

Generalized Secure Hash Algorithm: SHA-X

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Abstract—This paper defines a generalized SHA algorithm based on the SHA family rules. The proposed algorithm accepts arbitrary length message as input to generate message digest with the required length. It contains the initial values, constant values, padding, parsing, as well as the generalized main body. Further, the proposed algorithm solves the Length-of-the-Hash-Value (LHV) problem that occurs when SHA- r cannot be expressed as $r = mn$ uniquely.

Keywords: Secure hash algorithm, one-way hash function, cryptography, message digest, security, standard

I. INTRODUCTION

Cryptographic hash functions play an important role in modern cryptography. They are widely used in a variety of applications such as password protection, secure protocols, digital signatures, and more. The hash function uses a string of arbitrary length as its input and creates a fixed-length sting as its output. A hash value is often called a data fingerprint or message digest. The following sections provide some definitions of collision-free hash functions.

The Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) is a series of cryptographic hash functions published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). NIST proposed the SHA-0 as Federal Information Processing Standard Publication (FIPS PUB) 180 in 1993 [1] and announced a revised version, the SHA-1 (also called SHA-160) in FIPS PUB 180-1 as a standard instead of the SHA-0 in 1995 [2]. In 2001, the NIST published SHA as FIPS PUB 180-2 [3] consisting of four algorithms: SHA-160, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512. NIST updated FIPS PUB 180-2 [4] in 2004, specifying SHA-224 that matches the key length of 3DES [5].

Several recent studies propose extensions based on SHA. For example, RARSHA-256 [6] is composed of the SHA-256 compression function, and is faster than SHA-256 in parallel implementation. SHACAL and SHACAL-2 [7] are block ciphers based on SHA-1 and SHA-256, respectively. They were submitted to the New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity, and Encryption (NESSIE) project in 2003. The 42-round SHACAL-2 is based on a related-key rectangle attack, which requires $2^{243.38}$ related-key chosen plaintexts with a running time of $2^{488.37}$ [8]. Yoshida and Biryukov replaced all arithmetic additions with XOR operations in SHA-256, calling it SHA-256-XOR, and found that SHA-256-XOR has a pseudo-collision resistance weakness up to 34 rounds [9].

Based on the method of finding collisions in SHA-0 [10], Rijmen and Oswald applied the same method to find collisions in SHA-1 in early 2005 [11]. They examined message scheduling in SHA-0 and SHA-1 and proved that the complexity of finding collisions in a reduced version of SHA-1 (with 53 rounds instead of 80 rounds) was less than 2^{80} . Wang, Yin, and Yu found collisions with a complexity of 2^{69} in the full 80-step SHA-1 [12]. NIST has announced that SHA-1 will be used until 2010, at which time it will be replaced by other SHA algorithms.

Since 2004, several authors have researched collisions for SHA-256. Gilbert and Handschuh reported a 9-round local collision with the complexity 2^{66} of the differential path [13]. Mendel et al later reduced this complexity to 2^{39} by [14]. Nikolić and Biryukov found 21-step collisions for SHA-256 using a nonlinear differential path with a complexity of 2^{19} [15].

The paper defines a generalized SHA algorithm based on SHA family rules. The algorithm contains the initial values,

constant values, padding, parsing, as well as the main body, and accepts arbitrary length message as input to generate message digest with required length. Further, the study solves the Length-of-the-Hash-Value (LHV) problem that occurs when SHA- r cannot be expressed as $r = mn$ uniquely.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section II, we present each step of generalization process including padding, parsing, setting the initial hash values, constants, Boolean expressions and functions, message schedule, initializing the eight working variables, for-loop operation and computing the i^{th} intermediate hash values. Section III proposes the generalized SHA algorithm and shows the LHV problem. Section IV proposes the generalized SHA algorithm without the LHV problem. Section V concludes.

II. GENERALIZED SECURE HASH ALGORITHM

This section describes the processing of generalizing the Secure Hash Algorithm according to the SHA family algorithms. The process of generalization includes padding, parsing, setting the initial hash values, constants, Boolean expressions and functions, and message schedule; initializing the eight working variables and for-loop operation; and computing the i^{th} intermediate hash values. In the following section, we describe the processes of generalizing in detail.

