

Discrete Mathematics

Lecture 3

Liangfeng Zhang
School of Information Science and Technology
ShanghaiTech University

Summary of Lecture 2



Sum of ideals: $a\mathbb{Z} + b\mathbb{Z} = \gcd(a, b)\mathbb{Z}$. $\{a, b\} \neq \{0\}$

Greatest common divisor: $\gcd(a, b) = as + bt$.

- $c|ab, \gcd(c, a) = 1 \Rightarrow c|b$
- p is a prime, $p|ab \Rightarrow p|a$ or $p|b$ ↪, induction
- Uniqueness proof for FTA
- Infinity of primes

Equivalence relation: a binary relation R on a set A

- reflexive, symmetric, transitive
 $R, aRa, aRb, bRa, ab, ba, ac$
- equivalence class $[a]_R$

同余
Congruence: $R = \{(a, b) \in \mathbb{Z}^2 : n|(a - b)\}$

- $a \equiv b \pmod{n} : (a, b) \in R$
- $a = bq + r : a \bmod n = r$ ↪ 前项下
- $[a]_n$ equivalence class of a under mod n .
 $= a + n\mathbb{Z} = \{a + nx : x \in \mathbb{Z}\}$

$$[0]_6 = \{0, \pm 6, \pm 12, \dots\} \quad [1]_6 = \{\dots, -11, -5, 1, 7, 13, \dots\}$$

Residue Class

DEFINITION: Let $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$.

- $\lfloor \alpha \rfloor$: **floor** of α , the largest integer $\leq \alpha$
- $\lceil \alpha \rceil$: **ceiling** of α , the smallest integer $\geq \alpha$
 - If $a = bq + r$, then $q = \lfloor a/b \rfloor$ and $r = a - bq$

DEFINITION: Let $a \in \mathbb{Z}, n \in \mathbb{Z}^+$. We denote the equivalence class of a under the equivalence relation mod n with $[a]_n$ and call it the **residue class of a mod n** .

- $[a]_n = a + n\mathbb{Z} = \{a + nx : x \in \mathbb{Z}\}$
 - any element of $[a]_n$ is a **representative** of $[a]_n$

EXAMPLE: $[0]_6 = \{0, \pm 6, \pm 12, \dots\}$; $[1]_6 = \{\dots, -11, -5, 1, 7, 13, \dots\}$; ...

Residue Class

THEOREM: Let $n \in \mathbb{Z}^+, a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$. Then

$$[a]_n \cap [b]_n = \emptyset \text{ or } [a]_n = [b]_n.$$

- $[a]_n \cap [b]_n = \emptyset$: done
- $[a]_n \cap [b]_n \neq \emptyset$
 - $\exists c \in [a]_n \cap [b]_n$
 - $c \equiv a \pmod{n}, c \equiv b \pmod{n}$
 - $a \equiv b \pmod{n}$
 - $\exists t \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $a = b + nt$
 - $[a]_n = \{a + nx : x \in \mathbb{Z}\} = \{b + nt + nx : x \in \mathbb{Z}\} = [b]_n$

COROLLARY: $[a]_n = [b]_n$ iff $a \equiv b \pmod{n}$.

COROLLARY: $\{[0]_n, [1]_n, \dots, [n-1]_n\}$ is a partition of \mathbb{Z} .

- $[a]_n \cap [b]_n = \emptyset$ for all $a, b \in \{0, 1, \dots, n-1\}$
- $\mathbb{Z} = [0]_n \cup [1]_n \cup \dots \cup [n-1]_n$

$$\mathbb{Z}_n$$

DEFINITION: Let n be any positive integer. We define \mathbb{Z}_n to be set of all residue classes modulo n .

