potential to end poverty in West Africa and can achieve 50 percent more development goals compared to non-urbanized regions<sup>12</sup>

This World Bank report is one of the most comprehensive studies on the topic and can be applied to countless arguments by pro teams. In the foreword and executive summary, the author argues that urbanization will end poverty in Africa by 2040 - an incredibly bold statement. However, closer analysis of the article unveils that this success is contingent on urbanization being “well-managed.” The article concludes that current urbanization is not well managed and is contributing to economic hardship in the region. It lists policy recommendations to help fix this poorly managed process but offers no guarantee that these policy options will be explored. Overall, while this paper most certainly provides insights and valuable econometric analysis on the current context of West African urbanization, it provides a picture of a perfect world, not of a real one. Because West Africa’s urbanization is flawed (just look at our con arguments), a “perfect world” study cannot be effectively applied to this topic.

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<sup>12</sup> Jamal Saghir. “Harnessing Urbanization to End Poverty and Boost Prosperity in Africa.” *The World Bank*. 2013.

<http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/710431468191672231/pdf/815460WP0Afric00Box379851B00PUBLIC0.pdf>

**INDICTS TO  
CON EVIDENCE**

## A2 LOPEZ

A 1% increase in the Gini coefficient would increase poverty by 5.2%<sup>13</sup>

This evidence is often used to relate income inequality to rates of poverty because poverty is a far more tangible impact. As a reminder, the Gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality - the higher it is, the more unequal income distributions are. The Lopez evidence details several conditions that must manifest before poverty is actually increased. The 5.2% reduction only occurs if a country has a poverty line that is 33% of per capita income and a Gini coefficient of 0.3. When the study looks under different conditions that have higher levels of poverty (66% of per capita income), it actually finds the inverse to be true: rather than income inequality increasing poverty, high rates of poverty increase income inequality. This creates a real chicken-and-egg situation and makes the analysis “reverse causal.” The study is inconclusive because there is no way to determine whether it is income inequality that increases poverty, or it is poverty that increases income inequality. Rather than rely on this piece of evidence, con teams should find more specific impacts that stem from income inequality that have strong, direct warrants.

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<sup>13</sup> Lopez, Humberto. “Pro-growth, pro-poor: Is there a tradeoff?” *World Bank Publications*. 2004.  
[https://books.google.com/books?id=qA9XeCYGxEIC&pg=PA7&lpg=PA7&dq=%22a+1+percent+increase+in+the+gini%22&source=bl&ots=R7igZ\\_IDmF&sig=SPqYqEQLQmG8tb-qbNowmRsvh18&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKewihrPGNoO\\_YAhUFxmMKHTAcCywQ6AEIOTAF#v=onepage&q=%22a%201%20percent%20increase%20in%20the%20gini%22&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=qA9XeCYGxEIC&pg=PA7&lpg=PA7&dq=%22a+1+percent+increase+in+the+gini%22&source=bl&ots=R7igZ_IDmF&sig=SPqYqEQLQmG8tb-qbNowmRsvh18&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKewihrPGNoO_YAhUFxmMKHTAcCywQ6AEIOTAF#v=onepage&q=%22a%201%20percent%20increase%20in%20the%20gini%22&f=false)

## A2 NISHAT

1% increase in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) increases poverty 0.6%<sup>14</sup>

This study is often used to terminalize the negative impacts of predatory foreign direct investment. However, there are a few issues that arise when using this study in the context of this resolution. First and foremost, as the title of the paper indicates, this is a case study of Pakistan's FDI from 2000 to 2008. This puts a burden on the debaters to argue why this evidence referring to Pakistan's economy can be compared to that of West African nations' economies. Secondly, because the study uses FDI data from this time period, it is uniquely different from current FDI inflows. During 2008, the world experienced a massive global recession which would have greatly skewed Pakistan's rates of poverty. Finally, Pakistani FDI inflows are different from what rapidly urbanizing countries in West Africa are experiencing. FDI to Pakistan is more often than not micro-loans and micro-credits to individuals or infrastructure projects in rural areas. FDI going into urban centers would be fundamentally different and would likely go to business development or other urban assets. Con teams should look for more specific evidence to garner a terminal impact off of predatory investments from multinational capitalists.

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<sup>14</sup> Nishat, Muhammad. "Do Foreign Inflows Benefit Pakistani Poor?" *The Pakistan Development Review*. Winter 2009. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41261343?seq=1>

## A2 ROY

Air Pollution in Africa caused 712,000 deaths and cost \$400 billion economically<sup>15</sup>

Air pollution is indeed a costly health problem; however, this study tends to exaggerate the impact air pollution has. First and foremost, this study analyzes all of Africa, meaning it is more general than other pieces of evidence that look specifically at West African urbanization. Each urban center is different in how they handle pollution and the environment, so it's important to make these distinctions. Secondly, the 712,000 deaths are premature deaths, which is a little different than a direct loss of life. It just means a death that has occurred before the average age of death in a population. For example, if the average age of death is 75 and 180,000 people die at 70, that would still be 180,000 premature deaths. It is definitely not the same as more direct causes of death. Finally, the most concerning part of this study is in the economic analysis. It draws from another OECD paper that quantifies the “statistical economical value of a life” and then merely divides that number by the number of life years lost. That methodology is unrealistic because it does not tangibly relate to any economic impacts like poverty or lower GDP, but it is also concerning because it equates people’s lives with an economic value. If a con team attempts to use this as weighing against some of the economic benefits pro teams are arguing, it should not stand to measure up against real poverty reductions and economic GDP gains. The latter numbers are real and meaningful, whereas this analysis is merely hypothetical.

Roy, Rana. “The cost of air pollution in Africa.” *OECD Development Center Working Paper*. September 2016. <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/5jlqzq77x6f8-en.pdf?expires=1609377657&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=32E95F722E501D2CB3DA42E59B399F8A>

This paper is a first attempt at calculating the cost of air pollution in Africa. More precisely, it is a calculation of the major part of this cost: namely, **the cost of premature deaths attributable to air pollution**. It draws on the epidemiological evidence base assembled in the Global Burden of Disease Study 2013, in order to detail results for the health impacts of air pollution – in absolute terms and relative to selected other major risk factors, per country and for Africa as a whole. **And it draws on the economic analyses developed by the present author, among others, in recent OECD work on the value of statistical life, in order to establish results for the economic cost of the health impacts of air pollution.** In the period from 1990 to the present, and at each succeeding five-year interval in between, the death toll from air pollution in Africa has risen in tandem with the uninterrupted growth in the size of the urban population of Africa over this period. The total of annual deaths from ambient particulate matter pollution across the African continent increased by 36% from 1990 to 2013, from a then relatively low base of ≈ 180 000 in 1990 to ≈ 250 000 in 2013. Over this period, deaths from household air pollution also continued to increase, by 18%, from an already high base of ≈ 400 000 in 1990 to well over 450 000 in 2013. For Africa as a

<sup>15</sup> Roy, Rana. “The cost of air pollution in Africa.” *OECD Development Center Working Paper*. September 2016. <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/5jlqzq77x6f8-en.pdf?expires=1609377657&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=32E95F722E501D2CB3DA42E59B399F8A>

whole, as at 2013, the estimated economic cost of premature deaths from ambient particulate matter pollution was  $\approx$  USD 215 billion. The estimated economic cost of premature deaths from household air pollution was  $\approx$  USD 232 billion.