



CONTRACT WOLF

Blockchain Security - Smart Contract Audits

Security Assessment

August 10, 2022



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ContractWolf provides transparent report to all its "clients" and to its "clients participants" and will not claim any guarantee of bug-free code within it's **SMART CONTRACT**.

ContractWolf presence is to analyze, audit and assess the client's smart contract's code.

Each company or projects should be liable to its security flaws and functionalities.

Scope of Work

Ryoge Dao's team agreed and provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract.

The goal of this engagement was to identify if there is a possibility of security flaws in the implementation of the contract or system.

ContractWolf will be focusing on contract issues and functionalities along with the projects claims from smart contract to their website, whitepaper and repository which has been provided by **Ryoge Dao**.

Description

RYOGE DAO, is a decentralized autonomous organization, a true embodiment of blockchain. Ryoge DAO aims to establish an organization wherein there's no centralization.



Risk Level Classification

Risk Level represents the classification or the probability that a certain function or threat that can exploit vulnerability and have an impact within the system or contract.

Risk Level is computed based on CVSS Version 3.0

| Level | Value | Vulnerability |
|---------------|-----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Critical | 9 - 10 | An Exposure that can affect the contract functions in several events that can risk and disrupt the contract |
| High | 7 - 8.9 | An Exposure that can affect the outcome when using the contract that can serve as an opening in manipulating the contract in an unwanted manner |
| Medium | 4 - 6.9 | An opening that could affect the outcome in executing the contract in a specific situation |
| Low | 0.1 - 3.9 | An opening but doesn't have an impact on the functionality of the contract |
| Informational | 0 | An opening that consists of information's but will not risk or affect the contract |

Auditing Approach

Every line of code along with its functionalities will undergo manual review to check its security issues, quality, and contract scope of inheritance. The manual review will be done by our team that will document any issues that there were discovered.

Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

1. Code review that includes the following:

- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to ContractWolf to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
- Manual review of code, our team will have a process of reading the code line-by-line with the intention of identifying potential vulnerabilities and security flaws.

2. Testing and automated analysis that includes:

- Testing the smart contract functions with common test cases and scenarios, to ensure that it returns the expected results.

3. Best practices review, the team will review the contract with the aim to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarifications, maintainability, security, and control within the smart contract.

4. Recommendations to help the project take steps to secure the smart contract.

Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (Direct Imports)

Imported Packages

- IERC20
- IPancakeERC20
- IPancakeFactory
- IPancakeRouter01
- IPancakeRouter02
- Ownable
- Address
- EnumerableSet
- RyogeDao

Description

Optimization enabled: Yes

Decimal: 9

Symbol: Ryoge

Max / Total Supply: 1,000,000,000,000,000

Capabilities

Components

| Version | Contracts | Libraries | Interfaces | Abstract |
|---------|-----------|-----------|------------|----------|
| 1.0 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 1 |

Exposed Functions

| Version | Public | Private | External | Internal |
|---------|--------|---------|----------|----------|
| 1.0 | 41 | 21 | 72 | 25 |


State Variables

| Version | Total | Public |
|---------|-------|--------|
| 1.0 | 52 | 16 |

Capabilities

| Version | Solidity Versions Observed | Experimental Features | Can Receive Funds | Uses Assembly | Has Destroyable Contracts |
|---------|----------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|---------------|---------------------------|
| 1.0 | v0.8.13 | | Yes | Yes | No |

Inheritance Graph



Correct implementation of Token Standard

| Tested | Verified |
|--------|----------|
| ✓ | ✓ |

Overall Checkup (Smart Contract Security)

| Tested | Verified |
|--------|----------|
| ✓ | ✓ |

| Function | Description | Exist | Tested | Verified |
|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|--------|----------|
| TotalSupply | Information about the total coin or token supply | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| BalanceOf | Details on the account balance from a specified address | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Transfer | An action that transfers a specified amount of coin or token to a specified address | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| TransferFrom | An action that transfers a specified amount of coin or token from a specified address | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Approve | Provides permission to withdraw specified number of coin or token from a specified address | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

Verify Claims

| Statement | Exist | Tested | Deployer |
|--------------------|-------|--------|----------|
| Renounce Ownership | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Mint | — | — | — |
| Burn | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ |
| Block | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Pause | — | — | — |

Legend

| Attribute | Symbol |
|--------------------------|--------|
| Verified / Can | ✓ |
| Verified / Cannot | ✗ |
| Unverified / Not checked | 🚩 |
| Not Available | — |

