

Cryogenically Frozen Malware

vx-underground collection // by [smelly_vx](#) and [Ethereal](#)



Frozen Malcode:


For quite sometime now we've been sitting on a lesser known malware technique I've (smelly) titled *Cryogenically Frozen Malcode*. This term derives from the fact that the malicious binary is in a long-term frozen state and has a low-likelihood of execution (or *unthawing* and/or *resurrection*). This technique is not ideal - however under very specific environments or scenarios it may be viable. This technique is made possible by abusing registry components [tied to specific properties](#) within the [Windows Installer API](#).

The [Windows Installer API's properties](#), which derive from the Windows Installer binary, allow a product to configure it's uninstall properties which will be visible from the Control Panel. When a user selects uninstall (or, depending on the binary configurations, *modify settings*) it will refer to the property present within the registry titled *Uninstall*. (Un)fortunately, the documentation present on MSDN is slightly misleading - the documentation states that the binary uninstall path is located in [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE](#) i.e.


```
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall
```

However, this is not entirely true. In some scenarios applications will store uninstaller properties in the user-specific registry key [HKEY_CURRENT_USER](#) which does not require administrative and/or elevated privileges to write to i.e.

```
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall
```



The image above is a snippet of the file listing present within the Uninstall Key. Each entry contains attributes which the Control Panel reads when a user navigates through them.



In this particular paper our code demonstrates enumerating the Uninstall Key, locates a specified application, hijacks its UninstallString key and replaces it with a powershell command line which requests our malicious binary be run as admin. Ideally, a non-educated user would attempt to uninstall the application and allow UAC to execute the binary being presented. Why would a user not trust the Control Panel?

dows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\wire		
Name	Type	Data
(Default)	REG_SZ	(value not set)
DisplayIcon	REG_SZ	C:\Users\...AppData\Local\wire\app.ico
DisplayName	REG_SZ	Wire
DisplayVersion	REG_SZ	3.19.3731
EstimatedSize	REG_DWORD	0x00010a56 (68182)
InstallDate	REG_SZ	20200922
InstallLocation	REG_SZ	C:\Users\...AppData\Local\wire
Language	REG_DWORD	0x00000409 (1033)
NoModify	REG_DWORD	0x00000001 (1)
NoRepair	REG_DWORD	0x00000001 (1)
Publisher	REG_SZ	Wire
QuietUninstallString	REG_SZ	"C:\Users\...AppData\Local\wire\Update.exe" --uninstall -s
UninstallString	REG_SZ	powershell.exe start-process C:\Users\...source\repos\Persistence0x2\x64\Debug\Persistence0x2.exe -verb runas
URLUpdateInfo	REG_SZ	

The image above shows the modified UninstallString path.

```
powershell.exe start-process {binary-path.exe} -verb runas
```