- $\mathbb{Z}_n = \{[0]_n, [1]_n, \dots, [n-1]_n\}$
 - $\mathbb{Z}_n = \{0, 1, \dots, n-1\}$;
- $\mathbb{Z}_n = \{[1]_n, [2]_n, \dots, [n]_n\}$
 - $\mathbb{Z}_n = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$

EXAMPLE: Two representations of the set \mathbb{Z}_6

- $\mathbb{Z}_6 = \{[0]_6, [1]_6, [2]_6, [3]_6, [4]_6, [5]_6\}$
 $= \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$
- $\mathbb{Z}_6 = \{[-3]_6, [-2]_6, [-1]_6, [0]_6, [1]_6, [2]_6\}$
 $= \{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2\}$

$$\mathbb{Z}_n$$

DEFINITION: Let $n \in \mathbb{Z}^+$. For all $[a]_n, [b]_n \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, define

- **addition:** $[a]_n + [b]_n = [a + b]_n$
- **subtraction:** $[a]_n - [b]_n = [a - b]_n$
- **multiplication:** $[a]_n \cdot [b]_n = [a \cdot b]_n$

Well-defined? If $a \equiv a' \pmod{n}$ and $b \equiv b' \pmod{n}$, then $a \pm b \equiv a' \pm b' \pmod{n}$ and $ab \equiv a'b' \pmod{n}$.

- Hence, $[a]_n \pm [b]_n = [a']_n \pm [b']_n$; $[a]_n \cdot [b]_n = [a']_n \cdot [b']_n$
 - $a \equiv a' \pmod{n} \Rightarrow n|(a - a') \Rightarrow \exists x \text{ such that } a - a' = nx$
 - $b \equiv b' \pmod{n} \Rightarrow n|(b - b') \Rightarrow \exists y \text{ such that } b - b' = ny$
 - $(a + b) - (a' + b') = nx + ny$
 - $(a - b) - (a' - b') = nx - ny$
 - $ab - a'b' = a(b - b') + b'(a - a') = any + b'nx$

$$\mathbb{Z}_n^*$$

DEFINITION: Let $n \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ and $[a]_n \in \mathbb{Z}_n$. $[s]_n \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ is called an **inverse** of $[a]_n$ if $[a]_n[s]_n = [1]_n$.

- **division:** If $[a]_n [s]_n = [1]_n$, define $\frac{[b]_n}{[a]_n} = [b]_n \cdot [s]_n$

THEOREM: Let $n \in \mathbb{Z}^+$. $[a]_n \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ has an inverse iff $\gcd(a, n) = 1$.

- Only if: $\exists s$ s.t. $[a]_n[s]_n \equiv [1]_n$; $\exists t, as - 1 = nt$; $\gcd(a, n) = 1$
- If: $\exists s, t$ s.t. $as + nt = 1$; $as \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$

DEFINITION: Let $n \in \mathbb{Z}^+$. Define $\mathbb{Z}_n^* = \{[a]_n \in \mathbb{Z}_n : \gcd(a, n) = 1\}$

- If n is prime, then $\mathbb{Z}_n^* = \{1, 2, \dots, n - 1\}$
- If n is composite, then $\mathbb{Z}_n^* \subset \mathbb{Z}_n$

EXAMPLE: $\mathbb{Z}_5^* = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$; $\mathbb{Z}_6^* = \{1, 5\}$; $\mathbb{Z}_8^* = \{1, 3, 5, 7\}$

Euler's Phi Function

QUESTION: How many elements are there in \mathbb{Z}_n^* ?

- $|\mathbb{Z}_n^*|$ is the number of integers $a \in [n]$ such that $\gcd(a, n) = 1$

DEFINITION: (Euler's Phi Function) $\phi(n) = |\mathbb{Z}_n^*|, \forall n \in \mathbb{Z}^+$.

- $\phi(n)$ is the number of integers $a \in [n]$ such that $\gcd(a, n) = 1$

THEOREM: Let p be a prime. Then $\forall e \in \mathbb{Z}^+, \phi(p^e) = p^{e-1}(p - 1)$.

