


# 🌲 🌸 Spring notes for CTF 🚩

Week 2

Astrageldon

2024-03-22



Contents

1   **Crypto** . . . . . **3**

1.1   Discrete Logarithm Problems in Matrix Groups . . . . . 3

1.2   Cryptanalysis of the Cyclic Redundancy Check . . . . . 5

# 1 Crypto

## 1.1 Discrete Logarithm Problems in Matrix Groups

问题：给定有限域上的矩阵  $\mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times n}$ ,  $\mathbf{Y} = \mathbf{M}^x$ , 求  $x$ 。

此时我们有

$$\mathbf{Y} = \mathbf{M}^x \Rightarrow \det(\mathbf{Y}) \equiv \det(\mathbf{M})^x \pmod{q}$$

显然当  $\det(\mathbf{M}) \neq 0, 1$  时（此时  $\mathbf{M} \in \mathrm{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q) \setminus \mathrm{SL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q)$ ），我们可以通过求解上述离散对数问题来获得  $x$ 。

当  $\mathbf{M}$  不满足上述条件时，我们尝试将其转化为 Jordan 标准型：

$$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{P}\mathbf{J}\mathbf{P}^{-1}$$

求出  $\mathbf{P}$  与  $\mathbf{J}$  后，注意到

$$\mathbf{J} = \mathbf{P}^{-1}\mathbf{Y}\mathbf{P}$$

并注意到每个 Jordan 块  $\mathbf{D}_k$  都具有如下的性质：

$$\mathbf{D}_k = \begin{pmatrix} \lambda_k & 1 & & & \\ & \lambda_k & \ddots & & \\ & & \ddots & \ddots & \\ & & & \lambda_k & 1 \\ & & & & \lambda_k \end{pmatrix}, \quad \mathbf{D}_k^x = \begin{pmatrix} \lambda_k^x & x\lambda_k^{x-1} & * & \cdots & * \\ & \lambda_k^x & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots \\ & & \ddots & \ddots & * \\ & & & \lambda_k^x & x\lambda_k^{x-1} \\ & & & & \lambda_k^x \end{pmatrix}$$

我们据此可以很轻易地求出  $x$ 。

上述方法非常笨重，然而，改进的方法也相当自然。

众所周知

$$\lambda_i \text{ is an eigenvalue of } \mathbf{A} \Rightarrow \lambda_i^k \text{ is an eigenvalue of } \mathbf{A}^k$$

所以我们计算特征多项式

$$\chi_{\mathbf{M}}(\lambda) := \det(\lambda \mathbf{I} - \mathbf{M}) \quad \text{on } \mathbb{F}_q$$

的分裂域 (splitting field)  $\mathbb{F} = \mathbb{F}_{q^t}$ ，显然此时  $\chi_{\mathbf{M}}(\lambda)$  与  $\chi_{\mathbf{Y}}(\lambda)$  在  $\mathbb{F}$  上均有  $\deg \chi_{\mathbf{M}} = \deg \chi_{\mathbf{Y}} = n$  个根，而两组根之间显然存在幂次关系。

随手搓了一个脚本，急需完善大致能用，只不过需要注意的是  $\mathbb{F}_{q'}$  上离散对数的计算速度可能取决于  $q' - 1 = p'^k - 1$  的因子大小……完整代码见 [Github](#) 😊

matrix\_dlp.sage (part)

```
def matrix_dlp(Y, M):
    assert M.base_ring() == Y.base_ring()
    Fq = M.base_ring()
```

```

assert Fq.is_field()
assert Fq.is_finite()
p = Fq.base().order()

char_poly_M = M.characteristic_polynomial()
F.<x> = char_poly_M.splitting_field()
J_M = M.change_ring(F).jordan_form()
J_Y = Y.change_ring(F).jordan_form()
assert J_M.is_diagonal()
assert J_Y.is_diagonal()
M_eigenvals = sorted(set([J_M[i,i] for i in range(J_M.dimensions()[0])]), key
                        = lambda entry: entry.polynomial().degree())
Y_eigenvals = sorted(set([J_Y[i,i] for i in range(J_Y.dimensions()[0])]), key
                        = lambda entry: entry.polynomial().degree())

for entry_M in M_eigenvals:
    for entry_Y in Y_eigenvals:
        try:
            res = discrete_log(entry_Y, entry_M)
            if M**res == Y: return res
        except (ValueError, ZeroDivisionError):
            continue
return None

```

简易测试:

round = 10, pbits = 20, B = 10, m = -1, dimrange = (5,6)

round = 10, pbits = 10, B = 100, m = 2, dimrange = (12,13)

round = 10, pbits = 10, B = 100000, m = -1, dimrange=(10,11)

```

sage: test_matrix_dlp(round = 10, pbits = 20, m = -1, B = 10)
[+] Testing the function "matrix_dlp"...
[+] Round 1 / 10 succeeded in 0.05s!
[+] Round 2 / 10 succeeded in 0.03s!
[+] Round 3 / 10 succeeded in 0.27s!
[+] Round 4 / 10 succeeded in 0.81s!
[+] Round 5 / 10 succeeded in 0.05s!
[+] Round 6 / 10 succeeded in 0.02s!
[+] Round 7 / 10 succeeded in 0.07s!
[+] Round 8 / 10 succeeded in 0.35s!
[+] Round 9 / 10 succeeded in 8.11s!
[+] Round 10 / 10 succeeded in 12.98s!
[+] Test finished in 22.76s. Succ rate: 100.00% (10 / 10)

