PROCEEDINGS AT HEARING OF NOVEMBER 23, 2020

COMMISSIONER AUSTIN F. CULLEN

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1	November 23, 2020
2	(Via Videoconference)
3	(PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED AT 9:30 A.M.)
4	THE REGISTRAR: The hearing is now resumed.
5	Mr. Commissioner.
6	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
7	Yes, Mr. Martland, I see you are joined by
8	Ms. Rose and Ms. Patel.
9	MR. MARTLAND: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
10	And we are embarking on hearings now that turn
11	the focus of our process to virtual assets,
12	sometimes also referred to as cryptocurrency.
13	And we begin that topic first I'll speak to
14	one or two procedural things, and then we can
15	commence with the evidence of the panel of three
16	witnesses today.
17	First, by way of speaking to overview
18	reports on this topic area, pursuant to Rule 33,
19	overview reports have been circulated to
20	participants in draft format and we've
21	benefitted from input from participants on those
22	reports. We are now in a position to ask that
23	those please be marked as exhibits. Madam
24	Registrar has facilitated this with a list of
25	the three overview reports, which you'll

1	probably see on the screenshare right now.
2	First is proposed as the next exhibit,
3	overview report with respect to Quadriga CX.
4	THE COMMISSIONER: Very well. That will be
5	exhibit 246.
6	THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 246.
7	EXHIBIT 246: Overview Report - Quadriga CX
8	MR. MARTLAND: Secondly, the overview report, virtual
9	assets regarding the Canadian Securities
10	Administrators guidance.
11	THE COMMISSIONER: 247.
12	THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 247.
13	EXHIBIT 247: Overview Report - Canadian
14	Securities Administrators Publications on
15	Virtual Assets
16	MR. MARTLAND: Thank you. Third, the overview report
17	on virtual assets regarding the FATF and DOJ
18	documents.
19	THE COMMISSIONER: 248.
20	THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 248.
21	EXHIBIT 248: Overview Report - FATF
22	Publications on Virtual Assets
23	MR. MARTLAND: And finally the overview report on
24	Federal regulation of virtual currencies.
25	THE COMMISSIONER: 249.

1	THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 249.
2	EXHIBIT 249: Overview Report - Federal
3	Regulation of Virtual Currencies
4	MR. MARTLAND: Thank you. We can now move into
5	today's hearing with three member of the RCMP:
6	Sergeant Adrienne Vickery, Sergeant Warren
7	Krahenbil and I should pause to ask Officer
8	Krahenbil how badly I'm mispronouncing his name,
9	perhaps. That might be something to address at
10	the outset.
11	THE WITNESS: (WK) That was just fine.
12	MR. MARTLAND: Was it? All right. That's nice of
13	you to say. And Acting Sergeant Aaron Gilkes is
14	joining us as well.
15	And, Madam Registrar, all three witnesses
16	have asked to be affirmed, please.
17	THE REGISTRAR: Would each of you please state your
18	full name and spell your first name and last
19	name for the record. I'll start with Corporal
20	Gilkes.
21	THE WITNESS: (AG) Aaron Gilkes. First name Aaron,
22	A-a-r-o-n. Last name Gilkes, G-i-l-k-e-s.
23	THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. And Sergeant Vickery.
24	THE WITNESS: (AV) good day. Adrienne Vickery.
25	A-d-r-i-e-n-n-e. Last name V-i-c-k-e-r-y.

Aaron Gilkes (for the commission) Adrienne Vickery (for the commission) Warren Krahenbil (for the commission) Discussion re procedure

25

1	THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. And Sergeant Krahenbil.
2	THE WITNESS: (WK) Warren Krahenbil, W-a-r-r-e-n
3	K-r-a-h-e-n-b-i-l.
4	THE REGISTRAR: Thank you.
5	AARON GILKES, a witness
6	called for the
7	commission, affirmed.
8	ADRIENNE VICKERY, a
9	witness called for the
10	commission, affirmed.
11	WARREN KRAHENBIL, a
12	witness called for the
13	commission, affirmed.
14	MR. MARTLAND: Thank you. Mr. Commissioner, with
15	respect to the evidence this week unlike some of
16	the prior hearings, we've organized things in a
17	way that the documents for today's panel, at
18	least, does not contain documents where we need
19	to be cautious about having them shared with
20	more broadly on to the webcast of these
21	hearings. And so my expectation as we go
22	forward is that the documents I'm putting
23	forward can be displayed both on the Zoom
24	screenshare with participants that are on that

platform but also through the webcast out. And

25

as we mark exhibits, likewise I don't see any 1 expectation that we would need to have a delay 2 3 to permit a redactions process. To the extent there were a few redactions to address, or at 4 least contact information, those have already 5 6 been made to the proposed exhibits. THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Thank you. 7 MR. MARTLAND: I'll begin with -- to give a bit of a 8 9 lay of the land for today. I'm enormously 10 assisted by the fact that the witnesses have 11 prepared a PowerPoint presentation, which will 12 be a very useful way to walk through topics in 13 evidence today. So what I propose to do is 14 first to spend a little time with a biographical sketch of each of the three witnesses, including 15 marking their CVs, and then turn to that 16 17 PowerPoint and use that as the means to lead the 18 evidence through the panel. THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Thank you. 19 20 EXAMINATION BY MR. MARTLAND: 21 0 So first I'll start with Sergeant Vickery, 22 please. Sergeant, you are the RCMP National 23 Cryptocurrency Coordinator assigned to national headquarters in Ottawa, Federal Policing 24

Criminal Operations and within the Financial

1		Crime, Proceeds of Crime/Money Laundering
2		Section. Is that accurate?
3	А	(AV) Yes, that's correct.
4	Q	You've served with the RCMP since 2005 in a
5		number of different positions, including
6		Commercial Crime, Serious and Organized Crime
7		Section, Financial Crime Section and the
8		National Security High-Risk Traveller Unit?
9	А	(AV) That is correct.
10	Q	And last five years you've served as the
11		national RCMP Money Laundering/Proceeds of Crime
12		Coordinator at national headquarters and in that
13		capacity providing program governance, training
14		development and policy development; is that
15		right?
16	A	(AV) Yes.
17	Q	Your role includes file review, operational
18		feedback of priority money laundering and
19		cryptocurrency files, and that's a role that
20		really spans the whole country?
21	А	(AV) Yes, that is correct.
22	Q	You also participate in the FATF, the Financial
23		Action Task Force, Europol, and with other
24		international law enforcement, and indeed you

lead the RCMP domestic working group on

1		cryptocurrency based out of national
2		headquarters and serve as a member of the Five
3		Eyes Cryptocurrency Operational Readiness
4		Initiative?
5	А	(AV) Yes.
6	MR.	MARTLAND: And I'll ask Madam Registrar to please
7		have displayed on the screen your CV.
8	Q	(AV) And if I might simply confirm, Sergeant,
9		you recognize that as being your CV?
10	A	(AV) Yes, I do.
11	MR.	MARTLAND: I'll asking, Mr. Commissioner, that
12		please be marked as the next exhibit.
13	THE	COMMISSIONER: 250.
14	THE	REGISTRAR: Exhibit 250.
15		EXHIBIT 250: Curriculum Vitae of Sgt. Adrienne
16		Vickery
17	MR.	MARTLAND:
18	Q	Next, Acting Sergeant Gilkes, I'd ask that we
19		I'll review a biographical sketch and then also
20		turn up your CV. Your first with respect to
21		your rank, you're an acting sergeant and equally
22		corporal. So I'll probably try and stick to one
23		or the other through this, but you hold both

(AG) Yes. I am a corporal and acting sergeant

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1		at the moment.
2	Q	Thank you. You serve as a cybercrime instructor
3		with the Canadian Police College in Ottawa and
4		previously were a digital forensic supervisor
5		with the "E" Division, which is the
6		British Columbia arm of the RCMP; correct?
7	A	(AG) That's correct.
8	Q	And you've been with the RCMP since 2011, having
9		served in roles both in "E" Division here in BC,
10		"C" division in Quebec with their Proceeds of
11		Crime unit and with the Integrated Technological
12		Crime Unit?
13	A	(AG) That is correct.
14	Q	And by way of background, you had experience in
15		the financial sector before joining the RCMP?
16	A	(AG) That is correct.
17	Q	Your role now, you supervise technological crime
18		investigators, you're involved in development
19		and training with respect to digital evidence
20		acquisition methodologies and techniques and you
21		also are involved in forensic examinations of
22		digital devices and providing technological and
23		computer forensic support for municipal law
24		enforcement as well as "E" Division
25		invogtigations?

investigations?

25

1 Α (AG) That was my role when I was in "E" Division. 2 Okay. And so presently your role has shifted to 3 0 being focused on the police college in Ottawa? 4 (AG) That is correct. My current role is as a 5 Α member of Technological Crimes Learning 6 Institute, part of the Canadian Police College 7 to actually help build and develop a new 8 9 curriculum for investigations in terms of 10 cybercrime and cyber-related crimes. 11 Q The Canadian Police College, by virtue of its 12 name at least, suggests that is training at a 13 national level for officers serving with the 14 RCMP across the country; is that right? (AG) That is correct. We do offer training to 15 Α all police officers at all levels, municipal, 16 17 provincial and federal levels. 18 MR. MARTLAND: Okay. And I'll ask Madam Registrar to 19 please have your CV shown on the screen. 20 Acting Sergeant, you recognize that as being 0 21 your CV? 22 (AG) I do. Α 23 MR. MARTLAND: I'll ask, please, that that be exhibit -- I think it's 251, Mr. Commissioner. 24

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, 251. Thank you.

25

1	THE	REGISTRAR: Exhibit 251.
2		EXHIBIT 251: Curriculum Vitae of Cpl. Aaron
3		Gilkes
4	MR.	MARTLAND:
5	Q	And, Sergeant Krahenbil, I'll next and I
6		don't need the document displayed anymore.
7		Turning to you, you're the team leader of the
8		newly created Federal Cybercrime Operations
9		Group, which is based into "E" Divisions the
10		headquarter for the "E" Divisions being in
11		Surrey, British Columbia; is that accurate?
12	А	(AG) Yes. Yes.
13	Q	And the Cybercrime Operations Group, or COG, it
14		was launched fairly recently my note is
15		April of 2020 with a mandate to deal with
16		cybercrime in line with federal policing
17		strategic priorities. Is that accurate?
18	А	(AG) It is, yes.
19	Q	And the goal of the group is to transition
20		online investigations into real world police
21		enforcement?
22	А	(AG) Yes, it is.
23	Q	Before assuming that role you served as team
24		leader with FSOC, the Federal Serious and

Organized Crime Unit, for five years and you've

24

25

Gilkes

been with the RCMP since 2000? 1 (AG) Yes. 2 Α And in the course of that span of time with the 3 RCMP you've been involved in a number of 4 5 high-profile organized crime investigations, which include project E-Poisoned, E-Pork and 6 7 E-Pacement? (AG) Yes. A 8 9 0 And those designations of E-something starting 10 with a P, if you could just help us understand. Those described investigations brought in 11 "E" Division in British Columbia; is that fair? 12 13 Α (AG) It's fair. 14 MR. MARTLAND: All right. And, Madam Registrar, if 15 Sergeant Krahenbil's CV could please be 16 displayed. 17 0 Sir, you recognize that as your CV? 18 (AG) I do. Α 19 MR. MARTLAND: Thank you. Mr. Commissioner, I'll ask 20 that that exhibit please be marked as 21 exhibit 252. 22 THE COMMISSIONER: Very well. 252. 23 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 252.

EXHIBIT 252: Curriculum Vitae of Cpl. Aaron

1	MR.	MARTLAND: And I'm keeping Ms. Leung busy. I'll
2		ask next to please have displayed the first page
3		of a PowerPoint presentation, which has been
4		identified as appendix A.
5	Q	Maybe, Sergeant Vickery, if I could ask you
6		these questions. I know you've been involved in
7		this. First if you could just explain, please,
8		to the Commissioner what it is we see on screen
9		and what the who's been involved in the
10		preparation of this document.
11	A	(AV) So this is the first page of a PowerPoint
12		on virtual assets that is a joint development by
13		Acting Sergeant Gilkes, Sergeant Krahenbil and
14		myself. All three of us regularly provide
15		presentations to law enforcement on virtual
16		assets, and so we have taken what we feel are
17		the best aspects of all of our work and combined
18		them into one document.
19	Q	All right. And we'll be spending some time on
20		this today. We can see at the if you have a
21		look at the PDF reader display there, page 1 of
22		58. So this is a 58-page or a 58-slide, I
23		should say, presentation; is that right?
24	A	(AV) That's correct.

MR. MARTLAND: Mr. Commissioner, I'll ask that this

1		please be marked as exhibit 253.
2	THE	COMMISSIONER: Very well. 253.
3	THE	REGISTRAR: Exhibit 253.
4		EXHIBIT 253: RCMP Virtual Assets Slideshow
5	MR.	MARTLAND: And, Madam Registrar, I'll just here
6		and there be saying "next slide, please" as we
7		work our way through, and I may make reference
8		to the slide number if I need to do that, so
9		I'll give that a test right now. Next slide,
10		please.
11	Q	What I'm going to ask, Sergeant Vickery, or your
12		colleagues, to simply, as you might do
13		because I understand you've made presentations
14		helping to introduce the topic of virtual assets
15		and how does that relate to criminal
16		investigative work and money laundering on a
17		number of occasions.
18		So why don't you simply start into that with
19		this first slide, and I will be asking you
20		questions, though, as you go.
21	A	(AG) Okay. So sorry, I will begin. In terms
22		of bitcoin involving crimes, people rarely think
23		that they have encountered bitcoin, but really
24		the bitcoin well, crimes related to bitcoin

or facilitated by bitcoin or other

1		cryptocurrencies are actually quite a bit more
2		prevalent than most of us know. So, please,
3		next slide.
4		We can see with these news headlines that
5		there has been different campaigns targeting
6		victims throughout British Columbia. Now, these
7		tend to be when they do come into the
8		headlines tend to be on a smaller scale, so we
9		see smaller-scale scams or smaller-scale
10		victims, but what has to be taken into account
11		is the prevalence of these attempted crimes. So
12		it's probably not likely that anyone listening
13		today would not have received at some point a
14		phone call from someone claiming to be either
15		from some police agency or from the Canadian
16		Revenue Agency stating that they have had their
17		account somehow compromised or that they've been
18		somehow implicated in a crime and that they
19		would have to make payment immediately in order
20		to avoid going to prison.
21		Now, payment
22	Q	I'm sorry, carry on.
23	A	(AG) Sorry. Payment to avoid going to prison
24		typically can be requested in the form of
25		prepaid cards of some type or they can be made

1		of the bitcoin.
2	Q	These headline examples that you've used for
3		this third slide on the presentation, I take it
4		those are really just examples of that
5		relatively smaller amounts of well, they may
б		not seem that way to the victims obviously, but
7		these aren't enormous sums of money. But
8		individually people defrauded for some thousands
9		of dollars and using bitcoin as a mechanism are
10		a part of that fraudulent activity?
11	А	(AG) Precisely, so a lot of these crimes
12		actually go unreported or underreported, and
13		part of the reason is that people are not really
14		sure where to turn to when they do fall victim
15		of such a crime, so and as well as they also
16		may feel ashamed of the fact that they have
17		fallen victim for this type of crime. And in
18		the case of for example, if there was
19		something related to their computer, they might
20		think that it was more of a technological
21		related incident rather than an actual
22		defraud professional group or individual who
23		is going out and defrauding individuals.
24	Q	Thank you. I think we were about to turn to the
25		topic, I assume, of some of the terminology.

1	And just to situate that, these headlines I
2	think both of these headlines use the word
3	"bitcoin" to refer to a particular type of
4	cryptocurrency. As I started out, I said we're
5	dealing with virtual assets also sometimes
6	referred to as cryptocurrency. There's a number
7	of terms that are thrown around.
8	And perhaps if we could go to the next
9	slide. And I'd appreciate the panel members
10	speaking to that question really of terminology
11	and what we're describing.
12	MR. MARTLAND: If we could have the next slide,
13	please, Madam Registrar.
14	THE WITNESS: (AV) So as you had mentioned, yes,
15	"virtual assets" and "virtual currency" are
16	often synonymous. Now, the reason why we're
17	using the term "virtual asset" here is because
18	the Financial Action Task Force has tried to
19	come up with a definition in order to be able to
20	address this, and they wanted to stay away from
21	the term "virtual currency" because it denotes
22	an actual currency. And in actual fact the
23	majority of the countries out there do not see
24	virtual bitcoins, say, for instance or any of
25	these other virtual currencies or

1	cryptocurrencies as a currency at all. So they
2	wanted to get away that with term and they've
3	come up with something called a virtual asset.
4	And they've defined it as a digital
5	representation of value that can be digitally
6	traded or transferred and can be used for
7	payment or investment purposes.
8	They've also said three other things. That
9	it can operate as a medium of exchange, which is
10	basically just a form of bartering that has been
11	around for centuries; as a unit of account so
12	no matter what the type of virtual asset it is,
13	it can always be valued against some other
14	commodity or, say, the American dollar most
15	commonly and it will always have a stored
16	value. So that value will change depending on
17	supply and demand, but it will always have value
18	to somebody who's willing to accept it.
19	Next slide, please.
20	MR. MARTLAND:
21	Q And in fact if we could stay on that slide, I
22	have one or two questions. Thank you.
23	A (AV) Sorry.
24	Q With respect to the notion that you said some

countries don't -- they resist the use of the

25

1		word "currency" because that maybe suggests
2		something that would run as if it's equivalent
3		to national currencies with a central bank
4		authority and so forth. Is that your
5		understanding of the resistance to that
6		terminology?
7	А	(AV) Yes, exactly. It's a central bank issue,
8		digital currency.
9	Q	So I take it that one of the things that's
10		distinctive about virtual assets is the fact
11		that they're not tied to a central bank
12		authority which either decides, here's our
13		monetary policy and decisions about circulation
14		of their currency, or, for that matter, tying it
15		to an established currency like the US dollar?
16	А	(AV) Yes.
17	Q	Are in general terms, and if you need
18		specifics that's fine, are there virtual assets
19		that are tied to physical commodities? We think
20		of the old notion of a currency that might be
21		tied to a value in gold or some other physical
22		commodity.
23	А	(AV) Absolutely there are. Also there's
24		something that's called stable coins. We talk

about them a little bit later on in the

25

1		presentation as we go into the different kinds
2		of cryptocurrencies there are. Is it okay if I
3		wait until then?
4	Q	It is. That's fine, and we'll come to that. I
5		wonder if I could just also ask this question
6		since we see the terminology about "virtual
7		asset." Does the term "asset" also have a
8		particular implication for law enforcement?
9	A	(AV) Well, certainly if it's considered to be a
10		proceeds of crime or offence-related property,
11		then it would.
12	Q	We can go to the next slide, please. Thank you.
13	A	(AV) Okay. So there's two different types of
14		virtual assets that exist. There's something
15		called non-convertible, which means that it only
16		has value within the domain in which it is being
17		used. It's seen often in online gaming, such as
18		the World of Warcraft. If we wanted to take
19		that into a real life scenario it would be very
20		similar to Canadian Tire money. So there's
21		value within Canadian Tire, but we try to keep
22		it outside of Canadian Tire and nobody is really
23		willing to be able to accept it.
24		And then there's something called

convertible. So there's two kinds of

1	convertible virtual assets. There's centralized
2	and there's decentralized. So "centralized"
3	just means that there's a single administrative
4	authority. Now, we have the example there of a
5	Second Life virtual world, which is an online
6	gaming world, and they use something called
7	Linden money and where the players can
8	purchase real estate and various commodities and
9	assets within this world, and then they can
10	exchange those funds for real fiat currency out
11	in real in the real world.
12	There's also centralized cryptocurrencies
13	that exist out there or assets, and Acting
14	Sergeant Gilkes will be speaking about some of
15	those later. And then we have decentralized.
16	So this means that there's no single
17	administrative authority, there's no central
18	bank overseeing the issuance of these virtual
19	asset, no oversight whatsoever, and they operate
20	purely on a peer-to-peer basis.
21	So virtual currencies are assets which are
22	convertible, meaning that they can convert from
23	cryptocurrency or currencies into fiat; are
24	decentralized, so have no single oversight,

administrating oversight; and use something

1		called cryptography, which is a method to be
2		able to secure the transactions, are known as
3		cryptocurrencies.
4	Q	You used the term "converting to fiat." And
5		just so we're clear about that terminology,
6		that does that describe what most of us would
7		just simply think of as money but, in other
8		words, Canadian or American dollars or
9		British pounds, but real world cash at hand,
10		that sort of idea?
11	A	(AV) Exactly. Central-bank issued currencies.
12	Q	Okay. Thank you. We'll go to the next slide,
13		please.
14	A	(AG) This slide speaks to the overall well,
15		the overall importance of cryptocurrencies, at
16		least in 2017. So this is a snapshot of the
17		value, the approximate market capitalization,
18		which is essentially the value of each share, or
19		in this case each coin, multiplied by the number
20		of coins in circulation give you the overall
21		value of the particular cryptocurrency. And we
22		can see this was in 2017 before there was
23		a well, a considerable rise in the value of
24		bitcoin. I think, for example, the year it
25		reached close to \$20,000. But we can see here

1	that bitcoin at that time was had an
2	approximate value of \$20 billion overall, and it
3	was news back then for there to be
4	10 cryptocurrencies with a market capitalization
5	of over \$100 million, which seems rather
6	important. But if we jump ahead now to the next
7	slide, please. And we take a snapshot of the
8	top 10 cryptocurrencies in 2020, we can see that
9	the market capitalizations have increased
10	dramatically.
11	So we can look first at bitcoin, which now
12	has a market capitalization of approximately
13	\$300 billion. I mean, yes, we are taking into
14	account that there are more of them in supply
15	or actually available, but we can actually take
16	a look at all of other top 10 and we can see
17	that there's been exponential growth, so much
18	more than ten times the value that we had seen
19	in 2017.
20	Now, this should give a clear idea that
21	these cryptocurrencies have actually reached a
22	large percentage of individuals in the world and
23	you can see their importance simply based on the
24	amount of funds that they generate and that they
25	hold in terms of value.