- Let $x \in [p^e]$.
- $\gcd(x, p^e) \neq 1$ iff $p|x$
iff $x = p, 2p, \dots, p^{e-1} \cdot p$
- $\phi(p^e) = p^e - p^{e-1} = p^{e-1}(p - 1)$

EXAMPLE: $\phi(3^2) = 3(3 - 1) = 6$

- $\mathbb{Z}_9^* = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9\}$

EXAMPLE: $\phi(p) = p - 1$

- $\mathbb{Z}_p^* = \{1, 2, \dots, p - 1\}$

Euler's Phi Function

QUESTION: Formula of $\phi(n)$ for general integer n ?

THEOREM: If $n = p_1^{e_1} \cdots p_k^{e_k}$ for distinct primes p_1, \dots, p_k and integers $e_1, \dots, e_k \geq 1$, then $\phi(n) = \phi(p_1^{e_1}) \cdots \phi(p_k^{e_k})$.

Hence, $\phi(n) = n(1 - p_1^{-1}) \cdots (1 - p_k^{-1})$.

- There are many proofs. We will see in the future.

COROLLARY: If $n = pq$ for two different primes p and q , then $\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$.

EXAMPLE: $\phi(10) = (2 - 1)(5 - 1) = 4$; $n = 10$; $p = 2, q = 5$

- $\mathbb{Z}_{10}^* = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10\}$

Euler's Theorem

THEOREM (Euler) Let $n \geq 1$ and $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$. Then $\alpha^{\phi(n)} = 1$.

- $\alpha^{\phi(n)}, 1$ are both residue classes modulo n
- Suppose that $\alpha = [a]_n$ for $a \in \mathbb{Z}$. Then $\alpha^{\phi(n)} = 1$ is $([a]_n)^{\phi(n)} = [1]_n$
- How to prove?
 - Consider the map $f: \mathbb{Z}_n^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_n^* \quad [x]_n \mapsto [a]_n \cdot [x]_n$
 - We show that f is injective
 - $f([x]_n) = f([y]_n)$
 - $[a]_n \cdot [x]_n = [a]_n \cdot [y]_n$
 - $[ax]_n = [ay]_n$
 - $n | a(x - y)$
 - $n | (x - y)$, this is because $\gcd(n, a) = 1$
 - $[x]_n = [y]_n$

Euler's Theorem

THEOREM (Euler) Let $n \geq 1$ and $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$. Then $\alpha^{\phi(n)} = 1$.

- $\alpha^{\phi(n)}, 1$ are both residue classes modulo n
- Suppose that $\alpha = [a]_n$ for $a \in \mathbb{Z}$. Then $\alpha^{\phi(n)} = 1$ is $([a]_n)^{\phi(n)} = [1]_n$
- How to prove?
 - Consider the map $f: \mathbb{Z}_n^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_n^* \quad [x]_n \mapsto [a]_n \cdot [x]_n$
 - Suppose that $\mathbb{Z}_n^* = \{[x_1]_n, \dots, [x_{\phi(n)}]_n\}$.
 - $f([x_1]_n) \cdots f([x_{\phi(n)}]_n) = [x_1]_n \cdots [x_{\phi(n)}]_n$
 - $[ax_1]_n \cdots [ax_{\phi(n)}]_n = [x_1]_n \cdots [x_{\phi(n)}]_n$
 - $[a^{\phi(n)} x_1 \cdots x_{\phi(n)}]_n = [x_1 \cdots x_{\phi(n)}]_n$
 - $n \mid (a^{\phi(n)} - 1)x_1 \cdots x_{\phi(n)}$
 - $n \mid (a^{\phi(n)} - 1)$, this is because $\gcd(n, x_1 \cdots x_{\phi(n)}) = 1$
 - $[a^{\phi(n)}]_n = [1]_n$, i. e., $([a]_n)^{\phi(n)} = [1]_n$

Fermat's Little Theorem

EXAMPLE: Understand Euler's theorem with $\mathbb{Z}_{10}^* = \{1, 3, 7, 9\}$.


