

# Research Overview

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# Overview

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- Part I: Foundations for Location Virtualization
- Part II: Foundations for Specification Evolution
- Part III: Semantic Type Assertions for Deferred Memory-Reclamation Schemes

## Part I

# **Foundations for Location Virtualization**

# The Essentials in Systems Programming

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a supposedly allocated physical resource

1

pointer va :=  
a virtual reference

malloc (size)

# Memory Location Virtualization

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


Figure: Virtualization: The Deception of Abundance

# Memory Location Virtualization: Abstraction

## An Address Space with Logical Name $\gamma$




Figure: Address-Spaces: Named Containers for Virtual Memory Mappings

## A Program Named $\gamma_n$

$\gamma_n$

```
pointer va :=  
  malloc(size)
```

## A Program Named $\gamma_m$

$\gamma_m$

```
pointer va :=  
  malloc(size)
```

- A program is abstracted as a *named address-space*
- A container of *virtual-to-physical* memory resource mappings

# Page Tables





Figure: Page-Tables (**PT**): Data Structures for Address-Translation

# A Complete Picture of Address-Space Abstraction



## The Current View of Memory

The register  $cr_3$  points to the current view of the memory, i.e., the loaded address space in the memory

**Figure:** Depicting an Address-Space with its Essential Aspects




# Virtual Memory Management (VMM)

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## VMM as a General Resource Provider

"the virtual memory sub-system can be considered the core of a Solaris instance, and the implementation of Solaris virtual memory affects just about every other subsystem in the operating system" [McDougall and Mauro(2006)]

# Sharing Physical Page Tables




```
static pte_t *pte_nxt_table (pte_t *entry){
    pte_t *next;
    // If not already present, try to allocate
    if (!entry->present){
        if (!pte_alloc(&next)) {
            return NULL;
        }
        entry->pfn = PTE_PFN((uintptr_t) next);
        entry->present = 1;
    } else {
        uintptr_t next_phys_addr =
            PTE_PFN_TO_ADDR(entry->pfn);
        uintptr_t next_virt_addr = (uintptr_t)
            P2V(next_phys_addr);
        next = (pte_t *) next_virt_addr;
    }
    return next;
}

pte_t *walkpgdir(pte_t *l4, void *va){
    pte_t *l4_entry = &l4[L4I(va)];
    pte_t *l3 = pte_nxt_table(l4_entry);
    pte_t *l3_entry = &l3[L3I(va)];
    pte_t *l2 = pte_nxt_table(l3_entry);
    pte_t *l2_entry = &l2[L2I(va)];
    pte_t *l1 = pte_nxt_table(l2_entry);
    pte_t *l1_entry = &l1[L1I(va)];
    return l1_entry;
}
```

Figure: Accessing to the Page Referenced by L1 Entry

# Breaking Soundness in Sharing

Virtual



## Soundness of Traversal

Any update on the *shared page-tables*, which themselves are referenced with *physical memory* addresses, would break the soundness of any other traversal!

# Managing Agnostic Memory Mappings

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


Figure: An Address Space with Unique Root Address  $root_i$

# Managing Agnostic Memory Mappings

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


Figure: Two Address-Spaces with the Unique Root Addresses  $root_i$  and  $root_j$

# Managing Agnostic Memory Mappings

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


Figure: Switching Address-Spaces

# Managing Agnostic Memory Mappings




Figure: Switching Address-Spaces

## Referring to Agnostic Resources

Unless we bookkeep to which address-space each of these virtual-to-physical mappings belongs, *which we never see in the practice of using virtual memory references*, we need to figure out a way of referring to these mappings as *they are only valid in their own address-spaces*.