A. The Length of One Word and the Number of Output Words

First, we define the length of one word as n such that $n=32$ in SHA-224 and SHA-256, and $n=64$ in SHA-384 and SHA-512.

Second, we should define the number of output words m . For example, the output length of SHA-256 is 256 bits, 8 words equally ($m=8$, 256 bits=8 word \times 32 bits/word). Similarly, $m=6$ in SHA-384 (384 bits=6 words \times 64 bits/word). On the basis of the SHA, we define the value of m ($6 \leq m \leq 8$), and the length of one word/block n is multiple of 32. With the m and n , we can generalize the SHA family to SHA- mn .

In SHA- mn , where $m=\{6, 7, 8\}$, and $n=\{32, 64\}$, we find two additional formats, called SHA-192 ($m=6$ and $n=32$) and SHA-448 ($m=7$ and $n=64$). The Complete SHA family is defined below.

TABLE I. VALUES OF M AND N FOR SHA FAMILY

Property	SHA- mn					
Algorithm	SHA-192	SHA-224	SHA-256	SHA-384	SHA-448	SHA-512
Word Size (n)	32			64		
# of Output Words (m)	6	7	8	6	7	8
Message Digest Size	192	224	256	384	448	512
Block Size	512			1024		
Security ^a	2^{96}	2^{112}	2^{128}	2^{192}	2^{224}	2^{256}

a. The security complexity is under birthday attack.

B. Padding the Message M

The section generalizes the padding step in SHA- mn . Assuming that M is 1 bits ($0 \leq l < 2^{2n}$), the padding process should satisfy the following two rules:

- If we have $l \leq 14n-1 \pmod{16n}$, we should pad “1||0*||(l)₂” up to the length of $\lceil \frac{l}{16n} \rceil \times 16n$. Notice that “1||0*” denotes that “1” is followed by zero “0” bit or more than one bits and the (l)₂ denotes the length of message in binary.
- If we have $l > 14n-1 \pmod{16n}$, we should pad “1||0*||(l)₂” up to the length of $(\lceil l/16n \rceil + 1) \times 16n$. Notice that “1||0*” denotes that “1” is followed by zero “0” bit or more than one bits and the (l)₂ denotes the length of message in binary.

C. Parsing the Padded Message into Message Blocks

Based on the properties of SHA family, SHA- mn parses the padded message into N $16 \times n$ bits blocks denoted by $M(1) \dots M(N)$. For each $16 \times n$ -bit $M(i)$, the M will be divided into sixteen n -bit subblocks denoted by $M_0^{(i)} \dots M_{15}^{(i)}$.

D. Setting the Initial Hash Values

The initial hash values consist of eight n -bit words denoted by $H_0^{(0)} \dots H_7^{(0)}$. We generalize the properties of setting initial hash value for SHA- mn :

- For some x , if $m=8$ and $n=64x-32$ or $64x$, we map to 1st to 8th prime numbers. And the $64x-32$ bits are obtained by truncating the last 32 bits of the $64x$ bits.
- For some x , if $m=7$ and $n=64x-32$ or $m=6$ and $n=64x$, we map to 9th to 16th prime numbers. The $64x-32$ bits are obtained by truncating the first 32 bits of the $64x$ bits.
- For some x , if $m=6$ and $n=64x-32$ or $m=7$ and $n=64x$, we map to 17th to 24th prime numbers. The $64x-32$ bits are obtained by truncating the last 32 bits of the $64x$ bits.

$$\begin{aligned} H(1) &= 6a09e667f3bcc908 \\ H(2) &= bb67a8e584caa73b \\ H(3) &= 3c6ef372fe94f82b \\ H(4) &= a54ff53a5f1d36f1 \\ H(5) &= 510e527fa de682d1 \\ H(6) &= 9b05688c2b3e6c1f \\ H(7) &= 1f83d9abfb41bd6b \\ H(8) &= 5be0cd19137e2179 \end{aligned}$$

$$\underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{\text{SHA-256; } m=8, n=32}$$

$$\underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{\text{SHA-512; } m=8, n=64}$$

