

POL41660 - Principles of International Politics

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Introduction

This module aims to explore topics in international politics from a rationalist perspective using game theory and formal modelling to provide insight into the strategic choices faced by actors in different international political settings. Fundamental to this undertaking is understanding the strategic incentives faced by actors in different situations through the use of formal models and game theory. We will first set out a rationalist framework in which political leaders are motivated to fulfil their preferences for power and policy, but face strategic challenges and trade offs in doing so. Once the basic set of concepts and tools making up a rationalist perspective on international politics has been outlined, we will then apply this framework to a multitude of topics in international politics, including the causes and consequences of war and peace, the role of international organisations, the determinants of international negotiations, and the interplay between domestic and international concerns for political actors situated in both realms.

Course structure

The module follows the seminar format. This means that the class requires you to read a considerable amount of material, think about what you have read, and regularly talk about your understanding of the readings. A peer-review exercise will help students develop the drafts of their research papers, and a final research paper project will constitute the end of module assessment. More details on assessment requirements are provided below.

Learning outcomes

At the end of this module students will be able to:

- Examine international politics using the tools offered by game theory and formal modelling.
- Think about the strategic interactions between actors in international politics in a formalised way using mathematical models and constructs.
- Construct their own basic game-theoretic models relating to international politics
- Critique existing international politics literature

Prior learning

While there are no specific prior requirements for this module, students should have an interest in applying mathematical concepts to the study of politics. The module does not assume any prior knowledge of game theory or formal models, but some basic knowledge of algebra, probability and calculus will certainly help students to get to grips with the material covered.

Course assessment

Course grading scheme

- Attendance & participation: 15% (each unexcused absence = -1%)
- Peer-review work: 25%
- Final research paper: 60%

In-class participation and reading

This module will require both extensive (and attentive) reading and regular in-class participation. As a consequence, all students are required to attend all lectures/seminars unless prior notification and a certified excuse is presented to one of the course lecturers. Students also need to demonstrate that they have completed the readings and have thought about the issues involved. The success of the course depends on the commitment of its students. As such, full attendance and participation will form 15% of the final grade.

Peer review

The peer-review process is central to publishing work in academia. Part of your assessment for this module will therefore involve peer reviewing one another's work. Students will be required to submit a first draft of their research paper on **23/3/2018**. The class will then be randomly divided into small writing groups, with the draft essays distributed to all members of the group. Each student is required to write a review of each paper in their group. These reviews are then distributed among the group and will be graded by the lecturer. The advantage of this approach is that students can use these reviews to improve their work when redrafting their final research paper for submission. A full set of peer-review guidelines will be distributed before this exercise, and a peer-review workshop will prepare students for the task. Through this process you will:

- Learn how to carefully read a piece of writing, with attention to the details of the piece in terms of structure and content (whether the piece is your own or another writer's);
- Learn how to strengthen your writing by taking into account the responses of actual and anticipated readers;
- Make the transition from writing primarily for yourselves or for an instructor to writing for a broader audience
- Learn how to formulate and communicate constructive feedback on a peer's work;
- Learn how to gather and respond to feedback on your own work.

Research paper

Students will submit a single well developed research paper on a topic relevant to International Relations. This paper should be no longer than 5,000 words and should analyse an issue of importance relating to international politics that merits academic research. The analysis should be original and should include an evaluation of approaches to understanding, resolving or further investigating the question. This paper is not a literature review and marks will be awarded for applying original ideas or approaches to established thoughts on the issue. The lecturer will provide plenty of advice and help in choosing a topic and an appropriate research methodology. It is important that students begin to think about the topic they wish to write about immediately, as this is not a trivial undertaking. Identifying a good research question from the start will save much work down the line. The deadline for the first draft of the research paper for peer review is **23/3/2018**. It is **essential** that a first draft is submitted for this date so that you can receive peer reviews from your peers. The deadline for the final paper is **6/5/2017**. The research paper will be submitted through SafeAssign.