# Specifying Programs

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$$\{P\} C \{Q\}$$



# Separation Logic: Separating Conjunction

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$$\frac{\text{FRAME} \quad \{P\} \text{ e } \{Q\}}{\{P * R\} \text{ e } \{Q * R\}}$$

# Separation Logic: Ownership

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- Well-known points-to assertion, e.g.,  $\text{memory\_ref} \mapsto_q \text{val}$
- Regarding the logical machinery, Iris **SL** enables encoding a generalized form ownership of *logical resources*
- A fragmental  $\boxed{P}^\gamma$  ownership
  - Enabling coordinated access to logical resources
- Full  $\boxed{P}^\gamma$  ownership
  - Enabling access to *update* logical resources, presented as *invariants*

# Separation Logic: Invariants

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$$\frac{\text{INV} \quad \{P * R\} \alpha \{P * Q\}_\epsilon \quad \alpha \text{ physically atomic}}{\boxed{P}^n \vdash \{R\} \alpha \{Q\}_{\epsilon \uplus \{n\}}}$$

## Defining Some Ownership Assertions

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- Expected to have register ownership to be defined :  $\text{reg} \mapsto_r \text{reg\_val}$
- Expected to have *physical memory* ownership defined:  $\text{pa} \mapsto_p \text{val}$
- How about virtual memory references?

## A Naive Attempt on Virtual-Pointsto

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- Page and page table addresses are *physical*
- Purple (or red) path + bold black page references are *physical*
- Why don't we define *virtual* memory references in terms of the physical page-table and the final page references?

$L_4-L_1\text{-PointsTo}(va, l4e, l3e, l2e, l1e, paddr) + paddr \mapsto_p \text{page\_val}$

# Tokens for Traversals

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$$\underbrace{va \xrightarrow{\delta_q} pa}_{\text{Ghost translation}} * \underbrace{pa \mapsto_p \{qfrac\} val}_{\text{Physical location}}$$

- Abstract the purple and red segment of page-table traversal into *logical summarization of the walk*
- Distribute the fragmental ownership of the logical page-table summarization to virtual memory ownership

# Some Parts from Kernel Invariant

## Definition (The Kernel Invariant for Page-Table Traversal with Virtual Page-Table Pointers)

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathcal{I}ASpace_{id}(\theta, \Xi, m) &\triangleq ASpace\_Lookup_{id}(\theta, \Xi, m) * GhostMap(id, \Xi) * \\
 &\left( \begin{aligned} &* \quad \exists (l4e, l3e, l2e, l1e, paddr). L4\_L1\_PointsTo(va, l4e, l3e, l2e, l1e, paddr) \end{aligned} \right) * \\
 &* \quad \exists (qfrac, q, val, va). \ulcorner va = pa + KERNBASE \text{ level} > 1 \urcorner * \underbrace{va \xrightarrow{\delta_q} pa}_{\text{Ghost translation}} * \underbrace{pa \mapsto_p \{qfrac\} val}_{\text{Physical location}} * \\
 &\quad \underbrace{\ulcorner qfrac = 1 \leftrightarrow \neg \text{entry\_present}(val) \urcorner}_{\text{Entry validity}} * \\
 &\quad \underbrace{\left( \ulcorner \text{present\_L}(val, level) \urcorner \multimap \forall_{i \in 0..511}. ((\text{entry\_page } val) + i * 8) \xrightarrow{id} \text{level-1} \right)}_{\text{Indexing into next level of tables}}
 \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\text{present\_L}(val, level) \triangleq \text{entry\_present}(val) \wedge \text{level} > 0$$

