



# CredShields

# Smart Contract Audit

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**Aug 6th, 2023 • CONFIDENTIAL**

## **Description**

This document details the process and result of the Smart Contract Audit performed by CredShields Technologies PTE. LTD. on behalf of The HumanPlus Inc. between July 26th, 2023, and July 30th, 2023. And a retest was performed on Aug 2nd, 2023.

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# 1. Executive Summary

The HumanPlus Inc. engaged CredShields to perform a smart contract audit from July 26th, 2023, to July 30th, 2023. During this timeframe, Nine (9) vulnerabilities were identified. **A retest was performed on Aug 2nd, 2023, and all the bugs have been addressed.**

During the audit, zero (0) vulnerabilities were found with a severity rating of either High or Critical. These vulnerabilities represent the greatest immediate risk to "The HumanPlus Inc." and should be prioritized for remediation, and fortunately, none were found.

The table below shows the in-scope assets and a breakdown of findings by severity per asset. Section 2.3 contains more information on how severity is calculated.

| Assets in Scope      | Critical | High | Medium | Low | info | Gas | Σ |
|----------------------|----------|------|--------|-----|------|-----|---|
| Smart Contract Audit | 0        | 0    | 1      | 3   | 3    | 2   | 9 |
|                      | 0        | 0    | 1      | 3   | 3    | 2   | 9 |

*Table: Vulnerabilities Per Asset in Scope*

The CredShields team conducted the security audit to focus on identifying vulnerabilities in Smart Contract Audit's scope during the testing window while abiding by the policies set forth by Smart Contract Audit's team.

## State of Security

To maintain a robust security posture, it is essential to continuously review and improve upon current security processes. Utilizing CredShields' continuous audit feature allows both The HumanPlus Inc.'s internal security and development teams to not only identify specific vulnerabilities but also gain a deeper understanding of the current security threat landscape.

To ensure that vulnerabilities are not introduced when new features are added, or code is refactored, we recommend conducting regular security assessments. Additionally, by analyzing the root cause of resolved vulnerabilities, the internal teams at The HumanPlus Inc. can implement both manual and automated procedures to eliminate entire classes of vulnerabilities in the future. By taking a proactive approach, The HumanPlus Inc. can future-proof its security posture and protect its assets.

## 2. Methodology

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The HumanPlus Inc. engaged CredShields to perform a Smart Contract audit. The following sections cover how the engagement was put together and executed.

### 2.1 Preparation phase

The CredShields team meticulously reviewed all provided documents and comments in the smart-contract code to gain a thorough understanding of the contract's features and functionalities. They meticulously examined all functions and created a mind map to systematically identify potential security vulnerabilities, prioritizing those that were more critical and business-sensitive for the refactored code. To confirm their findings, the team deployed a self-hosted version of the smart contract and performed verifications and validations during the audit phase.

A testing window from July 26th, 2023, to July 30th, 2023, was agreed upon during the preparation phase.

### 2.1.1 Scope

During the preparation phase, the following scope for the engagement was agreed-upon:

| IN SCOPE ASSETS   |
|---|
| <a href="https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/tree/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992">https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/tree/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992</a> |

*Table: List of Files in Scope*

### 2.1.2 Documentation

Documentation was not required as the code was self-sufficient for understanding the project.

### 2.1.3 Audit Goals

CredShields uses both in-house tools and manual methods for comprehensive smart contract security auditing. The majority of the audit is done by manually reviewing the contract source code, following SWC registry standards, and an extended industry standard self-developed checklist. The team places emphasis on understanding core concepts, preparing test cases, and evaluating business logic for potential vulnerabilities.

## 2.2 Retesting phase

The HumanPlus Inc. is actively partnering with CredShields to validate the remediations implemented towards the discovered vulnerabilities.

