

Cookietective



Automated Cookie Vulnerability Scanner

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```
set_preference("permissions.default.network", "prompt")
opts.set_preference("http.response.timeout", 30)

driver = webdriver.Firefox(options=opts)

def scrape_links(url, stop_time):
    queue = set()

    try:
        driver.get(url)

        WebDriverWait(driver, scan_time).until(
            EC.presence_of_element_located((By.TAG_NAME, "a"))
        )

        links = driver.find_elements(By.TAG_NAME, "a")

        for link_to_add in links:
            href = link_to_add.get_attribute("href")

            if href and href.startswith("http"):
                queue.add(href)
```

```
def hasCNAMERecord(domainName, dbFile='../database.db'):
    dbFile = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), dbFile))
    conn = sqlite3.connect(dbFile)
    c = conn.cursor()
    c.execute("SELECT hasAtype FROM CNAMEpackets WHERE domainName = ?")
    result = c.fetchone()
    conn.close()
    if result is not None:
        return result[0]
    return None

def firstPartyCheck(domainName, dbFile='../database.db'):
    dbFile = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), dbFile))
    conn = sqlite3.connect(dbFile)
    c = conn.cursor()
    c.execute("SELECT CNAMEaliases FROM CNAMEpackets WHERE domainName = ?")
    result = c.fetchone()
    conn.close()
    if result is not None:
        return result[0]
    return None
```

```
def parse_packet():
    init(self, packet, A, ip):
        self.packet = packet
        self.has_A = A
        self.domain = packet.rname
        self.cname = packet.rdata
        if len(ip) < 1:
            self.ip = None
        else:
            self.ip = ip


def parseDNS(packet):
    if (packet and packet.haslayer('DNS') and packet.haslayer('UDP')):
        udp = packet['UDP']
        dns = packet['DNS']

        has_CNAME = False
        has_Atype = False
        src_ip = packet['IP'].src

        CNAME_index = 0
        ip = []

        if (int(udp.sport) == 53):
            for i in range(dns.count):
                dnsrr = dns.an[i]
                if dnsrr.type == dnsrr.get_flags():
```


Background



- Cookies Often Used For:
 - Session ID
 - Tracking / Advertising Services



Background



- **Cookies Often Used For:**
 - Session ID
 - Tracking / Advertising Services
- **Modern browsers & extensions:**
 - Increasingly block T/A cookies
 - Prevent 3rd party tracking
- **T/A services want to bypass**
 - Can lead to security vulnerabilities




What is CNAME Cloaking?

- CNAME DNS entry aliases:
 - Domain (what it actually is)
 - CNAME (what browser sees)
- CNAME Cloaking
 - Disguise 3rd-party (foreign host) as 1st-party (original domain)
 - T/A cookies trusted as 1st party
- Can cause severe security vulnerabilities

CNAME DNS Entry

track..example.org IN CNAME tracker.com

Browser sees:



Vulnerability

- Leaks cookies to 3rd party if:
 - CNAME cloaked
 - Lax cookie settings (Domain)
- Any 3rd party admin can:
 - Access leaked cookies
 - Potentially access session info

DNS resource records registered by first-party webmaster

1st-party.ex.	IN A	192.168.0.1
xyz.1st-party.ex.	IN CNAME	user1.3rd-party.ex.


DNS resource records registered by third-party vendor

user1.3rd-part.ex.	IN A	172.16.0.1.
user2.3rd-part.ex.	IN A	172.16.0.1.
user3.3rd-part.ex.	IN A	172.16.0.1.
...		

First-party cookie shared by CNAME cloaking



Why You Should Be Concerned



- Possibility of **session resprimg**
- Multiple widely-used banking sites found to be vulnerable
- Easy to set up, easy to miss, drastic consequences



Solution: Cookietective



Automated Scanner

1. Information Gathering:

- Parse through websites
- Scan for CNAME cloaking and Cookie information

2. Analysis:

- Label domains as **1st-party or 3rd-party**
- If 3rd party, scan if `Domain` setting leaks cookies


3. Measure Accuracy:

- Check if domain name is present in **Majestic Million** or **NoTracking** lists




1. Information Gathering

- **Web Crawler**
 - Send request to input domain
 - Locate and traverse links in BFS fashion
- **Traffic Parser scans:**
 - DNS traffic for CNAME packets
 - HTTPS traffic for Cookie settings
- **Records:**
 - CNAME alias, domain
 - Set-cookie settings
 - Original Domain being scanned



Scaling Crawler & Scanner



2. Analysis


- WHOIS data
 - Provides domain owner info
 - If owners match, label 1st party
 - If owners mismatch, label 3rd party
- URL Parser
 - Check Domain vs Original URL
 - Check CNAME vs Original URL
 - If mismatch, scan Cookie settings for vulnerabilities

```
Domain Name: youtube.com
Original URL: play.google.com
Thread started to look up youtube.com
Google LLC
Thread started to look up play.google.com
Google LLC
```