0.1 Suggested structure

You should aim to have the following sections in your assignment:

1. Introduction

- What is your research question and why is it important?
- What outcome(s) are you trying to explain?
- Try to focus in on a question that can be answered within the word limit. Many students make the mistake of trying to answer very broad and unfocused questions. Think about how your question can be narrowed down in focus if you think it is too broad.
- What case(s) and data will you use to answer your research question? Why is game theory suited for the case(s)
- This section should be short and sweet (1-2 pages maximum)

2. Literature review

- What is the current state of the art in the literature relating to your research question?
- What gap in the literature exists that your research is going to fill?
- You need to be careful to only include relevant literature so that you do not spend too much time talking about other peoples' research. We are interested in your original contribution, not what has been done before. You have to use this section to place your research and yourself in the current debate.

3. Case description and spatial model

- Provide background information and details about your chosen case(s)
- Can the case(s) usefully be described using a spatial model (ideally it should!)
- What are the issue(s) over which there is conflict?

- Who are the actors involved?
- What are the actors positions on the issue(s)?
- What power does each actor bring to the table?
- Other relevant elements of the spatial model?

4. Game theory models

- Describe and explain the game theoretic model you want to use to explore the conflict you are interested in analysing
- It can be normal form or extensive form in nature
- Solve the game using a Nash equilibrium or sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium approach
- Use the same model to explore how the outcome might change if one of the variables in the model changes (maybe one actor's relative power changes? Maybe the cost of conflict changes?)

5. Discussion/conclusions

- Restate the research question and explain how you have answered it based on the findings presented
- Do not introduce new explanations or factors relating to your research question here. Talk about the results described in the previous section.
- Here you also draw out the implications of your findings for both the existing literature and for the research question/problem you have studied

6. Bibliography

- Use a consistent style (Harvard recommended)

Important dates

- 23 March 2017: First draft of research paper due
- 26 March 2017: Peer-review workshop
- 8 April 2017: Peer-review worksheets due
- 6 May 2017: Final research paper due

Grading Criteria

In essence, markers assess four crucial elements in any answer:

- Analysis/understanding
- Extent and use of reading
- Organisation/structure
- Writing proficiency

The various grades/classifications reflect the extent to which an answer displays essential features of each of these elements (and their relative weighting). At its simplest: the better the analysis, the wider the range of appropriate sources consulted, the greater the understanding of the materials read, the clearer the writing style, and the more structured the argument, the higher will be the mark.

The following provides an indicative outline of the criteria used by markers to award a particular grade/classification. If you are in any confusion about how to correctly approach referencing and bibliography issues, there are many good guides available online (Here for instance: <http://www.ucd.ie/t4cms/Guide69.pdf>). Proper referencing is ESSENTIAL in a good assignment.

Grade explanation

Grade: A

Excellent Performance

A deep and systematic engagement with the assessment task, with consistently impressive demonstration of a comprehensive mastery of the subject matter, reflecting:

- A deep and broad knowledge and critical insight as well as extensive reading;
- A critical and comprehensive appreciation of the relevant literature or theoretical, technical or professional framework
- An exceptional ability to organise, analyse and present arguments fluently and lucidly with a high level of critical analysis, amply supported by evidence, citation or quotation;
- A highly-developed capacity for original, creative and logical thinking
- An extensive and detailed knowledge of the subject matter
- A highly-developed ability to apply this knowledge to the task set
- Evidence of extensive background reading
- Clear, fluent, stimulating and original expression
- Excellent presentation (spelling, grammar, graphical) with minimal or no presentation errors
- Referencing style consistently executed in recognised style

Grade: B

Very Good Performance

A thorough and well organised response to the assessment task, demonstrating:

- A thorough familiarity with the relevant literature or theoretical, technical or professional framework
- Well-developed capacity to analyse issues, organise material, present arguments clearly and cogently well supported by evidence, citation or quotation;

- Some original insights and capacity for creative and logical thinking
- A broad knowledge of the subject matter
- Considerable strength in applying that knowledge to the task set
- Evidence of substantial background reading
- Clear and fluent expression
- Quality presentation with few presentation errors
- Referencing style for the most part consistently executed in recognised style

Grade: C

Good Performance

An intellectually competent and factually sound answer with, marked by:

- Evidence of a reasonable familiarity with the relevant literature or theoretical, technical or professional framework
- Good developed arguments, but more statements of ideas
- Arguments or statements adequately but not well supported by evidence, citation or quotation
- Some critical awareness and analytical qualities
- Some evidence of capacity for original and logical thinking
- Adequate but not complete knowledge of the subject matter
- Omission of some important subject matter or the appearance of several minor errors
- Capacity to apply knowledge appropriately to the task albeit with some errors
- Evidence of some background reading
- Clear expression with few areas of confusion
- Writing of sufficient quality to convey meaning but some lack of fluency and command of suitable vocabulary
- Good presentation with some presentation errors
- Referencing style executed in recognised style, but with some errors

Grade: D

Satisfactory Performance

An acceptable level of intellectual engagement with the assessment task showing:

- Some familiarity with the relevant literature or theoretical, technical or professional framework
- Mostly statements of ideas, with limited development of argument
- Limited use of evidence, citation or quotation
- Limited critical awareness displayed
- Limited evidence of capacity for original and logical thinking
- Basic grasp of subject matter, but somewhat lacking in focus and structure
- Main points covered but insufficient detail
- Some effort to apply knowledge to the task but only a basic capacity or understanding displayed
- Little or no evidence of background reading
- Several minor errors or one major error
- Satisfactory presentation with an acceptable level of presentation errors
- Referencing style inconsistent

Grade: D-

Acceptable

The minimum acceptable of intellectual engagement with the assessment task which:

- The minimum acceptable appreciation of the relevant literature or theoretical, technical or professional framework
- Ideas largely expressed as statements, with little or no developed or structured argument
- Minimum acceptable use of evidence, citation or quotation
- Little or no analysis or critical awareness displayed or is only partially successful
- Little or no demonstrated capacity for original and logical thinking
- Shows a basic grasp of subject matter but may be poorly focussed or badly structured or contain irrelevant material
- Has one major error and some minor errors
- Demonstrates the capacity to complete only moderately difficult tasks related to the subject material

- No evidence of background reading
- Displays the minimum acceptable standard of presentation (spelling, grammar, graphical)
- Referencing inconsistent with major errors

Grade: E

Fail (marginal)

A factually sound answer with a partially successful, but not entirely acceptable, attempt to:

- Integrate factual knowledge into a broader literature or theoretical, technical or professional framework develop arguments
- Support ideas or arguments with evidence, citation or quotation
- Engages with the subject matter or problem set, despite major deficiencies in structure, relevance or focus
- Has two major error and some minor errors
- Demonstrates the capacity to complete only part of, or the simpler elements of, the task
- An incomplete or rushed answer e.g. the use of bullet points through part / all of answer
- Little or no referencing style evident

Grade: F

Fail (unacceptable)

An unacceptable level of intellectual engagement with the assessment task, with:

- No appreciation of the relevant literature or theoretical, technical or professional framework
- No developed or structured argument
- No use of evidence, citation or quotation
- No analysis or critical awareness displayed or is only partially successful
- No demonstrated capacity for original and logical thinking
- A failure to address the question resulting in a largely irrelevant answer or material of marginal relevance predominating
- A display of some knowledge of material relative to the question posed, but with very serious omissions / errors and/or major inaccuracies included in answer
- Solutions offered to a very limited portion of the problem set

- An answer unacceptably incomplete (e.g. for lack of time)
- A random and undisciplined development, layout or presentation
- Unacceptable standards of presentation, such as grammar, spelling or graphical presentation
- Evidence of substantial plagiarism
- No referencing style evident

Grade: G

Fail (wholly unacceptable)

No intellectual engagement with the assessment task

- Complete failure to address the question resulting in an entirely irrelevant answer
- Little or no knowledge displayed relative to the question posed
- Little or no solution offered for the problem set
- Evidence of extensive plagiarism
- No referencing style evident

Grade: NG

No grade (no work was submitted by the student or student was absent from the assessment, or work submitted did not merit a grade).

