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CERTIK AUDIT REPORT FOR CONVERGENCE FINANCE



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Certik Reports represent an extensive auditing process intending to help our customers increase the quality of their code while reducing the high level of risk presented by cryptographic tokens and blockchain technology.

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What is a CertiK report?

- A document describing in detail an in depth analysis of a particular piece(s) of source code provided to CertiK by a Client.
- An organized collection of testing results, analysis and inferences made about the structure, implementation and overall best practices of a particular piece of source code.
- Representation that a Client of CertiK has indeed completed a round of auditing with the intention to increase the quality of the company/product's IT infrastructure and or source code.





About CertiK

CertiK is a technology-led blockchain security company founded by Computer Science professors from Yale University and Columbia University built to prove the security and correctness of smart contracts and blockchain protocols.

CertiK, in partnership with grants from IBM and the Ethereum Foundation, CertiK's mission of every audit is to apply different approaches and detection methods, ranging from manual, static, and dynamic analysis, to ensure that projects are checked against known attacks and potential vulnerabilities. CertiK leverages a team of seasoned engineers and security auditors to apply testing methodologies and assessments to each project, in turn creating a more secure and robust software system.

CertiK has served more than 100 clients with high quality auditing and consulting services, ranging from stablecoins such as Binance's BGBP and Paxos Gold to decentralized oracles such as Band Protocol and Tellor. CertiK customizes its engineering tool kits, while applying cutting-edge research on smart contracts, for each client on its project to offer a high quality deliverable. For more information: https://certik.io.





Executive Summary

This report has been prepared for Convergence Finance to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of their ConvergenceToken smart contracts. A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing CertiK's Formal Verification Platform, Static Analysis, and Manual Review techniques.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.

Vulnerability Classification

CertiK categorizes issues into three buckets based on overall risk levels:

Critical

Code implementation does not match specification, which could result in the loss of funds for contract owner or users.

Medium

Code implementation does not match the specification under certain conditions, which could affect the security standard by loss of access control.

Low

Code implementation does not follow best practices, or uses suboptimal design patterns, which could lead to security vulnerabilities further down the line.





Testing Summary



ERTIK believes this smart contract passes security qualifications to be listed on digital asset exchanges.





Type of Issues

CertiK's smart label engine applied 100% formal verification coverage on the source code. Our team of engineers has scanned the source code using proprietary static analysis tools and code-review methodologies. The following technical issues were found:

Title	Description	Issues	SWC ID
Integer	An overflow/underflow occurs when an arithmetic operation	0	SWC-101
Overflow/	reaches the maximum or minimum size of a type.		
Underflow			
Function	Function implementation does not meet specification,	0	
Incorrectness	leading to intentional or unintentional vulnerabilities.		
Buffer	An attacker can write to arbitrary storage locations of a	0	SWC-124
Overflow	contract if array of out bound happens		
Reentrancy	A malicious contract can call back into the calling contract	0	SWC-107
	before the first invocation of the function is finished.		
Transaction	A race condition vulnerability occurs when code depends on	0	SWC-114
Order	the order of the transactions submitted to it.		
Dependence			
Timestamp	Timestamp can be influenced by miners to some degree.	0	SWC-116
Dependence			
Insecure	Using a fixed outdated compiler version or floating pragma	1	SWC-102
Compiler	can be problematic if there are publicly disclosed bugs and		SWC-103
Version	issues that affect the current compiler version used.		
Insecure	Using block attributes to generate random numbers is	0	SWC-120
Randomness	unreliable, as they can be influenced by miners to some		
	degree.		
"tx.origin" for	tx.origin should not be used for authorization. Use	0	SWC-115
Authorization	msg.sender instead.		



