

Security Assessment

TeleBot Connect

Verified on 09/29/2023



SUMMARY

| Project | | CHA | IN | | METHODOLOG | Υ |
|-----------------|----------------|-----------|----------------|---|---|--|
| TeleBot Connect | | Ethe | reum | | Manual & Autom | natic Analysis |
| FILES Single | | | VERY 9/2023 | | TYPE Standard Audit | |
| | | 0 | 0 | | | |
| | 0 | 0 | U | U | U | 3 |
| | Total Findings | Critical | Major | Medium | Minor | Informational |
| 0 Critical | | | | | | can affect the contract al events that can risk and ct |
| 0 Major | | | | | when using the co | can affect the outcome ontract that can serve as nipulating the contract in ner |
| 0 Medium | | | | | An opening that conexecuting the consituation | ould affect the outcome in tract in a specific |
| 0 Minor | | | | | An opening but do the functionality o | pesn't have an impact on f the contract |
| 3 Informational | | | | An opening that consists information but will not risk or affect the contract | | |
| STATUS | √ AUE | OIT PASSI | ED | | | |



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DISCLAIMER TeleBot Connect

<u>ContractWolf</u> audits and reports should not be considered as a form of project's "Advertisement" and does not cover any interaction and assessment from "Project Contract" to "External Contracts" such as PancakeSwap, UniSwap, SushiSwap or similar.

ContractWolf does not provide any <u>warranty</u> on its released report and should not be used as a <u>decision</u> to invest into audited projects.

ContractWolf provides a transparent report to all its "Clients" and to its "Clients Participants" and will not claim any guarantee of bug-free code within its **SMART CONTRACT**.

ContractWolf's presence is to analyze, audit and assess the Client's Smart Contract to find any underlying risk and to eliminate any logic and flow errors within its code.

Each company or project should be liable to its security flaws and functionalities.



SCOPE OF WORK TeleBot Connect

TeleBot Connect team has agreed and provided us with the files that need to be tested (*Github, BSCscan, Etherscan, Local files etc*). The scope of audit is the main contract.

The goal of this engagement is to identify if there is a possibility of security flaws in the implementation of smart contract and its systems.

ContractWolf will be focusing on contract issues and functionalities along with the project claims from smart contract to their website, whitepaper, repository which has been provided by **TeleBot Connect**.



AUDITING APPROACH TeleBot Connect

Every line of code along with its functionalities will undergo manual review to check for security issues, quality of logic and contract scope of inheritance. The manual review will be done by our team that will document any issues that they discovered.


METHODOLOGY

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- 1. Code review that includes the following:
- Review of the specifications, sources and instructions provided to ContractWolf to make sure we understand the size, scope and functionality of the smart contract.
- Manual review of code. Our team will have a process of reading the code line-by-line with the intention of identifying potential vulnerabilities, underlying and hidden security flaws.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes:
- Testing the smart contract function with common test cases and scenarios to ensure that it returns the expected results.
- 3. Best practices and ethical review. The team will review the contract with the aim to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarifications, maintainability, security and control within the smart contract.
- 4. Recommendations to help the project take steps to eliminate or minimize threats and secure the smart contract.



TOKEN DETAILS TeleBot Connect



TeleBot Connect is a new tool that makes swapping digital money between different systems easy and private.

| Token Name | Symbol | Decimal | Total Supply | Chain |
|----------------|--------|---------|--------------|----------|
| TeleBotConnect | TELE | 18 | 10,000,000 | Ethereum |

SOURCE

Source Sent Via local-files



INHERITANCE GRAPH TeleBot Connect


Inheritance Graph of Contract Functions





CALL GRAPH TeleBot Connect

Call Graph of Contract Functions





FINDINGS TeleBot Connect

| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
|----------------|----------|-------|--------|-------|---------------|
| Total Findings | Critical | Major | Medium | Minor | Informational |

This report has been prepared to state the issues and vulnerabilities for TeleBot Connect through this audit. The goal of this report findings is to identify specifically and fix any underlying issues and errors

| ID | Title | File & Line # | Severity | Status |
|---------|--------------------------------------|--|---------------|---------------------------|
| SWC-103 | Floating Pragma is set | Telebot.sol, L: 1027 | Informational | Pending |
| SWC-108 | State Variable Default Visibility | Telebot.sol, L: 1037, 1039, 1040, 1041 | Informational | Pending |
| CW-012 | SafeMath Override | SafeMath.sol | Informational | Pending |



