

# POL30350 - Politics and Policy making in the EU

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School of Politics and International Relations (SPIRe)

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# Introduction

The European Union (EU) currently consists of 28 European countries, and over its history has developed significant policy-making powers across a whole range of policy areas. This module surveys the development of European policy making competencies and will develop students understanding of the functioning of the EU as a political system. The module approaches the EU as a decision-making body that brings together a multitude of actors with varying roles, powers, and preferences, with the aim of explaining how these actors get what they want in EU politics. We will focus on the negotiations between actors when updating treaties, engaging in policy making, dealing with crisis, and deciding on budget allocations. The manner in which institutions and actor behaviour impact upon these negotiations will be examined. The module is research led, in that it focuses upon the political science literature that seeks to explain various aspects of European politics and policy making. This is reflected in the extensive reading list provided with the course. The module is aimed at those wanting a full and detailed understanding of (1) the political institutions of the EU, (2) its policy-making processes, and (3) current and future challenges facing the EU as a political system. The module does not assume any prior knowledge of the EU or EU politics.

## Learning outcomes

At the end of this course students will be able to:

- Explain how the three main legislative institutions of the EU function together and produce policy.
- Analyse European policy making using different theoretical approaches.
- Explain key concepts about EU policy making to others both verbally and in writing.
- Discuss the current and future challenges facing the EU in light of the theories and empirical evidence discussed throughout the course.

## Points of contact with Lecturer

- **Weekly lectures**
  - Mondays 14:00, Lecture Theatre P, Newman Building
  - Wednesdays 12:00, Lecture Theatre N, Newman Building
- **Email**
  - Please put course code (POL30350) in subject line of all correspondences.
  - `james.cross@ucd.ie`; `deirdre.tinney@ucd.ie`
- **Office hours**
  - By appointment

# Assessment strategy

## End of year exam

There will be a formal two-hour examination at the end of the semester as scheduled by the examination office. This examination will constitute 80% of your final mark. Example exams demonstrating the structure and requirements of the end of year exam will be distributed in due course.

## Blog-post assignment

In addition to the end of year exam, you will be required to submit a blog-post assignment of *strictly* under 1000 words. This 1000 words does not include the bibliography. This blog-post assignment will constitute 20% of your final mark in this course. Your blog-post assignment should be submitted no later than **3 p.m. on 27th October 2017**. You will be required to submit a copy of your assignment electronically via SafeAssign on Blackboard. Please read the SafeAssign guidelines in order to do this correctly.

The blog-post assignments are intended to assess your substantive knowledge of European policy making and apply the insights you have gained from the course to current issues facing the EU and the policy makers active within this organisation. Good blog posts should show consistency in argument, clear structure, simple and direct writing, good punctuation and evidence of wide reading. The relatively short length of the post means that students must prioritise what they include in their text. They need to think carefully about what elements of their argument need to be developed and what elements can be given less attention. You should endeavour to include graphs, data, and existing research findings in the academic literature, with accurate referencing where appropriate. Your answers should demonstrate your ability to:

- Identify important, relevant and recent developments in European policy making
- Identify the debates and academic authors in the discipline that address these developments
- Understand and apply the main theoretical approaches covered in the course to analyse EU politics
- Critically assess these approaches by drawing on the secondary literature on European policy making as well as empirical evidence and data

The blog post is also intended to assess your study skills. Your answers should demonstrate your ability to:

- Draw *selectively* on a range of relevant material, including existing literature on EU policy making, official documents, contemporary news sources, data, and the internet
- Understand, analyse and critically assess that material
- Use the material to make and sustain a well-structured line of argument

- Write in a concise and cogent style - The 1000 word limit forces you to prioritise information and think carefully about how to make a point in a relatively short amount of text.

A selection of the best blog posts shall be published (with the author's consent) on the Dublin European Institute's blog found at <http://www.europedebate.ie>. This widely read and highly visible platform provides the opportunity for students to contribute to the public debate about European integration in a concrete manner to a national and international audience. It also allows students to publicly demonstrate their mastery of their chosen topic in a professional context, and as such represents a great opportunity to build a profile for future employers be they in academia, the public sector or the private sector.

A large selection of excellent example blog posts to inspire you can be found at <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euoppblog/> and <http://www.europedebate.ie>. What you will notice about the blog posts on these sites is that they take insights gained from the political science literature, and use these insights to make a concise argument about current issues in EU integration and policy making. Please consult and explore this webpage at length to get an idea of what is expected of you.

One important difference between the above mentioned blog posts and your assignment, is that you are required to include more detailed and complete referencing in your blog assignment. You want to demonstrate that you have read the relevant literature and can reference it where necessary. The best blog-post assignments will combine clarity of argument with well researched points and demonstrate a clear mastery of the relevant literature.

## Grading Criteria

In essence, markers assess four crucial elements in any answer:

- Analysis/understanding
- Extent and use of reading
- Organisation/structure
- Writing proficiency

The various grades/classifications reflect the extent to which an answer displays essential features of each of these elements (and their relative weighting). At its simplest: the better the analysis, the wider the range of appropriate sources consulted, the greater the understanding of the materials read, the clearer the writing style, and the more structured the argument, the higher will be the mark.

## Headers and Formatting

At the top of your written work, please include:

- The date of submission
- The assignment you are submitting (e.g. Short Essay 1, Long Essay, etc.)

- Your student number
- A title, when appropriate
- The total number of words (use the word count feature of your word processor)

When formatting your assignments, please follow these guidelines:

- Add page numbers
- Use a minimum of 12 sized font
- Use a serif (such as Times Roman, Georgia, Garamond), not a sans serif font (such as Arial, Helvetica, Verdana)
- Please double space your essays

## Footnotes and References

Detailed and complete referencing in your assignment is **ESSENTIAL**. You are free to choose the referencing style that you prefer, but it must be applied consistently and in line with official style guidelines. If you are in any confusion about how to correctly approach referencing and bibliography issues, there are many good guides available online (Here for instance: <http://www.ucd.ie/t4cms/Guide69.pdf>).

