## Implementation memo rev.1

Toshiba Corporation Hideo Shimizu

## Domain parameters\*

parameter	symbol	description
dX	DX	Total degree of public key polynomial
dr	DR	Total degree of encryption random (1)
q	Q	Prime number for base field
િ	L	Encode parameter
n	N	Degree of residue class polynomial Prime number*
mlen	MLEN	Message byte size

Above parameter is defined in parameter.h

## variables

variable	type	description
M	OS	message to encrypt
С	OS	ciphertext
PK	OS	public key
SK	OS	secret key
m	$R_{\ell}$	decoded message
С	Pq(dX+dr)	decoded ciphertext
ux	$R_{\ell}$	decoded secret key (1)
uy	$R_{\ell}$	decoded secret key (2)
X	Pq(dX)	decoded public key
r	Pq(dr)	encryption random (1)
е	$P_{\ell}(dX+dr)$	encryption random (2)


★OS : Octet String

## size\*


191		bit size of ℓ (= 2)
q		byte size of q (= 4)
#terms(d)	(d + 1)(d + 2) / 2	Number of terms of bivariate polynomial with total degree d
ux	୧  * n	secret key 1 (bit size), ceil(n / 4) bytes*
uy	&  * n	secret key 2 (bit size), ceil(n / 4) bytes*
(ux, uy)	2* ℓ  * n	secret key (bit size), 2*ceil(n / 4) bytes*
X	q * #terms(dX) * n	public key (byte size)
payload	୧  * n	The number of bits that IEC can encrypt, ceil(n / 4) bytes*
С	q *#terms(dX+dr) * n	ciphertext (byte size)

## Parameters\*

Security	n	m	sk	pk	С	payload	PS
128bit	1201	16byte	602byte	14412byte	28824byte	301byte	285byte
192bit	1733	24byte	868byte	20796byte	41592byte	434byte	410byte
256bit	2267	32byte	1134byte	27204byte	54408byte	567byte	535byte
			2*ceil(n/4)	12*n	24*n	ceil(n/4)	payload-m



### Software layer



### Benchmark\*

#### Reference implementation


	keygen	encrypt	decrypt
IEC384	92909566	178456036	335353573
IEC448	160497017	378860493	716243384
IEC512	239510004	626677271	1186128486
			(cycles)

#### Optimized implementation

	keygen	encrypt	decrypt
IEC384	78272627	116773401	216049724
IEC448	131971731	248815749	466577361
IEC512	191246205	420543208	792576864
			(cycles)

<sup>†</sup> Xeon E5-1620 3.6GHz Windows 7 64bit 32GB memory

### Benchmark\*



### Optimization technique


- Fast prime (Mersenne prime 2<sup>31</sup>-1)
- Lazy reduction

Parallel implementation (not done)
 AVX2(Intel), NEON(ARM), GPU...

### Side channel countermeasure

- Execution time independent to input data (done)
- Random masking (not done)

# Source directory\*



All difference is parameter.h only.

### Difference from NIST API

- IND-CCA2 decryption with FO conversion needs public key as input for the purpose of verification.
- NIST provides seed expander  $\{0,1\}^{320} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$ . But we need seed expander  $\{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$ . So we use SHAKE256 as seed expander.
- Original AES256. We use original AES256 instead of libssl. In windows environment, it is hard to use libssl.

## All algorithms

- IECKG
- IECENC
- IECDEC
- keygen
- encrypt
- decrypt

### **IECKG**

- Key generation primitive
- (ux, uy, X) = IECKG() return ux: secret key 1 in  $R_e$ , uy: secret key 2 in  $R_e$ , X: public key in Pq(dX)
  - (1)  $ux \in_{R} R_{\ell}$

  - (2) uy  $\subseteq_R$   $R_\ell$ (3)  $X \subseteq_R$  Pq(dX)
  - (4)  $a_{00} = X(ux, uy)$
  - (5) X = X a00
  - (6) return (ux, uy, X)
- X(ux, uy) means substitute x = ux(t), y = uy(t) for X(x, y). The result is in Rq.
- $\subseteq_{R}$  uses random generator.

