



Security Assessment

NOXA

Verified on 10/5/25

SUMMARY

Project

NOXA

CHAIN

Binance Smart Chain

METHODOLOGY

Manual & Automatic Analysis

FILES

Single

DELIVERY

10/5/25

TYPE

Standard Audit



4

1

1

2

0

0

0

Total Findings

Critical

Major

Medium

Minor

Informational

Resolved

1 Critical

An exposure that can affect the contract functions in several events that can risk and disrupt the contract

1 Major

An opening & exposure to manipulate the contract in an unwanted manner

2 Medium

An opening that could affect the outcome in executing the contract in a specific situation

0 Minor

An opening but doesn't have an impact on the functionality of the contract

0 Informational

An opening that consists information but will not risk or affect the contract

0 Resolved

ContractWolf's findings has been acknowledged & resolved by the project

STATUS
 **AUDIT PASSED**

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DISCLAIMER | NOXA

ContractWolf audits and reports should not be considered as a form of project's "Advertisement" and does not cover any interaction and assessment from "Project Contract" to "External Contracts" such as PancakeSwap, UniSwap, SushiSwap or similar.

ContractWolf does not provide any warranty on its released report and should not be used as a decision to invest into audited projects.

ContractWolf provides a transparent report to all its "Clients" and to its "Clients Participants" and will not claim any guarantee of bug-free code within its **SMART CONTRACT**.

ContractWolf's presence is to analyze, audit and assess the Client's Smart Contract to find any underlying risk and to eliminate any logic and flow errors within its code.


Each company or project should be liable to its security flaws and functionalities.

SCOPE OF WORK | NOXA

NOXA team has agreed and provided us with the files that need to be tested (*Github, BSCscan, Etherscan, Local files etc*). The scope of audit is the main contract.

The goal of this engagement is to identify if there is a possibility of security flaws in the implementation of smart contract and its systems.

ContractWolf will be focusing on contract issues and functionalities along with the project claims from smart contract to their website, whitepaper, repository which has been provided by **NOXA**.



AUDITING APPROACH | NOXA

Every line of code along with its functionalities will undergo manual review to check for security issues, quality of logic and contract scope of inheritance. The manual review will be done by our team that will document any issues that they discovered.

METHODOLOGY

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps :

1. Code review that includes the following :
 - Review of the specifications, sources and instructions provided to ContractWolf to make sure we understand the size, scope and functionality of the smart contract.
 - Manual review of code. Our team will have a process of reading the code line-by-line with the intention of identifying potential vulnerabilities, underlying and hidden security flaws.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes :
 - Testing the smart contract function with common test cases and scenarios to ensure that it returns the expected results.
3. Best practices and ethical review. The team will review the contract with the aim to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarifications, maintainability, security and control within the smart contract.
4. Recommendations to help the project take steps to eliminate or minimize threats and secure the smart contract.

TOKEN DETAILS | NOXA



The best, fastest, DeFi primitives for the fearless degens. Colonizing all popular chains with our ecosystem of dApps.

Token Name

NOXA

Symbol

NOXA

Decimal

-

Total Supply

-

Chain

Multichain

SOURCE

Source

Sent Via local-files

FINDINGS

NOXA



4

1

1

2

0

0

0

Total Findings

Critical

Major

Medium

Minor

Informational

Resolved

This report has been prepared to state the issues and vulnerabilities for NOXA through this audit. The goal of this report findings is to identify specifically and fix any underlying issues and errors

ID	Title	File & Line #	Severity	Status
N/A	Pool Creation Front-Running	LauncherFactory.sol, L: 277	Critical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acknowledged
N/A	Zero Slippage Protection	LauncherFactory.sol, L: 469, 485	Major	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acknowledged
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	LauncherToken.sol, L: 117, 118, 122	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acknowledged
N/A	Inverted maxTxBps Validation Logic	LauncherToken.sol, L: 434	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acknowledged

SWC ATTACKS | NOXA

Smart Contract Weakness Classification and Test Cases

ID	Description	Status
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	● Passed
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	● Passed
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	● Passed
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	● Passed
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	● Passed
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	● Passed
SWC-106	Unprotected SELF DESTRUCT Instruction	● Passed
SWC-107	Reentrancy	● Passed
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	● Passed
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	● Passed
SWC-110	Assert Violation	● Passed
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	● Passed
SWC-112	Delegate call to Untrusted Callee	● Passed
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	● Passed
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	● Passed
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	● Not Passed
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	● Passed
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	● Passed
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	● Passed
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	● Passed
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	● Passed
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	● Passed
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	● Passed

ID	Description	Status
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	● Passed
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	● Passed
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	● Passed
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Griefing	● Passed
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	● Passed
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	● Passed
SWC-129	Typographical Error	● Passed
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character(U+202E)	● Passed
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	● Passed
SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	● Passed
SWC-133	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Arguments	● Passed
SWC-134	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	● Passed
SWC-135	Code With No Effects	● Passed
SWC-136	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	● Passed

