



# From Zero to App-Hero

Static and dynamic Android application  
reverse engineering

About myself

# Bjoern Kerler

- Reverse Engineer and Cryptoanalyst
- Likes to break software and hardware :)
- Twitter: <https://twitter.com/viperbjk>
- Github: <https://github.com/bkerler>

# Topics of this marvellous presentation

1. Introduction to static Android  
application reversing

**Level:** Bad-Ass – Lone Ranger

2. Reversing using dynamic  
application Android reversing  
(debugging and hooking/injection)

**Level:** Couch-Potato - I like watching

# Introduction to static application reversing

## What do we need ?

1. Disassembler  
IDA Pro, Hopper, Radare2, Capstone,...
2. Decompiler  
JEB, Jad-Gui, APKTool,...
3. Debugger  
JDB, ADB, Android Studio, IDA Pro, ...

## Location of an android application

- Free apps are stored as base.apk in /data/apps/[Your Appname]
- Some paid apps are encrypted as .asec encrypted ext4 container, containing the apk (see AppsOnSD.sks for aes key)
- Appname is based on java namespace

## Structure of an android application

APKs are ZIP-Files:

- AndroidManifest.xml
- Classes[Nr].dex
- Lib folder for native libraries
- Res folder for resources (language, strings, values, certificates, etc.)

## Get code from binaries

- `Classes[Nr].dex`:  
DEX=Dalvik Executable, can be converted to Java Smali Format  
Has main application code, sometimes multidex
- Native libraries:  
Folder for each platform (x86, arm, ..)  
Dynamic libraries as .so (mainly custom support stuff such as crypto)



## Typical way of reversing

- Classes[Nr].dex:  
JEB (Expensive), JAD-X (Free), Bytecode-Viewer (Free), IDA Pro (Expensive/Bytecode)
- Native libraries:  
IDA Pro (Expensive), JEB (Expensive), Hopper (Fair), Radare2/Capstone (Free)


# Our target for today

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# KYMS - Keep your media safe

IdeaSolutions S.r.l. Video Players & Editors ★★★★★ 12,439

USK: All ages


Contains ads · Offers in-app purchases

This app is compatible with all of your devices.

Add to Wishlist


Install

Hide and encrypt your media behind a working calculator.




Military grade encryption  
Real time decrypting

Hide and encrypt photos




Add media

Hide and encrypt videos



Add media

Hide



Kyms looks like a working and stylish calculator App but it hides an inviolable vault in which to hide and encrypt all your multimedia and text files with military grade security (AES Encryption).

<https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=it.ideasolutions.kyms&hl=en>

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## KYMS - Keep your media safe

IdeaSolutions S.r.l. Video Players & Editors

★★★★★ 12,439


USK: All ages

Contains ads · Offers in-app purchases

This app is compatible with all of your devices.

Add to Wishlist

Install



Yeah, “military” sounds  
frightening secure 😊

Kyms looks like a working and stylish calculator App but it hides an inviolable vault in which to hide and encrypt all your multimedia and text files with military grade security (AES Encryption).





# Lets download it

## Options of downloading apks

- Test device, rooted :  
Install from play store, grab base.apk from  
/data/app/it.ideasolutions.kyms-1
- Use Racoon (Java) or gplaycli (python)
- Get apk by googling from serious apk  
download site

## Options of downloading apks

- Test device, rooted :  
Install from play store  
/data/app/it.idea
- Use Racoon (Java)  Only if you are in desperate need of additional free malware/rootkits or „protective“ modifications 😊
- ~~- Get apk by googling from serious apk download site~~







Lets install it  
on emulator  
to see how it  
works


## What do we know

- Having a look at the some files and the main database, they do look encrypted. App page said “aes” is used.
- User can enter pin and password, or just password instead
- Calculator needs pin (enter pin and press enter), asks for password, then shows secret main area

## Crafting our attack plan

- Searching for any “aes” or “encrypt” debug string
- As database is encrypted, normally sqlcipher or direct aes encryption is being used
- AES Key is either a) derived via KDF (PBKDF-SHA1/SHA256 or scrypt) or b) custom crypto

# Lets go using JEB



Obfuscation is being used.  
Class names and functions are  
replaced by a, aa, aaa, b, bb and so  
on

```
.class public final a$b
.super Object

.annotation system EnclosingClass
    value = a
.end annotation

.annotation system InnerClass
    accessFlags = 0x19
    name = "b"
.end annotation

.field public static final bottomsheetsheet_default_sheet_width:I = 0x7F0B0013

.class public final a$a
.super Object


.annotation system EnclosingClass
```

Description Hex Dump Disassembly Zeichenketten

Logger

Console

```
Basisverzeichnis: C:\Decompiler\jeb2.4_floating
Programmverzeichnis: C:\Decompiler\jeb2.4_floating\bin
System: Windows 10 10.0 (amd64) de_DE
Java: Oracle Corporation 1.8.0_141
Plugin loaded: class com.pnf.plugin.oat.OATPlugin
Plugin loaded: class com.pnf.plugin.pdf.PdfPlugin
Suche nach Update...
Bei der Update-Suche ist ein Fehler aufgetreten
Creating a new project (primary file: C:\Emulator\it.ideasolutions.kyms-20.apk)
Adding artifact to project: C:\Emulator\it.ideasolutions.kyms-20.apk
```