1	Q	You mentioned that the year 2017, and I take
2		it that's actually quite a notable year with
3		respect to at least the value of the bitcoin in
4		particular. That was the banner year so far
5		with a bit of a footnote beside that to ask
6		whether we're presently coming up on the same
7		sort of dynamic right now, I gather.
8	A	(AG) That is correct. So that was at the time
9		when bitcoin had reached I think it was
10		\$20,000 in December. I believe the value of
11		it currently is not very far from there.
12		There's all sorts of possible reasons for that
13		to happen, but I'm not really sure exactly what
14		in each circumstance causes the increase.
15	Q	And if it's the case that 2017 and 2020 look to
16		be sort of relatively peaks, have there been
17		valleys in between? Has there been in general
18		terms some ups and downs with respect to the
19		cost in particular bitcoin?
20	A	(AG) Yes. There's actually been considerable
21		ups and downs, I suppose we can call it. We've
22		seen I suppose in 2018 we had seen bitcoin be
23		turned down to I suppose around \$10,000 in
24		value, so lost close to half, I believe. I'd
25		have to look at the exact capitalization to know

1		in 2018. But there has been considerable
2		fluctuation with value of bitcoin throughout its
3		history since its inception.
4	Q	And this and I think both the previous slide
5		and this slide show a list of really the top 10.
6		Could you give us a sense of how many virtual
7		currencies are out there?
8	A	(AG) There are thousands. There are thousands
9		of virtual currencies, some of which have their
10		own blockchain, which we will discuss later, and
11		some of which are operating on an existing
12		blockchain, for example, operating on the
13		Ethereum blockchain. Those are considered
14		tokens, but a virtual asset nonetheless.
15	Q	And these two slides, I think both of them
16		suggest a significant dominance when one
17		compares bitcoin to its competitors. Is that a
18		fair conclusion to draw?
19	A	(AG) Yes. And this might be due to the
20		infrastructure that's already in place. It
21		might be due to the popularity and the
22		overall I don't really want to the call it
23		advertising, but the fact that bitcoin appears
24		often in the new media and people speak about it
25		in general. It breeds a certain familiarity

1		with the coin itself and that familiarity and
2		there's also a lot of information available on
3		how to actually transact with bitcoin and much
4		less available for the other cryptocurrencies.
5		So it's a lot easier to do the necessary
6		research to actually purchase your own
7		cryptocurrencies or become a cryptocurrency
8		hobbyist using bitcoin.
9	Q	So I guess to some extent maybe that's a bit
10		like Kleenex or Xerox or one of these companies
11		that achieve such "currency" maybe is the
12		wrong word, but such prevalence in the popular
13		discourse that people might use bitcoin when in
14		fact technically it's a different cryptocurrency
15		that could be at issue or at least described?
16	A	(AG) That is correct.
17	Q	Are there any I may be taking you a little
18		out of sequence here as I ask these questions.
19		Are there any virtual currencies that are
20		actually tied to or managed by a national
21		banking authority, like a central banking
22		authority or a country?
23	A	(AG) In terms of a country, I suppose I'm not
24		sure if Sergeant Vickery might be better placed
25		for that particular question.

1		(AV) So as far as I know, not yet; however,
2		there are a lot of countries out there looking
3		at the proposal. China is very close to issuing
4		one and I believe they're about to launch a
5		lottery where they're going to give out
6		approximately \$1 million in these digital assets
7		to citizens to be able to use.
8		Canada even is part of a working group
9		right now with some of the other countries to
10		identify the best practices and approach to the
11		potential. They are not looking at developing a
12		digital a central bank digital currency
13		currently here in Canada but are exploring that
14		option in the future. I believe Venezuela has
15		also looked at doing this. So it is something
16		that many countries out there see the value in.
17		Certainly the blockchain technology
18		provides innovation and transparency that's
19		never been available before. So, you know, in
20		my opinion I won't be surprised if this becomes
21		more of a common move in the future.
22	Q	Thank you. I think we're in a position to move
23		to the next slide. This is an important heading
24		obviously because people wonder, they hear this
25		description of the blockchain. If you could

1		help us to please understand exactly what that
2		is and how it operates.
3	A	(AG) Sure. Absolutely. So in order to
4		properly understand bitcoin you need to
5		understand the technology that it's actually
6		built on. Now, it's built on something called a
7		blockchain, when in actual fact the
8		blockchain is more like a database. Now, it's
9		an innovative database in that everything added
10		to the database cannot be modified, deleted,
11		removed in any such way in any which way.
12		So if we are talking specifically about
13		bitcoin and how it works on a blockchain, we
14		could possibly relate it to either an Excel
15		spreadsheet or an open ledger, accounting
16		ledger, which is actually distributed to anyone
17		who requires or who would like to have a copy of
18		it.
19		Now, if we assume that each page of the
20		ledger has space for about 100 entries and that
21		each bitcoin transaction, so a transaction
22		sending money to and from individuals, accounts
23		for one entry, we can fill those entry fields
24		with one transaction each up until we get to
25		100, which would fill the page. Now, I'm simply

1	using a number 100 because it's easier for in
2	terms of reference. But once this has been
3	filled, this page becomes, well, part of the
4	block. So what happens are that there are
5	individuals who are processing these
6	transactions and these transactions will be
7	completely processed and then they'll become a
8	block, so a page that's locked and cannot be
9	changed at any time in the future.
10	Now, once that page a locked it is
11	translated into a cryptographic hash, which
12	means sort of like a numerical representation
13	of all of those transactions. That way if any
14	of those transactions are changed at any time in
15	the future, even by one number, we will see that
16	the hash itself will actually change and then we
17	will know that there's been a change, but we
18	may not know exactly what has changed, but we
19	know that it's not the same page that we were
20	working with when those transactions were the
21	word is "confirmed" or "verified."
22	Now, those transactions are being processed
23	by individuals or groups who we call miners.
24	And those miners basically solve cryptographic
25	hashes in order to add each of those

transactions to a block.

1		transactions to a block.
2		Now, as a reward for what they do they are
3		paid transaction fees. Those transaction fees
4		are actually paid by the individuals who are
5		sending the funds. It may sound strange, but if
6		we think it into if we think about it in
7		terms of PIN processing by maybe Visa or
8		Mastercard or Interac, the same thing is
9		happening only it's all occurring under one
10		central body, one central entity, and it's
11		typically the vendor who's paying fees for the
12		transaction itself. So basically it has just
13		taken it has just reversed or flipped the
14		side of where the transaction fees are coming
15		from.
16		Now, what a miner
17	Q	Let me just perhaps
18	А	(AG) Sorry.
19	Q	Sorry, just this question just occurred to
20		me. When you describe this in a very
21		decentralized environment, how is a decision
22		made as to who gets the next transaction, so to
23		speak? Which miner I don't know if there's
24		competition or if that's, like, a lottery or how
25		it is that those get sent around to different

1		miners.
2	A	(AG) Well, there actually is a competition
3		that's built into the platform itself, built
4		into the technology. Now, the basically a
5		transaction or a block is added every
6		ten minutes and it has to function like this in
7		order for the distribution of the coins
8		themselves because when a block is solved, or
9		when a block is added, the miners are paid with
10		newly minted bitcoins. And that's kind of why
11		they're called miners; right? Because they
12		these coins didn't exist before or they weren't
13		in circulation before, but now they're being
14		distributed through the discovery of a new
15		block.
16		Now, in order for the blocks because
17		there are a finite number of bitcoins that
18		exist. There's or that will exist. There's
19		slightly over 21 million, I believe, bitcoins
20		that will some exist in the future.
21		Now, in order to make sure that there's
22		enough bitcoins that are distributed at a proper
23		pace it has to take approximately 10 minutes for
24		each block to be solved. Now, what happens is
25		that depending on how powerful or how many

1	miners are working to solve these blocks, the
2	difficulty of solving the blocks will be
3	adjusted. And when I say "difficulty," I mean
4	that the hash has to reach, give or take, a
5	certain number that's created by the network,
6	that's created by the software itself.
7	Now, the first miner to reach that number
8	is awarded the block. So he's awarded the
9	payment for not only the transaction fees but
10	also the initial coins that are uncovered with
11	the solving of the block. So it is a
12	competition as to who can solve that equation
13	the fastest and who can add that block of
14	transactions to the blockchain the fastest.
15	(AV) If I may just cut in here is just to
16	mention an additional incentive for them is the
17	transactions fees. So every time somebody
18	conducts a transaction dealing with bitcoin they
19	have to add a transaction fee to it. Now,
20	that's not dependent on the actual size of the
21	transaction but rather the amount of addresses
22	that are involved in that. So when there's high
23	demand for bitcoin transactions, there can be
24	several transactions all occurring
25	simultaneously. Now, in order to fill this

1		block every ten minutes it can hold
2		approximately 1 megabyte of data, which works
3		out to about 2,000 transactions. And so really
4		it's up to the miner to scoop up those group
5		of 2,000 transactions to be able to solve this
6		computational mathematical puzzle in order to
7		create that block.
8		And there in order to incentivize them,
9		in order to grab your transaction to get it
10		solved within that first block and hopefully be
11		validated within that first 10 minutes, you want
12		to be able to increase that the value of that
13		transaction fee so that they are more willing to
14		grab yours instead of having it sit in
15		cyberspace for, you know, two, three, four, five
16		blocks down the road before your transaction is
17		actually validated and is added to the
18		blockchain.
19	Q	Go ahead.
20	А	(AG) If we're thinking in terms of efficiency,
21		we're looking at the potential for three to
22		seven bitcoin transactions per second. Now, if
23		we scale that and in comparison we're looking at
24		about more or less 200 transactions per second
25		for PayPal and we're in the tens of thousands

1		per second for a platform like Visa or
2		Mastercard in terms of processing transactions.
3		So it doesn't scale anywhere near that of
4		those other, I would say, remote or digital
5		payment systems structure out there.
6	Q	You described the ledger and say that that's a
7		public ledger. Do I have that right?
8	А	(AG) Yes. So the blockchain or the bitcoin
9		blockchain, I should say, is a public ledger.
10		Not all cryptocurrencies have a public ledger,
11		but in the case of blockchain it is. And there
12		are tens of thousands of what are considered
13		or what are called nodes in the world, which
14		actually keep track of all of this of the
15		entire blockchain. Which means that every
16		transaction since its inception in 2009 is
17		recorded and kept on these tens of thousand of
18		nodes. So in order that creates considerable
19		redundancy.
20		So in order for the entire network to go
21		well, for the for blockchain or for bitcoin
22		to go down, the entire blockchain would have to
23		be wiped out at the same time on all of the
24		computers or nodes in the world. So those
25		are tens of thousands, so the chances of that

1		happening are relatively limited.
2		So it does create challenges, which we will
3		discuss going further, but that would, well,
4		speak to the decentralization of the blockchain
5		itself.
6	Q	You describe the Acting Sergeant Gilkes, you
7		described it as being a ledger and the
8		information on it cannot be modified or deleted,
9		so I take it that's a permanent ledger and one
10		that does not admit of being forged or
11		manipulated because of that feature?
12	A	(AG) That is correct. So the miners themselves
13		in addition to processing the transactions
14		the new transactions, their part of their
15		assignment is also to go back and verify each
16		and every block that's ever been added to the
17		blockchain as they are verifying or as they are
18		completing and processing the new transactions.
19		So if there is any type of change, if there is
20		any type of modification or mismatch, then they
21		know that there's something wrong in the block
22		and that they cannot go forward with confirming
23		or adding new block to the chain.
24	Q	What information is on the public ledger?

(AG) In terms of information on the public

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1		ledger, we will see the date and time of the
2		transactions. We'll see the accounts that the
3		bitcoins were sent from and the account that the
4		bitcoins were sent to in addition to the
5		transaction number and the amount of coins that
6		were actually transacted at that time. We'll
7		see what that actually looks like in real life a
8		little bit in a couple of slides, but there's
9		actually a considerable amount of information in
10		relation to each transaction, which is available
11		publicly with simple open source software that
12		allows for blockchain exploration.
13	Q	You describe maybe you could comment on this:
14		to what extent is the information kept in a
15		manner that permits anonymity? How anonymous is
16		it to be let's focus on bitcoin for this
17		question. How anonymously can one engage in
18		these transactions in terms of a ledger that
19		maintains a store of information and detail
20		about transactions?
21	А	(AG) Well, the term "pseudo-anonymous" has been
22		used often with blockchain, or pseudonymous,
23		meaning that almost all information is actually
24		available publicly with the exception of the
25		identity of the person who actually conducted

the transaction and the location. So I kind of compare it to your using ATM machine and leaving your transaction slip behind you. So the person would be able to see how much money you may have withdrawn, they may actually -- they'll be able to see from which bank you've actually completed your transaction and maybe some information pertaining to the accounts that you used, but they might not know who you are, your actual name and residence. So we do consider that to be pseudo-anonymous.

Now, having this information available, I can speak in terms of law enforcement firsthand, can very much aid, for example, investigators.

And what I mean is this is information which we would typically have to complete a production order in order to obtain from a bank or financial institution, whereas here we could simply go publicly and confirm that a transaction has actually occurred. And especially, I think, in relation to transactions may have occurred outside of the Canadian jurisdiction or overseas, this is information with -- which can be requested but we'd have to use mutual legal assistance treaties and other

1		tools, which can greatly delay an investigation
2		and potentially hamper the outcome. So having
3		this information available at an investigator's
4		fingerprints can accelerate and really help an
5		investigation.
6	Q	Just to pick up on that, when you describe that
7		it's it provides relevant and useful
8		information but not necessarily the identity of
9		the person doing it, I take it in sort of
10		analogous terms and in terms of the
11		investigative value, this isn't the person's
12		dropped their ID at the crime scene or left
13		their fingerprints on the holdup note so much as
14		they've left behind some value some valuable,
15		maybe circumstantial evidence that can connect
16		with other information to help you figure out
17		who's behind something but not all the way there
18		to identifying that person?
19	A	(AG) Precisely. This information would have to
20		be used in conjunction with I call it good
21		old fashion policing in order to put the pieces
22		together and actually identify who may have been
23		responsible for whatever crime may have occurred
24		and to confirm the crime that may have actually
25		occurred itself.

1	Q	I've taken you already offscript, but why don't
2		you return to the slide we have there, please.
3	A	(AG) Oh, sure. Actually, I believe we're ready
4		to move to the next slide. Okay. As I
5		mentioned before that there are miners working
6		as individuals or as groups who are paid to
7		complete transactions for the bitcoin network.
8		Now, this is a headline from approximately
9		a year and a half ago and this is an investment
10		from a cryptomining farm or a bitcoin miner.
11		Now, it's kind of, I guess, difficult to see
12		from this photo, but this individual is actually
13		handling computers. So these are
14		application-specific computers which are created
15		with a sole purpose of mining bitcoins or other
16		cryptocurrencies. They are very, very powerful
17		computers but they only do one thing.
18		Now, these computers generate an enormous
19		amount of heat and require an enormous amount of
20		electricity in order to function. So this
21		company created a farm a crypto farm in
22		Quebec in Sherbrooke, Quebec. Now, one of
23		the reasons and it's one of many farms in
24		Quebec and in Canada, but particularly in
25		Quebec. Now, one of the reasons is well,

1		like I mentioned before that these machines
2		generate considerable amount of heat. So the
3		climate in Quebec is colder than many and also
4		the electricity in Quebec is very inexpensive,
5		so as a result many of these companies have
6		moved there. And there's also little regulation
7		in terms of well, at least regulation that
8		would stifle the develop and growth of the
9		cryptocurrency market in Quebec.
10		So the takeaway here is that there is
11		\$250 million being invested in this type of
12		facility. We can assume, then, going forward
13		that the investors would expect an exponential
14		return in their investment and they are not
15		expecting to simply flush their money down the
16		toilet. So if there are groups and individuals
17		investing this type of money, we can into the
18		infrastructure, the bitcoin infrastructure, we
19		can expect bitcoin to continue to grow or
20		continue to be prevalent.
21	Q	I don't want to draw too much from one person
22		of one fellow in a toque, but this seems to be
23		not a hobbyist's pursuit, someone with a
24		computer who decides they're going to be a

miner. It seems, the nature of what you've

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25

1		described, pretty significant computer power and
2		some capacity to be competing and succeeding in
3		the competition to be a bit farmer; is that
4		accurate?
5	A	(AG) Correct. If we think in terms of well,
6		basically 2009, 2010, I suppose up until about
7		2012 or so, if you had a very powerful computer,
8		you could compete, but at this point these
9		computers and the heavy investment in some of
10		these computers costs them tens of thousands of
11		dollars. It would not be likely that if you
12		were to attempt to solve a block yourself with
13		one computer that you would actually be
± J		
14		successful.
		successful. There is a way of joining a pool, basically
14		
14 15		There is a way of joining a pool, basically
14 15 16		There is a way of joining a pool, basically a pool of resources which can work together in
14 15 16 17		There is a way of joining a pool, basically a pool of resources which can work together in order to solve the cryptographic hashes and add
14 15 16 17 18		There is a way of joining a pool, basically a pool of resources which can work together in order to solve the cryptographic hashes and add the blocks, but that would be in terms of
14 15 16 17 18		There is a way of joining a pool, basically a pool of resources which can work together in order to solve the cryptographic hashes and add the blocks, but that would be in terms of opinion only, I'm not really sure that it would
14 15 16 17 18 19		There is a way of joining a pool, basically a pool of resources which can work together in order to solve the cryptographic hashes and add the blocks, but that would be in terms of opinion only, I'm not really sure that it would cover the electricity that it would cost to
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Q	There is a way of joining a pool, basically a pool of resources which can work together in order to solve the cryptographic hashes and add the blocks, but that would be in terms of opinion only, I'm not really sure that it would cover the electricity that it would cost to actually run this type of machine.

would be the type of information that you could

1		recuperate or simply access on the blockchain.
2		So this would be taken from blockchaininfo.com.
3		And this is actually a transaction that I myself
4		conducted with one of my wallets back this 2017.
5		Now, this is a simple deposit via a bitcoin
6		ATM. Now, the, I guess, rectangle above would
7		be the transaction with the amount of bitcoin
8		and below you'd see the translation of the
9		amount of money that was actually transacted.
10		Now, the hash that you can see there would be
11		actually the transaction number and below that
12		you would see the wallet or sorry, the
13		address, I should say, that the bitcoins came
14		from. And the on the right-hand side you see
15		there's kind of a green globe there, and that's
16		where the money or the bitcoin was deposited to.
17		So that actually is the account that was under
18		my control at that time, and I should mention,
19		please, no one send me bitcoin.
20	Q	Wait a sec. I think you do want them sending it
21		to you, just not taking it away. So this will
22		be quite inexact, but am I right to say, then,
23		as we look at this, sort of is a ledger of a
24		transaction at one level. What's going on is
25		that the if we look at the blue globe on the

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Α

1		left side would be akin to saying this is from,
2		let's say, a CIBC account in Vancouver. And
3		then with an arrow to the right going to a Bank
4		of Montreal account in Saskatoon. And the hash
5		at the top would be sort of functionally
6		equivalent to I don't know what that would be
7		equivalent to. Would that be sort of like a
8		transaction number?
9	A	(AG) Correct. It would be the transaction
10		number relating to the block that it came from.
11		And in this case it was likely that the where
12		the coins came from would be the exchanger who
13		actually manages the ATM that I was dealing
14		with.
15	Q	Okay. Yeah.
16	A	(AG) We can see that there is a date and time
17		and there's an amount as well as the fee that
18		was paid out in order to complete the
19		transaction.
20	Q	And all of these different displays of the hash
21		and such and the addresses have ellipses at the
22		end, so I take it they're quite a long number
23		and letter series, aren't they, that are
24		involved?

(AG) Yes, they are. We'll discuss a little bit

1		about that, I suppose, when we go forward and
2		speak about private keys and public keys and
3		things like that.
4	Q	Good. Shall we move to slide number 11?
5	А	(AG) Sure.
6		(AV) Sorry. So unlike cash, which is
7		completely traceless, the blockchain or at
8		least the bitcoin blockchain will allow us to be
9		able to see a transaction most of the the
10		cryptocurrency or sorry, a history of most of
11		the cryptocurrency transactions that have ever
12		occurred. So from a law enforcement perspective
13		this provides us an ability to trace and follow
14		the flow of funds to an extent that's just not
15		currently not available to us with the
16		traditional banking system.
17		So currently, you know, if grounds permit,
18		then we can obtain a production order and we can
19		go to a bank and we can obtain production order
20		results which identify account information and
21		account history for a suspect of our
22		investigation. Usually, you know, this can
23		cause some time delays where we can wait up to
24		90 days for this information in which time we
25		can analyze and assess it and maybe identify

1		co-conspirators or further accounts and
2		different banking organizations that we can then
3		follow up with additional production orders.
4		And all of this takes time and process to be
5		able to get there, whereas we can look at the
6		blockchain and we can get a pretty good
7		indication of the flow of the transactions from
8		that.
9		As Acting Sergeant Gilkes had mentioned,
10		that sorry, I lost my train of thought there
11		for a second. I'll just go back to
12	Q	Maybe I can ask you because one question of
13		course occurred to me as we go through this.
14		You describe that in the conventional banking
15		situation, the police investigating something,
16		they don't simply place a phone call to the
17		to a federal bank, let's say, and suddenly
18		receive the same day the information. There's a
19		legal regime that requires prior judicial
20		authorization, so an application, you mentioned
21		a production order under the Criminal Code,
22		where there's a standard that has to be met.
23		It's not simply we're interested, but we
24		actually have a reasonable basis to believe that
25		we may have evidence that emanates from

1		information that in this example, that the
2		bank has.
3		So I take it that here we're dealing with
4		something entirely different. You don't have to
5		be satisfying a ground of reasonable grounds
6		to believe that you may have evidence related to
7		a crime; you don't need to have a judicial
8		officer approving a warrant or production order?
9	А	(AV) So that depends. The information that's
10		available to us on the blockchain through open
11		source technology or through using these
12		aftermarket software tools, we can do an
13		analysis of the transactions and get a history
14		of the movement and flow of that funds.
15		These aftermarket software tools that cost money
16		that law enforcement are able to purchase also
17		will help provide links to criminality, links to
18		risky addresses, exposure so the darknet, to
19		mixing services, which is a third-party money
20		laundering service which we'll talk about a
21		little bit later in the testimony.
22		But that's what these tools provide us.
23		However, they still will not identify who the
24		holder of that account is. And in order for us
25		to get that information, we then we will have

an on ramp or an off-ramp. And when I say that I'm talking about the methods of cashing out and converting it over to a regular currency, so -- such as through an exchange. We'll talk shortly about the type of information -- how exchanges are structured and the type of information that they get. But at this point, if we can see a transaction going to a exchange, then we can go forward and get a production order with legal authorization from a judge because we have reasonable grounds to believe an offence has occurred, and then we can get that information.