## Grade explanation

### Grade: A

#### *Excellent Performance*

A deep and systematic engagement with the assessment task, with consistently impressive demonstration of a comprehensive mastery of the subject matter, reflecting:

- A deep and broad knowledge and critical insight as well as extensive reading;
- A critical and comprehensive appreciation of the relevant literature or theoretical, technical or professional framework
- An exceptional ability to organise, analyse and present arguments fluently and lucidly with a high level of critical analysis, amply supported by evidence, citation or quotation;
- A highly-developed capacity for original, creative and logical thinking
- An extensive and detailed knowledge of the subject matter
- A highly-developed ability to apply this knowledge to the task set
- Evidence of extensive background reading
- Clear, fluent, stimulating and original expression
- Excellent presentation (spelling, grammar, graphical) with minimal or no presentation errors
- Referencing style consistently executed in recognised style

## **Grade: B**

### *Very Good Performance*

A thorough and well organised response to the assessment task, demonstrating:

- A thorough familiarity with the relevant literature or theoretical, technical or professional framework
- Well-developed capacity to analyse issues, organise material, present arguments clearly and cogently well supported by evidence, citation or quotation;
- Some original insights and capacity for creative and logical thinking
- A broad knowledge of the subject matter
- Considerable strength in applying that knowledge to the task set
- Evidence of substantial background reading
- Clear and fluent expression
- Quality presentation with few presentation errors
- Referencing style for the most part consistently executed in recognised style

## **Grade: C**

### *Good Performance*

An intellectually competent and factually sound answer with, marked by:

- Evidence of a reasonable familiarity with the relevant literature or theoretical, technical or professional framework
- Good developed arguments, but more statements of ideas
- Arguments or statements adequately but not well supported by evidence, citation or quotation
- Some critical awareness and analytical qualities
- Some evidence of capacity for original and logical thinking
- Adequate but not complete knowledge of the subject matter
- Omission of some important subject matter or the appearance of several minor errors
- Capacity to apply knowledge appropriately to the task albeit with some errors
- Evidence of some background reading
- Clear expression with few areas of confusion
- Writing of sufficient quality to convey meaning but some lack of fluency and command of suitable vocabulary
- Good presentation with some presentation errors
- Referencing style executed in recognised style, but with some errors

## **Grade: D**

### *Satisfactory Performance*

An acceptable level of intellectual engagement with the assessment task showing:

- Some familiarity with the relevant literature or theoretical, technical or professional framework
- Mostly statements of ideas, with limited development of argument
- Limited use of evidence, citation or quotation
- Limited critical awareness displayed
- Limited evidence of capacity for original and logical thinking
- Basic grasp of subject matter, but somewhat lacking in focus and structure
- Main points covered but insufficient detail
- Some effort to apply knowledge to the task but only a basic capacity or understanding displayed
- Little or no evidence of background reading
- Several minor errors or one major error
- Satisfactory presentation with an acceptable level of presentation errors
- Referencing style inconsistent

## **Grade: D-**

### *Acceptable*

The minimum acceptable of intellectual engagement with the assessment task which:

- The minimum acceptable appreciation of the relevant literature or theoretical, technical or professional framework
- Ideas largely expressed as statements, with little or no developed or structured argument
- Minimum acceptable use of evidence, citation or quotation
- Little or no analysis or critical awareness displayed or is only partially successful
- Little or no demonstrated capacity for original and logical thinking
- Shows a basic grasp of subject matter but may be poorly focussed or badly structured or contain irrelevant material
- Has one major error and some minor errors
- Demonstrates the capacity to complete only moderately difficult tasks related to the subject material

- No evidence of background reading
- Displays the minimum acceptable standard of presentation (spelling, grammar, graphical)
- Referencing inconsistent with major errors

### **Grade: E**

#### *Fail (marginal)*

A factually sound answer with a partially successful, but not entirely acceptable, attempt to:

- Integrate factual knowledge into a broader literature or theoretical, technical or professional framework develop arguments
- Support ideas or arguments with evidence, citation or quotation
- Engages with the subject matter or problem set, despite major deficiencies in structure, relevance or focus
- Has two major error and some minor errors
- Demonstrates the capacity to complete only part of, or the simpler elements of, the task
- An incomplete or rushed answer e.g. the use of bullet points through part / all of answer
- Little or no referencing style evident

### **Grade: F**

#### *Fail (unacceptable)*

An unacceptable level of intellectual engagement with the assessment task, with:

- No appreciation of the relevant literature or theoretical, technical or professional framework
- No developed or structured argument
- No use of evidence, citation or quotation
- No analysis or critical awareness displayed or is only partially successful
- No demonstrated capacity for original and logical thinking
- A failure to address the question resulting in a largely irrelevant answer or material of marginal relevance predominating
- A display of some knowledge of material relative to the question posed, but with very serious omissions / errors and/or major inaccuracies included in answer
- Solutions offered to a very limited portion of the problem set



- An answer unacceptably incomplete (e.g. for lack of time)
- A random and undisciplined development, layout or presentation
- Unacceptable standards of presentation, such as grammar, spelling or graphical presentation
- Evidence of substantial plagiarism
- No referencing style evident

### **Grade: G**

*Fail (wholly unacceptable)*

No intellectual engagement with the assessment task

- Complete failure to address the question resulting in an entirely irrelevant answer
- Little or no knowledge displayed relative to the question posed
- Little or no solution offered for the problem set
- Evidence of extensive plagiarism
- No referencing style evident

### **Grade: NG**

*No grade (no work was submitted by the student or student was absent from the assessment, or work submitted did not merit a grade).*

## **Extenuating circumstances**

In the case that a student will not be able to meet an assessment deadline or will be absent from the course for an extended period of time, and this is known **IN ADVANCE**, they should consult the UCD policies on extenuating circumstances found here: <http://www.ucd.ie/registry/academicsecretariat/extc.htm>. It is important that in such cases you make the issue known to the lecturer as soon as possible. The sooner that the lecturer is made aware of the situation, the more likely it is that you can be accommodated.

## **Late assignment submissions**

If a student submits an assignment late, the following penalties will be applied:

- Coursework received at any time within two weeks of the due date will be graded, but a penalty will apply.
  - Coursework submitted at any time up to one week after the due date will have the grade awarded reduced by two grade points (for example, from B- to C).

- Coursework submitted more than one week but up to two weeks after the due date will have the grade reduced by four grade points (for example, from B- to D+). Where a student finds they have missed a deadline for submission, they should be advised that they may use the remainder of the week to improve their submission without additional penalty.
- Coursework received more than two weeks after the due date will not be accepted.

## Plagiarism

The university policy on plagiarism can be found here:

[http://www.ucd.ie/registry/academicsecretariat/docs/plagiarism\\_po.pdf](http://www.ucd.ie/registry/academicsecretariat/docs/plagiarism_po.pdf)

Plagiarism is taken extremely seriously throughout the university and academia in general. The school has systems in place to detect plagiarism and these systems are fully implemented. You need to be very clear about what constitutes plagiarism and avoid it at all costs. The library has a good guide to help you avoid plagiarism that can be found here:

[http://www.ucd.ie/library/supporting\\_you/support\\_learning/plagiarism/](http://www.ucd.ie/library/supporting_you/support_learning/plagiarism/)

Any student caught plagiarising will be subject to penalties in accordance with university policy.

## MODULE READINGS

### Textbook

The following text shall be used extensively throughout the course, so it is recommended that it is purchased:

- Lelieveldt, H., & Princen, S. (2015). The Politics of the European Union, 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press. Available through <http://www.amazon.co.uk> in paperback or kindle versions.