Looks like file decryption



The screenshot shows a Java decompiler interface with the following components:

- Left Panel (Class Hierarchy):** A tree view showing the package structure. The 'crypto' package is expanded, showing classes like 'CryptoSession', 'CryptoUtils', and 'DecryptInputStream'. The 'DecryptInputStream' class is selected, and its methods are listed: '<init>', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'close', 'nativeClose', 'nativeConstructor', 'nativeRead', 'nativeReset', 'nativeSkip', 'read', 'read', 'reset', and 'skip'.
- Right Panel (Source Code):** The source code of the 'DecryptInputStream' class is displayed. The 'close()' method is highlighted, showing a call to 'DecryptInputStream.nativeClose(this.a);'. The code is as follows:

```
public void close() {  
    Object v1 = this.c;  
    __monitor_enter(v1);  
    if (!this.b) {  
        DecryptInputStream.nativeClose(this.a);  
        this.b = true;  
    }  
    __monitor_exit(v1);  
    return;  
label_11:  
    __monitor_exit(v1);  
}  
catch (Throwable v0) {  
    goto label_11;  
}
```
- Bottom Panel (Logger/Console):** A log window showing the decompilation process. The log includes the following information:
  - Programmverzeichnis: C:\Decompiler\jeb2.4\_floating\bin
  - System: Windows 10 10.0 (amd64) de\_DE
  - Java: Oracle Corporation 1.8.0\_141
  - Plugin loaded: class com.pnf.plugin.oat.OATPlugin
  - Plugin loaded: class com.pnf.plugin.pdf.PdfPlugin
  - Suche nach Update...
  - Bei der Update-Suche ist ein Fehler aufgetreten
  - Creating a new project (primary file: C:\Emulator\it.ideasolutions.kyms-20.apk)
  - Adding artifact to project: C:\Emulator\it.ideasolutions.kyms-20.apk
  - Decompiling at Lit/ideasolutions/kyms/crypto/DecryptInputStream;->close()V+22h



What the ..... Empty function ?!?!?



The screenshot displays a Java decompiler interface. On the left, a project tree shows the following structure:

- kyms
  - a
  - app
  - b
  - calculator
  - crypto
    - CryptoSession
    - CryptoUtils
    - DecryptInputStream
      - <init>
      - a
      - b
      - c
      - close
      - nativeClose
      - nativeConstructor
      - nativeRead
      - nativeReset
      - nativeSkip
      - read
      - read
      - reset
      - skip
    - a
    - data

The right pane shows the source code of the `DecryptInputStream` class. The `nativeConstructor` method is highlighted:

```
private static native long nativeConstructor(byte[] arg0, String arg1) {  
    }  
  
private static native int nativeRead(long arg0, byte[] arg1, int arg2, int arg3) {  
    }  
  
private static native void nativeReset(long arg0) {  
    }  
  
private static native long nativeSkip(long arg0, long arg1) {  
    }  
  
public int read() {  
    return 0;  
}  
  
public int read(byte[] arg3, int arg4, int arg5) {  
    }  
}
```

The bottom pane shows a log of the decompilation process:

```
Programverzeichnis: C:\Decompiler\jeb2.4_floating\bin  
System: Windows 10 10.0 (amd64) de_DE  
Java: Oracle Corporation 1.8.0_141  
Plugin loaded: class com.pnf.plugin.oat.OATPlugin  
Plugin loaded: class com.pnf.plugin.pdf.PdfPlugin  
Suche nach Update...  
Bei der Update-Suche ist ein Fehler aufgetreten  
Creating a new project (primary file: C:\Emulator\it.ideasolutions.kyms-20.apk)  
Adding artifact to project: C:\Emulator\it.ideasolutions.kyms-20.apk  
Decompiling at Lit/ideasolutions/kyms/crypto/DecryptInputStream;->close()V+22h
```

The status bar at the bottom shows the coordinates (0,40,31), the address Lit/i...BLjava/lang/String;J, the location loc: ?, and the available decompilers: dex, arm, mips.

That could be an overloaded or an exported native function, which is loaded dynamically, in this case by using a dynamic library from the lib folder 😊

The screenshot displays the JD-GUI decompiler interface. On the left, a project tree shows the structure of the decompiled application, with the 'DecryptInputStream' class selected under the 'crypto' package. The main window shows the source code of this class, which includes several native methods (e.g., `nativeConstructor`, `nativeRead`, `nativeReset`, `nativeSkip`) and public methods (`read`). The code is written in Java, with native methods declared as `private static native`. The bottom panel shows the 'Logger' and 'Console' tabs, displaying the output of the decompilation process, including the path to the decompiled files and the version of the decompiler used.

```
public class DecryptInputStream {  
    private static native long nativeConstructor(byte[] arg0, String arg1) {  
    }  
  
    private static native int nativeRead(long arg0, byte[] arg1, int arg2, int arg3) {  
    }  
  
    private static native void nativeReset(long arg0) {  
    }  
  
    private static native long nativeSkip(long arg0, long arg1) {  
    }  
  
    public int read() {  
        return 0;  
    }  
  
    public int read(byte[] arg3, int arg4, int arg5) {  
    }  
}
```

coord: (0,40,31) | addr: Lit/i...B.java/lang/String;J | loc: ? Available decompilers: dex, arm, mips D...t