(AG) I would like to add that the tools are not an exact science. So we're thinking about heuristics here. So there is clustering, basically trying to attribute multiple transactions to the control of one or several individuals. There's also some properties inherent in the blockchain which allow for the -- I would say, which aid in providing a location for where a transaction may have occurred. But a lot of, I would say -- I don't want to call it guesswork because it is educated guesses, but based on information which is

1		collected in the clearnet, the darknet,
2		information circle information, reports from
3		police, reports in well, in journalistic
4		reports, will provide information that will help
5		to attribute ownership or attribute usership of
6		particular addresses, but, like I mentioned, not
7		an exact science and regular policework has to
8		be done in collaboration.
9	Q	So the slide that we have on display talks about
10		aftermarket software tools. I see three dollar
11		signs. If it was a restaurant review, this is a
12		fancier restaurant, I take it. And we see a
13		description on the slide, which I don't need to
14		read out, but if you could give us a sense of
15		what this describes and then how it is that law
16		enforcement and in particular the RCMP engages
17		with these sorts of tools and providers.
18	А	(AV) Sure. So I have the three dollar signs
19		there because yes, they don't necessarily come
20		cheap. But there are companies out there that
21		do an analysis of the blockchain, and as Acting
22		Sergeant Gilkes had mentioned, be able to
23		attribute and cluster addresses together and
24		link them to criminality such as, you know,
25		originating or passing through darknet or

1		related to other cryptocurrency addresses that
2		have been linked to hacks or frauds.
3		And so we have specialized resources within
4		law enforcement that are trained to be able to
5		utilize these software tracing tools, to be able
6		to do an analysis of that information. Again,
7		they can identify IP addresses, potentially.
8		While this will not identify who the holder of
9		that have account is, it does usually permit us
10		the ability to be able to use judicial
11		authorization to be able to gain access to
12		further information from the exchanges or the
13		third-party service providers who facilitated a
14		transaction through their exchange.
15	Q	Could you give the Commissioner a sense of who
16		the big players are in this area and whether
17		they are based in or operating in Canada as
18		opposed to elsewhere, and for that matter, how
19		they are structured? Who's is it a company
20		that's behind it, et cetera?
21	A	(AV) So the largest the software companies,
22		at least for Canadian law enforcement, tends to
23		be Chainalysis and CipherTrace. The National
24		Cybercrime Coordination Centre in Ottawa, which
25		is the National Police Services, acquired

1		several licences of each of these from each
2		of these companies to be able to a support
3		Canadian law enforcement at a municipal,
4		provincial and federal level.
5		There are other software companies that do
6		exist, such as a Elliptic, although that is a
7		company that is used more commonly in Europe. I
8		know the UK tends to use them quite a bit, but
9		here in Canada we typically rely on CipherTrace
10		and Chainalysis.
11	Q	And are those and are those sort of providers
12		that are looked to by law enforcement to offer
13		sort of tools and software to do that work, or
14		are they actually really to some extent is
15		worker analysis outsourced to those providers?
16	А	(AV) So they would post these servers with all
17		the information, and then the law enforcement
18		agencies will utilize their data from or
19		their platform basically to be able to do this
20		analysis, and then based on the information
21		that's a gathered from various law enforcement
22		entities that are using their tools they're able
23		to attribute certain addresses to criminality
24		and be able to come up with some trends on how
25		cryptocurrency is being utilized. So

1		CipherTrace and Chainalysis very often will
2		analyze this data and put out reports such as
3		the 2020 Chainalysis report and there's a
4		CipherTrace one as well, will do a quarterly
5		report, I believe.
6	Q	Does it makes sense that we move to the next
7		slide, number 12, which is in entitled
8		"Public/Private Key Pairs," to understand more
9		about what the key pair describes?
10	A	(AG) Okay. So we'll be getting into bitcoin
11		wallets. So basically everything that I've
12		discussed before on the blockchain, what does an
13		individual see when they actually create their
14		own bitcoin account, I suppose you can call it,
15		would be when they create their own wallet they
16		are given a private key. So basically the
17		private key is the one that you can see there at
18		the bottom written in red, and it's very, very
19		long, and that's important because it's similar
20		to having a password. And this password allows
21		you access to whatever bitcoin are stored in
22		whatever addresses are associated with this
23		private key. So it allows you to spend it.
24		Now, it's enough to simply see it, or to

see what's called a QR code. So you can see

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that there's something that looks like a barcode on the right-hand side. There's also an associated code with a private key. So anyone who sees that can take a picture of it, or can simply memorize the numbers, can actually rebuild the wallet that this is actually associated to and then use whatever coins are associated to it.

So it's, I guess, considered an enhanced password because you can actually use this or several people can share the same private key and all have access to the same account and all have the ability to spend the same coins that are associated to the same wallet. Now, when I'm talking about a wallet, I'm referring to actually the public keys that are associated. So public keys can be considered account numbers or accounts that are associated to the private key which would be in the wallet itself.

Now, the public keys are where you would actually send or receive the bitcoins themselves, and they're actually not necessarily private. So this is a key that you don't mind having it shared with other individuals because they can use it as your account number, for

1		example, to send funds to. So you can sort of
2		consider it, like I said, an account number or,
3		as we can see here, any email address for
4		accepting e-transfers. So that would cover
5		that.
6	Q	And just to pick up on that so I have the point.
7		If you lost your public key that's not the end
8		of the world. That's people may or may not
9		circulate it widely, but there's nothing that
10		puts you at risk of having your account emptied,
11		so to speak. But losing the private key could
12		give rise to that risk that someone else then
13		has effectively the ability to move that bitcoin
14		or money around?
15	A	(AG) Right. And like I mentioned before, it's
16		really enhanced. So it's not quite losing
17		your private key is not exactly like losing your
18		wallet because if you do lose your wallet, well,
19		whoever finds it can use it. But in the private
20		key, if I have seen your private key or I have
21		taken a picture or somehow recorded the
22		information from your private key, even though
23		you may still physically be in control of
24		whatever device this may be stored on, because I
25		have taken that picture, I can actually spend

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1		your bitcoins.
2	Q	Thank you.
3	A	(AG) So next slide, please. Okay. Now, in term
4		of managing your cryptocurrencies, and I had
5		mentioned before the creation of wallets. And
6		so as it says there:
7		"Digital wallets are hardware or software
8		that manage keys, addresses, and
9		transactions."
10		Now, you need to create a wallet. And there's
11		several different types of wallets that we'll
12		talk about briefly, the first one being an
13		online wallet. Now, an online wallet is, well,
14		I suppose a wallet which has the least amount of
15		control for the person who's actually creating
16		the wallet. Now, these tend to be held by
17		exchangers. So, now, you would simply log into
18		an exchanger, provide your personal information
19		and create an account.
20		Now, this account would then give you some
21		public keys or addresses or account numbers
22		basically to send funds to or to send bitcoins
23		to, but with that being said, the exchanger will
24		keep control of your private key. So it's much

like depositing your money in the bank. So when

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you deposit your money in the bank, they have
total control of your funds. They can do pretty
much whatever they want with your money, and
it's the same thing with an exchange. So they
will keep your private key well, they will
keep control of the private key and just allow
you to spend funds that have been deposited with
their business or with their exchange.

Next we have desktop and mobile wallets, which are essentially the same thing only portability is different. Now, these wallets, these can be used to -- well, this is software that is downloaded and it's used to generate wallets on your own device. So you keep control of your keys personally, so your private keys and your public keys, and you have full control over your transactions. These ones, the mobile wallet, the desktop wallet and the online wallets, are very -- tend to be very fast because they are what you would call hot wallets, so meaning that they are wallets where the private key is or has been online, and they can be used to conduct transactions relatively swiftly.

Now, in terms of security, a wallet being

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held -- an online wallet being held at an exchanger, that is -- depending on how you look at it, it can be considered secure because there is a company which is actually taking care of the security of your private key and making sure through their own network security that no one actually has access to your private keys. Ιt also allows, in the event that you cannot forget -- you cannot remember your access codes or passwords or something like that, there's some sort of way to get back whatever is in your account. There's some sort of customer service that can provide some sort of assistance if you do lose your wallet or if you do lose your log-in information.

Whereas with mobile wallets or desktop
wallets, if your device becomes somehow
corrupted, if you lose your device or if you're
a victim of some sort of malware which actually
steals your information, your keys, and you lose
your wallet, well, then you lose your bitcoins.
There's actually no resource or little recourse
in order to get back whatever bitcoins you may
have lost. So there are some advantages and
disadvantages to each wallet.

1	If we move on to hardware wallet, which
2	I suppose it's the second picture from the
3	right. This is similar to a USB key, but it's a
4	device that's created simply and specifically
5	for the storage of your private keys and your
6	wallet, meaning that it this small encrypted
7	device can keep the well, the ability to
8	spend associated bitcoins completely free from
9	the internet and even when connected to a
10	computer, it never release the private keys to
11	the computer itself. It simply allows the
12	access to the wallet to actually conduct
13	whatever transaction that would be conducted
14	online.
15	And finally at the end, completely on the

And finally at the end, completely on the right we see a paper wallet. Now, a paper wallet is essentially just that. We can see a public key and we can see a private key. And in order to spend these funds you would either need to -- well, you would need to take a picture or use the actual funds themselves, use the actual piece of paper itself, to rebuild the wallet to be able to send the funds that are associated with it.

These are both considered cold storage,

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_	willou media ende il delle il prepared
2	properly, then particularly on the paper
3	wallet, then these private keys have never been
4	online. So, now, the if you are preparing it
5	properly, like I said, for a paper wallet, you
6	should be preparing this on a computer that is
7	disconnected from the internet if you're going
8	to be doing that. So in order to spend funds
9	that are associated to either the paper wallet
10	or the hardware wallet, it takes a little bit
11	more time and effort in order to do so. And
12	like I mentioned, that's why they are considered
13	cold wallets. Much enhanced in terms of
14	security versus the other wallets.
15	The paper wallet can be an automatic so
16	a visit to an ATM machine. If you do not have
17	an existing account and you do deposit funds,
18	then you will be simply granted or in
19	exchange you will receive a paper wallet. So
20	it's as simple as that to obtain a paper wallet.
21	And as far as hardware wallets go, they tend to
22	be less popular due to well, I guess people
23	being unsure about dealing with them as well as
24	they tend to be an investment of more than \$100

or so right off the bat, so for the casual user

which means that if done -- if prepared

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1		they tend not be to be so popular.
2	Q	That makes sense. Let's turn to the next slide
3		which has to do with seed phrase.
4	A	(AG) Yes.
5	Q	And explaining what that concept is. And just
6		to alert you to this as I look at the clock, I
7		want to make sure we track along and I leave
8		sufficient time for other counsel to ask some
9		questions. So if you spot a shortcut, you can
10		take it. And if I have other questions, I'll
11		slow you down to ask them as I appreciate not
12		blaming anyone for going slowly because I asked
13		a whole bunch of questions already.
14		But why don't we turn to slide 14, please,
15		and help us understand what the "seed phrase"
16		refers to.
17	A	(AG) Sure. Absolutely. So the seed phrase
18		would be kind of your backup to your wallet. So
19		depending on the type of wallet you have, it
20		will be 12 to 24 words. Now, just having these
21		words and knowing the type, or in some cases not
22		even the type but typically the software used to
23		create the wallet in the first place, you can
24		recreate whatever wallet has been lost.

So in the event that you do lose or -- your

1	device but you do have these words written down
2	somewhere, then you can recreate and rebuild
3	your wallet and regain access to the funds.
4	Now, this is important for law enforcement in
5	the event that we find something like this,
6	rather than actually being able to access
7	whatever device had bitcoins stored on them.
8	So if we can go to the next slide, please.
9	(AV) Okay. Now we're going to go through
10	the different types of methods available to
11	citizens to be able to purchase cryptocurrency.
12	So the most popular out there is a public
13	exchange otherwise known as a centralized
14	exchange. This is a third party that
15	facilitates the purchase, sale and conversion of
16	cryptocurrency from one to another. They
17	usually are funded through the transaction fees
18	that they charge their customers. In order to
19	create an account with one of these entities,
20	normally they'll accept all sorts of payment,
21	whether it be bank transfers, credit card, money
22	orders, gift cards. You can even send a
23	transfer through Canada Post. And then often
24	times they will use the service of a third-party
25	service provider in order to be able to accept

1		this payment. And the reason that they have to
2		do that, at least here in Canada, is just an
3		unwillingness by the Canadian banks to support
4		cryptocurrency purchases. So the exchanges have
5		to use this third-party service provider as the
6		banks will not facilitate a bank transfer to go
7		directly to that exchange.
8		The reason that I bring this up is, at
9		least from a law enforcement perspective, this
10		does tend to further distance the funds from the
11		source which, you know, potentially can help
12		facilitate money laundering if such you know,
13		a target is pursuing that.
14		Now, upon receiving the funds a client is
15		usually asked to provide some KYC. So the
16	Q	I'll pause to make sure we have it. KYC, know
17		your customer?
18	А	(AV) Sorry. Yeah.
19	Q	No, that's okay. Carry on.
20	А	(AV) Yeah, know your customer. And so the
21		exchange will usually ask for usually a
22		picture of the person requesting the account
23		holding their driver's licence or some sort of
24		picture ID next to them, and then they will send
25		this image forward to the exchange who will run

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a computer algorithm against it and confirm that
the person holding the driver's licence is
actually the same person that's in that ID. And
when they're quite convinced that you are in
fact who you say you are, they'll follow up with
some sort of request for proof of address, a
utility bill or whatnot.

Now, as we know, legislation has just come into play here in Canada that says these exchanges now must be registered as money service business and that they need to collect KYC, but this is a process that they've been doing for a long time, often maybe as the role as foreign money service businesses in dealing with -- in the oversight of FinCEN perhaps in the States but also as a method to just protect themselves from frauds.

There's been hacks that have happened in the past where customer information has been captured and a lot of these images of an individual holding their driver's licence are available for sale on the darknet and are being used by corrupt entities trying to create accounts with the exchanges. So that's why they run this computer algorithm and ensure that the

1		client is confirmed.
2	Q	If I could just pause to make sure we've got the
3		reference. You referred to some recent
4		legislation. Is that is it the case that
5		you're referring to amendments that took effect
6		at the start of June of this year to the
7		Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and
8		Terrorist Finance Act? Is that accurate?
9	A	(AV) That is correct.
10	Q	All right. Carry on.
11	A	(AV) So once a client is able to create an
12		account, once they've gone through all of this
13		process, they're able to create an account on an
14		exchange and they're able to transact on there,
15		either purchase cryptocurrency, sell
16		cryptocurrency or convert one type for another,
17		say, as a conversion from bitcoin over to
18		litecoin, which is different cryptocurrency.
19		The exchange will usually hold what's
20		called a custodial wallet, whereas they'll hold
21		the customer's private keys and take custody of
22		those. So the customer themselves is no longer
23		really in control of this; however, any time a
24		transaction occurs with their funds their
25		account shows up as either debited or credited.

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1	Now, all the cryptocurrency private keys
2	aren't actually retained within the exchange
3	themselves and that's to protect both themselves
4	and the clients from potential hacks. So they
5	actually store the majority of their reserves in
6	a cold wallet offline and they'll only keep
7	what's necessary in order to be able to handle
8	transactions to meet the supply and demand of
9	those transactions within their hot wallets.
10	And then as the reserves deplete, they can
11	replenish them from their cold wallets offline.
12	So typically that's how these exchanges work.
13	Now, an example of one of these exchanges
14	that I'd like to bring up is Quadriga, which
15	is you know, had a basically rose to fame
16	in January of last year when it was reported
17	that their CEO, 30-year-old Gerald Cotten, died
18	while in India, honeymooning with his wife. And
19	media reports quickly came out after that, you
20	know, Gerald Cotten was the only person in
21	possession of the private keys accessing these
22	cold wallets offline that held up to
23	\$250 million in the in clients'
24	cryptocurrency assets.

So, you know, of course the international

1	community was completely shaken.
2	76,000 customers had lost potential access to
3	their cryptocurrency assets. Now, Quadriga
4	wasn't able to actually meet the demands of
5	everybody trying to withdraw their assets at
6	this time, so they had to declare bankruptcy and
7	were put under the trustee of Ernst & Young.
8	Simultaneously the RCMP began an investigation
9	into this out of Milton, Ontario, just based on
10	suspicious nature of Gerald Cotten's death and
11	the activities that ensued.
12	So that's an ongoing investigation and I
13	won't speak to that, but what I did want to
14	highlight is just some of the findings that have
15	been published by the Ontario Securities
16	Commission and Ernst & Young and which are
17	actually available in the overview report. And
18	that's just, you know, how something like this
19	could have potentially happened, and I think
20	from the findings of Ontario Security
21	Commission and Ernst & Young shows that in fact
22	the private keys accessing those cold the
23	funds in the cold storage are not really at
24	issue here because those cold storages are
25	were relatively close to being empty. But what

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1 in fact happened was that the CEO, Gerald Cotten, was manipulating the assets that were in 2 3 there. He was creating fictitious individuals 4 and transferring assets using real customers' cryptocurrency that was there. He was paying 5 new customers with -- or sorry, old customers 6 with new customers' funds, basically carrying 7 out a Ponzi-type scheme. And it just goes to 8 9 show how could something like this potentially 10 happen without -- we certain certainly need more 11 oversight and regulatory monitoring of what 12 happens within a public exchange. 13 Now, we've talked already at length about

Now, we've talked already at length about how all these transactions that occur on the blockchain are visible to everybody. Well, one thing we didn't mention is the exception to that or one of the exceptions is when a transaction goes into an exchange. And so all of the dealings that happen within are off of that blockchain and are only visible to that exchange themselves, and unless they actually have accountability for the transactions that they're doing that -- doing within there, then this type of thing can happen.

It also begs the question that -- you know,

1		the idea that one person could be the sole
2		entity in control of private keys accessing up
3		to \$250 million in customers' assets, you know,
4		at one point in time this was inconceivable.
5		And, now, yes, this may not have been what
6		happened in this case, but it shows that the
7		potential threat is there and there needs to be
8		more oversight over the cold storage wallets
9		that are held within these exchanges.
10		Now, currently the exchanges don't publish
11		the amounts that are in their cold storage
12		wallets, so nobody had any indication that
13		Quadriga didn't have the balance in there
14		necessary to support the degree of operations
15		that they were controlling there. So more
16		transparency in regards to that I think would be
17		very helpful moving forward.
18	Q	Quadriga was a notorious case and of course a
19		Vancouver-based case that was actually written
20		up in the media, including Vanity Fair. It
21		achieved a certain prominence. But when you
22		describe the exchanges, it's sort of a point
23		from the point of view of tracing that the
24		exchange itself can be the dead end that breaks
25		what might otherwise be a chain or a trail that

1		could be followed by investigators?
2	А	(AV) Absolutely. We can see, using these
3		aftermarket software tools, when a transaction
4		has entered the exchange. We cannot see what
5		happens within than exchange, nor can we see
6		what happens when it if a transaction leaves
7		that exchange. So that's why we you know,
8		we'll need to go forward and get production
9		orders under lawful authority to be able to get
10		some information in regards to that. Now
11	Q	Thank you. I was going to direct you to the
12		next slide, which talks about KYC protocols with
13		public exchangers.
14	A	(AV) Yes. So as I had mentioned before, when
15		trying to gain an account with one of these
16		exchanges and they are not all the same.
17		They all have their own different KYC protocols
18		especially here in Canada. Now, this is
19		probably going to become a little bit more
20		standardized since regulations have been put
21		into play, but a lot of the more reputable ones,
22		as I said, will ask for driver's licence ID and
23		that sort of information. So this is the kind
24		of information that we can capture if we have
25		the lawful authority to go forward with a

1		production order, and certainly some of it
2		depends on how the individual purchased their
3		cryptocurrency. So as you can see on the slide,
4		bank account information and credit card
5		information. Obviously that will be reliant on
6		the method of payment used.
7		Next slide, please.
8	Q	We turn here to public sorry, from public
9		exchangers to private exchangers.
10	А	(AV) Right. So private exchangers are it's
11		basically a peer-to-peer platform which connects
12		buyers and sellers and they post their fees, so
13		the exchange doesn't necessarily control the
14		fees; the individuals do themselves. And then
15		they connect with who they want to purchase
16		from. So it's almost similar to what you would
17		see on Kijiji or Craigslist where if you're a
18		seller of cryptocurrency or you want to purchase
19		it, you would put your ad up there and somebody
20		would, you know, contact you if they're willing
21		to pay the fees that you're offering.
22		So from a law enforcement perspective this
23		is a very risky way to be able to go and
24		purchase your cryptocurrency. For one, it's

extremely expensive in comparison to what the

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exchanges charge, which is traditionally about a quarter of a percentage of up 4 percent. Now, that may be increasing with the increase in the price of bitcoin right now. I'm not sure. But with private exchangers you can pay anywhere from 10 to 15 percent. And most of the time the reason that you're paying these fees it because it offers that anonymity that you do not get when you're dealing with the exchanges.

Now, some of these platforms will take payment in, you know, credit card or bank transfer, so KYC may actually be conducted, but a lot of the time cash transactions is the way to go and these individuals or these exchangers will meet the buyer in a Tim Hortons or in some dark alleyway to conduct the transaction.

Now, as we had said, it takes at minimum of ten minutes but can take up to an hour or more for that transaction to be authenticated and to appear on the blockchain. And normally we would want to wait three or four validations before that happens, so before you can be actually convinced that your transaction has gone through could take 30 minutes to 60 minutes. So if you're meeting some stranger for an agreed upon

1		price to be able to transact cash for bitcoin,
2		what are the chances that that individual is
3		going to, like, stand there and wait those
4		30 minutes to 60 minutes to confirm that the
5		transaction has gone through? It's highly
6		likely, which unlikely, sorry, which puts the
7		individual at risk of fraud. There's also been
8		cases where individuals have been assaulted and
9		their bags of cash just stolen as the
10		individuals have run away.
11		There are several exchanges out there.
12		Paxful is one of the more common ones, and they
13		actually boast over 300 payment methods, which
14		includes cash and various gift card
15		transactions. So it makes it very difficult
16		from a law enforcement perspective to be able to
17		follow the flow of funds or collect KYC when
18		needed.
19		Next slide, please.
20	Q	And we move now to the topic of bitcoin ATMs.
21	A	(AV) Right. So bitcoin ATM machines. So these
22		are just another mode of exchange. These
23		machines are available all over Canada.
24		Currently we just have as of yesterday just
25		under 1,000 of these machines across the country

and they basically allow anybody to go in and
purchase bitcoin or other types of
cryptocurrency using cash. They offer they
also offer higher exchange rates, you know, 10
to 15 percent. They can be used certainly as a
facilitator for money laundering but they also
provide an ability, from my opinion, for
somebody who's interested in cryptocurrency to
be able to just go to a machine and input \$20
and see how it works. Now, some of these
machines will allow you to or sorry, they
will all allow you to purchase cryptocurrency,
and then some of them will allow you to sell
cryptocurrency as well.

Now, there's different ways to be able to run one of these machines, to be an operator of it, and that is to either purchase one of these machines and have an open -- or sorry, have an open account with an exchange. And so every time a purchase is made at this ATM machine it will mirror the transaction with your open account at the exchange. That makes sure that the wallet used to support the bitcoin ATM machine is fully replenished and will always meet the supply and demand of that particular

1	machine. It also ensures that the operator of
2	that machine is paying the same amount for the
3	cryptocurrency as it's being sold for. And that
4	just helps deal with some of the volatility
5	issue. So if the operator isn't able to get to
6	their machine or fill up their own
7	cryptocurrency wallet, their relationship with
8	the larger exchange will just help facilitate
9	that and run the process through.
10	The other option is to purchase one of
11	these machines and support it using your own hot
12	wallet. Now, as you can imagine, you would have
13	to have a lot of reserves to be able to keep in
14	this hot wallet and be able to run it. Now,
15	there's a couple of instances that I can
16	highlight in which individuals have used this
17	machine in order to be able to these machines
18	in order to be able to facilitate money
19	laundering schemes.
20	So in May of 2019 in Spain a criminal
21	organization was getting drugs from the
22	Colombian cartel, importing the drugs, selling
23	it in Spain and then they needed something to do
24	with this with the cash that they were

bringing in from the sale. So they ended up

with two of these bitcoin ATM machines and they
fabricated a money service business. They were
feeding the cash into these machines and then
instantly transacting the cryptocurrency over to
Colombia, who were able to get the proceeds of
these sales without actually ever having to
touch the elicit cash and were able to settle
debts almost immediately.