Write Functions of Contract

1. AddWalletExclusion

2. AddressResetBuyLock

3. AddressResetSellLock

4. CollectMarketingBNB

5. REL

6. REM

7. Rewards

8. SetupEnableTrading

9. SetupLiquidityTokenAddress

10. TeamChangeDevelopment

11. TeamChangeMarketing

12. TeamChangeMarketingShare

13. TeamChangeMaxBuy

14. TeamCollectRemainingBNB

15. TeamCollectXMarketingBNB

16. TeamCreateLPandBNB

17. TeamDisableBuyLock

18. TeamDisableSellLock

19. TeamExtendLiquidityLock

20. TeamSetBuyLockTime

21. TeamSetSellLockTime

22. TeamSetTaxes

23. TeamSwitchManualBNBConversion

24. TeamUpdateAmountToSwap

25. TeamUpdateLimits

26. addAddressToBlacklist

27. approve

28. decreaseAllowance

29. increaseAllowance

30. removeAddressFromBlacklist

31. renounceOwnership


32. setGasLimit

33. transfer

34. transferFrom

35. transferOwnership

Call Graph



SWC Attacks

| ID | Title | Status |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| SWC-136 | Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain | PASSED |
| SWC-135 | Code With No Effects | PASSED |
| SWC-134 | Message call with hardcoded gas amount | PASSED |
| SWC-133 | Hash Collisions with Multiple Variable Length Arguments | PASSED |
| SWC-132 | Unexpected Ether balance | PASSED |
| SWC-131 | Presence of unused variables | PASSED |
| SWC-130 | Right-To Left Override control character (U+202E) | PASSED |
| SWC-129 | Typographical Error | PASSED |
| SWC-128 | DoS With Block Gas Limit | PASSED |
| SWC-127 | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable | PASSED |
| SWC-126 | Insufficient Gas Griefing | PASSED |
| SWC-125 | Incorrect Inheritance Order | PASSED |
| SWC-124 | Write to Arbitrary Storage Location | PASSED |
| SWC-123 | Requirement Violation | PASSED |
| SWC-122 | Lack of Proper Signature Verification | PASSED |
| SWC-121 | Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks | PASSED |
| SWC-120 | Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes | PASSED |
| SWC-119 | Shadowing State Variables | PASSED |
| SWC-118 | Incorrect Constructor Name | PASSED |
| SWC-117 | Signature Malleability | PASSED |
| SWC-116 | Block values as a proxy for time | PASSED |
| SWC-115 | Authorization through tx.origin | PASSED |
| SWC-114 | Transaction Order Dependence | PASSED |
| SWC-113 | DoS with Failed Call | PASSED |
| SWC-112 | Delegate call to Untrusted Callee | PASSED |
| SWC-111 | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions | PASSED |
| SWC-110 | Assert Violation | PASSED |

| | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------|
| SWC-109 | Uninitialized Storage Pointer | PASSED |
| SWC-108 | State Variable Default Visibility | LOW ISSUE |
| SWC-107 | Reentrancy | PASSED |
| SWC-106 | Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction | PASSED |
| SWC-105 | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal | PASSED |
| SWC-104 | Unchecked Call Return Value | PASSED |
| SWC-103 | Floating Pragma | LOW ISSUE |
| SWC-102 | Outdated Compiler Version | PASSED |
| SWC-101 | Integer Overflow and Underflow | PASSED |
| SWC-100 | Function Default Visibility | PASSED |

AUDIT PASSED

Low Issues

| | |
|------------------------------------------------|---------|
| A floating pragma is set (SWC-103) | L: 42 |
| State variable visibility is not set (SWC-108) | L: 1186 |

Audit Comments

- Deployer can update total tax up to 100%
- Deployer can update marketing share up to 100%
- Deployer can release liquidity tokens after liquidity time lock is over to development address
- Deployer can distribute staked amount after liquidity time lock is over
- Deployer can collect liquidity tokens after liquidity time lock is over to marketing balance
- Deployer can collect BNB from contract to development address
- Deployer can collect BNB from marketing balance
- Deployer can update max buy transaction with an indefinite amount
- Deployer can toggle sell time lock
- Deployer can toggle sell cooldown time
- Deployer can toggle buy cooldown time
- Deployer can block/unblock users
- Deployer can update max sell transaction amount not less than 1%
- Deployer can update max wallet amount
- Deployer can renounce ownership
- Deployer can transfer ownership
- Deployer can toggle manual conversion of tokens
- Deployer can change development address receiver
- Deployer can change marketing address receiver
- Deployer can update max amount to swap tokens
- Deployer can exclude addresses from fees
- Deployer can manually swap contract's balance tokens
- Deployer can update gas limit
- Deployer can enable trading
- Deployer can change liquidity token address
- Deployer can update liquidity time lock

- Deployer cannot burn tokens
- Deployer cannot mint after initial deployment
- Deployer cannot pause contract





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