JEB 2.3 - C:\Emulator\it.ideasolutions.kyms-20.apk

Datei Bearbeiten Navigation Aktion Native Debugger Fenster Hilfe

Project Explorer Bytecode/Hierarchy

it  
  ideasolutions  
    a  
      a  
      b  
    browser  
    kyms  
  javax  
  net  
    sqlcipher  
      database  
      AbstractCursor  
      AbstractWindowedCursor  
      BuildConfig  
      BulkCursorNative  
      BulkCursorProxy  
      BulkCursorToCursorAdaptor  
      CrossProcessCursorWrapper  
      Cursor  
      CursorIndexOutOfBoundsException  
      CursorWindow  
      CursorWrapper  
      DatabaseErrorHandler  
      DatabaseUtils  
      DefaultDatabaseErrorHandler  
      IBulkCursor  
      IContentObserver  
      MatrixCursor  
      R  
      SQLException  
      StaleDataException  
  org  
    apache  
    iavia

Filter: type "Enter" to validate

As expected, we spotted as well net.sqlcipher which is being used for database encryption 😊

```
.method public  
  .registers 5  
  00000000 iget-object v0, p0, f$4->c:f  
  00000004 iget-object v1, p0, f$4->a:ContentFrameLayout  
  00000008 iget-boolean v2, p0, f$4->b:Z  
  0000000C invoke-static f->a(f, ContentFrameLayout, Z)V, v0, v1, v2  
  00000012 return-void  
.end method  
  
.class f$a  
.super Object  
  
.implements AbsListView$OnScrollListener  
  
.annotation system EnclosingClass  
  value = f  
.end annotation  
  
.annotation system InnerClass
```

Description Hex Dump Disassembly Zeichenketten

Logger Console

Programmverzeichnis: C:\Decompiler\jeb2.4\_floating\bin  
System: Windows 10 10.0 (amd64) de\_DE  
Java: Oracle Corporation 1.8.0\_141  
Plugin loaded: class com.pnf.plugin.oat.OATPlugin  
Plugin loaded: class com.pnf.plugin.pdf.PdfPlugin  
Suche nach Update...  
Bei der Update-Suche ist ein Fehler aufgetreten  
Creating a new project (primary file: C:\Emulator\it.ideasolutions.kyms-20.apk)  
Adding artifact to project: C:\Emulator\it.ideasolutions.kyms-20.apk  
Decompiling at Lit/ideasolutions/kyms/crypto/DecryptInputStream;->close()V+22h

coord: (77615,3,40) | addr: ...tions/kyms/app/f\$a; | loc: ? Available decompilers: dex, arm, mips D...t

SQLCipher has three traditional ways of inputting a dbpassword :

1. Via „PRAGMA KEY“ sqlite command
2. Via Class Constructor and/or OpenOrCreateDatabase function

The screenshot displays the JEB 2.3 interface. The Project Explorer on the left shows a tree structure with 'it' as the root, containing 'ideasolutions', 'javax', 'net', and 'org'. Under 'net', 'sqlcipher' is expanded, showing various classes like 'AbstractCursor', 'BulkCursorNative', etc. The Disassembly view on the right shows the code for the 'f\$a' class, which implements 'AbsListView\$OnScrollListener'. The Console log at the bottom shows the decompilation process, including the path 'C:\Decompiler\jeb2.4\_floating\bin' and the message 'Creating a new project (primary file: C:\Emulator\it.ideasolutions.kyms-20.apk)'.



## Project Explorer

## Querverweise

Index	Adresse	Label	Kommentar
0	Lit/ideasolutions/kyms/data/SettingsManager;->a(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)V+20h		
1	Lit/ideasolutions/kyms/data/sqldatabase_handler\$1;->run()V+32h		
2	Lit/ideasolutions/kyms/data/sqldatabase_handler\$6;->run()V+14h		

Tracing back function a (with  
getWritableDatabase), we see only  
three functions are calling it

SettingsManager does look way too  
interesting 😊

```
b).getWritableDatabase(arg3);
```

```
ad[] arg13) {
```

```
Plugin 1  
Suche nach Upd  
Bei der Update-Suche  
Creating a new project (primary file  
Adding artifact to project: C:\Emulator\it.ideasolutions.kyms-20.apk  
Decompiling at Lit/ideasolutions/kyms/crypto/DecryptInputStream;->close()V+22h  
Decompiling at Lnet/sqlcipher/database/SQLiteDatabase;->openDatabase(Ljava/lang/String;[Lnet/sqlcipher/database/SQLite  
Decompiling at Lit/ideasolutions/kyms/app/al;-><clinit>()V+4h  
Decompiling at Lit/ideasolutions/kyms/data/SettingsManager;->d(Ljava/lang/String;)V+Eh
```

```
public void a(String arg3, String arg4, String arg5) {  
    if(arg4 != null) {  
        this.g(arg3);  
    }  
    else {  
        arg4 = arg3;  
    }  
  
    this.a(arg5);  
    sqldatabase_handler.a().a(this.b(arg4));  
}
```


