

WARNING

The following talk contains disturbing stories from the automotive industry, which can cause discomfort and anger towards the audience. There have already been many instances of fainting and vomiting in conference halls. For those choosing to continue, you have been warned...

/s


HORROR STORIES

FROM THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY


THOMAS SERMPINIS
@CROWTOM

\$Whoami

- Thomas Sermpinis (a.k.a. cr0wtom)
 - Automotive Pentest Lead by Day
 - Security Researcher by Night
- Hack Everything, Everywhere, All at Once (and Legally)
- TROOPERS Speaker and Addict
- *For more: cr0wsplace.com*



TROOPERS




Goals of this talk

- Analyse the state of cybersecurity in the automotive industry
- Present unique (and hopefully interesting) use-cases, result of around 100 pentests and research projects in the industry
- Educate the new, the old and the **bold**
- Endorse and push more hackers to automotive
- Raise and highlight the significance of safety related devices



ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟ 0

AUTOMOTIVE SECURITY



The state of automotive cybersecurity

Relay attacks in 2023? Is that even possible?

The state of automotive cybersecurity



Relay attacks in 2023? Is that even possible?

The state of automotive cybersecurity

Relay attacks in 2023? Is that

Kevin2600 @Kevin2600 · May 15
Replying to @Kevin2600
Demo video




youtube.com
Nissan Sylphy Classic 2021 Fixed Code Vulnerability

How Thieves Are Stealing Hyundais and Kias With Just a USB Cable

This low-tech hack specifically targets the Korean cars that use a physical key.

BY ROB STUMPF | PUBLISHED AUG 2, 2022 3:28 PM EDT

NEWS



The state of automotive cybersecurity

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NEWS

TRANSPO / TECH / CARS


This remote keyfob hack may leave the past decade of Hondas vulnerable



Despite automaker's attempts at security

By Mitchell Clark
Jul 11, 2022 at 6:23 PM MST | 0 Comments / 0 News

Even the most recent models. Image: Honda



The state of automotive cybersecurity



Kevin2600 @Kevin2600 · May 15

Replying to @Kevin2600

Demo video

Sirius XM flaw could've let hackers remotely unlock and start cars



Nissan is just one of the auto manufacturer's that use Sirius XM's connected vehicle services.

Security researcher Sam Curry found an exploit affecting the telematics and infotainment systems powered by Sirius XM. Curry says the company has since fixed the issue.

By Emma Roth, a news writer who covers the streaming wars, consumer tech, crypto, social media, and much more. Previously, she was a writer and editor at MUO.

Dec 3, 2022 at 11:12 AM MST | □ 8 Comments / 8 New




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
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Kias With Just a
Cable
ts the Korean cars that use a physical key.
SHED AUG 2, 2022 3:28 PM EDT
NEWS



The state of automotive cybersecurity

How Tech-Savvy Thieves Are Stealing Cars By Hacking Through Headlights

by [Nathan Ord](#) — Saturday, April 08, 2023, 02:37 PM EDT



Early last year, [hackers were replaying](#) remote keyless system codes to unlock and steal Honda or Acura vehicles. This year, criminals of TikTok have been showing people how to break into certain [Hyundai and Kia models](#) with some hotwiring. However, criminals are upping their thieving game as car companies come to the rescue with patches and security solutions for vehicles. With this forced advancement come car thefts through attacks on the car's central nervous system called the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus.

[BECOME A PATRON](#)



t use Sirius XM's connected



Even the most recent models. Image: Honda



Kevin2600 @Kevin2600 · May 15

Replying to @Kevin2600

Demo video

Should've let hackers and start cars

Security researcher Sam Curry found an exploit affecting the telematics and infotainment systems powered by Sirius XM. Curry says the company has since fixed the issue.

By [Emma Roth](#), a news writer who covers the streaming wars, consumer tech, crypto, social media, and much more. Previously, she was a writer and editor at MUO.

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


Thieves Are Stealing Kias With Just a Cable

It's the Korean cars that use a physical key.

