


Enabling RUST for UEFI Firmware

UEFI 2020 Virtual Plugfest
August 20, 2020
Jiewen Yao & Vincent Zimmer, Intel Corporation


Jiewen Yao

Jiewen Yao is a principal engineer in the Intel Architecture, Graphics, and Software Group. He has been engaged as a firmware developer for over 15 years. He is a member of the UEFI Security sub team, and the TCG PC Client sub working group.



Vincent Zimmer

Vincent Zimmer is a senior principal engineer in the Intel Architecture, Graphics, and Software Group. He has been engaged as a firmware developer for over 25 years and leads the UEFI Security sub team.



Vincent Zimmer

Agenda





- EDKII Security Summary
- RUST Language
- Enabling RUST for EDKII
- Summary / Call to Action



EDKII Security Summary

BIOS Memory Issue in Hack Conf



Attacking Intel® BIOS

Rafal Wojtczuk and

Extreme Privilege Escalation on Windows 8/UEFI Systems

Attacking Intel TXT® via SINIT code execution hijacking

@coreykal

@xenokovah

Rafal Wojtczuk rafal@invisiblethingslab.com

joann

G

A New Class of Vulnerabilities in SMI Handlers

Advanced Threat Research (<u>www.intelsecurity.com/atr</u>)

Oleksandr Bazhaniuk, Yuriy Bulygin, **Andrew Furtak**, Mikhail Gorobets, **John Loucaides**, Alexander Matrosov, Mickey Shkatov






Top Issue	Open Source	Close Source
Buffer Overflow/ Integer Overflow	50%	38%
SMM	7%	18%
Variable	8%	5%
Register Lock	3%	10%

Vulnerabilities in C/C++



8



Source: Trends, challenges, and strategic shifts in the software vulnerability mitigation landscape – Microsoft, Bluehat IL 2019

Firmware as Software



- Many software issues are also firmware issues.
 - Buffer Overflow
 - Integer Overflow
 - Uninitialized Variable
- Software mitigation can be used for firmware mitigation.
 - (See next page)

3 Levels of Prevention

Prevention	Method	EDKII Open Source Example
Eliminate Vulnerability	Reduce Attack Surface	SMI Handler Profile
	Static Analysis / Dynamic Analysis	Clang Static Analysis, Memory Sanitizer, KLEE
	Security Test / Fuzzing	Host-based Firmware Analyzer, Peach, AFL
	Vulnerability Scan	Chipsec
Break	Stack Guard	MSVC:/GS, GCC:-fstack-protector
Exploitation	Address Space Layout Randomization	DXE/SMM ASLR
	Non Executable Data	SMM Memory Protection
	Control Flow Guard	SMM Control-flow Enforce Technology (CET)
	Code Integrity	UEFI Secure Boot
Contain	Sandbox	EBC
Damage	Deprivilege	Ring3-based third-party Code (?)
	Isolation	(?)



What's More: Type Safe Language



Rather than providing guidance and tools for addressing flaws,

we should strive to <u>prevent the developer from introducing the flaws</u> in the first place.

Source: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/07/16/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/



RUST Language Introduction

RUST Language



Why Rust?

Performance

Rust is blazingly fast and memoryefficient: with no runtime or garbage collector, it can power performancecritical services, run on embedded devices, and easily integrate with other languages.

Reliability

Rust's rich type system and ownership mode guarantee memory-safety and thread-safety — enable you to eliminate many classes of bugs at compile-time.

Productivity

Rust has great documentation, a friendly compiler with useful error messages, and top-notch tooling — an integrated package manager and build tool, smart multi-editor support with auto-completion and type inspections, an auto-formatter, and more.


Source: https://www.rust-lang.org/

RUST Project














RUST Memory Safety









rule out mutation in the presence of aliasing

Memory Safety Issue in BIOS

Туре	Sub Type	Threat in BIOS	Risk in BIOS (Probability/Impact)
Access Error	Buffer Overflow (Write)	Integrity	High / High
	Buffer Over-Read	Confidentiality	High / Low
	Use After Free (Dangling Pointer)	Availability	Medium / Low
	Double Free	Availability	Medium / Low
	Race Condition	Integrity	Low / Low
Uninitialized	Unitialized Variable	Availability	High / Medium
Data	Wild Pointer	Availability	Medium / Low
	NULL pointer deference	Availability	High / Medium
Memory	Stack Exhausing	Availability	Low / Low
Leak	Heap Exhausing	Availability	High / Low

Memory Safety – in RUST

Туре	Sub Type	RUST
Access Error	Buffer Overflow (Write)	Use Offset/Index for Slice Runtime Boundary Check — [panic_handler]
	Buffer Over-Read	Use Offset/Index for Slice Runtime Boundary Check – [panic_handler]
	Use After Free (Dangling Pointer)	Ownership - Compile Time Check
	Double Free	Ownership - Compile Time Check
	Race Condition	Thread Safety - Compile Time Check
Uninitialized	Uninitialized Variable	Initialization - Compile Time Check
Data	Wild Pointer	Initialization - Compile Time Check
	NULL pointer deference	Use Option <t> enum Allocation Check — [alloc_error_handler]</t>
Memory Leak	Stack Exhausing	N/A
	Heap Exhausing	Allocation Check – [alloc_error_handler]