Sqlatabase\_handler.a().a(dbpassword)

So this.b(arg4) must be our dbpassword

Ok, pointing to our beloved native library ... argh !

```
        v0 = 0;  
        break;  
    }  
}  
  
return v0;  
}  
  
public String b(String arg2) {  
    return SettingsManager.nativeGenerateKey(arg2);  
}  
  
public void b(a arg2) {  
    this.w.remove(arg2);  
}  
  
public void b(h arg2) {
```





Searching for strings „Pin“ and „Password“, we find this one, which is also used for sqlcipher init. And yes, it's also pointing to native library !

This.e() points to the entered user password, so user password is being used by native library function to generate our db password !



# Lets get dirty

...

# Native libraries

```
00032904 00032904: .plt:00032904 (Synchronized with Hex View-1)
```

## Your Con



Searching for „nativeGenerateKey“  
also returns no hit on the exports list  
?!?

sqlcipher::CursorWindow::putNull(uint,uint)	000C7C36
sqlcipher::CursorWindow::read_field_slot(int,int,sqlcipher::fie...	000C7A70
sqlcipher::CursorWindow::~CursorWindow()	000C7888
sqlcipher::compile(_JNIEnv *,_jobject *,sqlite3 *,_jstring *)	000C4F50
sqlcipher::dbopen(_JNIEnv *,_jobject *,_jstring *,int)	000C4E3C
sqlcipher::get_window_from_object(_JNIEnv *,_jobject *)	000C4F34
sqlcipher::native_key(_JNIEnv *,_jobject *,_jbyteArray *)	000C5018
sqlcipher::native_key_utf8(_JNIEnv *,_jobject *,_jcharArray *)	000C4EB8
sqlcipher::native_rawExecSQL(_JNIEnv *,_jobject *,_jstring *)	000C4DC8
sqlcipher::native_rekey(_JNIEnv *,_jobject *,_jbyteArray *)	000C653C
sqlcipher::native_status(_JNIEnv *,_jobject *,int,uchar)	000C4C70
sqlcipher::register_android_database_CursorWindow(_JNIE...	000C52CC
sqlcipher::register_android_database_SQLiteCompiledSql(_J...	000C5940
sqlcipher::register_android_database_SQLiteDatabase(_JNIE...	000C5DB4
sqlcipher::register_android_database_SQLiteProgram(_JNIE...	000C635C
sqlcipher::register_android_database_SQLiteQuery(_JNIEnv *)	
sqlcipher::register_android_database_SQLiteStatement(_JNIE...	

Searching for the string  
„nativeGenerateKey“ we find a java  
native call nativeGenerateKey(String)  
:?

IDA View-A Occurrences of binary: "nativeGenerate" Structures Enums Imports

```

• .rodata:0014E960 aLandroidCont_1 DCB "(Landroid/Context;)V",0
• .rodata:0014E960 ; DATA XREF: .data:0017F0E0↓o
• .rodata:0014E97D aNativehaskey DCB "nativeHasKey",0 ; DATA XREF: .data:0017F0E8↓o
• .rodata:0014E98A aZ_0 DCB "()Z",0 ; DATA XREF: .data:0017F0EC↓o
• .rodata:0014E98A ; .data:0018009C↓o
• .rodata:0014E98E aNativegenerate DCB "nativeGenerateKey",0 ; DATA XREF: .data:0017F0F4↓o
• .rodata:0014E9A0 aLjavaLangStr_0 DCB "(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/String;",0
• .rodata:0014E9A0 ; DATA XREF: .data:0017F0F8↓o
• .rodata:0014E9A0 ; .data:0017F104↓o
• .rodata:0014E9C7 aNativeauthenti DCB "nativeAuthenticate",0 ; DATA XREF: .data:0017F100↓o
• .rodata:0014E9DA aNativeclearkey DCB "nativeClearKey",0 ; DATA XREF: .data:0017F10C↓o
• .rodata:0014E9E9 aU DCB "()U",0 ; DATA XREF: .data:0017F110↓o
• .rodata:0014E9E9 ; .data:0017FEC8↓o ...
• .rodata:0014E9ED aNativechangeke DCB "nativeChangeKeyPassword",0
• .rodata:0014E9ED ; DATA XREF: .data:0017F118↓o
• .rodata:0014E9E0 aLjavaLangStr_1 DCB "(Ljava/lang/String;)V",0 ; DATA XREF: .data:0017F11C↓o

