

Security Assessment

# **FUST Staking**

Verified on 6/30/25



#### **SUMMARY**

Project	CHAIN	N	METHODOLOGY	
FUST	Binand	ce Smart Chain	Manual & Automatic An	alysis
FILES	DELIV	/ERY	TYPE	
Single	6/30/2	5	Standard Audit	
	3 0	0 0	2 1	0
	otal Findings Critical !	Major Medium	Minor Informational	Resolved
	otal i maings officer i	viajoi	Willel	Resolved
0 Critical			An exposure that can affer functions in several event disrupt the contract	ect the contract ts that can risk and
0 Major			An opening & exposure to contract in an unwanted in	
0 Medium	An opening that could affect the outcome in executing the contract in a specific situation		ect the outcome in a specific situation	
2 Minor			An opening but doesn't h the functionality of the co	ave an impact on
1 Informational			An opening that consists not risk or affect the cont	information but will ract
0 Resolved			ContractWolf's findings had acknowledged & resolved	as been d by the project
STATUS	<b>✓</b> AUDIT PASSE	D		



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### DISCLAIMER FUST Staking

<u>ContractWolf</u> audits and reports should not be considered as a form of project's "Advertisement" and does not cover any interaction and assessment from "Project Contract" to "External Contracts" such as PancakeSwap, UniSwap, SushiSwap or similar.

**ContractWolf** does not provide any <u>warranty</u> on its released report and should not be used as a <u>decision</u> to invest into audited projects.

**ContractWolf** provides a transparent report to all its "Clients" and to its "Clients Participants" and will not claim any guarantee of bug-free code within its **SMART CONTRACT**.

**ContractWolf**'s presence is to analyze, audit and assess the Client's Smart Contract to find any underlying risk and to eliminate any logic and flow errors within its code.

Each company or project should be liable to its security flaws and functionalities.



### SCOPE OF WORK FUST Staking

**FUST's** team has agreed and provided us with the files that need to be tested (*Github*, *BSCscan*, *Etherscan*, *Local files etc*). The scope of audit is the main contract.

The goal of this engagement is to identify if there is a possibility of security flaws in the implementation of smart contract and its systems.

ContractWolf will be focusing on contract issues and functionalities along with the project claims from smart contract to their website, whitepaper, repository which has been provided by **FUST**.



### AUDITING APPROACH FUST Staking

Every line of code along with its functionalities will undergo manual review to check for security issues, quality of logic and contract scope of inheritance. The manual review will be done by our team that will document any issues that they discovered.

#### **METHODOLOGY**

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- 1. Code review that includes the following:
- Review of the specifications, sources and instructions provided to ContractWolf to make sure we understand the size, scope and functionality of the smart contract.
- Manual review of code. Our team will have a process of reading the code line-by-line with the intention of identifying potential vulnerabilities, underlying and hidden security flaws.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes:
- Testing the smart contract function with common test cases and scenarios to ensure that it returns the expected results.
- 3. Best practices and ethical review. The team will review the contract with the aim to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarifications, maintainability, security and control within the smart contract.
- Recommendations to help the project take steps to eliminate or minimize threats and secure the smart contract.



# TOKEN DETAILS | FUST Staking



FUST is a utility token with standard tokenomics which is part of the FUSD ecosystem. FUSD is an appreciating stable token due to launch in the next few weeks and FUST will be used to mine free FUSD using a staking protocol we are calling the Fusion Miner.

Token Name	Symbol	Decimal	Total Supply	Chain
-	_	-	-	Binance Smart Chain


### **SOURCE**

Source Sent Via local-files



# INHERITANCE GRAPH FUST Staking


Inheritance Graph of Contract Functions





### CALL GRAPH FUST Staking

Call Graph of Contract Functions





# FINDINGS FUST Staking



This report has been prepared to state the issues and vulnerabilities for FUST Staking through this audit. The goal of this report findings is to identify specifically and fix any underlying issues and errors

ID	Title	File & Line #	Severity	Status
SWC-128	Incorrect Reward Calculation		Minor	<ul><li>Pending</li></ul>
CW-002	Stake Time Not Reset on Top-Ups		Minor	<ul><li>Pending</li></ul>
SWC-135	Code with No Effects	L: 31	Informational	<ul><li>Pending</li></ul>



