



Security Assessment

Fusion

Verified on 5/30/25

SUMMARY

Project

Fusion

CHAIN

Binance Smart Chain

METHODOLOGY

Manual & Automatic Analysis

FILES

Single

DELIVERY

5/30/25

TYPE

Standard Audit



0

0

0

0

1

3

0

Total Findings

Critical

Major

Medium

Minor

Informational

Resolved

0 Critical

An exposure that can affect the contract functions in several events that can risk and disrupt the contract

0 Major

An opening & exposure to manipulate the contract in an unwanted manner

0 Medium

An opening that could affect the outcome in executing the contract in a specific situation

1 Minor

An opening but doesn't have an impact on the functionality of the contract

3 Informational

An opening that consists information but will not risk or affect the contract

0 Resolved

ContractWolf's findings has been acknowledged & resolved by the project

STATUS
✓ AUDIT PASSED

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DISCLAIMER | Fusion

ContractWolf audits and reports should not be considered as a form of project's "Advertisement" and does not cover any interaction and assessment from "Project Contract" to "External Contracts" such as PancakeSwap, UniSwap, SushiSwap or similar.

ContractWolf does not provide any warranty on its released report and should not be used as a decision to invest into audited projects.

ContractWolf provides a transparent report to all its "Clients" and to its "Clients Participants" and will not claim any guarantee of bug-free code within its **SMART CONTRACT**.

ContractWolf's presence is to analyze, audit and assess the Client's Smart Contract to find any underlying risk and to eliminate any logic and flow errors within its code.


Each company or project should be liable to its security flaws and functionalities.

SCOPE OF WORK | Fusion

Fusion team has agreed and provided us with the files that need to be tested (*Github, BSCscan, Etherscan, Local files etc*). The scope of audit is the main contract.

The goal of this engagement is to identify if there is a possibility of security flaws in the implementation of smart contract and its systems.

ContractWolf will be focusing on contract issues and functionalities along with the project claims from smart contract to their website, whitepaper, repository which has been provided by **Fusion**.



AUDITING APPROACH | Fusion

Every line of code along with its functionalities will undergo manual review to check for security issues, quality of logic and contract scope of inheritance. The manual review will be done by our team that will document any issues that they discovered.

METHODOLOGY

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps :

1. Code review that includes the following :
 - Review of the specifications, sources and instructions provided to ContractWolf to make sure we understand the size, scope and functionality of the smart contract.
 - Manual review of code. Our team will have a process of reading the code line-by-line with the intention of identifying potential vulnerabilities, underlying and hidden security flaws.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes :
 - Testing the smart contract function with common test cases and scenarios to ensure that it returns the expected results.
3. Best practices and ethical review. The team will review the contract with the aim to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarifications, maintainability, security and control within the smart contract.
4. Recommendations to help the project take steps to eliminate or minimize threats and secure the smart contract.

TOKEN DETAILS | Fusion



FUST is a utility token with standard tokenomics which is part of the FUSD ecosystem. FUSD is an appreciating stable token due to launch in the next few weeks and FUST will be used to mine free FUSD using a staking protocol we are calling the Fusion Miner.


Token Name	Symbol	Decimal	Total Supply	Chain
FUST	FUST	18	1,000,000	Binance Smart Chain

SOURCE

Source `0x695579CfE2b2D9066Fddc9ef3462b6AE05e127C3`


INHERITANCE GRAPH | Fusion

Inheritance Graph of Contract Functions



CALL GRAPH | Fusion

Call Graph of Contract Functions



FINDINGS

Fusion



4

0

0

0

1

3

0

Total Findings

Critical

Major

Medium

Minor

Informational

Resolved

This report has been prepared to state the issues and vulnerabilities for Fusion through this audit. The goal of this report findings is to identify specifically and fix any underlying issues and errors

ID	Title	File & Line #	Severity	Status
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	FUST.sol, L: 164	Minor	• Pending
SWC-103	Floating Pragma is set	FUST.sol	Informational	• Pending
N/A	Gas Griefing via Redundant Approvals	FUST.sol	Informational	• Pending
N/A	Potential Loss of Precision on High-Decimal Balances	FUST.sol, L: 102	Informational	• Pending

SWC ATTACKS | Fusion

Smart Contract Weakness Classification and Test Cases

ID	Description	Status
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	● Passed
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	● Passed
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	● Passed
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	● Not Passed
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	● Not Passed
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	● Passed
SWC-106	Unprotected SELF DESTRUCT Instruction	● Passed
SWC-107	Reentrancy	● Passed
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	● Passed
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	● Passed
SWC-110	Assert Violation	● Passed
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	● Passed
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	● Passed
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	● Passed
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	● Passed
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	● Passed
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	● Passed
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	● Passed
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	● Passed
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	● Passed
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	● Passed
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	● Passed
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	● Passed