## 2.3 Vulnerability Classification and severity

CredShields follows OWASP's Risk Rating Methodology to determine the risk associated with discovered vulnerabilities. This approach considers two factors - Likelihood and Impact - which are evaluated with three possible values - **Low**, **Medium**, and **High**, based on factors such as Threat agents, Vulnerability factors, Technical and Business Impacts. The overall severity of the risk is calculated by combining the likelihood and impact estimates.

| Overall Risk Severity |            |        |        |          |
|-----------------------|------------|--------|--------|----------|
| Impact                | HIGH       | Medium | High   | Critical |
|                       | MEDIUM     | Low    | Medium | High     |
|                       | LOW        | Note   | Low    | Medium   |
|                       |            | LOW    | MEDIUM | HIGH     |
|                       | Likelihood |        |        |          |

Overall, the categories can be defined as described below -

### 1. Informational

We prioritize technical excellence and pay attention to detail in our coding practices. Our guidelines, standards, and best practices help ensure software stability and reliability. Informational vulnerabilities are opportunities for improvement and do



not pose a direct risk to the contract. Code maintainers should use their own judgment on whether to address them.

## **2. Low**

Low-risk vulnerabilities are those that either have a small impact or can't be exploited repeatedly or those the client considers insignificant based on their specific business circumstances.

## **3. Medium**

Medium-severity vulnerabilities are those caused by weak or flawed logic in the code and can lead to exfiltration or modification of private user information. These vulnerabilities can harm the client's reputation under certain conditions and should be fixed within a specified timeframe.

## **4. High**

High-severity vulnerabilities pose a significant risk to the Smart Contract and the organization. They can result in the loss of funds for some users, may or may not require specific conditions, and are more complex to exploit. These vulnerabilities can harm the client's reputation and should be fixed immediately.

## **5. Critical**

Critical issues are directly exploitable bugs or security vulnerabilities that do not require specific conditions. They often result in the loss of funds and Ether from Smart Contracts or users and put sensitive user information at risk of compromise

or modification. The client's reputation and financial stability will be severely impacted if these issues are not addressed immediately.

## **6. Gas**

To address the risk and volatility of smart contracts and the use of gas as a method of payment, CredShields has introduced a "Gas" severity category. This category deals with optimizing code and refactoring to conserve gas.

## 2.4 CredShields staff

The following individual at CredShields managed this engagement and produced this report:

- **Shashank, Co-founder CredShields**
  - [shashank@CredShields.com](mailto:shashank@CredShields.com)

Please feel free to contact this individual with any questions or concerns you have around the engagement or this document.

## 3. Findings

This chapter contains the results of the security assessment. Findings are sorted by their severity and grouped by the asset and SWC classification. Each asset section will include a summary. The table in the executive summary contains the total number of identified security vulnerabilities per asset per risk indication.

### 3.1 Findings Overview

#### 3.1.1 Vulnerability Summary

During the security assessment, Nine (9) security vulnerabilities were identified in the asset.

| VULNERABILITY TITLE  | SEVERITY      | SWC   Vulnerability Type  |
|--|---------------|---------------------------|
| Use safeTransfer/safeTransferFrom instead of transfer/transferFrom | Low           | Missing best practices    |
| Floating and Outdated Pragma                                       | Low           | Floating Pragma (SWC-103) |
| Missing Events in Functions  | Low           | Missing Best Practices    |
| Variables should be Immutable                                      | Gas           | Gas Optimization          |
| Require Instead of If and Revert                                   | Informational | Best Practices            |
| Missing NatSpec Comments   | Informational | Missing best practices    |
| Use Call instead of Transfer                                       | Informational | Best Practices            |
| Functions should be declared External                              | Gas           | Gas Optimization          |

| Gas Optimization in Require Statements | Gas | Gas Optimization |
|--|-----|------------------|
|--|-----|------------------|