- $n = 10, \phi(n) = 4,$
- $1^4 \equiv 1 \pmod{10} \Rightarrow ([1]_{10})^4 = [1]_{10}$
- $3^4 = 81 \equiv 1 \pmod{10} \Rightarrow ([3]_{10})^4 = [1]_{10}$
- $7^4 = 2401 \equiv 1 \pmod{10} \Rightarrow ([7]_{10})^4 = [1]_{10}$
- $9^4 = 6561 \equiv 1 \pmod{10} \Rightarrow ([9]_{10})^4 = [1]_{10}$
 - Consider the map $f: \mathbb{Z}_{10}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_{10}^* \quad [x]_n \mapsto [9]_n \cdot [x]_n$
 - $f([1]_{10}) = [9]_{10} \cdot [1]_{10} = [9]_{10}; f([3]_{10}) = [7]_{10}; f([7]_{10}) = [3]_{10}, f([9]_{10}) = [1]_{10}$
 - f is injective
 - $f([1]_{10})f([3]_{10})f([7]_{10})f([9]_{10}) = [9]_{10}[7]_{10}[3]_{10}[1]_{10}$

Fermat's Little Theorem: If p is a prime and $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p$.

Then $\alpha^p = \alpha$.


- This is a corollary of Euler's theorem for $n = p$
- By Euler's theorem, $\alpha^{p-1} = 1$
 - $\alpha^p = \alpha$

Cryptography



- **Confidentiality:** The property that sensitive information is not disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes. --FIPS 140-2

Public-Key Encryption



- **Gen, Enc, Dec:** key generation, encryption, decryption
- m, c, pk, sk : plaintext (message), ciphertext, public key, private key
- \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C} : plaintext space, ciphertext space
 - $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}) + \mathcal{M}, |\mathcal{M}| > 1$
 - **Correctness:** $\text{Dec}(sk, \text{Enc}(pk, m)) = m$ for any pk, sk, m
 - **Security:** if sk is not known, it's difficult to learn m from pk, c

RSA

A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystem


- Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman (1977)-MIT
- Scientific Contributions: Turing Award (2002)
 - Public-Key Encryption: the first construction
 - Digital Signature: the first construction



Rivest



Shamir



Adleman

Plain RSA



CONSTRUCTION: $\Pi = (\mathbf{Gen}, \mathbf{Enc}, \mathbf{Dec}) + \mathcal{M}$, the message space is $\mathcal{M} = \{m: m \in [N], \gcd(m, N) = 1\}$

?Dec(sk, Enc(pk, m) = m

- $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \mathbf{Gen}(1^n)$
 - choose two n -bit primes $p \neq q$;
 - $N = pq$; $\phi(N) = (p-1)(q-1)$
 - $[e]_{\phi(N)} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}^*$ *→ kal? 11 2*
 - $[d]_{\phi(N)} = ([e]_{\phi(N)})^{-1}$
 - $0 \leq e, d < \phi(N)$
 - output $pk = (N, e)$ and $sk = (N, d)$
- $c \leftarrow \mathbf{Enc}(pk, m)$:
 - output $c = m^e \bmod N$
 - $0 \leq c < N$
- $m \leftarrow \mathbf{Dec}(sk, c)$:
 - output $m = c^d \bmod N$
 - $0 \leq m < N$

- $[d]_{\phi(N)} = ([e]_{\phi(N)})^{-1}$
- $\exists t \in \mathbb{Z}$ s.t. $ed = 1 + t \cdot \phi(N)$
- $[c^d]_N = ([c]_N)^d$
 - $= ([m^e]_N)^d$
 - $= (([m]_N)^e)^d$
 - $= ([m]_N)^{ed}$
 - $= ([m]_N)^{1+t\phi(N)}$
 - $= [m]_N \cdot ([m]_N)^{\phi(N)t}$
 - $= [m]_N \cdot [1]_N$
 - $= [m]_N$
- $m = c^d \bmod N$

RSA is correct!