Formal Verification Platform for Smart Contracts and Blockchain Ecosystems



Title	Description	Issues	SWC ID
Delegatecall	Calling untrusted contracts is very dangerous, so the target	0	SWC-112
to Untrusted	and arguments provided must be sanitized.		
Callee			
State Variable	Labeling the visibility explicitly makes it easier to catch	0	SWC-108
Default	incorrect assumptions about who can access the variable.		
Visibility			
Function	Functions are public by default, meaning a malicious user	0	SWC-100
Default	can make unauthorized or unintended state changes if a		
Visibility	developer forgot to set the visibility.		
Uninitialized	Uninitialized local storage variables can point to other	0	SWC-109
Variables	unexpected storage variables in the contract.		
Assertion	The assert() function is meant to assert invariants.	0	SWC-110
Failure	Properly functioning code should never reach a failing assert		
	statement.		
Deprecated	Several functions and operators in Solidity are deprecated	0	SWC-111
Solidity	and should not be used.		
Features			
Unused	Unused variables reduce code quality	0	SWC-131
Variables			

Vulnerability Details

Critical

No issue found.

Medium

No issue found.

Low

No issue found.





Review Notes

Source Code SHA-256 Checksum

• ConvergenceToken.sol¹ d9d086932b36df750cf8cbcbc728ccfe7d15fca441998d58472103956ef69bf7

Summary

CertiK team is invited by The ConvergenceToken team to audit the design and implementations of its to be released ERC20 based smart contract, and the source code has been analyzed under different perspectives and with different tools such as CertiK formal verification checkings as well as manual reviews by smart contract experts. That end-to-end process ensures proof of stability as well as a hands-on, engineering-focused process to close potential loopholes and recommend design changes in accordance with the best practices in the space. We have been actively interacting with client-side engineers when there was any potential loopholes or recommended design changes during the audit process, and ConvergenceTokenToken team has been actively giving us updates for the source code and feedback about the business logics.

Meanwhile, it is recommended to have a more well-detailed document for the public to describe the source code specifications and implementations.

Overall we found the ConvergenceToken contract follows good practices, with reasonable amount of features on top of the ERC20 related to administrive controls by the token issuer. With the final update of source code and delivery of the audit report, we conclude that the contract is not vulnerable to any classically known antipatterns or security issues. The audit report itself is not necessarily a guarantee of correctness or trustworthiness, and we always recommend seeking multiple opinions, more test coverage and sandbox deployments before the mainnet release.

Recommendations

Items in this section are low impact to the overall aspects of the smart contracts, thus will let client to decide whether to have those reflected in the final deployed version of source codes.

Convergence Token.sol

• INFO Literals with many digits are difficult to read and review. Consider using scientific notation or ether suffix for variable TOTAL_SUPPLY.

^{1&}lt;https://etherscan.io/address/0xc834fa996fa3bec7aad3693af486ae53d8aa8b50>





Static Analysis Results

INSECURE_COMPILER_VERSION

Line 9 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

- pragma solidity >=0.6.0 <0.8.0;</pre>
 - 1 Only these compiler versions are safe to compile your code: 0.7.4





Formal Verification Results

How to read

Detail for Request 1

transferFrom to same address

```
Verification\ date
                        20, Oct 2018
 Verification\ timespan
                        ● 395.38 ms
□ERTIK label location
                        Line 30-34 in File howtoread.sol
                    30
                            /*@CTK FAIL "transferFrom to same address"
                    31
                                @tag assume_completion
      \BoxERTIK label
                    32
                                @pre from == to
                    33
                                @post __post.allowed[from] [msg.sender] ==
                    34
    Raw code location
                        Line 35-41 in File howtoread.sol
                            function transferFrom(address from, address to
                    35
                    36
                                balances[from] = balances[from].sub(tokens
                    37
                                allowed[from][msg.sender] = allowed[from][
          Raw\ code
                    38
                                balances[to] = balances[to].add(tokens);
                    39
                                emit Transfer(from, to, tokens);
                    40
                                return true;
                    41
     Counter example \\
                        This code violates the specification
                     1
                       Counter Example:
                       Before Execution:
                     3
                            Input = {
                                from = 0x0
                     4
                                to = 0x0
                     5
                     6
                                tokens = 0x6c
                     7
                            This = 0
   Initial environment
                                    balance: 0x0
                    55
                    56
                    57
                       After Execution:
                    58
                            Input = {
                    59
                                from = 0x0
    Post environment
                    60
                                to = 0x0
                    61
                                tokens = 0x6c
```





Formal Verification Request 1

Context _msgSender

```
## 23, Mar 2021
```

0 20.18 ms

Line 22-25 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
/*OCTK "Context _msgSender"

