

> DATA IS THE NEW CURRENCY

BY: ES

DIFFICULTY: EASY

CATEGORY: FORENSICS

SOLVES: SOME, A FEW, NONE, ON PART II

DESCRIPTION:

Corrupt government officials are offering the voter information as a service for a profit. You have been tasked with uncovering this hidden service. Hint: The 2 types of crypto used are AES CBC and RSA

ARTIFACTS: ARTIFACT.PCAP


SOLUTION:

PART 1:

What file is sent to the customer, who just purchased access to the voter information service?
(Answer Format is the full path)


We are given a pcap, let's open it with wireshark.

First an aside. There is a flag.zip in the HTTP traffic:



Packet	Hostname	Content Type	Size	Filename
1062	88.98.148.178	application/zip	134 kB	flag.zip
1085	54.201.243.51	text/html	1,681 bytes	/
4677	54.201.243.51	text/html	1,681 bytes	/
8385	54.201.243.51	text/html	1,681 bytes	/
12223	54.201.243.51	text/html	1,681 bytes	/
17089	54.201.243.51	text/html	1,681 bytes	/
18796	54.201.243.51	text/html	1,681 bytes	/
25216	54.201.243.51	text/html	1,681 bytes	/
32865	54.201.243.51	text/html	1,681 bytes	/
36555	54.201.243.51	text/html	1,681 bytes	/
40558	54.201.243.51	text/html	1,681 bytes	/
44671	54.201.243.51	text/html	1,681 bytes	/
50033	54.201.243.51	text/html	1,681 bytes	/

If you export the HTTP object and extract it, you get the image file flag.jpg:



This is just the Val Verde flag, there is nothing hidden inside of it. Its a red herring. I didn't expect people to try to analyze the image.


If we look at the conversation statistics, there are too many conversations to search manually, we must think about what protocols could be used to send a message, and obvious candidate is SMTP (ie. email).

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	SMTP	144	220 192.168.1.2 at your service
2	0.000000	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	SMTP	144	250 220 OK
3	0.000000	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	SMTP	144	220 192.168.1.2 at your service
4	0.000000	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	SMTP	144	250 220 OK
5	0.000000	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	SMTP	144	220 192.168.1.2 at your service
6	0.000000	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	SMTP	144	250 220 OK
7	0.000000	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	SMTP	144	220 192.168.1.2 at your service
8	0.000000	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	SMTP	144	250 220 OK
9	0.000000	192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	SMTP	144	220 192.168.1.2 at your service
10	0.000000	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.1	SMTP	144	250 220 OK


Lets try and filter on that.

Additionally, we can see alot of repetition in the traffic, we are essentially looking for anomalies.

Filter on imf (Internet Message Format), and sort by message length:



Viewing the message itself we get the flag:



Flag: /62608e08adc29a8d6dbc9754e659f125/file.zip

PART 2:

What is the occupation of Tatiana Castro?

There are some hints in the message from the previous part:

Hello client,
We have processed your payment, and will now grant you access to the service.
The keys can be found here:

```
http://7bd594d.data.elections.valverde.gov/62608e08adc29a8d6dbc9754e659f125/file.zip
```


Instructions for connecting to the service have already been provided. Please generate a session key before connecting to the information service.

Cheers.

Tatiana's occupation can likely be found as part of the information service, as stated in the challenge description: You have been tasked with uncovering this (voter information) hidden service.

In the message it says: *Please generate a session key before connecting to the information service*, and provides a path to a file containing keys. Lets start by downloading this file.


We can find it by filtering on the file path:



The image shows a Wireshark packet capture window with the title 'entfuit.pcap'. The packet list is filtered with the expression 'http.request.uri contains file.zip'. The selected packet is number 20, an HTTP GET request from 10.0.2.15 to 54.201.243.51. The packet details pane shows the request line: 'GET http://7bd594d.data.elections.valverde.gov/62608e08adc29a8d6dbc9754e659f125/file.zip HTTP/1.1'. The packet bytes pane shows the raw data of the request.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
20	0.811043	10.0.2.15	54.201.243.51	HTTP	376	GET /

Extract the bytes in the HTTP response to get a zip file:



We get the private key of the server, and the public key of the client:

```
crazy@es-base: ~/Desktop/PCAP-Generator/keys
crazy@es-base:~/Desktop/PCAP-Generator/keys$ cat server_public_key.pem
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEApar7uw7jxFEMES9d+toT
fHFykLP4gKAqh/9+5n6aCsYkyDsN0UgoE9fu6DcRkyhWkqHpnsp4wZV15a/wDjA
wTkO2r38h0MJH6wguSof+bZZFKxdsu/Ksz0LAGy8kkQl4L7jIQFcuw69F6MV7iLm
V9g4pTqTFKczrNcNgM0VHW00xWnNv0jYoLoXRxcXqkX1S818RQ/+MQaXF7a9b8rr
EPT3fAuu1o4G3jQosdZ8FFsqYSR0LLjkeVNgR1I2LG7SV0X0QjJ2BRvpuJN57eRc
Mz1F+XhHylVikLCqezUNBwIy0fz5jyQ1lsu/hts3XegBBXPHKDCrYNXgx9i9Qei9
LwIDAQAB
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
crazy@es-base:~/Desktop/PCAP-Generator/keys$ cat client_private_key.pem
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
crazy@es-base:~/Desktop/PCAP-Generator/keys$
```

Based on the information in the email, you have to figure out that there is a key generation service. To find it filter on IP of client fetching the zip file.zip mentioned in the email, 167.78.10.156

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
6453	23.312568	167.78.10.156	41.87.240.150	SNMP	177	Standard query 0x4160 A 78010461 data etiontime-valideron.gov
6453	23.312568	167.78.10.156	41.87.240.150	SNMP	177	Standard query 0x4160 A www.example.com A 211.177.36.50
7090	23.315197	167.78.10.156	211.177.36.50	TCP	54	60606 → 80 [FIN] Seq=0 Wm=8192 Len=0
7096	23.315519	211.177.36.50	167.78.10.156	TCP	54	80 → 60606 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Wm=8192 Len=0
7097	23.315197	167.78.10.156	211.177.36.50	TCP	54	60606 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Wm=8192 Len=0
7098	23.315197	167.78.10.156	211.177.36.50	HTTP	347	GET /?020e0e0a0c20a0d00c0754e00f120711e.zip
7099	23.315519	211.177.36.50	167.78.10.156	TCP	54	80 → 60606 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=294 Wm=8192 Len=0
7000	23.315519	211.177.36.50	167.78.10.156	TCP	1254	80 → 60606 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=294 Wm=8192 Len=1200 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
7061	23.315197	167.78.10.156	211.177.36.50	TCP	54	60606 → 80 [ACK] Seq=294 Ack=1201 Wm=8192 Len=0
7062	23.315519	211.177.36.50	167.78.10.156	TCP	1254	80 → 60606 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1201 Ack=294 Wm=8192 Len=1200 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
7063	23.315197	167.78.10.156	211.177.36.50	TCP	54	60606 → 80 [ACK] Seq=294 Ack=2401 Wm=8192 Len=0
7064	23.315519	211.177.36.50	167.78.10.156	TCP	71	HTTP/1.1 200 OK [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
7065	23.315197	167.78.10.156	211.177.36.50	TCP	54	60606 → 80 [ACK] Seq=294 Ack=2418 Wm=8192 Len=0
7066	23.315519	211.177.36.50	167.78.10.156	TCP	54	80 → 60606 [FIN, ACK] Seq=2418 Ack=294 Wm=8192 Len=0
7067	23.315197	167.78.10.156	211.177.36.50	TCP	54	60606 → 80 [ACK] Seq=294 Ack=2419 Wm=8192 Len=0
7068	23.315197	167.78.10.156	211.177.36.50	TCP	54	60606 → 80 [FIN, ACK] Seq=294 Ack=2419 Wm=8192 Len=0
7069	23.315197	167.78.10.156	211.177.36.50	TCP	54	80 → 60606 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Wm=8192 Len=0
7050	23.322176	167.78.10.156	167.78.189.77	TCP	54	49585 → 7192 [SYN] Seq=0 Wm=8192 Len=0
7051	23.322548	167.78.189.77	167.78.10.156	TCP	54	7192 → 49585 [FIN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Wm=8192 Len=0
7052	23.322176	167.78.10.156	167.78.189.77	TCP	54	49585 → 7192 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Wm=8192 Len=0
7053	23.322176	167.78.10.156	167.78.189.77	TCP	560	49585 → 7192 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Wm=8192 Len=512
7054	23.322548	167.78.189.77	167.78.10.156	TCP	54	7192 → 49585 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=513 Wm=8192 Len=0
7055	23.322548	167.78.189.77	167.78.10.156	TCP	560	7192 → 49585 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=513 Wm=8192 Len=512
7056	23.322176	167.78.10.156	167.78.189.77	TCP	54	49585 → 7192 [ACK] Seq=513 Ack=513 Wm=8192 Len=0
7057	23.322548	167.78.189.77	167.78.10.156	TCP	54	7192 → 49585 [FIN, ACK] Seq=513 Ack=513 Wm=8192 Len=0
7058	23.322176	167.78.10.156	167.78.189.77	TCP	54	49585 → 7192 [ACK] Seq=513 Ack=514 Wm=8192 Len=0
7059	23.322176	167.78.10.156	167.78.189.77	TCP	54	49585 → 7192 [FIN, ACK] Seq=513 Ack=514 Wm=8192 Len=0
• Frame 6402: 95 bytes on wire (760 bits), 95 bytes captured (760 bits) • Ethernet II, Src: 08:02:4d:64:57:4b (08:02:4d:64:57:4b), Dst: 08:61:4c:0b:76:60 (08:61:4c:0b:76:60) • Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 167.78.10.156, Dst: 41.87.240.150 • User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 60606, Dst Port: 53 • Domain Name System (query)						
0000	00 61 4c 0b 76 60 00 62	4d 64 57 4b 08 00 45 00	afkvf b mchak E			
0010	00 51 80 02 00 00 00 11	ae c3 87 4e 0c 29 07 07	Q...R...N...W			
0020	70 90 ff 02 00 35 00 3d	50 30 00 00 01 00 00 01	...S...U...			
0030	00 00 00 00 00 00 07 37	62 64 35 30 34 64 04 64	...T...V...W...X...Y...Z...			
0040	61 74 61 00 00 6c 60 63	74 69 8f 0e 7d 00 76 61	ata-elec lions wa			
0050	6c 76 65 72 64 65 63 67	6f 76 00 00 01 00 01	lverde g ov....			

