Master in Computational Science and Engineering
Mathematics Section, EPFL

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# Describing information influence in social media with coupling inference methods

Master Thesis Defense

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Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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## Introduction

## Terminology

#### **Falseness** Intent to harm

Misinformation

Sharing of false or inaccurate information, regardless of intent to mislead

Disinformation

Targeted
misinformation:
intentional sharing
of false or
misleading
information

Malinformation

**Deliberate**publication of
 private
information

## Circle of amplification **Disinformation** very **frequent** on social media. Increasing number of Recommender people rely systems help almost propagate it by exclusively on maximizing user social media for engagement. getting news.

## Impact of disinformation

 Confused the public, led to political inaction, and to the rejection of mitigation policies

 Lost of trust in government, scientific community, medicine...

Polarization and social fracture




Image from <a href="mailto:nrdc.org">nrdc.org</a>


Individuals



- Individuals
- Companies



- Individuals
- Companies
- Institutions






## Goal & Motivation

## Disinformation campaigns

 Virulent, organized, large scale disinformation operation by coordinated actors

Flooding the zone

 Deny responsibility in assassination, opposition to climate regulations



Weaponising news
RT, Sputnik and targeted
disinformation

Dr Gordon Ramsay Dr Sam Robertshaw

## Disinformation campaigns

Virulent, organized, large scale

DENY, DECEIVE, DELAY

Weaponising news
RT, Sputnik and targeted

dialiada maratian

"To solve the climate crisis, we **must** also tackle the information crisis"

assassination, **opposition** to climate **regulations** 



Dr Sam Robertshaw

## Modeling influence

 Create a system able to capture influence attempts relating to (climate change)
 disinformation between users on Twitter.

Quantify the influence between users on Twitter

 Derive new influence measures describing the amount of disinformation shared by the users on Twitter.




Image from commonexperience.edu

Create and curate 2 new datasets of tweets around COP26 and COP27

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- **Derive** new **influence measures**

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- Sensitivity analysis of key-components of the framework
- **Generalize** on different **types** of **events**


## Methodology

#### **Datasets**

- COP26: all climate-related tweets containing a URL around COP26 (2021).
- COP27: all climate-related tweets containing a URL around COP27 (2022).
- Control: all climate-related tweets containing a URL at random dates.
- Skripal: all tweets related to the Skripal poisoning in 2018 and containing a URL.

("climate change" OR #climatechange OR #climate\_change OR "climate crisis" OR #climatecrisis OR #climate\_crisis OR "climate emergency" OR #climateemergency OR #climate\_emergency OR "global warming" OR #globalwarming OR #global\_warming OR "climate action" OR #climateaction OR #climate\_action) has:links lang:en

### Data processing



## Data processing (example)



"We need to remind ourselves that we can still turn this around. It's entirely possible if we are prepared to change. Hope is all around us."

I wrote a text about what it will take for the #COP26 to be successful.




theguardian.com

There are no real climate leaders yet – who will step up at Cop26? | Greta Thu... Like other rich nations, the UK is more talk than action on the climate crisis. Something needs to change in Glasgow, says climate activist Greta Thunberg


6:30 PM · Oct 21, 2021

• **Timestamp:** 2021-10-21 at 18:30




- Stratification: Before COP26 (based on timestamp)
- Actor: Greta Thunberg
- Action: sharing of Trustworthy
   (T) news (NewsGuard score for theguardian.com is 100)

#### Time series creation



## Influence graphs



### Key component: Coupling Inference Methods

Transfer Entropy (TE)


- Need to binarize the time series
- Naive estimation of state probabilities
- Need an arbitrary threshold
- Well-known and less subject to noise

Joint Distance Distribution (JDD)

- Use original (standardized) values
- Based on distances
- Formulated as hypothesis testing
- More subject to noise


#### Influence measures

• Outdegree: for each node (actor) in the influence graph, outdegree directly indicates how many other actors this actor influenced.



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- Outdegree: for each node (actor) in the influence graph, outdegree directly indicates how many other actors this actor influenced.
- Betweenness: indication of how well one actor serves as a bridge to influence many other users.



#### Influence measures


These measures can be fine-grained and derived for each edge type in the graph:

- T-T: echo chamber of trustworthy news sharing.
- T-U: credibility cross-over of trustworthy to untrustworthy news sharing
- U-T: credibility cross-over of untrustworthy to trustworthy news sharing
- U-U: echo chamber of untrustworthy news sharing.

## Results


#### Action distributions

- Proportion of untrustworthy news sharing larger during Skripal
- May be a hint of underlying disinformation campaign




## Comparison JDD-TE influence graphs

- JDD detects large spikes of influence of the untrustworthy types during COP26.
- No difference with the control for TE.



JDD on the COP26 dataset TE on the COP26 dataset




#### One influence measure to rule them all?

Weak overall correlations

 Only outdegree and betweenness exhibit relatively high correlation.

 Each measure is in fact capturing different types of information, and influence definitions.



Correlation matrix between influence measures for JDD on the COP26 dataset

## What do influential people share? -- Skripal

	Skripal dataset	Top 10 JDD	Top 10 TE
Before	4.8	-	32.9
During	3.9	33.6	15.1
After	6.3	20.7	10.9


	Skripal dataset	Top 10 JDD	Top 10 TE
Before	1.1	-	4.0
During	1.9	28.7	19.5
After	1.4	11.5	0


Mean number of mentions of "rt.com"

Mean number of mentions of "sputniknews.com"

- RT and Sputnik vectors of Russian disinformation campaign during Skripal
- Significantly more sharing of these websites by the most influential users we detected
- Even more sharings by users detected by JDD compared to TE

### What do influential people share? -- COP26





- Most influential users share articles from China-controlled or far-rightaffiliated media
- JDD detects more content directly related to disinformation than TE
- China-affiliated news outlets share anti US and anti-Western climate narratives.
- Far-right US outlets share counter narrative and narrative against Biden's climate awareness

## Conclusion

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- Quantifying influence between users on social media is difficult, but essential to detect and counter disinformation.
- Derived and explored a novel method to measure influence and detect disinformation on social media.
- Compared two coupling inference methods to derive the influence graphs.
- Influence measures have relatively low correlation between themselves, showcasing that they
  do not capture the same types of influence.
- **JDD** results in **sparser influence graphs**, but finds individuals who seem **more active** in spreading **disinformation** than when using **TE**.

## Future work

- **Explore** other **action** definitions
- Incorporate **content analysis**
- Further validate on other known
   cases of disinformation campaigns

## Thank you!