### Methods in EU research - A guide to reading and interpreting cutting edge scholarship

This module is research driven, so a familiarity with how political research is undertaken and how to interpret the results presented in the literature is very useful. The following texts provide a good introduction to the different approaches you are likely to come across in the assigned readings.

Readings

- Van Evera, S. (1997). Guide to methods for students of political science. Cornell University Press. Chapter 1.
- Bellmare, M. (2012). A Primer on Causality.

- Bellmare, M. (2012). A Primer on Linear Regression.
- Thomson, R., Stokman, F. N., Achen, C. H., & König, T. (Eds.). (2006). The European union decides. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1 & 2.
- Ragin, C. C. (2014). The comparative method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies. University of California Press.
- Gschwend, T., & Schimmelfennig, F. (Eds.). (2007). Research design in political science: how to practice what they preach. Palgrave Macmillan.

## WEEKLY READING LIST

### PART I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK(S) AND METHODS IN EU RESEARCH

#### Week 1: Politics and policy making in the EU - An introduction to the conceptual tools to be used in this course

##### Study questions

- What are the respective variants of the institutionalist approach; who are the main actors according to each approach and what role do they play in the EU policy process?

##### Required Readings

- Lelieveldt, H., & Princen, S. (2015). The Politics of the European Union, 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1,2.
- Aspinwall, M. D., & Schneider, G. (2000). Same menu, separate tables: The institutionalist turn in political science and the study of European integration. European Journal of Political Research, 38(1), 1-36.

##### Further reading

- Pollack, M. A. (2007). Rational choice and EU politics. Handbook of European Union Politics, 31-55.
- Hinich M. J. & Munger, M. C. (1997). Analytical politics.
- Shepsle, K. A., & Weingast, B. R. (1981). Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice. Public choice, 37(3), 503-519.
- Shepsle, K. A., & Weingast, B. R. (1987). The institutional foundations of committee power. The American Political Science Review, 85-104.
- Arrow, K. J. (1963). Social Choice and Individual Values (No. 12). Yale University Press.
- Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto players: How political institutions work. Princeton University Press.

- Checkel, J. T. (1999). Social construction and integration. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6(4), 545-560.
- Christiansen, T., Jørgensen, K. E., & Wiener, A. (Eds.). (2001). *The social construction of Europe*. Sage.
- Jupille, J., Caporaso, J. A., & Checkel, J. T. (2003). Integrating Institutions Rationalism, Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union. *Comparative Political Studies*, 36(1-2), 7-40.
- Benoit, K., & Laver, M. (2012). The dimensionality of political space: Epistemological and methodological considerations. *European Union Politics*, 13(2), 194-218.

## PART II: NEGOTIATING EU PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LAW

### Week 2: Negotiating the treaties

#### Study questions

- What are the sources of states' bargaining power during treaty negotiations? How do domestic constraints condition states' bargaining strength at IGCs?
- There is conflicting evidence regarding which players and what factors are most likely to affect the outcome of a treaty. What is the role of supranational actors in explaining IGC bargains?
- How has the Treaty of Lisbon shifted the EU's institutional balance of power between the major institutions of the EU?

#### Required Readings

- Lelieveldt, H., & Princen, S. (2015). *The Politics of the European Union*, 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1,10
- Moravcsik, A. & Nicolaidis, K. (1999). Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 37(1): 59-85.
- Slapin, J. B. (2008). Bargaining power at Europe's intergovernmental conferences: testing institutional and intergovernmental theories. *International Organization*, 62(01), 131-162.
- Finke, D. (2009). Challenges to intergovernmentalism: an empirical analysis of EU treaty negotiations since Maastricht. *West European Politics*, 32(3), 466-495.

#### Further reading

- Hug, S., & König, T. (2002). In view of ratification: Governmental preferences and domestic constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference. *International Organization*, 56(02), 447-476.
- Finke, D., König, T., Proksch, S. O., & Tsebelis, G. (2012). *Reforming the European Union: realizing the impossible*. Princeton University Press.

- Slapin, J. B. (2006). Who is powerful? Examining preferences and testing sources of bargaining strength at European intergovernmental conferences. *European Union Politics*, 7(1), 51-76.
- Slapin, J. B. (2009). Exit, voice, and cooperation: Bargaining power in international organizations and federal systems. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 21(2), 187-211.
- Finke, D. (2010). European integration and its limits: intergovernmental conflicts and their domestic origins. ECPR Press.
- Franchino, F. (2013). Challenges to liberal intergovernmentalism. *European Union Politics*, 14(2), 324-337.
- Finke, D. (2009). Governmental Positions on European Treaty Reforms: Towards a Dynamic Approach.
- Reinhard, J., Biesenbender, J., & Holzinger, K. (2014). Do arguments matter? Argumentation and negotiation success at the 1997 Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference. *European Political Science Review*, 6(02), 283-307.
- Finke, D. (2007). Constitutional Politics in the European Union: Stability and Change of Intergovernmental Conflict Patterns.
- Finke, D. (2013). Reforming International Institutions: The Domestic Origins and Conditional Logic of Governmental Reform Preferences. *International Studies Quarterly*, 57(2), 288-302.
- Reinhard, J. (2012). 'Because we are all Europeans!' When do EU Member States use normative arguments?. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 19(9), 1336-1356.
- König, T., & Slapin, J. (2004). Bringing Parliaments Back in The Sources of Power in the European Treaty Negotiations. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 16(3), 357-394.
- König, T., & Slapin, J. B. (2006). From unanimity to consensus: an analysis of the negotiations at the EU's constitutional convention. *World Politics*, 58(03), 413-445.
- Finke, D., & König, T. (2009). Why risk popular ratification failure? A comparative analysis of the choice of the ratification instrument in the 25 Member States of the EU. *Constitutional Political Economy*, 20(3-4), 341-365.
- König, T., Daimer, S., & Finke, D. (2008). The Treaty Reform of the EU: Constitutional Agenda-Setting, Intergovernmental Bargains and the Presidency's Crisis Management of Ratification Failure. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 46(2), 337-363.
- Lenz, H., Dorussen, H., & Ward, H. (2007). Public commitment strategies in intergovernmental negotiations on the EU Constitutional Treaty. *The Review of International Organizations*, 2(2), 131-152.

### Week 3: The Commission - Negotiating a legislative proposal?

#### Study questions

- Some recent studies find congruence between the Commission and member states' policy positions suggesting that the Commission might not be "completely independent in the performance of their duties" as specified in the treaty and not quite as supranational as it has been often portrayed. To what can we attribute this policy congruence? i.e., what are some of the key factors that constrain the Commission's independence and condition its policy positions, as identified in the readings?
- How convincing do you find the argument that the Commission has become less of a supranational actor and more of an agent of national interests? Have the Commission's policies become increasingly less "European"? What are the implications for the legislative decision-making in the EU if this were the case?
- What role do interest groups play in the process of putting together a legislative proposal? Is including interest groups in the process a good thing?
- Which conceptual approach to analysing the Commission's legislative role is more appropriate: the Commission as a unitary actor approach or the Commission as a collective of individual actors approach?

