What's all the fuzz about?

Project Robus
Aegis™ Platform

Adam Crain, Automatak Chris Sistrunk PE, Mandiant






Project Robus

- Started in April 2013
- 17 advisories / 31 tickets
- Mostly DNP3, 1 Modbus
- Only 4 products so far without a detectable issue

www.automatak.com/robus www.automatak.com/aegis









Vendor Response Matrix


| <u>#</u> | ICS-CERT Adv | Company | Bug | Fix | Days | <u>Advisory</u> |
|----------|-----------------|-------------------|------|-------|-------|-----------------|
| 1 | ICSA-13-161-01 | IOServer | 4/24 | 5/24 | 30 | 6/10/2013 |
| 2 | ICSA-13-213-03 | IOServer | 5/1 | 7/20 | 80 | 8/1/2013 |
| 3 | ICSA-13-219-01 | SEL | 5/1 | 5/30 | 29 | 8/7/2013 |
| 4 | ICSA-13-226-01 | Kepware | 4/24 | 6/18 | 55 | 8/14/2013 |
| 5 | ICSA-13-234-02 | TOP Server | 4/24 | 6/18 | 55 | 8/22/2013 |
| 6 | ICSA-13-240-01 | TMW | 4/24 | 6/17 | 54 | 8/28/2013 |
| 7 | ICSA-13-213-04A | Matrikon | 4/24 | 6/17 | 54 | 8/29/2013 |
| 8 | ICSA-13-252-01 | Subnet | 4/24 | 8/30 | 128 | 9/9/2013 |
| 9 | ICSA-13-282-01 | Alstom | 4/24 | 6/4 | 41 | 10/21/2013 |
| 10 | ICSA-13-297-01 | Catapult | 4/24 | 10/1 | 160 | 11/22/2013 |
| 11 | ICSA-13-297-02 | GE IP | S.R. | 10/1 | n/a | 11/22/2013 |
| 12 | ICSA-13-337-01 | Elecsys | 9/12 | 11/4 | 53 | 12/3/2013 |
| 13 | ICSA-13-346-02 | Cooper OPC | 7/31 | None | ∞day™ | 12/12/2013 |
| 14 | ICSA-13-346-01 | Cooper/Cybectec | 5/1 | 12/12 | 225 | 12/12/2013 |
| 15 | ICSA-13-352-01 | Novatech | 5/1 | 9/5 | 127 | 12/18/2013 |
| 16 | ICSA-14-014-01 | Schneider | 8/6 | 8/23 | 17 | 1/14/2014 |
| 17 | ICSA-14-006-01 | Schneider/Telvent | 8/29 | 10/16 | 48 | 1/30/2014 |






Breaking Down DNP3


Users DNP3 Application Layer Logging (out of DNP3 Secure Authentication scope) DNP3 Transport Function DNP3 Data Link Layer Internet TCP 20000 Serial Protocol TCP 19999 (TLS) **UDP 20000** Suite







White Noise Fuzzing




#1 random == really "dumb"





Template (mutational) Fuzzing







Generational "Smart" Fuzzing













Multi-field Anomalies














Generational == most vulns!








Comparing template and generational fuzzing









Aegis™ Specifics

- Written in Scala www.scala-lang.org
- Currently porting it to C#
- Protocol boundary conditions
- Abstracts physical layer
- Combines aspects of generation and mutation
- Repeatable random seeds
- ~200,000 test cases with one seed





Fuzzer Test Flow

x Num Test Cases Test DNP3 Message (DL, TL, or AL) x Num Retry (10) Request Link States Request Response Link Status





I 0x0564 U...







Combinatorics

```
val nums = List(1, 3)
val colors = List("red","green")
```

```
// repeat the reversed string num times
```

```
def combine(i: Int, s: String) = List.fill(i)(s.reverse).mkString
```

val result = Cartesian.Transform(colors,nums)(combine)

What is result?






