

Preliminary Teaching Structure - International Cooperation

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"I argue that scientific progress is best made by combining three methodological approaches in our research: formal, mathematical logic to ensure internal consistency in arguments about complex and contingent relations among variables; case studies and archival research to evaluate verisimilitude between theory and action; and statistical analysis to establish the generality of the hypothesized relations among variables" (Bueno de Mesquita 2002, 1).

Following two introductory semesters in political science and prior to writing a bachelor thesis, classes on international cooperation should teach three things. First, an overview of the types of cooperation and its manifestations. Second, an introductory formal understanding of the theories we apply to understand the strategies that are at the foundation of the analysis of international cooperation. Third, a sound methodological basis that enables students to conduct their own research in future projects. As good scholarship is time-consuming, so is teaching it. One semester is not sufficient to teach all three approaches to empirical scholarship. Therefore, each class focuses on one of the methods highlighted by Bueno de Mesquita, though we will not exclusively focus on one method per class and there will be intersections of methods, each method is broadly dedicated one semester.

Though there will be excursions to topics such as war or terrorism, these classes will focus mainly on the cooperation (or lack thereof) of different in inter- and transnational arenas. The substantive focus of the methods class is exclusively on European Integration. In the following, I will shortly outline the goal for each of the courses.

Potential Outline of the Classes

In order to give some examples of the content of each class, the following list gives an overview of the substantive classes, their goals, the topics discussed and potential literature. Each class consists of 14 sessions. Following a substantive block, there is one session that is TBD. This session is intentionally left open, in order to accommodate topics that may arise during the class. The final sessions of the two substantive classes are dedicated to student presentations. These presentations are intended to foster a discourse surrounding the research topics the students have chosen throughout the class as topics for their final papers.

Class 1 - Proseminar - International Cooperation I

The goal of this first class is to provide an initial understanding of the varying forms of international cooperation. We look at different types of cooperation to learn about its distinctive features, understand why and how these cooperative agreements are formed and when they are terminated. Methodologically the focus of this class will be on case studies, though we will discuss some large-N studies as well.

Goals:

- Give an overview of grand-theories in IR (in line with the accompanying lecture)
- Focus on case-studies as a tool for scholarship

- Introduce varying forms of international cooperation with examples
- Understand the fundamental drivers of international cooperation
- Independently conduct a case study

Session 1: Conducting research in international relations

- Goodin, R., & Gerring, J. (2011). The Case Study: What it is and What it Does. In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Science*. : Oxford University Press.
- De Mesquita, B. (2002). Domestic Politics and International Relations. *International Studies Quarterly*, 46(1), 1-9.

Session 2: Neorealism vs. Neoliberalism

- Nye, J. (1988). Neorealism and Neoliberalism. *World Politics*, 40(2), 235-251.
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Session 3: Introduction to Cooperation in IR

- Martin, L. (1999). The Political Economy of International Cooperation. In *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century*. : Oxford University Press.
- Keohane, R. (1982). The Demand for International Regimes. *International Organization*, 36(2), 325-355.

Session 4: Domestic influences of international cooperation

- Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2012). Domestic Explanations of International Relations. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 15(1), 161–181.
- de Mesquita, B. B., & Smith, A. (2015). Tanzania's Economic and Political Performance: A District-Level Test of Selectorate Theory BT - *Politics in South Asia: Culture, Rationality and Conceptual Flow* (S. O. Wolf, J. Schöttli, D. Frommherz, K. Fürstenberg, M. Gallenkamp, L. König, & M. Pauli, eds.).

Session 5: International Bargains

- Fearon, J. D. (1998). Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. *International Organization*, 52(2), 269–305.
- Steinberg, R. (2002). In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO. *International Organization*, 56(2), 339-374.

Session 6: Why states cooperate in international agreements

- Mansfield, E., Milner, H., & Rosendorff, B. (2002). Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. *International Organization*, 56(3), 477-513.
- Dür, A., Baccini, L. & Elsig, M. (2014). The design of international trade agreements: Introducing a new dataset. *The Review of International Organizations* 9, 353–375.

Session 7: Case studies - e.g. Paris accord and TTIP (undecided)

- Eliasson, L. J., Garcia-Duran Huet, P. (2018). TTIP Negotiations: Interest Groups, Anti-TTIP Civil Society Campaigns and Public Opinion. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 16(2), 101–16.
- Sebenius, J. K., Singh M. K. (2012). Is a Nuclear Deal with Iran Possible? An Analytical Framework for the Iran Nuclear Negotiations. *International Security* 37(3), 52–91.

Session 8: Why states act through formal international organizations

- Abbott, K., & Snidal, D. (1998). Why States Act through Formal International Organizations. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(1), 3-32.
- Vreeland, J. (2008). Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture. *International Organization*, 62(1), 65-101.

Session 9: Case studies - e.g. Andean Pact and WTO (undecided)

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- Davis, C. L., & Wilf, M. (2017). Joining the Club: Accession to the GATT/WTO. *The Journal of Politics*, 79(3), 964–978.

Session 10: Transnational Cooperation

- Abbott, K., Green, J., & Keohane, R. (2016). Organizational Ecology and Institutional Change in Global Governance. *International Organization*, 70(2), 247-277.
- Charles Roger, Thomas Hale & Liliana Andonova (2017). The Comparative Politics of Transnational Climate Governance, *International Interactions*, 43:1, 1-25.

