

# POL40970 - The Politics of European Governance

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Term 1

# Introduction

The European Union (EU) currently consists of 28 European countries. It has evolved into a political community that deeply affects the daily lives of its citizens. How can we explain the process of European Integration? What does the political structure of the EU look like? The module surveys the development of European integration and introduces students to the EU's political system. We will discuss theories of European integration and examine major challenges, that the EU faces at the beginning of the 21st century. The module is research lead, in that it focuses upon the political science literature that seeks to explain various aspects of European integration. This is reflected in the extensive reading list provided with the module.

The module is aimed at those wanting a full and detailed introduction to (1) the history and theories of European integration; (2) the political institutions of the EU and its policy-making process; and (3) current and future challenges facing the EU as a political system. The module does not assume any prior knowledge of the EU or EU politics.

## Module structure

The module follows the seminar format. This means that in general students will be responsible for directing individual class sessions. It also means that the module requires you to read a considerable amount of material, think about what you have read, and regularly talk about your understanding of the readings. Each week different student groups will lead the discussion by preparing a presentation to introduce the topic to their peers and run the seminar for the 1st hour. A peer-review exercise will help students develop the drafts of their research papers, and a final research paper project will constitute the end of module assessment. More details on assessment requirements are provided below.

## Learning outcomes

At the end of this module students will be able to:

- Explain the historical development of the European integration project from its beginnings as the European Coal and Steel Community to the institution we currently see today.
- Explain how the three main legislative institutions of the EU function together and produce policy.
- Analyse European integration using different theoretical approaches.
- Discuss different EU policy areas and the manner in which the EU functions in these areas.
- Explain key concepts about integration to others both verbally and in writing.
- Discuss the current and future challenges facing the EU in light of the theories discussed throughout the module.

# Module assessment

## Module grading scheme

- Attendance & participation: 10% (A doctors note or equivalent is required to be excused from class. Each unexcused absence = -2% of the possible 10% available for attendance/participation)
- Running a seminar: 20% (includes outline & materials)
- Peer-review work: 20%
- Final research paper: 50%

## In-class participation and reading

This module will require both extensive and attentive reading, and regular in-class participation. As a consequence, all students are required to attend all lectures/seminars unless prior notification and a certified excuse is presented to the module lecturers. Students also need to demonstrate that they have completed the readings and have thought about the issues involved. The success of the module depends on the commitment of its students. As such, full attendance and participation will form 10% of the final grade.

## Student-led seminar and presentation

In addition, students will be required to lead discussion as part of a group once during the semester (preparation of handouts and/or overheads recommended). Presentations will relate to the seminar topics for a particular week, and topics will be assigned at the beginning of the term.

## Peer review

The peer review process is central to publishing work in academia. Part of your assessment for this module will therefore involve peer reviewing one each others' work. Students will be required to submit a first draft of their research paper on **1 November 2019**. The draft essays will then be distributed for peer review. Each student is required to write a review of two papers. These reviews are due on **15 November 2019** and are graded by the professor and then returned to the authors. The advantage of this approach is that students can use these reviews to improve their work when redrafting their final research paper for submission. A full set of peer-review guidelines will be distributed before this exercise, and a peer-review workshop during **Week 8** of the semester will prepare students for the task.

Through this process you will:

- Learn how to carefully read a piece of writing, with attention to the details of the piece in terms of structure and content (whether the piece is your own or another writer's);
- Learn how to strengthen your writing by taking into account the responses of actual and anticipated readers;

- Make the transition from writing primarily for yourselves or for an instructor to writing for a broader audience
- Learn how to formulate and communicate constructive feedback on a peer's work;
- Learn how to gather and respond to feedback on your own work.

## Research paper

Students will submit a single well developed research paper on a topic relevant to European integration. This paper should be no longer than **5,000 words** including bibliography, and should analyse an issue of importance relating to the EU or European integration that merits academic research. The analysis should be original and should include an evaluation of approaches to understanding, resolving or further investigating the question. This paper is not a literature review and marks will be awarded for applying original ideas or approaches to established thoughts on the issue. The lecturer will provide plenty of advice and help in choosing a topic and an appropriate research methodology. It is important that students begin to think about the topic they wish to write about immediately, as this is not a trivial undertaking. Identifying a good research question from the start will save much work down the line. The deadline for the first draft of the research paper for peer review is **1 November 2019**. It is essential that a first draft is submitted for this date so that you can receive peer reviews from your peers. The deadline for the final paper is **5pm on 6 December 2019**. The research paper will be submitted through Brightspace.

## Important dates

- **1 November 2019**: First draft of research paper due
- **4 November 2019**: Peer-review workshop
- **15 November 2019**: Peer-review assignment due
- **6 December 2019**: Final research paper due

## Grading Criteria

In essence, markers assess four crucial elements in any answer:

- Analysis/understanding
- Extent and use of reading
- Organisation/structure
- Writing proficiency

The various grades/classifications reflect the extent to which an answer displays essential features of each of these elements (and their relative weighting). At its simplest: the better the analysis, the wider the range of appropriate sources consulted, the greater the understanding of the materials read, the clearer the writing style, and the more structured the argument, the higher will be the mark.

The following provides an indicative outline of the criteria used by markers to award a particular grade/classification. If you are in any confusion about how to correctly approach referencing and bibliography issues, there are many good guides available online (Here for instance: <http://www.ucd.ie/t4cms/Guide69.pdf>). Proper referencing is ESSENTIAL in a good assignment.

## **Grade explanation**

### **Grade: A**

#### *Excellent Performance*

A deep and systematic engagement with the assessment task, with consistently impressive demonstration of a comprehensive mastery of the subject matter, reflecting:

- A deep and broad knowledge and critical insight as well as extensive reading;
- A critical and comprehensive appreciation of the relevant literature or theoretical, technical or professional framework
- An exceptional ability to organise, analyse and present arguments fluently and lucidly with a high level of critical analysis, amply supported by evidence, citation or quotation;
- A highly-developed capacity for original, creative and logical thinking
- An extensive and detailed knowledge of the subject matter
- A highly-developed ability to apply this knowledge to the task set
- Evidence of extensive background reading
- Clear, fluent, stimulating and original expression
- Excellent presentation (spelling, grammar, graphical) with minimal or no presentation errors
- Referencing style consistently executed in recognised style

### **Grade: B**

#### *Very Good Performance*

A thorough and well organised response to the assessment task, demonstrating:

- A thorough familiarity with the relevant literature or theoretical, technical or professional framework
- Well-developed capacity to analyse issues, organise material, present arguments clearly and cogently well supported by evidence, citation or quotation;
- Some original insights and capacity for creative and logical thinking
- A broad knowledge of the subject matter
- Considerable strength in applying that knowledge to the task set

- Evidence of substantial background reading
- Clear and fluent expression
- Quality presentation with few presentation errors
- Referencing style for the most part consistently executed in recognised style