```
def parse_url(url):
    first_run = urlparse(url)
    pattern = r"^(?P<scheme>[^\s:/?#]+):(?://)?(?:P<login>[^\s:]+)(?:P<password>[^\s@]*@)?(?:P<path>[^\s?#]+)?(?:P<query>[^\s?#]+)?(?:P<fragment>[^\s?#]+)?$"
    matches = []
    if first_run[1] == "":
        a = re.search(pattern, first_run[2])
        matches.append(a.group('host'))
    else:
        a = re.search(pattern, first_run[1])
        b = re.search(pattern, first_run[2])
        matches.append(a.group('host'))
```



Analysis Explanation



3. Accuracy Measuring



	Address	...	NoTracking
0	0.soompi.io	...	0
1	0000000000000000webcdnstreamnejp.cdnnext.stream...	...	0
2	01.cdn.mediadradecraft.com	...	0
3	02xx45i856w77713a9.agilewingcdn.com	...	0
4	0520d376af104e859d57c1ad8ae1c81a.unbouncepages...	...	0
...
14367	zlianjfre.v.bsgslb.cn	...	0
14368	zms.cntd.ru	...	0
14369	zomato.edgekey.net	...	0
14370	zoosnet.net	...	0
14371	zuhauseplus.vodafone.de	...	0

```
ad.gmw.cn,0,1
ads.dennisnet.co.uk,0,1
ads.youtube.com,0,1
annefrank.containers.piwik.pro,0,1
assets-jpcust.jwpsrv.com,0,1
beap.gemini.yahoo.com,0,1
content.apruvd.com,0,1
content.id.elsevier.com,0,1
get.mndbdy.ly,0,1
info.evidon.com,0,1
mbid.marfeelrev.com,0,1
olytics.ameda.com,0,1
partners2.stacksocial.com,0,1
partners3.stacksocial.com,0,1
pi.pardot.com,0,1
pubads.g.doubleclick.net,0,1
refer.zazzlerefferral.com,0,1
regstat.betfair.com,0,1
securepubads.g.doubleclick.net,0,1
share.vimeo.com,0,1
web-analytics.uni-muenchen.de,0,1
widgethost.barnebys.com,0,1
```



Results



Scanner Results

Chart 1: Scanned Domains




Table 2: Collected CNAME Packets

URLs with CNAME Aliasing	CNAME Entries	Distinct CNAME Aliased Domains
9846	15381	14372

Table 3: Collected Set-Cookie Information


URLs w/ Set - Cookie Headers	Cookies Received	Specified Domain Attributes
8365	25758	7362



Analysis Results

- Ran multiple analyses on the database
 - Consistent results with ~450 vulnerabilities found
- 5751 URLs contain 3rd party CNAME cloaking
 - 33.6% of the domains scanned
- 419 unique URLs are vulnerable
 - 7.28% of the domains utilize CNAME cloaking


% Websites that use CNAME
Cloaking with Vulnerabilities



Accuracy Measurement Results

















- 24 / 26 CNAME aliased domains on notrack marked
 - 92.3% of known T/A services labeled as CNAME cloaked
- 417 domains marked as using CNAME Cloaking **not** listed on the notracking list
- 7 on MM and **not** on NT labeled as vulnerable
 - Base assumption by paper
 - Could represent inaccuracies in analysis

CNAME cloaked



Limitations

- Computational:
 - Number of containers/workers
 - Scan time per domain
 - Resource allocation
- 1st vs 3rd Party Categorizing:
 - WHOIS data can be hidden by domain owner
 - Limited by WHOIS server speed
 - Parser may falsely flag related domains that look different

<input type="checkbox"/>	Name	Image	Status	Port(s)
<input type="checkbox"/>	 tender_swartz a75b9998e47e 	snickerdoodle	Exited	9007:53 (UDP) Show all ports (2)
<input type="checkbox"/>	 blissful_rubin ba236f6dbf5a 	snickerdoodle	Exited	9006:53 (UDP) Show all ports (2)
<input type="checkbox"/>	 modest_kare 1d79ebf19f99 	snickerdoodle	Exited	9005:53 (UDP) Show all ports (2)
<input type="checkbox"/>	 gifted_keldysh 23042bc1d0aa 	snickerdoodle	Exited	9004:53 (UDP) Show all ports (2)
<input type="checkbox"/>	 loving_pare d651bf92e889 	snickerdoodle	Exited	9003:53 (UDP) Show all ports (2)
<input type="checkbox"/>	 charming_ramanujan 37ee280faacf 	snickerdoodle	Exited	9002:53 (UDP) Show all ports (2)
<input type="checkbox"/>	 goofy_heyrovsky 13003576f857 	snickerdoodle	Exited	9001:53 (UDP) Show all ports (2)
<input type="checkbox"/>	 modest_liskov 43c34078129f 	snickerdoodle	Exited	9000:53 (UDP) Show all ports (2)



Registrant Contact

Name: Contact Privacy Inc. Customer 7151571251

Organization: Contact Privacy Inc. Customer 7151571251



Final Insights

- Previous paper found ~21.2% of websites used CNAME Cloaking
 - We found ~33.6%
 - Similar and could mean more websites are utilizing CNAME cloaking
- Previous paper found 50% of websites with CNAME cloaking were vulnerable
 - We found only 7.28%
 - Website owners may be more aware





Thank you!

Any questions?



Sources

- Risk Analysis of Cookie Sharing by Link Decoration and CNAME Cloaking:
 - https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ipsjjip/29/0/29_649/_pdf/-char/en
- Oversharing is Not Caring: How CNAME Cloaking Can Expose Your Session Cookies:
 - http://megele.io/cname_cloaking-asiaccs2021.pdf
- The CNAME of the Game: Large-scale Analysis of DNS-based Tracking Evasion:
 - <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2102.09301.pdf>
- Cookie Synchronization: Everything You Always Wanted to Know But Were Afraid to Ask:
 - <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.10505.pdf>
- CNAME Cloaking: Disguising Third Parties Through the DNS:
 - <https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cname-cloaking/>