Lazy Generator

```
// val nums = List(1, 3)
// val colors = List("red", "green")
> result.foreach(println)
  der
  derderder
  neerg
  neergneergneerg
```






Fuzzing is O(2ⁿ)







Generators can get large!




- Many function codes
- Many objects
- Header types
- Many field values





Types of Vulnerabilities





Using Aegis

```
C:\aegis\aegis-console\bin>aegis-console -mid dnp3
Aegis Platform - CONFIDENTIAL - Automatak, LLC
Required argument not found: pid (Procedure id within module)
usage: aegis-console [flags ... ]
Ualid module ids: [dnp3]
-mid
                                                   Module id of protocol
                    <arq>
-pid
                    <arg>
                                                   Procedure id within module
                    <arg>(127.0.0.1)</a>
                                                   IP address for client connection
-host
-port
                    <arg>(20000)[0, 65535]
                                                   Port to connect or listen on
-listen
                                                   Listens on the specified port instead of connecting
-help
                                                   Prints help information
-start
                                                   Starts testing at a specified test case #
                    <arq>
-count
                    (arg)
                                                   Limits execution to the specified number of test cases
-repeats
                    <arg>(1)[min=1]
                                                   Number of times to repeat the specified test case
```





```
13:48:51.049 - >> 05 64 0A C4 00 04 01 00 2D 3F C0 7F 0F 00 00 E2 AE
 13:48:51.049 - -> master: true pri: true fcb: false fcv: false func: REQUEST LINK STATES(0x09) 0xC9 length: 5 dest: 1024 src: 1
 13:48:51.050 - >> 05 64 05 C9 00 04 01 00 98 81
 13:48:51.263 - <- master: false pri: false fcb: false fcv: false func: LINK STATUS(0x0B) 0x0B length: 5 dest: 1 src: 1024
 13:48:51.263 - Test: 2301 - ahfuzz[4176] - Pass
 13:48:51.263 - Test: 2302 - ahfuzz[4176] - Begin
 13:48:51.263 - => fir: false fin: true con: true uns: true seq: 0x0F func: InitData(0x0F) IIN(0xFF: [AllStations, Class1Events,
 Class2Events, Class3Events, NeedTime, LocalControl, DeviceTrouble, DeviceRestart]: 0xFF: [FuncNotSupported, ObjectUnknown, Para
 mError, EventBufferOverflow, AlreadyExecuting, ConfigCorrupt, Reserved1, Reserved2])
 13:48:51.263 - ~> fir: true fin: true seq: 0 payload size: 4
 13:48:51.263 - -> master: true pri: true fcb: false fcv: false func: UNCONFIRMED USER DATA(0x04) 0xC4 length: 10 dest: 1024 src:
 13:48:51.263 - >> 05 64 0A C4 00 04 01 00 2D 3F C0 7F 0F FF FF 27 C8
 13:48:51.264 - -> master: true pri: true fcb: false fcv: false func: REQUEST LINK STATES(0x09) 0xC9 length: 5 dest: 1024 src: 1
 13:48:51.264 - >> 05 64 05 C9 00 04 01 00 98 81
 13:48:51.464 - <- master: false pri: false fcb: false fcv: false func: LINK STATUS(0x0B) 0x0B length: 5 dest: 1 src: 1024
 13:48:51.464 - Test: 2302 - ahfuzz[4176] - Pass
 13:48:51.464 - Test: 2303 - ahfuzz[4176] - Begin
 13:48:51.464 - => fir: false fin: true con: true uns: true seg: 0x0F func: InitData(0x0F)
 13:48:51.464 - ~> fir: true fin: true seq: 0 payload size: 2
 13:48:51.464 - -> master: true pri: true fcb: false fcv: false func: UNCONFIRMED USER DATA(0x04) 0xC4 length: 8 dest: 1024 src:
 13:48:51.465 - >> 05 64 08 C4 00 04 01 00 9A 19 C0 7F 0F FB 35
 13:48:51.465 - -> master: true pri: true fcb: false fcv: false func: REQUEST LINK STATES(0x09) 0xC9 length: 5 dest: 1024 src: 1
 13:48:51.465 - >> 05 64 05 C9 00 04 01 00 98 81
 13:48:51.511 - Retrying link status: 11 attempts remaining
 13:48:51.511 - -> master: true pri: true fcb: false fcv: false func: REQUEST LINK STATES(0x09) 0xC9 length: 5 dest: 1024 src: 1
 13:48:51.511 - >> 05 64 05 C9 00 04 01 00 98 81
 13:48:51.512 - Retrying link status: 10 attempts remaining
 13:48:51.512 - -> master: true pri: true fcb: false fcv: false func: REQUEST LINK STATES(0x09) 0xC9 length: 5 dest: 1024 src: 1
 13:48:51.512 - >> 05 64 05 C9 00 04 01 00 98 81
🚬 13:48:51.514 - The target has dropped the connection: Broken pipe
```