## **Grade: C**

### *Good Performance*

An intellectually competent and factually sound answer with, marked by:

- Evidence of a reasonable familiarity with the relevant literature or theoretical, technical or professional framework
- Good developed arguments, but more statements of ideas
- Arguments or statements adequately but not well supported by evidence, citation or quotation
- Some critical awareness and analytical qualities
- Some evidence of capacity for original and logical thinking
- Adequate but not complete knowledge of the subject matter
- Omission of some important subject matter or the appearance of several minor errors
- Capacity to apply knowledge appropriately to the task albeit with some errors
- Evidence of some background reading
- Clear expression with few areas of confusion
- Writing of sufficient quality to convey meaning but some lack of fluency and command of suitable vocabulary
- Good presentation with some presentation errors
- Referencing style executed in recognised style, but with some errors

## **Grade: D**

### *Satisfactory Performance*

An acceptable level of intellectual engagement with the assessment task showing:

- Some familiarity with the relevant literature or theoretical, technical or professional framework
- Mostly statements of ideas, with limited development of argument
- Limited use of evidence, citation or quotation

- Limited critical awareness displayed
- Limited evidence of capacity for original and logical thinking
- Basic grasp of subject matter, but somewhat lacking in focus and structure
- Main points covered but insufficient detail
- Some effort to apply knowledge to the task but only a basic capacity or understanding displayed
- Little or no evidence of background reading
- Several minor errors or one major error
- Satisfactory presentation with an acceptable level of presentation errors
- Referencing style inconsistent

**Grade: D-**

*Acceptable*

The minimum acceptable of intellectual engagement with the assessment task which:

- The minimum acceptable appreciation of the relevant literature or theoretical, technical or professional framework
- Ideas largely expressed as statements, with little or no developed or structured argument
- Minimum acceptable use of evidence, citation or quotation
- Little or no analysis or critical awareness displayed or is only partially successful
- Little or no demonstrated capacity for original and logical thinking
- Shows a basic grasp of subject matter but may be poorly focussed or badly structured or contain irrelevant material
- Has one major error and some minor errors
- Demonstrates the capacity to complete only moderately difficult tasks related to the subject material
- No evidence of background reading
- Displays the minimum acceptable standard of presentation (spelling, grammar, graphical)
- Referencing inconsistent with major errors

**Grade: E***Fail (marginal)*

A factually sound answer with a partially successful, but not entirely acceptable, attempt to:

- Integrate factual knowledge into a broader literature or theoretical, technical or professional framework develop arguments
- Support ideas or arguments with evidence, citation or quotation
- Engages with the subject matter or problem set, despite major deficiencies in structure, relevance or focus
- Has two major error and some minor errors
- Demonstrates the capacity to complete only part of, or the simpler elements of, the task
- An incomplete or rushed answer e.g. the use of bullet points through part / all of answer
- Little or no referencing style evident

**Grade: F***Fail (unacceptable)*

An unacceptable level of intellectual engagement with the assessment task, with:

- No appreciation of the relevant literature or theoretical, technical or professional framework
- No developed or structured argument
- No use of evidence, citation or quotation
- No analysis or critical awareness displayed or is only partially successful
- No demonstrated capacity for original and logical thinking
- A failure to address the question resulting in a largely irrelevant answer or material of marginal relevance predominating
- A display of some knowledge of material relative to the question posed, but with very serious omissions / errors and/or major inaccuracies included in answer
- Solutions offered to a very limited portion of the problem set
- An answer unacceptably incomplete (e.g. for lack of time)
- A random and undisciplined development, layout or presentation
- Unacceptable standards of presentation, such as grammar, spelling or graphical presentation
- Evidence of substantial plagiarism
- No referencing style evident



## Grade: G

*Fail (wholly unacceptable)*

No intellectual engagement with the assessment task

- Complete failure to address the question resulting in an entirely irrelevant answer
- Little or no knowledge displayed relative to the question posed
- Little or no solution offered for the problem set
- Evidence of extensive plagiarism
- No referencing style evident

## Grade: NG

*No grade (no work was submitted by the student or student was absent from the assessment, or work submitted did not merit a grade).*

## Extenuating circumstances

In the case that a student will not be able to meet an assessment deadline or will be absent from the module for an extended period of time, and this is known **IN ADVANCE**, they should consult the UCD policies on extenuating circumstances found here: <http://www.ucd.ie/registry/academicsecretariat/extc.htm>. It is important that in such cases you make the issue known to the lecturer as soon as possible. The sooner that the lecturer is made aware of the situation, the more likely it is that you can be accommodated.

## Late assignment submissions

If a student submits an assignment late, the following penalties will be applied:

- Coursework received at any time within two weeks of the due date will be graded, but a penalty will apply.
  - Coursework submitted at any time up to one week after the due date will have the grade awarded reduced by two grade points (for example, from B- to C).
  - Coursework submitted more than one week but up to two weeks after the due date will have the grade reduced by four grade points (for example, from B- to D+). Where a student finds they have missed a deadline for submission, they should be advised that they may use the remainder of the week to improve their submission without additional penalty.
- Coursework received more than two weeks after the due date will not be accepted.

## Module readings

### Required Readings:

The following text shall be used extensively throughout the module, so it is recommended that it is purchased:

- Cini, M. & Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, N. (2019). *European Union Politics*. 6th Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

### Further reading:

In addition to the readings required for each topic, a series of recommended readings are also included in the syllabus. These readings will generally not be discussed in class, but are useful for those who wish to explore a particular topic in more detail. They will also be very useful when approaching the essay assignment, for which you are required to demonstrate a more in-depth understanding of your chosen topic.

The following are good general texts on the EU and EU politics.

- Nugent, N. (2006). *Government and Politics of the European Union*. 6th ed. Duke University Press.
- Peterson, J. & Bomberg, E. (1999). *Decision-Making in the European Union*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Peterson, J. & Shackleton, M. (2006). *The Institutions of the European Union*. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Richardson, J. (2005). *European Union: Power and Policy-Making*. 3rd ed. London: Routledge.
- Bache, I. & George, S. (2006). *Politics in the European Union*. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Moravcsik, A. (1998). *The Choice for Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Rosamond, B. (2000). *Theories of European Integration*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Cini, M. & Bourne, A.K. (2006). *Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies*. New York: Palgrave.
- Jorgensen, K.E., Pollack, M.A., & Rosamond, B. (2007). *The Handbook of European Union Politics*. New York: Sage Publications.

In addition to these readings, students should keep up to date on current European affairs by reading daily newspapers, or one of the many websites devoted to EU politics. These websites include the following:

- <http://www.euobserver.com>
- <http://europa.eu.int>

- <http://www.eupolitics.com>
- <http://www.ft.com>
- <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euoppblog/>
- <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/>

Finally, each week a number of study questions are provided in order to guide your thinking about the topics being discussed and the required readings. These study questions will form the basis of the seminar topics covered and so careful consideration of the issues they raise should help you get to grasp with the issues being dealt with.