Plain RSA

EXAMPLE: this is a toy example; all numbers are very small

- $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \mathbf{Gen}(1^n)$
 - $p = 7, q = 13,$
 - $N = 91, \phi(N) = 72$
 - $[e]_{72} = [5]_{72}$
 - $[d]_{72} = [29]_{72}$
 - $pk = (91, 5); sk = (91, 29)$
- $c \leftarrow \mathbf{Enc}(pk, m): m = 2$
- $c = (2^5 \bmod 91) = 32$
- $m \leftarrow \mathbf{Dec}(sk, c): c = 10$
- $m = (32^{29} \bmod 91) = 2$
- $32^{29} = (2^5)^{29} = 2^{145}$
- $2^{145} \equiv ? \pmod{91}$
- $[2^{145}]_{91} = [?]_{91}$
- $([2]_{91})^{145} = [?]_{91}$
- $[2]_{91} \in \mathbb{Z}_{91}^*$
- $([2]_{91})^{\phi(91)} = [1]_{91}$
- $([2]_{91})^{145} = ([2]_{91})^{72}([2]_{91})^{72}[2]_{91}$
 $= [1]_{91}[1]_{91}[2]_{91}$
 $= [2]_{91}$

Security

Security: If sk is not known, it's difficult to learn m from pk, c

- At least, it should be difficult to learn d from pk

Plain RSA and Integer Factoring (given N , find p, q):

- “Factoring is easy” \Rightarrow “Plain RSA is not secure”
 - $N \rightarrow (p, q) \rightarrow \phi(N) \rightarrow d$: computable with EEA
- “Plain RSA is secure” \Rightarrow “Factoring is hard”
- “Factoring is hard” \nRightarrow “Plain RSA is secure”
- It is likely that “Factoring is hard” \Rightarrow “Plain RSA is secure”
 - The best known method of computing d is via factoring N

How Large is the N in practice?

- $|N| = 2048$ is recommended from present to 2030
- $|N| = 3072$ is recommended after 2030

RSA

EXAMPLE: A sample execution of the RSA public-key encryption.

- $p = 179769313486231590772930519078902473361797697894230657273430081157732675805500963132708477322407536021120113879871393357658789768814416622492847430639474124377767893424865485276302219601246094119453082952085005768838150682342462881473913110540827237163350510684586298239947245938479716304835356329624225795083$
- $q = 179769313486231590772930519078902473361797697894230657273430081157732675805500963132708477322407536021120113879871393357658789768814416622492847430639474124377767893424865485276302219601246094119453082952085005768838150682342462881473913110540827237163350510684586298239947245938479716304835356329624227077847$
- $N = 32317006071311007300714876688669951960444102669715484032130345427524655138867890893197201411522913463688717960921898019494119559150490921095088152386448283120630877367300996091750197750389652106796057638384067568276792218642619756161838094338476170470581645852036305042887575891541065808607552399123931212190742861198666048560131098081430518774846347259215332611759149330725252437276424147817808729273755165527379964561074264587032664709511346018327798373715290148129504141795132314929388992688247440232727539575514688633282447719228530664706520939357878528540284184156513405575872085703420500969966917951381310826301$
- $\phi(N) = 3231700607131100730071487668866995196044410266971548403213034542752465513886789089319720141152291346368871796092189801949411955915049092109508815238644828312063087736730099609175019775038965210679605763838406756827679221864261975616183809433847617047058164585203630504288757589154106580860755239912393121219038332257169358537858523704327271382812275186342687129721228916840978708566542221552391774628940093485139736801331477871715085171882512773342103512436341899373968354945401344376784553485755251993821373671344677095606146354543604901758694718276224054213583162787340809095977593826461068360296205292132857953372$

RSA

EXAMPLE: A sample execution of the RSA public-key encryption.

