

Security Assessment

Ryūjin

Verified on 01/06/2024



SUMMARY

Project	CHAIN		METHODOLOGY			
Ryūjin		Solana		Manual & Automatic Analysis		
FILES Single		DELIVERY 01/06/2024			TYPE Standard Audit	
	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Total Findings	Critical	Major	Medium	Minor	Informational
0 Critical						can affect the contract al events that can risk and ct
0 Major					when using the co	can affect the outcome intract that can serve as hipulating the contract in ner
0 Medium					An opening that c executing the con situation	ould affect the outcome in tract in a specific
0 Minor					An opening but do the functionality o	pesn't have an impact on f the contract
1 Informational			An opening that consists information but will not risk or affect the contract			
STATUS	√ AUE	OIT PASSI	ED			



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DISCLAIMER Ryūjin

<u>ContractWolf</u> audits and reports should not be considered as a form of project's "Advertisement" and does not cover any interaction and assessment from "Project Contract" to "External Contracts" such as PancakeSwap, UniSwap, SushiSwap or similar.

ContractWolf does not provide any <u>warranty</u> on its released report and should not be used as a <u>decision</u> to invest into audited projects.

ContractWolf provides a transparent report to all its "Clients" and to its "Clients Participants" and will not claim any guarantee of bug-free code within its **SMART CONTRACT**.

ContractWolf's presence is to analyze, audit and assess the Client's Smart Contract to find any underlying risk and to eliminate any logic and flow errors within its code.

Each company or project should be liable to its security flaws and functionalities.



SCOPE OF WORK Ryūjin

Ryūjin team has agreed and provided us with the files that need to be tested (*Github, BSCscan, Etherscan, Local files etc*). The scope of audit is the main contract.

The goal of this engagement is to identify if there is a possibility of security flaws in the implementation of smart contract and its systems.

ContractWolf will be focusing on contract issues and functionalities along with the project claims from smart contract to their website, whitepaper, repository which has been provided by **Ryūjin**.



AUDITING APPROACH Ryūjin

Every line of code along with its functionalities will undergo manual review to check for security issues, quality of logic and contract scope of inheritance. The manual review will be done by our team that will document any issues that they discovered.

METHODOLOGY

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- 1. Code review that includes the following:
- Review of the specifications, sources and instructions provided to ContractWolf to make sure we understand the size, scope and functionality of the smart contract.
- Manual review of code. Our team will have a process of reading the code line-by-line with the intention of identifying potential vulnerabilities, underlying and hidden security flaws.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes:
- Testing the smart contract function with common test cases and scenarios to ensure that it returns the expected results.
- 3. Best practices and ethical review. The team will review the contract with the aim to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarifications, maintainability, security and control within the smart contract.
- 4. Recommendations to help the project take steps to eliminate or minimize threats and secure the smart contract.



TOKEN DETAILS Ryūjin



Ryūjin is the first project on Solana with a working revenue-sharing LP / Token locker

Token Name	Symbol	Decimal	Total Supply	Chain
_	_	_	_	Solana


SOURCE

Source

https://explorer.solana.com/address/FBF5kyc3xpHLvWuRwgN4uU46p5BxtjDb3VGUgksAjsZg



FINDINGS Ryūjin



This report has been prepared to state the issues and vulnerabilities for Ryūjin through this audit. The goal of this report findings is to identify specifically and fix any underlying issues and errors

ID	Title	File & Line #	Severity	Status
RCW-003	Integer Overflow and Underflow	lib.rs, L : 83	Informational	Pending



CW RUST ASSESSMENT Ryūjin

ContractWolf Vulnerability for Rust and Security Test Cases Relevant & known up-to-date issues for rust language

ID	Name	Description	Status
RCW-001	Reentrancy	a malicious contract calls back into the calling contract before the first invocation of the function is finished.	V
RCW-002	Undefined behavior	The Rust reference contains a non-exhaustive list of behaviors considered undefined in Rust	V
RCW-003	Integer overflow & underflow	Overflow/Underflow of mathematical operations inside the rust smart contract	î
RCW-004	Out of bounds read/write	The contract or function reads data past the end or before beginning of the intended buffer	V
RCW-005	Memory Corruption	Wrong usage of memory model throughout the contract or within its functions.	V
RCW-006	Typographical Error	Unintended error for contract, function names, code and arithmetic inputs	V
RCW-007	Hash Collisions With Multiple Arguments	If used incorrectly, triggers a hash collision while calling a function within a function.	✓
CVE-2021-39137	Erroneous Computation	Incorrect math calculation	V
CVE-2022-37450	Function Manipulation	Manipulation attack of time-difference values to increase rewards	V
CVE-2022-23328	Denial of Service	DDoS Attack using pending transactions	V
CVE-2022-29177	High verbosity logging	The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources.	V

ContractWolf follows the safety protocols from **NVD**(National Vulnerability Database) & **CVE Details** for **RUST Language** to assess and identify the security risk for rust smart contracts.



FIXES & RECOMMENDATION

RCW-003 Integer overflow & underflow

Code line 83 from function unlock_tokens imposes a possible overflow/underflow

```
// In lock_tokens
let unlock_at = vault.lock_at + (vault.lock_period as i64);
```

Recommendation

To solve this issue, you can add a check to prevent overflow before performing the addition (sample code and logic below)

```
// In lock_tokens
let unlock_at = vault.lock_at + (vault.lock_period as i64);
.ok_or(ValidationError::IntegerOverflow)?;
```



AUDIT COMMENTS Ryūjin

Smart Contract audit comment for a non-technical perspective

- Contract is a locker contract
- Contract is not pausable
- Owner can renounce and transfer ownership
- Owner can burn tokens
- Owner & users can mint after initial deployment
- Owner cannot set max transaction limit
- Owner cannot block users



CONTRACTWOLF

Blockchain Security - Smart Contract Audits