These individuals in Spain had created this fictitious money service businesses, fabricated all their books and then you were able to justify their money service business, their shell company essentially, as justification for this influx of cash.

Spain -- the Spanish police became aware of this and they took them down in May of last year. And then just in July of this year a California man pled guilty for basically doing the same thing. He exchanged up to \$25 million in cash through 17 ATM machines that he had had disbursed across California which he did with -- provided individuals the addresses so they could go and use these machines as well as he facilitated in-person transactions. And he did the same thing, he created a fictitious money

1		service business to justify the proceeds of this
2		sale. Now
3	Q	Are there any I'm sorry. Are there any KYC
4		or any sort of mechanisms that prevent, if I'm
5		drug dealer, me from simply taking the
6		machine I don't know if they even speak to
7		this issue of setting up the machine in my own
8		garage to feed in stacks of 20s generated from
9		drug dealing and then converting that out to
10		bitcoin and hiding the trail if I move it around
11		from there?
12	A	(AV) Well, as a third-party operator service
13	А	operator of these machines, now, you know,
14		regulations require reporting and anything over
15		\$1,000 which I believe doesn't take effect
16		until next year, although the majority of the
17		operators are now facilitating it, is anything
18		over \$1,000 requires KYC. But these are the
19		more reputable operators out there that are
20		trying to be compliant and abide. As well as if
21		they don't flag this and report to FINTRAC, then
22		if they have an account already set up with the
23		exchange to mirror the transactions, then that
24		exchange is likely going to be able to capture
25		that information through reporting.

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1	But in your example, to have a criminal
2	organization purchase one of these machines and
3	run them in their garage, then no, there would
4	likely be no reporting take place. And if
5	there's no mirroring with an exchange, there
6	would be no safety net to capture that
7	information. And unless law enforcement was
8	particularly looking at them and watching the
9	blockchain transactions and investigating it, it
10	would likely go unnoticed.

So with bitcoin ATM machines, their use has increased substantially. In the last year there has been a hundred percent increase in these ATM machines. So where there was about 6,000 of them worldwide last November, we now see over 12,000 of them out there potentially because they offer an ability for people that traditionally have been unbanked to be able to now deal and to transact, move currency anywhere across the world in a matter of minutes, providing somebody has access to one of these machines in one of the 74 countries out there. But it also is a very -- a tool susceptible to laundering as we have mentioned. So there's been a lot --

1	Q	In a sense there you sort of capture the good
2		and the bad, don't you? That on the one hand
3		there's a sort of and I think that's been
4		sort of the more optimistic discussion around
5		bitcoin in particular is that this may provide a
6		mechanism for what you call the unbanked people
7		who don't have access to regular bank accounts,
8		especially in the developing world, to suddenly
9		have an easy means of transacting and moving
10		money around, et cetera, on the other hand a
11		vulnerability to crime and money laundering?
12	А	(AV) Absolutely. And these new KYC
13		requirements, it's very obvious to see that
14		they're being implemented. But I know from law
15		enforcement out in British Columbia who had been
16		dealing with one of the operators out there, he
17		had set a very minimal KYC requirement in his
18		machine in his effort to try to deter money
19		laundering through them and during that time
20		since, he had implemented this low KYC he'd
21		noticed that his business had dropped by
22		30 percent.
23		So there's not much incentive on the
24		operators to be able to try to keep those

requirements for KYC low and do their part to be

1		able to support this. At least beyond what has
2		been required by FINTRAC and the Proceeds of
3		Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing
4		Act.
5	Q	What sort of KYC measures can the ATM operator
6		take? I take it they could use a picture
7		take a picture of whoever is there at the
8		machine feeding in the bills?
9	A	(AV) Yeah. So they can it's really up to
10		them what sort of, you know, KYC they want to
11		implement. They can take a picture, ask for
12		photo identification. They can ask for SMS
13		verification, which is a cellphone number. But
14		in this day and age anybody can download an app
15		to change the number of their cellphone
16		temporarily or use a burner phone.
17	Q	Yeah.
18	A	(AV) There's also the ability to put a
19		fingerprint to capture a fingerprint in order
20		to be able to utilize those machines. But here
21		in Canada where our right to privacy is
22		inherent, you know, it's not something I think
23		most people would feel very comfortable in
24		doing.

Now, most of these machines will capture an

1		image of the user as they approach the machine
2		to utilize it, but, you know, there's no
3		mechanism in place to ensure that that's been
4		captured until they reach the threshold over the
5		\$1,000 mark. So it's very easy for anybody to
6		just do a quick camera dodge or put their thumb
7		over the camera to make sure
8	Q	Or wear a mask these days.
9	A	(AV) Yes. Yeah. Well, exactly; right? Next
10		slide.
11	Q	Why don't we maybe we can go quickly through
12		the next few. I think they describe
13	A	(AV) Sure.
14	Q	Number 17 there we see and I'll let you do
15		that. Thank you.
16	A	(AV) Yeah. So I'll run through quick. We do
17		have a site available to us on coinATMradar.com
18		where anybody who wants to publish their machine
19		in order to gain customers can post it on this
20		website, so it's available to the entire world.
21		We pulled this stat up here from Alberta. So
22		you can see there a map that shows there are
23		101 ATMs currently in the Vancouver area.
24		Next slide, please. And then what you can

do is go in there and put in your postal code

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1	and it will pull up a list of all of the ATMs
2	within the area and starting from that within
3	the closest vicinity to you and just getting
4	further and further and further away.
5	So I put in the address for the Cullen
6	Commission, and this is the first machine within
7	the vicinity. And so as we can see on this
8	page on the left-hand corner, the operator is
9	Bitcoiniacs and there's some contact information
10	there for Bitcoiniacs. Down below you'll see
11	the location, which is Waves Coffee House at 900
12	Howe Street, as well as the operating hours of
13	the actual coffee shop.
14	On the right-hand side you'll see the
15	bitcoin machine details. This particular
16	machine will allow an individual to both
17	purchase and sell bitcoin as well as litecoin,
18	and then it will have the fee there that the
19	operator charges.
20	And then in the red highlighted box you'll
21	see "limits and verification." So this
22	particular operator, Bitcoiniacs, is very, very
23	compliant and is doing their role to try to
24	prevent money laundering, which is you know,

here they're requesting SMS verification for any

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1	purchase between \$20 and \$200. And anything
2	over \$201 they actually are requesting ID scan
3	verification. So this is quite rare when it
4	comes to bitcoin ATMs. The majority of them
5	will not be asking for any kind of verification
6	under \$1,000.
7	And then in the bottom, just a nice to
8	know. This is actually the world's first
9	bitcoin machine ever in Vancouver at this
10	location, which is quite interesting. And as
11	you can see, when it was opened there in 2013
12	the value of bitcoin was at \$211 per bitcoin,
13	and just a day or two or so ago it was at
14	23,000. I imagine it's increased more since
15	then.
16	Next slide, please.
17	(AG) This is simply a slide indicating that
18	police are aware of the use of these bitcoin ATM
19	machines in British Columbia and surrounding
20	areas. Next slide, please.
21	(AV) Okay. Another mode of exchange are
22	these prepaid bitcoin debit cards. So there are
23	several merchants out there now that are
24	accepting bitcoin as a form of payment or other

cryptocurrencies, but they're still very few and

Exam by Mr. Martland

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1	far between. And the reason really is based on
2	the volatility of specifically bitcoin in which
3	a merchant can't be sure of the purchasing
4	power. So if they accept \$20 for a cup of
5	coffee, then perhaps the next day that \$20 will
6	only be a value of \$10. So it really doesn't
7	make sense for them necessarily to accept it at
8	this point.

So these prepaid bitcoin debit cards offer an alternative for that. So somebody -- anybody can order one these cards and transfer cryptocurrency over to a third-party operator who will then fund these cards with currency that the person can now spend where -- anywhere that accepts Visa or Mastercard. So they're fairly easy to get. You can just go online and you can order one of these plastic or virtual cards. They're extremely vulnerable to money laundering because when we are purchasing online we can use fake ID, we can use straw buyers who can get a whole bunch of these cards and then transfer the PIN number and even just the virtual card number over to the bad actor. ask for very little KYC, if you go onto a lot of these sites. They ask for your first name,

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1 phone number and an email. If you want an actual plastic version of the card instead of a 2 virtual one, they'll ask for a PO box. 3 And then of course there's the idea of the 4 5 gift cards. So gift cards, they want an email and a name, PO box if you want a plastic card. 6 They are -- because gift cards are considered 7 closed loop, they won't actually fall under the 8 9 KYC regulations and neither the prepaid cards nor the gift cards are considered monetary 10 11 instruments, which means, you know, anybody can, 12 like, cross any border with any amount of these 13 cards and not be responsible to account for those. Next slide, please. 14 Now, a couple more unofficial modes are 15 over-the-counter brokers. So when the -- when 16 17 an -- or a transaction goes through an exchange, 18 an exchange is technically required to keep, 19 like, a public order book where they mark all 20 the transactions that go through their exchange. 21 So if there is a very large amount of

cryptocurrency being purchased or sold, it has

the cryptocurrency community would get kind of

bent out of shape, what is happening; what does

the potential to rock the market. And people --

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2	sell, sell, or whatnot. So these
3	over-the-counter brokers provide an opportunity
4	for whales to exchange very large amounts of
5	cryptocurrency outside of an open exchange. So
6	they're normally run by an exchange but not
7	under the same type of scrutiny. And personally
8	I'm not going to speak much to them because I'm
9	not an expert in this area, but I know that they
10	are quoted by Chainalysis as being very
11	susceptible to money laundering because they
12	have don't have the same oversight.
13	And then there's private offchain
14	transactions. Now, I've said before the
15	exchange what happens when a transaction goes
16	through an exchange is offline; it's not
17	captured on the blockchain. Well, the same can
18	be can ring true with these private off-chair
19	transactions. Now, how this can occur is if I
20	were to conduct a transaction with one
21	individual and I were to send my friends from my
22	bitcoin address to their bitcoin address, it
23	would be captured onto the blockchain. However,
24	as we know, the individual that has access to
25	that private key can access the cryptocurrency.

this individual know that we don't know; sell,

Exam by Mr. Martland

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1	So if I were to just provide the private key to
2	another individual, I've essentially transferred
3	the funds over to that person without it being
4	captured at all on the blockchain. The same is
5	true if I had a paper wallet and I wanted to
6	capture an image of it and giving it to them.
7	So basically I'm giving them access and control
8	of the cryptocurrency without actually
9	documenting it on the blockchain.

Now, there's something else called the lightning network, which will -- is basically like running a tab. It's -- in order to help deal with some of the scaleability that happens with bitcoin on the blockchain, and that is the length of time that it takes to process transactions. So the lightning network will enable somebody to transact with another entity, but then all of the individual transactions that occur between them will not be captured until the account is settled. So as I said, running a tab, say, with a bar over a period of a couple weeks and you may attend to this particular location 5, 10, 15 times and have very -- like, transactions occur, but only once that tab is

settled will it appear on the blockchain as one

1	single transaction for the total amount that
2	what has occurred.
3	So it helps deal with the scaleability but
4	from a law enforcement perspective it is quite
5	difficult because we're unable to see what has
6	occurred throughout those various transactions
7	or even to know if there's been more than one.
8	Next slide, please.
9	MR. MARTLAND: I wonder, Mr. Commissioner, if I might
10	suggest this may be a useful time to suggest
11	a break, maybe for 10 minutes.
12	THE COMMISSIONER: Very well. We'll take 10 minutes,
13	Mr. Martland. Thank you.
14	MR. MARTLAND: Thank you.
15	THE REGISTRAR: This hearing is adjourned for a
16	10-minute recess until 11:26 a.m. Please mute
17	your mic and turn off your video. Thank you.
18	(WITNESSES STOOD DOWN)
19	(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 11:17 A.M.)
20	(PROCEEDINGS RECONVENED AT 11:26 A.M.)
21	AARON GILKES, a witness
22	for the commission,
23	recalled.
24	ADRIENNE VICKERY, a
25	witness for the

1	commission, recalled.
2	WARREN KRAHENBIL, a
3	witness for the
4	commission, recalled.
5	THE REGISTRAR: Thank you for waiting. The hearing
6	is now resumed. Mr. Commissioner.
7	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
8	MR. MARTLAND: Thank you.
9	EXAMINATION BY MR. MARTLAND (continuing):
10	Q Panel members, we were, I think, at slide 23 and
11	now on to 24. And I wonder just before we move
12	into 24, though, if I could pick up on a few
13	questions that have to do with the point about
14	the regulation of the ATMs, and if you're able
15	to comment with respect to the FINTRAC reporting
16	regime, which includes registration and
17	reporting particular kinds of transactions,
18	suspicious transactions, certain compliance
19	measures and so forth, and where things stand
20	with in particular some of these different modes
21	of exchange that you've been describing.
22	A (AV) So I believe all the money service
23	businesses in Canada that will be dealing with
24	virtual currencies will need to or will have

had to have registered with FINTRAC as of

1		June 1st, 2020. So this year. They will also
2		all have to report on any suspicious
3		transactions. And they have to improve their
4		ability to be prepared to report on large cash
5		transactions as I believe also foreign money
6		service businesses fall into this category,
7		providing they provide services to Canadians.
8		So they don't necessarily have to be located in
9		Canada, but if they offer services to Canadians
10		citizens, then they will.
11	Q	And so that's a change from a requirement that
12		used to be that if the MSB had, let's say,
13		incorporated in Canada, office in Canada, agents
14		in Canada, they were under that regime, but
15		that's been changed to actually cover off
16		situations where the MSB isn't incorporated
17		here, may not have an office here or agents here
18		and yet if it's conducting business here, it
19		falls under that regime; is that your
20		understanding?
21	A	(AV) I'm not sure how foreign money service
22		businesses were dealt with prior to this
23		legislation.
24	Q	All right. Why don't I let you carry on, then,

with slide 24.

1	A	(AV) Okay. So bitcoin is number 1. We keep
2		talking about all these different
3		cryptocurrencies. In fact there's over 7,700 of
4		them that exist. But over 62 percent of all
5		transactions with cryptocurrency is dealt with
6		bitcoin. So it is by far number 1, but it does
7		have its flaws.
8		First and foremost is the lack of privacy.
9		As we've already talked about, the type of
10		information that's available and transparent on
11		the blockchain poses a problem, yes, to the
12		criminal element, but it also poses a problem to
13		the regular public. Just like I wouldn't want
14		to put my bank account information up here on
15		the screen for everybody to see the amount that
16		currently is in or not in my bank account, I
17		don't necessarily want everybody to be able to
18		see my transactions within my address on the
19		blockchain either.
20		There's also potential for high transaction
21		fees. During times of high demand you must pay
22		a high transaction fee in order to entice the
23		miners as we talked about before. Now, this can
24		vary. At times it's worth about 40 cents per
0.5		

transaction fee up until -- just the other day

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1	we're now at \$11 per transaction fee. Back on
2	December 17th of 2017 where bitcoin was at its
3	highest, there was actually times where the
4	average transaction fee was about \$55 US, which
5	is it's not conceivable to think that people
6	would be paying that kind of transaction fees
7	for simple purchases.
8	And then obviously the high volatility.
9	You can't be sure of the purchasing power of it,
10	so, you know, it's hard to use for regular
11	transactions. The long wait times. And Acting
12	Sergeant Gilkes already talked about this, how,
13	you know, bitcoin can only transact about seven
14	transactions per second compared to Visa, which
15	can do 24,000 per second.
16	It's also not backed by a central
17	authority, which means if your account's been
18	compromised, there's actually nobody that you're
19	able there's no legal discourse available for
20	you to be able to fall back on and get
21	reimbursed for transactions that have been lost
22	or stolen.
23	And transactions are irreversible. So as
24	you saw, that public address that exists, which

is what we provide individuals in order to be

1		able to send us funds, is a really long
2		alphanumeric code. And if you inadvertently put
3		in the wrong upper case where it's supposed to
4		be a lower case or you just put in the wrong
5		address, then you've essentially sent those
6		funds off to cyberspace or to somebody else's
7		address and there's no mechanism in place to be
8		able to recover that.
9		Next slide, please.
10	Q	You speak here about other the alt coins,
11		stable coins, privacy coins, et cetera?
12	A	(AV) Yeah. So this is kind of the
13		cryptocurrency community's response to some of
14		these deficiencies that exist within bitcoin.
15		The stable coins deal with the issue of
16		volatility in that they're backed by some sort
17		of fiat currency or stable commodity as we had
18		talked about at the beginning. And this
19		commodity will usually hold as act as
20		collateral, and so the entity who's managing it
21		will keep the equivalent of the amount that
22		they've lent out in actual assets. So it will
23		always be a balance and that's where the change
24		doesn't the change in volatility isn't really
25		seen. Tether is one of the coins currently that

is a stable coin and one of the top

cryptocurrencies out there.

Privacy coins. So these help of

Privacy coins. So these help deal with some of the privacy issues that we see with bitcoin. Yes, you know, with bitcoin we can't see who the holder of that account is, but we can see what addresses it was sent by, to whom it was received, where some of these privacy coins will circumvent that and offer embedded encryptions within the transactions. So that information is not actually capable of being captured, not even with these aftermarket software tools that will usually provide attribution for some of the other coins out there.

And then there's alternative coins. So alternative coins truly refers to any other coin other than bitcoin. But there's many options out there that will provide their platform, such as the Ethereum blockchain, to be able to support smart contracts. So, for instance, we've talked about the blockchain and the transparency that exists there and the ability to kind of follow the flow of funds, and you can do that with all sorts of information.

Exam by Mr. Martland

1	So Walmart has adopted the IBM food trust
2	blockchain in which they're able to be able to
3	follow the flow of all their crops or their
4	produce, sorry, from crops through distribution
5	centre to store shelf, and they mandate any
6	supplier dealing with produce in their
7	businesses to be able to put this information or
8	the blockchain. So now if they have, say, a
9	head of lettuce that's linked to listeria, they
10	can look at the blockchain and see exactly which
11	distribution centres that head of lettuce flowed
12	through and which crop it originated from as
13	well as every other store shelf in Walmart
14	businesses that may have some of these crops
15	that originated or produce that originated
16	from the same crops, and they can remove that
17	from their store shelf.
18	So what used to take them seven days to be
19	able to trace this information, they can now do
20	so in a matter of two minutes and it's been
21	saving lives. It's worked so well for them that
22	they're actually moving this, you know,
23	blockchain ability over to their pharmaceuticals
24	as well.

Next slide, please.

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1	Q	And this is a New York Times headline dealing
2		with the Facebook proposed cryptocurrency called
3		Libra?
4	A	(AG) That is correct. So Libra was originally a
5		proposal for a blockchain cryptocurrency that
6		was backed by several partnership well,
7		partner companies. And of those partner
8		companies originally it was Visa and
9		Mastercard. And it was basically to have a
10		backed, I suppose in this case, centralized
11		cryptocurrency, but it was met with quite a bit
12		of resistance. The reason being is that
13		Facebook would have overnight become the world's
14		largest bank. If they if we took into
15		account that they have approximately 2 billion
16		users all over the planet. And everybody
17		subscribe to something like Libra, that would be
18		an incredible an incredibly sized bank much
19		larger than anyone in the world, and it would
20		have, well, enormous repercussions in terms of
21		the stability of currencies of many countries
22		where people might be switching over to using
23		this type of cryptocurrency, which is backed and
24		supported by these very large groups.

Now, the original proposal did not go

1	ahead. Now, it doesn't mean that it's that
2	the project itself is dead. It is going to be
3	moving forward or it appears that it's going to
4	be moving forward but only once approval from
5	the US government has been provided. And it
6	will be becoming back as basically a backed
7	or I will say a financially, well, backed system
8	in that it will be backed by whatever currency
9	of the market it's actually working in. So it's
10	actually not should not compromise the
11	stability of many smaller currencies which
12	happen to be out there.
13	Now, it is based out of Switzerland, so
14	that does bring some questions in terms of
15	reporting, taxation, things like that, under
16	what categories would they fall and how
17	difficult would it be to obtain information
18	as I mentioned before, for Canadian law
19	enforcement to obtain information on
20	transactions that would occur in Canada,
21	conducted by Canadians. But you would have to
22	reach overseas in order to obtain significant
23	information in relation to that.
24	Next slide, please.

This one's important to us. "Benefits and

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1		Drawbacks of Cryptocurrency For Criminals &
2		Money Launderers."
3	А	(AV) So in this global economy cryptocurrency
4		really does offer just a very quick, efficient,
5		secure and affordable manner to be able to move
6		value anywhere in the world in a matter
7		of seconds. Providing somebody has access to
8		the internet or to one of these 12,000-plus
9		cryptocurrency ATM machines that exist in over
10		74 countries, they can gain access to
11		cryptocurrency. There's very minimal fees. I
12		mean, yes, currently we're looking at about \$11
13		average per fee, but that's or per
14		transaction, but that's actually quite less.
15		And it's accessible to people. So it doesn't
16		matter if you're in an area that's traditionally
17		unbanked, as I said, you can now be able to gain
18		access to this crypto.
19		There's no limit on the amount of
20		transactions that go through. As I had said
21		before, you're not paying the fees on based on
22		the amount of the transaction but how many
23		parties are a part of that particular
24		transaction. An added benefit is that
25		conversion is not an issue. A bitcoin is a

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bitcoin is a bitcoin anywhere in the world, and it can be compared to -- usually the US dollar 2 3 or the currency of that country. Global movement of value. So when dealing 4 5 with bulk cash, there's always the issue of 6 security, speed and cost. When moving large amounts of bulk cash, a target is a susceptible 7 to interdiction by police, having other -- like 8 9 the couriers or other criminals stealing those 10 funds. The speed of time that it takes to move bulk cash from, say, just even one point of this 11 12 country, from Vancouver through to Saint John's, 13 Newfoundland, can take a significant amount of 14 time let alone trying to move it across international borders. 15 And then the fee that's associated with 16 17 that because you're paying for couriers to move 18 your money, you're perhaps paying for officials 19 at the borders to be able to turn a blind eye. 20 There's significant cost involved in this, and 21 cryptocurrency avoids all of that. As I said, 22 almost instantaneously you can move money across 23 international borders, any amount, at most for

\$11 per transaction currently.