Examples

Run 10 link layer test cases starting at #123

```
$ aegis-console -mid dnp3 -pid lfuzz -start 123 -count 10
```

Unsolicited response fuzzing of a master listening on default port 20000 with master address of 0 and an outstation address of 1

```
$ aegis-console -mid dnp3 -pid aufuzz -dest 0 -src 1 -master -listen
```

Outstation link layer fuzzing test case #100 only

```
$ aegis-console -mid dnp3 -pid lfuzz -start 100 -count 1
```

Outstation application object fuzzing against 192.168.1.55:20001 with default addressing

```
$ aegis-console -mid dnp3 -id aofuzz -host 192.168.1.55 -port 20001
```





Recorded Demos

Video 1: a DNP3 outstation

-pid aofuzz

Video 2: a DNP3 master

-pid aufuzz -listen -master -seed 1





White-box vs. Black-box Testing

- Defender has the advantage, but has to choose to exercise it.
- Software-based solutions allow developers to test continually.

There are many OSS tools of the trade.





Code Coverage with gcov


- If you don't run a line of code, you'll never find a bug in it
- Important metric, but not a guarantee of success







Dynamic Analysis with Valgrind



valgrind.org

- Virtualized binary execution
 - hooks system calls
- memcheck is your friend
 - leaks
 - overrun / underrun
 - user after free
- callgrind
 - find true bottlenecks






Wurldtech Achilles - opendnp3 outstation - SELECT code coverage








Mu4000 - opendnp3 outstation - SELECT code coverage








Aegis™ 0.1.0 - opendnp3 outstation - SELECT code coverage








opendnp3 outstation code coverage %



3 Diferent Platforms












Total code coverage







More Fuzzers are Better

- Aegis fuzzing with every release
- In-memory fuzzing
- Checks from Codenomicon, Wurldtech, Mu







Fuzzing is just another tool

- Unit test coverage in excess of 90%
- Valgrind for dynamic analysis
- Open source conformance test harness
- Static analysis using Clang / Coverity / CppCheck







Security!

HOST Grant

- Adding authentication (SAv5)
- Adding encryption (TLS)

http://investments.opencybersecurity.org/







SHODAN update

Probably default configs

- Many similar responses
- Same DNP Addresses


python shell

```
>>> " ".join("%02x" % ord(i) for i in "DNP3 paste from shodan")
```

Unsolicited Response, IIN Restart & Need Time Synch

Unsolicited Response with Binary and Analog Data

Class 1/2/3/0 Poll!!!





Conclusions

- DNP3 is not a special case, other protocols same fate
 Modbus, IEC 60870, IEC 61850, ICCP, EtherNet/IP...
- Early testing both slave/server AND master/client sides of the protocol are important!
- Compliance != Security, but the culture is important
- Don't have to be a nation/state or large firm to do this
- A few good folks can make a difference in the industry







Go fuzz yourself before does...

Questions?



@jadamcrain @chrissistrunk