Qtag assume_completion

Qpost __return == msg.sender

*/
```

Line 27-29 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function _msgSender() internal view virtual returns (address payable) {
return msg.sender;
}
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 2

Context _msgData

23, Mar 2021

 $\mathbf{\tilde{o}}$ 5.48 ms

Line 31-34 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
/*@CTK "Context _msgData"

@tag assume_completion

@post __return == msg.data

*/
```

Line 36-39 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function _msgData() internal view virtual returns (bytes memory) {
    this; // silence state mutability warning without generating
    bytecode - see https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/issues/2691
    return msg.data;
}
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 3

SafeMath tryAdd

23, Mar 2021

 $\overline{\bullet}$ 38.0 ms

Line 147-153 in File ConvergenceToken.sol





```
/*@CTK "SafeMath tryAdd"

@tag spec

@tag is_pure

@post a + b < a || a + b < b -> __has_overflow

@post a + b < a -> __return == false & __return1 == 0

@post a + b >= a -> __return == true & __return1 == a + b

*/
```

Line 155-159 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function tryAdd(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (bool,
    uint256) {
    uint256 c = a + b;
    if (c < a) return (false, 0);
    return (true, c);
}</pre>
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 4

SafeMath trySub

23, Mar 2021

11.55 ms

Line 167-172 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
/*@CTK "SafeMath trySub"

@tag spec

@tag is_pure

@post b > a -> __return == false & __return1 == 0

@post b <= a -> __return == true & __return1 == a - b

*/
```

Line 174-177 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 5

SafeMath tryMul

23, Mar 2021

• 95.86 ms

Line 185-191 in File ConvergenceToken.sol





Line 193-201 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function tryMul(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (bool,
193
        uint256) {
            // Gas optimization: this is cheaper than requiring 'a' not being
194
        zero, but the
            // benefit is lost if 'b' is also tested.
195
            // See:
196
        https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/pull/522
            if (a == 0) return (true, 0);
197
            uint256 c = a * b;
198
            if (c / a != b) return (false, 0);
199
            return (true, c);
200
201
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 6

SafeMath tryDiv

23, Mar 2021 12.81 ms

Line 209-214 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
/*@CTK "SafeMath tryDiv"

0tag spec

0tag is_pure

0post b == 0 -> __return == false & __return1 == 0

0post b != 0 -> __return == true & __return1 == a / b

*/
```

Line 216-219 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function tryDiv(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (bool,
uint256) {
    if (b == 0) return (false, 0);
       return (true, a / b);
}
```

The code meets the specification.





Formal Verification Request 7

SafeMath tryMod

```
## 23, Mar 2021
```

<u> 14.44 ms</u>

Line 227-232 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

Line 234-237 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function tryMod(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (bool,

uint256) {

if (b == 0) return (false, 0);

return (true, a ½ b);

}
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 8

If method completes, integer overflow would not happen.

```
23, Mar 2021
18.96 ms
```

250

Line 250 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
//@CTK NO_OVERFLOW
```

Line 261-265 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function add(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
    uint256 c = a + b;
    require(c >= a, "SafeMath: addition overflow");
    return c;
}
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 9

SafeMath add

```
23, Mar 2021

4.15 ms
```

Line 251-259 in File ConvergenceToken.sol





```
/*@CTK "SafeMath add"
251
             Otag spec
252
             @tag is_pure
253
             @post (a + b < a / | a + b < b) == __reverted
254
             @post !__reverted -> __return == a + b
255
             @post !__reverted -> !__has_overflow
256
             @post !__reverted -> !__has_assertion_failure
257
             @post !(__has_buf_overflow)
258
259
```

Line 261-265 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function add(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
    uint256 c = a + b;
    require(c >= a, "SafeMath: addition overflow");
    return c;
}
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 10

If method completes, integer overflow would not happen.

```
## 23, Mar 2021
• 17.51 ms
```

278

Line 278 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
//@CTK NO_OVERFLOW
```

Line 290-293 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function sub(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
    require(b <= a, "SafeMath: subtraction overflow");
    return a - b;
}</pre>
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 11

SafeMath sub

```
23, Mar 2021
2.27 ms
```

Line 279-288 in File ConvergenceToken.sol





Line 290-293 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function sub(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
    require(b <= a, "SafeMath: subtraction overflow");
    return a - b;
}</pre>
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 12

If method completes, integer overflow would not happen.