# Specifying P2V

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```
{ P * IASpaceid( $\theta, \Xi \setminus \{\text{entry}\}$ ), m) * rbp-8  $\mapsto_v$  entry * rcx  $\mapsto_r$  _ * entry  $\mapsto_{id}$  _ * rrv  $\hookrightarrow^{\delta^s} \delta$  }rrv  
{ entry + KERNBASE  $\mapsto_{vpte, qfrac}$  (pte_initialized (entry_val.pfn))1 }rrv  
{ rbp-16  $\mapsto_v$  (pte_initialized (entry_val.pfn)) * rax  $\mapsto_r$  table_root (pte_initialize(entry_val.pfn)) }rrv  
{  $\forall_{i \in 0 \dots 511} \cdot ((\text{table\_root} (\text{pte\_initialized} (\text{entry\_val.pfn}))) + i * 8) \hookrightarrow^{id} v-1$  }  
;; uintptr_t next_virt_addr = (uintptr_t) P2V(entry.pfn << 12);  
movabs KERNBASE, rcx { ... * rcx  $\mapsto_r$  KERNBASE * ... }rrv  
add rcx, rax  
{ ... * rax  $\mapsto_r$  table_root (pte_initialize(entry_val.pfn)) + KERNBASE * ... }rrv  
... ;; clean up the stack and return the rax value
```

Figure: Converting a physical address of a PTE to a virtual address (w/o instruction pointer or flag updates).



# The Current Status of Machinery

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


Figure: x64-Iris

- Dumping **.o** files
- Manuel treatment on **Xabs** instructions and field access

# A Rough Quantification on the Current Status

Table: Line-of-Code Numbers for pte Verification

	C LoC A	Assembly LoC	Roqc Proof LoC
pte_get_next_table	12	45	3200
pte_walkpgdir	8	44	3200
pte_p2v	–	1	75
pte_switch_addrspc	–	18	350
pte_map_page	7	28	1750
pte_initialize	4	20	700

Table: Line-of-Code Numbers for x64-Iris Logic

	Roqc LoC
Soundness of Instructions Mentioned in the Presentation	50176
VMM Related Logical Constructions	5554
Machine Model	6172

(The Complete Set of Instructions  $\geq 1$  Million)

## Part II

# **Foundations for Specification Evolution**

# Protocols

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- Interfaces are well-known abstractions in low-level systems
  - Device drivers, Virtual-File-Systems (VFS) etc.
- Protocols are well-know for specifying them

# Specifying Protocols for Systems with STSes




Figure: STS for Distributed File Protocol




Figure: STS for Traditional File Protocol

## Interacting with STSes

Modelling interactions of a client with a state machine via *token exchange*

# Defining STSes

## Definition (**STS** Definition following CaReSL's presentation [Turon et al.(2013)])

An STS  $\pi$  is given by:

1. a set of states  $\mathcal{S}$ ,
2. a map from a state set of tokens  $\mathcal{T} : \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \text{TokSet}$ ,
3. a transition relation  $\rightsquigarrow$  on states, which is then lifted to pairs of a state and token set:

$$(s; T) \rightsquigarrow (s'; T') \triangleq s \rightsquigarrow s' \wedge \mathcal{T}(s) \uplus T = \mathcal{T}(s') \uplus T'$$

4. an interpretation mapping states to state assertions  $\varphi : \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \text{Prop}$ .

# Propositional Kripke Model

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## Definition ((Propositional) Kripke Model [Hughes and Cresswell(1996)])

A Kripke model  $\mathfrak{M}$  is a triple  $(W, R, V)$  where

- $W$  is a set of “worlds”
- $R \subseteq W \times W$  is a relation called the *accessibility* relation between worlds
- $V : \text{PropVar} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(W)$  gives for each propositional variable  $p$  a set of worlds  $V(p)$  where  $p$  is considered true

# Bisimulations over Kripke Models

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

## Definition ((Propositional) Bisimulation of Kripke Structures: $\mathfrak{M} \sim \mathfrak{M}'$ .)

A *bisimulation* between (multimodal) Kripke structures  $(W, R_{i \in I}, V)$  and  $(W', R'_{i \in I}, V')$  is a relation  $E \subseteq W \times W'$  satisfying:

- If  $w E w'$ , then  $w$  and  $w'$  satisfy the same propositional variables.
- If  $w E w'$  and  $w R v$ , then there exists  $v' \in W'$  such that  $v E v'$  and  $w' R' v'$
- If  $w E w'$  and  $w' R' v'$ , then there exists  $v \in W$  such that  $v R v'$  and  $w R v$



