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Q1. [25pts] For the simplified DES, consider Sbox S0 and show how DiffCrypto attack would work. Show your work for partial credit.

The DiffCrypto attack abuses the non-uniform differential behavior of S-boxes. Even though the output for uniformly distributed single bits is uniformly distributed, the differential output between two uniformly distributed bits is not uniformly distributed.

The 4-bit input to Sbox S0 has 16 possible values. Assign variables,  
 $x, x^*, x' = x \text{ xor } x^*$

The 2-bit output of Sbox S0 has 4 possible values. Assign variables,  
 $y = S0(x), y^* = S0(x^*), y' = y \text{ xor } y^* = S0(x) \text{ xor } S0(x^*)$

The differential distribution table for S0 is:

Input $x'$	Output $y'$			
	0	1	2	3
0	16	0	0	0
1	0	10	6	0
2	0	2	10	4
3	2	4	0	10
4	2	4	8	2
5	4	2	2	8
6	8	2	2	4
7	2	8	4	2
8	2	4	8	2
9	0	2	2	12
a	10	0	4	2
b	4	10	2	0
c	8	2	2	4
d	2	8	4	2
e	2	4	8	2
f	4	2	2	8

Note the highly non-uniform distribution of the output.

The first row is clearly explained because when  $x' = 0$  then  $x = x^*$  and clearly  $y = y^*$

But all other rows show a non-uniform distribution of outputs...

Consider the input XOR 2:

Here are the possible input values for S0 with input XOR 2

2 → 1: D, F

2 → 2: 0, 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, A, B, C, E

2 → 3: 4, 5, 6, 7

Suppose we know two inputs to S0 as 4 and 6 which XORs to 2 and the output XOR as 1

The input XOR is 2 regardless of the key because the key does not change

$$\begin{aligned} S0'_I &= S0_I \text{ xor } S0^*_I \\ &= (S0_E \text{ xor } S0_K) \text{ xor } (S0^*_E \text{ xor } S0_K) \\ &= S0_E \text{ xor } S0^*_E \\ &= S0'_E \end{aligned}$$

And since  $S0_I = S0_E \text{ xor } S0_K$

We know  $S0_K = S0_I \text{ xor } S0_E$

Which means

$$D \text{ xor } 4 = 9 \quad D \text{ xor } 6 = B$$

$$F \text{ xor } 4 = B \quad F \text{ xor } 6 = 9$$

So the possible keys are {B, 9}

You can repeat this for each block of subkey to derive the entire subkey

Q2 [25pts] Consider the crypto system below and compute  $H(K|C)$

$$P = \{a, b, c\} \quad \text{with} \quad P_P(a) = 1/3 \quad P_P(b) = 1/6 \quad P_P(c) = 1/2$$

$$K = \{k_1, k_2, k_3\} \quad \text{with} \quad P_K(k_1) = 1/2 \quad P_K(k_2) = 1/4 \quad P_K(k_3) = 1/4$$

$$C = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$$

$$e_{k1}(a) = 1 \quad e_{k1}(b) = 2 \quad e_{k1}(c) = 2$$

$$e_{k2}(a) = 2 \quad e_{k2}(b) = 3 \quad e_{k2}(c) = 1$$

$$e_{k3}(a) = 3 \quad e_{k3}(b) = 4 \quad e_{k3}(c) = 4$$

$$P_C(1) = 1/6 + 1/8 = 7/24$$

$$P_C(2) = 1/12 + 1/4 + 1/12 = 5/12$$

$$P_C(3) = 1/24 + 1/12 = 1/8$$

$$P_C(4) = 1/24 + 1/8 = 1/6$$

$$H(P) = -(1/3 \log_2 1/3 + 1/6 \log_2 1/6 + 1/2 \log_2 1/2) = 1.459$$

$$H(K) = -(1/2 \log_2 1/2 + 1/4 \log_2 1/4 + 1/4 \log_2 1/4) = 1.500$$

$$H(C) = -(7/24 \log_2 7/24 + 5/12 \log_2 5/12 + 1/8 \log_2 1/8 + 1/6 \log_2 1/6) = 1.851$$

$$H(K|C) = 1.500 + 1.459 - 1.851 = 1.108$$