## WEEKLY READING LIST

### PART I: THE HISTORY AND THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

#### Week 1: The Origins of the EU, and the development of Integration Theory.

##### Study question

- What are the main milestones that the integration process in Europe went through? How has the European integration project developed over time and how has the policy remit of the EU evolved?
- Why did neofunctionalists like Ernst Haas believe that the process of European integration, having begun so modestly, would snowball into an ongoing process of political integration? Are you convinced by the idea of spill-over effects proposed by the neofunctionalists as an explanation of the integration process?
- By the late 1950s, the neofunctionalist spill-over processes predicted by Ernst Haas seemed to be in full swing, only to be disrupted in the 1960s by French President Charles de Gaulle. Looking beyond the personality of de Gaulle, (1) analyze why the decades of the 1960s and 1970s appeared to have falsified Haas' neofunctionalism, and (2) assess whether the 1960s and 1970s were a period of progress, or rollback, or a mix of the two, in the integration process.
- Many saw the Single European Act (SEA) to be an effort to reinvigorate the integration process after several decades of stagnation, but the explanations for the SEA found in the required readings differ. What are the differences between the respective explanations for the SEA put forward by Zysman and Sandholtz and Moravcsik. Which argument is more persuasive, and why?
- Brexit is the first example of a member state trying to leave the EU. Can the existing theories of European integration shed light on the Brexit process and any likely outcomes?

##### Required Readings

- Hix, S. and Høyland, B. 2011. The political system of the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 1.

- Schmitter, P.C. (2006). Ernst B. Haas and the legacy of neofunctionalism. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 12(2): 255–272.
- Stone Sweet, A. & Sandholtz, W. (1997). European Integration and Supranational Governance. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 4(3): 297–317.
- Moravcsik, A. (1998). *The Choice for Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Chapter 1.

#### Further reading

- Cini, M. & Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, N. (2019). *European Union Politics*. 6th Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapters 4 and 5.
- Jones, E., Kelemen, R.D. and Meunier, S. 2016. Failing forward? The Euro crisis and the incomplete nature of European integration. *Comparative Political Studies*, 49(7), pp.1010–1034.
- Marks, G. (2011). Europe and Its Empires: From Rome to the European Union. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 50(1): 1–20.
- Haas, E.B. (1958). *The Uniting of Europe*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Hoffmann, S. (1966). Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe. *Daedalus*. 95(3).
- Deutsch, K.W. et al. (1957). *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Diebold, W. (1959). *The Schuman Plan: A Study in Economic Cooperation, 1950–1959*. New York: Praeger.
- Haas, E.B. (1976). Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration. *International Organization*. 30: 173–212.
- Monnet, J. (1978). *Memoirs*. New York: Doubleday.
- Moravcsik, A. *The Choice for Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Chapter 2.
- Rittberger, B. (2001). Which Institutions for Post-War Europe? Explaining the Institutional Design of Europe's First Community. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 8(5): 673–708.
- Caporaso, J. (1998). Regional integration theory: understanding our past and anticipating our future. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 5(1): 1–16.
- Mattli, W. (1999). Explaining regional integration outcomes. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 6(1): 1–27.
- Risse, T. (2005). Neofunctionalism, European identity, and the puzzles of European integration. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 12(2): 291–309.

- Corbett, R. (1987). The 1985 Intergovernmental Conference and the Single European Act. in Roy Pryce (ed.), *The Dynamics of European Union*. New York: Croom Helm.
- Tranholm-Mikkelsen, J. (1991). Neofunctionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? *Journal of International Studies*. 20(1): 1-22.
- Moravcsik, A. (1993). Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 31: 473–524.

## **Week 2: Institutional change and Institutionalism**

### Study Questions

1. While the neofunctionalist-intergovernmentalist debate enlightened our understanding of the integration process, new theories of EU politics have since emerged focusing on institutions. What are these theories and what types of questions do they attempt to address?
2. How has the focus of the theoretical debate changed in light of these new institutionalist theories?
3. What do the different ‘institutionalism’ have in common and how do they differ?

### Required Reading

- Aspinwall, M.D. & Schneider, G. (2000). Same menu, separate tables: The institutional turn in political science and the study of European integration. *European Journal of Political Research*. 38(1): 1–36.
- Tsebelis, G. & Garrett, G. (2001) The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism. *International Organization*. 55(2): 357-90.
- Pierson, P. (1996). The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutional Analysis. *Comparative Political Studies*. 29(2): 123-163.
- Checkel, J.T. & Moravcsik, M. (2001). A Constructivist Research Programme in EU Studies? *European Union Politics*. 2(2): 219-49.

### Further reading

- Cini, M. & Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, N. (2019). *European Union Politics*. 6th Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 6.
- Moravcsik, A. & Nicolaidis, K. (1998). Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 37: 59–85.
- Garrett, G. & Tsebelis, G. (1996). An Institutional Critique of Intergovernmentalism. *International Organization*. 50(02): 269–99.
- Hix, S. (1994). The Study of the European Community: The Challenge to Comparative Politics. *West European Politics*. 17: 1-30.

- Garrett, G. & Tsebelis, G. (1996). An Institutional Critique of Intergovernmentalism. *International Organization*. Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 269-99.
- Christiansen, T., Jorgensen, K.E. & Wiener, A. (1999). The Social Construction of Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 6: 528-44.
- Moravcsik, A. (1999). Is Something Rotten in the State of Denmark? Constructivism and European Integration. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 6(4).
- Checkel, J.T. & Moravcsik, A. (2001). A Constructivist Research Programme in EU Studies? *European Union Politics*. 2(2): 219-49.
- Jupille, J. & Caporaso, J.A. (1999). Institutionalism and the European Union: Beyond International Relations and Comparative Politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*. 2: 429-44.
- Aspinwall, M. & Schneider, G. eds. (2000). *The Rules of Integration: Institutional Approaches to the Study of Europe*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

## PART II: THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE EU AND ITS POLICY-MAKING PROCESS

### Week 3: Negotiating the treaties

#### Study questions

- What are the sources of states' bargaining power during treaty negotiations? How do domestic constraints condition states' bargaining strength at IGCs?
- There is conflicting evidence regarding which players and what factors are most likely to affect the outcome of a treaty. What is the role of supranational actors in explaining IGC bargains?
- How has the Treaty of Lisbon shifted the EU's institutional balance of power between the major institutions of the EU?