```

Getting the reference for the string,  
we see a function pointer table .... So  
sub\_39E30 must be  
nativeGenerateKey 😊

```
.data:0017F0E8      DCD aNativehaskey      ; "nativeHasKey"
.data:0017F0EC      DCD aZ_0                ; "()"Z"
.data:0017F0F0      DCD sub_39C34+1
.data:0017F0F4      DCD aNativegenerate    ; "nativeGenerateKey"
.data:0017F0F8      DCD aLjavaLangStr_0    ; "(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/String;"
.data:0017F0FC      DCD sub_39E30+1
.data:0017F100      DCD aNativeauthenti    ; "nativeAuthenticate"
.data:0017F104      DCD aLjavaLangStr_0    ; "(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/String;"
.data:0017F108      DCD sub_39F58+1
.data:0017F10C      DCD aNativeclearkey    ; "nativeClearKey"
.data:0017F110      DCD aV                  ; "()"V"
.data:0017F114      DCD sub_3A228+1
```

Disassembly is best for details, but we prefer decompiling this time instead 😊

IDA View-A   Occurrences of binary: "nativeGenerate"   Hex View-1

```
nativeGenerateKey

var_70= -0x70
var_68= -0x68
var_64= -0x64
var_40= -0x40
var_30= -0x30
var_20= -0x20
var_10= -0x10

F0 B5      PUSH      {R4-R7,LR}
03 AF      ADD       R7, SP, #0xC
99 B0      SUB       SP, SP, #0x64
04 B4      PUSH      {R2}
20 BC      POP       {R5}
04 00      MOVS      R4, R0
2F 48      LDR       R0, =(__stack_chk_guard_ptr - 0x39E42)
78 44      ADD       R0, PC, __stack_chk_guard_ptr
00 68      LDR       R0, [R0], __stack_chk_guard
00 68      LDR       R0, [R0]
18 90      STR       R0, [SP,#0x70+var_10]
14 A8      ADD       R0, SP, #0x70+var_20
10 21      MOVS      R1, #0x10
F8 F7 02 EE BLX       j RAND_bytes
01 28      CMP       R0, #1
3F D1      BNE       loc_39ED2
```

```
10 A8      ADD       R0, SP, #0x70+var_30
10 21      MOVS      R1, #0x10
F8 F7 FC ED BLX       j RAND_bytes
01 28      CMP       R0, #1
3B D1      BNE       loc_39ED6
```

```
0C A8      ADD       R0, SP, #0x70+var_40
10 21      MOVS      R1, #0x10
F8 F7 F6 ED BLX       j RAND_bytes
01 28      CMP       R0, #1
37 D1      BNE       loc_39EDA
```



```

int __fastcall nativeGenerateKey(int a1, int a2, int a3)
{
    int v3; // r5@1
    int v4; // r4@1
    int v5; // r1@4
    int result; // r0@4
    const char *v7; // r1@8
    char v8; // [sp+10h] [bp-64h]@7
    char v9; // [sp+34h] [bp-40h]@3
    char v10; // [sp+44h] [bp-30h]@2
    char v11; // [sp+54h] [bp-20h]@1

    v3 = a3;
    v4 = a1;
    if ( j RAND_bytes(&v11, 16) != 1 )
    {
        v7 = "key RAND_bytes error";
LABEL_11:
        throwEx(v4, v7);
        return 0;
    }
    if ( j RAND_bytes(&v10, 16) != 1 )
    {
        v7 = "salt RAND_bytes error";
        goto LABEL_11;
    }
    if ( j RAND_bytes(&v9, 16) != 1 )
    {
        v7 = "iv RAND_bytes error";
        goto LABEL_11;
    }
    v5 = sub_3A4E8(v4, &v9, &v10, v3, (int)&v11);
    result = 0;
    if ( v5 == 1 )
    {
        pthread_mutex_lock((pthread_mutex_t *)&unk_182D8C);
        if ( !dword_182D90 )
            dword_182D90 = operator new[](0x10u);
        _aeabi_memcpy();
        pthread_mutex_unlock((pthread_mutex_t *)&unk_182D8C);
        tohex((unsigned __int8 *)&v11, 16, &v8);
    }
}

```

So, we got a random key (16 bytes)=v11, salt (16 bytes)=v10 and iv (16 bytes)=v9 generated that needs to be stored somewhere ...

And a func sub\_3a4E8 that does something with it



```

int __fastcall sub_3A4E8(int a1, void *iv, void *salt, int a4, int a5)
{
    void *v5; // r4@1
    int v6; // r5@1
    signed int v7; // r6@1
    void *v8; // r6@2
    int v9; // r0@2
    int v10; // r4@4
    int v11; // r4@5
    FILE *v12; // r4@6
    FILE *v13; // r4@7
    int keysize; // ST20_4@8
    int v15; // r1@8
    int v16; // r5@8
    int v17; // r4@9
    int v18; // r1@9
    void (__fastcall *v19)(int, int, const char *); // r3@9
    const char *v20; // r2@9
    int v21; // r0@10
    int result; // r0@17
    int v23; // [sp+8h] [bp-5Ch]@3
    void *v24; // [sp+10h] [bp-54h]@2
    int v25; // [sp+18h] [bp-4Ch]@2
    const void *ptr; // [sp+1Ch] [bp-48h]@1
    int v27; // [sp+20h] [bp-44h]@2
    char v28[32]; // [sp+24h] [bp-40h]@3
    char v29; // [sp+44h] [bp-20h]@1
    int v30; // [sp+54h] [bp-10h]@17

    v5 = iv;
    v6 = a1;
    ptr = salt;
    v7 = 0;
    if ( PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_0((int *)a1, a4, (int)salt, (int)&v29) != 1 )
        goto LABEL_17;
    v25 = v6;
    v27 = 0;
    v8 = (void *)j_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
    v9 = j_EVP_aes_128_cbc();
    v24 = v5;