Extenuating circumstances

In the case that a student will not be able to meet an assessment deadline or will be absent from the course for an extended period of time, and this is known **IN ADVANCE**, they should consult the UCD policies on extenuating circumstances found here: <http://www.ucd.ie/registry/academicsecretariat/extc.htm>. It is important that in such cases you make the issue known to the lecturer as soon as possible. The sooner that the lecturer is made aware of the situation, the more likely it is that you can be accommodated.

Late assignment submissions

If a student submits an assignment late, the following penalties will be applied:

- Coursework received at any time within two weeks of the due date will be graded, but a penalty will apply.
 - Coursework submitted at any time up to one week after the due date will have the grade awarded reduced by two grade points (for example, from B- to C).

- Coursework submitted more than one week but up to two weeks after the due date will have the grade reduced by four grade points (for example, from B- to D+). Where a student finds they have missed a deadline for submission, they should be advised that they may use the remainder of the week to improve their submission without additional penalty.
- Coursework received more than two weeks after the due date will not be accepted.

Plagiarism

The university policy on plagiarism can be found here:

http://www.ucd.ie/registry/academicsecretariat/docs/plagiarism_po.pdf

Plagiarism is taken extremely seriously throughout the university and academia in general. The school has systems in place to detect plagiarism and these systems are fully implemented. You need to be very clear about what constitutes plagiarism and avoid it at all costs. The library has a good guide to help you avoid plagiarism that can be found here:

http://www.ucd.ie/library/supporting_you/support_learning/plagiarism/

Any student caught plagiarising will be subject to penalties in accordance with university policy.

Course readings

Required Readings:

The following text shall be used extensively throughout the module, so it is essential that it is purchased:

- Bueno de Mesquita, B. (2014). Principles of International Politics. 5th ed. Thousand Oaks: CQ Press

Further reading:

In addition to the readings required for each topic, a series of recommended readings are also included in the syllabus. These readings are useful for those who wish to explore a particular topic in more detail. They will also be very useful when approaching the essay assignment, for which you are required to demonstrate a more in-depth understanding of your chosen topic.

The following is a good general text on game theory and international politics.

- Spaniel, W. (2011). Game theory 101: The complete textbook (Ebook available through Amazon)
- Spaniel, W. (2012). Game Theory 101: The Rationality of War. (Ebook available through Amazon)
- Osborne, M. J. (2004). An introduction to game theory (Vol. 3, No. 3). New York: Oxford University Press.

WEEKLY READING LIST

PART I: Foundations

Week 1: Introduction

Study question

- What is the unitary state actor assumption?
- Can we aggregate individual preferences into a meaningful collective choice?
- If not, does it mean rational collective decision-making is impossible?
- What are three major approaches in International Relations?
- What the major areas of agreement/disagreements between the approaches?

Required Readings

- BBdM Introduction & Appendix
- Barack Obama (2009). Cairo speech. Available here: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?pagewanted=all&r=0>
- Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. *American Political Science Review*, 88(03), 577-592.
- David Singer, J. (1961). The level-of-analysis problem in international relations. *World Politics*, 14(01), 77-92.

Further reading

- Powell, R. (1993). Guns, butter, and anarchy. *American Political Science Review*, 87(01), 115-132.
- Arrow, K. J. (1951). *Social choice and individual values*. Wiley, New York.
- McKelvey, R. D. (1976). Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control. *Journal of Economic theory*, 12(3), 472-482.
- McKelvey, R. D. (1979). General conditions for global intransitivities in formal voting models. *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*, 1085-1112.
- Schofield, N. (1978). Instability of simple dynamic games. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 575-594.
- Shepsle, K. A. (1979). Institutional arrangements and equilibrium in multidimensional voting models. *American Journal of Political Science*, 27-59.
- Niemi, R. & Weisberg, H eds. (2001). *Controversies in Voting Behavior*, 4.
- Kennedy, J. F. (1962). Speech Announcing the Quarantine Against Cuba. Available here: <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kencuba.htm>