#### Required Readings

- Cini, M. & Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, N. (2019). *European Union Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 3.
- Dörfler, T., Holzinger, K., & Biesenbender, J. (2017). Constitutional Dynamics in the European Union: Success, Failure, and Stability of Institutional Treaty Revisions. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 1-13.
- Slapin, J. B. (2008). Bargaining power at Europe's intergovernmental conferences: testing institutional and intergovernmental theories. *International Organization*. 62(01): 131-162.
- Finke, D. (2009). Challenges to intergovernmentalism: an empirical analysis of EU treaty negotiations since Maastricht. *West European Politics*. 32(3): 466-495.

## Further reading

- Slapin, J. B. (2006). Who is powerful? Examining preferences and testing sources of bargaining strength at European intergovernmental conferences. *European Union Politics*. 7(1): 51-76.
- Schneider, C. J. (2013). Globalizing electoral politics: Political competence and distributional bargaining in the European Union. *World Politics*, 65(3), 452-490.
- Johansson, K. M. (2016). The role of Europarties in EU treaty reform: Theory and practice. *Acta Politica*, 1-20.
- Panke, D. (2017). Speech is silver, silence is golden? Examining state activity in international negotiations. *The Review of International Organizations*, 12(1), 121-146.
- Finke, D., König, T., Proksch, S.O., & Tsebelis, G. (2012). *Reforming the European Union: realizing the impossible*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Slapin, J. B. (2009). Exit, voice, and cooperation: Bargaining power in international organizations and federal systems. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*. 21(2): 187-211.
- Finke, D. (2010). *European integration and its limits: intergovernmental conflicts and their domestic origins*. ECPR Press.
- Franchino, F. (2013). Challenges to liberal intergovernmentalism. *European Union Politics*. 14(2): 324-337.
- Finke, D. (2009). Domestic Politics and European Treaty Reform Understanding the Dynamics of Governmental Position-Taking. *European Union Politics*. 10(4): 482-506.
- Reinhard, J., Biesenbender, J., & Holzinger, K. (2014). Do arguments matter? Argumentation and negotiation success at the 1997 Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference. *European Political Science Review*. 6(02): 283-307.
- Finke, D. (2013). Reforming International Institutions: The Domestic Origins and Conditional Logic of Governmental Reform Preferences. *International Studies Quarterly*. 57(2): 288-302.
- Reinhard, J. (2012). Because we are all Europeans! When do EU Member States use normative arguments?. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 19(9): 1336-1356.

## Week 4: The EU as a Political System; the Commission and Executive Politics

### Study Questions

1. Why do Member States choose to delegate policy-making powers to the supranational level? What types of problems does such delegation solve and what types of problems arise from the delegation decision?

2. Some recent studies find congruence between the Commission and member states' policy positions suggesting that the Commission might not be "completely independent in the performance of their duties" as specified in the treaty and not quite as supranational as it has been often portrayed. To what can we attribute this policy congruence? i.e., what are some of the key factors that constrain the Commission's independence and condition its policy positions, as identified in the readings?

#### Required Reading

- Cini, M. & Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, N. (2019). *European Union Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 10-11.
- Pollack, M.A., (1997). Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community. *International Organization*. 51(1): 99–134.
- Egeberg, M. (2014). The European Commission: From agent to political institution. *Public Administration*, 92(1), 240-246.
- Wonka, A. (2007). Technocratic and Independent? The Appointment of European Commissioners and its Policy Implications. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 14(2): 169-89.
- Klüver, H., Mahoney, C. and Opper, M. (2015). Framing in context: how interest groups employ framing to lobby the European Commission. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(4), 481-498.

#### Further reading

- Ringe, N. (2005). Policy Preference Formation in Legislative Politics: Structures, Actors, and Focal Points. *American Journal of Political Science*. 49(4): 731–45.
- Thomson, R. (2008). National Actors in International Organizations: The Case of the European Commission. *Comparative Political Studies*. 41: 169-92.
- Hooghe, L. (2002). *The European Commission and the Integration of Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Pollack, M.A. (2003). *The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency and Agenda Setting in the European Union*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Egeberg, M. (2006). Executive Politics as Usual: Role Behaviour and Conflict Dimensions in the College of European Commissioners. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 13(1): 1-15.
- Franchino, F. (2009). Experience and the distribution of portfolio payoffs in the European Commission. *European Journal of Political Research*. 48(1): 1-30.
- Hooghe, L. (1999). Images of Europe: Orientations to European Integration Among Senior Officials of the Commission. *British Journal of Political Science*. 29: 345–367.
- Hooghe, L. (2002). *The European Commission and the Integration of Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.



- Hooghe, L. (2005). Several Roads Lead to International Norms, But Few via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission. *International Organization*. 59: 861-898.
- Rasmussen, A. (2007). Challenging the Commission's Right of Initiative? Conditions for Institutional Change and Stability. *West European Politics*. 30(2): 244-64.
- Egeberg, M., Gornitzka, Å., & Trondal, J. (2014). A not so technocratic executive? Everyday interaction between the European Parliament and the Commission. *West European Politics*, 37(1), 1-18.
- Christensen, J. (2015). Recruitment and Expertise in the European Commission. *West European Politics*, 38(3), 649-678.
- Egeberg, M., Trondal, J., & Vestlund, N. M. (2015). The quest for order: unravelling the relationship between the European Commission and European Union agencies. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(5), 609-629.
- Wonka, A. (2008). 'Decision-Making Dynamics in the European Commission: Partisan, National or Sectoral?', *Journal of European Public Policy* 15(8), pp.1145-63.
- Hartlapp, M., Metz, J., & Rauh, C. (2014). Which policy for Europe?: power and conflict inside the European Commission. Oxford University Press.
- Egeberg, M., Trondal, J., & Vestlund, N. (2014). Situating EU agencies in the political-administrative space. ARENA Working Papers 6.
- Kassim, H. (2008). '“Mission Impossible”, but Mission Accomplished: the Kinnock Reforms and the European Commission', *Journal of European Public Policy* 15(5), 648-68
- Smith, A., (2014). How the European Commission's Policies Are Made: Problematisation, Instrumentation and Legitimation, *Journal of European Integration*, 36(1), 55-72.
- Schmidt, S.K. (2000). 'Only an Agenda Setter? The European Commission's Power Over the Council of Ministers', *European Union Politics* 1(1), pp.37-61
- Peterson, J. (2012). "The College of Commissioners." In: John Peterson & Michael Shackleton (eds.). *The Institutions of the European Union*. 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 96-123.
- Quittkat, C. (2011). The European Commission's Online Consultations: A Success Story? *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49(3): 653-674.
- Eising, R., Rasch, D., & Rozbicka, P. (2015). Institutions, policies, and arguments: context and strategy in EU policy framing. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(4), 516-533.