SATURDAY, AUGUST 6, 2022 3:28 PM EDT

NEWS



Attempts at



By [Mitchell Clark](#)
Jul 11, 2022 at 6:23 PM MST | □ 0 Comments / 0 New



The state of automotive cybersecurity

- Is there light at the end of the tunnel?
- The automotive industry cannot be considered new
 - The connectivity and technological aspect of it though, is not so old
- Entertainment and constant need for connectivity, are the reasons for technological advancements and integration
- *Usually, 100+ year old industries, trying to catch up with young start-ups*



The state of automotive cybersecurity



The state of automotive cybersecurity

- UN Regulation No. 155 - general requirements for Vehicle Cybersecurity
 - Provides a set of standards that must be met in order to ensure the safety of road vehicles
 - The regulation requires the operation of a certified cybersecurity management system (CSMS)
 - UN R155 is significant as it provides a set of standards that must be met in order to ensure the safety of road vehicles
- **In summary:** Trying to shape the completely unregulated mess that exists right now
- **Biggest caveat?** Penetration testing is solely based on the Risk Assessment (TARA)



ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟ 1

TIER 1 SUPPLIERS

A story of how cybersecurity requirements are designed by OEMs and NOT followed by Tier 1's.



Cyber Security Requirements

- Cyber security requirements are developed and distributed by OEMs
 - A document which specifies **the engineering requirements for cybersecurity risk management** throughout the vehicle life cycle, including the **processes, policies, and standards to comply with the legal framework** and **protect the vehicle from cyber-attacks**
- Tier 1 suppliers should (ideally) comply to those, for correct and “secure” functionality of the supplied components

Is that actually the case though?



Reality check

- Several Tier 1's are based in countries with *Low Transparency and Weak Governance*.^{1,2}
- *How clear are the Cyber Security Requirements?*
- *Is there a proactive or reactive approach from the OEM or the pentesting supplier?*

1. There is no specific company, entity or government targeted in this sentence.

2. The original bullet-point was referring to **shady countries**. To avoid any legal implications, speakers used the magic of AI to suggest and use a more formal alternative. /s

3. No language models were used throughout this research and this presentation.




Use Case 1: The path to Game Over

- UDS stands for Unified Diagnostic Services, an application layer protocol for communication between electronic control units in automotive electronics
- Allows diagnostic functions such as reading and erasing fault codes, programming, testing, and monitoring of ECUs
- Consists of several “services” which can be used to perform specific actions
- A really common authentication scheme in UDS is the **Security Access** service (0x27)
 - Allows elevated access to authenticated users




Use Case 1: The path to Game Over



Use Case I: The path to Game Over


- Loosely developed requirements, can result in:
 1. Sloppy authentication implementations
 2. Weak sources of randomness
 3. Backdoors implemented outside of the scope of the requirements
 - e.g. Extra security access sub-service, with extremely weak security

Backdoors, backdoors, backdoors...




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can0	761	[8]	06	67	71	05	23	AA	12	00
can0	760	[8]	06	27	72	00	00	00	00	00
can0	761	[8]	02	67	73	00	00	00	00	00

Backdoors, backdoors, backdoors...




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Backdoors, backdoors, backdoors...




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can0	760	[8]	06 27 72 00 00 00 00 00
can0	761	[8]	02 67 73 00 00 00 00 00

Backdoors, backdoors, backdoors...



can0	760	[8]	02 27 70 00 00 00 00 80
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Backdoors, backdoors, backdoors...



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Backdoors

SECURITY LEVEL?




MAXIMUM!



SUMMARY

- While Tier 1 supplied components might follow the OEMs cybersecurity requirements, that doesn't mean we only need to test "*by the book*"
- In most cases:
 - Several misconfigurations existing **outside of the CyberSec Requirements**
 - **OEM doesn't know** (or doesn't want us to know)
 - **Tier 1's did not inform the OEM**
 - But why ... ?



Solution...

- *For the OEM:* Build more strict Cyber Security Requirements
- *For the pentest suppliers / researchers:*
 - Build a **robust methodology** which will cover a realistic amount of testcases
 - Don't build it solely based on requirements
 - **Educate** the client (OEM, Tier 1 or anyone applicable)

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟ 2

TELEMATICS

A story of how bad architecture can lead to devastating results.



