

Security Assessment

Seagen

Verified on 11/15/2023



#### **SUMMARY**

Project		СНА	IN		METHODOLOG	Υ
Seagen		Ethereum		Manual & Autom	Manual & Automatic Analysis	
FILES Single		DELIVERY 11/15/2023		TYPE Standard Audit		
	0	0	0	0	0	3
	Total Findings	Critical	Major	Medium	Minor	Informational
0 Critical						can affect the contract al events that can risk and ct
0 Major					when using the co	can affect the outcome intract that can serve as hipulating the contract in ner
0 Medium					An opening that c executing the con situation	ould affect the outcome in tract in a specific
0 Minor					An opening but do the functionality o	pesn't have an impact on f the contract
3 Informational				An opening that consists information but will not risk or affect the contract		
STATUS	<b>√</b> AU[	OIT PASSI	ED			



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# DISCLAIMER Seagen

<u>ContractWolf</u> audits and reports should not be considered as a form of project's "Advertisement" and does not cover any interaction and assessment from "Project Contract" to "External Contracts" such as PancakeSwap, UniSwap, SushiSwap or similar.

**ContractWolf** does not provide any <u>warranty</u> on its released report and should not be used as a <u>decision</u> to invest into audited projects.

**ContractWolf** provides a transparent report to all its "Clients" and to its "Clients Participants" and will not claim any guarantee of bug-free code within its **SMART CONTRACT**.

**ContractWolf**'s presence is to analyze, audit and assess the Client's Smart Contract to find any underlying risk and to eliminate any logic and flow errors within its code.

Each company or project should be liable to its security flaws and functionalities.



# SCOPE OF WORK | Seagen

**Seagen** team has agreed and provided us with the files that need to be tested (*Github, BSCscan, Etherscan, Local files etc*). The scope of audit is the main contract.

The goal of this engagement is to identify if there is a possibility of security flaws in the implementation of smart contract and its systems.

ContractWolf will be focusing on contract issues and functionalities along with the project claims from smart contract to their website, whitepaper, repository which has been provided by **Seagen**.



### AUDITING APPROACH | Seagen

Every line of code along with its functionalities will undergo manual review to check for security issues, quality of logic and contract scope of inheritance. The manual review will be done by our team that will document any issues that they discovered.

#### **METHODOLOGY**

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- 1. Code review that includes the following:
- Review of the specifications, sources and instructions provided to ContractWolf to make sure we understand the size, scope and functionality of the smart contract.
- Manual review of code. Our team will have a process of reading the code line-by-line with the intention of identifying potential vulnerabilities, underlying and hidden security flaws.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes:
- Testing the smart contract function with common test cases and scenarios to ensure that it returns the expected results.
- 3. Best practices and ethical review. The team will review the contract with the aim to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarifications, maintainability, security and control within the smart contract.
- 4. Recommendations to help the project take steps to eliminate or minimize threats and secure the smart contract.



# TOKEN DETAILS | Seagen



Following on from our NFT analysis tool; SeaFarer. We have developed a shitcoin auditing tool. Fusing Al with web3 technology.

Token Name	Symbol	Decimal	Total Supply	Chain
Seagen	SEAGEN	18	10,000,000	Ethereum

### SOURCE

Source

0x81b52e81A6Aa714fA8A4a2a6e3492F12f2d51059



### INHERITANCE GRAPH Seagen

Inheritance Graph of Contract Functions





### CALL GRAPH Seagen

Call Graph of Contract Functions





# FINDINGS Seagen



This report has been prepared to state the issues and vulnerabilities for Seagen through this audit. The goal of this report findings is to identify specifically and fix any underlying issues and errors

ID	Title	File & Line #	Severity	Status
SWC-103	Floating Pragma is set	seageneth.sol, L:	Informational	<ul><li>Pending</li></ul>
SWC-131	Presence of Unused Variable	Seageneth.sol, L: 608, 634	Informational	<ul><li>Pending</li></ul>
CW-012	SafeMath OVerride	SafeMath.sol	Informational	<ul><li>Pending</li></ul>



