



*Security Assessment*

# Klover Network

Verified on 03/28/2023

## SUMMARY

Project

Klover Network

CHAIN

Arbitrum

METHODOLOGY

Manual &amp; Automatic Analysis

FILES

Single

DELIVERY

03/28/2023

TYPE

Standard Audit



9

0

0

0

5

4

Total Findings

Critical

Major

Medium

Minor

Informational

 0 Critical

0 Pending

An exposure that can affect the contract functions in several events that can risk and disrupt the contract

 0 Major

0 Pending

An exposure that can affect the outcome when using the contract that can serve as an opening in manipulating the contract in an unwanted manner

 0 Medium

0 Pending

An opening that could affect the outcome in executing the contract in a specific situation

 5 Minor

0 Pending

An opening but doesn't have an impact on the functionality of the contract

 4 Informational

5 Pending

An opening that consists information but will not risk or affect the contract

**STATUS**
 **AUDIT PASSED**

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## DISCLAIMER | Klover Network

**ContractWolf** audits and reports should not be considered as a form of project's "Advertisement" and does not cover any interaction and assessment from "Project Contract" to "External Contracts" such as PancakeSwap, UniSwap, SushiSwap or similar.

**ContractWolf** does not provide any warranty on its released report and should not be used as a decision to invest into audited projects.

**ContractWolf** provides a transparent report to all its "Clients" and to its "Clients Participants" and will not claim any guarantee of bug-free code within its **SMART CONTRACT**.

**ContractWolf's** presence is to analyze, audit and assess the Client's Smart Contract to find any underlying risk and to eliminate any logic and flow errors within its code.


*Each company or project should be liable to its security flaws and functionalities.*

## SCOPE OF WORK | Klover Network

**Klover Network** team has agreed and provided us with the files that need to be tested (*Github, BSCscan, Etherscan, Local files etc*). The scope of audit is the main contract.

The goal of this engagement is to identify if there is a possibility of security flaws in the implementation of smart contract and its systems.

ContractWolf will be focusing on contract issues and functionalities along with the project claims from smart contract to their website, whitepaper, repository which has been provided by **Klover Network**.



## AUDITING APPROACH | Klover Network

Every line of code along with its functionalities will undergo manual review to check for security issues, quality of logic and contract scope of inheritance. The manual review will be done by our team that will document any issues that they discovered.

### METHODOLOGY

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps :

1. Code review that includes the following :
  - Review of the specifications, sources and instructions provided to ContractWolf to make sure we understand the size, scope and functionality of the smart contract.
  - Manual review of code. Our team will have a process of reading the code line-by-line with the intention of identifying potential vulnerabilities, underlying and hidden security flaws.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes :
  - Testing the smart contract function with common test cases and scenarios to ensure that it returns the expected results.
3. Best practices and ethical review. The team will review the contract with the aim to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarifications, maintainability, security and control within the smart contract.
4. Recommendations to help the project take steps to eliminate or minimize threats and secure the smart contract.

## TOKEN DETAILS | Klover Network



Klover Network is a web3 casino aggregator empowering anyone to build a fair and transparent online casino


Token Name	Symbol	Decimal	Total Supply	Chain
KloverToken	KVN	18	289,000,000	Arbitrum

## SOURCE

Source <https://arbiscan.io/address/0xFe288714c6708A0907b7AB2B42BD8c2B7a4eC385>

# INHERITANCE GRAPH | Klover Network


Inheritance Graph of Smart Contract Functions





# CALL GRAPH | Klover Network

Inheritance Graph of Smart Contract Functions



# FINDINGS | Klover Network



9

0

0

0

5

4

Total Findings

Critical

Major

Medium

Minor

Informational

This report has been prepared to state the issues and vulnerabilities for Klover Network through this audit. The goal of this report findings is to identify specifically and fix any underlying issues and errors

ID	Title	File & Line #	Severity	Status
SWC-107	Reentrancy Attack	KloverToken.sol, L: 1889	Minor	• Pending
CW-009	Assembly Usage	KloverToken.sol, L: 2058, 2072, 2088, 3769	Minor	• Pending
SWC-135	Code With No Effects	KloverToken.sol, L: 2057, 2072	Informational	• Pending
SWC-103	Floating Pragma is set	Every line with Pragma solidity ^0.8.0;	Informational	• Pending
CW-001	Multiple Versions	Every line with Pragma solidity ^0.8.0;	Informational	• Pending

# SWC ATTACKS | Klover Network

Smart Contract Weakness Classification and Test Cases

ID	Description	Status
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	● Passed
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	● Passed
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	● Passed
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	● Not Passed
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	● Passed
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	● Passed
SWC-106	Unprotected SELF DESTRUCT Instruction	● Passed
SWC-107	Reentrancy	● Not Passed
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	● Passed
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	● Passed
SWC-110	Assert Violation	● Passed
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	● Passed
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	● Passed
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	● Passed
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	● Passed
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	● Passed
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	● Passed
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	● Passed
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	● Passed
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	● Passed
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	● Passed
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	● Passed
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	● Passed