CW ASSESSMENT | NOXA

ContractWolf Vulnerability and Security Tests

ID	Name	Description	Status
CW-001	Multiple Version	Presence of multiple compiler version across all contracts	✓
CW-002	Incorrect Access Control	Additional checks for critical logic and flow	✓
CW-003	Payable Contract	A function to withdraw ether should exist otherwise the ether will be trapped	✓
CW-004	Custom Modifier	major recheck for custom modifier logic	✓
CW-005	Divide Before Multiply	Performing multiplication before division is generally better to avoid loss of precision	✓
CW-006	Multiple Calls	Functions with multiple internal calls	✓
CW-007	Deprecated Keywords	Use of deprecated functions/operators such as block.blockhash() for blockhash(), msg.gas for gasleft(), throw for revert(), sha3() for keccak256(), callcode() for delegatecall(), suicide() for selfdestruct(), constant for view or var for actual type name should be avoided to prevent unintended errors with newer compiler versions	✓
CW-008	Unused Contract	Presence of an unused, unimported or uncalled contract	✓
CW-009	Assembly Usage	Use of EVM assembly is error-prone and should be avoided or double-checked for correctness	✓
CW-010	Similar Variable Names	Variables with similar names could be confused for each other and therefore should be avoided	✓
CW-011	Commented Code	Removal of commented/unused code lines	✓
CW-012	SafeMath Override	SafeMath is no longer needed starting with Solidity v0.8+. The compiler now has built-in overflow checking.	✓

FIXES & RECOMMENDATION

Pool Creation Front-Running

```
// LauncherFactory.sol
if (IUniswapV3Factory(dex.factory)
    .getPool(poolParams.token0, poolParams.token1, dex.poolFee)
    != address(0))
{
    revert PoolAlreadyExists();
}

address pool = IUniswapV3Factory(poolFactory)
    .createPool(params.token0, params.token1, poolFee);
```

During the token launch, the contract creates a new liquidity pool immediately after deploying the token using **CREATE2**, which generates a predictable address. Because this transaction and its parameters are visible in the public mempool before confirmation, bots can detect the pending launch, calculate the token's future address, and front-run the transaction by creating the same pool first. This causes your launch transaction to revert with `PoolAlreadyExists()` and results in a failed or delayed token launch.

Recommendation

To prevent this type of front-running, the launch transaction should be submitted through a private RPC relay such as Flashbots or MEV-Blocker instead of the public mempool. Using a private submission keeps the token's deployment details hidden until the transaction is mined, ensuring no one can calculate the token address or pre-create its pool ahead of the legitimate launch.

Zero Slippage Protection

```
// LauncherFactory.sol
router.exactInputSingle{ value: amountIn }(
  ISwapRouter02.ExactInputSingleParams({
    tokenIn: weth,
    tokenOut: token,
    fee: poolFee,
    recipient: recipient,
    amountIn: amountIn,
    amountOutMinimum: 0, // ✗ No slippage protection
    sqrtPriceLimitX96: 0
  })
);
```

The initial buy uses `amountOutMinimum = 0`, which tells the swap to accept any token output amount. Because this transaction is visible in the public mempool before it's mined, MEV bots can front-run and manipulate the price, causing the deployer to receive far fewer tokens and lose potential funds during the launch.

Recommendation

Mitigated if using private RPC to prevent front running attacks, or add a `minTokensOut` parameter and replace `amountOutMinimum = 0` with `amountOutMinimum = minTokensOut` to enforce a minimum output amount and protect the initial buy from slippage

Authorization through tx.origin

```
// LauncherToken.sol
if (from == pool && to != launchFactory && to != _tokenInfo.deployer) {
    uint256 newTotal = tokensFromPoolPerOrigin[tx.origin] + value; // ✗ Uses tx.origin
    tokensFromPoolPerOrigin[tx.origin] = newTotal;
    ...
}
```

The contract uses tx.origin to track and limit token purchases, which links authorization to the original transaction sender instead of the immediate caller. This can be abused through intermediary contracts that relay calls on behalf of others, bypassing restrictions, and also breaks compatibility with smart-contract wallets such as Gnosis Safe or account-abstraction wallets.

Recommendation

Replace tx.origin with msg.sender or track limits by recipient (to) to ensure restrictions apply to the correct address. This prevents bypassing through relay contracts and maintains compatibility with smart-contract wallets.

Inverted maxTxBps Validation Logic

```
// LauncherFactory.sol  
if (config.maxTxBps < config.maxWalletBps) revert InvalidBasisPoints();  
// ❌ Inverted logic
```

The validation logic mistakenly reverts when the maximum transaction percentage (maxTxBps) is smaller than the maximum wallet percentage (maxWalletBps). This forces maxTxBps to be greater than or equal to maxWalletBps, which contradicts normal anti-whale rules where individual transactions should be smaller than the total allowed wallet size. As a result, valid configurations such as a 0.5 % transaction limit and a 2 % wallet limit would incorrectly revert.

Reverse the comparison to correctly require the maximum transaction limit to be less than or equal to the wallet limit, ensuring accumulation happens through multiple smaller transactions as intended:

```
if (config.maxTxBps >= config.maxWalletBps) revert InvalidBasisPoints();  
// ✅ Corrected logic
```

AUDIT COMMENTS | NOXA

Smart Contract audit comment for a non-technical perspective

LauncherFactory.sol

- Owner can set launch fee with an indefinite amount
- Owner can renounce and transfer ownership
- Owner can toggle launching of tokens
- Owner can exclude/include addresses from launch whitelist
- Owner can add DEX configurations
- Owner can toggle DEX status
- Owner can add and update launch templates
- Owner cannot mint after initial deployment
- Owner cannot burn
- Owner cannot block users
- Owner cannot change max transaction amount

LauncherLocker.sol

- Owner can update protocol fee share up to 100%
- Owner can initialize factory address
- Owner can renounce and transfer ownership
- Owner can update protocol fee receiver
- Owner can exclude/include addresses from fee collectors
- Owner cannot mint after initial deployment
- Owner cannot burn
- Owner cannot block users
- Owner cannot change max transaction amount
- Owner cannot pause contract

LauncherToken.sol

- Contract does not have owner functions



CONTRACTWOLF

Blockchain Security - Smart Contract Audits