#### Required Readings

- Lelieveldt, H., & Princen, S. (2015). The Politics of the European Union, 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 6,8
- Egeberg, M. (2014). The European Commission: From agent to political institution. *Public Administration*, 92(1), 240-246.
- Boräng, F., & Naurin, D. (2015). 'Try to see it my way!' Frame congruence between lobbyists and European Commission officials. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(4), 499-515.
- Dür, A., Bernhagen, P., & Marshall, D. (2015). Interest Group Success in the European Union When (and Why) Does Business Lose?. *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(8), 951-983
- Beyers, J., Bonafont, L. C., Dür, A., Eising, R., Fink-Hafner, D., Lowery, D., ... & Naurin, D. (2014). The INTEREURO project: Logic and structure. *Interest Groups & Advocacy*, 3(2), 126-140.
- Explore the following website: <http://www.intereuro.eu/public/>.

#### Further reading

- Klüver, H., Mahoney, C. and Oppen, M. (2015). Framing in context: how interest groups employ framing to lobby the European Commission. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(4), 481-498.

- Egeberg, M., Gornitzka, Å., & Trondal, J. (2014). A not so technocratic executive? Everyday interaction between the European Parliament and the Commission. *West European Politics*, 37(1), 1-18.
- Christensen, J. (2015). Recruitment and Expertise in the European Commission. *West European Politics*, 38(3), 649-678.
- Wonka, A. (2007). Technocratic and Independent? The Appointment of European Commissioners and its Policy Implications. *Journal of European Public Policy* 14(2): 169-89.
- Egeberg, M., Trondal, J., & Vestlund, N. M. (2015). The quest for order: unravelling the relationship between the European Commission and European Union agencies. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(5), 609-629.
- Wonka, A. (2008). ‘Decision-Making Dynamics in the European Commission: Partisan, National or Sectoral?’, *Journal of European Public Policy* 15(8), pp.1145–63.
- Hartlapp, M., Metz, J., & Rauh, C. (2014). Which policy for Europe?: power and conflict inside the European Commission. Oxford University Press.
- Egeberg, M., Trondal, J., & Vestlund, N. (2014). Situating EU agencies in the political-administrative space. ARENA Working Papers 6.
- Kassim, H. (2008). ‘“Mission Impossible”, but Mission Accomplished: the Kinnock Reforms and the European Commission’, *Journal of European Public Policy* 15(5), 648–68
- Smith, A., (2014). How the European Commission’s Policies Are Made: Problematisation, Instrumentation and Legitimation, *Journal of European Integration*, 36(1), 55-72.
- Schmidt, S.K. (2000). ‘Only an Agenda Setter? The European Commission’s Power Over the Council of Ministers’, *European Union Politics* 1(1), pp.37–61
- Peterson, J. (2012). “The College of Commissioners.” In: John Peterson & Michael Shackleton (eds.). *The Institutions of the European Union*. 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 96-123.
- Quittkat, C. (2011). The European Commission’s Online Consultations: A Success Story? *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49(3): 653-674.
- Pollack, M.A., (1997). Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community. *International Organization*, 51(1), pp.99–134.
- Beyers, J., Bonafont, L. C., Dür, A., Eising, R., Fink-Hafner, D., Lowery, D., ... & Naurin, D. (2014). The INTEREURO project: Logic and structure. *Interest Groups & Advocacy*, 3(2), 126-140.
- Bernhagen, P., Dür, A., & Marshall, D. (2014). Measuring lobbying success spatially. *Interest Groups & Advocacy*, 3(2), 202-218.

- Eising, R., Rasch, D., & Rozbicka, P. (2015). Institutions, policies, and arguments: context and strategy in EU policy framing. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(4), 516-533.
- Bunea, A., & Ibenskas, R. (2015). Quantitative text analysis and the study of EU lobbying and interest groups. *European Union Politics*, 16(3).
- Klüver, H. (2015). The promises of quantitative text analysis in interest group research: a reply to Bunea and Ibenskas. *European Union Politics*, 16(3).
- Bunea, A. (2014). Sharing ties and preferences: Stakeholders' position alignments in the European Commission's open consultations. *European Union Politics*, 16(2).

#### **Week 4: The Council - Negotiating a consensus between member states?**

##### Study questions

- How is the Council of Ministers organised? Who holds power in the Council?
- Does the hierarchical structure of the Council help or hinder its ability to make decisions?
- What factors drive the 'consensus style' decision-making we tend to observe in the Council?

##### Required Readings

- Lelieveldt, H., & Princen, S. (2015). *The Politics of the European Union*, 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 3
- Lewis, J. (2003). Institutional Environments And Everyday EU Decision Making Rationalist or Constructivist?. *Comparative Political Studies*, 36(1-2), 97-124.
- Aksoy, D. (2012). Institutional arrangements and logrolling: Evidence from the European Union. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(3), 538-552.
- Naurin, D. (2015). Generosity in intergovernmental negotiations: The impact of state power, pooling and socialisation in the Council of the European Union. *European Journal of Political Research*.

##### Further reading

- Arregui, J., & Thomson, R. (2009). States' bargaining success in the European Union. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 16(5), 655-676.
- Arregui, J., & Thomson, R. (2014). Domestic adjustment costs, interdependence and dissent in the Council of the European Union. *European Journal of Political Research*, 53(4), 692-708.
- Bailer, S., Mattila, M., & Schneider, G. (2015). Money makes the EU go round: The objective foundations of conflict in the council of ministers. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 53(3), 437-456.



- Smeets, S. (2015). Unanimity and exposure in the EU Council of Ministers—or how the Dutch won and lost the ICTY debate. *European Journal of Political Research*, 54(2), 288-304.
- Finke, D., & Herbel, A. (2015). Beyond rules and resources: Parliamentary scrutiny of EU policy proposals. *European Union Politics*, 1465116515584202.
- Scherpereel, J. A., & Perez, L. K. (2015). Turnover in the Council of the European Union: what it is and why it matters. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 53(3), 658-673.
- Veen, T. (2011). *The Political Economy of Collective Decision-making: Conflicts and Coalitions in the Council of the European Union*. Springer.
- Grøn, C. H., & Salomonsen, H. H. (2015). Who's at the table? An analysis of ministers' participation in EU Council of Ministers meetings. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(8), 1071-1088.
- Schalk, J., Torenvlied, R., Weesie, J., & Stokman, F. (2007). The power of the Presidency in EU Council decision-making. *European Union Politics*, 8(2), 229-250.
- Cross, J. P. (2012). Interventions and negotiation in the Council of Ministers of the European Union. *European Union Politics*, 13(1), 47-69.
- Cross, J. P. (2013). Everyone's a winner (almost): Bargaining success in the Council of Ministers of the European Union. *European Union Politics*, 14(1), 70-94.
- Golub, J. (2012). How the European Union does not work: national bargaining success in the Council of Ministers. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 19(9), 1294-1315.
- Tallberg, J. (2008). Bargaining Power in the European Council\*. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 46(3), 685-708.
- Warntjen, A. (2008). The Council Presidency Power Broker or Burden? An Empirical Analysis. *European Union Politics*, 9(3), 315-338.
- Smeets, S., & Vennix, J. (2014). 'How to make the most of your time in the Chair': EU presidencies and the management of Council debates. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 21(10), 1435-1451.
- Jensen, M. D., & Nedergaard, P. (2014). Uno, duo, trio? Varieties of Trio Presidencies in the Council of Ministers. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 52(5), 1035-1052.
- Kreppel, A. (2014). Ideology in the EU's Second Chamber: A New Understanding of the Character and Impact of the Council on EU Policy Making. In APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2451566>