# Intuition on Bisimulations over STSes



- More than just relating **STSes** in representation invariants per state.
- Bisimilar states can have different representation invariants.

## Proof Indistinguishability

Knowing the proof of a client against the right (target STS conventionally  $\pi'$ ) *enables* deducing the proof against the bisimilar on the left (source STS conventionally  $\pi$ ).

# A Quick Tour on STS Assertions

- Invariants  $\boxed{\varphi}^\gamma_\pi$ , client capability  $\boxed{s; T}^\gamma$

STSalloc

$$\varphi(s) \Rightarrow \exists \gamma. \boxed{\varphi}^\gamma_\pi * \boxed{s; \text{AllTokens} \setminus \mathcal{T}(s)}^\gamma$$

STSoPEN

$$\boxed{\varphi}^\gamma_\pi * \boxed{s; T}^\gamma \Rightarrow (\exists s'. \ulcorner (s_0, T) \rrcorner \sqsubseteq_\pi^{rely^*} (s', T)^\top * \varphi(s) * \forall s', T'. \ulcorner (s', T) \rrcorner \sqsubseteq_\pi^{guar.^*} (s', T')^\top * \varphi(s') \Rightarrow \boxed{s'; T'}^\gamma)$$

UPDIsl

$\alpha$  physically atomic

$$\frac{\forall s_0. ((s; T) \sqsubseteq_\pi^{rely^*} (s_0; T)) \vdash \{\varphi(s_0) * P\} \alpha \{\exists s', T'. (s_0; T) \sqsubseteq_\pi^{guar.^*} (s'; T') * \varphi(s') * Q\}}{\boxed{\varphi}^\gamma_\pi \vdash \{\boxed{s; T}^\gamma * P\} \alpha \{\exists s', T'. \boxed{s'; T'}^\gamma * Q\}}$$

Figure: Iris STS Library [Jung et al.(2015)] simplified with later modality and invariant masks omitted

# Decomposing Bisimilarity in STSes

The bisimulation  $(\mathcal{M}(\pi, \pi', \varphi, \varphi', s, T, U))$  between two state machines,  $\pi$  and  $\pi'$  is composed of

- The source STS –  $\pi$
- The target STS –  $\pi'$
- The source STS's state interpretation function –  $\varphi$
- The target STS's state interpretation function –  $\varphi'$
- Token Embedding –  $\epsilon_S : \mathcal{S}(\pi) \mapsto \mathcal{S}(\pi')$
- State Embedding –  $\epsilon_T : \mathcal{T}(\pi) \mapsto \mathcal{T}(\pi')$
- The Law of Rely
- The Law of Guarantee
- The Law of Tolerance
- The state of source STS from which bisimulation is considered against any client interference with the token set  $T$

## Proof Translation

Obtain a proof rule utilizing the bisimulation to translate proofs between bisimilar state machines!

# We Need This

---

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \text{BISIM} \\
 \pi \sim \pi' \quad q \in_S s \quad q' \in_S s' \quad \{[s; \overline{\epsilon_{\overline{T}}(\mathcal{T})}]_{\pi'}^\gamma * P\} C \{[s'; \overline{T'}]_{\pi'}^\gamma * Q\} \\
 \hline
 [\varphi]_\pi^\gamma \vdash \{[q; \overline{T}]_\pi^\gamma * P\} C \{[q'; \overline{T'}]_\pi^\gamma * Q\}
 \end{array}$$

# We Use This

---

UPDISL

$\alpha$  physically atomic

$$\frac{\forall s_0 . ((s; T) \sqsubseteq_{\pi}^{\text{rely}^*} (s_0; T)) \vdash \{\varphi(s_0) * P\} \alpha \{\exists s', T' . (s_0; T) \sqsubseteq_{\pi}^{\text{guar}^*} (s'; T') * \varphi(s') * Q\}}{\boxed{\varphi}_{\pi}^{\gamma} \vdash \{\boxed{s; T}^{\gamma} * P\} \alpha \{\exists s', T' . \boxed{s'; T'}^{\gamma} * Q\}}$$

BISIM

$$\frac{\pi \sim \pi' \quad q \in_S s \quad q' \in_S s' \quad \{\boxed{s; \overline{T}(\mathcal{T})}^{\gamma}_{\pi'} * P\} C \{\boxed{s'; T'}^{\gamma}_{\pi'} * Q\}}{\boxed{\varphi}_{\pi}^{\gamma} \vdash \{\boxed{q; T}^{\gamma}_{\pi} * P\} C \{\boxed{q'; T'}^{\gamma}_{\pi} * Q\}}$$

# Invariants of File Protocols

## Definition (File Protocol Invariants)

$$\varphi_{\text{distributedfile}}(\ell, R)(s) \triangleq \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \text{match } s \text{ with} \\ \text{to } - \text{ flush} \Rightarrow & R * \exists fs. \text{isValidDirty}(fs) * \\ & \ell \mapsto (fs.id, fs.status = \text{dirty}) \\ \text{opened} \Rightarrow & R * \exists fs. \text{isValid}(fs) * \\ & \ell \mapsto (fs.id, fs.status = \text{clean}) \\ \text{closed} \Rightarrow & \exists fs. \text{isValidClosed}(fs) * \\ & \ell \mapsto (fs.id, fs.status = \text{closed}) \end{array} \right\}$$

$$\varphi_{\text{file}}(\ell, R)(s) \triangleq \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \text{match } s \text{ with} \\ \text{opened} \Rightarrow & R * \exists fs. \text{isValid}(fs) * \ell \mapsto (fs.id, fs.status = \text{clean} \vee \text{dirty}) \\ \text{closed} \Rightarrow & \exists fs. \text{isValidClosed}(fs) * \ell \mapsto (fs.id, fs.status = \text{closed}) \end{array} \right\}$$