It's pseudo anonymous, which is an

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1 advantage. It may be not as anonymous as what we see with cash, but the ability to be able to 2 3 move that value so quickly circumvents that and the information isn't available instantly to law 4 enforcement who the holder of that account is. 5 As well as with, you know, using fraudulent ID 6 and some of the aftermarket money laundering 7 tools that we'll talk about soon helps this. 8 9 There's also a strong lack of understanding 10 by law enforcement worldwide on what 11 cryptocurrencies are, how to investigate them, 12 the legal authorities to go after the seizure of 13 them and forfeiture of them as well as a lack of global regulation. So we're very lucky here in 14 15 Canada that regulations are now in play, but in 16 this global economy there's nothing that 17 restricts a Canadian citizens from only 18 utilizing money service businesses within our jurisdiction. So if you're a criminal and you 19 20 want to avoid these reportings by the compliance 21 entities, then you can easily just go online and 22 find yourself an exchange that doesn't have any 23 reporting requirements. Now, some of the disadvantages are the 2.4

volatility of value. You know, we talked about

1	that purchasing power and not being clear on
2	what that will be. So holding on to those funds
3	can certainly be a disadvantage if the value
4	were to drop exponentially.
5	And then traceability. I think, you know,
6	there's most of these criminal entities will
7	read the newspapers, read media and they'll
8	see they're aware that law enforcement can
9	actually purchase some of these aftermarket
10	tools to be able to trace the flow of funds.
11	And then just like there is a lack of
12	understanding by law enforcement, there's also a
13	lack of understanding by the criminal element on
14	what these cryptocurrencies are, how to use
15	them, which I think prevents a lot of them from
16	wanting to venture over and utilizing this,
17	specifically maybe some of the older portion of
18	the population.
19	Next slide, please. Are you going to go?
20	(AG) Oh, sure. Okay. So now we'll speak
21	in the next few slides about cryptocurrency and
22	criminality. So this is basically these are
23	the topics that we're going to be covering, so
24	basically various types of fraud, extortion,
25	Ponzi schemes, so forth and so on. Ransomware,

1	malware attacks, drug sales, human trafficking,
2	terrorist financing and finally, while we're
3	here, money laundering.
4	Next slide, please. So in order to
5	explain, you know, cryptocurrencies and
6	criminality, it's important to start at the
7	beginning or as what I would consider the
8	beginning of laundering funds via virtual
9	assets. Now, what you're seeing on the screen
10	is basically a screenshot of a webpage from I
11	believe this is from 2002 or 2003. So as you
12	can see from on the top right-hand of your
13	screen that this is a site that was run by a
14	team or a group of individuals, possibly a gang,
15	called the Shadowcrew. Now, the Shadowcrew,
16	what they were doing was laundering funds from
17	stolen credit cards, identity theft, selling
18	counterfeit identities, so forth and so on.
19	Different types of frauds. And they were
20	laundering these funds through a virtual asset
21	or a virtual currency at the time called E-gold.
22	Now, E-gold had been around since about 1996,
23	and this particular bust of the Shadowcrew was
24	2003, 2004. And there well, there was
25	approximately 20 people who went to prison as

1	part of the Shadowcrew bust.
2	Now, E-gold itself was invited in 2007 and
3	there were many bank accounts that were seized
4	and assets were seized. And E-gold, it's
5	important to mention, is that they were located
6	in the United States at the time. So we'll kind
7	of call that strike one for the virtual assets
8	and money laundering. Next slide, please.
9	Then we can move on to a currency called
10	Liberty Reserve, which is almost like a version
11	2.0 of E-gold. So, now, we had seen with E-gold
12	that there was well, I guess, a seizure and
13	arrest and that there were seizures for and
14	arrests for virtual currency or sorry,
15	operating as a money transmitting business and
16	also money laundering.
17	Now, the in order to prove money
18	laundering you need to prove that the people who
19	moved the funds actually have some sort of
20	knowledge of the funds of the origins of the
21	funds that they're actually moving. Now,
22	Liberty Reserve came in and actually tried to
23	modify their plan in order to evade police in
24	that they were not dealing directly with cash
25	money or fiat money. Liberty Reserve was

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1	virtual currency that was established in Costa
2	Rica in 2006, and they were reported to be
3	backed by gold.
4	Now, you could log into the Liberty Reserve
5	site and you could create your own account, but
6	you could not deposit fiat money directly into a
7	Liberty Reserve account. What you could do,
8	however, is send money to a broker who would
9	then a third-party broker who would then
10	deposit Liberty Reserve into your Liberty
11	Reserve account, meaning that Liberty Reserve
12	would not actually be handling physical fiat
13	money or you would not be sending money directly
14	to them. There were also located offshore.
15	So they were part of well, I should
16	mention before that that in 2012, 2013, there
17	was a modification to the Bank Secrecy Act in
18	the United States which meant that virtual
19	well, companies dealing in virtual currencies
20	were now recognized as money service businesses
21	and obliged to obey the laws on reporting and
22	operating as a money service business.
23	Now, in 2013/14 Liberty Reserve was
24	indicted, a \$6 billion indictment with

several million dollars seized. And the

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operator of Liberty Reserve had admitted to
laundering between 200 and \$500 million through
the course of their operations.

Now, what we can see is a variation on a

Now, what we can see is a variation on a theme; right? So, I mean, rather than starting another virtual assets company within the United States, they started it overseas. Rather than dealing with actual fiat money and potentially being accused of money laundering, they were dealing simply with virtual currency, which didn't mean anything or had no actual intrinsic value to anyone. And by dealing with a broker, a middleman, then they could simply say that they had no involvement or had no way of knowing who was actually behind the funds that were actually being transacted.

So fast forward, 2013/14. We now look at a considerable rise in the value of bitcoin which had been around since 2009; right? And so bitcoin by itself automatically responded to the issues of the first two major virtual assets or virtual currencies which were used to launder funds. So immediately now you're looking at a decentralized network, meaning that police cannot simply go to one -- a one-stop shop and

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1	seize all of the accounts belonging to all of
2	the clients. It provided anonymity at the time,
3	especially. There were no tools and there was
4	no additional means to aid police with tracking
5	down who was actually responsible for a
6	particular transaction.
7	So well, that anonymity in addition to
8	the redundancy of the network as well as not
9	requiring a licence, not requiring a money
10	service business licence in order to deal with
11	bitcoins, really made them popular suddenly
12	overnight with those people who had lost
13	considerable amounts of money with Liberty
14	Reserve and E-gold.
15	Next slide, please. Okay. So as far as
16	bitcoin scams go, I mean, we had discussed these
17	previously, but this is to give you an idea of
18	how much money can actually be siphoned through
19	this particular type of scam, CRA-type scams,
20	where we are talking about, you know, a total of
21	\$340,000 in the York Region. So we are talking
22	about prevalence. Next slide, please.
23	Ransomware. So this is hopefully a screen
24	that you've never actually seen yourself. But

ransomware is a type of malware that once it

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1 affects the system of the victim, it encrypts their entire -- or all of the data or targeted 2 3 data on their computer. In order to regain 4 access to their data, their only personal information, they have to pay a certain ransom, 5 6 typically paid via bitcoin. And as we saw before, it's relatively easy to identify a 7 bitcoin ATM, a location. And so when somebody 8 9 calls -- a lot of these -- I should say a lot of 10 these ransomware pages come with a 1-800 number 11 and you would call and actually speak to a 12 receptionist or someone who will answer your 13 call and actually walk you through the process 14 of getting back your data and they will search 15 for bitcoin ATM with you and tell up to go to the nearest bitcoin ATM, how to buy it and how 16 17 to actually transfer to decrypt your files. 18 Next slide, please. 19 20 types of phishing scams. I'm sure that we have

Next slide, please.

Phishing. We've seen many types of -- many types of phishing scams. I'm sure that we have all had those in our email boxes where people purport to have obtained our password of some type, some type of extortion, sextortion scams, CRA scams, basically enticing people -- or convincing someone that they've actually been a

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some type of crime, and then having to pay legal 2 3 fees through bitcoin or through some of other 4 mode. Next slide, please. Now, we are getting into more of the 5 cybercrime types of attacks. So this would be a 6 DDoS attack, or distributed denial of service 7 attack, and essentially that's a process of 8 9 flooding a network with traffic so that whatever 10 site is hosted on that network cannot actually 11 operate any longer. So it may not seem like 12 that big a deal, but if you're thinking of, you 13 know, a network that -- for example, an online gambling site which supplies services to however 14 many thousands of clients and transacts how many 15 16 thousands of times per hour and you down that 17 network for half an hour or more, then you're 18 talking about considerable losses for that 19 company. And these types of attacks can be paid 20 via bitcoin and remain completely anonymous 21 going forward. That's basically another variation on a 22 0 23 shakedown where the provider company would have 24 you as being taken offline and told, pay up 25 until -- unless you want to be kept offline?

victim of -- or that they are responsible for

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1 Α (AG) Yes. So that can be a ransom attack. Ιt 2 can be trying to convince them to actually take some sort of action in the interest of whoever 3 4 the person who is attacking. So it could be any number of reasons. I've seen it for video 5 6 Somebody wants to really win a video game and simply takes the network offline. 7 Everybody has their motives. Next slide, 8 9 please.

Infrastructure. So I can speak as an investigator that it's already difficult enough to track down cybercriminals. Now, there was the -- there was legislation that was introduced in Europe which actually limits the amount of information that is required to be put online in relation to domains that are being hosted. in addition to that not being able to find out who's behind a particular website that could be mirroring a legitimate site or some sort of site that's hosting malware or something like that, people can host sites or pay for the hosting of sites via bitcoin or via another cryptocurrency and actually avoid providing any type of personal information whatsoever. And many of these sites are hosted offshore, though some are

1		hosted in Canada, and once again you run into
2		the problem of obtaining that information via
3		mutual legal assistance treaties and so forth
4		and so on. Next slide, please.
5	Q	And, Acting Sergeant Gilkes, you're now at quite
6		a good trot I appreciate because I think I've
7		got, on my math for participants' questions and
8		such, about a half hour. And your colleague
9		Sergeant Krahenbil has been mercifully relieved
10		of questions, but I actually will have a few for
11		him too as we get towards the end of the slides.
12		So I appreciate you covering this ground as you
13		are. Carry on.
1.4	А	(AG) Okay. Thank you. This is basically a
14		
15		basic structure of a money-muling network. So
		basic structure of a money-muling network. So if we were to take into account the
15		
15 16		if we were to take into account the
15 16 17		if we were to take into account the cybercriminal who's on the right there, if he
15 16 17 18		if we were to take into account the cybercriminal who's on the right there, if he were to breach an account via stolen credentials
15 16 17 18 19		if we were to take into account the cybercriminal who's on the right there, if he were to breach an account via stolen credentials or something like that at a particular bank, the
15 16 17 18 19 20		if we were to take into account the cybercriminal who's on the right there, if he were to breach an account via stolen credentials or something like that at a particular bank, the best way of getting the money out of that bank
15 16 17 18 19 20 21		if we were to take into account the cybercriminal who's on the right there, if he were to breach an account via stolen credentials or something like that at a particular bank, the best way of getting the money out of that bank would not actually be to transfer the funds
15 16 17 18 19 20 21		if we were to take into account the cybercriminal who's on the right there, if he were to breach an account via stolen credentials or something like that at a particular bank, the best way of getting the money out of that bank would not actually be to transfer the funds directly but to transfer the clients within the

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bank. 2 3 Now, these money mules in this case are 4 required -- sorry, are recruited in various ways. So now we've seen those work from home 5 6 emails where they say that -- where people will claim that you can get paid for processing 7 transactions, so you will be receiving a certain 8 9 amount of money a certain number times per day 10 or per week or what may be, and your job is to 11 actually withdraw those funds from your account, 12 buy bitcoin with it and then transfer it back to 13 whoever actually conducted the data breach or whoever actually was the cybercriminal to gain 14 access to the breached account in the first 15 place. So it's more of a variation on a theme. 16 17 Next slide, please. Okay. So we'll go 18 over this briefly. So typically when we mention 19 the dark web or we mention cryptocurrency, we 20 mention them synonymously; right? And to give 21 you an idea of what it is, the surface web is 22 where most of us deal or where most of us 23 interact with the internet, so Wikipedia, Google, et cetera. But most of the internet is 24 25 actually contained in the deep web. And so

multiple clients of -- within that particular

those are -- that's information that we really don't want to have indexed, we don't really want to have people to simply be able to Google our medical records and, you know, access them directly. We -- these are accessible typically via portals or computers that are accessible to the internet and require some sort of access code, email, password, so forth and so on. And then at the very bottom we have the dark web. Now, the dark web, we do hear about

And then at the very bottom we have the dark web. Now, the dark web, we do hear about it often, but it's actually a very, very small portion of the internet and it's basically kind of an alternate internet which is hosted on voluntary computers, and it's -- it is encrypted. It's very difficult to trace traffic coming to, from or through that internet.

Next slide, please. So now if we take a look at the sites that are hosted on the dark web we can say that between 50 and 70 percent of them are actually illegal, and we're thinking of the types of things that you can do on the dark web, so that's buy drugs, child exploitation material, so forth and so on. But as it was initially designed for encrypted communication and to permit people to communicate with each

other and at the same time avoid detection and avoid eavesdropping, there are still a number of legal sites which are on there and people do use. For example, reporters trying to spread or trying to transmit a message without it actually being intercepted and taken down.

Next slide, please. We often hear about dark markets on the darknet and the original dark market would be Silk Road. Now, Silk Road was -- I would call it similar to eBay but selling very -- or selling illicit products on the site. So you would be able to buy drugs, guns, child exploitation material, things like that completely anonymously. Now, what's so novel is not necessarily that it's basically like an illicit eBay, it's actually the payment structure. So next slide, please.

So, now, the payment system is what's novel about Silk Road because what we were looking at were buyers purchasing their bitcoin, so typically at that time since we're talking about 2012, 2013, they were doing it via an exchanger or some type of broker who was providing this service and getting -- buying the bitcoins for them.

Now, the buyer themselves would visit the	
so-called website and see something that they	
would like to purchase, some type of illicit	
substance that they might intend to purchase,	
and they would send the transaction send	
those bitcoins to Silk Road. Now, Silk Road	
would hold the bitcoins in escrow and wait unti	1
the actual product was delivered to the	
purchaser. So once the once that purchaser	
has actually received what he had ordered he	
confirms the order to Silk Road who then	
releases the funds minus a commission to the	
vendor, and we finish the cycle.	

And the reason this is important is because if you are a person who is looking to commit a crime, likely you are going to be interacting with a criminal and so the level of trust has dropped to virtually zero. So enable -- so allowing people to have a full trust network, it was novel.

Yeah, it regularizes their dealings in the sense of providing some -- almost like a third-party assurance that the money won't be handed over without you getting what you've ordered from that illicit menu.

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1	А	(AG) Precisely. Okay. So we fast forward to
2		2017. And this is where I'd like to make it
3		clear that Canada is a player in these types of
4		scenarios. So AlphaBay was a kind of Silk Road
5		on steroids. I hate to use the term, but it
6		was, and it was a very large marketplace run on
7		the dark web, which was run by a Canadian. So
8		he was an administrator, Alexandre Cazes, and he
9		was arrested back in 2017 in Thailand. And as a
10		result of this seizure or of this arrest
11		there was seizure of from him from about
12		1,600 bitcoin, which I know I had the
13		approximate value of about 16,000 sorry,
14		\$16 million, but currently today's value is
15		\$38 million, so that would have to be corrected.
16		There was also various properties, high priced
17		vehicles which were also seized at that time.
18		So we can see that there are serious
19		Canadian players who are laundering funds and
20		providing services on the dark web. Next slide,
21		please.
22	Q	This slide gives us a sense of what was on offer
23		at the AlphaBay Market.
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(AG) Precisely. So next slide, please.

Okay. So in preparation for the commission

what I did was I actually went to visit the dark web and prepared to make purchases as though I had never been there before. So basically I went on the clear web and I downloaded a dark web guide, and the dark web guide basically provided me with every -- with instruction on everything I would need to be able to purchase any number of illicit goods on the dark web.

Now, what I did was after downloading the guide it instructed me to install a virtual private network, install particular software required to navigate the dark web, create an encrypted email account in order to be able to deal with the individuals. And also I had to procure bitcoins, or in this case any type of --well, particular cryptocurrency.

So what I did was I registered -- well, I created an account at a popular online exchanger, bitcoin exchanger, with very minimal KYC. And the reason I was able to do that with minimal KYC is because I had no intention of depositing fiat. Now, if you intend to deposit fiat, you tend to have greater requirements in terms of reporting on your identity and so forth and so on. But in this case I had no intention

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of depositing fiat. What I did was I went to an ATM machine and I deposited funds directly to that online exchanger. Once I deposited to the online exchanger I converted from bitcoin to Monero, which is a privacy coin which does not have a public blockchain. I navigated to the —through the dark web using, I guess, a listing that was very similar to a Wikipedia-type listing for the dark web, and I visited multiple sites and prepared to make multiple types of purchases.

So of the things that I was able to purchase but I did not would be, for example, various types of malware, various money-laundering instruments, prepaid gift cards, so forth and so on, as well as many different types of drugs.

I have to mention that in doing so the -there was more difficulty in procuring something
like fentanyl, and based on the chats and the
forums on these particular sites it was because
of the -- well, the sites that do sell fentanyl
garner quite a bit more police attention than do
sites that don't. Also they tend to try to stay
away from risks which may actually kill an

1		individual, and there's a high kill rate of
2		fentanyl. They well, at least those were the
3		reasons given on the sites themselves.
4	Q	I wonder if I can interrupt you, Sergeant
5		Gilkes, to ask you this, though. I appreciate
6		what you're saying that the your recent
7		attempt to sort of test and have a look at how
8		quickly and how easily this played out when you
9		look at the question of fentanyl or fentanyl
10		precursors that presently seems to have been
11		more clamped down and so forth, but could you
12		tell us a bit more about the use of whether
13		it's the use of virtual currencies and/or the
14		dark web in relation to fentanyl precursors in
15		particular and that market.
16	А	(AG) Well, I think actually Sergeant Krahenbil
17		might actually be more placed for fentanyl
18		precursors and fentanyl itself.
19	Q	Maybe we can do a little diversion to ask him
20		that very question, if he if I can do that.
21		I think it's timely.
22	А	(WK) Sure. We as a group we haven't delved
23		into fentanyl precursors ourselves online. But
24		as far as fentanyl being difficult to find, it
25		hasn't really been because everything that we've

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1		processed has always been fentanyl or sorry,
2		the items that we've ordered have been fentanyl.
3		So precursors I can't speak to, but fentanyl is
4		alive and well online.
5	Q	And tell us a bit more about how this connects
6		with the use of virtual currency as opposed to
7		cash like, fiat currency transactions.
8	А	(WK) When products are ordered online, generally
9		opioids like OxyContins and the heroins of the
10		world, when they arrive, they're generally
11		always fentanyl. So we use or sorry, when
12		you purchase with cryptocurrency and you get the
13		product, you're going to be anonymously
14		receiving fentanyl in the mail.
15		When it comes to larger amounts, I mean, we
16		have experience in the past where dark web
17		traffickers of pure fentanyl were ordering
18		specifically large amounts of fentanyl from
19		China, having it arrive in Canada, breaking it
20		down and selling it via the dark web with
21		cryptocurrency, taking that profit from those
22		transactions and doing the loop, converting it
23		into fiat via prepaid business cards like
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Sergeant Vickery described earlier.

All right. Why don't I return to Acting

1 Sergeant Gilkes with the slide that we had up, 2 please. 3 (AG) Yes. I would just mention that in terms of 4 making the purchases, many of the dark markets 5 themselves actually offered mixing services as 6 you made your purchase in order to try to maintain the anonymity of the person who was 7 actually doing the purchase themselves. So it 8 9 seemed -- it was really rather -- it was either 10 a mixing service that was being offered or they were offering the use of a privacy coin to make 11 12 the purchase of the illicit substance. 13 slide, please. 14 (AV) Okay. So we keep coming back to 15 bitcoin, and, again, that just, you know, is based on the fact that bitcoin is really the 16 17 most commonly used cryptocurrency we've seen in 18 our investigations. And despite its pseudo anonymity there are a lot of anonymizing 19 20 measures that somebody can employ to enhance the 21 privacy associated with it and that's through 22 the use of the VPNs, proxy servers, going onto 23 the darknet, creating fictitious moniker names

in order to be able to transact online.

There's also some other additional money

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1 laundering practises that they can employ to be able to help obfuscate that source of funds. 2 3 Next slide, please. 4 So here is just a graph with a list of some of these practises that we've identified over 5 6 the course of our investigations, and I'll go through each one of them over the next slide. 7 So if we can just move on to the next, please. 8 9 So first and foremost, unregulated exchanges. As I mentioned on a previous slide, 10 11 there's nothing preventing somebody from going 12 online and specifically seeking out an exchange 13 in another jurisdiction that doesn't need to 14 comply with any KYC reporting requirements or 15 any AML requirements. There's also the ability 16 for the peer-to-peer transactions, so back to 17 that initial slide where, you know, buddy's wearing a trench coat offering to sell 18 19 cryptocurrency within. This really does provide 20 a mechanism just to exchange cash for 21 cryptocurrency and have no trace for it.

be able to trace the source or origin of them.

As well as just providing private keys offline,

We can also, you know, pay with prepaid

cards or gift cards where there's no method to

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1 like I mentioned in a previous example.

And then there's the online gambling and gaming sites. So there's many of them that exist online where you can go in and you can buy in basically using cryptocurrency, play a couple of rounds and then be able to cash out at any point. Now, when you cash out you're provided with the reserves that you had put in or at least what's left of your pot, but you're not necessarily getting back the same cryptocurrency that you've put in there, which effectively enables you to clean your funds going through there. So it's certainly an effective method to be able to clean your money.

We'll move on to the next slide, and Acting Sergeant Gilkes can go through the process.

(AG) So I will mention that for online gambling you can deposit directly from an ATM to your online account with whatever gambling site there may be. Now, this is actually a scenario that I do use for my classes where you go to an ATM to deposit directly to a gambling site, conduct some transactions. Now, the benefit, I suppose, for criminals to possibly use this as an alternative would be that it's possible to

1 win money. So they may actually win money while laundering their funds, then the funds can be 2 transferred to another address entirely, another 3 4 account and there would be no connection really between that initial fiat deposit and the 5 6 bitcoin that ends up into a third party or a criminal's account. Next slide, please. 7 (AV) So on this slide you'll find again 8 9 listed ATMs and prepaid cards. I think that 10 we've gone through that to a good extent, so I 11 won't beat it to death, which leads us to the 12 last point, which is GoFundMe. This is a 13 crowdfunding initiative where somebody can create an account and solicit donations from 14 individuals. We see it oftentimes in order --15 16 if somebody's ill or -- you know, and needs to 17 go to Disneyland for the last time, or various 18 such initiatives. So this is a threat, as far as I'm concerned, when it comes to 19 20 cryptocurrency transactions. The reason being 2.1 is there's no limit on how many addresses that 22 somebody can hold and there's no limit on how 23 many wallets they can hold as well. So technically if I were -- if I were a bad actor 24 25 and I wanted to launder my funds, I could create

1 a GoFundMe page and start funneling transactions from my various addresses that I have as well as 2 3 maybe co-mingle them with some authentic transactions, donations from kind members of the 4 5 public. At the end of the day I'll have, you 6 know, a large reserve of cryptocurrency that's been donated to me, but I can justify the 7 reasoning behind that is there's lot of kind 8 individuals out there that have all donated to 9 10 my cause to help send me to Disneyland one last time before I pass away of cancer, for instance. 11 12 And there's -- because there's no ability 13 to identify who the holder of all these 14 addresses are, that unless it's actually being 15 investigated by law enforcement, it just -- it 16 provides a good opportunity. Any target can 17 say, you know what; I'd love to thank those kind 18 individuals that funded this initiative for me, but I can't because, you know, I'm not able to 19 20 see who the holder of those accounts are. 2.1 Meanwhile it's been myself depositing all that

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time.