- $e = 15$
- $d = 4308934142841467640095316891822660261392547022628731204284046057003287351849052119092960188203055128491829061456253069265882607886732122812678420318193104416084116982306799478900026366718620280906141018451209009103572295819015967488245079245130156062744219446938174005718343452205475441147673653216524161625384443009559144717144698272436361843749700248456916172961638555787971611422056296206985569950525345798018631573510863716228678022917668369778947134991512253249862447326053512583571273798100700265842849822845956946080819513939147320234492629103496540561811088371645441212797012510194809114706160705617714393783$
- $m = 10604921754758721445761654694144853008952777608280437615045472365621528740679915569270051503191522500036448557172487959011926112038398359402756573149541644330968641767630622070720630061130259783825355948223371330949158036812742187057045604934546811790948975878200144189048344249873200320299277234465689039409989622319232683984241843711183212001991457793528752812978134072787404790207031482099444968252108690296363773578594703102617386738297675080295774091447240197521221546035459030086538114428516078644733180655540109133778241607260273655335661777894173665137928787960365220712025120785257907244561721692764755210375$
- $c = 10526389958138962919595594093411158893099743508465902347128478139908774614311778097354795345791726768384252751637693995592403757856185437083738829836072472243389583367910268799453378039419721345566549516730187308436864460088396611726670050723242080139176080334720294195304048915003805656341816548307249886049027910488249318660062714335703057576576016988513484148308512574950252535463185824865665499749033598201370342142901944632549253564037639312442875039735826909329356840665993783695101447610485922726915969967968584661240430425982194189504400469889762574275824269475495394920107921066723277769226199475558068627049$

Questions from RSA

CONSTRUCTION: $\Pi = (\mathbf{Gen}, \mathbf{Enc}, \mathbf{Dec}) + \mathcal{M}$, the message space

is $\mathcal{M} = \{m: m \in [N], \gcd(m, N) = 1\}$

- $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \mathbf{Gen}(1^n)$
 - choose two n -bit primes $p \neq q$
 - $N = pq$; $\phi(N) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$
 - $[e]_{\phi(N)} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}^*$
 - $[d]_{\phi(N)} = ([e]_{\phi(N)})^{-1}$
 - $0 \leq e, d < \phi(N)$
 - output $pk = (N, e)$ and $sk = (N, d)$
- $c \leftarrow \mathbf{Enc}(pk, m)$:
 - output $c = m^e \bmod N$
 - $0 \leq c < N$
- $m \leftarrow \mathbf{Dec}(sk, c)$:
 - output $m = c^d \bmod N$
 - $0 \leq m < N$

How to choose p, q
EFFICIENTLY?

How to compute d
EFFICIENTLY?

How to compute c
EFFICIENTLY?

How to compute m
EFFICIENTLY?

Implementation Issues

CONSTRUCTION: $\Pi = (\mathbf{Gen}, \mathbf{Enc}, \mathbf{Dec}) + \mathcal{M}$, the message space is $\mathcal{M} = \{m: m \in [N], \gcd(m, N) = 1\}$

- $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \mathbf{Gen}(1^n)$
 - choose two n -bit primes $p \neq q$
 - $N = pq$; $\phi(N) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$
 - $[e]_{\phi(N)} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}^*$
 - $[d]_{\phi(N)} = ([e]_{\phi(N)})^{-1}$
 - $0 \leq e, d < \phi(N)$
 - output $pk = (N, e)$ and $sk = (N, d)$
- $c \leftarrow \mathbf{Enc}(pk, m)$:
 - output $c = m^e \bmod N$
 - $0 \leq c < N$
- $m \leftarrow \mathbf{Dec}(sk, c)$:
 - output $m = c^d \bmod N$
 - $0 \leq m < N$

Questions

- Choose p, q efficiently?
 - Prime number generation
- Compute d efficiently?
 - Square-and-multiply
- Compute c/m efficiently?
 - Square-and-multiply