



Security Assessment

Mystery

Verified on 10/20/25

SUMMARY

Project

CHAIN

METHODOLOGY

Mystery

Binance Smart Chain

Manual & Automatic Analysis

FILES

DELIVERY

TYPE

Single

10/20/25

Standard Audit



1

0

0

1

1

1

0

Total Findings

Critical

Major

Medium

Minor

Informational

Resolved

■ 0 Critical

An exposure that can affect the contract functions in several events that can risk and disrupt the contract

■ 0 Major

An opening & exposure to manipulate the contract in an unwanted manner

■ 1 Medium

An opening that could affect the outcome in executing the contract in a specific situation

■ 1 Minor

An opening but doesn't have an impact on the functionality of the contract

■ 1 Informational

An opening that consists information but will not risk or affect the contract

■ 0 Resolved

ContractWolf's findings has been acknowledged & resolved by the project

STATUS
✓ **AUDIT PASSED**

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DISCLAIMER | Mystery

ContractWolf audits and reports should not be considered as a form of project's "Advertisement" and does not cover any interaction and assessment from "Project Contract" to "External Contracts" such as PancakeSwap, UniSwap, SushiSwap or similar.

ContractWolf does not provide any warranty on its released report and should not be used as a decision to invest into audited projects.

ContractWolf provides a transparent report to all its "Clients" and to its "Clients Participants" and will not claim any guarantee of bug-free code within its **SMART CONTRACT**.

ContractWolf's presence is to analyze, audit and assess the Client's Smart Contract to find any underlying risk and to eliminate any logic and flow errors within its code.

Each company or project should be liable to its security flaws and functionalities.

SCOPE OF WORK | Mystery

Mystery team has agreed and provided us with the files that need to be tested (*Github, BSCscan, Etherscan, Local files etc*). The scope of audit is the main contract.

The goal of this engagement is to identify if there is a possibility of security flaws in the implementation of smart contract and its systems.

ContractWolf will be focusing on contract issues and functionalities along with the project claims from smart contract to their website, whitepaper, repository which has been provided by **Mystery**.

AUDITING APPROACH | Mystery

Every line of code along with its functionalities will undergo manual review to check for security issues, quality of logic and contract scope of inheritance. The manual review will be done by our team that will document any issues that they discovered.

METHODOLOGY

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps :

1. Code review that includes the following :
 - Review of the specifications, sources and instructions provided to ContractWolf to make sure we understand the size, scope and functionality of the smart contract.
 - Manual review of code. Our team will have a process of reading the code line-by-line with the intention of identifying potential vulnerabilities, underlying and hidden security flaws.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes :
 - Testing the smart contract function with common test cases and scenarios to ensure that it returns the expected results.
3. Best practices and ethical review. The team will review the contract with the aim to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarifications, maintainability, security and control within the smart contract.
4. Recommendations to help the project take steps to eliminate or minimize threats and secure the smart contract.

TOKEN DETAILS | Mystery



N/A

Token Name

Mystery

Symbol

Mystery

Decimal

18

Total Supply

500,000

Chain

Binance Smart
Chain

SOURCE


Source

`0xF1E73934296EbA012F27449fA4e6766276a4EE16`

INHERITANCE GRAPH


Mystery

Inheritance Graph of Contract Functions



CALL GRAPH

Call Graph of Contract Functions



FINDINGS | Mystery



This report has been prepared to state the issues and vulnerabilities for Mystery through this audit. The goal of this report findings is to identify specifically and fix any underlying issues and errors.

ID	Title	File & Line #	Severity	Status
N/A	Unbounded Array	Mystery.sol, L: 620	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pending
N/A	Setting Fees to 0	Myster.sol, L: 713, 724	Minor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pending
SWC-103	Floating Pragma is set	Mystery.sol	Informational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pending

SWC ATTACKS

Mystery

Smart Contract Weakness Classification and Test Cases

ID	Description	Status
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	● Passed
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	● Passed
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	● Passed
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	● Not Passed
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	● Passed
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	● Passed
SWC-106	Unprotected SELF DESTRUCT Instruction	● Passed
SWC-107	Reentrancy	● Passed
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	● Passed
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	● Passed
SWC-110	Assert Violation	● Passed
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	● Passed
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	● Passed
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	● Passed
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	● Passed
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	● Passed
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	● Passed
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	● Passed
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	● Passed
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	● Passed
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	● Passed
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	● Passed
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	● Passed