These crowdfundings are certainly something that we're seeing being employed by terrorist financing groups. So if you want to the go move

1 to the next slide, please, I'll expand on that. So first -- before I get into how they're 2 using the crowdfunding, I just wanted to talk 3 4 really briefly about the SamSam ransomware scam. 5 And very much like that slide that Acting Sergeant Gilkes had showed us with the 6 ransomware and said if, you know, you need to 7 able to send funds to this particular address, 8 9 or just like the picture, the image in this slide which will show those foreign fighters 10 holding that banner with a particular bitcoin 11 12 address identified in, saying, if you want to 13 donate to the cause, please send it to this 14 address. Well, that's exactly what these SamSam ransomware scam individuals did. They were able 15 to extort \$6 million US from various hospitals, 16 17 universities and institutions. 18 And the reason that they were -- the US law enforcement was able to take them down was 19 20 because as they extorted cryptocurrency 21 donations from all these entities, they supplied 22 the same bitcoin address that they wanted them 23 sent to. They actually had two different bitcoin addresses. So using these aftermarket 24

software tools, law enforcement was able to

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1	trace this, provide attribution to it and
2	identify who their suspects were. It was a
3	great accomplishment. In fact those two bitcoin
4	addresses were the first ever to be added to the
5	OFAC list. But what this did was alert
6	basically the criminal element that law
7	enforcement, number one, can trace transactions;
8	number two, if you provide and use the same
9	bitcoin address each and every time, then you're
10	likely to get caught.
11	So very shortly after, al-Qassam Brigades

So very shortly after, al-Qassam Brigades began a crowdfunding campaign to solicit funds to support its campaign based on what I believe was a result of this SamSam ransomware scam. They wanted to collect donations using a different method, and they created a website. So every time somebody wanted to go and donate to this charity through bitcoin transactions, they would have to click on a link which would automatically generate a new bitcoin address that these transactions would go through. And they simultaneously created a video -- a YouTube video telling their supporters why they had done this as an effort to avoid law enforcement. And like a step-by-step 1, 2, 3 on how to do this.

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Al-Qaeda has recently had a campaign where they were using social media platforms to solicit charity donations. And within COVID this year an ISIS facilitator took advantage of the whole pandemic and was purporting to be selling PPE equipment online and so was collecting all sorts of money and purchases and donations for this, and was able to take this money to be able to fund and support ISIS.

So in August of this year law enforcement actually was very successful in taking down these three entities and seizing millions of dollars in cryptocurrency assets that were used for terrorist financing.

Next slide, please. Okay. So chain hopping isn't really something we've discussed, but each and every cryptocurrency has their own individual blockchain for the most part. Some of them will piggyback on other blockchains, but for the most part they do. So the flow of funds can be seen on that particular blockchain and these, you know, aftermarket software tools allow us to be able to trace it. But a good way to be able to break that flow is to change and convert from one cryptocurrency into another

Warren Krahenbil (for the commission) Exam by Mr. Martland

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because you're basically hopping from one
blockchain onto a second one or onto a third
one, if you want to keep the momentum going.

And in doing so it helps break that flow and
make it far more difficult for law enforcement
to be able to trace even using these aftermarket
tools.

Now, we've mentioned mixers quite a few times here, and this is just basically a third-party service that you can hire that will allow individuals to pool their funds together and they will combine them, mix them together basically in a blender. And at the end they will be able to return the funds to the sender, but the funds that you are receiving after it's gone through this mixing process is not necessarily the funds that you've put into in the first place, which will help, again, to break up that attribution.

Now, when we go back to the whole process and how exchanges are structured and the fact that they will take custodial ownership of those private keys and they will remove the majority of those funds offline into these cold wallets, what they're doing basically is pooling

everybody's funds together. Now, they don't all use the same method but the majority of them do and in essence are really acting as one of these mixers, not purposely, but it's how the system goes. So exchanges really a wonderful method to be able to mix the flow of funds.

Now, coinjoins are very similar. Whereas with a mixer you have to trust your funds with a third party, so provide them the private keys and they're mixing it all up and you really put a lot of trust in this individual, this -- like, essentially a criminal entity to be able launder your funds for you. So coinjoins have gained more in popularity because it's the peer-to-peer group that will combine their funds in order to be able to mix them up rather than depending on that third party to do so on their behalf. Next slide, please.

And now here's just a few of the money laundering/terrorist financing indicators. And you'll see that many of them are very similar to what we see with the traditional currency or banking system. And that's, you know, the use of smurfing and third-party money mules to be able to deposit these, frequent deposits or

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outside of the normal behaviour when dealing 2 3 with currency. 4 Now, one thing in law enforcement that 5 we've noticed is prolonged meets in vehicles. So with traditional drug exchanges, you know, in doing surveillance there would be an ability to 7 be -- oftentimes to be able to see movement of 8 9 cash or movement of drugs. And in certain files 10 that have been seen across Canada but also out 11 in -- by the Dutch is that these individuals are 12 now meeting together and they're meeting in 13 vehicles for an extended period of time. 14 Surveillance teams are watching and they can't 15 understand what's happening because there's 16 actually no transfer or doesn't appear to be any 17 transfer of cash. 18 Well, one thing that they have noticed is 19 that both individuals have a smartphone out. 20 And so what appears to be happening is that when 21 meeting there is a change, there is a 22 transaction occurring but it's occurring on the 23 blockchain. And now the individuals are sitting 24 in the car waiting for a prolonged period of 25 time so that they can actually see that the

withdrawals, any behaviour that's, you know,

1		transaction's been validated by the miners and
2		appears as a block on the blockchain. And only
3		when that is done and it's confirmed will the
4		individuals depart and go on their way. Next
5		slide, please.
6		(AG) This one is as it states. It's simply
7		for honourable mention. I actually don't know
8		of any active investigation or otherwise which
9		confirms illicit illicitly gained or
10		ill-gotten gained bitcoins used to actually
11		purchase a home, but we can see that there are
12		people who are willing to trade bitcoins for
13		homes. So is this a potential for money
14		laundering? Well, I cannot confirm, but it does
15		exist. It is out there.
16	Q	There isn't an impediment there that if someone
17		has that their money, their earnings, I
18		suppose, or elicit gains in bitcoin, let's say,
19		they have there's nothing to stop that being
20		used to go and make the purchase of real estate?
21	A	(AG) Right. Or if you are from a jurisdiction
22		which has a limitation on how much in terms of
23		funds can be withdrawn from whatever country or
24		jurisdiction that you're in but you can convert
25		whatever amount of money, fiat in your country,

Exam by Mr. Martland

1	to crypto, then you would be able to make that
2	purchase. Next slide, please.
3	Okay. In terms of investigative
4	challenges, there are new schemes out there
5	which have made, I can say as an investigator,
6	our lives much more difficult. And
7	traditionally when we're talking about
8	traditional organized crime we're talking about
9	a pyramidal-type structure where you have the
10	boss at the top and then his corporals working
11	for him and so then so forth and so on as you go
12	down the list until the very bottom. But
13	everybody really knows who they're working for
14	and what particular organization they're part of
15	and who's actually paying their salary at the
16	end of I'm going to say at the end of the
17	week; right?
18	Whereas when you have these structures of
19	where criminals work together but from all over
20	the world, it can well, it contributes to
21	confusion in terms of when you actually do track
22	down someone who is responsible for a crime and
23	then you ask them who do they work for. They
24	legitimately don't know who they work for. They
25	receive funds to their bitcoin address or

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1 whatever coin address they happen to be using from another address with not necessarily a name 2 3 connected to it. They might be communicating via some online forum with each other and that's 4 5 the extent to what they know their implication is in whatever crime. Particularly if each 6 crime is compartmentalize and everyone is given 7 a very small task of a complete bigger -- they 8 9 don't have the bigger picture of what they've 10 actually done themselves. So being able to arrest the guy at the 11 12 bottom and then follow the chain all the way up 13 to the top to the boss doesn't work as well as 14 it used to because of the anonymous structure that -- well, and the removal of trust between 15 criminals that is there because as we mentioned, 16 17 you know, these transactions are irreversible. 18 So you know that once that amount of bitcoin hits your address, well, then it can't be 19 20 reversed. So you can trust whatever -- whoever 21 your boss happens to be that you've never met 22 will continue making your payments. 23 I take it another challenge there must be that

you also have a distributed network model where

it doesn't need to be the sort of classic -- I

1		think one of the slides had a picture of
2		Al Pacino and Scarface. It doesn't need to be
3		Al Pacino with his gang in Miami, what have you.
4		These could be people that don't even know each
5		other scattered around the globe, so from an
6		enforcement point of view how do you go about
7		trying to connect up people who may not even
8		know each other or know where the other people
9		physically are situate?
10	A	(AG) Precisely. You are going to
11	Q	Okay. You were going to
12	А	(AG) Next slide, please. Sorry.
13	Q	Thanks.
14	A	(AG) Okay. As far as RCMP virtual asset
15		investigations go, we've been investigating
16		virtual assets at the RCMP, I can speak at least
17		personally, for approximately ten years, since
18		the beginning of my service with. And there
19		have been many successful investigations. And
20		I'm going to qualify what I mean by "successful
21		investigations."
22		Now, being responsible for the
23		investigation from beginning to end, so
24		identifying whatever crime actually happened,
25		collecting the evidence and being able to prove

1 that a particular individual in the jurisdiction or otherwise was responsible, and then laying 2 3 the charge and putting them in jail would be a 4 flow through of, I guess, a traditional-type investigation. But a lot of these 5 6 investigations involving virtual assets are dealing with individuals, like we mentioned 7 before, which may be -- who maybe don't know 8 9 each other, maybe don't know where they are and 10 require some different types of approaches to 11 investigations. 12 So in our implication and these types of 13 investigations we may be tasked with something 14 like in AlphaBay; right? Where we'll be tasked with monitoring type of communication, 15 interception of communication, locating 16 17 particular targets, conducting a certain type of 18 surveillance, so forth and so on, but we'll have a compartmentalized piece of the investigation 19 20 which will be part of a greater international 2.1 investigation which will lead to a takedown 22 itself. 23 So we have been and we continue to be 24 involved in these types of investigations.

far as considering these investigations,

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particularly virtual asset investigations, I

don't really want to qualify them as such

because I make the -- well, I use the allegory

that if you pay a hitman with bitcoins, it

doesn't make it a cybercrime when he commits the

murder. He is still a hitman, he is still

getting paid in another format, but the crime

remains the same.

So we may not know of the implication or of the involvement of virtual assets at the outset of the investigation. This is something that may come up once we actually are fully involved in the investigation or towards the end of the investigation when we actually do a search and seizure and then we find oh, whoa, there's actually some wallets here, and then we have to deal with them differently. So if we discover it early on, we can actually develop some sort of tracing and monitoring and things like that of the behaviour of the criminal. If we discover it only towards the end of the investigation, well, then, maybe it might be up to Digital Forensic Services to come in and try and actually do a seizure of the goods as either proceeds of crime or the bitcoin used as -- in

the commission of the offence itself. 1 2 How do you actually go about trying to do a 0 seizure of bitcoin or a virtual currency? 3 4 (AG) So there's several different ways. I mean, Α 5 as we mentioned before that they could be kept on an exchange itself, and then you would have 6 to go through legal paperwork. If not and you 7 are doing a search, if, for example, there is an 8 9 indicator that is there is wallet on the system 10 or on the phone but that the phone is encrypted 11 or the computer is encrypted, we might look for 12 another alternative, for example, like a seed 13 list, as I mentioned before. 14 Right. Q (AG) Which is that list of words. And once we 15 Α obtain that list of words, we can recreate the 16 17 wallet itself and then move the funds out to different wallets, which I think Sergeant 18 19 Vickery will speak to later. But there's a few 20 different approaches we can take to actually 21 get -- gain control of that private key or gain 22 control of the wallet to be able to sweep the 23 funds out into a Crown-controlled wallet. 24 I assume that has to happen sometimes very Q

quickly. It's not like the classic search

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1		warrant at the drug house and you've got a stash
2		of cash which isn't going anywhere if it's being
3		seized by the police and held pending the
4		process and possibly forfeiture, what have you.
5		But if someone else has the right information,
6		they could be moving the bitcoin out from
7		underfoot, so to speak.
8		Sergeant Vickery, you've actually dealt with
9		or are aware of some of these situations?
10		Sorry, you'll need to unmute. There we go.
11	A	(AV) Thank you. Yeah. Absolutely, you've hit
12		the nail on the head there. We can have access
13		to these wallets or the seed phrases in our
14		possession, but basically in essence all we have
15		is an image of, say, a large stash of bulk cash
16		and there's other people that have that same
17		image, and it truly is a race to see who can get
18		their first. We have absolutely no ability to
19		control who has sorry, my cat's here. No
20		ability to control who has access to that
21		information and who can essentially gain access
22		to that cryptocurrency, so we do need to be able
23		to get it and take it into custody as quickly as
24		possible to ensure that it's not liquidated or
25		transferred.

1 Q Shall we move to the -- one of the last slides, the responses to lessons learned? 2 3 (AV) Sure. Just before we get there I just 4 wanted to speak very quickly to our most notable file and that, as far as I'm concerned, is a 5 file that took place in May of 2018 in which the 6 Milton RCMP detachment were able to take down a 7 prolific darknet vendor online who was selling 8 9 fentanyl and in doing a after his arrest they 10 found out they were able to seize cryptocurrency. 11 So these members, despite most of them even just 12 learning what bitcoin was in the days leading up 13 to this arrest and the actual seizure, were able to solicit the assistance of our digital 14 15 forensics unit to go in there and recreate a wallet and do the seizure of this 16 17 cryptocurrency. 18 It was very successful file. It ended up in conviction in court and the 22-odd bitcoin 19 20 that were seized were -- which had a value of 2.1 about \$200,000 Canadian was successfully 22 forfeited as offence-related property. So it 23 was a very successful file it's because these 24 members showed ingenuity when going after this.

And we realized, at least from a national

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headquarters level, that the RCMP was deficient in our ability at that time to be able to handle these investigations and support our members to it and that we actually needed to have policies and guidelines and training in place in order to be able to deal with these effectively.

So shortly thereafter the RCMP identified an RCMP identified national cryptocurrency coordinator, who is myself, led to put these in place and make sure that we could meet the operational demands and support the field in order to be able to do these investigations. So since we have created RCMP guidelines, which will direct the membership on how to do these investigations and the seizure. We also have policies to do that and we have guidelines which are a little bit more flexibility for us given the evolving and dynamic nature of cryptocurrency. And truly, because this is a fairly new phenomenon for us in law enforcement, we learn each and every investigation that we have. these guidelines will allow us to adapt and adjust as we learn the best practices, both internally to be able to deal with this but also from our international law enforcement partners.

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1 So we offer training at all levels for few years now, actually. Two years or so we've 2 3 been offering training, national financial crime 4 courses, including a proceeds of crime course, a 5 counterfeit course, the financial integrity 6 Terrorist financing course is also being offered, the cybercrime courses offered at 7 CPC or PRTC, and on the online undercover 8 9 course. We have put together one-day workshops, 10 which we piloted out in the Pacific region and in Edmonton and Alberta earlier this year, but 11 12 unfortunately those were put on hold due to 13 COVID. So currently we're actually building an 14 online cryptocurrency 101 course which will be accessible to all RCMP regardless of what 15 business line they fall into, whether they're 16 17 federal policing or contract level, will be able to access and use these -- this training 18 19 opportunity. And the hope is to be able to put 20 that over onto the Canadian Police Knowledge 2.1 Network and make it available to all municipal 22 and provincial law enforcement in Canada as 23 well.

We have developed several working groups

and worked in collaboration with other partners

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in order to enhance our capabilities to be able to do this job. There's a virtual currency working group that was created actually back in 2017, and it was kind of in response to several initiatives that were being initiated across the divisions by several different business lines who were all encountering cryptocurrency in their own investigations and they were all trying separately to build and enhance their capability to be able to investigate this.

So what this working group does is be able to bring everybody together regardless of what business line that they're in and really take a multidisciplinary approach to how best we can enforce these -- both investigate and enforce these crimes. The National Cybercrime Coordination Centre has, you know, really been a wonderful partner for all of law enforcement The National Police Service, here in Canada. and as I had mentioned earlier in the testimony they have acquired software tracing tools from both Chainalysis and CipherTrace which they've disseminated out to law enforcement in Canada to help us be able to follow these flow of funds and, you know, identify attribution to this.

1	They also provide support to municipal and
2	provincial partners who maybe don't have the
3	resources within to be able to do their own
4	tracing.
5	They'll provide the ability to do the
6	tracing on their behalf. They'll also do
7	deconfliction for all law enforcement and they
8	are a conduit to Europol as they have a liaison
9	officer currently stationed there in The Hague.
10	The Canadian anti-fraud centre is also a
11	wonderful partner for us. Again, I mean they
12	see a huge influx of frauds being facilitated
13	through cryptocurrency go through their
14	databases all the time. They also have access
15	to these software tracing tools provided by the
16	National Cybercrime Coordination Centre and they
17	are really are the first point of contract for
18	the RCMP contract members to be able to do that
19	tracing of their fraud files and use them as a
20	deconfliction tool to see if these addresses are
21	linked to other fraud files across the country.
22	We have partnerships with our Government of
23	Canada partners out there, you know, CRA and
24	Department of Finance, FINTRAC, FAMG. FAMG is
25	another resource, the Forensic Accounting

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Exam by Mr. Martl	and		

1		Management Group that we use all the time. They
2		also have access to these software tracing tools
3		and can provide tracing support for some of our
4		larger tier 1 and tier 2 files.
5		We have international partnerships through
6		the Five Eyes cryptocurrency operational
7		readiness group where we are able to really
8		discuss best practices and trade craft as well
9		as what these Five Eyes countries are doing in
10		order to build capacity internally and how we
11		can leverage that in this international fight
12		against money laundering.
13	Q	You speak about partnerships. I wonder if I
14		could ask you in particular about something
15		about Project Participate, if you could describe
16		what that is and to the extent that you or RCMP
17		have been involved or contributed to that
18		undertaking.
19	A	(AV) Yes. So Project Participate is basically a
20		working group comprised of a lot of the private
21		sector money service businesses, and it's a
22		joint partnership with that they are trying
23		to increase their ability to be able to be
24		compliant and to implement proper AML/KYC within

their exchanges in order to prevent money

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laundering from going through. So they have created different documents in trying to, you know, educate the money service businesses out there on how best to identify that. The RCMP does have a representative that is part of this group. Our point of contact is based in the Greater Toronto Area where many of these exchanges are located.

And through this partnership we've been able to work with Project Participate to improve our ability in law enforcement to be able to go after some of these assets -- or not necessarily the assets, but at least identify them and who the targets of these transactions are. instance, the money service businesses -- or virtual asset service providers that are part are of Project Participate were able to come up with a list of information that they captured during the course of their regular business activity and were able to provide this list of information to law enforcement so that we have a template, some sort of starting point in how to go -- find this information with a production order.

Obviously, you know, we need to be able to

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has occurred and get lawful authority from the court in order to be able to go after these funds, but having this template is certainly helpful for us. So I can certainly speak to all of these partnerships that we have going and how valuable each and every one of them are.

Now, the one partner -- Government of Canada partner that I haven't quite mentioned yet is the Seized Property Management Directorate. So the Seized Property Management Directorate has been around for ages. I believe they were created in 1993 and were a government entity designated to manage all seized offence-related property and proceeds of crime and to manage those assets on -- sorry, for all federally prosecuted cases and to manage those assets until they were either ordered returned upon no conviction or they were forfeited and to dispose of those assets upon forfeiture. So they're a wonderful entity that's been used by federal policing within the RCMP for 25 years, but their services did not extend beyond those cases in federally prosecuted court, so our contract members were unable to use them, we

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1 were unable to use them for, say, fraud files and none of our municipal/provincial partners 2 3 were able to employ their services as well. 4 And, I mean, they have contracts all across 5 the country to be able to store these assets for 6 a very limited fee. In Vancouver rates for storing, say, vehicles are very expensive. You 7 can pay up to \$70 a day to be able to store a 8 9 vehicle in a tow yard, whereas the Seized Property Management Directorate has contracts 10 already in place and can do so for \$6 a day, 11 12 potentially, or \$10 a day. So they have the 13 ability to save the government a lot of money. 14 They will also be manage all restrained assets. 15 So they can go in and manage a house, make sure

slide, please. 21 0 I wonder if I could just pause, though, to pick up on this and maybe put it through the prism of thinking about it in this province. Sergeant Krahenbil, would you able to speak a little bit about in "E" Division and in British Columbia

that that -- you know, the lawn is getting cut

removed or all gold faucets aren't being removed

and that the hardwood flooring isn't being

from the homes, to maintain that asset.

1		the cybercrimes unit, your involvement in it but
2		also the number of people that are there and how
3		that is organized.
4	A	(WK) I think we stated earlier the unit is
5		pretty new. We started in April right in the
6		middle of the first COVID lockdown, so some
7		difficulties there. But we've been at this type
8		of work since 2016, so we started in the dark
9		web in 2016 as a serious and organized crime
10		group working specifically on opioids online and
11		trafficking, and that's how we with that
12		in that venue that's how we came interested in
13		sort of working on cryptocurrency also as
14		they're dark web, fentanyl and cryptocurrency
15		pretty much go hand in hand. So we're currently
16		three regular member and an analyst.
17	Q	Okay.
18	A	(WK) There will be expansion to the unit, so we
19		will be growing.
20	Q	When is that expected to happen?
21	A	(WK) Hopefully soon. I can't say for sure.
22		This is just something that's in the process,
23		so yeah.
24	Q	Do you have a sense of how big of an expansion,

or is that all under consideration right now?

1	A	(WK) It's all under consideration right now,
2		yes.
3	Q	Okay. All right. Sergeant Vickery, we can
4		return to this slide. I think we'll probably
5		need to switch over to others asking questions
6		before I run them out of time too much so but
7		you carry on, please. You're muted again.
8	A	(AV) Sorry. Just the two slides left. So
9		cryptocurrency seizures. We have obviously
10		we've talked a little by about the inability to
11		be able to control who has access to these seed
12		phrases or the private keys and so until we
13		actually can transfer or transact the
14		cryptocurrency from one address to one belonging
15		to the government under a government-controlled
16		wallet, we do not really have access to those
17		funds. There's also been a lot of concern and I
18		guess history supports the need for oversight
19		and due diligence when handling this. We have
20		seen cases in the US specifically from Silk Road
21		where agents from the DEA and the US Secret
22		Service were able to divert funds that were
23		seized by the law enforcement agencies because
24		they had access to the seed phrases. So when it
25		comes to our cryptocurrency seizure we're very

1 diligent in the way that we proceed forward with them by managing who has access to that 2 information both in terms of disclosure in 3 4 court, by restricting the private key or the 5 seed phrases and managing the members who will 6 be doing and conducting that seizure. So as the process goes, we have our Digital 7 Forensic Services Units who will actually 8 9 oversee the seizure conducted by our frontline 10 members. There will be two of them in doing. 11 Each of them will have responsibility for 12 securing half of that seed phrase. So they 13 would truly have to work collaboratively in order to be able to combine the seed phrase into 14 an ability to be able to transact that. 15 And then instead of actually keeping the 16 17 seizures in our own custody, we were going to be 18 employing the use of the Seized Property Management Directorate. So as I had mentioned, 19 20 they've been around and have supported federal 2.1 policing for years, but their legislation just 22 recently changed last year, in June of last 23 year, which will now allow them to provide services to all municipal/provincial forces in 24 25 Canada. And so we have engaged in an MOU with

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them in the RCMP that they can now manage all of
our seized assets, both cryptocurrency assets
but as well as any seized or recovered property
and do so at a very good price for the
government.