```
## 23, Mar 2021
• 55.72 ms
```

Line 306 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
//@CTK NO_OVERFLOW
```

Line 318-323 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function mul(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
    if (a == 0) return 0;
    uint256 c = a * b;
    require(c / a == b, "SafeMath: multiplication overflow");
    return c;
}
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 13

SafeMath mul

```
## 23, Mar 2021
• 132.1 ms
```

Line 307-316 in File ConvergenceToken.sol





Line 318-323 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function mul(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
    if (a == 0) return 0;
    uint256 c = a * b;
    require(c / a == b, "SafeMath: multiplication overflow");
    return c;
}
```

✓ The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 14

If method completes, integer overflow would not happen.

```
23, Mar 202113.43 ms
```

Line 338 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
38 //@CTK NO_OVERFLOW
```

Line 350-353 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function div(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
    require(b > 0, "SafeMath: division by zero");
    return a / b;
}
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 15

SafeMath div

```
## 23, Mar 2021
•• 2.04 ms
```

Line 339-348 in File Convergence Token.sol

```
339     /*@CTK "SafeMath div"
340     @tag spec
341     @tag is_pure
342     @tag assume_completion
343     @post (b <= 0) == __reverted</pre>
```





Line 350-353 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function div(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
    require(b > 0, "SafeMath: division by zero");
    return a / b;
}
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 16

If method completes, integer overflow would not happen.

```
23, Mar 2021
14.42 ms
```

368

Line 368 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
//@CTK NO_OVERFLOW
```

Line 380-383 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function mod(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
require(b > 0, "SafeMath: modulo by zero");
return a  b;
}
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 17

SafeMath mod

```
## 23, Mar 2021
• 1.85 ms
```

Line 369-378 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
/*@CTK "SafeMath mod"
369
             @tag spec
370
             @tag is_pure
371
             @tag assume_completion
372
             @post b != 0 -> !__reverted
373
             @post !__reverted -> __return == a % b
374
             @post !__reverted -> !__has_overflow
375
             @post !(__has_buf_overflow)
376
             @post !(__has_assertion_failure)
377
378
```





Line 380-383 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function mod(uint256 a, uint256 b) internal pure returns (uint256) {
require(b > 0, "SafeMath: modulo by zero");
return a  b;
}
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 18

If method completes, integer overflow would not happen.

```
23, Mar 2021
13.94 ms
```

399

Line 399 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
//@CTK NO_OVERFLOW
```

Line 411-418 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 19

```
SafeMath sub with err
```

Line 400-409 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
/*@CTK "SafeMath sub_with_err"
400
            @tag spec
401
            Otag is_pure
402
            @pre b <= a
403
             Qpost (a < b) == \_reverted
404
             @post !__reverted -> __return == a - b
405
             @post !__reverted -> !__has_overflow
406
            @post !__reverted -> !__has_assertion_failure
407
            @post !(__has_buf_overflow)
408
409
```





Line 411-418 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function sub(
411
             uint256 a,
412
             uint256 b,
413
             string memory errorMessage
414
         ) internal pure returns (uint256) {
415
             require(b <= a, errorMessage);</pre>
416
             return a - b;
417
        }
418
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 20

If method completes, integer overflow would not happen.

```
23, Mar 2021
14.03 ms
```

436

Line 436 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
//@CTK NO_OVERFLOW
```

Line 448-455 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function div(
448
             uint256 a,
449
             uint256 b,
450
             string memory errorMessage
451
        ) internal pure returns (uint256) {
452
             require(b > 0, errorMessage);
453
             return a / b;
454
        }
455
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 21

```
SafeMath div_with_err
```

```
23, Mar 2021

2.19 ms
```

Line 437-446 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
/*OCTK "SafeMath div_with_err"

0tag spec

0tag is_pure

0tag assume_completion

0post (b <= 0) == __reverted

0post !_reverted -> __return == a / b
```





```
0post !__reverted -> !__has_overflow
0post !__reverted -> !__has_assertion_failure
0post !(__has_buf_overflow)
446
*/
```