- Allison, G. T., & Zelikow, P. (1999). *Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis* (Vol. 2). New York: Longman.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Lalman, D. (1992). *War and reason: Domestic and international imperatives* (pp. 153-55). New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Fey, M., & Ramsay, K. W. (2007). Mutual optimism and war. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(4), 738-754.
- Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). *Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics* (Vol. 35). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Checkel, J. T. (2001). Why comply? Social learning and European identity change. *International organization*, 55(03), 553-588.
- Lalman, D., Oppenheimer, J., & Swistak, P. (1993). Formal rational choice theory: A cumulative science of politics. *Political science: The state of the discipline II*, 77-104.
- Kahneman, Daniel (2011) *Thinking, Fast and Slow*. Macmillan. Ch 1 (Pp. 19-30), Ch 8-9 (Pp. 89-105)

Week 2: Theory building and theory testing

Study Questions

1. What is a theory, how can they be distinguish from facts?
2. How can we judge theories?
3. How can we evaluate predictions of theories?
4. How do we evaluate theories against each other?

Required Readings

- BBdM Ch 1
- Friedman, M. (1953). The methodology of positive economics. *Essays in positive economics*, 3(3).
- Thompson, C. (2009). Can Game Theory Predict When Iran Will Get the Bomb. *The New York Times Magazine*. Available here: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/magazine/16Bruce-t.html?pagewanted=all>

Further reading

- Bueno de Mesquita, B. (2010). *The Predictioneer's Game: Using the logic of brazen self-interest to see and shape the future*. Random House LLC.
- Krasner, S. D. (1978). *Defending the national interest: Raw materials investments and US foreign policy*. Princeton University Press.

- Keohane, R. O. (2005). *After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy*. Princeton University Press.
- Morrow, J. D. (1994). *Game theory for political scientists*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Downs, G. W., & Rocke, D. M. (1990). Tacit bargaining, arms races, and arms control. *Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press*.
- Downs, G. W., Rocke, D. M., & Barsoom, P. N. (1998). Managing the evolution of multilateralism. *International Organization*, 52(02), 397-419.

Week 3: The strategic perspective

Study Questions

1. Describe and explain the ‘chicken’ game. Does it help us to understand the Israel-Palestine conflict?
2. Who are the main actors in selectorate theory and what do they want?
3. What is the relationship between a selectorate and a winning coalition? Describe the selectorate and a winning coalition in 1) Ireland, 2) the USA, 3) Russia, 4) North Korea
4. What should an effective leader do to stay in power?
5. What is the relationship between coalition size and regime type?
6. What is a public good? How is the provision of public goods related to the size of the winning coalition in a country?
7. What is the relationship between coalition size and public policy performance?
8. Why do autocracies hold elections?
9. Why do leaders kill(purge) their loyal followers?

Required Readings

- BBdM Ch 2
- Spaniel (2012). *Game Theory 101: The Complete Textbook*. Lesson 1.6.1
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., & Smith, A. (2004). Testing novel implications from the selectorate theory of war. *World Politics*, 56(03), 363-388.
- Clarke, K. A., & Stone, R. W. (2008). Democracy and the logic of political survival. *American Political Science Review*, 102(03), 387-392.
- Morrow, J. D., De Mesquita, B. B., Siverson, R. M., & Smith, A. (2008). Retesting selectorate theory: separating the effects of W from other elements of democracy. *American Political Science Review*, 102(03), 393-400.

Further reading

- Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R., & Morrow, J. (2003). The logic of political survival.
- Kennedy, R. (2009). Survival and Accountability: An Analysis of the Empirical Support for “Selectorate Theory”. *International Studies Quarterly*, 53(3), 695-714.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2010). Leader survival, revolutions, and the nature of government finance. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(4), 936-950.

Week 4: Tools for Analysing International Affairs: Spatial Models of Politics

Study Questions

1. What does the term ‘single-peaked preference’ mean?
2. Why is the median position so important in the median voter theorem?
3. What do the shape and the size of a win set tell us about the final outcome?
4. What happens when the expected utility of two policy options are exactly the same; how should the policy maker choose?

Required Reading

- BBdM Ch 3
- Gandhi, J., & Przeworski, A. (2007). Authoritarian institutions and the survival of autocrats. *Comparative Political Studies*.
- Park, J. S. (2005). Inside multilateralism: The six-party talks. *Washington Quarterly*. 28(4). 73-91.