They have much less traffic. They fetch file.zip, and connect to two other services, one on port 7192, and the other on port 5721.

Because they need to generate a session key before they can connect to the voter information service, we can assume the first service is a key gen service, and the second is the voter information service. Let's write a script to extract the traffic, passing the session key obtained from the first service to decrypt the traffic from the second. The decrypt functions are implemented based on the crypto algorithms given in the hint, and were the first results on google. It may take a few tries to get the right one.

```

from scapy.all import *
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa, padding
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
import base64

from Cryptodome.Cipher import AES
from Cryptodome.Hash import SHA256
from Cryptodome import Random
from pathlib import Path

r = rdpcap("artifact.pcap")

n = len(r)
client_ip = "167.78.10.156"

keygen_service_port = 7192
voter_info_service_port = 5721

```

```

def decrypt(message_encrypted, private_key):
    try:
        message_decrypted = private_key.decrypt(
            message_encrypted,
            padding.OAEP(
                mgf=padding.MGF1(algorithm=hashes.SHA256()),
                algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
                label=None
            )
        )
        return message_decrypted
    except ValueError:
        return "Failed to Decrypt"

def decrypt0(key, source, decode=True):
    if decode:
        source = base64.b64decode(source)
        key = SHA256.new(key).digest() # use SHA-256 over our key to get a
proper-sized AES key
        IV = source[:AES.block_size] # extract the IV from the beginning
        decryptor = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, IV)
        data = decryptor.decrypt(source[AES.block_size:]) # decrypt
        padding = data[-1] # pick the padding value from the end; Python 2.x:
ord(data[-1])
        if data[-padding:] != bytes([padding]) * padding: # Python 2.x:
chr(padding) * padding
            raise ValueError("Invalid padding...")
        return data[:-padding] # remove the padding

private_pem_bytes = Path("keys/client_private_key.pem").read_bytes()
client_priv = serialization.load_pem_private_key(private_pem_bytes,
password=None)

key = b""
for i in range(n):
    pkt = r[i]
    is_tcp = pkt.haslayer(TCP)
    if Raw in pkt and r[i].haslayer(TCP) and pkt[TCP].sport ==
keygen_service_port and pkt[IP].dst == client_ip:

```



```

print(pkt[TCP].load)
resp = pkt[TCP].load
resp = resp.decode()
resp = bytes.fromhex(resp)
msg = decrypt(resp, client_priv)
print(msg)
msg = msg.decode()
key = msg.replace("KEY: ", "").encode()

if Raw in pkt and r[i].haslayer(TCP) and pkt[TCP].sport ==
voter_info_service_port and pkt[IP].dst == client_ip:
    if key == b"":
        print('ERROR!')
    else:
        print(pkt[TCP].load)
        resp = pkt[TCP].load
        msg = decrypt0(key, resp)
        print(msg)

```

Output:

```
crazy@es-base: ~/Desktop/CS2025-RGNL/challenges/forensics/pcap-chall
crazy@es-base:~/Desktop/CS2025-RGNL/challenges/forensics/pcap-chall$ python3 solve.py
[KEYGEN SERVICE]
b'919d5ec90112461e98c32b36a8659e2dd5a211271b8d644dd4e876787963a8e6ad4f69ecc46e31d34c172df8c522d0ea09f5798
a4b455a17457adec7621db28602e19a1589c136cbf5698965cc4a32c54fca2e0f7a2b6e50313685580e50cfe48150eaaef900e37e
ebf3ac2183714412d004d20bed1a5aaab6d342049ec63635ed48b46590d29c4270de8278b808a2e3ca6148b0226df2170109ec363
553953769104316e273902055e0faabaa53ec0c6c334a1732a97d4cb162e47b2084f6fe2670753c4b103dde44a4bd6dd4f6197721
927d73d541c236febe815f3b9bb149152f814b23f31db6a58dae4e9ccaf6e832b3384de763b3352955f40a8f7a3247'
b'KEY: 3a5d6f0b799b745d064d311dbf9064f9'
[VOTER INFO SERVICE]
b'qg0ZawxyYCY7fJzy1v0Qnx5ACNMVklS95ZS4Q9iyNX/1tEc57iBONTAS/mwKg05F0Aqgm0R9vfdiBt51+p9t49wnPODD8m1Hr9PqhUK
L0z/DRFyc8NEVZNIWnkcc3j+YUzEwFpdIzrap0Eu6hjpsdbTQ8YJgLLa3TTaCpEezbGhB/Dzy/8pAk0py7XdqDbGQDom6Zyhzto5mH9H0
bcSXM1hyk06uz+zwyW5vcKSwMPglJdEcormYXHNFWck8Pj/VwxU5q+SJ7YJhRZE1uevvZUSFwdJckKbj0cKONIKNLZ5EvPr510za7TH7
nEcKjsHCmw2bhd4gH3Jt38FC3o0T6QpQ+sI/QJ4iS12jjnGvs='
b'\n+-----+\n| THE UNDERGROUND VOTER DB | \n+-----+\n
nProviding Paying Customers with Voter Information. Operated by An0n Pub S3rvant\nWhen both sides are cor
rupt, might as well make a bit of money\n'
[VOTER INFO SERVICE]
b'tyHYKXWn1DTEdWlBor48lwbCF+VyIEVwGbhayChjDHZJRnBAXv7AhZA1k2WmJAt03JLL/3dLJIRrPzF0e4F3y0BRH3hyFwHMMi0c26n
dyF+lLesztDCqevYHn30SMk1sbYUNJLgv1/9j09ovt5B3+d0N1URZKNDRNLf6GLEGU75L6PUkJMiZVkvLJkI6LCZwim/NC4wskqh1iIJO
GXjKkMG0cYMLbIRwsjDEayw6KPRr5+0mlxof2nXg0dbAEcn2JuKRURZF2FP43U5e3fqW8fhxaeYgq4ArgPgFeNZPL18='
b'[1] Polling\n[2] Riding Polling <Party>\n[3] Riding Historic <Party>\n[4] Riding Information <Ridin
g>\n[5] Voter Registration <Riding>\n[6] Voter Search <Voter>\n[7] Voter Background <Voter>\n'
[VOTER INFO SERVICE]
