



Security Assessment

VybeSale Lock

Verified on 12/22/2025

SUMMARY

Project

VybeSale Lock

CHAIN

METHODOLOGY

Manual & Automatic Analysis

FILES

Single

DELIVERY

12/22/2025

TYPE

Standard Audit



5

0

1

0

2

2

5

Total Findings

Critical

Major

Medium

Minor

Informational

Resolved

■ 0 Critical

An exposure that can affect the contract functions in several events that can risk and disrupt the contract

■ 1 Major

An opening & exposure to manipulate the contract in an unwanted manner

■ 0 Medium

An opening that could affect the outcome in executing the contract in a specific situation

■ 2 Minor

An opening but doesn't have an impact on the functionality of the contract

■ 2 Informational

An opening that consists information but will not risk or affect the contract

■ 5 Resolved

ContractWolf's findings has been acknowledged & resolved by the project

STATUS
✓ **AUDIT PASSED**

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DISCLAIMER | VybeSale Lock

ContractWolf audits and reports should not be considered as a form of project's "Advertisement" and does not cover any interaction and assessment from "Project Contract" to "External Contracts" such as PancakeSwap, UniSwap, SushiSwap or similar.

ContractWolf does not provide any warranty on its released report and should not be used as a decision to invest into audited projects.

ContractWolf provides a transparent report to all its "Clients" and to its "Clients Participants" and will not claim any guarantee of bug-free code within its **SMART CONTRACT**.

ContractWolf's presence is to analyze, audit and assess the Client's Smart Contract to find any underlying risk and to eliminate any logic and flow errors within its code.

Each company or project should be liable to its security flaws and functionalities.

SCOPE OF WORK | VybeSale Lock

VybeSale Lock team has agreed and provided us with the files that need to be tested (*Github, BSCscan, Etherscan, Local files etc*). The scope of audit is the main contract.

The goal of this engagement is to identify if there is a possibility of security flaws in the implementation of smart contract and its systems.

ContractWolf will be focusing on contract issues and functionalities along with the project claims from smart contract to their website, whitepaper, repository which has been provided by **VybeSale Lock**.

AUDITING APPROACH | VybeSale Lock

Every line of code along with its functionalities will undergo manual review to check for security issues, quality of logic and contract scope of inheritance. The manual review will be done by our team that will document any issues that they discovered.

METHODOLOGY

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps :

1. Code review that includes the following :
 - Review of the specifications, sources and instructions provided to ContractWolf to make sure we understand the size, scope and functionality of the smart contract.
 - Manual review of code. Our team will have a process of reading the code line-by-line with the intention of identifying potential vulnerabilities, underlying and hidden security flaws.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes :
 - Testing the smart contract function with common test cases and scenarios to ensure that it returns the expected results.
3. Best practices and ethical review. The team will review the contract with the aim to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarifications, maintainability, security and control within the smart contract.
4. Recommendations to help the project take steps to eliminate or minimize threats and secure the smart contract.

TOKEN DETAILS | VybeSale Lock



A multi-chain launchpad. Run presales, fair launches, or let us build your custom token. Comes with built-in LP locker, token locker, airdrop tool, and optional professional auditing. Launch safer, faster, across every major chain.



FINDINGS | VybeSale Lock



This report has been prepared to state the issues and vulnerabilities for VybeSale Lock through this audit. The goal of this report findings is to identify specifically and fix any underlying issues and errors

| ID | Title | File & Line # | Severity | Status |
|---------|-------------------------------------|--|---------------|---|
| N/A | Unprotected init() Function | TokenLock.sol, TockenLockNormal.sol, , LiquidityLock.sol, VestingLock.sol | Major | ● Resolved |
| N/A | Missing Validation for cyclePercent | VestingLock.sol, LockFactory.sol | Minor | ● Resolved |
| N/A | Missing Validation for unlockDate | TokenLock.sol, TockenLockNormal.sol, , LiquidityLock.sol, VestingLock.sol | Minor | ● Resolved |
| SWC-103 | Floating Pragma is set | TokenLock.sol, TockenLockNormal.sol, , LiquidityLock.sol, VestingLock.sol | Informational | ● Resolved |
| SWC-131 | Presence of Unused Variables | TokenLock.sol, TockenLockNormal.sol, , LiquidityLock.sol, VestingLock.sol | Informational | ● Resolved |