## **SWC ATTACKS** FUST Staking

Smart Contract Weakness Classification and Test Cases

ID	Description	Status
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-106	Unprotected SELF DESTRUCT Instruction	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-107	Reentrancy	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-110	Assert Violation	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>



ID	Description	Status
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Griefing	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	<ul><li>Passed</li></ul>
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	<ul> <li>Not Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-129	Typographical Error	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character(U+202E)	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-133	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Arguments	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-134	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-135	Code With No Effects	Not Passed
SWC-136	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>



### **CW ASSESSMENT** FUST Staking

ContractWolf Vulnerability and Security Tests

ID	Name	Description	Status
CW-001	Multiple Version	Presence of multiple compiler version across all contracts	<b>V</b>
CW-002	Incorrect Access Control	Additional checks for critical logic and flow	×
CW-003	Payable Contract	A function to withdraw ether should exist otherwise the ether will be trapped	<b>V</b>
CW-004	Custom Modifier	major recheck for custom modifier logic	<b>V</b>
CW-005	Divide Before Multiply	Performing multiplication before division is generally better to avoid loss of precision	<b>V</b>
CW-006	Multiple Calls	Functions with multiple internal calls	<b>V</b>
CW-007	Deprecated Keywords	Use of deprecated functions/operators such as block.blockhash() for blockhash(), msg.gas for gasleft(), throw for revert(), sha3() for keccak256(), callcode() for delegatecall(), suicide() for selfdestruct(), constant for view or var for actual type name should be avoided to prevent unintended errors with newer compiler versions	<b>V</b>
CW-008	Unused Contract	Presence of an unused, unimported or uncalled contract	<b>V</b>
CW-009	Assembly Usage	Use of EVM assembly is error-prone and should be avoided or double-checked for correctness	V
CW-010	Similar Variable Names	Variables with similar names could be confused for each other and therefore should be avoided	V
CW-011	Commented Code	Removal of commented/unused code lines	<b>V</b>
CW-012	SafeMath Override	SafeMath is no longer needed starting with Solidity v0.8+. The compiler now has built-in overflow checking.	<b>V</b>



#### **FIXES & RECOMMENDATION**

### **SWC-128** Incorrect Reward Calculation

The pendingReward function uses todayRewardPool (fixed at daily trigger) for all unclaimed days, ignoring daily reward pool decay.

This results in overestimation of rewards for past days (if not triggered every 24h)

#### Example Scenario:

If todayRewardPool = 1000 and a user has <u>2 unclaimed days</u>, they receive 2 \* (1% of 1000),

but the correct calculation should use **1000** for Day 1 and 990 (decayed amount) for Day 2.

Users claim inflated rewards, depleting the reward pool prematurely. Staking protocol sustainability is compromised.

#### Recommendation

- Implement a reward-per-share model.
- Track <u>accumulated reward per share</u> updated during daily decay.
- Store user's reward per share paid to calculate pending rewards.



### **CW-002** Stake Time does not Reset on Top-ups

Adding funds to an existing stake (stake()) does not reset user.since. The entire stake is subject to the original lockup time.

Newly added funds incur premature penalties if unstaked early.

#### Recommendation

reset user.since on top-ups or separate each stake record.





### **SWC-135** Code With No Effects

StakeInfo's rewardDebt is declared but never used.

```
struct StakeInfo {
    uint256 amount;
    uint256 since;
    uint256 claimed;
    uint256 rewardDebt; ← This code
    uint256 lastClaimedDay; // Track which day they last claimed
    uint256 totalRewardsEarned; // Track total rewards earned
    uint256 accumulatedRewards; // Track accumulated unclaimed rewards
}
```

#### Recommendation

Remove the unused storage variable to save gas.



### AUDIT COMMENTS FUST Staking

Smart Contract audit comment for a non-technical perspective

- Contract does not have taxes
- Contract cannot be paused
- Owner can transfer ownership
- Owner cannot set max transaction limit
- Owner cannot block users



# CONTRACTWOLF

**Blockchain Security - Smart Contract Audits**