```

Func sub\_3a4E8 uses  
pbkcs5\_pbkdf2\_hmac .. and  
result of that function is being  
used to decrypt the key using  
aes\_128\_cbc



```

signed int __fastcall PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_0(int *a1, int a2, int a3, int a4)
{
    int v4; // ST20_4@1
    int *v5; // r4@1
    const char *v6; // r6@1
    int v7; // r5@1
    int v8; // r0@1
    int v9; // r0@1
    int v10; // r1@1
    signed int result; // r0@2
    int v12; // r0@3
    int v13; // [sp+14h] [bp-1Ch]@1

    v4 = a3;
    v5 = a1;
    v13 = a2;
    v6 = (const char *)((*int (__fastcall **)(int *))(a1 + 676))(-
    v7 = strlen(v6);
    v8 = j_EVP_sha1();
    v9 = j_PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC((int)v6, v7, v4, 16, 10000, v8);
    v10 = *v5;
    if ( v9 == 1 )
    {
        (*(void (__fastcall **)(int *, int, const char *))(v10 + 680))(v5, v13, v6);
        result = 1;
    }
    else
    {
        v12 = (*(int (__fastcall **)(int *, const char *))(v10 + 24))(v5, "java/security/InvalidKeyException");
        (*(void (__fastcall **)(int *, int, const char *))(v5 + 56))(v5, v12, "PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC error");
        result = 0;
    }
    return result;
}

```

Having a closer look at  
PKCS5\_PBKDF2\_HMAC  
function, let's google if they  
used openssl



PKCS5\_PBKDF2\_HMAC, PKCS5\_PBKDF2\_HMAC\_SHA1 - password based derivation routines with salt and iteration count

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/evp.h>

int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen,
                      const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
                      const EVP_MD *digest,
                      int keylen, unsigned char *out);
```

```
v8 = j_EVP_sha1();
v9 = j_PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC((int)v6, v7, v4, 16, 10000, v8);
v10 = *v5;
if ( v9 == 1 )
{
    (*(void (__fastcall **)(int *, int, const char *)))(v10 + 680)(v10 + 680);
    result = 1;
}
else
{
    v12 = (*(int (__fastcall **)(int *, const char *)))(v10 + 24);
    (*(void (__fastcall **)(int *, int, const char *)))(v10 + 56);
    result = 0;
}
return result;
```

Googling the  
PKCS5\_PBKDF2\_HMAC  
function, we immediately see  
that :

Saltlen=16  
Iterations=10000  
Algo=SHA1



IDA... Pseud... Occurrences of binary: "nativeG... Hex... Str... En... Im... Ex...

```

32 salt_1 = salt;
33 v7 = 0;
34 if ( PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_0((int *)a1, a4, (int)salt, (int)&v29) != 1 )
35     goto LABEL_17;
36 v25 = v6;
37 v27 = 0;
38 v8 = (void *)j_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
39 v9 = j_EVP_aes_128_cbc();
40 iv_1 = v5;
41 if ( j_EVP_CipherInit_ex(v8, v9) )
42 {
43     if ( j_EVP_CipherUpdate(v8, encryptedkey, &v27, a5, 16,
44     {
45         v10 = v27;
46         if ( j_EVP_CipherUpdate(v8, &encryptedkey[v27], &v27
47         {
48             v11 = j_EVP_CipherFinal_ex(v8, &encryptedkey[v27
49             j_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(v8);
50             if ( v11 )
51             {
52                 filehandle = fopen((const char *)dword_182D98,
53                 if ( filehandle )
54                 {
55                     v7 = 1;
56                     fputc(1, filehandle);
57                     fwrite(salt_1, 1u, 0x10u, filehandle);
58                     fwrite(iv_1, 1u, 0x10u, filehandle);
59                     fwrite(encryptedkey, 1u, 0x20u, filehandle);
60                     fclose(filehandle);
61                     v13 = fopen((const char *)dword_182D98, (const char
62                     if ( v13 )
63                     {
64                         keysize = getFileSize();
65                         v16 = v15;

```

Ok. So what we know so far :  
A password is being used to  
derive an aes\_key using  
PBKDF2\_SHA1(Generated  
Salt[16],Iterations=10000) and  
then encrypts a random key  
(encryptedkey) using  
aes\_cbc\_128bit with a random  
iv.

But where are the encryptedkey,  
generated salt, generated iv  
being stored to ?



IDA... Pseud... Occurrences of binary: "nativeG... Hex... Str... En... Im... Ex...