ID	Description	Status
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	● Passed
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	● Passed
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	● Passed
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Griefing	● Passed
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	● Passed
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	● Passed
SWC-129	Typographical Error	● Passed
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character(U+202E)	● Passed
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	● Passed
SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	● Passed
SWC-133	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Arguments	● Passed
SWC-134	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	● Passed
SWC-135	Code With No Effects	● Passed
SWC-136	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	● Passed

CW ASSESSMENT

Mystery

ContractWolf Vulnerability and Security Tests

ID	Name	Description	Status
CW-001	Multiple Version	Presence of multiple compiler version across all contracts	✓
CW-002	Incorrect Access Control	Additional checks for critical logic and flow	✓
CW-003	Payable Contract	A function to withdraw ether should exist otherwise the ether will be trapped	✓
CW-004	Custom Modifier	major recheck for custom modifier logic	✓
CW-005	Divide Before Multiply	Performing multiplication before division is generally better to avoid loss of precision	✓
CW-006	Multiple Calls	Functions with multiple internal calls	✓
CW-007	Deprecated Keywords	Use of deprecated functions/operators such as block.blockhash() for blockhash(), msg.gas for gasleft(), throw for revert(), sha3() for keccak256(), callcode() for delegatecall(), suicide() for selfdestruct(), constant for view or var for actual type name should be avoided to prevent unintended errors with newer compiler versions	✓
CW-008	Unused Contract	Presence of an unused, unimported or uncalled contract	✓
CW-009	Assembly Usage	Use of EVM assembly is error-prone and should be avoided or double-checked for correctness	✓
CW-010	Similar Variable Names	Variables with similar names could be confused for each other and therefore should be avoided	✓
CW-011	Commented Code	Removal of commented/unused code lines	✓
CW-012	SafeMath Override	SafeMath is no longer needed starting with Solidity v0.8+. The compiler now has built-in overflow checking.	✓

FIXES & RECOMMENDATION

Unbounded Array

Code

```
address[] public holders;
```

The contract adds every token holder to an array that never stops growing, and tries to loop through the entire array to distribute rewards on every sell transaction, once the array reaches a certain amount, the loop becomes too expensive to execute, causing the reward distribution to permanently fail for holders

Switch from automatic push-based rewards to claim-based rewards where users pull their own rewards, eliminating the need to loop through holders.

Setting Fees to 0

Code

```
uint256 totalFee = _buyTotalFee + _sellTotalFee; // Could be 0 + 0 = 0
uint256 profitUsdt = (usdtBalance * profitFeeAmount) / tokenAmount; // X tokenAmount could be 0
uint256 lpUsdtAmount = (usdtBalance * lpTokenAmount) / tokenAmount; // X tokenAmount could be 0
```

If the owner sets all buy and sell fees to zero, the swapTokenForFund() function will attempt division by zero (tokenAmount / totalFee where totalFee = 0), causing all sell transactions to revert and completely halting trading until the contract is redeployed.

Add validation checks in the setBuyFee() and setSellFee() functions to prevent both buy and sell total fees from being zero simultaneously.

SWC-103 | A Floating Pragma is Set

Code

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.19;
```

The compiler version should be a fixed one to avoid undiscovered compiler bugs. Fixed version sample below

```
pragma solidity 0.8.19;
```

AUDIT COMMENTS | Mystery

Smart Contract audit comment for a non-technical perspective

- Owner can update total buy, total sell and profit fee up to an indefinite amount
- Owner can renounce and transfer ownership
- Owner can start trade
- Owner can exclude/include addresses from whitelist pre launch, fees, swap pair, rewards and router
- Owner can update max buy amount for pre launch
- Owner can update fund, special addresses
- Owner can update minimum tokens required to be a holder
- Owner can update minimum rewards in pool before distribution
- Owner can update gas limit for reward distribution
- Owner can add/remove addresses for USDT dividends
- Owner can update amount for minimum USDT before partner distribution
- Owner can assign POW staking powers to addresses
- Owner can add/remove addresses to share pool
- Owner can manually set cost basis for accounts
- Owner can override rebase timing
- Owner and fund address can update rebase and distribution ratio
- Owner and fund address can update percentage sent to hold pool daily
- Owner and fund address can update percentage sent to POW pool daily
- Owner and fund address can update percentage sent to share pool daily
- Fund address can collect tokens and BNB from contract
- Owner cannot burn
- Owner cannot block users
- Owner cannot update max transaction amount
- Owner cannot pause contract
- Owner cannot mint after initial deployment



CONTRACTWOLF

Blockchain Security - Smart Contract Audits