## Week 5: The European Parliament - Negotiating, committees and voting

### Study questions

- Does the EP function like a ‘normal Parliament’?
- Should supranational partisan motivations override national interests for MEPs in the legislative process of the EU?
- How do the institutional structures of the EP impact upon the behaviour of MEPs?
- What roles do committees play in the EP? How are committee roles assigned, and does this give European party groups power to affect the behaviour of MEPs?
- Does the separation of powers between the legislative and the executive authority in the EU help or hinder the policy process and the overall functioning of the Union?

### Required Readings

- Lelieveldt, H., & Princen, S. (2015). *The Politics of the European Union*, 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 7
- Hix, S., Noury, A., & Roland, G. (2005). Power to the parties: cohesion and competition in the European Parliament, 1979–2001. *British Journal of Political Science*, 35(02), 209-234.
- Yoshinaka, A., McElroy, G., & Bowler, S. (2010). The appointment of rapporteurs in the European Parliament. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 35(4), 457-486.
- Yordanova, N. (2009). The Rationale behind Committee Assignment in the European Parliament Distributive, Informational and Partisan Perspectives. *European Union Politics*, 10(2), 253-280.
- Costello, R. & Thomson, R. (2010). The policy impact of leadership in committees: Rapporteurs’ influence on the European Parliament’s opinions. *European Union Politics*, 11(2), 219-240.
- Slapin, J. B., & Proksch, S. O. (2010). Look who’s talking: Parliamentary debate in the European Union. *European Union Politics*, 11(3), 333-357.
- What role do national parliaments play in EU politics?

### Further reading

- Greene, D., & Cross, J. P. (2017). Exploring the Political Agenda of the European Parliament Using a Dynamic Topic Modeling Approach. *Political Analysis*, 25(1), 77-94.
- Rauh, C., & De Wilde, P. (2017). The opposition deficit in EU accountability: Evidence from over 20 years of plenary debate in four member states. *European Journal of Political Research*. (Ahead of print).

- Crum, B. (2017). Parliamentary accountability in multilevel governance: what role for parliaments in post-crisis EU economic governance? *Journal of European Public Policy*, (Ahead of print).
- Costello, R., & Thomson, R. (2014). Bicameralism, nationality and party cohesion in the European Parliament. *Party Politics*, .
- Corbett, R., Jacobs, F., & Shackleton, M. (2000). *The European Parliament* (Vol. 5). London: John Harper.
- Hix, S., Noury, A. G., & Roland, G. (2007). *Democratic politics in the European Parliament*. Cambridge University Press.
- McElroy, G., & Benoit, K. (2007). Party groups and policy positions in the European Parliament. *Party Politics*, 13(1), 5-28.
- Hix, S. (2002). Parliamentary behavior with two principals: preferences, parties, and voting in the European Parliament. *American Journal of Political Science*, 688-698.
- Hix, S., Noury, A., & Roland, G. (2006). Dimensions of politics in the European Parliament. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(2), 494-520.
- Hix, S., & Marsh, M. (2007). Punishment or protest? Understanding European parliament elections. *Journal of Politics*, 69(2), 495-510.
- Hix, S., & Noury, A. (2009). After enlargement: voting patterns in the sixth European Parliament. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 34(2), 159-174.
- Proksch, S. O., & Slapin, J. B. (2010). Position taking in European Parliament speeches. *British Journal of Political Science*, 40(03), 587-611.
- Lindberg, B., Rasmussen, A., & Warntjen, A. (2008). Party politics as usual? The role of political parties in EU legislative decision-making. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(8), 1107-1126.
- Bressanelli, E. (2012). National parties and group membership in the European Parliament: ideology or pragmatism?. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 19(5), 737-754.
- McElroy, G., & Benoit, K. (2009). *Party group switching in the European Parliament*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Finke, D. (2012). Proposal stage coalition-building in the European Parliament. *European Union Politics*, 13(4), 487-512.
- McElroy, G. (2006). Committee representation in the European Parliament. *European Union Politics*, 7(1), 5-29.
- Armingeon, K., & Ceka, B. (2013). The loss of trust in the European Union during the great recession since 2007: The role of heuristics from the national political system. *European Union Politics*, 15(1).

- Lefkofridi, Z., & Katsanidou, A. (2014). Multilevel representation in the European Parliament. *European Union Politics*, 15(1), 108-131.
- Trumm, S. (2015). Voting Procedures and Parliamentary Representation in the European Parliament. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*.
- Schmitt, H., Hobolt, S. B., & Popa, S. A. (2015). Does personalization increase turnout? Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 European Parliament elections. *European Union Politics*.
- Winzen, T. (2011). Technical or political? An exploration of the work of officials in the committees of the European Parliament. *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 17(1), 27-44.

## **Week 6: Inter-institutional politics - Negotiating inter-institutional agreements**

### Study questions

- The EU has been described as a ‘hyper-consensus system of government’ (Hix, 2008) because of the need to accommodate a large number of veto players in the policy - making process. Describe and give examples of how actors within particular institutions are able to use formal and informal powers of these institutions to align legislation with their preferences.
- In a highly consensual policy process like that found in the EU, where policies are often moving targets, what are the most decisive factors that contribute to the successful adoption of policies?
- What sorts of coalitions are required for the adoption of successive policies in the areas of structural funds and employment. At what levels of governance do these coalitions exist?
- How might informal political arrangements reduce the difficulty associated with reaching agreements under more formal legislative procedures?

### Required Readings

- Lelieveldt, H., & Princen, S. (2015). *The Politics of the European Union*, 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 4.
- Rasmussen, A., & Reh, C. (2013). The consequences of concluding codecision early: trilogues and intra-institutional bargaining success. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20(7), 1006-1024.
- Reh, C., H  ritier, A., Bressanelli, E., & Koop, C. (2013). The informal politics of legislation explaining secluded decision making in the European Union. *Comparative Political Studies*, 46(9), 1112-1142.
- Cross, J. P., & Hermansson, H. (2017). Legislative amendments and informal politics in the European Union: A text reuse approach. *European Union Politics*, (Ahead of print).