Telematics and Connectivity


- Almost no vehicles ship anymore without a telematics unit
- Secure update procedures became a necessity (they are part of the recent regulations)
- Several running services, including remote vehicle management in most cases (e.g. door unlock, vehicle conditioning, etc.)
- *TLDR: Please consider the applicable connectivity while designing the architecture*

Use Case II: The supetcar

Telematics




Use Case II: The supetcar




Use Case II: The supetcar




Use Case II: The supetcat



Use Case II: The supercar



Use Case II: The supercar



The tale of the buses

- Interconnected buses can act as a stepping stone in safety critical attacks
- Gateways are commonly used for message filtering and routing
- Bypassing the gateway, results in direct interception and communication of CAN¹ messages
- At this point, target ECUs existing on those buses can be analysed, enumerated, and exploited without the assumed restrictions

1. Or other applicable interfaces and communication protocols




Use Case II: The supetcar

- Remember UDS?
- Service 0x11 - ECURestart
- 90% of target ECUs, come with no authentication or pre-condition for hard ECURestarts
- This means that any ECU which allows execution of this service, can be immediately interrupted by hard resetting it


Outcome?




Use Case II: The supercar



Use Case II: The supercar



Use Case II: The supetcat





The tale of the buses

- Automotive architecture, understandably gets more complicated
- More internal buses need to be introduced for proper segmentation of safety critical and non-critical components
- Better design should be considered from the first steps of production

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟ 3

DESIGN CHOICES


...



IS IT Hard...

- Other than architecture, there are several points during the design of a vehicle that need to be considered
- The specific physical space of the components, wiring and connections is a - multifunctional issue with several restrictions
- Manufacturers need to make sure that everything is secure, isolated and inaccessible to external users

What if it's not?



External Points of Connectivity

- Several external components are directly connected to internal buses
 - e.g. radars, lidars, lights
- Recent Toyota hack proved that this can have devastating results
- Bad design choices and bad architecture are not a good combination
 - External access to internal busses is a really common “misconfiguration”



Ian Tabor
@mintynet · Follow

No fcuking point having a nice car these days, came out early to find the front bumper and arch trim pulled off and even worse the headlight wiring plug had been yanked out, if definitely wasn't an accident, kerb side and massive screwdriver mark. Breaks in the clips etc. C&#ts


7:03 PM · Apr 24, 2022

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
Source: <https://www.thedrive.com/news/shadetree-hackers-are-stealing-cars-by-injecting-code-into-headlight-wiring>




Use Case III: External Points of Connectivity



Use Case III: External Points of Connectivity



Use Case III: External Points of Connectivity





External Points of Connectivity

- Separates direct current into specified components
- Several reasons behind the inclusion of those isolators
 - Both security and safety related
- Encountered during pentests mainly on buses, trucks and boats
- Should it be accessible in an unrestricted manner though ... ?



Source: Alibaba

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟ 4

BOOTLOADERS

A story of how the old is becoming new again.



SecureBoot


- Depending on the target architecture and system, the bootloader is implemented accordingly
- ECU bootloaders are usually used for:
 - Re-programming
 - Initialisation of application section of memory
 - Read and write *from* and *to* sensitive parts of memory
- **Understandably** security measures must be taken to restrict unauthenticated access to the bootloader

Unfortunately, not so many manufacturers restrict access to the bootloader...


The Reality

- Even if we can obtain access to the bootloader, sensitive services are restricted to unauthenticated users
 - Request Download (0x34) / Request Upload (0x35)
 - Transfer Data (0x36)
- Most of the ECUs use the “bootloader” section (or UDS programming session) to perform secure update of the target
- Authentication sub-service for re-programming is different from the sub-service used in application mode for other restricted tasks


The Reality




The Reality




The Reality



The reality



The reality




The hard truth


- UDS Diagnostic Session Control for Programming session (10 02) is most of the times accessible to unauthenticated users
- What happens if it's not?
- Remember ECUReset?




The hard truth



The hard truth




The hard truth




ECUReset restricted, you say?