## Week 5: Legislative Politics & Policy making (The Council of Ministers and the European Parliament)

### Study Questions

1. Is the European Parliament a “normal” Parliament? In what sense is it “normal” and in what sense (if any) does it remain unique or sui generis? How has this changed over time as the EU has been reformed?
2. What drives policy outcomes in the Council of Ministers?
3. How is the impact of the Council, Parliament and Commission mediated through the institutional structure and rules of the decision-making process? What factors impact upon a legislative actor's ability to influence legislative outcomes?
4. How successful have the attempts to formally model the legislative process been at predicting legislative outcomes? Is this approach suitable for the task at hand? What aspects of the decision-making process might such models miss?
5. How might informal political arrangements reduce the difficulty associated with reaching agreements under more formal legislative procedures?

### Required Reading

- Cini, M. & Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, N. (2019). *European Union Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 12.
- Hix, S., Noury, A., & Roland, G. (2002). A ‘Normal’ Parliament? Party Cohesion and Competition in the European Parliament, 1979-2001. *EPRG Working Paper*. No 9, available on-line at: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/eprg/working-papers.htm>.
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- Bailer, S., Mattila, M., & Schneider, G. (2015). Money makes the EU go round: The objective foundations of conflict in the Council of Ministers. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 53(3), 437-456.
- Cross, J. P., & Hermansson, H. (2017). Legislative amendments and informal politics in the European Union: A text reuse approach. *European Union Politics*, 18(4), 581-602.

### Further reading

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- Slapin, J.B. (2014). Measurement, Model Testing, and Legislative Influence in the European Union. *European Union Politics*. 15(1): 24-42.
- Rasmussen, A., & Reh, C. (2013). The consequences of concluding codecision early: trilogues and intra-institutional bargaining success. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20(7), 1006-1024.

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- Hix, S. & H  yland, B. (2011). *The Political System of the European Union*. Chapter 3.
- Leinaweaver, J. & Thomson, R. (2014). Testing Models of Legislative Decision-Making with Measurement Error: the Robust Predictive Power of Bargaining Models Over Procedural Models. *European Union Politics*. 15(1): 43–58.
- Tsebelis, G. & Garrett, G. (2000). Legislative Politics in the European Union. *European Union Politics*. 1: 9-36.
- Tsebelis, G. & Garrett, G. (2001). The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union. *International Organization*. 55: 357-90.
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- Kreppel, A. (2001). *The European Parliament and Supranational Party System: A Study in Institutional Development*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cross, J.P. (2013). Everyone’s a winner (almost): Bargaining success in the Council of Ministers of the European Union. *European Union Politics*. 14(1): 70-94.
- Cross, J.P. (2012). Interventions and negotiation in the Council of Ministers of the European Union. *European Union Politics*. 13(1): 47-69.
- Hix, S., Raunio, T. & Scully, R. eds., (2003). Fifty Years on: Research on the European Parliament. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 43(2).
- Carubba, C. et al. (2003). Selection Bias in the Use of Roll-Call Votes to Study Legislative Behavior. *EPRG Working Paper*. No. 11, available on-line at: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/eprg/workingpapers.htm>.
- Hix, S., Noury, A., & Roland, G. (2005). Power to the Parties: Cohesion and Competition in the European Parliament, 1979-2001. *British Journal of Political Science*. 35(2): 209-234
- *European Parliament Research Group Working Papers Series*. Available on-line at: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/eprg/working-papers.htm>.
- Hayes-Renshaw, F. & Wallace, F. (2006). *The Council of Ministers*. 2nd revised and updated edition (London: Palgrave).
- Thomson, R. (2011). *Resolving controversy in the European Union: legislative decision-making before and after enlargement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

## Week 6: Judicial Politics

### *The ECJ, Judicial Politics and Compliance*

#### Study Question

1. Describe the powers of the ECJ. Do these powers make the ECJ an independent court? What limits (both formal and informal) exist on the powers of the ECJ?
2. What do we mean by the term “judicial activism”? Does the ECJ engage in judicial activism often? How have member states reacted to examples of judicial activism by the ECJ?
3. Carruba et al. and Stone Sweet & Brunell disagree on the extent to which member states can act collectively to constrain the ECJ. Which account of ECJ power and influence is more convincing and why?
4. We observe significant variation in the levels of compliance with EU law both between Member States and over time. What can explain this variation?

#### Required Readings

- Cini, M. & Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, N. (2019). *European Union Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 13.
- Stone Sweet, A. (2010). The European Court of Justice and the Judicialization of EU Governance. *Living Reviews in European Governance*. 5(2).
- Carrubba, C.J., Gabel, M. & Hankla, C. (2008). Judicial behavior under political constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice. *American Political Science Review*. 102(4): 435–452.
- Stone Sweet, A. & Brunell, T. (2012). The European Court of Justice, State Non-compliance, and the Politics of Override. *American Political Science Association*. 106(01): 204–213.
- Zhelyazkova, A. (2013). Complying with EU directives’ requirements: the link between EU decision-making and the correct transposition of EU provisions. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20(5), 702-721.

#### Further reading

- Hix, S. & Høyland, B. (2011). *The Political System of the European Union*. Chapter 12.
- Angelova, M., Dannwolf, T. & König, T. (2012). How Robust are Compliance Findings. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 19(8): 1269-91.
- Garrett, G. (1992). International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community’s Internal Market. *International Organization*. 46: 533–60.
- Burley, A-M. & Mattli, W. (1993). Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration. *International Organization*. 47: 41–76.

- Garrett, G. (1995). The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union. *International Organization*. 49: 171–81.
- Mattli, W. & Slaughter, A-M. (1995). Law and Politics in the European Union: A Reply to Garrett. *International Organization*. 49: 183–90.
- Garrett, G., Kelemen, D. & Schulz, H. (1998). The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union. *International Organization*. 52: 149–76.
- Stone Sweet, A. & Brunell, T.L. (1998). Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community. *American Political Science Review*. 92: 63–81.
- Weiler, J.H.H. (2000). *The Constitution of Europe: “Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?” and Other Essays on European Integration*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tallberg, J. (2004). European governance and supranational institutions: making states comply. Routledge.
- Alter, K. (2010). The European Court’s political power: selected essays. Oxford University Press.
- Hartlapp, M. (2007). On Enforcement, Management and Persuasion: Different Logics of Implementation Policy in the EU and the ILO\*. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45(3), 653-674.
- Falkner, G., Treib, O., & Holzleithner, E. (2008). Compliance in the enlarged European Union: living rights or dead letters?. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd..
- Dimitrova, A. L., & Toshkov, D. (2009). Post-accession compliance between administrative co-ordination and political bargaining. *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)*, (2).
- Falkner, G. (2007). Time to Discuss: Data to Crunch or Problems to Solve? A Rejoinder to Robert Thomson. *West European Politics*. 30(5): 1009–1021.
- Hartlapp, M. & Falkner, G. (2009). Problems of Operationalization and Data in EU Compliance Research. *European Union Politics*. 10(2): 281–304.
- Thomson, R. (2010). Opposition through the back door in the transposition of EU directives. *European Union Politics*. 11(4): 577–596.
- Thomson, R. (2009). Same effects in different worlds: the transposition of EU directives. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 16(1): 1–18.
- Thomson, R. (2007). Time to Comply: National Responses to Six EU Labour Market Directives Revisited. *West European Politics*. 30(5): 987–1008.
- Thomson, R., Torenvlied, R. & Arregui, J. (2007). The Paradox of Compliance: Infringements and Delays in Transposing European Union Directives. *British Journal of Political Science*. 37(04).