Session 11: Case Studies - e.g. Internet and Environment (undecided)

- Andonova, L. B., Hale, T. N., & Roger, C. B. (2017). National policy and transnational governance of climate change: Substitutes or complements? *International Studies Quarterly*, 61(2), 253–268.
- Forthcoming: Weyrauch, D., & Winzen T. (2020). Internet fragmentation and transnational engineering networks: Concentration rather than fragmentation.

Session 12: Varying Topic - TBD

Session 13: Student Presentations

Session 14: Student Presentations

Class 2 - Übung - Quantitative Methods in International Relations

This data-driven class provides the foundation for empirical analyses. As it is an “Übung” the focus of this class will be on the methods. Nevertheless, the class is structured along important empirical contributions in scholarship on European Integration. The final examination is a take-home exam. This class has been built with Verena Kunz and Mio Hinstorfer-Heitmann and is taught by all three of us.

Session 1: Course Organization and Introduction to R I

Session 2: Introduction to R II

Session 3: Data Wrangling

Session 4: Descriptive Analyses

Session 5: Data Visualisation

Session 6: Uncertainty I

Session 7: Uncertainty II

Session 8: Linear Regression I

Session 9: Linear Regression II

Session 10: Linear Regression III

Session 11: Logistic Regression

Session 12: Count Models

Session 13: Varying Topic (Intro to Network Analyses, Intro to Text as Data)

Session 14: Open Office Hours

Class 3 - Hauptseminar - International Cooperation II

In this final class, we will focus more distinctly on the strategic interactions of actors in international cooperation. In the first block, we look at the underlying mechanisms that structure these interactions. Starting from the theoretical concept of two-level games we will identify the varying bargains that governments have to strike with one another and with domestic actors. Finally, we will problematize the unitary-actor assumption in international cooperation. In a second block, we will discuss influential papers that shape our understanding of international cooperation in light of the theoretical foundations that we have acquired in the first bloc of this class. To give an example, we will look at the conflicting results of Mansfield/Milner (2002) and Kono (2006). While the former identifies a greater willingness of democracies to cooperate with one another, the latter identifies that democracies try to obfuscate trade barriers and only seemingly are willing to cooperate more. We will discuss other motives of governments, whether institutions are sufficient as explanatory variables or if we will need to take into account more dynamic processes of international cooperation.

The final exam of this class will be a fully developed paper and should be considered a trial-run for the bachelor thesis.

Goals:

- Introduce the formal, mathematical logic underlying our theories
- Consolidate and intensify our understanding of international cooperation
- Problematize our current understanding of the preference formation and the relevant actors in international cooperation
- Independently write a first scholarly paper

Session 1: Introduction

Session 2: Two-Level Games

- Putnam, R. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International Organization*, 42(3), 427-460.
- da Conceição-Heldt, E. & Mello, P. A. (2017). *Two-Level Games in Foreign Policy Analysis*, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Session 3: International Bargains

- Fearon, J. (1998). Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. *International Organization*, 52(2), 269-305.
- Powell, R. (2002) Bargaining Theory and International Conflict. *Annual Review of Political Science* 5(1), 1–30.

Session 4: National Bargains

- Morrow, J., De Mesquita, B., Siverson, R., & Smith, A. (2008). Retesting Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects of W from Other Elements of Democracy. *The American Political Science Review*, 102(3), 393-400.

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Session 5: Credible Commitments and Audience Costs

- Tomz, M. (2007) Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach. *International Organization* 61(4), 821–40.
- Slantchev, B. (2006). Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs. *International Studies Quarterly*, 50(2), 445-477.

Session 6: Unitary Actors in International Relations

- Moravcsik, A. (1997). Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. *International Organization*, 51(4), 513-553.
- König, T. (2018). Still the Century of Intergovernmentalism? Partisan Ideology, Two-level Bargains and Technocratic Governance in the post-Maastricht Era. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 56(6), 1240–1262.

Session 7: International Agreements (I) - Domestic Institutions

- Mansfield, E., Milner, H., & Rosendorff, B. (2002). Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. *International Organization*, 56(3), 477-513.
- Kono, D. (2006). Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency. *The American Political Science Review*, 100(3), 369-384.

Session 8: International Agreements (II) - Questions of Design

- Baccini, L., Dür, A., & Elsig, M. (2015). The Politics of Trade Agreement Design: Revisiting the Depth-Flexibility Nexus. *International Studies Quarterly*, 59(4), 765–775.
- Baccini, L. (2019). The Economics and Politics of Preferential Trade Agreements. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 22(1), 75–92.

Session 9: International Organizations (I) - Undecided

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Session 10: International Organizations (II) - Questions of Design

- Voeten, E. (2019). Making Sense of the Design of International Institutions. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 22(1), 147–63.
- Koremenos, B. (2016). COIL's building blocks: Theory and data. In *The Continent of International Law: Explaining Agreement Design* (pp. 23-63). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Session 11: Cooperative Failure or Failure to Cooperate?

- von Borzyskowski, I., Vabulas, F. (2019). Hello, goodbye: When do states withdraw from international organizations?. *The Review of International Organizations* 14, 335–366.
- Hobolt, S. B. (2016). The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(9), 1259-1277.

Session 12: Varying Topic - TBD

Session 13: Student Presentations

Session 14: Student Presentations