Our Current Focus:

Synthesis of formal models from the ADSL

Important features of the models we're building:

- Efficient they have a small number of state variables
- Generic they use the same model framework for synchronous, quasi-synchronous, and asynchronous systems
- Automatic <u>model generation</u> and <u>verification</u> is as automatic as possible

Progress Since October

- Updated OM(1) model:
 - complete byzantine faults model
 - auxiliary system abstraction
- Fully inductive proof of validity under suitable maximum fault assumption
 - inductive proof is significantly faster to check
 - scales significantly better


Current OM(1) Model

Summary of our OM(1) model:

- an ideal "model" of the models we wish to synthesize from the ADSL
- quasi-synchronous approximation of the classical synchronous OM(1)
- built on a general and extensible timing and message passing framework (based on calendar automata)
- → incorporates a <u>fault model</u> which is compositional rather than baked in to the node behavior
- → contains an *inductive proof* of key properties


Fault Model

- We have implemented a
 Byzantine fault model on top
 of the calendar automata
- It can easily be extended to a hybrid fault model including manifest and symmetric faults
- Messages are modeled by non-negative integers ...
- Each node is nondeterministically initialized faulty or not



Fault Model

- When a node sends a message, it appear on the calendar as normal
- When a message is read, the result is either:
 - (sender is not faulty) the intended message
 - (sender is faulty)
 uninterpreted constant of
 type Message
- A-priori, the number of distinct messages generated in a trace is *unbounded*



u is a non-negative integer that we know nothing aboutu is a (potentially) different constant on each receive

Fault Model

- Faults are manifested through reading from the global calendar
- Model nodes can be synthesized without any awareness of the fault model and don't need to be changed if the fault model changes
- The extent and type of faults is easily controlled from a single place in the model
- ... but use of <u>uninterpreted constants</u> limits our choice of model checking tools

Verification


- For infinite models, we cannot use symbolic (BDD) model checking, nor ordinary bounded model checking
- Infinite bounded model checking is an SMT-based approach to model checking infinite systems
 - It is supported by SAL (sal-inf-bmc)
 - The main technique used is **induction**:
 - user provides inductive invariants of the system
 - model checker tries to prove a given property by induction using the invariants
 - ... or else provides a counter-example trace.
 - Proof by induction generally requires more work on the user's side (providing invariants)
 - Proof by induction is generally much faster and scalable

Proof by Induction

- We have completed a proof by induction of the validity property for OM(1)
 - Many auxiliary lemmas were required to complete the proof – they were hand generated
 - A main goal of the proof's construction was to separate out those auxiliary lemmas that we believe can be generated automatically in our translation
- As a side benefit, we have a proof which is much faster to verify and which scales much better than symbolic or ordinary bounded model checking

Lemma structure

- lemma_conj: basic framework lemmas, e.g. "time is always nonnegative and increases monotonically"
- fault_propagation: "if a faulty message is received, then one of the nodes upstream must be faulty"
- one_faulty_in_buffers:
 "under the maximum fault
 assumption, each receiver buffer
 contains at most one faulty value"
- counter_candidate_ix: a disjunctive invariant of the voting procedure



blue lemmas are specific to the property (validity) being proved

Model Checking

- Model checking time is greatly reduced using induction
- Human time is greatly increased, however
- Proof-by-induction has worst-case exponential complexity in N, the number of system variables
- Ordinary bounded model checking and symbolic model checking have worst-case doubleexponential complexity in N

v1	v4	v2016-01 current
> 7200 s	91 s	11 s

Time for verification

(Intel Xeon E5-2620 v2 @ 2.10GHz)