- Toshkov, D. (2008). Embracing European law compliance with EU directives in Central and Eastern Europe. *European Union Politics*, 9(3), 379-402.
- Toshkov, D. (2010). Taking stock: a review of quantitative studies of transposition and implementation of EU law. Institute for European Integration Research.
- Angelova, M., Dannwolf, T., & König, T. (2012). How robust are compliance findings? A research synthesis. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 19(8), 1269-1291.
- Zhelyazkova, A. & Torenvlied, R. (2009). The Time-Dependent Effect of Conflict in the Council on Delays in the Transposition of EU Directives. *European Union Politics*. 10(1): 35–62.
- Thomann, E., & Sager, F. (2017). Moving beyond legal compliance: innovative approaches to EU multilevel implementation. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 24(9), 1252-1268.
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- Mastenbroek, E. (2017). Guardians of EU law? Analysing roles and behaviour of Dutch legislative drafters involved in EU compliance. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 24(9), 1289-1307.
- Gollata, J. A., & Newig, J. (2017). Policy implementation through multi-level governance: analysing practical implementation of EU air quality directives in Germany. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 24(9), 1308-1327.
- Scholten, M. (2017). Mind the trend! Enforcement of EU law has been moving to 'Brussels'. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 24(9), 1348-1366.
- Heidbreder, E. G. (2017). Strategies in multilevel policy implementation: moving beyond the limited focus on compliance. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 24(9), 1367-1384.
- Thomann, E., & Sager, F. (2017). Toward a better understanding of implementation performance in the EU multilevel system. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 24(9), 1385-1407.
- Finke, D., & Dannwolf, T. (2015). Who let the dogs out? The effect of parliamentary scrutiny on compliance with EU law. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(8), 1127-1147.

## **Week 7: Interest representation: Lobbying in Brussels**

### **Study Question**

- Describe the different access point through which lobbyists attempt to influence EU policy making. Do the institutional structures of the Commission, EP, and Council aid or hinder lobbyists in their lobbying attempts?

- What different types of factors have been identified as influencing lobbying success?
- What attempts have been made to regulate EU lobbying? Have these attempts been successful?

#### Key reading

- Cini, M. & Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, N. (2019). *European Union Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 14.
- European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission). (2013). *Report on the Role of Extra-Institutional Actors in the Democratic System*. Available here: [http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdf=CGL-AD\(2013\)011-e](http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdf=CGL-AD(2013)011-e)
- Flöthe, L. and Rasmussen, A., 2018. Public voices in the heavenly chorus? Group type bias and opinion representation. *Journal of European Public Policy*, pp.1-19.
- Binderkrantz, A.S. and Rasmussen, A., 2015. Comparing the domestic and the EU lobbying context: perceived agenda-setting influence in the multi-level system of the European Union. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(4), pp.552-569.
- Bouwen, P. (2004): Exchanging access goods for access: A comparative study of business lobbying in the European Union Institutions. *European Journal of Political Research*. 43: 337–369.

#### Further reading

- Carroll, B.J. and Rasmussen, A., 2017. Cultural capital and the density of organised interests lobbying the European Parliament. *West European Politics*, 40(5), pp.1132-1152.
- Marshall, D. (2010) Who to Lobby and When: Institutional Determinants of Interest Group Strategies in European Parliament Committees. *European Union Politics*. 11(4): 553-575.
- Mahoney, C. & Baumgartner, F., (2008). Converging perspectives on interest group research in Europe and America. *West European Politics*. 31(6): 1253–1273.
- Mahoney, C. (2007). Lobbying Success in the United States and the European Union. *Journal of Public Policy*. 27(1): 35-56.
- Beyers, J. (2008) Policy Issues, Organizational Format and the Political Strategies of Interest Organizations. *West European Politics*. 31(6): 1188-1211.
- Beyers, J. & Kerremans, B. (2004). Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Societal Interests: How Is European Policy Making Politicized?" *Comparative Political Studies*. 37(10): 1119-1150.
- Börzel, T., Heard-Lauréote, K. (2009). Networks in EU Multi-level governance: Concepts and Contributions. *Journal of Public Policy*. 29(2): 135-152.

- Coen, D. (2007). Empirical and theoretical studies in EU lobbying. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 14(3): 333-345.
- Coen, D & Richardson, J (eds.) (2009). *Lobbying the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dür, A. (2008). Interest groups in the European Union: How Powerful are They? *West European Politics*. 31(6): 1212-1230.
- Eising, R. (2007). The access of business interests to EU institutions: towards elite pluralism? *Journal of European Public Policy*. 14(3): 384-403.
- Eising, R. (2008). Interest Group in EU policymaking. *Living Reviews in European Governance*. Vol. 3 (<http://europeangovernance.livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg-2008-4/> ).
- Greenwood, J (2007a). *Interest Representation in the European Union*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Greenwood, J. (2007b). Review Article: Organized Civil Society and Democratic Legitimacy in the EU. *British Journal of Political Science*. 37: 333-35.
- Klüver, H. (2010). Measuring Interest Group Influence using Quantitative Text Analysis. *European Union Politics*. 10(4): 535- 549.
- Mahoney, C. (2008). *Brussels versus the Beltway. Advocacy in the United States and the European Union*. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Quittkat, C. (2011). The European Commission's Online Consultations: a Success Story? *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 49(3): 653-674.
- Skodvin, T., Gullberg, A.T., & Aakre, S. (2010). Target-group influence and political feasibility: the case of climate policy design in Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 17(6): 854-873.

## Week 8: Peer-review workshop

### Exercise

1. Write a 2-page review of the draft paper distributed by the lecturer. Utilise the guidelines provided to do so. These reviews will be considered in class and used as the basis for the seminar.

### Required Readings

- Distributed draft paper
- Guidelines for workshop



## Week 9: Brexit, public opinion, and the future of the EU

### Study Questions

1. What drives public opinion about the EU? Can traditional explanations of public opinion help us understand the Brexit vote?
2. The balance of power in the Brexit negotiations is heavily in favour of the EU, why is this? What (if anything) might the UK be able to do to mitigate its disadvantaged bargaining position?
3. What are the implications of Brexit for the future of the EU?