Line 448-455 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

✓ The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 22

If method completes, integer overflow would not happen.

```
23, Mar 202112.32 ms
```

Line 473 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
//@CTK NO_OVERFLOW
```

Line 485-492 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 23

SafeMath mod_with_err

```
23, Mar 20211.81 ms
```

Line 474-483 in File ConvergenceToken.sol





```
/*@CTK "SafeMath mod_with_err"
474
             Otag spec
475
             @tag is_pure
476
            @tag assume_completion
477
             @post b != 0 -> !__reverted
478
            @post !__reverted -> __return == a % b
479
            @post !__reverted -> !__has_overflow
480
            @post !( has buf overflow)
481
            @post !(__has_assertion_failure)
482
483
```

Line 485-492 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 24

ERC20 constructor

```
23, Mar 2021
16.85 ms
```

Line 546-551 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
/*@CTK "ERC20 constructor"

otag assume_completion

opost __post._name == name_

opost __post._symbol == symbol_

opost __post._decimals == 18

*/
```

Line 552-556 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
constructor(string memory name_, string memory symbol_) public {
    _name = name_;
    _symbol = symbol_;
    _decimals = 18;
}
```

The code meets the specification.





Formal Verification Request 25

ERC20 name

```
## 23, Mar 2021
```

<u> 5.71 ms</u>

Line 562-565 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

Line 566-568 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function name() public view virtual returns (string memory) {
    return _name;
}
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 26

ERC20 symbol

```
23, Mar 2021
7.15 ms
```

Line 574-577 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

Line 578-580 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function symbol() public view virtual returns (string memory) {
    return _symbol;
}
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 27

ERC20 decimals

```
23, Mar 2021

4.6 ms
```

Line 596-599 in File ConvergenceToken.sol



602



```
/*@CTK "ERC20 decimals"

otag assume_completion

post __return == _decimals

*/

Line 600-602 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

function decimals() public view virtual returns (uint8) {
    return _decimals;
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 28

ERC20 totalSupply

```
## 23, Mar 2021
```

 \bullet 6.38 ms

Line 607-610 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

Line 611-613 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function totalSupply() public view virtual override returns (uint256) {
    return _totalSupply;
}
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 29

ERC20 balanceOf

```
## 23, Mar 2021
```

(i) 7.22 ms

Line 619-622 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

Line 623-625 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function balanceOf(address account) public view virtual override returns

(uint256) {

return _balances[account];

}
```

The code meets the specification.





Formal Verification Request 30

ERC20 transfer

23, Mar 2021 • 202.25 ms

Line 636-643 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
/*@CTK "ERC20 transfer"
636
            Otaq assume completion
            @pre recipient != address(0)
638
            @pre amount <= _balances[msq.sender]</pre>
639
            @post msg.sender == recipient -> _balances[msg.sender] ==
640
        __post._balances[msg.sender]
            @post msg.sender != recipient -> __post._balances[msg.sender] ==
641
        _balances[msg.sender] - amount
            @post msg.sender != recipient -> __post._balances[recipient] ==
642
        _balances[recipient] + amount
643
```

Line 644-647 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function transfer(address recipient, uint256 amount) public virtual

override returns (bool) {

_transfer(_msgSender(), recipient, amount);

return true;

}
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 31

ERC20 allowance

23, Mar 2021 • 5.11 ms

Line 653-656 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

Line 657-659 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function allowance(address owner, address spender) public view virtual

override returns (uint256) {

return _allowances[owner][spender];

}
```

The code meets the specification.





Formal Verification Request 32

ERC20 approve

```
23, Mar 2021
70.08 ms
```

Line 669-673 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

Line 674-677 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function approve(address spender, uint256 amount) public virtual override

returns (bool) {
    _approve(_msgSender(), spender, amount);
    return true;
}
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 33

ERC20 transferFrom