$$\begin{aligned} H(9) &= cbb9d5dc1059ed8 \\ H(10) &= 629a292a367cd507 \\ H(11) &= 9159015a3070dd17 \\ H(12) &= 152fec8df70e5939 \\ H(13) &= 67332667ffc00b31 \\ H(14) &= 8eb44a8768581511 \\ H(15) &= db0c2e0d64f98fa7 \\ H(16) &= 47b5481dbefa4fa4 \end{aligned}$$

$$\underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{\text{SHA-224; } m=7, n=32}$$

$$\underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{\text{SHA-384; } m=6, n=64}$$

$$\begin{array}{l}
\left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
H(17) = \text{a e 5 f 9 1 5 6} & \text{e 7 b 6 d 9 9 b} \\
H(18) = \text{c f 6 c 8 5 d 3} & \text{9 d 1 a 1 e 1 5} \\
H(19) = \text{2 f 7 3 4 7 7 d} & \text{6 a 4 5 6 3 c a} \\
H(20) = \text{6 d 1 8 2 6 c a} & \text{f d 8 2 e 1 e d} \\
H(21) = \text{8 b 4 3 d 4 5 7} & \text{0 a 5 1 b 9 3 6} \\
H(22) = \text{e 3 6 0 b 5 9 6} & \text{d c 3 8 0 c 3 f} \\
H(23) = \text{1 c 4 5 6 0 0 2} & \text{c e 1 3 e 9 f 8} \\
H(24) = \text{6 f 1 9 6 3 3 1} & \text{4 3 a 0 a f 0 e}
\end{array} \right. \\
\hline
\text{SHA-192, } m=6, n=32 \\
\hline
\text{SHA-448, } m=7, n=64
\end{array}$$

Figure 1. Initial values of SHA- mn

E. Setting the Constants.

In SHA, SHA-224 and SHA-256 obtain 64 constants by computing the first 32 bits of the fractional parts of the cube roots of the first 64 prime numbers denoted by $K_0^{(256)} \dots K_{63}^{(256)}$. Similarly, SHA-384 and SHA-512 obtain 80 constants by computing the first 64 bits of the fractional parts of the cube roots of the first 80 prime numbers denoted by $K_0^{(512)} \dots K_{79}^{(512)}$.

We can compute the constants by computing the first n bits of the fractional parts of the cube roots of the first $f_{13}(n)$ prime numbers.

$$f_{13}(n) = \frac{1}{2}n + 48 \quad (1)$$

F. Boolean Expressions and Functions

In SHA- mn , the paper renames $Ch()$ and $Maj()$ functions to $g_1()$ and $g_2()$ and merges some Σ and σ functions described in SHA family. Note that $ROTR^k(x)$ means to rotate right k bits, and $SHR^k(x)$ means to shift right k bits.

- $\Sigma_0^{(224)}(x), \Sigma_0^{(256)}(x), \Sigma_0^{(384)}(x), \Sigma_0^{(512)}(x)$ are merged to

$$g_3() = ROTR^{f_1(x)}(x) \oplus ROTR^{f_2(x)}(x) \oplus ROTR^{f_3(x)}(x) \quad (2)$$

, where $f_1(n) = \frac{13}{16}n - 24$, $f_2(n) = \frac{21}{32}n - 8$, and $f_3(n) = \frac{17}{32}n + 5$.

- $\Sigma_1^{(224)}(x), \Sigma_1^{(256)}(x), \Sigma_1^{(384)}(x), \Sigma_1^{(512)}(x)$ are merged to

$$g_4() = ROTR^{f_4(x)}(x) \oplus ROTR^{f_5(x)}(x) \oplus ROTR^{f_6(x)}(x) \quad (3)$$

, where $f_4(n) = \frac{1}{4}n - 2$, $f_5(n) = \frac{7}{32}n + 4$, and $f_6(n) = \frac{1}{2}n + 9$.

- $\sigma_0^{(224)}(x), \sigma_0^{(256)}(x), \sigma_0^{(384)}(x), \sigma_0^{(512)}(x)$ are merged to

$$g_5() = ROTR^{f_7(x)}(x) \oplus ROTR^{f_8(x)}(x) \oplus SHR^{f_9(x)}(x) \quad (4)$$

, where $f_7(n) = -\frac{3}{16}n + 13 \pmod{n}$, $f_8(n) = -\frac{5}{16}n + 28 \pmod{n}$, and $f_9(n) = \frac{1}{8}n - 1$.