ID	Description	Status
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	● Passed
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	● Passed
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	● Passed
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Griefing	● Passed
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	● Passed
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	● Passed
SWC-129	Typographical Error	● Passed
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character(U+202E)	● Passed
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	● Passed
SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	● Passed
SWC-133	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Arguments	● Passed
SWC-134	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	● Passed
SWC-135	Code With No Effects	● Passed
SWC-136	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	● Passed

CW ASSESSMENT | Fusion

ContractWolf Vulnerability and Security Tests

ID	Name	Description	Status
CW-001	Multiple Version	Presence of multiple compiler version across all contracts	✓
CW-002	Incorrect Access Control	Additional checks for critical logic and flow	✓
CW-003	Payable Contract	A function to withdraw ether should exist otherwise the ether will be trapped	✓
CW-004	Custom Modifier	major recheck for custom modifier logic	✓
CW-005	Divide Before Multiply	Performing multiplication before division is generally better to avoid loss of precision	✓
CW-006	Multiple Calls	Functions with multiple internal calls	✓
CW-007	Deprecated Keywords	Use of deprecated functions/operators such as block.blockhash() for blockhash(), msg.gas for gasleft(), throw for revert(), sha3() for keccak256(), callcode() for delegatecall(), suicide() for selfdestruct(), constant for view or var for actual type name should be avoided to prevent unintended errors with newer compiler versions	✓
CW-008	Unused Contract	Presence of an unused, unimported or uncalled contract	✓
CW-009	Assembly Usage	Use of EVM assembly is error-prone and should be avoided or double-checked for correctness	✓
CW-010	Similar Variable Names	Variables with similar names could be confused for each other and therefore should be avoided	✓
CW-011	Commented Code	Removal of commented/unused code lines	✓
CW-012	SafeMath Override	SafeMath is no longer needed starting with Solidity v0.8+. The compiler now has built-in overflow checking.	✓

FIXES & RECOMMENDATION

SWC-103 | A Floating Pragma is Set

Code

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
```

The compiler version should be a fixed one to avoid undiscovered compiler bugs. Fixed version sample below

```
pragma solidity 0.8.20;
```

SWC-104 | Unchecked Low-Level Call Return Value

Code

```
(bool succ, ) = ecoSystemWallet.call{value: ecosystemAmount}("");  
if (!succ) emit FailTransfer(ecoSystemWallet, ecosystemAmount);
```

Failing to check the return value of a low-level `.call` can result in silent failures when transferring BNB. In this contract, if the `ecoSystemWallet` cannot accept BNB (e.g., due to being a contract with no `receive()` function), the call fails silently but the contract still resets internal state, leading to stuck funds and inaccurate accounting.

```
(bool succ, ) = ecoSystemWallet.call{value: ecosystemAmount}("");  
require(succ, "Transfer to ecoSystemWallet failed");
```

To prevent this, enforce that the call must succeed using `require`. This ensures that if the transfer fails, the transaction is reverted and no state is incorrectly updated.

Gas Griefing via Redundant Approvals

Code

```
// executed every time swapAndDistributeBNB() runs
_approve(address(this), address(uniswapV2Router), type(uint256).max);
```

Re-writing an allowance that is already `type(uint256).max` costs ~1 700 extra gas (storage-touch + Approval event) on every swap.

```
constructor(
) ERC20(_name, _symbol) Ownable(_owner) {
    // one-time router approval
    _approve(address(this), address(uniswapV2Router), type(uint256).max);
}
```

Grant the infinite allowance once in the constructor (or check allowance first)

Potential Loss of Precision on High-Decimal Balances

Code

```
bool canSwap = (balanceOf(address(this)) / 10 ** decimals()) >  
                ((totalSupply() * threshold) / (10 ** decimals() * PRECISION));
```

Because both sides divide by `10**decimals()` early, any balance smaller than one whole token (e.g., `0.00000000000001`) is rounded down to zero. This may delay -- or permanently prevent -- automatic swaps when the tax pool is small.

```
bool canSwap = balanceOf(address(this)) >  
                (totalSupply() * threshold) / PRECISION;
```

Compare raw token units first, then scale only once:

AUDIT COMMENTS | Fusion

Smart Contract audit comment for a non-technical perspective

- Owner can renounce and transfer ownership
- Owner can update buy and sell taxes up to 25% each
- Owner can change ecosystem wallet
- Owner can exclude/include addresses from taxes
- Owner can update threshold between 0 and 10,000
- Owner can collect BNB from contract
- Owner can burn tokens
- Owner cannot mint after initial deployment
- Owner cannot block users
- Owner cannot pause contract



CONTRACTWOLF

Blockchain Security - Smart Contract Audits