```

32 salt_1 = salt;
33 v7 = 0;
34 if ( PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_0((int *)a1, a4, (int)salt, (int)&v29) != 1 )
35     goto LABEL_17;
36 v25 = v6;
37 v27 = 0;
38 v8 = (void *)j_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
39 v9 = j_EVP_aes_128_cbc();
40 iv_1 = v5;
41 if ( j_EVP_CipherInit_ex(v8, v9) )
42 {
43     if ( j_EVP_CipherUpdate(v8, encryptedkey, &v27, a5, 16,
44     {
45         v10 = v27;
46         if ( j_EVP_CipherUpdate(v8, &encryptedkey[v27], &v27
47         {
48             v11 = j_EVP_CipherFinal_ex(v8, &encryptedkey[v27
49             j_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(v8);
50             if ( v11 )
51             {
52                 filehandle = fopen((const char *)dword_182D98,
53                 if ( filehandle )
54                 {
55                     v7 = 1;
56                     fputc(1, filehandle);
57                     fwrite(salt_1, 1u, 0x10u, filehandle);
58                     fwrite(iv_1, 1u, 0x10u, filehandle);
59                     fwrite(encryptedkey, 1u, 0x20u, filehandle);
60                     fclose(filehandle);
61                     v13 = fopen((const char *)dword_182D98, (const char
62                     if ( v13 )
63                     {
64                         keysize = getFileSize();
65                         v16 = v15;

```

Yay, a file is being written with  
char\_1  
salt[0x10]  
iv[0x10]  
encryptedkey[0x20]

File size of 0x41 in total. And  
there is only one file that fits :  
“main.key” in the application  
“files” subfolder



So we need a  
bruteforcer  
“to go”

```

import hashlib
import binascii
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
import struct
import sys

def pkcs7Verify(data,i):
    dlen=len(data)
    val=int(data[-1])
    if val > i:
        return b''
    h=int(data[-val])
    if (val!=h):
        return b''
    v = dlen - val
    return data[:v]

def main(argv):
    z=0
    for password in sys.stdin:
        if (password == ""):
            break
        password=str(password).replace('\n','')
        key=b''
        iv=b''
        data=b''
        version=b''

        with open('main.key','rb') as fr:
            version=fr.read(1)
            salt=fr.read(0x10)
            iv=fr.read(0x10)
            key=fr.read(0x20)

        aeskey = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac('sha1',bytes(password,'utf8'),bytes(salt),10000,0x10)
        decryptor = AES.new(aeskey, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
        dbkey = decryptor.decrypt(key)
        dbkey = pkcs7Verify(dbkey,32)
        if len(dbkey)>0:
            print ('SQLCipher key found:'+str(binascii.hexlify(dbkey))+'\nPassword found:'+str(password)+'\n')
            break
        z+=1
        if ((z%100)==0):
            print('Current password: '+str(password))
            z=1

```

In Python, just PoC.  
Way faster if  
Pyopencl and  
multithreading would  
be used 😊



## To conclude

- Static reverse engineering is really time consuming and brain damaging.
- Obfuscation and encryption can make reading code really tough.
- Sometimes you have both Java and Native worlds to cope with.
- But it will give you a very deep insight.

# Dynamic application reversing

Or: This is how we do if want to spend more time on  
beer and friends 😊

## What do we need ?

1. Emulator or Test device  
Emulator:x86, Test device:ARM
2. Debugger  
JDB, ADB, Android Studio, IDA Pro, ...

or:

2. Injection Framework  
FRIDA.RE, XPosed

## Wait what ?

### Debugger:

Lets you step through each instruction while the app is running.

### Injection Framework:

Take over functions by hooking into dynamically

## Injection ?

It's like playing pirates. Jump on the boat, enter the boat, get the gold.

“FRIDA.re” needs two languages for that :

- Python for the User interactions
- Javascript (Duktape) for injections

Lets see some injection examples 😊

# Injection on java functions

```
Java.perform(function() {  
  var SQLHelper = Java.use("net.sqlcipher.database.SQLiteOpenHelper");  
  ...  
  if (SQLHelper.getWritableDatabase) {  
    console.log("We got getWritableDatabase");  
    SQLHelper.getWritableDatabase.overload.implementation = function(password) {  
      console.log(password);  
      return this.getWritableDatabase.overload.apply(this, arguments);  
    }  
  }  
}
```

## Injection on native functions

```
setImmediate(function() {  
    Java.perform(function() {  
        var sqlite3_key = Module.findExportByName("libsqlcipher_android.so", "sqlite3_key");  
        if (sqlite3_key)  
        {  
            Interceptor.attach(sqlite3_key, {  
                onEnter: function(args)  
                {  
                    console.log("We got SQLCipher key");  
                    var len=args[2];  
                    var pw=Memory.readUtf8String(args[1],parseInt(len));  
                    console.log(pw);  
                },  
                onLeave: function(ret)  
                {  
                }  
            });  
        }  
    });  
});
```

## Easy mate, easy ....

To automate things, I initially modified  
“Appmon” <http://dpnishant.github.io/appmon> :

1. Start the target app, make sure adb works
2. Run appmon script on the app :