SWC ATTACKS

VybeSale Lock

Smart Contract Weakness Classification and Test Cases

| ID | Description | Status |
|---------|---|---|
| SWC-100 | Function Default Visibility | ● Passed |
| SWC-101 | Integer Overflow and Underflow | ● Passed |
| SWC-102 | Outdated Compiler Version | ● Passed |
| SWC-103 | FloatingPragma | ● Passed |
| SWC-104 | Unchecked Call Return Value | ● Passed |
| SWC-105 | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal | ● Passed |
| SWC-106 | Unprotected SELF DESTRUCT Instruction | ● Passed |
| SWC-107 | Reentrancy | ● Passed |
| SWC-108 | State Variable Default Visibility | ● Passed |
| SWC-109 | Uninitialized Storage Pointer | ● Passed |
| SWC-110 | Assert Violation | ● Passed |
| SWC-111 | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions | ● Passed |
| SWC-112 | Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee | ● Passed |
| SWC-113 | DoS with Failed Call | ● Passed |
| SWC-114 | Transaction Order Dependence | ● Passed |
| SWC-115 | Authorization through tx.origin | ● Passed |
| SWC-116 | Block values as a proxy for time | ● Passed |
| SWC-117 | Signature Malleability | ● Passed |
| SWC-118 | Incorrect Constructor Name | ● Passed |
| SWC-119 | Shadowing State Variables | ● Passed |
| SWC-120 | Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes | ● Passed |
| SWC-121 | Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks | ● Passed |
| SWC-122 | Lack of Proper Signature Verification | ● Passed |

| ID | Description | Status |
|---------|--|----------|
| SWC-123 | Requirement Violation | ● Passed |
| SWC-124 | Write to Arbitrary Storage Location | ● Passed |
| SWC-125 | Incorrect Inheritance Order | ● Passed |
| SWC-126 | Insufficient Gas Griefing | ● Passed |
| SWC-127 | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable | ● Passed |
| SWC-128 | DoS With Block Gas Limit | ● Passed |
| SWC-129 | Typographical Error | ● Passed |
| SWC-130 | Right-To-Left-Override control character(U+202E) | ● Passed |
| SWC-131 | Presence of unused variables | ● Passed |
| SWC-132 | Unexpected Ether balance | ● Passed |
| SWC-133 | Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Arguments | ● Passed |
| SWC-134 | Message call with hardcoded gas amount | ● Passed |
| SWC-135 | Code With No Effects | ● Passed |
| SWC-136 | Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain | ● Passed |

CW ASSESSMENT

VybeSale Lock

ContractWolf Vulnerability and Security Tests

| ID | Name | Description | Status |
|--------|--------------------------|--|--------|
| CW-001 | Multiple Version | Presence of multiple compiler version across all contracts | ✓ |
| CW-002 | Incorrect Access Control | Additional checks for critical logic and flow | ✓ |
| CW-003 | Payable Contract | A function to withdraw ether should exist otherwise the ether will be trapped | ✓ |
| CW-004 | Custom Modifier | major recheck for custom modifier logic | ✓ |
| CW-005 | Divide Before Multiply | Performing multiplication before division is generally better to avoid loss of precision | ✓ |
| CW-006 | Multiple Calls | Functions with multiple internal calls | ✓ |
| CW-007 | Deprecated Keywords | Use of deprecated functions/operators such as block.blockhash() for blockhash(), msg.gas for gasleft(), throw for revert(), sha3() for keccak256(), callcode() for delegatecall(), suicide() for selfdestruct(), constant for view or var for actual type name should be avoided to prevent unintended errors with newer compiler versions | ✓ |
| CW-008 | Unused Contract | Presence of an unused, unimported or uncalled contract | ✓ |
| CW-009 | Assembly Usage | Use of EVM assembly is error-prone and should be avoided or double-checked for correctness | ✓ |
| CW-010 | Similar Variable Names | Variables with similar names could be confused for each other and therefore should be avoided | ✓ |
| CW-011 | Commented Code | Removal of commented/unused code lines | ✓ |
| CW-012 | SafeMath Override | SafeMath is no longer needed starting with Solidity v0.8+. The compiler now has built-in overflow checking. | ✓ |

FIXES & RECOMMENDATION

SWC-103 | A FloatingPragma is Set

Code

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.17;
```

The compiler version should be a fixed one to avoid undiscovered compiler bugs. Fixed version sample below

```
pragma solidity 0.8.17;
```

SWC-131 | Presence of unused variables

Code

```
// In TokenLockNormal.sol
event LogWithdrawReflections(address to, uint256 amount);
event LogWithdrawDividends(address to, uint256 dividends);
event LogReceive(address from, uint256 value);

// In LockFactory.sol
address public saleFactory;

// In all lock contracts
modifier onlyOwnerOrFactory() {
    require(
        msg.sender == owner || msg.sender == lockFactory,
        "ONLY_OWNER_OR_FACTORY"
    );
    _;
}
```

Recommendation

Unused variables are allowed in Solidity and they do not pose a direct security issue. It is best practice though to avoid them

Unprotected init() Function

The init() function is public, allowing anyone to front-run the factory and initialize clones with malicious parameters, potentially causing fund loss.

```
function init(
    address _owner,
    uint256 _unlockDate,
    uint256 _amount,
    address _token,
    address _factory,
    string memory _logoImage
) public {
    require(_owner != address(0), "ADDRESS_ZERO");
    require(isInitialized == false, "Already initialized");
    owner = _owner;
    // rest of initialization
}
```

Recommendation

Add `require(_factory == msg.sender, "ONLY_FACTORY")` and `require(_factory != address(0), "FACTORY_ZERO")` at the beginning of init() in all lock contracts to ensure only the factory can initialize clones.

Missing Validation for cyclePercent

If `cyclePercent = 0` and `tgePercent < 100`, the vesting loop runs infinitely. Very small cyclePercent values can create thousands of cycles, causing gas limit failures.