```
23, Mar 2021

364.76 ms
```

Line 693-703 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
/*@CTK "ERC20 transferFrom"
693
            @tag assume_completion
            @pre sender != address(0)
695
            @pre recipient != address(0)
696
            @pre amount <= _balances[sender] && amount <=</pre>
697
       allowances[sender][msq.sender]
            @post sender == recipient -> _balances[sender] ==
698
       __post._balances[sender]
            @post sender != recipient -> __post._balances[sender] ==
699
        balances[sender] - amount
            @post sender != recipient -> __post._balances[recipient] ==
700
        balances[recipient] + amount
            @post __post._allowances[sender][msg.sender] ==
701
        _allowances[sender][msg.sender] - amount
            @post return ==true
702
703
```

Line 704-716 in File ConvergenceToken.sol





```
function transferFrom(
704
             address sender,
705
             address recipient,
706
             uint256 amount
707
        ) public virtual override returns (bool) {
708
             _transfer(sender, recipient, amount);
709
             _approve(
710
                 sender,
711
                 _msgSender(),
712
                 _allowances[sender][_msgSender()].sub(amount, "ERC20: transfer
713
        amount exceeds allowance")
             );
714
             return true;
        }
716
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 34

ERC20 increaseAllowance

```
## 23, Mar 2021
• 54.18 ms
```

Line 731-735 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

Line 736-739 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function increaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 addedValue) public

virtual returns (bool) {
    _approve(_msgSender(), spender,
    _allowances[_msgSender()][spender].add(addedValue));
    return true;
}
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 35

ERC20 decreaseAllowance

```
23, Mar 2021

• 66.76 ms
```

Line 757-762 in File ConvergenceToken.sol





Line 763-770 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function decreaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 subtractedValue)
763
        public virtual returns (bool) {
             _approve(
764
                 _msgSender(),
765
                 spender,
766
                 _allowances[_msgSender()][spender].sub(subtractedValue, "ERC20:
767
        decreased allowance below zero")
            );
768
            return true;
769
        }
770
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 36

Line 788-796 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
/*@CTK "ERC20 _ transfer"
788
            @tag assume_completion
789
            @pre sender != address(0)
790
            @pre recipient != address(0)
791
            @pre amount <= _balances[sender]</pre>
792
            @post sender == recipient -> _balances[sender] ==
793
        post. balances[sender]
            @post sender != recipient -> __post._balances[sender] ==
794
        balances[sender] - amount
            @post sender != recipient -> __post._balances[recipient] ==
795
        _balances[recipient] + amount
796
```

Line 797-810 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function _transfer(
    address sender,
    address recipient,
    uint256 amount
```





```
) internal virtual {
801
            require(sender != address(0), "ERC20: transfer from the zero
802
            require(recipient != address(0), "ERC20: transfer to the zero
803
        address");
804
            _beforeTokenTransfer(sender, recipient, amount);
805
806
            _balances[sender] = _balances[sender].sub(amount, "ERC20: transfer
807
        amount exceeds balance");
            _balances[recipient] = _balances[recipient].add(amount);
808
            emit Transfer(sender, recipient, amount);
809
        }
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 37

```
ERC20 __mint

23, Mar 2021

88.21 ms
```

Line 822-827 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
/*@CTK "ERC20 _mint"

@tag assume_completion

@pre account != address(0)

@post __post._totalSupply == _totalSupply + amount

@post __post._balances[account] == _balances[account] + amount

*/
```

Line 828-836 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function _mint(address account, uint256 amount) internal virtual {
828
            require(account != address(0), "ERC20: mint to the zero address");
829
830
            beforeTokenTransfer(address(0), account, amount);
831
832
            totalSupply = totalSupply.add(amount);
833
            _balances[account] = _balances[account].add(amount);
834
            emit Transfer(address(0), account, amount);
835
        }
836
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 38

```
ERC20 __burn

23, Mar 2021

202.18 ms
```





Line 850-856 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
/*@CTK "ERC20 _burn"

@tag assume_completion

@pre account != address(0)

@pre amount <= _balances[account] & amount <= _totalSupply

@post __post._totalSupply == _totalSupply - amount

@post __post._balances[account] == _balances[account] - amount

*/
```