Arithmetics – in RUST

Туре	Method	RUST
Integer Overflow	Addition/ Subtraction/ Multiplication/ Division/ Shift/ Power Overflow	<pre>DEBUG: Runtime Check – [panic_handler] RELEASE: Discard overflow data Compiler Flage: -C overflow-checks=on/off Function: checked overflowing saturating wrapping_ add sub mul div rem shl shr pow()</pre>
Type Cast	Number Cast	Must be explicit — compile time check (Dest Size == Source Size) => no-op (Dest Size < Source Size) => truncate (Dest Size > Source Size) => { (source is unsigned) => zero-extend (source is signed) => sign-extend }

Pointer in RUST



Туре	Description	Example	Usage
Raw Pointer	Unsafe	*const T	Read only Memory
		*mut T	Read-write Memory
Reference	Memory owned by	&T	Shared, Immutable Memory
	some other value	&mut T	Exclusive, Mutable Memory
Smart Pointer	Special Data Structure	Box <t></t>	Heap Memory Allocation

Unsafe Code

- Dereference raw pointer (from C function)
- Call unsafe functions (to C function)
- Access RUST mutable global static variable
- Implement RUST unsafe trait
- Access RUST Union

In this case, you trust me.
- Dev To Rust



Enabling RUST for EDKII

Build RUST in EDKII



- EDKII **Staging Branch** : edkii-rust
 - https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/tree/edkii-rust
- Compiler: LLVM9.0 + RUST Cargo-xbuild
- Target: (supported in rust-lang master)
 - x86_64-unknown-uefi
 - i686-unknown-uefi

Rust Example for EDKII



- **fat-rust**: FAT file system library:
 - https://github.com/jyao1/edk2/tree/edkii-rust/RustPkg/External/FatDxeLibRust
- efi-lib: memory allocation, debug log, boot services, etc.
 - https://github.com/jyao1/edk2/tree/edkii-rust/RustPkg/External/efi-lib
- efi-str: handle CHAR16 string in UEFI
 - https://github.com/jyao1/edk2/tree/edkii-rust/RustPkg/External/efi-str

Rust Crypto Library for EDKII



- ring: for general purpose Cryptography (RSA, ECC, etc)
- webpki: for Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
 - Add extension for UEFI/EDKII.
 - https://github.com/jyao1/ring/tree/uefi_support
 - https://github.com/jyao1/webpki/tree/uefi_support
- efi-random: RDRAND, RDSEED instruction
 - https://github.com/jyao1/edk2/tree/edkii-rust/RustPkg/External/efi-random

Other EFI-Rust Project



- **r-efi**: UEFI Reference Specification Protocol Constants and Definitions
 - https://github.com/r-util/r-efi
- uefi-rs: Wrapper for writing UEFI applications in RUST.
 - https://github.com/rust-osdev/uefi-rs
- Redox uefi support: Wrapper for UEFI services.
 - https://gitlab.redox-os.org/redox-os?utf8=%E2%9C%93&filter=uefi
- rust-hypervisor-firmware: A simple KVM firmware for cloud hypervisor with minimal UEFI support.
 - https://github.com/cloud-hypervisor/rust-hypervisor-firmware
- Rust-based Unit Test in EDKII: Rust-based UefiVariablePolicyLib with Unit Test.
 - https://github.com/corthon/edk2-staging/tree/rust_and_tests

Some Limitations



- UEFI specification and interfaces are defined in C.
- Cross module interaction is C-API.
- Unsafe Code is required.

Where RUST Can Help



- 1. Eliminate Vulnerability (Compile Time Check)
 - Unitialized variable
 - Use After Free
 - Double Free
- 2. **Break Exploitation** (Runtime Check)
 - Memory Boundary Check
 - Integer Overflow Check
- NOTE: Boundary Check Code is still required to prevent system from panic.

Where RUST Cannot Help



- Silicon Register Lock
 - Need Chipsec
- Security Policy
 - Need policy checker
- TOC/TOU
 - Need design review
- SMM Callout
 - Need hardware restriction
- Unsafe Code Block
 - Need careful code review
 - NOTE: Putting C code in Rust Unsafe Block helps nothing.



Summary & Call for Action

Summary & Call for Action



• 50% of EDKII security issues are memory issues.

RUST can help to mitigate memory issues.

Write critical firmware modules in RUST.

Reference



Attack

- https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/WOJTCZUK/BHUSA09-Wojtczuk-AtkIntelBios-SLIDES.pdf
- https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/14-2221-extreme-escalation-presentation.pdf
- https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2011/Attacking_Intel_TXT_via_SINIT_hijacking.pdf
- http://www.c7zero.info/stuff/ANewClassOfVulnInSMIHandlers csw2015.pdf

EDKII Security Bug

- https://edk2-docs.gitbooks.io/security-advisory/content/
- https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/buglist.cgi?bug_status=__all__&list_id=16941&order=bug_id&product=Tianocore%20Security%20Issues&query_format=specific

• Rust Type Safe Language

- https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/07/16/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/
- http://design.inf.unisi.ch/sites/default/files/seminar-niko-matsiakis-rustoverview.pdf

• Rust Project


- https://github.com/libra/libra
- https://github.com/apache/incubator-teaclave-sgx-sdk
- https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker
- https://github.com/oreboot/oreboot
- https://gitlab.redox-os.org/redox-os

To Learn More About UEFI Security



Building Secure Firmware:Armoring the Foundation of the Platform

https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1484261054/





Questions?

Thanks for attending the UEFI 2020 Virtual Plugfest



For more information on UEFI Forum and UEFI Specifications, visit http://www.uefi.org

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