

Security Assessment

Battle World NFTs

Verified on 05/21/2023



SUMMARY

Project Battle World NF	rs .	CHAIN Polygon		METHODOLOG	
FILES Single		DELIVERY 05/21/2023		TYPE Standard Audit	
	1 0	0	0	0	1
	Total Findings Critic	al Major	Medium	Minor	Informational
0 Critical	0 Pending				can affect the contract al events that can risk and ct
0 Major	0 Pending			when using the co	can affect the outcome ntract that can serve as ipulating the contract in ner
0 Medium	0 Pending			An opening that convexecuting the convexecution	ould affect the outcome in tract in a specific
0 Minor	0 Pending			An opening but do the functionality of	esn't have an impact on f the contract
1 Information	al 1 Pending			An opening that co will not risk or affe	onsists information but ct the contract

STATUS





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DISCLAIMER Battle World NFTs

<u>ContractWolf</u> audits and reports should not be considered as a form of project's "Advertisement" and does not cover any interaction and assessment from "Project Contract" to "External Contracts" such as PancakeSwap, UniSwap, SushiSwap or similar.

ContractWolf does not provide any <u>warranty</u> on its released report and should not be used as a <u>decision</u> to invest into audited projects.

ContractWolf provides a transparent report to all its "Clients" and to its "Clients Participants" and will not claim any guarantee of bug-free code within its **SMART CONTRACT**.

ContractWolf's presence is to analyze, audit and assess the Client's Smart Contract to find any underlying risk and to eliminate any logic and flow errors within its code.

Each company or project should be liable to its security flaws and functionalities.



SCOPE OF WORK Battle World NFTs

Battle World NFTs team has agreed and provided us with the files that need to be tested (*Github, BSCscan, Etherscan, Local files etc*). The scope of audit is the main contract.

The goal of this engagement is to identify if there is a possibility of security flaws in the implementation of smart contract and its systems.

ContractWolf will be focusing on contract issues and functionalities along with the project claims from smart contract to their website, whitepaper, repository which has been provided by **Battle World NFTs**.





AUDITING APPROACH Battle World NFTs

Every line of code along with its functionalities will undergo manual review to check for security issues, quality of logic and contract scope of inheritance. The manual review will be done by our team that will document any issues that they discovered.

METHODOLOGY

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- 1. Code review that includes the following:
- Review of the specifications, sources and instructions provided to ContractWolf to make sure we understand the size, scope and functionality of the smart contract.
- Manual review of code. Our team will have a process of reading the code line-by-line with the intention of identifying potential vulnerabilities, underlying and hidden security flaws.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes:
- Testing the smart contract function with common test cases and scenarios to ensure that it returns the expected results.
- 3. Best practices and ethical review. The team will review the contract with the aim to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarifications, maintainability, security and control within the smart contract.
- 4. Recommendations to help the project take steps to eliminate or minimize threats and secure the smart contract.



TOKEN DETAILS Battle World NFTs



Battle World is a Gamefi battle royale Metaverse project built on Polygon network. A globally appealing mid-core game for the masses.

Token Name	Symbol	Decimal	Total Supply	Chain
Battle World	BWO	0	_	Polygon

SOURCE


Source

0x217C0Ef13A5533Feb841f9029B7bdc536fFFf46A




INHERITANCE GRAPH Battle World NFTs

Inheritance Graph of Contract Functions





CALL GRAPH Battle World NFTs





FINDINGS Battle World NFTs

1	0	O	0	0	1
Total Findings	Critical	Major	Medium	Minor	Informational

This report has been prepared to state the issues and vulnerabilities for Battle World NFTs through this audit. The goal of this report findings is to identify specifically and fix any underlying issues and errors

ID	Title	File & Line #	Severity	Status
SWC-103	Proper Naming	battleWorld.sol, L: 95	Informational	Pending



SWC ATTACKS Battle World NFTs

Smart Contract Weakness Classification and Test Cases

ID	Description	Status
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	 Passed
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	 Passed
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	 Passed
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	 Passed
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	 Passed
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	 Passed
SWC-106	Unprotected SELF DESTRUCT Instruction	 Passed
SWC-107	Reentrancy	 Passed
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	 Passed
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	 Passed
SWC-110	Assert Violation	 Passed
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	 Passed
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	 Passed
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	 Passed
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	 Passed
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	 Passed
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	 Passed
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	 Passed
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	 Passed
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	 Passed
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	 Passed
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	 Passed
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	 Passed



ID	Description	Status
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	 Passed
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	 Passed
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	 Passed
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Griefing	 Passed
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	Passed
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	Passed
SWC-129	Typographical Error	Passed
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character(U+202E)	Passed
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	Passed
SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	Passed
SWC-133	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Arguments	Passed
SWC-134	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	Passed
SWC-135	Code With No Effects	Passed
SWC-136	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	 Passed



CW ASSESSMENT Battle World NFTs

ContractWolf Vulnerability and Security Tests

ID	Name	Description	Status
CW-001	Multiple Version	Presence of multiple compiler version across all contracts	V
CW-002	Incorrect Access Control	Additional checks for critical logic and flow	V
CW-003	Payable Contract	A function to withdraw ether should exist otherwise the ether will be trapped	V
CW-004	Custom Modifier	major recheck for custom modifier logic	V
CW-005	Divide Before Multiply	Performing multiplication before division is generally better to avoid loss of precision	V
CW-006	Multiple Calls	Functions with multiple internal calls	V
CW-007	Deprecated Keywords	Use of deprecated functions/operators such as block.blockhash() for blockhash(), msg.gas for gasleft(), throw for revert(), sha3() for keccak256(), callcode() for delegatecall(), suicide() for selfdestruct(), constant for view or var for actual type name should be avoided to prevent unintended errors with newer compiler versions	V
CW-008	Unused Contract	Presence of an unused, unimported or uncalled contract	V
CW-009	Assembly Usage	Use of EVM assembly is error-prone and should be avoided or double-checked for correctness	V
CW-010	Similar Variable Names	Variables with similar names could be confused for each other and therefore should be avoided	V
CW-011	Commented Code	Removal of commented/unused code lines	V
CW-012	SafeMath Override	SafeMath is no longer needed starting Solidity v0.8+. The compiler now has Built in overflow checking.	V



FIXES & RECOMMENDATION

Proper Naming

In the function **batchMint** The parameter **_creators** is defined as a single address, but it's used as if it represents an array of creators.

```
function batchMint(
   address _creators,
   uint256[] calldata supply
) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {
   for (uint256 i = 0; i < supply.length; i++) {
      uint256 _tokenId = _tokenIdTracker.current();
      require(_tokenId <= MaxMint, "Maximum Mint Limit Reached");
      _mint(_creators, _tokenId, supply[i], "");
      _setURI(_tokenId, _tokenId.toString());
      _tokenIdTracker.increment();
   }
}</pre>
```

Suggestion

If you intend to pass multiple creator addresses, you may need to update the parameter type and adjust the implementation accordingly.



AUDIT COMMENTS Battle World NFTs

Smart Contract audit comment for a non-technical perspective

- Owner can renounce and transfer ownership
- Owner can burn NFT
- Owner can update mint limit amount
- Owner can exclude/include addresses in approval for marketplace
- Owner can update base URI
- Owner can mint after initial deployment
- Owner can update to a new implementation contract with or without a call
- Owner can toggle pause
- Proxy contract can update to a new implementation contract with or without a call
- Owner cannot block users



CONTRACTWOLF

Blockchain Security - Smart Contract Audits