## Further reading

- König, T., Lindberg, B., Lechner, S., & Pohlmeier, W. (2007). Bicameral conflict resolution in the European Union: an empirical analysis of conciliation committee bargains. *British Journal of Political Science*, 37(02), 281-312.
- Tsebelis, G. (1994). The power of the European Parliament as a conditional agenda setter. *American Political Science Review*, 88(01), 128-142.
- Bailer, S., (2014). An Agent Dependent on the EU Member States? The Determinants of the European Commission's Legislative Success in the European Union, *Journal of European Integration*, 36(1), 37-53.
- Rasmussen, A. (2011). Early conclusion in bicameral bargaining: Evidence from the co-decision legislative procedure of the European Union. *European Union Politics*, 12(1), 41-64.
- Rasmussen, A. (2008). The EU Conciliation Committee One or Several Principals?. *European Union Politics*, 9(1), 87-113.
- Rasmussen, A. (2012). Twenty Years of Co-decision Since Maastricht: Inter-and Intrainstitutional Implications. *Journal of European Integration*, 34(7), 735-751.
- Hix, S., & Høyland, B. (1999). The political system of the European Union (p. 357). London: Macmillan. Chapter 3
- Hansen, V. W. (2014). Incomplete information and bargaining in the EU: An explanation of first-reading non-agreements. *European Union Politics*, 15(4), 472-495.
- Mühlböck, M., & Rittberger, B. (2015). The Council, the European Parliament, and the paradox of inter-institutional cooperation. *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)*, 19.
- Costello, R., & Thomson, R. (2011). The nexus of bicameralism: Rapporteurs' impact on decision outcomes in the European Union. *European Union Politics*, 12(3), 337-357.
- Costello, R. (2011). Does bicameralism promote stability? Inter-institutional relations and coalition formation in the European Parliament. *West European Politics*, 34(1), 122-144.
- Costello, R. & Thomson, R. (2013). The distribution of power among EU institutions: who wins under codecision and why? *Journal of European Public Policy* 20(7): 1025-1039.
- Bølstad, J., & Cross, J. P. (2016). Not all treaties are created equal: The effects of treaty changes on legislative efficiency in the EU. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 54(4), 793-808.
- Burns, C., Rasmussen, A., & Reh, C. (2013). Legislative codecision and its impact on the political system of the European Union. *Journal of European Public Policy* 20(7): 941-952.

- König, T. (2008). Analysing the Process of EU Legislative Decision-Making. To Make a Long Story Short. *European Union Politics* 9(1): 145-165.
- Kardasheva, R. (2009). “The Power to Delay: The European Parliament’s Influence in the Consultation Procedure.” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 47(2): 385-409.
- Bocquillon, P. & Dobbels, M. (2013). An elephant on the 13th floor of the Berlaymont? European Council and Commission relations in legislative agenda-setting. *Journal of European Public Policy* 21(1): 20-38.
- Brandsma, G. J. (2015). Co-decision after Lisbon: The politics of informal trilogues in European Union lawmaking. *European Union Politics*, 16(2).

### **Week 7: Writing week**

- Students should use this week to complete their blog post assignment. The assignment is due before 3pm on the **27th October 2017**.

### **Week 8: The ECJ - Powers, implementation and compliance**

#### Study questions

- What role does the ECJ play in EU politics and through what channels can it have an influence over policy outcomes?
- How independent is the ECJ? What institutional rules and judicial rulings have given rise to the level of ECJ independence we observe?
- Why might member states not comply with EU law and what can the EU do about cases of non-compliance?

#### Required Readings

- Lelieveldt, H., & Princen, S. (2015). *The Politics of the European Union*, 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 11
- König, T., & Mäder, L. (2014). The strategic nature of compliance: an empirical evaluation of law implementation in the central monitoring system of the European Union. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(1), 246-263.
- Tallberg, J. (2002). Paths to compliance: Enforcement, management, and the European Union. *International Organization*, 56(03), 609-643.
- Zhelyazkova, A. (2013). Complying with EU directives’ requirements: the link between EU decision-making and the correct transposition of EU provisions. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20(5), 702-721.

#### Further reading

- Thomann, E., & Sager, F. (2017). Moving beyond legal compliance: innovative approaches to EU multilevel implementation. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 24(9), 1252-1268.

- Thomann, E., & Zhelyazkova, A. (2017). Moving beyond (non-) compliance: the customization of European Union policies in 27 countries. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 24(9), 1269-1288.
- Mastenbroek, E. (2017). Guardians of EU law? Analysing roles and behaviour of Dutch legislative drafters involved in EU compliance. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 24(9), 1289-1307.
- Gollata, J. A., & Newig, J. (2017). Policy implementation through multi-level governance: analysing practical implementation of EU air quality directives in Germany. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 24(9), 1308-1327.
- Scholten, M. (2017). Mind the trend! Enforcement of EU law has been moving to 'Brussels'. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 24(9), 1348-1366.
- Heidbreder, E. G. (2017). Strategies in multilevel policy implementation: moving beyond the limited focus on compliance. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 24(9), 1367-1384.
- Thomann, E., & Sager, F. (2017). Toward a better understanding of implementation performance in the EU multilevel system. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 24(9), 1385-1407.
- Tallberg, J. (2004). *European governance and supranational institutions: making states comply*. Routledge.
- Alter, K. (2010). *The European Court's political power: selected essays*. Oxford University Press.
- Hartlapp, M. (2007). On Enforcement, Management and Persuasion: Different Logics of Implementation Policy in the EU and the ILO\*. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45(3), 653-674.
- Falkner, G., Treib, O., & Holzleithner, E. (2008). *Compliance in the enlarged European Union: living rights or dead letters?*. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd..
- Dimitrova, A. L., & Toshkov, D. (2009). Post-accession compliance between administrative co-ordination and political bargaining. *European Integration online Papers (EIOP)*, (2).
- Thomson, R. (2009). Same effects in different worlds: the transposition of EU directives. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 16(1), 1-18.
- Thomson, R. (2010). Opposition through the back door in the transposition of EU directives. *European Union Politics*, 11(4), 577-596.
- Toshkov, D. (2008). Embracing European law compliance with EU directives in Central and Eastern Europe. *European Union Politics*, 9(3), 379-402.
- Toshkov, D. (2010). *Taking stock: a review of quantitative studies of transposition and implementation of EU law*. Institute for European Integration Research.