ID	Description	Status
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	● Passed
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	● Passed
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	● Passed
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Griefing	● Passed
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	● Passed
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	● Passed
SWC-129	Typographical Error	● Passed
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character(U+202E)	● Passed
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	● Passed
SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	● Passed
SWC-133	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Arguments	● Passed
SWC-134	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	● Passed
SWC-135	Code With No Effects	● Not Passed
SWC-136	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	● Passed

# CW ASSESSMENT | Klover Network

ContractWolf Vulnerability and Security Tests

ID	Name	Description	Status
CW-001	Multiple Version	Presence of multiple compiler version across all contracts	✗
CW-002	Incorrect Access Control	Additional checks for critical logic and flow	✓
CW-003	Payable Contract	A function to withdraw ether should exist otherwise the ether will be trapped	✓
CW-004	Custom Modifier	major recheck for custom modifier logic	✓
CW-005	Divide Before Multiply	Performing multiplication before division is generally better to avoid loss of precision	✓
CW-006	Multiple Calls	Functions with multiple internal calls	✓
CW-007	Deprecated Keywords	Use of deprecated functions/operators such as block.blockhash() for blockhash(), msg.gas for gasleft(), throw for revert(), sha3() for keccak256(), callcode() for delegatecall(), suicide() for selfdestruct(), constant for view or var for actual type name should be avoided to prevent unintended errors with newer compiler versions	✓
CW-008	Unused Contract	Presence of an unused, unimported or uncalled contract	✓
CW-009	Assembly Usage	Use of EVM assembly is error-prone and should be avoided or double-checked for correctness	✗
CW-010	Similar Variable Names	Variables with similar names could be confused for each other and therefore should be avoided	✓
CW-011	Commented Code	Removal of commented/unused code lines	✓
CW-012	SafeMath Override	SafeMath is no longer needed starting Solidity v0.8+. The compiler now has Built in overflow checking.	✓

## FIXES & RECOMMENDATION

### SWC-107 | Reentrancy

Function Flashloan requires a reentrancy

```
function flashLoan(
    IERC3156FlashBorrower receiver,
    address token,
    uint256 amount,
    bytes calldata data
) public virtual override returns (bool) {
    require(amount <= maxFlashLoan(token), "ERC20FlashMint: amount exceeds maxFlashLoan");
    uint256 fee = flashFee(token, amount);
    _mint(address(receiver), amount);
    require(
        receiver.onFlashLoan(msg.sender, token, amount, fee, data) == _RETURN_VALUE,
        "ERC20FlashMint: invalid return value"
    );
    address flashFeeReceiver = _flashFeeReceiver();
    _spendAllowance(address(receiver), address(this), amount + fee);
    if (fee == 0 || flashFeeReceiver == address(0)) {
        _burn(address(receiver), amount + fee);
    } else {
        _burn(address(receiver), amount);
        _transfer(address(receiver), flashFeeReceiver, fee);
    }
    return true;
}
```

### Recommendation

Make sure all internal state changes are performed before the call is executed. This is known as the Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern.

## CW-009 | Assembly Usage

```
function unsafeAccess(address[] storage arr, uint256 pos) internal pure returns  
(StorageSlot.AddressSlot storage) {
```

```
function unsafeAccess(bytes32[] storage arr, uint256 pos) internal pure returns  
(StorageSlot.Bytes32Slot storage) {  
    bytes32 slot;
```

and

```
function unsafeAccess(uint256[] storage arr, uint256 pos) internal pure returns  
(StorageSlot.Uint256Slot storage) {  
    bytes32 slot;
```

### Recommendation

Use of EVM assembly is error-prone and should be avoided or double-checked for correctness.

## SWC-135 | Code With No Effects

```
function unsafeAccess(address[] storage arr, uint256 pos) internal pure returns  
(StorageSlot.AddressSlot storage) {  
    bytes32 slot;
```

and

```
function unsafeAccess(bytes32[] storage arr, uint256 pos) internal pure returns  
(StorageSlot.Bytes32Slot storage) {  
    bytes32 slot;  
    /// @solidity memory-safe-assembly  
    assembly {  
        mstore(0, arr.slot)  
        slot := add(keccak256(0, 0x20), pos)  
    }  
    return slot.getBytes32Slot();  
}
```

### Recommendation

Code above is not being used and should be removed to ensure the correct behavior of the contract



## SWC-103 | A Floating Pragma is Set

```
// SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED  
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
```

The compiler version should be a fixed one to avoid undiscovered compiler bugs. Fixed version sample below

```
// SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED  
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
```

## CW-001 | Multiple Version

A single line using a different compiler version has been found ;  
Version **^0.8.0** has been used across the contracts and found one using a different version exactly at Line 3781.

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.9;
```



## AUDIT COMMENTS | Klover Network

Smart Contract audit comment for a non-technical perspective

- Contract is pausable
- Owner can renounce and transfer ownership
- Owner can burn tokens
- Owner cannot mint after initial deployment
- Owner cannot set max transaction limit
- Owner cannot block users





# **CONTRACTWOLF**

**Blockchain Security - Smart Contract Audits**