*Table: Findings in Smart Contracts*

### 3.1.2 Findings Summary

| SWC ID  | SWC Checklist  | Test Result    | Notes  |
|---------|--|----------------|--|
| SWC-100 | <a href="#">Function Default Visibility</a>          | Not Vulnerable | Not applicable after <b>v0.5.X</b> (Currently using solidity <b>v &gt;= 0.8.6</b> )  |
| SWC-101 | <a href="#">Integer Overflow and Underflow</a>       | Not Vulnerable | The issue persists in versions before <b>v0.8.X</b> .  |
| SWC-102 | <a href="#">Outdated Compiler Version</a>            | Not Vulnerable | Version 0 <sup>^</sup> .8.0 and above is used  |
| SWC-103 | <a href="#">Floating Pragma</a>                      | Not Vulnerable | Contract uses floating pragma  |
| SWC-104 | <a href="#">Unchecked Call Return Value</a>          | Not Vulnerable | <b>call()</b> is not used  |
| SWC-105 | <a href="#">Unprotected Ether Withdrawal</a>         | Not Vulnerable | Appropriate function modifiers and require validations are used on sensitive functions that allow token or ether withdrawal. |
| SWC-106 | <a href="#">Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction</a> | Not Vulnerable | <b>selfdestruct()</b> is not used anywhere   |
| SWC-107 | <a href="#">Reentrancy</a>                           | Not Vulnerable | No notable functions were vulnerable to it.  |
| SWC-108 | <a href="#">State Variable Default Visibility</a>    | Not Vulnerable | Not Vulnerable   |
| SWC-109 | <a href="#">Uninitialized Storage Pointer</a>        | Not Vulnerable | Not vulnerable after compiler version, <b>v0.5.0</b>   |

|         |   |                |  |
|---------|---|----------------|--|
| SWC-110 | <a href="#">Assert Violation</a>                                    | Not Vulnerable | Asserts are not in use.  |
| SWC-111 | <a href="#">Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions</a>                | Not Vulnerable | None of the deprecated functions like <code>block.blockhash()</code> , <code>msg.gas</code> , <code>throw</code> , <code>sha3()</code> , <code>callcode()</code> , <code>suicide()</code> are in use |
| SWC-112 | <a href="#">Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee</a>                    | Not Vulnerable | Not Vulnerable.  |
| SWC-113 | <a href="#">DoS with Failed Call</a>                                | Not Vulnerable | No such function was found.  |
| SWC-114 | <a href="#">Transaction Order Dependence</a>                        | Not Vulnerable | Not Vulnerable.  |
| SWC-115 | <a href="#">Authorization through tx.origin</a>                     | Not Vulnerable | <code>tx.origin</code> is not used anywhere in the code  |
| SWC-116 | <a href="#">Block values as a proxy for time</a>                    | Not Vulnerable | <code>Block.timestamp</code> is not used   |
| SWC-117 | <a href="#">Signature Malleability</a>                              | Not Vulnerable | Not used anywhere  |
| SWC-118 | <a href="#">Incorrect Constructor Name</a>                          | Not Vulnerable | All the constructors are created using the <code>constructor</code> keyword rather than functions.   |
| SWC-119 | <a href="#">Shadowing State Variables</a>                           | Not Vulnerable | Not applicable as this won't work during compile time after version <code>0.6.0</code>   |
| SWC-120 | <a href="#">Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes</a>    | Not Vulnerable | Random generators are not used.  |
| SWC-121 | <a href="#">Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks</a> | Not Vulnerable | No such scenario was found   |