- $\sigma_1^{(224)}(x), \sigma_1^{(256)}(x), \sigma_1^{(384)}(x), \sigma_1^{(512)}(x)$ are merged to

$$g_6() = ROTR^{f_{10}(x)}(x) \oplus ROTR^{f_{11}(x)}(x) \oplus SHR^{f_{12}(x)}(x) \quad (5)$$

, where $f_{10}(n) = \frac{1}{16}n + 15 \pmod{n}$, $f_{11}(n) = \frac{21}{16}n - 23 \pmod{n}$, and $f_{12}(n) = -\frac{1}{8}n + 14 \pmod{n}$.

G. Message Schedule

In SHA-224 and SHA-256, the padded message is parsed into N 512-bit blocks, $M^{(1)} \dots M^{(N)}$, for each 512-bit block, $M^{(i)}$, which is divided into 16 32-bit blocks, $M_0^{(i)} \dots M_{15}^{(i)}$. In SHA-384 and SHA-512, for each 1024-bits block, $M^{(i)}$, which is divided into 16 64-bit blocks, $M_0^{(i)} \dots M_{15}^{(i)}$. The message schedule $\{W_t\}$ is implemented as following.

$$W_t = \begin{cases} M_t^{(i)} & 0 \leq t \leq 15 \\ g_5(W_{t-15}) + g_6(W_{t-2}) + W_{t-16} + W_{t-7} & 16 \leq t \leq f_{13}(n) - 1 \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

, where $f_{13}(n) = \frac{1}{2}n + 48$, and the addition(+) is performed modulo 2^n .

H. For-Loop Operation.

The paper generalizes the for-loop operation of SHA- mn , which is the core part of SHA family algorithms. For each message block $M^{(i)}$, $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$, should be executed $f_{13}(n)$ rounds. Notice that addition(+) is performed modulo 2^n .

Algorithm For-Loop-Operations

For $t = 0$ to $(f_{13}(n)-1)$ {

$$T_1 = a_7 + g_4(a_4) + g_1(a_4, a_5, a_6) + K_t(mn) + W_t;$$

$$T_2 = g_3(a_0) + g_2(a_0, a_1, a_2);$$

$$a_7 = a_6; a_6 = a_5; a_5 = a_4; a_4 = a_3 + T_1;$$

$$a_3 = a_2; a_2 = a_1; a_1 = a_0; a_0 = T_1 + T_2;$$

}

I. Compute the i th Intermediate Hash Value $H(i)$

For each $16 \times n$ -bit block $M^{(i)}$, $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$, the intermediate message digests in the SHA standard execute the following operations:

$$H_j^{(i)} = a_j + H_j^{(i-1)}, 0 \leq j \leq 7 \quad (7)$$

J. The Message Digest.

After repeating steps N times (i.e., After processing $M^{(N)}$), the $m \times n$ bits message digest of the message is:

$$H_0^{(N)} \parallel H_1^{(N)} \parallel \dots \parallel H_{m-1}^{(N)}. \quad (8)$$

III. SHA(x) FAMILY

The paper reduces the parameter $n = \{32, 64\}$ as $n = 32 \times (2-i)$, $i \in \{0, 1\}$ and replaces the generalized SHA as SHA(x) which is the family of SHAs of x . The section discusses SHA(1) and SHA(2) first and the LHV (Length-of-the-Hash-Value) problem of SHA(x).

Definition SHA(x)

$$SHA(x) = \{SHA-m[32 \times (2x-i)] \mid i \in \{0, 1\} \text{ and } m \in \{6, 7, 8\}\}$$

A. SHA(1) and SHA(2).

According to the Definition, $SHA(1) = \{SHA-192, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-448, SHA-512\}$. And $SHA(2) = \{SHA-576, SHA-672, SHA-768, SHA-896, SHA-1024\}$ for $x=2$. The number of SHA(2) elements is 5, because $m \times n = 768$ when $n = 96$, $m = 8$ and $n = 128$, $n = 6$. Therefore, we only use SHA-768 to denote the two cases. The elements of SHA(2) are listed in Table II.