```

```

sage: test_matrix_dlp(round = 10, pbits = 10, m = 2, B = 100, dimrange=(12,13))
[+] Testing the function "matrix_dlp"...
[+] Round 1 / 10 succeeded in 0.09s!
[+] Round 2 / 10 succeeded in 0.07s!
[+] Round 3 / 10 succeeded in 0.07s!
[+] Round 4 / 10 succeeded in 0.07s!
[+] Round 5 / 10 succeeded in 0.06s!
[+] Round 6 / 10 succeeded in 0.06s!
[+] Round 7 / 10 succeeded in 0.09s!
[+] Round 8 / 10 succeeded in 0.08s!
[+] Round 9 / 10 succeeded in 0.07s!
[+] Round 10 / 10 succeeded in 0.09s!
[+] Test finished in 5.74s. Succ rate: 100.00% (10 / 10)

```

```

sage: test_matrix_dlp(round = 10, pbits = 10, m = -1, B = 100000, dimrange=(10,11))
[+] Testing the function "matrix_dlp"...
[+] Round 1 / 10 succeeded in 17.29s!
[+] Round 2 / 10 succeeded in 0.04s!
[+] Round 3 / 10 succeeded in 66.08s!
[+] Round 4 / 10 succeeded in 0.14s!
[+] Round 5 / 10 succeeded in 0.08s!
[+] Round 6 / 10 succeeded in 0.04s!
[+] Round 7 / 10 succeeded in 0.04s!
[+] Round 8 / 10 succeeded in 0.05s!
[+] Round 9 / 10 succeeded in 0.05s!
[+] Round 10 / 10 succeeded in 0.05s!
[+] Test finished in 83.85s. Succ rate: 100.00% (10 / 10)

```

## 1.2 Cryptanalysis of the Cyclic Redundancy Check

给定如下的 CRC 函数：

```
def crc(msg, IN, OUT, POLY):
    crc256 = IN
    for b in msg:
        crc256 ^= b
        for _ in range(8):
            crc256 = (crc256 >> 1) ^ (POLY & -(crc256 & 1))
    return (crc256 ^ OUT).to_bytes(32, 'big')
```

那么显然该函数具有多重线性性，即：

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{crc}(\text{msg}_1 \oplus \text{msg}_2, \text{IN}_1 \oplus \text{IN}_2, \text{OUT}_1 \oplus \text{OUT}_2, \text{POLY}) \\ &= \text{crc}(\text{msg}_1, \text{IN}_1, \text{OUT}_1, \text{POLY}) \oplus \text{crc}(\text{msg}_2, \text{IN}_2, \text{OUT}_2, \text{POLY}) \end{aligned}$$

据此，我们可以将取模之前的运算做如下改写：

$$\text{crc}(\mathbf{m}, 0, 0, 0) = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{m}$$

其中  $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{F}_2^{256 \times 256}$ ， $\mathbf{m} \in \mathbb{F}_2^{256}$ ，据此，我们只要求出标准正交基赋给  $\text{crc}(\cdot, 0, 0, 0)$  的所有值就可以推算出  $\mathbf{A}$ ，此后解密的过程便极其容易：

$$\mathbf{A} = \begin{pmatrix} \left| \begin{array}{c} \text{crc}(\mathbf{e}_1, 0, 0, 0) \\ \vdots \\ \text{crc}(\mathbf{e}_{256}, 0, 0, 0) \end{array} \right| & \begin{array}{c} \vdots \\ \vdots \\ \vdots \end{array} \end{pmatrix}_{256 \times 256}, \quad \mathbf{m} = \mathbf{A}^{-1} \text{crc}(\mathbf{m}, 0, 0, 0)$$

我们还可以用多项式的形式来表示上述函数，也即：

$$\text{crc}(M(x), 0, 0, G(x)) = M(x) \cdot x^{256} \bmod G(x)$$

$$\text{crc}(M(x), A(x), B(x), G(x)) = (M(x) + A(x)) \cdot x^{256} + B(x) \bmod G(x)$$

其中  $M(x), G(x), A(x), B(x) \in \mathbb{F}_2[x]$ ， $\deg M < 256$ ， $\deg G = 256$ 。

相比于矩阵表示，它在外观上长得更加简洁。

现在假设我们需要求出模多项式  $G(x) = x^{256} + g(x)$  ( $\deg g < 256$ )，那么我们需要一对满足下式的输入  $M_1(x), M_2(x)$ ：

$$M_1(x) + M_2(x) = 1$$

从而

$$\begin{aligned} C_1(x) + C_2(x) &\equiv (M_1(x) + M_2(x)) \cdot x^{256} \pmod{G(x)} \\ &\equiv g(x) \pmod{G(x)} \end{aligned}$$

如果有一个 CRC Oracle 能够告诉我们  $C_1(x)$  与  $C_2(x)$  的值，那么我们就能够得到  $G(x)$ ，如果还知道另外两个（长度不超过 256 比特）消息的加密异或值  $C_3(x) + C_4(x)$ ，那么通过在  $\mathbb{F}_2[x]/(G(x))$  上除去  $x^{256}$ ，便可以得到两个消息的异或值  $M_3(x) + M_4(x)$ 。