#### **IECENC**

- Encryption primitive
- c = IECENC(m, X)
   input m: message in R<sub>e</sub>, X:public key in Pq(dX)
   return c: ciphertext in Pq(dX+dr)
  - (1)  $r \in_R Pq(dr)$ (2)  $e \in_R P_{\ell}(dX+dr)$ (3)  $c = m + X*r + \ell*e$ (4) return c
- $\in_{\mathbb{R}}$  uses seed expander.

### **IECDEC**

- Decryption primitive
- m = IECDEC(c, ux, uy) input c: ciphertext in Pq(dX+dr), ux: secret key 1 in  $R_{\ell}$ , uy: secret key 2 in  $R_{\ell}$  return m: message in  $R_{\ell}$ 
  - (1) m = c(ux, uy) (2) m = reduce(m,  $\ell$ ) (3) return m
- c(ux, uy) means substitute x = ux(t), y = uy(t) for c(x, y). The result is in Pq.
- reduce(m, ℓ) means make all the coefficients of m(t) remainder divided by ℓ.

## keygen

- Key generation
- SK, PK = keygen()
   return SK: secret key in OS, PK: public key in OS
  - (1) (ux, uy, X) = IECKG()
  - (2) SK =  $R_e 2OS(ux) \mid R_e 2OS(uy)$
  - (3) PK = Pq2OS(X)
  - (4) return (SK, PK)

### encrypt\*

- IND-CCA2 encryption with FO conversion
- C = encrypt(msg, PK) input msg: message in OS with length mlen, PK: public key in OS return C: ciphertext in OS
  - (1) PS  $\subseteq_R$  OS with byte length of payload mlen Let the last 8 - 2\* (n % 4) bits of PS set to 0.\*
  - (2)  $M = msg \mid PS$
  - (3) Initialize seed expander with coin = H(M)
  - (4)  $m = OS2R_{\ell}(M)$
  - (5) X = OS2Pq(dX, PK)
  - (6) c = IECENC(m, X)
  - (7) C = Pq2OS(dX+dr, c)
  - (8) return C
- H(•) is seed expander. In this implementation, we use SHAKE3-256 as seed expander.
- In this implementation, |PS| = ceil(n / 4) mlen bytes.


### decrypt

- IND-CCA2 decryption with FO conversion
- M = decrypt(C, SK, PK) input C: ciphertext in OS, SK: secret key in OS, PK: public key in OS return M: message in OS or IEC\_NG
  - (1) c = OS2Pq(dX+dr, C)(2) decompose SK to SK1, SK2
  - (3)  $ux = OS2R_{e}(SK1)$
  - (4) uy =  $OS2R_{\ell}(SK2)$
  - (5) m = IECDEC(c, ux, uy)
  - # verify whether C is correctly generated ciphertext
  - (6)  $M = R_e 20S(m)$
  - (7) Initialize seed expander with coin = H(M)
  - (8) X = OS2Pq(dX, PK)
  - (9) c2 = IECENC(m, X)
  - (10) if c == c2: return first mlen bytes of M
  - (11) return IEC\_NG
- |SK| = n / 2 bytes, |SK1| = |SK2| = n / 4 bytes.


### Data conversion

- OS2Fq / Fq2OS
- OS2Rq / Rq2OS
- $OS2R_{\ell} / R_{\ell}2OS$
- OS2Pq / Pq2OS


# OS2Fq / Fq2OS



## OS2Rq/Rq2OS




# $OS2R_{\ell}/R_{\ell}2OS^*$




# OS2Pq / Pq2OS

#### degree 1 case



## OS2Pq / Pq2OS

#### degree 2 case



## Difference of previous submit\*

- The algorithm name is now Giophantus.
- n must be prime number. (p.2) This affects followings:
  - Various sizes are changed ceil(n / 4). (p.3)
  - encode/decode rule of OS2Rl / RlOS are changed.
    (p.23) Now we need zero padding.
- For security reason, parameters are changed.
   (p.5)