The hard truth



The hard truth



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
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


The hard truth




The hard truth

Powercycle through unrestricted access
to battery isolator



The hard truth



BYPASSES IN FRONT OF YOUR EYES

- As mentioned, battery isolator can be used to clear errors from ECUs
- ECUs are mainly powered by the internal 12V battery
 - In EVs, from the AC Inverter, which is supplied by the vehicles batteries
- Isolating the power source, technically turns off the ECUs
 - By supplying power again, we initiate the boot process and everything that comes after that



What about the hidden bypasses...


- TROOPERS22 - UDS Fuzzing and the Path to Game Over
- Security access seed randomness based on system clock and old vulnerabilities becoming new again
- Manufacturers start realising and mitigating this issue
 - Especially big OEMs and Tier 1s




But did they actually realise?




The Hard Truth




The Hard Truth



The Hard Truth




The Hard Truth




Seed Source of Randomness:

The Hard Truth




Seed Source of Randomness:
HSM


The Hard Truth



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


The Hard Truth





Seed Source of Randomness:

The Hard Truth



Seed Source of Randomness:
System Clock

The Hard Truth




The Hard Truth

- Things which are protected on the application layer, can be usually unprotected on the bootloader
 - Forgotten?
 - Separate development teams?
 - Externally sourced, so different code base?
- It's worth testing all available services and sub-services, under all available layers

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟ 5

SEEDS^{^2}

The story of the duplicates once again.



UDS FUZZING

- CaringCaribou and seed_randomness_fuzzer module
- Mostly modular with several developed modules
- Main advantage is the ease of use
- Main disadvantage is the inability to easily alter the low level layers of the project

Use Case IV: Hydrogen Combustion ATV

- Safety critical components need to be easily isolated from batteries
- After enumerating:
 - ECURest is not available in any diagnostic session
 - The available Security Access is not backdoored or vulnerable to weak seed randomness
 - No other misconfigurations discovered during initial enumeration



Use Case IV: Hydrogen Combustion ATV


Use Case IV: Hydrogen Combustion ATV



Use Case IV: Hydrogen Combustion ATV



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Use Case IV: Hydrogen Combustion ATV



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Use Case IV: Hydrogen Combustion ATV

The screenshot shows a terminal window with two panes. The left pane displays a command-line interface for fuzzing a CAN bus interface. The right pane shows the raw CAN bus data being captured.

Left Pane (Fuzzing Command):

```
cr0wtom@kali-m1: ~/Tools/caringcaribou/tool
File Actions Edit View Help
[cr0wtom@kali-m1:~/Tools/caringcaribou/tool]
$ python3 cc.py -i can0 uds_fuzz seed_randomness_fuzzer -d 1.102 10032701 0x7d4 0x7d5
```

Right Pane (CAN Dump):

```
[cr0wtom@kali-m1:~/Tools/caringcaribou/tool]
$ candump can0,7D5:7D4
```

At the bottom of the terminal window, there is a status bar with the text "[1] 0:zsh*". In the bottom right corner, the system information "kali-m1" 13:44 04-Jun-22 is visible.

Results

- Having a relay as the source of the powercycle, can result in more accurate results from last year
- With around 20% of duplicate seeds out of 1k samples, we can be relatively confident that the target is sourcing the randomness on the system clock
- In most cases, it's easier to intercept a seed and pre-calculated key pair from the bootloader accessible sub-session than from the application layer
 - Used for re-programming purposes

EPILOGUE



For the community

- While CC might not be the best tool out there, it can help newcomers start
 - A project which also helped us start
- Several new automations from my side to help the project move forward:
 - Write Data by Identifier fuzzer
 - Auto module, for complete automation of the UDS enumeration
 - Support for new CAN interfaces with proprietary drivers under python-can
 - Different padding (and no padding) support

Pentesting VS Research

- While reversing firmwares and getting hardware access is fun, scope is usually extremely limited
- We are tasked to find efficient ways to perform more testing, in a result driven environment
- Automation of tasks is usually the main priority of the testing
- Direct result is the extension of our methodology and testcases

Clients VS Pentesters

- Automotive clients need to understand our methodology and testcases
- Abstract results are not always a good way forward
- Education is the key to a better collaboration with developers as there is no clear standard and methodology available online, in contrast to mature industries like web, infra, API, etc.

Do they even care?



THE END

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION



TROOPERS

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