TABLE II. SHA(2)

SHA(2)	SHA-576	SHA-672	SHA-768	SHA-768	SHA-896	SHA-1024
m	6	7	8	6	7	8
n (bits)	96	96	96	128	128	128
$m \times n$ (bits)	576	672	768	768	896	1024

B. Length-of-the-Hash-Value Problem

From the cases of SHA-768 and SHA-1536, which is $m \times n = 1536$ when $n=256$, $m=6$ and $n=192$, $n=8$, it exists LHV problem that some SHA- r cannot be expressed as $r=mn$ uniquely. The LHV problems are classified into 6-7-8-LHV problem, 6-7-LHV problem, 6-8-LHV problem and 7-8-LHV problem. The section defines the LHV problem. Otherwise, SHA- r has no LHV problem.

Definition LHV (Length-of-the-Hash-Value) problem

- (1) Let SHA- r have a LHV problem if r satisfies $\{r = m \times n = m' \times n' \mid \exists \text{ distinct } n, n' \in \{32(2x-i) \mid x \in N, i = \{0, 1\}\}, \forall m, m' \in \{6, 7, 8\}\}$
- (2) Let SHA- r have 6-7-8-LHV problem if r satisfies $\{r = 6 \times n = 7 \times n' = 8 \times n'' \mid \exists \text{ distinct } n, n', n'' \in \{32(2x-i) \mid x \in N, i = \{0, 1\}\}\}$
- (3) Let SHA- r have 6-7-LHV problem if r satisfies $\{r = 6 \times n = 7 \times n' \neq 8 \times n'' \mid \exists \text{ distinct } n, n', n'' \in \{32(2x-i) \mid x \in N, i = \{0, 1\}\}\}$
- (4) Let SHA- r have 6-8-LHV problem if r satisfies $\{r = 6 \times n = 8 \times n' \neq 7 \times n'' \mid \exists \text{ distinct } n, n', n'' \in \{32(2x-i) \mid x \in N, i = \{0, 1\}\}\}$
- (5) Let SHA- r have 7-8-LHV problem if r satisfies $\{r = 7 \times n = 8 \times n' \neq 6 \times n'' \mid \exists \text{ distinct } n, n', n'' \in \{32(2x-i) \mid x \in N, i = \{0, 1\}\}\}$

IV. SHA'(x) WITHOUT LHV PROBLEM

The previous section defines LHV problem within all the situations of the LHV problem within SHA(x). Consider the length of one word in the form of $32 \times 2^{k-1}$ for $k \in N$, if we take $m = 6$, $n = 32 \times 23 = 256$, $r = m \times n = 1536$. However, $n' = 1536/8 = 192 \notin \{32 \times 2^{k-1} \mid k \in N\}$. That is, $\nexists n \in \{32 \times 2^{k-1} \mid k \in N\}$ such that $1536 = 6 \times 256 = 8 \times n$. We solve 6-8-LHV problem. The found SHA- $m \times (32 \times 2^{k-1})$ has no LHV problem and is defined as SHA'(x). Therefore, we have $\text{SHA}'(x) = \{\text{SHA}-192 \times 2^{x-1}, \text{SHA}-224 \times 2^{x-1}, \text{SHA}-256 \times 2^{x-1} \mid x \in N\}$.

Definition SHA'(x) without LHV problem

$$\text{SHA}'(x) = \{\text{SHA}-m[32 \times (2x-1)] \mid x \in N \text{ and } m \in \{6, 7, 8\}\}$$

V. CONCLUSIONS

This work generalized the SHA family as SHA- mn that takes arbitrary length message as input to generate a message digest with required length. We modify each of the steps of SHA- mn as generalized version that contains padding and parsing; setting the initial hash values, constants, Boolean expressions and functions and message schedule; initializing the eight working variables and for-loop operation; and, computing the i^{th} intermediate hash values. Further, the LHV

problem that does not exist in the original SHA standard is solved.

Owing to security considerations, SHA- mn is generalized based on the rules of SHA family design. Although many may not agree the method for calculating complexity according to the birthday paradox as the collision of full SHA-1 has been found in 2005, the design of SHA is improved. Efficient ways of finding collisions of SHA-256 remain the focus of many researchers to date. We believe, therefore, the approximate complexity of SHA- mn is $2^{mn/2}$ under birthday attack.

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