# Keeping Promises

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TRANSFER FILE WRITE

$$\frac{
 \begin{array}{c}
 \pi \sim \pi' \quad \text{opened} \in_S s \quad q' \in_S s' \\
 \{ \boxed{s; \overline{\tau}(\mathcal{T})}_{\pi'}^\gamma * P \} \text{ write } \ell \text{ new\_val } \{ \boxed{s'; \overline{\tau}'}_{\pi'}^\gamma * Q \}
 \end{array}
 }{
 \boxed{\varphi_{\text{distributedfile}}}_{\pi}^\gamma \vdash \{ \boxed{\text{opened}; \overline{\tau}}_{\pi}^\gamma * P \} \text{ write } \ell \text{ new\_val } \{ \boxed{q'; \overline{\tau}'}_{\pi}^\gamma * Q \}
 }$$

# The Law of Rely

## Theorem (The Law of Rely)

$$\begin{aligned} \forall s'. (s; T) \stackrel{\text{rely}^*}{\sqsubseteq}_{\pi} (s'; T) \leftrightarrow \\ (\forall_{s_1, s'_1, T_1}. \epsilon_S(s, s_1) \rightarrow \epsilon_S(s', s'_1) \rightarrow \epsilon_{\overline{T}}(T, T_1) \rightarrow (s_1; T_1) \stackrel{\text{rely}^*}{\sqsubseteq}_{\pi'} (s'_1; T_1)) \end{aligned}$$

- We do not drop any client interference with capabilities  $T$
- Indetification of the states that are tolerant to the client interference from which the STS can take steps (Guarantee)
- Bookkeeping of the client interference needed!
- Identifying the valid *pre* state



# The Law of Guarantee

## Theorem (Guarantee Bisim without Invariants)

$$\begin{aligned} \forall_{q', q, T'}. \epsilon_{\overline{T}}(T) \equiv T' \rightarrow \epsilon_S(s, q) \rightarrow (q; T') &\stackrel{\text{rely}^*}{\sqsubseteq} \pi' (q'; T') \rightarrow \\ \forall_{q'', T''}. (q'; T') &\stackrel{\text{guar.}}{\sqsubseteq} \pi' (q''; T'') \rightarrow \\ \exists_{s', s'', T'_0, T''_0}. (s'; T'_0) &\stackrel{\text{guar.}}{\sqsubseteq} \pi (s''; T''_0) \wedge \\ \epsilon_S(s') = q' \wedge \epsilon_S(s'') = q'' \wedge \epsilon_{\overline{T}}(T'_0) \equiv T' \wedge \epsilon_{\overline{T}}(T''_0) \equiv T'' \end{aligned}$$

- Under the embedded client interference, the steps taken by the target STS must be countered by a one in the source STS
- From target STS to source STS
- Identifying the valid *post* state

# Soundness

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## Theorem (Soundness)

*The updated state from  $\text{UPDISL}$  is preserved by the bisimulation.*

## Ongoing Work

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- Homomorphisms for general form of specifications (i.e., more than STSes)
- Exploit another obvious application fields, e.g., device drivers
- Only Iris pluggable?

## Part III

# **Semantic Type Assertions for Deferred Memory Reclamation Schemes**

# What is Deferred Memory Reclamation?

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- Both *reader* and *writer* threads accessing to a memory location *simultaneously*
- The write *waits* the readers that are already on the same memory location — i.e., *Grace Period*
- After the grace period end, the grace period ends, i.e, the readers leave the memory location, it is safe to *reclaim* the memory location
- Different schemes: Hazard Pointers (Maged M. Michael 2004), Read-Copy-Update (PE McKenney and JD Slingwine [McKenney and Slingwine(1998)])

# RCU Semantics





Figure:  $tid_{mut}$  unlinks the node with value 1.



to-free list

... (  $F[ s(1, tid_{mut}) \rightarrow tid_{r1}, tid_{r2} ]$  ) ...

# RCU Semantics




Figure: Bounding threads,  $tid_{r1}$  and  $tid_{r2}$  exit ReadBlock.




Figure: Reclaimed the node 1

# Type Assertions for RCU

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```
struct BagNode{
    int data;
    BagNode<rcuItr> Next;
}
BagNode<rcuRoot> head;
```

```
void add(int toAdd){
    WriteBegin;
    BagNode nw = new;
    {nw: rcuFresh{}}
    nw.data = toAdd;
    {head: rcuRoot, par: undef, cur: undef}
    BagNode<rcuItr> par, cur = head;
    {head: rcuRoot, par: rcultrε{}}
    {cur: rcultrε{}}
    cur = par.Next;
    {cur: rcultrNext{}}
    {par: rcultrε{Next ↦ cur}}
    while(cur.Next != null){
        {cur: rcultr(Next)k.Next{}}
        {par: rcultr(Next)k{Next ↦ cur}}
        par = cur;
        cur = par.Next;
    }
    ...
    WriteEnd;
}
```