- Angelova, M., Dannwolf, T., & König, T. (2012). How robust are compliance findings? A research synthesis. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 19(8), 1269-1291.
- Falkner, G. (2007). Time to discuss: Data to crunch or problems to solve? A rejoinder to Robert Thomson. *West European Politics*, 30(5), 1009-1021.
- Zhelyazkova, A., & Torenvlied, R. (2011). The successful transposition of European provisions by member states: application to the Framework Equality Directive. *Journal of European public policy*, 18(5), 690-708.
- Zhelyazkova, A., & Yordanova, N. (2015). Signalling ‘compliance’: The link between notified EU directive implementation and infringement cases. *European Union Politics*, 1465116515576394.
- Kaeding, M. (2006). Determinants of transposition delay in the European Union. *Journal of Public Policy*, 26(03), 229-253.
- König, T., & Luig, B. (2014). Ministerial gatekeeping and parliamentary involvement in the implementation process of EU directives. *Public Choice*, 160(3-4), 501-519.
- Finke, D., & Dannwolf, T. (2015). Who let the dogs out? The effect of parliamentary scrutiny on compliance with EU law. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(8), 1127-1147.

## **PART III: NEGOTIATING THE EU BUDGET AND THE RESPONSE TO THE EUROCRISIS**

### **Week 9: Actors, institutions and power in EU budget negotiations**

#### Study questions

- What actors and institutions are involved in negotiating the EU budget?
- How are the powers of these actors to shape the EU budget influenced by the institutional rules structuring the budget-making process?
- How has the budget-making process in the EU evolved over time? How do the economic contexts of the time affect the budget-making procedure?

#### Required Readings

- Citi, M. (2015). European Union budget politics: Explaining stability and change in spending allocations. *European Union Politics*, 16(2), 260-280.
- Crombez, C. & Høyland, B. (2015). The budgetary procedure in the European Union and the implications of the Treaty of Lisbon. *European Union Politics* 16(1): 67–89.
- Benedetto, G. (2017). Power, money and reversion points: the European Union’s annual budgets since 2010. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 24(5), 633-652.



- Goetz, K. H., & Patz, R. (2016). Pressured budgets and the European Commission: towards a more centralized EU budget administration?. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(7), 1038-1056.

#### Further reading

- Citi, M. (2013). EU budgetary dynamics: incremental or punctuated equilibrium?. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20(8), 1157-1173.
- Citi, M. (2014). Reforming the EU budget: A Time Series Analysis of Institutional and Partisan Effects. Available at SSRN 2432087.
- Aksoy, D. (2010). Who gets what, when, and how revisited: Voting and proposal powers in the allocation of the EU budget. *European Union Politics* 11(2): 171–194.
- Alt, J. E. & Lassen, D. D. (2006). Transparency, political polarization, and political budget cycles in OECD countries. *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 530–550.
- Bailer, S., Mattila, M., & Schneider, G. (2015). Money makes the EU go round: The objective foundations of conflict in the council of ministers. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 53(3), 437-456.
- Blavoukos, S. & Pagoulatos, G. (2011). Accounting for coalition-building in the European Union: Budget negotiations and the south. *European Journal of Political Research* 50(4): 559–581.
- Bojar, A. (2014). Intra-governmental bargaining and political budget cycles in the European Union. *European Union Politics* 15(1): 132–151.
- Breunig, C. (2006). The more things change, the more things stay the same: A comparative analysis of budget punctuations. *Journal of European Public Policy* 13(7): 1069–1085.
- Dellmuth, L. M. & Stoffel, M. F. (2012). Distributive politics and intergovernmental transfers: The local allocation of European Union structural funds. *European Union Politics* 13(3): 413–433.
- Goldbach, R. & Fahrholz, C. (2011). The euro area’s common default risk: Evidence on the Commission’s impact on European fiscal affairs. *European Union Politics* 12(4): 507–528.
- Jones, B. D., Baumgartner, F. R., Breunig, C., et al. (2009). A general empirical law of public budgets: A comparative analysis. *American Journal of Political Science* 53(4): 855–873.
- König, T. & Troeger, V. E. (2005). Budgetary politics and veto players. *Swiss Political Science Review* 11(4): 47–75.
- Laffan, B. (2000). The big budgetary bargains: From negotiation to authority. *Journal of European Public Policy* 7(5): 725–743.

- Mink, M. & de Haan, J. (2006). Are there political budget cycles in the euro area? *European Union Politics* 7(2): 191–211.
- Chang, M. (2013). Fiscal policy coordination and the future of the community method. *Journal of European Integration*, 35(3), 255-269.

## **Week 10: The emergence and evolution of new institutions in response to crisis**

### Study questions

- What issues in the institutional structure of the Euro came to the fore following the Euro crisis?
- What institutional developments have occurred to address some of these weaknesses?
- How have these new institutions and rules affected the balance of power between the existing actors in EU politics?

### Required Readings

- Schimmelfennig, F. (2015). Liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(2), 177-195.
- Salines, M., Glöckler, G., & Truchlewski, Z. (2012). Existential crisis, incremental response: the eurozone's dual institutional evolution 2007–2011. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 19(5), 665-681.
- Verdun, A. (2015). A historical institutionalist explanation of the EU's responses to the euro area financial crisis. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(2), 219-237.
- Bauer, M. W., & Becker, S. (2014). The unexpected winner of the crisis: The European Commission's strengthened role in economic governance. *Journal of European Integration*, 36(3), 213-229.

### Further reading

- Glöckler, G., Lindner, J., & Salines, M. (2017). Explaining the sudden creation of a banking supervisor for the euro area. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 24(8), 1135-1153.
- Crum, B. (2017). Parliamentary accountability in multilevel governance: what role for parliaments in post-crisis EU economic governance? *Journal of European Public Policy*, (Ahead of print).
- Kastner, L. (2017). Business lobbying under salience—financial industry mobilization against the European financial transaction tax. *Journal of European Public Policy*, (Ahead of print).
- Scicluna, N. (2017). Integration through the disintegration of law? The ECB and EU constitutionalism in the crisis. *Journal of European Public Policy*, (Ahead of print).

- Nielsen, B., & Smeets, S. (2017). The role of the EU institutions in establishing the banking union. Collaborative leadership in the EMU reform process. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 1-24.
- Donnelly, S. (2016) 'Expert advice and political choice in constructing European banking union', *Journal of Banking Regulation* 1–15.
- Epstein, R.A. and Rhodes, M. (2016) 'The political dynamics behind Europe's new banking union', *West European Politics* 39(3): 415–437.
- Schäfer, D. (2016). A banking union of ideas? The impact of ordoliberalism and the vicious circle on the EU banking union. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 54(4), 961-980.
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2014). European integration in the euro crisis: The limits of postfunctionalism. *Journal of European Integration*, 36(3), 321-337.
- Fabbrini, S. (2013) 'Intergovernmentalism and its limits: assessing the European Union's answer to the euro crisis', *Comparative Political Studies* 46(9): 1003–1029.
- Hennessy, A. (2014) 'Redesigning financial supervision in the European Union (2009–2013)', *Journal of European Public Policy* 21(2): 151–168.
- Savage, J. D., & Verdun, A. (2016). Strengthening the European Commission's budgetary and economic surveillance capacity since Greece and the euro area crisis: a study of five Directorates-General. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(1), 101-118.
- De Rynck, S. (2016). Banking on a union: the politics of changing eurozone banking supervision. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(1), 119-135. Howarth, D. and Quaglia, L. (2013) 'Banking union as holy grail: rebuilding the single market in financial services, stabilizing Europe's banks and "completing" economic and monetary union', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 51(S1): 103–123.
- Howarth, D., & Quaglia, L. (2014). The steep road to European Banking Union: constructing the single resolution mechanism. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 52(S1), 125-140.
- Schwarzer, D. (2015). Building the euro area's debt crisis management capacity with the IMF. *Review of International Political Economy*, 22(3), 599-625.
- Mény, Y. (2014). Managing the EU crises: another way of integration by stealth?. *West European Politics*, 37(6), 1336-1353.
- Ackrill, R., & Kay, A. (2006). Historical-institutionalist perspectives on the development of the EU budget system. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(1), 113-133.
- Blavoukos, S., & Pagoulatos, G. (2011). Accounting for coalition-building in the European Union: Budget negotiations and the south. *European Journal of Political Research*, 50(4), 559-581.