|         |   |                |  |
|---------|---|----------------|--|
| SWC-122 | <a href="#">Lack of Proper Signature Verification</a>                   | Not Vulnerable | Not used anywhere  |
| SWC-123 | <a href="#">Requirement Violation</a>                                   | Not Vulnerable | Not vulnerable   |
| SWC-124 | <a href="#">Write to Arbitrary Storage Location</a>                     | Not Vulnerable | No such scenario was found                                 |
| SWC-125 | <a href="#">Incorrect Inheritance Order</a>                             | Not Vulnerable | No such scenario was found                                 |
| SWC-126 | <a href="#">Insufficient Gas Griefing</a>                               | Not Vulnerable | No such scenario was found                                 |
| SWC-127 | <a href="#">Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable</a>              | Not Vulnerable | <b>Jump</b> is not used.                                   |
| SWC-128 | <a href="#">DoS With Block Gas Limit</a>                                | Not Vulnerable | Not Vulnerable.  |
| SWC-129 | <a href="#">Typographical Error</a>                                     | Not Vulnerable | No such scenario was found                                 |
| SWC-130 | <a href="#">Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)</a>       | Not Vulnerable | No such scenario was found                                 |
| SWC-131 | <a href="#">Presence of unused variables</a>                            | Not Vulnerable | No such scenario was found                                 |
| SWC-132 | <a href="#">Unexpected Ether balance</a>                                | Not Vulnerable | No such scenario was found                                 |
| SWC-133 | <a href="#">Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments</a> | Not Vulnerable | <b>abi.encodePacked()</b> or other functions are not used. |
| SWC-134 | <a href="#">Message call with hardcoded gas amount</a>                  | Not Vulnerable | Not used anywhere in the code                              |
| SWC-135 | <a href="#">Code With No Effects</a>                                    | Not Vulnerable | No such scenario was found                                 |
| SWC-136 | <a href="#">Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain</a>                       | Not Vulnerable | No such scenario was found                                 |





## 4. Remediation Status

The HumanPlus Inc. is actively partnering with CredShields from this engagement to validate the discovered vulnerabilities' remediations. **A retest was performed on Aug 2nd, 2023, and all the issues have been addressed.**

Also, the table shows the remediation status of each finding.

| VULNERABILITY TITLE  | SEVERITY      | REMEDICATION STATUS   |
|--|---------------|-----------------------|
| Use safeTransfer/safeTransferFrom instead of transfer/transferFrom | Low           | Fixed<br>[02/08/2022] |
| Floating and Outdated Pragma                                       | Low           | Fixed<br>[02/08/2022] |
| Missing Events in Functions  | Low           | Won't Fix             |
| Variables should be Immutable                                      | Gas           | Fixed<br>[02/08/2022] |
| Require Instead of If and Revert                                   | Informational | Fixed<br>[02/08/2022] |
| Missing NatSpec Comments   | Informational | Won't Fix             |
| Use Call instead of Transfer                                       | Informational | Won't Fix             |
| Functions should be declared External                              | Gas           | Fixed<br>[02/08/2022] |
| Gas Optimization in Require Statements                             | Gas           | Fixed<br>[02/08/2022] |

*Table: Summary of findings and status of remediation*

## 5. Bug Reports

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Bug ID#1 [Fixed]

### Use safeTransfer/safeTransferFrom instead of transfer/transferFrom

#### Vulnerability Type

Missing best practices

#### Severity

Low

#### Description

The transfer() and transferFrom() method is used instead of safeTransfer() and safeTransferFrom(), presumably to save gas however OpenZeppelin's documentation discourages the use of transferFrom(), use safeTransferFrom() whenever possible because safeTransferFrom auto-handles boolean return values whenever there's an error.

#### Affected Code

- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L83](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L83)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L207](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L207)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L80](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L80)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L89](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L89)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L182](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L182)

- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L212](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L212)

## Impacts

Using safeTransferFrom has the following benefits -

- It checks the boolean return values of ERC20 operations and reverts the transaction if they fail,
- at the same time allowing you to support some non-standard ERC20 tokens that don't have boolean return values.
- It additionally provides helpers to increase or decrease an allowance, to mitigate an attack possible with vanilla approve.

## Remediation

Consider using `safeTransfer()` and `safeTransferFrom()` instead of `transfer()` and `transferFrom()`.

## Retest

## Bug ID #2 [Fixed]

### Floating and Outdated Pragma

#### Vulnerability Type

Floating Pragma ([SWC-103](#))

#### Severity

Low

#### Description

Locking the pragma helps ensure that the contracts do not accidentally get deployed using an older version of the Solidity compiler affected by vulnerabilities.