### Required Readings

- Cini, M. & Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, N. (2019). *European Union Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 27 & 28.
- Jennings, W. and Lodge, M. 2018. Brexit, the tides and Canute: the fracturing politics of the British state, *Journal of European Public Policy*.
- Manners, I. 2018. Political Psychology of European Integration: The (Re)production of Identity and Difference in the Brexit Debate. *Political Psychology*, 39, pp.1213-1232.
- Hix, S. 2018. Brexit: Where is the EU–UK Relationship Heading?. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 56, pp.11–27.
- Richards, L. , Heath, A. and Carl, N. 2018. Red Lines and Compromises: Mapping Underlying Complexities of Brexit Preferences. *The Political Quarterly*, 89, pp.280-290.
- Laffan, B. 2018. Brexit: Re-opening Ireland’s English Question. *The Political Quarterly*, 89, pp.568-575.
- Springford, J. 2018. Theresa May’s Irish trilemma. <https://www.cer.eu/insights/theresa-mays-irish-trilemma>.

### Further reading

- Richardson, J. 2018. Brexit: The EU Policy-Making State Hits the Populist Buffers. *The Political Quarterly*, 89, pp.118-126.
- Hobolt, S. B. (2016). The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(9), 1259-1277.
- Hix, S. 2018. Brexit: Where is the EU–UK Relationship Heading?. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 56, pp.11–27.
- Lavery, S., McDaniel, S. and Schmid, D., 2018. Finance fragmented? Frankfurt and Paris as European financial centres after Brexit. *Journal of European Public Policy*, pp.1-19.

- Jennings, W. and Lodge, M. 2018. Brexit, the tides and Canute: the fracturing politics of the British state, *Journal of European Public Policy*
- Qvortrup, M. 2016. Referendums on Membership and European Integration 1972–2015. *The Political Quarterly*, 87, pp.61-68.
- Henderson, A. , Jeffery, C. , Liñeira, R. , Scully, R. , Wincott, D. and Wyn Jones, R. 2016. England, Englishness and Brexit. *The Political Quarterly*, 87, pp.187-199.
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- Laffan, B. 2018. Brexit: Re-opening Ireland's English Question. *The Political Quarterly*, 89, pp.568-575.
- Chen W, Los B, McCann P, Ortega-Argilés R, Thissen M, van Oort F. 2018. The continental divide? Economic exposure to Brexit in regions and countries on both sides of The Channel. *Papers in Regional Science*. 97, pp.25–54.
- Richardson, J. 2018. Brexit: The EU Policy-Making State Hits the Populist Buffers. *The Political Quarterly*, 89, pp.118-126.
- Richards, L. , Heath, A. and Carl, N. 2018. Red Lines and Compromises: Mapping Underlying Complexities of Brexit Preferences. *The Political Quarterly*, 89, pp.280-290.
- Hantzsche, A. , Kara, A. and Young, G. 2018. The Economic Effects of the UK Government's Proposed Brexit Deal. *The World Economy*, Accepted Author Manuscript.
- Gasiorek, M. , Serwicka, I. and Smith, A. 2019. Which Manufacturing Industries and Sectors Are Most Vulnerable to Brexit?. *The World Economy*, Accepted Author Manuscript.
- Manners, I. 2018. Political Psychology of European Integration: The (Re)production of Identity and Difference in the Brexit Debate. *Political Psychology*, 39, pp.1213-1232.
- Warlouzet, L. 2018. Britain at the Centre of European Co-operation (1948–2016). *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 56, pp.955–970.
- Dhingra, S., & Sampson, T. 2016. Life after BREXIT: What are the UK's options outside the European Union?. CEPBREXIT01. London School of Economics and Political Science, CEP, London, UK.
- Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2016). Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic have-nots and cultural backlash. HKS Working Paper No. RWP16-026. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2818659>.
- Goodwin, M. J., & Heath, O. (2016). The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An Aggregate-level Analysis of the Result. *The Political Quarterly*, 87(3), 323-332.

- Jensen, M. D., & Snaith, H. (2016). When politics prevails: the political economy of a Brexit. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(9), 1302-1310.
- Oliver, T., & Williams, M. J. (2016). Special relationships in flux: Brexit and the future of the US—EU and US—UK relationships. *International Affairs*, 92(3), 547-567.
- Kierzenkowski, R., et al. (2016). The Economic Consequences of Brexit: A Taxing Decision, OECD Economic Policy Papers, No. 16, OECD Publishing, Paris. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jm01svdkf6k-en>.
- Kaufmann, E. (2016). It's NOT the economy, stupid: Brexit as a story of personal values. *British Politics and Policy at LSE*.
- Whitman, R. G. (2016). Brexit or Bremain: what future for the UK's European diplomatic strategy?. *International Affairs*, 92(3), 509-529.
- Ottaviano, G. I. P., Pessoa, J. P., Sampson, T., & Van Reenen, J. (2014). Brexit or Fixit? The trade and welfare effects of leaving the European Union.
- Oliver, T. (2016). European and international views of Brexit. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(9), 1321-1328.
- Menon, A., & Salter, J. P. (2016). Brexit: initial reflections. *International Affairs*, 92(6), 1297-1318.

## Week 10: The EU budget

### Study questions

- What actors and institutions are involved in negotiating the EU budget?
- How are the powers of these actors to shape the EU budget influenced by the institutional rules structuring the budget-making process?
- How has the budget-making process in the EU evolved over time?

### Required Readings

- Citi, M. (2015). European Union budget politics: Explaining stability and change in spending allocations. *European Union Politics*. 16(2). 260-280.
- Crombez, C. & Høyland, B. (2015). The budgetary procedure in the European Union and the implications of the Treaty of Lisbon. *European Union Politics*. 16(1): 67–89.
- Benedetto, G. (2017). Power, money and reversion points: the European Union's annual budgets since 2010. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 24(5), 633-652.
- Schneider, C. (2013). Globalizing Electoral Politics: Political Competence and Distributional Bargaining in the European Union. *World Politics*, 65(3), 452-490.