Now, they have their own internal policies
in place when dealing with cryptocurrency

in place when dealing with cryptocurrency seizures and would be able to manage them properly and safely, as we do. They also have the ability to be able to liquidate these assets within a 24-hour period in order to maintain the value of that asset if it's either ordered returned or forfeited.

Now, when it comes to our cryptocurrency seizures, we will always refer to the cryptocurrency in the amount of -- value of the cryptocurrency and never in comparison to its value compared to fiat, the American dollar or Canadian dollar. And that just protects law enforcement from any change in the value of that asset while it's under our custody. So very much the same process that we use when seizing any -- say, a gold bar. We would seize one gold bar; we would return one gold bar or we would forfeit one gold bar. Next slide please.

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1	Q	And a number of these topics you've talked on
2		or talked about, rather, but go ahead, please.
3	А	(AV) Yeah. I would say I guess I can turn
4		the floor over to Sergeant Krahenbil, if he has
5		anything more he'd like to add to the federal
6		cybercrime operations group, and if not, we can
7		go to PCMLTFA amendments.
8		(WK) I don't really have anything to add
9		unless you have questions about what we do or
10		where we were at.
11	Q	I think you've given us a sense of that so far.
12		So the PCMLTFA amendments which we touched
13		on before, additional comments about that
14		particularly in terms of the implications from
15		the law enforcement point of view.
16	А	(AV) So in my opinion I believe that the
17		amendments are a wonderful addition here in
18		Canada and far overdue. We certainly need them
19		here in order to be able to help regulate and
20		oversee the transactions that are going through.
21		But I do believe that the criminal element is
22		very adaptive, and just like the al-Qassam
23		Brigades were able to adopt or adapt the way
24		that they were accepting cryptocurrency payments

by, you know, providing a method to create a new

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1	address each and every time, I think that these
2	PCMLTFA amendments will just solicit more
3	ingenuity when to comes to how these
4	cryptocurrency is used. I think probably the
5	criminals will start flocking more to the
6	privacy coins, such a Monero, to be able to hide
7	the flow of funds, knowing not only about the
8	regulations but also that legal tool or
9	sorry, tools exist that will allow us to trace
10	those the flow of funds. And they're very
11	limited when it comes to some of these privacy
12	coins such as Monero.
13	(AG) I would just like to add that I think
14	we can see through well, historically, if
15	we're taking about E-gold and Liberty Reserve
16	followed by bitcoin, that regulating away crime
17	doesn't seem to work in terms of simply
18	eliminating the criminal element. I mean, we
19	can limit the way or try to hamper them in terms
20	of their area of operation, but in terms of
21	eliminating money laundering through
22	regulations, I think that would be particularly
23	difficult.
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As far as our existing structure goes, I

mean, I think that the courts have been -- have

1	assisted us greatly in fighting money
2	laundering, in fighting cybercrime by being so
3	open with the application of different laws.
4	And I also think that as far as the PCMLTFA
5	modifications go, what we're going to see is not
6	necessarily that we're going to stop money
7	laundering through by bad actors, but we're
8	going to see money services businesses who deal
9	in cryptocurrencies being able to come more out
10	into the light and actually being more
11	recognized by the general public and by banking
12	services, and as a result they will be more
13	cooperative and be able to provide more
14	information to law enforcement and to other
15	government agencies who will aid in the
16	combatting of the money laundering that occurs
17	through their services.
18	MR. MARTLAND: Members, thank you very much.
19	Mr. Commissioner, we have, I think, three
20	participants who sought some time for questions,
21	and the province first. Ms. Harlingten for the
22	province.
23	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Martland.
24	Yes, Mr. Harlingten.

MS. HARLINGTON: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

25

Α

(AV) Yes.

1	EXAM	MINATION BY MS. HARLINGTEN:
2	Q	Good afternoon, panel members. Can you all hear
3		me all right?
4	А	(AG) Yes.
5	Q	Wonderful. So I think my first set of questions
6		is largely going to be for Sergeant Vickery.
7		Just by way of context for you, Sergeant
8		Vickery. I assume you are already know this,
9		but the terms of reference for the Commissioner
10		allows the Commissioner to make recommendations
11		for the regulation of financial institutions,
12		money services, including unregulated entities
13		and persons who provide banking-like services.
14		So with that in mind, I'd like to focus on the
15		evidence you gave while speaking to my friend,
16		Mr. Martland, about the regulation of public
17		exchanges, which sort of follows on something
18		Acting Sergeant Gilkes just said about
19		regulation being difficult.
20		But when you were discussions that issue
21		with Mr. Martland around third-party public
22		exchanges, you stated that if I'm quoting you
23		correctly, that it distances the funds from the
24		source. Do I have that correct?

1	Q	And because of that distancing, I think you also
2		referred to a third-party public exchange as the
3		end of a trace for law enforcement?
4	A	(AV) I may have. If I did say that, it's not
5		necessarily the end of a trace, but it certainly
6		does provide an opportunity to gather more
7		information.
8	Q	So you can follow the public nature of bitcoin
9		up to a certain point with the third-party
10		exchange and then it becomes you have much
11		less visibility after that. Is that a fair
12		understanding?
13	А	(AV) Well, through the results obtained via
14		judicial authorization, we will be able to
15		hopefully be able to get some know-your-customer
16		information on the holder of that account, but
17		we'll also be able to get information from the
18		exchange where the transaction went once it's
19		left the exchange, which now brings us back to
20		the blockchain and ability to continue tracing.
21	Q	Okay. And so I believe in your evidence you
22		also said because of some of the difficulties
23		around the visibility with third-party pubic
24		exchanges that some regulating and monitoring
25		might be helpful in that particular area. Is

1		that a fair summary of what you said to
2		Mr. Martland?
3	A	(AV) Yes.
4	Q	And so I understand now since the amendments to
5		the act came in to the Proceeds of Crime and
6		Financing Act that there are going to be FINTRAC
7		reporting and know-your-client requirements for
8		some of those money service businesses. But I
9		understand also that right now there's no
10		licensing or regulation provincially for those
11		public exchanges. Is that true to your
12		knowledge?
13	А	(AV) I can't comment on that. I'm not sure.
14	Q	No, that's totally fine. I will ask you,
15		though, just based on your extensive experience,
16		is there anything that you would say would be
17		helpful from a law enforcement perspective if
18		the province were to establish a new provincial
19		regulator for these third-party public
20		exchanges?
21	A	(AV) What I feel, in my opinion, would be the
22		best process is to eliminate the need for these
23		third-party service providers and have our
24		Canadian banks actually associate directly with
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the exchanges themselves.

1	Q	And just to elaborate a bit on that. Is that
2		because those financial institutions are
3		regulated, and so some of the difficulties
4		around knowing what those third-party
5		regulator or pardon me, third-party
6		exchangers were doing for a law enforcement?
7	A	(AV) Yes, and in doing so also, I mean, it would
8		help support the purchase of cryptocurrency
9		with, you know, bank transfers and credit cards
10		rather than gift guards or Canada Post or money
11		orders.
12	Q	So if I understand correctly, would it be fair
13		to say that that would bring cryptocurrency into
14		our current financial system rather than
15		creating a regulation for it outside of that
16		financial system?
17	A	(AV) Yes, exactly.
18	Q	All right. And just to return to the FINTRAC
19		reporting requirements, and I understand that
20		those will well, those are in force now. Is
21		it fair to stay, though, that those reporting
22		requirements when that information goes to
23		FINTRAC, there is going to be a bit of a time
24		lag between reporting and law enforcement
25		activity with respect to any information

25

1		provided?
2	А	(AV) That I can't comment on because I don't
3		work at FINTRAC. I do know that, you know, our
4		best case scenario is to be able to get that
5		information as quickly as possible. As, you
6		know, we've said throughout the testimony, there
7		is a great need to be able to go after and seize
8		these elicit cryptocurrency assets as quickly as
9		possible because we just aren't able to control
10		who may or may not have access to them, so the
11		quicker that we can get the information, the
12		better.
13	Q	Okay. And the customer identification and know
14		your clients, those would it be fair to
15		characterize those as more preventative or
16		mitigation measures?
17	А	(AV) I believe so. I do think that you know,
18		I mean they're sort of a necessary practice in
19		order to be able to, you know, deal with the
20		regulations that are in play but also, as I
21		mentioned, just as a method for the entity
22		themselves to protect against fraudulent
23		activity.
24	Q	Right. And I think you said that the

regulations were long overdue. In terms of the

1		those preventative measures just from your
2		knowledge and experience, are there other
3		measures that you would consider helpful as
4		preventative for money laundering specifically?
5	А	(AV) Well, I would say that I would like if I
6		had the choice is that I would like to see
7		FINTRAC be able to issue higher monetary
8		penalties for non-compliance. And we've seen it
9		at, you know, a very large extent out in the US
10		where FinCEN has you know, I think at one
11		point I want to say they issued a
12		\$250 million penalty on BTCE for non-complying,
13		and they were a huge facilitator for money
14		laundering and it essentially corrupted the
15		entity. I don't want to see, you know,
16		exchanges that are facilitating money laundering
17		actually, you know, all end up in bankruptcy;
18		however, it certainly would be a greater
19		deterrent if that threat was there.
20	Q	Thank you. I just have one further question.
21		When you were talking about responses and lesson
22		learned, Sergeant Vickery, you mentioned that
23		there was a successful forfeiture with respect
24		to the RCMP investigation. Can I take from that
25		evidence that you see a role for civil

1	forfeiture for seized cryptocurrency assets?
2	A (AV) Well so it was forfeited criminally in
3	court as offence-related property. You know, in
4	the RCMP we're always you know, I work in the
5	proceeds of crime/money laundering course and
6	we're always teaching as a matter of first
7	resort is to go after the criminal investigation
8	and go after those assets criminally. And when
9	the investigation is completely exhausted, then
10	yes, I do see a benefit of it going civilly.
11	MS. HARLINGTON: Thank you for answer questions,
12	Sergeant Vickery.
13	Those are all my questions,
14	Mr. Commissioner.
15	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr. Harlingten.
16	And next I understand we have Ms. Magonet.
17	Is that am I pronouncing that correctly? For
18	the BC Civil Liberties Association, who has been
19	allocated 30 minutes.
20	MS. MAGONET: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
21	To begin if I could ask Madam Registrar to
22	please pull up the PowerPoint that we were
23	reviewing this afternoon as I have some my
24	first questions refer to it. Thank you so much,
25	Madam Registrar.

25

Α

(AV) Yes.

1		Can everyone hear me okay?
2	A	(AV) Yes.
3	THE	COMMISSIONER: Yes. Thank you.
4	EXAM	INATION BY MS. MAGONET:
5	Q	Okay. Great. So for the most part my questions
6		are directed to whoever on panel feels best
7		positioned to answer them, so you can make that
8		decision yourself, though I have some questions
9		that will be directed to particular individuals.
10		Perhaps as a preliminary question before I
11		start going through the slides, I wanted to ask
12		the panel if they would agree that an
13		individual's financial transactions can in some
14		cases contain very personal information about
15		them and could reveal information related to
16		their politics, their religion, their location
17		and even their sexuality?
18	A	(WK) I'd agree with that.
19		(AG) I would agree with that statement as
20		well.
21	Q	Excellent. And also would the panel agree that
22		individuals who are not engaged in criminal
23		activity may also have a legitimate interest in
24		financial privacy?

25

1 (WK) I agree with that. 2 Thank you. 0 MS. MAGONET: Madam Registrar, if you could please go 3 4 to slide 2 of the presentation. Thank you. So slide 2 and 3 both refer to bitcoin scams, 5 0 and I would just like to ask if the panel would 6 agree that these stories are about scams and not 7 money laundering using cryptocurrency? 8 9 Α (AG) I would disagree because the 10 cryptocurrencies were leveraged in order for --11 well, for speed, for ease of use and as a way to 12 dissuade police officers from continuing an 13 investigation if they happened to believe that it would be that much more difficult than simply 14 finding out what bank account the funds were 15 transferred to. 16 17 (AV) As well as any cryptocurrency derived 18 as a result of that fraudulent activity, any 19 transaction or conversion of that cryptocurrency 20 now becomes money laundering. 21 0 Okay. Thank you. 22 MS. MAGONET: Madam Registrar, if you could please go 23 to slide 11 of the presentation. So this slide referred to aftermarket software 24

tools, and the panel did a great job of

1		explaining how these work and what type of
2		information can be available using these tools.
3		I just wanted to confirm that when the RCMP
4		obtains information with the assistance of
5		aftermarket software tools like Chainalysis, the
6		type of information provided may include a
7		user's IP address; is that correct?
8	А	(WK) That's correct.
9	Q	And these tools are also able to tie
10		IP addresses to a list of transactions for that
11		individual; is that correct?
12	А	(WK) I don't personally believe they can tie the
13		IP to the transactions, like a multitude of
14		transactions, but I could be wrong.
15	Q	Could they tie the IP address to a specific
16		transaction for that individual?
17	А	(WK) They could tie the IP address to the
18		transaction, yes.
19	Q	Great. And would that IP address be linked to
20		any other information for that individual other
21		than a transaction?
22	А	(WK) Are you talking about, like, private
23		information or something outside of the
24		blockchain?
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Either inside or out -- actually I would be

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Q

1		interest in both, either information within the
2		blockchain or not related to the blockchain.
3		For example, if the aftermarket software company
4		is integrating other sources of information into
5		their analysis?
6	A	(WK) They do integrate OSINT-type information,
7		but it's not related to the IP.
8	Q	Okay. Thank you. And I wanted to confirm that
9		when the RCMP obtains data from companies like
10		Chainalysis or other aftermarket software tools,
11		they do not first seek a production order, but
12		rather these companies, when paid, hand this
13		information over to the RCMP?
14	A	(WK) The information that comes from Chainalysis
15		and CipherTrace isn't something that they hand
16		over to us. It's more of an interpretive tool
17		of the publicly available information that
18		already exists.
19	Q	But when Chainalysis provides this
20		interpretation, I think it was maybe earlier
21		Sergeant Vickery was speaking to the fact that
22		this can be advantageous or that the
23		blockchain can be advantageous for the RCMP and
24		these aftermarket software tools can be
25		advantageous because unlike going through a bank

1

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Q

		-
2		access financial information, in these
3		circumstances a production order would not be
4		necessary; is that correct?
5	А	(AV) But that's not through the use of these
6		blockchain, like, aftermarket software tools;
7		that was in relations to the blockchain itself.
8		Now, these software tools, they are hosted by a
9		server from these companies, but really the data
10		that's collected on there is data that is
11		collected by law enforcement by searching the
12		public blockchain.
13		Now, they can look at some of the searching
14		that's been done to come up with their own
15		statistics on trends surrounding the elicit use
16		of cryptocurrency, but we actually don't gain
17		any information from them that would require the
18		use of a production order because it is all
19		information that they gather from the analysis
20		done by police. And each of these licences are
21		designated to a specific law enforcement agency,
22		so we cannot see, say, what the FBI is tracing
23		on there. We can only see what we are doing
24		ourselves.
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Thank you. That's very helpful. So when

where you would need a production order to

1		Chainalysis or another aftermarket software tool
2		company is providing analysis to the RCMP, they
3		are only using data that the RCMP has given to
4		them; is that correct?
5	A	(WK) No. No. The data comes from the public
6		blockchain. So what we're doing is with those
7		tools is searching the public data.
8	Q	Okay. So then the only data that these
9		companies are analyzing is data that is
10		available on the blockchain; they're not tying
11		it to other data sources. Is that accurate?
12	A	(WK) Yes and no. The they also include OSINT
13		data. So if you say, I'm using Chainalysis
14		and I want to search for a specific blockchain
15		address. I can put that into Chainalysis,
16		they'll provide me the transaction data and if
17		they have OSINT data, like open source data from
18		the internet, related to that specific address,
19		it will show up.
20	Q	Okay. Oh, sorry. Go ahead, Sergeant Vickery.
21	А	(AV) If I may, we're not really very we're
22		not privy to the proprietary, you know, work of
23		these software companies. And I know
24		Chainalysis will be testifying tomorrow so these
25		questions may be better directed at them on how

1	they gather this information.
2	MS. MAGONET: Thank you very much, Sergeant Vickery.
3	Madam Registrar, if you could please go to
4	slide 27 of the PowerPoint. Thank you.
5	Q So this slide lists benefits and drawbacks of
6	cryptocurrency for criminals and money
7	launderers. Would the panel agree that many of
8	the advantages listed here are advantages that
9	would also exist for people who aren't criminals
10	and may explain why they would turn or would
11	have an interest in cryptocurrency and as well
12	for the disadvantages?
13	A (AV) Yes.
14	(AG) Yes.
15	(WK) Yeah.
16	Q Thank you. And would you also agree that one of
17	the disadvantages, specifically traceability,
18	may in some ways make cryptocurrency less
19	advantageous than cash for individuals who are
20	engaged in money laundering?
21	A (AV) Yes.
22	MS. MAGONET: Thank you. If Madam Registrar could
23	please go to slide 37.
24	Q So this slide looks at the surface web, deep web

and dark web. I was wondering if the panel is

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1		aware that the Tor encrypted technology used on
2		the dark web is also used by individuals living
3		in countries that have restrictions on freedom
4		of expression to circumvent government's
5		censorship. So it has been, for example, used
6		in China and Russia by people trying to get
7		around censorship?
8	A	(WK) Absolutely.
9		(AG) Yes.
10	Q	And that Tor has therefore been endorsed by many
11		human rights organizations as a means of
12		promoting free expression?
13	А	(WK) Yes.
14		(AG) M'mm-hmm.
15	Q	Thank you. Is the panel aware that BBC launched
16		a mirror website on the dark web to circumvent
17		censorship in some countries?
18	A	(WK) Yes.
19		(AG) M'mm-hmm.
20	MS.	MAGONET: Thank you. If you could please go to
21		the next slide, Madam Registrar.
22	Q	Slide 38 oh, sorry.
23	MR.	MARTLAND: I'll just do this for my friend's
24		benefit to make sure that we preserve a very

meticulous record that when -- I think it was

25

1		Acting Sergeant Gilkes said m'mm-hmm two
2		different times, I took those as being
3		agreements, as a yes. So I'll just have the
4		record reflect that. I'm sorry to interrupt my
5		friend.
6	MS.	MAGONET: No. Thank you.
7	Q	So this slide sets out a description of the dark
8		web and the type of content you could find
9		there. You would agree that what defines the
10		dark web isn't that it's exclusively illegal
11		content or that its existence is illegal but
12		rather that the sites on the dark web are not
13		it can't be indexed by search engines and that
14		also that it can only be access using certain
15		softwares, configurations or authorizations?
16	A	(AG) Yes, I agree with that.
17		(WK) Yes.
18	Q	Thank you. And just wanted to confirm. Earlier
19		I wasn't sure if I heard you, Acting Sergeant
20		Gilkes, when you said that 50 to 70 percent of
21		the dark web did you say that it was legal or
22		illegal?
23	A	(AG) Well, it's an estimate. Like I
24		mentioned well, I should have clarified. The

sites on the dark web are not as constant as,

1		for example, on the clear web. They are up;
2		they're down; they're called the hidden
3		services. For any number of reasons why they
4		were not constant. So we do see a fluctuation
5		of 50 to 70 percent of illegal sites of
6		different types.
7		And once again, I expressed that legality
8		depends of course on jurisdiction because some
9		of the things which would be considered legal in
10		Canada would be considered illegal in some other
11		countries and so forth, so there's a variation.
12	Q	Thank you. Would you agree, though, that
13		according to this analysis, and I'm not sure
14		which jurisdiction they were looking at, that
15		only that illegal contact sorry, excuse
16		me illegal content only accounted for
17		27.8 percent of the dark web and that the rest
18		was either legal sites, legal pornography and
19		broken links?
20	A	(AG) That is entirely possible. This is this
21		site is slightly dated, I should advise. I used
22		it simply as a representation of the types of
23		content that you can find on the dark web
24		itself. So the estimates do change over
25		the years and this is, I believe, three years

25

1 old or so, so the current estimates would likely 2 be different. 3 MS. MAGONET: Okay. Thank you. Madam Registrar, if you could please go to slide 39. 4 So slides 39 and 42 refer to Silk Road and 5 0 6 AlphaBay. And you would agree that these sites 7 were successfully shut down by law enforcement? Α (AG) Yes. 8 9 (WK) Yes. 10 MS. MAGONET: Thank you. Madam Registrar, if you 11 could please go to slide 45. 12 Q This slide refers to ways that individuals who 13 are engaging in bitcoin transactions can take 14 measures to provide further anonymity. You 15 would agree that even legitimate users of 16 bitcoin who aren't engaged in criminal activity 17 may want to take measures to anonymize their 18 transactions? (AG) Yes. 19 Α 20 (WK) Yes. 21 MS. MAGONET: Thank you. Those are my only questions 22 about the PowerPoint. Thank you so much, Madam 23 Registrar, for scrolling through it so 24 efficiently.

I would now like to pull up the 2015 senate

perfect.