The contract was allowing floating or unlocked pragma to be used, i.e., **^0.8.0**.

This allows the contracts to be compiled with all the solidity compiler versions above the limit specified. The following contracts were found to be affected -

#### Impacts

If the smart contract gets compiled and deployed with an older or too recent version of the solidity compiler, there's a chance that it may get compromised due to the bugs present in the older versions or unidentified exploits in the new versions.

Incompatibility issues may also arise if the contract code does not support features in other compiler versions, therefore, breaking the logic.

The likelihood of exploitation is really low therefore this is only informational.

#### Remediation

Keep the compiler versions consistent in all the smart contract files. Do not allow floating pragmas anywhere. It is suggested to use the 0.8.19 pragma version

Reference: <https://swcregistry.io/docs/SWC-103>

#### Retest:

Pragma has been fixed to 0.8.19

## Bug ID#3 [Won't Fix]

### Missing Events in Functions

#### Vulnerability Type

Missing Best Practices

#### Severity

Low

#### Description

Events are inheritable members of contracts. When you call them, they cause the arguments to be stored in the transaction's log—a special data structure in the blockchain. These logs are associated with the address of the contract which can then be used by developers and auditors to keep track of the transactions.

The contract was found to be missing these events on certain critical functions which would make it difficult or impossible to track these transactions off-chain.

#### Affected Code

The following functions were affected -

- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L86-L94](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L86-L94)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L96-L99](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L96-L99)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L112-L116](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L112-L116)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L118-L122](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L118-L122)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L124-L126](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L124-L126)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L78-L84](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L78-L84)

- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L93-L101](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L93-L101)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L103-L106](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L103-L106)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L119-L123](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L119-L123)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L125-L128](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L125-L128)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L130-L132](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L130-L132)

### **Impacts**

Events are used to track the transactions off-chain, and missing these events on critical functions makes it difficult to audit these logs if they're needed at a later stage.

### **Remediation**

Consider emitting events for the functions mentioned above. It is also recommended to have the addresses indexed.

### **Retest**

Events are already added wherever needed.



## Bug ID #4 [Fixed]

### Variables should be Immutable

#### Vulnerability Type

Gas Optimization

#### Severity

Gas

#### Description:

Declaring state variables that are not updated following deployment as immutable can save gas costs in smart contract deployments and function executions. Immutable state variables are those that cannot be changed once they are initialized, and their values are set permanently.

By declaring state variables as immutable, the compiler can optimize their storage in a way that reduces gas costs. Specifically, the compiler can store the value directly in the bytecode of the contract, rather than in storage, which is a more expensive operation.

#### Affected Code:

- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L33](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L33)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L40C20-L40C47](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L40C20-L40C47)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L32](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L32)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L39](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L39)

#### Impacts:

Gas usage is increased if the variables that are not updated outside of the constructor are not set as immutable.

**Remediation:**

An “`immutable`” attribute should be added in the parameters that are never updated outside of the constructor to save the gas.

**Retest**

Immutable has been added to the above-mentioned variables.

Bug ID #5 [Fixed]

## Require Instead of If and Revert

### Vulnerability Type

Best Practices

### Severity

Informational

### Description:

The “require()” Solidity function guarantees the validity of the condition(s) passed as a parameter that cannot be detected before execution. It checks inputs, and contract state variables, and returns values from calls to external contracts.

Using require instead of revert improves the overall readability of the contract code.

### Affected Code:

- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L153-L155](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L153-L155)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L148-L150](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L148-L150)

### Impacts:

Using require instead of if and revert makes the code more readable and it's only a matter of code writing style and usability.

### Remediation:

Depending on the contract's validation checks, it is recommended to use the “require()” statement to handle input validations.

### Retest

This is fixed. If and revert have been updated to require statements.