Line 857-865 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function _burn(address account, uint256 amount) internal virtual {
857
            require(account != address(0), "ERC20: burn from the zero address");
858
859
            _beforeTokenTransfer(account, address(0), amount);
860
861
            balances[account] = balances[account].sub(amount, "ERC20: burn
862
        amount exceeds balance");
            _totalSupply = _totalSupply.sub(amount);
863
            emit Transfer(account, address(0), amount);
864
        }
865
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 39

```
ERC20 _approve

23, Mar 2021

3.02 ms
```

Line 881-886 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

Line 887-897 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function _approve(
   address owner,
   address spender,
   uint256 amount
) internal virtual {
   require(owner != address(0), "ERC20: approve from the zero address");
   require(spender != address(0), "ERC20: approve to the zero address");
```





```
allowances[owner][spender] = amount;
emit Approval(owner, spender, amount);
}
```

The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 40

```
ERC20 _setupDecimals
```

```
🛗 23, Mar 2021
```

 \bullet 6.67 ms

Line 907-910 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

Line 911-913 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
function _setupDecimals(uint8 decimals_) internal virtual {
    _decimals = decimals_;
}
```

▼ The code meets the specification.

Formal Verification Request 41

ConvergenceToken constructor

```
23, Mar 2021
152.77 ms
```

Line 949-954 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
/*OCTK "ConvergenceToken constructor"

Otag assume_completion

Opre genesis_holder != address(0)

Opost __post._totalSupply == _totalSupply + TOTAL_SUPPLY

Opost __post._balances[genesis_holder] == _balances[genesis_holder]

\( \to + TOTAL_SUPPLY \)

*/
```

Line 955-958 in File ConvergenceToken.sol

```
constructor(address genesis_holder) {
    require(genesis_holder != address(0), "ConvergenceToken: zero
    address");
    _mint(genesis_holder, TOTAL_SUPPLY);
}
```

The code meets the specification.





Source Code with CertiK Labels

ConvergenceToken.sol

```
*Submitted for verification at Etherscan.io on 2021-03-22
2
   */
   // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
5
6
   // File @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol@v3.4.1
7
   pragma solidity >=0.6.0 <0.8.0;</pre>
10
   /*
11
    * Odev Provides information about the current execution context, including
12
    * sender of the transaction and its data. While these are generally
13
    → available
    * via msq.sender and msq.data, they should not be accessed in such a direct
    * manner, since when dealing with GSN meta-transactions the account sending
15
    st paying for execution may not be the actual sender (as far as an
16
    → application
    * is concerned).
17
    * This contract is only required for intermediate, library-like contracts.
19
    */
20
   abstract contract Context {
21
       /*@CTK "Context _msgSender"
22
           @tag assume_completion
23
           @post __return == msg.sender
24
       */
25
       /* CertiK Smart Labelling, for more details visit: https://certik.org */
26
       function _msgSender() internal view virtual returns (address payable) {
27
           return msg.sender;
28
       }
29
30
       /*@CTK "Context _msgData"
31
           Otag assume_completion
32
           @post __return == msq.data
34
       /* CertiK Smart Labelling, for more details visit: https://certik.org */
35
       function msgData() internal view virtual returns (bytes memory) {
36
           this; // silence state mutability warning without generating
37
       bytecode - see https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/issues/2691
           return msg.data;
```





```
}
40
41
   // File @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol@v3.4.1
42
43
44
^{45}
   /**
46
    * @title ConvergenceToken
47
48
    * @dev A minimal ERC20 token contract for the Convergence token.
49
50
   contract ConvergenceToken is ERC20("Convergence", "CONV") {
51
       uint256 private constant TOTAL_SUPPLY = 100000000000e18;
52
53
54
       /*@CTK "ConvergenceToken constructor"
55
            @tag assume_completion
56
            @pre genesis_holder != address(0)
57
            @post __post._totalSupply == _totalSupply + TOTAL_SUPPLY
58
            @post __post._balances[genesis_holder] == _balances[genesis_holder]
59
       + TOTAL SUPPLY
       */
60
       constructor(address genesis holder) {
61
           require(genesis_holder != address(0), "ConvergenceToken: zero
62
       address");
            _mint(genesis_holder, TOTAL_SUPPLY);
63
       }
64
   }
65
```