1	report on cryptocurrency that I circulated on
2	Friday. And thank you.
3	Q And I would first like to ask whether the panel
4	is familiar with this document or recognizes
5	this document?
6	A (AG) Yes.
7	(WK) Yes.
8	MS. MAGONET: Okay. Great. Madam Registrar, could
9	you please go to page 32 of this document.
10	Q So this was a Senate report into digital
11	currency that was done in 2015. And on this
12	page I think it might be a little further up.
13	Yes. Right there. That's perfect. It says:
14	"The Royal Canadian Mounted Police said
15	that laws and regulations for digital
16	currencies should not negatively affect
17	the innovative benefits that legitimate
18	users derive from these currencies."
19	You would agree with this statement?
20	A (WK) Yes.
21	(AV) Yes.
22	(AG) Yes.
23	MS. MAGONET: Thank you. And, Madam Registrar, if
24	you could also go to page 39. Yes, this is

1	
1	Q And on this page it says:
2	"The Royal Canadian Mounted Police noted
3	that legitimate users of digital
4	currencies can benefit from increased
5	privacy."
6	You would agree with this statement?
7	A (WK) Yes.
8	MS. MAGONET: Excellent. Mr. Commissioner
9	THE WITNESS: (AG) Yes.
10	MS. MAGONET: Oh, thank you.
11	THE WITNESS: (AG) Sorry.
12	MS. MAGONET: Mr. Commissioner, would it be possible
13	to have this marked as an exhibit?
14	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. That is fine. We'll mark
15	that as our next exhibit. Madam Registrar, I
16	think I've lost track.
17	THE REGISTRAR: It's number 254, Mr. Commissioner.
18	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
19	EXHIBIT 254: Senate Report - Digital Currency:
20	You Can't Flip this Coin! - June 2015
21	MS. MAGONET: Thank you, so much to the panelists.
22	And, Mr. Commissioner, those are my questions.
23	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Now, Mr. Gratl, on
24	behalf of Transparency International Coalition
25	you've been allocated 45 minutes, and I'm just

1 wondering if you anticipate taking that full amount of time. 2 I do not. 3 MR. GRATL: 4 THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. Thanks. Please go ahead. EXAMINATION BY MR. GRATL: 5 My first question is for Acting Sergeant Gilkes. 6 Your curriculum vitae lists collaboration with 7 corporate security of major banks, unofficial 8 9 task forces. Which major banks and what are the unofficial task forces? 10 (AG) In terms of unofficial task forces, it was 11 A 12 more in relation to the recovery of defrauded 13 funds. Now, this was in collaboration with 14 other police departments and the major banks 15 themselves, the five major banks, in that when there would be a report of -- and a confirmation 16 17 of defrauded funds, there would be an attempt by 18 a group of law enforcement to try to track down 19 the funds and provide a venue for recovering the 20 funds. 21 So all five major banks, then? 0 22 (AG) To my knowledge they were all participants Α 23 in some way, but simply to notify police that 24 there was -- well, quickly notify police of some

sort of fraud or some sort of breach that ha

1		occurred.
2	Q	All right. And does this unofficial
3		collaboration have a name?
4	А	(AG) No. This was actually some time ago,
5		several years ago, and it was really in
6		association with investigations that were
7		well, there was often collaboration between the
8		various police agencies and simply that there
9		would be a notification of some sort of breach,
10		and then all police the police agencies would
11		simply contact each other and ask if there was
12		anything in your jurisdiction that could be done
13		in order to recover whatever funds may have been
14		breached or help in any way.
15	Q	Sergeant Vickery, you mentioned Project
16		Participate, and my notes indicate you saying
17		that a lot of the private sector money services
18		businesses are involved in that. I take it that
19		includes the chartered banks in Canada, does it?
20	А	(AV) No, I don't believe that the banks are a
21		part of that. I believe that it's all the newly
22		registered virtual asset service providers.
23		Those that are actually dealing with virtual
24		currency exchanges. There are Canadian entities
25		as well as some of the larger ones within the

	United Kingdom and the United States as well as
	private sector such as Grant Thornton, who I
	believe will be testifying either tomorrow or
	Wednesday.
Q	I have that note that Scotiabank is part of
	Project Participate; is that correct, or can you
	speak to it?
А	(AV) I cannot speak to that. I don't I'm not
	familiar with all of the parties. As I said,
	our counterpart in the RCMP or my colleague out
	in the Greater Toronto Area is the
	representative. I've sat in on a couple of
	meetings but I'm not familiar with all the
	participants.
Q	All right. And then you're familiar with the
	alliance with Bank of Montreal called Project
	Protect? Have you heard of that?
А	(AV) Yes, I have.
Q	All right. So that involves the Bank of
	Montreal collaborating with the RCMP; is that
	correct?
А	(AV) I believe so. I wasn't involved in Project
	Protect, so I'm not again, I don't know who
	all the players are in that.
	A Q

Okay. Do you agree with the description of

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Q

1		Project Protect as a public/private partnership?
2	А	(AV) You know what? I just really don't feel
3		comfortable commenting on it because I I
4		mean, I've heard the name but I really don't
5		offhand without reviewing it in advance, I can't
6		speak to what it was about.
7	Q	Acting Sergeant Gilkes, can you speak to Project
8		Protect, the public/private partnership with
9		BMO?
10	А	(AG) I cannot. I do not have details as to the
11		operation itself or the project.
12	Q	And, Sergeant Krahenbil, could you speak to
13		Project Protect?
14	А	(WK) Sorry, this is the first I've heard of it.
15	Q	All right. Would you agree that the banks are
16		in competition with cryptocurrency because the
17		banks own other transfer systems like Interac
18		and Visa?
19	А	(AV) Personally, no, I don't believe that
20		they're in competition with them at all. I
21		mean, I think that, you know, other payment
22		methods are still king. The Bank of Canada did
23		a report, I want to say last year, I believe,
24		where they evaluated that only 5 percent of
25		Canadian citizens were currently dealing in

1		cryptocurrency. So I think, you know, the use
2		of cryptocurrency would have to come a lot
3		further before the Canadian banks would feel
4		that they were in competition with the
5		exchanges.
6	Q	All right. Sergeant Vickery, do you agree there
7		is a growing class of institutional investors
8		conducting larger transfers of cryptocurrencies?
9	A	(AV) Can you rephrase that, please.
10	Q	Institutional investors account for more than
11		half of all purchases of bitcoin, for example,
12		above \$1 million. You're aware of that?
13	A	(AV) No, I can't speak to that.
14	Q	Okay. So you're not aware of the extent to
15		which, say, large banks in Canada are involved
16		in the purchase of bitcoin?
17	A	(AV) No, I'm not.
18	Q	Are banks in Canada involved in the
19		cryptocurrency market as over-the-counter
20		brokers for their clients?
21	A	(AV) I cannot speak to that. I don't know.
22	Q	Acting Sergeant Gilkes, could you speak to that?
23	A	(AG) I'm actually not aware of that. I'm sorry.
24	Q	All right. And, Sergeant Krahenbil, have you

heard of that?

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1	А	(WK) Sorry, I haven't.
2	Q	Okay. Would you would any of the panelists
3		be familiar with large institutional investors
4		in bitcoin or cybercurrency in Canada at all?
5	A	(AV) No.
6		(WK) No, sorry.
7		(AG) No.
8	Q	I take it it's fair to conclude that to your
9		knowledge the RCMP is not interested in the
10		cybercurrency activities engaged in by private
11		banks and large institutions in Canada. Is that
12		true?
13	A	(AV) I wouldn't say that at all. I would say
14		that we are three individuals of a very large
15		organization and, you know, we can only know so
16		much or have, you know, an expertise in such a
17		large area and perhaps there are other
18		individuals that could speak to this.
19	Q	Sergeant Vickery, you're the cybercurrency
20		coordinator for the entire RCMP based in Ottawa;
21		right?
22	А	(AV) I'm the national cryptocurrency
23		coordinator, yes.
24	Q	Yeah, so if anybody in the RCMP is qualified to

speak about RCMP involvement in cryptocurrency

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MR. GRATL:

1	that would be you, wouldn't it?
2	A (AV) I
3	MR. BRONGERS: Mr. Commissioner, it's Jan Brongers on
4	behalf of the Government of Canada. The witness
5	has answered that she does not feel that she is
6	able to answer these factual questions. These
7	witnesses have been asked to appear before the
8	commission in order to provide factual
9	information about virtual currencies, and I
10	don't think it's appropriate for counsel to
11	continue with this line of questioning when the
12	witness has said that she can't provide an
13	answer.
14	MR. GRATL: I'm just asking about the scope of her
15	competency and if anybody within the RCMP is
16	better able to speak to that than the witness.
17	THE COMMISSIONER: I think that's a fair question.
18	THE WITNESS: (AV) As I had mentioned, I'm really
19	not I'm not familiar to be able to provide
20	you an answer to that at this point. IT'S
21	certainly something that I can look into and
22	come back with an answer for, but I cannot
23	answer it at this point in time because I do not
24	have the knowledge.

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Α

1	Q	Sure. BUT what I was really asking was would
2		there be anybody within the RCMP better
3		positioned than you to have that knowledge about
4		the RCMP's interest in banks' involvement in
5		cybercurrency or large institutional investors'
6		involvement in cybercurrency?
7	A	(AV) Would there be somebody? Well, considering
8		that I have no answer for you, I would assume
9		that there probably is somebody that would know
10		more than me, but I'm unable to provide you an
11		answer at this point. I'm not sure how to alter
12		that answer any way.
13	Q	Okay. Thank you. I take it that you
14		appreciate this is for each of the panel
15		members. You appreciate that banks in Canada
16		are involved in money laundering, Sergeant
17		Vickery?
18	A	(AV) Well, does money laundering flow through
19		Canadian banks, yes.
20	Q	Acting Sergeant Gilkes?
21	A	(AG) In terms of banks being used as a tool to
22		launder funds, I would agree with that
23		particular statement.
24	Q	And Sergeant Krahenbil?

(WK) Other than things that I know anecdotally

1		from the media, it's outside of my venue.
2	Q	All right. I just say this, that it would
3		appear from the slide presentation that the
4		primary targets of the cryptocurrency are scams,
5		frauds perpetrated by cybercurrency, phishing,
6		including sextortion, purchase of drugs and
7		gambling; is that right?
8	А	(AV) They're some of the offences that can be
9		facilitated through the use of cryptocurrency,
10		but I think that, you know, cryptocurrency is
11		basically a substitution for cash and can be
12		used to enable all kind of criminality. We also
13		talked about terrorist financing there as well.
14	Q	Right. But you're familiar that HSBC, for
15		example, was charged for laundering billions of
16		dollars for Mexican cartels?
17	A	(AV) I recall something along those lines. I
18		don't know the exact amount or really even the
19		bank that was involved.
20	Q	And do you know that Scotiabank was recently
21		ran into some trouble in Costa Rica for being
22		involved in payment of bribes for a large
23		infrastructure project?
24	A	(AV) That I was not aware of.

All right. And of course those aren't unusual

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Q

1		circumstances, are they?
2	А	(AV) That I cannot speak to.
3	Q	All right. Can you speak to, from a policy
4		point of view, why the RCMP is not casting its
5		investigative eye on institutional investors
6		involved in large transactions?
7	А	(AV) So my role as the national cryptocurrency
8		coordinator is to identify, you know, what tools
9		are needed by our operational membership in
10		order to be able to conduct their cryptocurrency
11		investigations. You're asking me questions that
12		are at a far higher level and I think there are
13		better people suited within the RCMP, certainly
14		of a higher rank, to be able to answer these
15		questions.
16	Q	All right. Sergeant Vickery, I understand that
17		your primary service provider for the detection
18		of movement of cryptocurrency is the company
19		Chainalysis; is that right?
20	А	(AV) No, that's not necessarily correct. We
21		also utilize CipherTrace, and we have an equal
22		amount of licences for both.
23	Q	I see. All right. Now, is what level of due
24		diligence has been conducted into Chainalysis's

history and its operations?

1	А	(AV) So that would be a question better pointed
2		to the National Cybercrime Coordination Centre
3		who are the organization that have gathered
4		these tools on behalf of law enforcement and
5		provided access to these tools to us. They have
6		done significant work, I know, in that area, but
7		I was not involved in it and so cannot speak to
8		it.
9	Q	Who operates that national cybercrime
10		organization?
11	А	(AV) I believe it's a joint force operation with
12		public safety, the RCMP and some other police
13		forces, but I'm not sure to their exact
14		structure.
15	Q	All right. What level of investigative scrutiny
16		is cast on organizations like Chainalysis?
17	А	(AV) As I had mentioned, the background checks
18		and the scrutiny would have come from the
19		National Cybercrime Coordinate Centre, but I can
20		certainly say that the FBI, HSI, DEA, Europol
21		all employ the services of these tools and they
22		are certainly considered a valuable partner to
23		law enforcement.
24	Q	All right. Chainalysis works by aggregating
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publicly available data about transfers of

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1		blockchain and then providing software to enable
2		searches of those of that publicly available
3		data; is that correct? Maybe Sergeant
4		Krahenbil
5	А	(AV) yeah, I'll defer.
6		(WK) I believe that's correct.
7	Q	All right. And, Sergeant Krahenbil, I take it
8		you're a great you've received personally a
9		great deal of training into the Chainalysis and
10		its systems?
11	A	(WK) Yeah, I've received training from
12		Chainalysis and I've participated in their
13		Webinars.
14	Q	All right. And if Chainalysis doesn't include
15		data in its own proprietary database, I take it,
16		then, it would be invisible to the RCMP officer
17		using the software?
18	THE	COMMISSIONER: Sorry, could you repeat that
19		question. I didn't quite hear it.
20	MR.	GRATL:
21	Q	So Chainalysis has a proprietary database which
22		is created by aggregating publicly available
23		blockchain data; is that right?
24	A	(WK) I would probably pass that question off to
٥٢		the Chairelands seemle the Thelices were the

the Chainalysis people, who I believe are going

1		to be testifying tomorrow or the next day.
2	Q	All right. The existing RCMP investigations
3		have not really extended beyond the commission
4		of ordinary crimes using cybercurrency as a
5		medium or a vehicle for the commission of the
6		crime; is that correct?
7	А	(WK) So is your just to clarify. Your
8		question is the substantive offence in most of
9		these investigations is not the cryptocurrency?
10	Q	Well, I mean to say that Acting Sergeant Gilkes
11		stated earlier that just because you pay the
12		hitman in bitcoin doesn't turn it into a
13		cybercrime. Well, the same thing is true for
14		drug crime; right? SO just because you pay for
15		the mail order fentanyl with bitcoin, that
16		doesn't turn it into a cybercrime; correct?
17	А	(WK) It would be a more of a cyber-enabled
18		crime.
19	Q	Right. So and similarly just because you pay
20		the ransomware people with bitcoin, that doesn't
21		turn it into a money laundering kind of offence,
22		does it?
23	А	(WK) I don't investigate money laundering
24		per se myself, but I'd say that the funds would

eventually be laundered down -- wouldn't it

1		become fiat?
2	Q	All right. Are you aware of any requirement
3		that any elected public officials declare
4		cybercurrency asset ownership as part of ethics
5		scrutiny?
6	A	(WK) I don't know that.
7	Q	All right. Is there any type of asset registry
8		in Canada that would require a person within
9		Canada to declare ownership of cybercurrency?
10	А	(WK) Not that I know of.
11	Q	Sergeant Vickery?
12	А	(AV) No, I do not believe so.
13	Q	All right. Acting Sergeant Gilkes, is there
14		such a thing, an asset registry for
15		cybercurrency?
16	A	(AG) To my knowledge, no.
17	Q	All right. So in that case is there anything
18		that would prevent bribes to public officials,
19		either elected or senior civil servants, using
20		cryptocurrency?
21	A	(AV) I don't believe so.
22		(WK) I don't think so.
23	Q	All right. If cybercurrency is an asset, then
24		increases in the value of the asset would

attract capital gains tax; is that correct?

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1	A	(AV) Yes, that's the approach that CRA is
2		taking.
3	Q	All right. And what work is CRA doing to
4		coordinate the detection of capital gains
5		derived from the increases in the value of
6		cybercurrency?
7	А	(AV) That would be a question best directed to
8		Canada Revenue Agency.
9	Q	All right. So you're not you don't know of
10		any RCMP work in that regard?
11	A	(AV) No.
12	Q	Okay. Would the would an asset registry that
13		would include registration of cybercurrency be
14		of assistance to law enforcement?
15	A	(WK) Sorry, just to clarify that. You're
16		talking about, like, a list of the
17		cryptocurrency that somebody would own?
18	Q	Yes, that's correct.
19	A	(AV) I mean, of course it would be helpful to
20		law enforcement because any information is
21		helpful to law enforcement, but it would also be
22		detrimental to our privacy rights here in Canada
23		for all the legitimate users of cryptocurrency.
24	Q	I wonder if the panel can comment on the use of

cryptocurrency to conceal non-payment of income

1		tax.
2	A	(WK) I don't think I could speak to that.
3		(AG) Personally I've never investigated
4		income tax evasion, so unfortunately I cannot
5		speak to that either.
6	Q	I'm thinking of a vehicle using bitcoin as a
7		vehicle for offshore transfer of funds within
8		Canada.
9	A	(AV) I mean, certainly having cryptocurrency
10		offers or enables a means to be able to put
11		value towards it; right? And as you said,
12		transfer it offshore. Unless you're under
13		investigation by the RCMP or you declare it to
14		CRA, it's very likely that these that the
15		cryptocurrency can go unnoticed or unidentified.
16		And so yes, there is a huge threat to be able to
17		use it for tax evasion or to avoid the payment
18		of capital gains for any interest that is
19		accrued while it's in your possession.
20	Q	When I'm in court in the Vancouver Law Courts I
21		like to have coffee in the morning at the Waves
22		café which houses the first bitcoin ATM machine.
23		I'm usually there from about 7 o'clock when the
24		cafe opens to 9 o'clock in the morning when the
25		free parking runs out, and I go to the parking

1		lot underneath the courthouse. I never see
2		anybody use that machine. Are there any records
3		kept about how much of a problem ATM bitcoin
4		machines might be?
5	А	(AV) Well, I want to say Chainalysis in their
6		spring 2020 report reported that 88 percent of
7		all cryptocurrency ATMs funds were sent offshore
8		to an international country. Now, whether that
9		actually supports the amount of elicit
10		cryptocurrency going through, I'm not sure, but
11		they certainly are seen as a risky mechanism to
12		be able to launder funds.
13	Q	All right. But is the RCMP taking any steps to
14		attend to transactions cryptocurrency
15		transactions originating in Canada or with
16		Canadian destinations that are of large amounts,
17		like in excess of a million dollars, for
18		example?
19	А	(AV) Well, that I can't speak to ongoing
20		investigations as well as, you know, currently
21		some of these investigations are done in covert
22		methods that aren't necessarily open. The files
23		themselves are restricted and not available to
24		all of us to be able to view and see what we're
25		currently working on.

1	Q	You're saying I can neither confirm nor deny the
2		existence of such an investigation?
3	А	(AV) Yeah, you are.
4	Q	All right. Rather than speaking of specific
5		investigations, I wonder if as an institutional
6		policy whether the RCMP isn't turning its
7		investigative eye more to small players like the
8		ATM the bitcoin ATMs rather than paying
9		attention to the large transactions by
10		institutional investors for private equity?
11	А	(AV) So I believe what was, you know, addressed
12		in the second slide when we began our
13		presentation that while, you know, these CRA
14		scams appear at first glance to be very small
15		amounts, whether it be \$18,000 or \$2,000,
16		collectively this is a multi-million-dollar
17		fraud scheme, and the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre
18		has collected more than 5,700 complaints of
19		fraud dealing with cryptocurrency. So you can
20		imagine the totality of the funds that are
21		extorted from victims, innocent victims across
22		the country, so I don't actually see that as
23		being a small fish.
24		(AG) Also myself, I mentioned in the way

that the RCMP conducts its investigations, it

1 doesn't necessarily start off as a virtual asset 2 investigation. So we essentially start an 3 investigation into whatever type of crime may be the substantive crime, and then follow it as it 4 5 goes, and if it leads to virtual assets, then it 6 leads to virtual assets. So we tend to approach it in that regard. 7 All right. The predicate offences that you're 0 8 9 investigating within the institution, those tend to be oriented towards the smaller end of the 10 11 transactions rather than the large aggregate 12 amounts; is that right? 13 Α (AG) Well, in terms of investigating smaller 14 transactions versus larger transactions, the 15 initial complaint tends to be a portion or a small compartment of the overall damage or 16 17 the -- of the aggregate offence. So if we 18 attempt to take on an investigation and we're 19 lucky enough to be able to find out -- find 20 other victims, find other evidence that proves 21 that it's part of a much larger endeavour, well, 22 then that is great and that's where the 23 investigation take us. If not, then we're able to basically conduct a smaller investigation and 24

bring someone to justice who we were able to

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1 prove have three victims as opposed to the 300, well, then we continue to do that. 2 3 So there's -- so to your knowledge, though, there's no presumption of investigative interest 4 or suspicion associated with large transactions, 5 6 say, above a million dollars or some other large amount the way there might be for presumptive 7 reporting for transfers of cash involving 8 9 greater than \$10,000 under the money laundering 10 rules? 11 Α (AV) So you have to understand that these 12 regulations have just come into play here in 13 Canada. So unless we're actually investigating 14 one of these entities we may never have been 15 even made aware of that transactions of this 16 level have gone through dealing with 17 cryptocurrency. And I think, you know, in 18 Canada here we're in a far better position now 19 that regulations are in play to be alerted to 20 this kind of information through proactive 2.1 disclosures from FINTRAC. 22 I'm not sure that you understood the nature of 0 23 the question. FINTRAC creates a requirement. There's a requirement for financial agencies to 24

report all cash transactions of greater than

1		\$10,000. It automatically goes to FINTRAC.
2	A	(AV) Yes.
3	Q	And there's a requirement to ask questions of
4		the person engaged in the transaction. Is there
5		anything comparable for transactions involving
6		cybercurrency?
7	A	(AV) Well, regulations have just come into play
8		here in Canada to have the money service
9		businesses report any suspicious transaction
10		reports, and I believe it will come into effect
11		on June 1st of 2021 where the large cash
12		transactions, so anything over and above the
13		\$10,000 threshold, will need to be reported as
14		large cash transactions.
15	Q	All right. Would it assist the RCMP to have
16		greater scrutiny the larger the amount reported
17		so that, for example, each time you added a zero
18		it would a transaction would receive, say,
19		ten times the scrutiny?
20	A	(AV) Well, I believe that we have to have faith
21		in the money service businesses to be able to
22		detect these suspicious transactions or the
23		large cash transaction. I mean, they are going
24		to be mandated to report all of these to
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FINTRAC, and FINTRAC is the entity assigned to

Aaron Gilkes (for the commission)
Adrienne Vickery (for the commission)
Warren Krahenbil (for the commission)
Discussion re examinations

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1		be able to analyze these and, you know, when
2		warranted turn this information over to the
3		RCMP. So I believe that all information that
4		requires that greater level of scrutiny is
5		already being disseminated.
6	Q	Okay.
7	A	(AG) I also don't think it's the actual amount
8		of the transaction itself that will garner the
9		interest; I think it's the nature of the
10		transaction. And once again I come to the
11		aggregate potential. I mean, if we're talking
12		about 1,000 victims of \$100 each versus one
13		\$1,100,000 transaction, I mean, you're looking
14		at the same damage in the end. So, I mean, it
15		makes more sense to target the investigation
16		where you can help more victims in your
17		investigation.
18	MR.	GRATL: Thank you, those are my questions.
19	THE	COMMISSIONER: All right. Thank you, Mr. Gratl.
20		Anything arising, Ms. Magonet? And please
21		correct me if I'm mispronouncing your name.
22	MS.	MAGONET: Excuse me. It's pronounced Magonet,
23		Mr. Commissioner.
24	THE	COMMISSIONER: Magonet. Thank you.

MS. MAGONET: And -- no problem. And nothing

Aaron Gilkes (for the commission) Adrienne Vickery (for the commission) Warren Krahenbil (for the commission) Discussion re examinations

1	arising. Thank you.
2	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Ms. Harlingten?
3	MS. HARLINGTON: Nothing arising from me,
4	Mr. Commissioner. Thank you.
5	THE COMMISSIONER: Mr sorry. Mr. Martland?
6	MR. MARTLAND: No, thank you, Mr. Commissioner. I
7	think that concludes subject to anyone else
8	unmuting to tell us otherwise, that concludes
9	our evidence today. Thank you.
10	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you to the members of the
11	panel. You are now excused from further
12	testifying.
13	All right. We will adjourn until tomorrow
14	at 9:30.
15	THE REGISTRAR: The hearing is now adjourned until
16	November 24th, 2020, at 9:30 a.m. Thank you.
17	(WITNESSES EXCUSED)
18	(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 1:49 P.M. TO NOVEMBER 24
19	2020)
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