```
“python appmon.py -a it.ideasolutions.kyms -p android -s scripts\Android -c”
```

3. Do your app-stuff
4. Run 127.0.0.1:5000 to see the results
5. Enjoy your spare time !



## Easy mate, easy ....

After some months of deep research on native and java functions, backtracing callers and performance, I completely rewrote a new tool:

# "Appmonitor" .... to be released soon.

AppMonitor (c) B.Kerler 2019

Menu

Hook

Selection

- > ☒ Bluetooth
- > ☒ Clipboard
- > ☒ Crypto
  - ☒ Cipher
  - ☐ Hash
  - ☒ Keystore
  - ☒ OpenSSL
  - ☒ PBKDF
  - ☒ PBKDF2
- > ☒ Database
- > ☒ FileSystem
- > ☒ FlagSecure
- > ☒ IPC
- > ☒ Network
- > ☒ Process
- > ☒ Runtime
- > ☒ SQLCipher
- > ☒ SQLiteDatabase
- > ☒ Syscall
- > ☒ WebView

Un/Select all

Monitor

	Idx	Function	Caller	Data
4	3	WebView.android.webkit.WebView.evaluateJavascript	java.lang.Thread.getStackTrace(Thread.java:...	Script:(window.AFMA_ReceiveMessage    function() {})(('onDefaultPositionReceived',{"x":20,"y":341,"width":...
5	4	WebView.android.webkit.WebView.evaluateJavascript	java.lang.Thread.getStackTrace(Thread.java:...	Script:(window.AFMA_ReceiveMessage    function() {})(('onAdVisibilityChanged',{"isVisible":"1"}));
6	5	WebView.android.webkit.WebView.evaluateJavascript	java.lang.Thread.getStackTrace(Thread.java:...	Script:(window.AFMA_ReceiveMessage    function() {})(('onScreenInfoChanged',{"width":360,"height":640...
7	6	WebView.android.webkit.WebView.evaluateJavascript	java.lang.Thread.getStackTrace(Thread.java:...	Script:(window.AFMA_ReceiveMessage    function() {})(('onDefaultPositionReceived',{"x":20,"y":341,"width":...
8	7	WebView.android.webkit.WebView.evaluateJavascript	java.lang.Thread.getStackTrace(Thread.java:...	Script:(window.AFMA_ReceiveMessage    function() {})(('onAdVisibilityChanged',{"isVisible":"1"}));
9	8	fopen:libkys-jni.so.fopen		Options:Filename:/data/user/0/it.ideasonline.kyms/files/main.key;Mode:rb;;
10	9	fread:libkys-jni.so.fread		Data:Size:41;Data:01eda89889b5d69e3e26d9c120b66daadc0cb4d8879150f8cbb3cbb1e0572316b63c09...
11	10	EVP_sha1:base.odex.EVP_sha1	{'address': '0xd900b62f', 'name': '0x3a62f', '...	SHA1:Init;
12	11	PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC:base.odex.PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC	{'address': '0xcbf8508f', 'name': None, 'mod...	Arguments:Password:70617373776f7264;Salt:eda89889b5d69e3e26d9c120b66daadc;Iter:10000;Len:16;
13	12	EVP_CipherInit_ex:base.odex.EVP_CipherInit_ex	{'address': '0xffc3677c', 'name': None, 'mod...	InitOptions:Algo:419;Name:AES-128-CBC;Key:27c741b53724bd5ec6f4b7809b575299;iv:0cb4d8879150f...
14	13	EVP_CipherUpdate:base.odex.EVP_CipherUpdate	{'address': '0x1c', 'name': None, 'moduleNa...	Input [Size:20]:3c09d250eae4ff85b62b49f2b8277c7d79d7e0657b85143bd03318f1b3160e52;Output [Siz...
15	14	EVP_CipherFinal_ex:base.odex.EVP_CipherFinal_ex	{'address': '0xb', 'name': None, 'moduleNam...	Output [Size:3]:232a23;

Save process log

Select Process: it.ideasonline.kyms

Run Monitor

Console

```
We got getReadableDatabase
We got SQLCipher
Hook: EVP_CipherInit_ex in: libkys-jni.so at: 0xd9097554
Hook: EVP_CipherUpdate in: libkys-jni.so at: 0xd9097220
Hook: EVP_CipherFinal_ex in: libkys-jni.so at: 0xd909744c
Hook: EVP_sha1 in: libkys-jni.so at: 0xd90984c0
Hook: PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC in: libkys-jni.so at: 0xd90988e0
We hooked PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC in: libkys-jni.so
We hooked fopen in: libkys-jni.so
We hooked fread in: libkys-jni.so
We hooked fwrite in: libkys-jni.so
We hooked fread in: libkys-jni.so
We hooked recv
We hooked send
```

Save console log

# DEMO time !!!

## On our target app 😊

## Recommendations :

- Use hidden root (reverse shell), not su or magisk, a lot apps tend to detect these, same applies for emulators
- Grab a current android device, unlock it (not Huawei).
- For creating a ramdisk with hidden root, you may use: [https://github.com/bkerler/android\\_universal](https://github.com/bkerler/android_universal)

## Recommendations :

- Use dwarf or frick !!!!!!  
<https://github.com/iGio90/Dwarf>

That's it folks !

Thanks for  
listening