- Dür, A., & Mateo, G. (2010). Bargaining power and negotiation tactics: the negotiations on the EU's financial perspective, 2007-13. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 48(3), 557-578.
- Kauppi, H., & Widgrén, M. (2007). Voting rules and budget allocation in the enlarged EU. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 23(3), 693-706.
- Saurugger, S. (2014). Europeanisation in times of Crisis. *Political Studies Review*, 12(2), 181-192.
- Ladi, S., & Tsarouhas, D. (2014). The politics of austerity and public policy reform in the EU. *Political Studies Review*, 12(2), 171-180.
- Papanikolaou, N. I. (2015). The road towards the establishment of the European Banking Union. *Munich Personal RePEc Archive Paper*, (62463).
- Howarth, D., & Quaglia, L. (2015). The political economy of the euro area's sovereign debt crisis: introduction to the special issue of the *Review of International Political Economy*. *Review of International Political Economy*, 22(3), 457-484.
- Gandrud, C., & Hallerberg, M. (2015). Does banking union worsen the EU's democratic deficit? The need for greater supervisory data transparency. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 53(4), 769-785.
- Gren, J., Howarth, D., & Quaglia, L. (2015). Supranational Banking Supervision in Europe: The Construction of a Credible Watchdog. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 53(S1), 181-199.
- Crum, B. (2013). Saving the Euro at the Cost of Democracy?. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51(4), 614-630.
- Schwarzer, D. (2012). The Euro Area Crises, Shifting Power Relations and Institutional Change in the European Union. *Global Policy*, 3(s1), 28-41.
- Yiangou, J., O'keeffe, M., & Glöckler, G. (2013). 'Tough love': how the ECB's monetary financing prohibition pushes deeper euro area integration. *Journal of European Integration*, 35(3), 223-237.
- Tosun, J., Wetzel, A., & Zapryanova, G. (2014). The EU in crisis: advancing the debate. *Journal of European Integration*, 36(3), 195-211.
- Krampf, A. (2014). From the Maastricht Treaty to Post-crisis EMU: The ECB and Germany as Drivers of Change. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 22(3), 303-317.

## PART IV: EXITING THE UNION?

### Week 11: Questions of Democracy - Transparency, legitimacy and accountability

Study questions

- Are the EU decision-making processes we have examined in this course democratic? How might we make them more democratic?
- How might we assess the democratic quality of EU decision making?
- Has the EU become more or less democratic and accountable over time?

#### Required Readings

- Lelieveldt, H., & Princen, S. (2015). *The Politics of the European Union*, 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press. CH 12
- Follesdal, A., & Hix, S. (2006). Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and Moravcsik. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44(3), 533-562.
- Cross, J. P. (2013). Striking a pose: Transparency and position taking in the Council of the European Union. *European Journal of Political Research*, 52(3), 291-315.
- Dawson, M. (2015). The Legal and Political Accountability Structure of 'Post-Crisis' EU Economic Governance. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 53(5), 976-993.

#### Further reading

- Hix, S. (2013). *What's Wrong with the Europe Union and How to Fix it*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Maier, M., Maier, J., Baumert, A., Jahn, N., Krause, S., & Adam, S. (2015). Measuring citizens' implicit and explicit attitudes towards the European Union. *European Union Politics*.
- Chalmers, A. W., & Dellmuth, L. M. (2015). Fiscal redistribution and public support for European integration. *European Union Politics*.
- Vössing, K. (2015). Transforming public opinion about European integration: Elite influence and its limits. *European Union Politics*, 16(2), 157-175.
- Williams, C., & Spoon, J. J. (2015). Differentiated party response: The effect of Euroskeptic public opinion on party positions. *European Union Politics*, 16(2).
- van Elsas, E., & van der Brug, W. (2015). The changing relationship between left-right ideology and euroscepticism, 1973–2010. *European Union Politics*, 16(2), 194-215.
- Bølstad, J. (2015). Dynamics of European integration: Public opinion in the core and periphery. *European Union Politics*, 16(1), 23-44.
- Fishkin, J. S., Luskin, R. C., & Siu, A. (2014). Europolis and the European public sphere: Empirical explorations of a counterfactual ideal. *European Union Politics*, 15(3).

- Corbett, R. (2014). ‘European Elections are Second-Order Elections’: Is Received Wisdom Changing?. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 52(6), 1194-1198.
- Cross, J. P. (2014). The seen and the unseen in legislative politics: explaining censorship in the Council of Ministers of the European Union. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 21(2), 268-285.
- Cross, J. P., & Bølstad, J. (2014). Openness and censorship in the European Union: An interrupted time series analysis. *European Union Politics*, 16(2).
- Hillebrandt, M. Z., Curtin, D., & Meijer, A. (2014). Transparency in the EU Council of Ministers: An Institutional Analysis. *European Law Journal*, 20(1), 1-20.

## Week 12: Negotiating Brexit

### Study questions

- What factors explain the Brexit vote. Base your answer on empirical evidence from the academic literature.
- How has the decision to leave the EU affected the UK’s ability to influence other countries in international negotiations. Provide examples and references to the literature to illustrate your arguments.

### Required Readings

- Hobolt, S. B. (2016). The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(9), 1259-1277.
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### Further reading

- Goodwin, M. J., & Heath, O. (2016). The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An Aggregate-level Analysis of the Result. *The Political Quarterly*, 87(3), 323-332.

- Kierzenkowski, R., et al. (2016). The Economic Consequences of Brexit: A Taxing Decision, OECD Economic Policy Papers, No. 16, OECD Publishing, Paris. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jm01svdkf6k-en>.
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- Whitman, R. G. (2016). Brexit or Bremain: what future for the UK's European diplomatic strategy?. International Affairs, 92(3), 509-529.
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