Bug ID#6 [Won't Fix]

## Missing NatSpec Comments

### Vulnerability Type

Missing best practices

### Severity

Informational

### Description

Solidity contracts use a special form of comments to document code. This special form is named the Ethereum Natural Language Specification Format (NatSpec).

The document is divided into descriptions for developers and end-users along with the title and the author.

The contracts were missing NatSpec comments in the code which makes it difficult for the auditors and future developers to understand the code.

### Impacts

Missing NatSpec comments and documentation about a library or a contract affect the audit and future development of the smart contracts.

### Remediation

Add necessary NatSpec comments inside the library along with documentation specifying what it's for and how it's implemented.

### Retest

This is not fixed.

## Bug ID #7 [Won't Fix]

### Use Call instead of Transfer

#### Vulnerability Type

Best Practices

#### Severity

Informational

#### Description:

Using Solidity's transfer function has some notable shortcomings when the withdrawer is a smart contract, which can render ETH deposits impossible to withdraw. Specifically, the withdrawal will inevitably fail when:

- The withdrawer smart contract does not implement a payable fallback function.
- The withdrawer smart contract implements a payable fallback function which uses more than 2300 gas units.
- The withdrawer smart contract implements a payable fallback function which needs less than 2300 gas units but is called through a proxy that raises the call's gas usage above 2300.

#### Affected Code

- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L206](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L206)

#### Impacts

The transfer function has some restrictions when it comes to sending ETH to contracts in terms of gas which could lead to transfer failure in some cases.

#### Remediation

It is recommended to transfer ETH using the call() function, handle the return value using require statement, and use the nonreentrant modifier wherever necessary to prevent reentrancy.

Ref: <https://solidity-by-example.org/sending-ether/>

**Retest**

This is not fixed but will be considered later.

## Bug ID#8 [Fixed]

### Functions should be declared External

#### Vulnerability Type

Gas Optimization

#### Severity

Gas

#### Description

Public functions that are never called by a contract should be declared external in order to conserve gas.

The following functions were declared as public but were not called anywhere in the contract, making public visibility useless.

#### Affected Code

The following functions were affected -

- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L79-L106](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L79-L106)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L63-L69](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L63-L69)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L119-L132](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L119-L132)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L84-L106](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L84-L106)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L62-L68](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L62-L68)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L78-L99](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L78-L99)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L112-L126](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L112-L126)

#### Impacts

Smart Contracts are required to have effective Gas usage as they cost real money and each function should be monitored for the amount of gas it costs to make it gas efficient.

**"public"** functions cost more Gas than **"external"** functions.

### **Remediation**

Use the **"external"** state visibility for functions that are never called from inside the contract.

### **Retest**

The functions that are not called anywhere from inside the contract are set as external.



## Bug ID#9 [Fixed]

# Gas Optimization in Require Statements

### Vulnerability Type

Gas Optimization

### Severity

Gas

### Description

The **require()** statement takes an input string to show errors if the validation fails.

The strings inside these functions that are longer than **32 bytes** require at least one additional MSTORE, along with additional overhead for computing memory offset and other parameters. For this purpose, having strings lesser than 32 bytes saves a significant amount of gas.

### Vulnerable Code

- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L79-L82](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L79-L82)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L88](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L88)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L149](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/SFLStaking.sol#L149)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L85-L88](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L85-L88)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L95](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L95)
- [https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market\\_place\\_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L154](https://github.com/hupayx-com/nft-market_place_contract/blob/53d797896f68e85db6cb4a861437734d79e21992/TRIStaking.sol#L154)

### Impacts

Having longer require strings than 32 bytes costs a significant amount of gas.

### **Remediation**

It is recommended to shorten the strings passed inside **require()** statements to fit under **32 bytes**. This will decrease the gas usage at the time of deployment and at runtime when the validation condition is met.

### **Retest**

This is fixed. The require statements have been reduced to under 32 characters.

## 6. Disclosure

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