```
function _isValidVested(
    uint256 tgePercent,
    uint256 cyclePercent
) internal pure returns (bool) {
    return tgePercent + cyclePercent <= 100;
}

function _initializeVested(
    uint256 amount,
    uint256 unlockDate,
    uint256 tgePercent,
    uint256 cycle,
    uint256 cyclePercent
) internal {
    //
    while (tempAmount > 0) {
        uint256 vestCycleValue = tempAmount > cycleValue
            ? cycleValue
            : tempAmount;
        // loop continues
    }
}
```

Recommendation

In `_isValidVested()`, add `require(cyclePercent > 0, "CYCLE_PERCENT_ZERO")` when `tgePercent < 100`. In `_initializeVested()`, add a maximum cycles limit (e.g., 1000) with a counter to prevent gas griefing attacks.

Missing Validation for Unlock Date

The init() function doesn't validate that `_unlockDate` is in the future, allowing users to create locks that are immediately withdrawable.

```
function init(
    address _owner,
    uint256 _unlockDate,
    uint256 _amount,
    address _token,
    address _factory,
    string memory _logoImage
) public {
    require(_owner != address(0), "ADDRESS_ZERO");
    require(isInitialized == false, "Already initialized");
    // No validation for _unlockDate
    lockInfo.unlockDate = _unlockDate;
    //
}
```

Recommendation

Add `require(_unlockDate > block.timestamp, "UNLOCK_DATE_IN_PAST")` and `require(_amount > 0, "AMOUNT_ZERO")` in the init() function of all lock contracts to ensure valid future unlock dates and non-zero amounts.

AUDIT COMMENTS | VybeSale Lock

Smart Contract audit comment for a non-technical perspective

LockFactory

- Owner can exempt users from fees
- Owner can set TokenLock fee
- Owner can set VestingLock fee
- Owner can transfer ownership
- Admin can set factory addresses
- Admin can set normal fee
- Admin can set liquidity fee
- Admin can set vesting fee
- Admin can set reward fee
- Admin can set fee receiver
- SaleFactory can set free lock for sales
- Anyone can create locks (with fees)
- Owner cannot pause contract
- Owner cannot renounce ownership
- Owner cannot burn tokens
- Owner cannot mint tokens
- Owner cannot set taxes
- Owner cannot set max transaction limit
- Owner cannot block users

TokenLock

- Owner can extend lock time
- Owner can update logo
- Owner can unlock tokens after unlock date
- Owner can withdraw reflections
- Owner can withdraw dividends (other tokens)
- Owner can withdraw BNB
- Owner can transfer and transfer ownership
- Owner cannot unlock before unlock date
- Owner cannot withdraw locked tokens
- Owner cannot change unlock date to past
- Owner cannot pause contract
- Owner cannot burn tokens
- Owner cannot mint tokens
- Owner cannot set taxes
- Owner cannot set max transaction limit

- Owner cannot block users

TokenLockNormal

- Owner can extend lock time
- Owner can update logo
- Owner can unlock tokens after unlock date
- Owner can withdraw BNB
- Owner can transfer and transfer ownership
- Owner cannot withdraw reflections (function doesn't exist)
- Owner cannot withdraw dividends (function doesn't exist)
- Owner cannot unlock before unlock date
- Owner cannot pause contract
- Owner cannot burn tokens
- Owner cannot mint tokens
- Owner cannot set taxes
- Owner cannot set max transaction limit
- Owner cannot block users

LiquidityLock

- Owner can extend lock time
- Owner can update logo
- Owner can unlock LP tokens after unlock date
- Owner can withdraw BNB
- Owner can transfer and transfer ownership
- Owner cannot withdraw reflections (function doesn't exist)
- Owner cannot withdraw dividends (function doesn't exist)
- Owner cannot unlock before unlock date
- Owner cannot pause contract
- Owner cannot burn tokens
- Owner cannot mint tokens
- Owner cannot set taxes
- Owner cannot set max transaction limit
- Owner cannot block users

VestingLock

- Owner can update logo
- Owner can unlock vesting tokens after unlock date
- Owner can withdraw reflections
- Owner can withdraw dividends (other tokens)
- Owner can withdraw BNB
- Owner can transfer and transfer ownership
- Owner cannot extend lock time (function doesn't exist)

- Owner cannot unlock before unlock date
- Owner cannot change vesting parameters
- Owner cannot pause contract
- Owner cannot burn tokens
- Owner cannot mint tokens
- Owner cannot set taxes
- Owner cannot set max transaction limit
- Owner cannot block users





CONTRACTWOLF

Blockchain Security - Smart Contract Audits