# A Taste of Soundness on Type System for RCU

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- Soundness on top of Views Framework (Dinsdale-Young et.al. [?])
  - Logical state with its observation-map , free-list etc.
  - Denotation of types encoding the post-environment of any type accurately

$$\llbracket \Gamma, x : \text{rcultr } \rho \mathcal{N}[y : \text{rcultr}] \rrbracket_{M, tid}$$

- Global Invariants
  - Unlinked Reachability:
  - Delayed Ownership Transfer and Reader in Freelist:
- Discharging these invariants once as a part of soundness
  - No need to prove them for each different client

## Remarks

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- Simpler than full-blown program logics: Tassarotti et al. (PLDI 2015) [Tassarotti et al.(2015)], Fu et.al., Gotsman et.al.(ESOP 2013)
- The first general operational model for RCU-based memory management
- Based on our suitable abstractions for RCU in the operational semantics
  - Decoupling the memory-safety proofs from the underlying reclamation model
  - Similar is done for correctness by Meyer and Wolff (POPL 2019)
- Applicability/Usability
  - The first safety proof RCU client Citrus Binary Search Tree (Maya Arbel and Hagit Attiya PODC 2014)
  - Linked-list based bag implementation (McKenney Technical Report 2015)
- More type rules in the paper
  - Refinement rules for control flows
  - A simple type system for readers
  - Entering and exiting read/write-side critical sections

# Future Directions

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- Deploying it as Clang front-end
  - Abstract operational semantics can handle “classical RCU”
  - But optimized “batch lists” in Linux kernel? Refinement with our abstract model?
- Rust ownership
  - When published Rust’s ownership was not able to handle RCU-like programming pattern
  - Now there is a set of RCU types
- Go adopted similar pattern in the existence of garbage-collector
  - Captured by our operational semantics
  - Async-free + Free list
- Beyond memory-safety? Tolerance to *stale data*



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