SWC ATTACKS TeleBot Connect

Smart Contract Weakness Classification and Test Cases

| ID | Description | Status |
|---------|---|--------------------------------|
| SWC-100 | Function Default Visibility | Passed |
| SWC-101 | Integer Overflow and Underflow | Passed |
| SWC-102 | Outdated Compiler Version | Passed |
| SWC-103 | Floating Pragma | Not Passed |
| SWC-104 | Unchecked Call Return Value | Passed |
| SWC-105 | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal | Passed |
| SWC-106 | Unprotected SELF DESTRUCT Instruction | Passed |
| SWC-107 | Reentrancy | Passed |
| SWC-108 | State Variable Default Visibility | Not Passed |
| SWC-109 | Uninitialized Storage Pointer | Passed |
| SWC-110 | Assert Violation | Passed |
| SWC-111 | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions | Passed |
| SWC-112 | Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee | Passed |
| SWC-113 | DoS with Failed Call | Passed |
| SWC-114 | Transaction Order Dependence | Passed |
| SWC-115 | Authorization through tx.origin | Passed |
| SWC-116 | Block values as a proxy for time | Passed |
| SWC-117 | Signature Malleability | Passed |
| SWC-118 | Incorrect Constructor Name | Passed |
| SWC-119 | Shadowing State Variables | Passed |
| SWC-120 | Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes | Passed |
| SWC-121 | Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks | Passed |
| SWC-122 | Lack of Proper Signature Verification | Passed |



| ID | Description | Status |
|---------|--|----------------------------|
| SWC-123 | Requirement Violation | Passed |
| SWC-124 | Write to Arbitrary Storage Location | Passed |
| SWC-125 | Incorrect Inheritance Order | Passed |
| SWC-126 | Insufficient Gas Griefing | Passed |
| SWC-127 | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable | Passed |
| SWC-128 | DoS With Block Gas Limit | Passed |
| SWC-129 | Typographical Error | Passed |
| SWC-130 | Right-To-Left-Override control character(U+202E) | Passed |
| SWC-131 | Presence of unused variables | Passed |
| SWC-132 | Unexpected Ether balance | Passed |
| SWC-133 | Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Arguments | Passed |
| SWC-134 | Message call with hardcoded gas amount | Passed |
| SWC-135 | Code With No Effects | Passed |
| SWC-136 | Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain | Passed |



CW ASSESSMENT TeleBot Connect

ContractWolf Vulnerability and Security Tests

| ID | Name | Description | Status |
|--------|--------------------------|--|----------|
| CW-001 | Multiple Version | Presence of multiple compiler version across all contracts | V |
| CW-002 | Incorrect Access Control | Additional checks for critical logic and flow | V |
| CW-003 | Payable Contract | A function to withdraw ether should exist otherwise the ether will be trapped | V |
| CW-004 | Custom Modifier | major recheck for custom modifier logic | V |
| CW-005 | Divide Before Multiply | Performing multiplication before division is generally better to avoid loss of precision | V |
| CW-006 | Multiple Calls | Functions with multiple internal calls | V |
| CW-007 | Deprecated Keywords | Use of deprecated functions/operators such as block.blockhash() for blockhash(), msg.gas for gasleft(), throw for revert(), sha3() for keccak256(), callcode() for delegatecall(), suicide() for selfdestruct(), constant for view or var for actual type name should be avoided to prevent unintended errors with newer compiler versions | V |
| CW-008 | Unused Contract | Presence of an unused, unimported or uncalled contract | ✓ |
| CW-009 | Assembly Usage | Use of EVM assembly is error-prone and should be avoided or double-checked for correctness | V |
| CW-010 | Similar Variable Names | Variables with similar names could be confused for each other and therefore should be avoided | V |
| CW-011 | Commented Code | Removal of commented/unused code lines | V |
| CW-012 | SafeMath Override | SafeMath is no longer needed starting with Solidity v0.8+. The compiler now has built-in overflow checking. | × |



FIXES & RECOMMENDATION

SWC-103 A Floating Pragma is Set

Code

pragma solidity ^0.8.19;

The compiler version should be a fixed one to avoid undiscovered compiler bugs. Fixed version sample below

pragma solidity 0.8.17;



SWC-108 State Variable Visibility

```
uint256 SUPPLY = 10_000_000 * 10**18;

uint256 snipeFee = 40;
uint256 totalFee = 5;
uint256 botFee = 1;
```

Labeling the visibility explicitly makes it easier to catch incorrect assumptions about who can access the variable. Variables can be specified as being public, internal or private. Explicitly define visibility for all state variables.



cw-012 | SafeMath Override

library SafeMath

SafeMath is no longer needed starting Solidity v0.8+. The compiler now has Built in overflow checking.



AUDIT COMMENTS TeleBot Connect

Smart Contract audit comment for a non-technical perspective

- Owner can collect ETH from contract
- Owner can exclude addresses from dividends
- Owner can change bot wallet receiver
- Owner can update dividends address
- Owner can update fees up to 15%
- Owner can update max wallet between 1%-100% of total supply
- Owner can change ETH pool address
- Owner can update minimum swapping amount lower than 2% of total supply
- Owner cannot burn
- Owner cannot mint after initial deployment
- Owner cannot block users
- Owner cannot pause contract
- Owner cannot renounce and transfer ownership



CONTRACTWOLF

Blockchain Security - Smart Contract Audits