### Further reading

- Gehring, K. and Schneider, S.A. 2018. Towards the Greater Good? EU Commissioners' Nationality and Budget Allocation in the European Union. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 10(1), pp.214-39.
- Dellmuth, L. M. & Stoffel, M. F. (2012). Distributive politics and intergovernmental transfers: The local allocation of European Union structural funds. *European Union Politics*. 13(3): 413–433.
- Patz, R., & Goetz, K. H. (2015). From Politicised Budgeting to Political Budgets in the EU?. Available here: <http://www.icpublicpolicy.org/conference/file/reponse/1434615065.pdf>.
- Citi, M. (2013). EU budgetary dynamics: incremental or punctuated equilibrium?. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 20(8): 1157-1173.
- Citi, M. (2014). Reforming the EU budget: A Time Series Analysis of Institutional and Partisan Effects. Available here: [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2432087](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2432087).
- Alt, J. E. & Lassen, D. D. (2006). Transparency, political polarization, and political budget cycles in OECD countries. *American Journal of Political Science*. 50(3): 530–550.
- Bailer, S., Mattila, M., & Schneider, G. (2015). Money makes the EU go round: The objective foundations of conflict in the council of ministers. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 53(3): 437-456.
- Blavoukos, S. & Pagoulatos, G. (2011). Accounting for coalition-building in the European Union: Budget negotiations and the south. *European Journal of Political Research*. 50(4): 559–581.
- Bojar, A. (2014). Intra-governmental bargaining and political budget cycles in the European Union. *European Union Politics*. 15(1): 132–151.
- Breunig, C. (2006). The more things change, the more things stay the same: A comparative analysis of budget punctuations. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 13(7): 1069–1085.
- Goldbach, R. & Fahrholz, C. (2011). The euro area's common default risk: Evidence on the Commission's impact on European fiscal affairs. *European Union Politics*. 12(4): 507–528.
- Jones, B. D., Baumgartner, F. R., Breunig, C., et al. (2009). A general empirical law of public budgets: A comparative analysis. *American Journal of Political Science*. 53(4): 855–873.
- König, T. & Troeger, V. E. (2005). Budgetary politics and veto players. *Swiss Political Science Review*. 11(4): 47–75.
- Laffan, B. (2000). The big budgetary bargains: From negotiation to authority. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 7(5): 725–743.
- Mink, M. & de Haan, J. (2006). Are there political budget cycles in the euro area? *European Union Politics*. 7(2): 191–211.

## Week 11: “Europeanisation” of National Politics; Enlargement and Differentiated Integration

### Study Questions

1. What do we mean by “Europeanisation,” according to Börzel & Risse? How might the EU create pressures for change inside the member states of the EU? Is there evidence that the EU really is resulting in such changes in the EU’s various member states? If so, what do these changes look like?
2. What kinds of questions does the 2004 enlargement of the European Union pose for students of European integration, according to Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier? What evidence do we see of “Europeanisation” in the new member states of the EU, and what mechanisms seem to be driving the changes we see? How has the EU itself adapted to this increased diversity in membership?

### Required Readings

- Cini, M. & Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, N. (2019). *European Union Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 8,18.
- Schimmelfennig, F. & Sedelmeier, U. (2002). Theorising EU Enlargement: Research Focus, Hypotheses, and the State of Research. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 9(4): 500-528.
- Schimmelfennig, F. (2001). The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. *International Organization*. 55(1): 47-80.
- Holzinger, K. & Schimmelfennig, F. (2012). Differentiated Integration in the European Union: Many Concepts, Sparse Theory, Few Data. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 19(2): 292–305.

### Further reading

#### *On Europeanization*

- Börzel, T.A. & Risse, T. (2000). When Europe hits home: Europeanization and domestic change. *European integration online papers (EIoP)*. 4(15).
- Green Cowles, M. Caporaso, J.A. & Risse, T. (2001). *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Featherstone, K. & Radaelli, C. eds. (2003). *The Politics of Europeanization*. New York: Oxford University Press.

#### *On Enlargement*

- Slapin, J. B. (2015). How European Union membership can undermine the rule of law in emerging democracies. *West European Politics*, 38(3), 627-648.
- Moravcsik, A. & Vachudova, M. (2002) Bargaining Among Unequals: Enlargement and the Future of European Integration. *EUSA Review*. 15(4): 1-3, available online at: <http://www.eustudies.org/MoravcsikVachudovaEssay.pdf>.

- Jacoby, W. (2004). *The Enlargement of the European Union: Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Vachudova, M.A. (2005). *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schimmelfennig, F. & Sedelmeier, U. (eds.) (2005). *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., & Schimmelfennig, F. (2013). *Differentiated Integration: Explaining Variation in the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Ch. 1.

## **Week 12: The Democratic Deficit, Democratic Legitimacy and Legislative Transparency**

### Study Questions

1. What is the EU's "democratic deficit"? What are the fundamental causes of this deficit, and why is it unlikely to be fixed in the near future? Why does Moravcsik argue that the EU is not particularly "broken" and so should not be "fixed"? Why, finally, do Follesdal & Hix believe that the democratic deficit is more serious than Moravcsik (and another analyst, Giandomenico Majone) thinks, and what do they recommend as to fix the problem? Which view do you find most convincing, and why?
2. The Laeken declaration (2001) states that: "the European project [...] derives its legitimacy from democratic, transparent and efficient institutions". At the same time, transparency is seen by Naurin as a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratic accountability in the European Union. How transparent is the EU in general and the legislative process in particular. Has this changed over time? What are the implications of the current levels of transparency in EU politics for the aforementioned democratic deficit? Finally, can the EU be simultaneously democratic transparent and efficient?

### Required Readings

- Cini, M. & Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, N. (2019). *European Union Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 9.
- The European Council. (2001). *The Laeken declaration*. Available here: <http://european-convention.eu.int/pdf/1knen.pdf>
- Moravcsik, A. (2002). In Defense of the Democratic Deficit: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 40(4): 603-624.
- Follesdal, A. & Hix, S. (2006). Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and Moravcsik. *Journal of common market studies*. 44(3): 533-562.
- Naurin, D. (2007). *Deliberation behind closed doors: transparency and lobbying in the European Union*. ECPR press. Chapter 1-2.

- Cross, J.P. (2013a). Striking a pose: transparency and position taking in the Council of the European Union. *European Journal of Political Research*. 52(3): 291–315.

#### Further reading

##### *The Democratic Deficit and Legislative Transparency*

- Scharpf, F.W. (1999). *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Olsen, J.P. Sbragia, A. & Scharpf, F.W. (2002). Symposium: Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? *Journal of European Public Policy*. 7(2): 310-24.
- Cross, J.P. (2014). The seen and the unseen in legislative politics: explaining censorship in the Council of Ministers of the European Union. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 21(2): 268-285.
- Cross, J.P. & Bølstad, J. (2015). Openness and Censorship in the EU: an Interrupted Time-Series Analysis. *European Union Politics*. 16(2): 216-240.
- Crombez, C. (2003). The Democratic Deficit in the European Union: Much Ado about Nothing? *European Union Politics*. 4(1): 101–120.
- Hobolt, S.B. (2012). Citizen Satisfaction with Democracy in the European Union\*. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 50(s1): 88–105.
- Majone, G. (1998). Europe’s “democratic deficit”: The question of standards. *European Law Journal*. 4(1): 5–28.
- Stasavage, D. (2004). Open-door or closed-door? Transparency in domestic and international bargaining. *International Organization*. 58(04): 667–703.
- Stasavage, D. (2007). Polarization and publicity: rethinking the benefits of deliberative democracy. *Journal of Politics*. 69(1): 59–72.
- Zweifel, T.D. (2002). ... Who is without sin cast the first stone: the EU’s democratic deficit in comparison. *Journal of European Public Policy*. 9(5): 812–840.