

Security Assessment

MegaBase

Verified on 10/7/25



SUMMARY

Project	CHAIN	METHODOLOGY
MegaBase	Base	Manual & Automatic Analysis
FILES Single	DELIVERY 10/7/25	TYPE Standard Audit
To	2 0 0 otal Findings Critical Major	O 1 1 O Medium Minor Informational Resolved
0 Critical		An exposure that can affect the contract functions in several events that can risk and disrupt the contract An opening & exposure to manipulate the
0 Major	contract in an unwanted manner	
O Medium An opening that could affect the executing the contract in a speci		
1 Minor	An opening but doesn't have an impact on the functionality of the contract	
1 Informational An opening that consists inform not risk or affect the contract		
0 Resolved	O Resolved ContractWolf's findings has been acknowledged & resolved by the pro	
STATUS	✓ AUDIT PASSED	



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DISCLAIMER | MegaBase

<u>ContractWolf</u> audits and reports should not be considered as a form of project's "Advertisement" and does not cover any interaction and assessment from "Project Contract" to "External Contracts" such as PancakeSwap, UniSwap, SushiSwap or similar.

ContractWolf does not provide any <u>warranty</u> on its released report and should not be used as a <u>decision</u> to invest into audited projects.

ContractWolf provides a transparent report to all its "Clients" and to its "Clients Participants" and will not claim any guarantee of bug-free code within its **SMART CONTRACT**.

ContractWolf's presence is to analyze, audit and assess the Client's Smart Contract to find any underlying risk and to eliminate any logic and flow errors within its code.

Each company or project should be liable to its security flaws and functionalities.



SCOPE OF WORK | MegaBase

MegaBase team has agreed and provided us with the files that need to be tested (*Github*, *BSCscan*, *Etherscan*, *Local files etc*). The scope of audit is the main contract.

The goal of this engagement is to identify if there is a possibility of security flaws in the implementation of smart contract and its systems.

ContractWolf will be focusing on contract issues and functionalities along with the project claims from smart contract to their website, whitepaper, repository which has been provided by **MegaBase**.



AUDITING APPROACH MegaBase

Every line of code along with its functionalities will undergo manual review to check for security issues, quality of logic and contract scope of inheritance. The manual review will be done by our team that will document any issues that they discovered.

METHODOLOGY

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- Code review that includes the following :
- Review of the specifications, sources and instructions provided to ContractWolf to make sure we understand the size, scope and functionality of the smart contract.
- Manual review of code. Our team will have a process of reading the code line-by-line with the intention of identifying potential vulnerabilities, underlying and hidden security flaws.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes:
- Testing the smart contract function with common test cases and scenarios to ensure that it returns the expected results.
- 3. Best practices and ethical review. The team will review the contract with the aim to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarifications, maintainability, security and control within the smart contract.
- 4. Recommendations to help the project take steps to eliminate or minimize threats and secure the smart contract.



TOKEN DETAILS | MegaBase



MegaBase is a purpose-driven cryptocurrency built on a foundation of stability and community. Featuring a unique progressive protection protocol, holder's rewards and giveaway drawing.

Token Name	Symbol	Decimal	Total Supply	Chain
MegaBase	\$MGBS	18	600,000,000,000,000	Base

SOURCE

Source

0xf8b3116F4F7fCDB8482980a25a5c8631EA0AFeb6



FINDINGS MegaBase



This report has been prepared to state the issues and vulnerabilities for MegaBase through this audit. The goal of this report findings is to identify specifically and fix any underlying issues and errors

ID	Title	File & Line #	Severity	Status
SWC-103	Floating Pragma is set	MegaBase.sol	Informational	Pending
CW-003	Payable Contract	MegaBase.sol	Minor	Pending



SWC ATTACKS MegaBase

Smart Contract Weakness Classification and Test Cases

ID	Description	Status
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	 Passed
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	 Passed
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	 Passed
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	 Not Passed
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	 Passed
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	 Passed
SWC-106	Unprotected SELF DESTRUCT Instruction	 Passed
SWC-107	Reentrancy	 Passed
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	 Passed
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	 Passed
SWC-110	Assert Violation	 Passed
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	 Passed
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	 Passed
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	 Passed
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	 Passed
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	 Passed
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	 Passed
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	Passed
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	 Passed
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	 Passed
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	 Passed
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	 Passed
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	 Passed



ID	Description	Status
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	 Passed
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	 Passed
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	 Passed
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Griefing	 Passed
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	Passed
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	Passed
SWC-129	Typographical Error	Passed
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character(U+202E)	Passed
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	Passed
SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	Passed
SWC-133	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Arguments	 Passed
SWC-134	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	 Passed
SWC-135	Code With No Effects	 Passed
SWC-136	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	 Passed



ContractWolf Vulnerability and Security Tests

ID	Name	Description	Status
CW-001	Multiple Version	Presence of multiple compiler version across all contracts	V
CW-002	Incorrect Access Control	Additional checks for critical logic and flow	V
CW-003	Payable Contract	A function to withdraw ether should exist otherwise the ether will be trapped	×
CW-004	Custom Modifier	major recheck for custom modifier logic	V
CW-005	Divide Before Multiply	Performing multiplication before division is generally better to avoid loss of precision	V
CW-006	Multiple Calls	Functions with multiple internal calls	V
CW-007	Deprecated Keywords	Use of deprecated functions/operators such as block.blockhash() for blockhash(), msg.gas for gasleft(), throw for revert(), sha3() for keccak256(), callcode() for delegatecall(), suicide() for selfdestruct(), constant for view or var for actual type name should be avoided to prevent unintended errors with newer compiler versions	V
CW-008	Unused Contract	Presence of an unused, unimported or uncalled contract	V
CW-009	Assembly Usage	Use of EVM assembly is error-prone and should be avoided or double-checked for correctness	V
CW-010	Similar Variable Names	Variables with similar names could be confused for each other and therefore should be avoided	V
CW-011	Commented Code	Removal of commented/unused code lines	V
CW-012	SafeMath Override	SafeMath is no longer needed starting with Solidity v0.8+. The compiler now has built-in overflow checking.	V



SWC-103 A Floating Pragma is Set

Code

pragma solidity ^0.8.17;

The compiler version should be a fixed one to avoid undiscovered compiler bugs. Fixed version sample below

pragma solidity 0.8.17;



Code

```
receive() external payable {}
```

The contract can receive ETH but has no withdrawal function. Any ETH sent directly to the contract or leftover from rounding errors in tax distributions will be permanently locked with no recovery mechanism.

```
function withdrawStuckETH(address to, uint256 amount) external onlyOwner {
    require(to != address(0), "Cannot withdraw to zero address");
    require(amount <= address(this).balance, "Insufficient ETH balance");
    (bool success, ) = payable(to).call{value: amount}("");
    require(success, "ETH transfer failed");
    emit ETHWithdrawn(to, amount);
}
event ETHWithdrawn(address indexed to, uint256 amount);</pre>
```



- Contract has fixed fees, owner can dynamically change the distribution percentage
- Owner can renounce and transfer ownership
- Owner can start the trading
- Owner can update main pair address
- Owner can update tax receivers
- Owner can update max transaction and max wallet amount not lower than .01% of total supply
- Owner cannot mint after initial deployment
- Owner cannot burn
- Owner cannot pause contract
- Owner cannot block users



CONTRACTWOLF

Blockchain Security - Smart Contract Audits