Further reading

- Austen-Smith, D., & Banks, J. S. (2000). *Positive political theory I: collective preference* (Vol. 1). University of Michigan Press.
- Moulin, H. (1991). *Axioms of cooperative decision making* (No. 15). Cambridge University Press.
- Tsebelis, G. (2002). *Veto players: How political institutions work*. Princeton University Press.

Week 5: Introduction to game theory

Study Questions

1. What is game theory?
2. What are the components of game theory?
3. Why do we study non-cooperative games?
4. What is the distinction between normal form and extensive form games?
5. Why do we study imperfect information games?

Required Reading

- BBdM Ch 4
- Spaniel, W. (2012). Game Theory 101: The Rationality of War. Ch 1.
- Spaniel (2012). Game Theory 101: The Complete Textbook. Lesson 1.6.2 and Lesson 2.1-2.2
- Van Evera, S. (1998). Offense, defense, and the causes of war. International Security, 22(4), 5-43.

Further reading

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PART II: War

Week 6: Why war? The big picture

Study Questions

1. What are the evidence against the claim that war is an irrational phenomena?
2. Why, according to the rationalist view, is war puzzling?
3. How does Neorealism and Power transition judge the effects the power parity on the likelihood of war?
4. If Power Transition has greater empirical support, what does it imply about the rise of china and the response of the United States to it?

Required Reading

- BBdM Ch 5
- Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization, 49(03), 379-414.
- Spaniel, W. (2012). Game Theory 101: The Rationality of War. Ch 2.

- Lake, D. (2011). “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War?” *International Security* 35(3): 7-52.

Further reading

- Huntington, S. P. (1996). *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. Penguin Books India.
- Achen, C. H. & Snidal, D. (1989). Rational deterrence theory and comparative case studies. *World Politics*, 41(02), 143-169.
- Downs, G. W. (1989). The rational deterrence debate. *World Politics*, 41(02), 225-237.
- Huth, P. & Russett, B. (1993). General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models. *American Political Science Review*, 87(01), 61-73.
- Gartzke, E. (1999). War is in the Error Term. *International Organization*, 53(03), 567-587.
- Slantchev, B. L. (2003). The power to hurt: Costly conflict with completely informed states. *American Political Science Review*, 97(01), 123-133.
- Slantchev, B. L. (2003b). The principle of convergence in wartime negotiations. *American Political Science Review*, 97(04), 621-632.
- Powell, R. (1999). *In the shadow of power: States and strategies in international politics*. Princeton University Press.
- Deutsch, K. W., & Singer, J. D. (1964). Multipolar power systems and international stability. *World Politics*, 16(03), 390-406.
- Organski, A. F. (1981). *The war ledger*. University of Chicago Press.
- Kugler, J., & Lemke, D. (Eds.). (1996). *Parity and war: Evaluations and extensions of the war ledger*. University of Michigan Press.
- Lemke, D., & Reed, W. (1996). Regime types and status quo evaluations: Power transition theory and the democratic peace. *International Interactions*, 22(2), 143-164.
- Lemke, D., & Werner, S. (1996). Power parity, commitment to change, and war. *International Studies Quarterly*, 235-260.

Week 7: Domestic theories of war and civil war

Study Question

1. How do audience costs affect the behaviour of leaders?
2. What does it mean to assert that democracies try harder in wars?
3. What are selection effects and how do they relate to the targets democracies pick upon?

4. How does the selectorate account of policy making explain the democratic peace?
5. What does the selectorate account imply about the pacifism of democracy?

Required Readings

- BBdM Ch 6
- Spaniel, W. (2012). *Game Theory 101: The Rationality of War*. Ch 3.
- Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2002). On the incidence of civil war in Africa. *Journal of conflict resolution*, 46(1), 13-28.
- Lake, D. A., & Rothchild, D. (1996). Containing fear: The origins and management of ethnic conflict. *International security*, 21(2), 41-75.