# SWC ATTACKS Seagen

Smart Contract Weakness Classification and Test Cases

ID	Description	Status
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	<ul> <li>Not Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-106	Unprotected SELF DESTRUCT Instruction	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-107	Reentrancy	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-110	Assert Violation	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>



ID	Description	Status
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	<ul><li>Passed</li></ul>
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	<ul><li>Passed</li></ul>
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Griefing	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	<ul><li>Passed</li></ul>
SWC-129	Typographical Error	<ul><li>Passed</li></ul>
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character(U+202E)	<ul><li>Passed</li></ul>
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	<ul> <li>Not Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	<ul><li>Passed</li></ul>
SWC-133	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Arguments	<ul><li>Passed</li></ul>
SWC-134	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-135	Code With No Effects	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>
SWC-136	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	<ul> <li>Passed</li> </ul>



### CW ASSESSMENT Seagen

ContractWolf Vulnerability and Security Tests

ID	Name	Description	Status
CW-001	Multiple Version	Presence of multiple compiler version across all contracts	V
CW-002	Incorrect Access Control	Additional checks for critical logic and flow	<b>V</b>
CW-003	Payable Contract	A function to withdraw ether should exist otherwise the ether will be trapped	<b>V</b>
CW-004	Custom Modifier	major recheck for custom modifier logic	<b>V</b>
CW-005	Divide Before Multiply	Performing multiplication before division is generally better to avoid loss of precision	<b>V</b>
CW-006	Multiple Calls	Functions with multiple internal calls	<b>V</b>
CW-007	Deprecated Keywords	Use of deprecated functions/operators such as block.blockhash() for blockhash(), msg.gas for gasleft(), throw for revert(), sha3() for keccak256(), callcode() for delegatecall(), suicide() for selfdestruct(), constant for view or var for actual type name should be avoided to prevent unintended errors with newer compiler versions	<b>V</b>
CW-008	Unused Contract	Presence of an unused, unimported or uncalled contract	<b>V</b>
CW-009	Assembly Usage	Use of EVM assembly is error-prone and should be avoided or double-checked for correctness	<b>V</b>
CW-010	Similar Variable Names	Variables with similar names could be confused for each other and therefore should be avoided	V
CW-011	Commented Code	Removal of commented/unused code lines	V
CW-012	SafeMath Override	SafeMath is no longer needed starting with Solidity v0.8+. The compiler now has built-in overflow checking.	×



#### FIXES & RECOMMENDATION

**SWC-103** A Floating Pragma is Set

Code

pragma solidity ^0.8.17;

The compiler version should be a fixed one to avoid undiscovered compiler bugs. Fixed version sample below

pragma solidity 0.8.17;



# **SWC-131** Presence of Unused Variable

Code

```
Uint256 private _tfeeTotal;
uint256 private _previousMaxTxAmount;
```

Unused Variables should be removed to save gas, and also improve the codebase cleanliness and readability.



### **cw-012** | SafeMath Override

### library SafeMath

SafeMath is no longer needed starting Solidity v0.8+. The compiler now has Built in overflow checking.



Owner can pause trading if max transaction amount is updated to 0

```
function set_Max_Transaction_Percent(
    uint256 maxTxPercent_x100
) external onlyOwner {
    _maxTxAmount = (_tTotal * maxTxPercent_x100) / 10000;
}
```

Owner can pause trading if max transaction is updated to 0, thus pausing the transfer function and freezing their assets

#### Suggestion:

Add a minimum amount/percentage that it cannot go lower when updating max transaction percentage



### AUDIT COMMENTS Seagen

Smart Contract audit comment for a non-technical perspective

- Owner can pause trading through max transaction when set to 0
- Owner can renounce and transfer ownership
- Owner can toggle taking of fees
- Owner can exclude/include addresses from fees
- Owner can update total buy and sell fee up to 5% each
- Owner can toggle swap and liquify enabled
- Owner can update number of trades/transactions before triggering liquify
- Owner can update number of trades/transactions without fees
- Owner can manually swap and liquify tokens
- Owner can update router/pair address
- Owner can update max transaction with an indefinite amount
- Owner can change dev wallet address
- Owner cannot block users
- Owner cannot mint after initial deployment
- Owner cannot burn



# CONTRACTWOLF

**Blockchain Security - Smart Contract Audits**