b'/7w+8S/IgzIuYz7kPnD0vHTNPFqPYCA8ars6UBgIuYpIMnjiwy/HLMVyiDi0RV3c1E7LMjH3VvbPH2QnUrwFHns3ZzgkzsDLHRAzrk
FNzc+RkJC2ZomQPH0cNMZrtunfeHk3BUWx56Gcd9RdiwIAA=='
b'[FP] Freedom Party 62.5% \n[PP] Populus Party 37.5% \n'
[VOTER INFO SERVICE]
b'bSP2+UXQ9Ei80FleJ2T4TojM+EKuG5BZxZRElfkxIKQ/xN4tTBK7svXrvtCS0dvJ/P3P0G6INj1MMPx3Wze9590tb+xGGRS18FHEqM
BYKs0XFroFu1SLBAmzeawpeQE7r8eerZn5EpNEBoiNyG80DdA7ICiCpLRTv+JciwPIRXYN4mF0olvPr8waUqZpm+eQmy2WdRWxyVUujH9
9LVOTI27zrA0Hlunt1TriXi1lf/wXkJT47qJGvPME65wOMWe/Ra/0YYZdJ28d4Ge3dHSXk3Ed7vbcWbUF0E/XJZ3i2Vbd36BfMrTdH1i
zy/kTnTM+XuRgYea8d65NLyZvcYCJzQKJXcsyTZiNAYQq1D1ckIb67QY9npdwdKXECvvoA+nB4xCJBN8aYASZ7SL20op1CU5G0HJZJEE+
DTpaUSAeb5Z1bv/hGRm0JyhyiHU4pjUiedowDyAkW0f5M0Zk6edf7W8vAMG6dj0GjPLCTSDcECFXG4t61VAl1JrQb9evBOJT+LU4iMJ5
oSzN29jCQUTWUE08Is60HGpkELyAvdkPKX508XEnjSDV4y6PzLZC16g/yeWqNVqFp5FeNhZ56LuphJ0BkKDY07zsdavEkwsmgXythv9
GlsHPQK+MSDj0m8L8cw7cXfk8p3sQybZEy50/jqG77Tjk53fiE/SEUCPhaXixsL/Lyb1rH9gx3Su57GKfv0vvpFpInC5L4v6pjFYSAqMN
UzfVn0p9++VJe7hrB2i4dTx0dCJHbAST/Yg'
b'ID Name Percent \nCE11 Cordova East 62.97 \nCWN12
Cordova West 61.44 \nCC21 Cordova Center 29.29 \nVG22 Vega
28.13 \nGH15 Green Hills 75.63 \nCT31 Centretown 9
7.98 \nOR13 Orron 91.88 \nOR23 Orleans 90.09
\nLE33 Lensa 54.9 \nCA14 Carnet North 73.27 \nCA34
Carnet South 26.08 \n'
[VOTER INFO SERVICE]
b'gkKwMa2agfCdwgcmlmj70aWKpRE8lHLhUQ58kQqv1RETka/An6ATVqDsPf+yD5w0bcJCIApjX3Lq0sJg/HqRB682m0QtZLKdWcZPfYI
GIzAU6EZ6vVbS1m1hfp+8XgC+qsQPtfc3EAQcZftkyShtrYah3L134ZumbKe+G/DdnTDgUnAl0ixlVJ6am4Y3jw1AV6tsuj0f1qL1uhVY
b0FDlv42CamNoxSiePCyE84+keN93daydl7ddq8t+UDCuX2S0Z1kzaUeqyLcRgvbUtECTs4Nf8ZHAYUaMVTBoPRTzwnChY1VppJNM2Ya8
B4hJwoK3SlyOI+YIS+WYcgESJVGCA9w16yt/nETHjkl9QB80MmuiQyv3+ekSyAUF9Vuz6xYfwHyKvRAYRWFML86DJYxf3GpInOsG/oD
uXiVG+xNw='
b'\nName: Tatiana Castro Historical Voting Patterns: FP,FP,FP,FP,FP,FP,FP,FP,FP\nOccup
ation: Nurse at Vega General Dependents: 0\nMarital Status: Widowed Country of Orig
in: Guatemala\nAge: 67 Income Bracket: T3\nEducation: College\n'
crazy@es-base:~/Desktop/CS2025-RGNL/challenges/forensics/pcap-chall$
```

And we can see the profession of Tatiana Castro in the output.

Flag: **Nurse at Vega General**

A mistake I made:

I used `b"3a5d6f0b799b745d064d311dbf9064f9"` instead of the actual byte values as the key when encrypting with AES, and it confused a lot of people. Its still something that could happen, but its unexpected.

DONE!

FEEDBACK IS WELCOME :)