Further reading

- Bueno de Mesquita, B. & Lalman, D. (1992). War and reason: Domestic and international imperatives (pp. 153-55). New Haven: Yale University Press. Part II.
- Maoz, Z., & Russett, B. (1993). Normative and structural causes of democratic peace, 1946-1986. *American Political Science Review*, 624-638.
- Chan, S. (1997). In search of democratic peace: Problems and promise. *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41(1), 59-91.
- Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. *American Political Science Review*, 88(03), 577-592.
- Schultz, K. A. (1999). Do democratic institutions constrain or inform? Contrasting two institutional perspectives on democracy and war. *International Organization*, 53(02), 233-266.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., & Smith, A. (1999). An institutional explanation of the democratic peace. *American Political Science Review*, 791-807.
- Slantchev, B. L. (2006). Politicians, the media, and domestic audience costs. *International Studies Quarterly*, 50(2), 445-477.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2012). Domestic explanations of international relations. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 15, 161-181.
- Ashworth, S., & Ramsay, K. W. (2011). Should Audiences Cost? Optimal Domestic Constraints in International Crises.

Week 8: Peer-review workshop

Exercise

1. Write a 2-page review of the article distributed in class. Utilise the guidelines provided to do so. These reviews will be read out in class and used as the basis for the seminar.

Required Readings

- Guidelines for workshop
- Example texts to be peer reviewed in class

Week 9: Easter Monday

Week 10: How international organisations work or don't work

Study Question

- What are the functions of International Organizations (IOs) from the rationalist point of view?
- What are the functions of IOs from the constructivist point of view?
- How do IOs promote interstate cooperation?
- How can one explain the apparent shallowness of many multilateral agreements created under the auspices of IOs?

Key reading

- BBdM Ch 7
- Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. Harvard University Press.
- Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., & Snidal, D. (2001). The rational design of international institutions. *International organization*, 55(04), 761-799.
- Garrett, Geoffrey (1992). International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: the European Community's Internal Market. *International Organization* 46(2): 533-560.
- Posen, B. R. (2006). Nuclear-armed Iran: A Difficult But Not Impossible Policy Problem. Century Foundation.
- Joffe, J. (2011). Less Than Zero. *Foreign Affairs*. 90(1) Jan/Feb. Available here: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67034/josef-joffe-and-james-w-davis/less-than-zero>

Further reading

- Fearon, J. D. (1998). Bargaining, enforcement, and international cooperation. *International Organization*, 52(02), 269-305.

- Martin, L. L. (1993). Credibility, costs, and institutions: Cooperation on economic sanctions. *World Politics*, 45(03), 406-432.
- Morrow, J. D. (1994). Modeling the forms of international cooperation: distribution versus information. *International Organization*, 48(03), 387-423.
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Week 11: Global warming: Designing a solution

Study Questions

1. Why are countries not responding effectively to global warming?
2. What are the real costs of measures to address global warming?
3. If global agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol 1997 and Copenhagen Summit 2009 are not working, what according to BBdM accounts for the apparent reduction in carbon emissions?
4. If the lack of effective response is rational, what can be done to address global warming (while remaining within the rationalist framework)?

Required Readings

- BBdM Ch 8
- Browne, J. (2004). "Beyond Kyoto." *Foreign Affairs* 83(4): 20-32.

- Ostrom, E. (1990). *Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action*. Cambridge university press. Ch 1.
- Sebenius, J. K. (1992). Challenging conventional explanations of international cooperation: negotiation analysis and the case of epistemic communities. *International organization*, 46(01), 323-365.

Further reading

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- Ostrom, E. (2008). Tragedy of the Commons. *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*, 3573-3576.
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- Finus, M. (2007). *Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks and Future Challenges*.

Week 12: Human Rights, International Law, Norms

Study Questions

1. Distinguish between International Law, international Regimes and international norms?
2. Are economic/social rights a necessary precursor to political rights?
3. Why are such arguments (economic versus political rights) popular with dictators?
4. Which specific combination of political rights does the strategic perspective seem to argue for?

Required Readings

- BBdM Ch 9
- Simmons, B. A., & Danner, A. (2010). Credible commitments and the international criminal court. *International Organization*, 64(02), 225-256.
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Further reading

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