# How to benefit from DDOS ecosystem The D4 project



Gérard Wagener

http://www.circl.lu/ Twitter: *@d4\_project* 

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How to use our tools and databases in case of DDOS

# Part 1 - DDOS threat evaluation


## The accidental denial of service

#### Denial of services not triggered by an attacker

- Configuration errors in DNS, PABX, proxies, ...
- Asymmetric routing
- IP conflicts
- Never experienced software / hardware side effects
  - Experienced often after equipment replacement
  - Full state table management of firewalls
  - Load balancing edge cases
  - Interception proxies
  - Untested fall back mechanisms
- Difference between documentation and practical implementation
- Domino effects
- Badly coordinated maintenance

## The accidental denial of service

#### Configuration errors are quickly done



https://circl.lu/situational-awareness/

## DDOS blackmail

#### Blackmail send by email

```
"Should we attack ...
```

There are proofs of our capabilities:

https://twitter.com/apophissquadv2/status/1011743626890760193

Now the real question is are are willing to pay a lifetime protection fee?

If the answer is positive pay exactly to 2.01 Bitcoin to ... before before the Wednesday ...'

How do you react towards such mails?

### Threat evaluation

- ullet Where is the email from o email headers  $^1$
- Did other organizations receive a similar mail\*
- Is a specific target mentioned? (i.e. website, online service, ...)
- Payment method: Bitcoin?
  - Check if others paid already\*
  - Number of Bitcoin transactions ~ number of targets\*
- To whom was it send within your organization?
- Is the text generic?
- \* Do lookups in https://misppriv.circl.lu for instance

https://circl.lu/pub/tr-07/

### Threat evaluation

#### Search information on the attacker

- Identify typical attacker artefacts
  - o Email addresses, Twitter handle, uncommon strings
- Search email address in AIL
  - $\circ$  Identify attack scripts  $\rightarrow$  which attack techniques are they using?
  - o Identify hidden services related to them
- Search Twitter account in AIL or on Twitter
  - Read about capacity, political background
  - Identify old targets
- ullet Check other and your own data sources ullet how many colleagues received the blackmail
- Source for uncommon strings: raw email message<sup>2</sup>
- Challenge: filter out imitators

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>https://circl.lu/pub/tr-34/

## Is the event known?

#### Search in MISP



### Is the event known?

#### MISP sightings



Did other organizations saw some attributes?

#### Is the event known?


#### Did others paid



- Bitcoin address reused for a target
- One Bitcoin address per target
- Search in MISP other attributes (email source address, ...)


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## Monitoring future publications in AIL



### DDOS services

#### Example of a TOR hidden service




How serious do you take such services?

## Example of a TOR hidden service

#### Evaluating the service

- Is it a specialized DDOS attacks?
- Are their details about the attack techniques or capacities?
  - Amplification attacks
  - IP spoofing
  - Application attacks
  - o ...
- Since how long are the services announced?
  - · Check .onion addresses in AIL
  - Analyse the repostings → differences
- Check threat sharing platforms to check .onion addresses

## Crawl hidden services with AIL



### Crawl hidden services with AIL

- Tor crawler (aka regular crawler) is used to crawl .onion addresses
- Splash (scriptable browser) is rending the pages (including javascript) and produce screenshots (HAR archive too)




Figure: Architecture of AIL and its hidden services crawler

## Getting attack information

Example nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk

# UK's National Crime Agency hit by DDoS attack, following LizardStresser arrests

Last week, users of Lizard Squad's DDoS-on-demand service were feeling the heat after arrests were made by UK police. This week, it's the UK's National Crime Agency which has found itself the victim of a denial-of-service attack.



Graham Cluley 1 Sep 2015 - 02:01PM

## Getting additional information

Example national crimeagency.gov.uk

What are the targets: The website?

nslookup nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk

Server: 127.0.0.53

Address: 127.0.0.53#53

Non-authoritative answer:

Name: nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk

Address: 194.61.183.46


## Getting additional information on DDOS attacks

Example national crimeagency.gov.uk

```
find files/2015/08/28/ -type f | parallel -j 7 'zcat {}
| tcpdump -n -r - "host 194.61.183.46";
17:10:06.857475 IP 194.61.183.46.80 > x.x.109.194.17293
  Flags [S.], seq 1635851834, ack 1801912321, win 0, length 0
17:10:14.869661 IP 194.61.183.46.80 > x.x.109.73.58142:
  Flags [S.EW], seq 1066513712, ack 4190371841, win 0, length 0
17:10:14.881036 IP 194.61.183.46.80 > x.x.111.106.49231:
  Flags [S.EW], seq 1531124927, ack 252116993, win 0, length 0
17:10:15.186684 IP 194.61.183.46.80 > x.x.102.45.62535:
  Flags [S.EW], seq 486934691, ack 536346625, win 0, length 0
17:10:18.946674 TP 194.61.183.46.80 > x.x.67.46.62399:
  Flags [S.EW], seq 234597292, ack 4069785601, win 0, length 0
```

## Observing SYN floods attacks in backscatter traffic

Attack description




Fill up state connection state table of the victim

Other DDOS on nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk




How is the claim "proved"?

DDOS targeting European Parliament, Europol and cert.eu



How is the claim "proved"?

#### Screenshots from the attacker are valuable information




#### Screenshots from the attacker are valuable information

- If some operational security is done
  - Hide displayed hints (i.e. user name, IP address, country)
- Local time
- Used operating system
- Used browser
- Used browser plugins
- Bookmarks
- Open other tabs
- Configured search engines
- Some cases images contains meta data such as exif.
- ...

## D4 project


- Raised from CIRCL research program
- Development of the DDoS detection platform
  - o Deployment of distributed DOS detection devices on voluntary basis
- Open D4 core working setup
  - Discussions about DDOS strategies, effectiveness of mitigation techniques and more
  - Provide open data sets
- Provision and advisory support services
  - Extension of CIRCL services (AIL, DMA)
  - Training courses

# Examples of passive DDOS capacity measurements Mirai



## Examples of passive DDOS capacity measurements

#### Partial Netis or similar exploits



## Conclusions

- D4 is a collaborative project to gather information about DDOS
- D4 is an open project
- Join the project info@circl.lu
- Co-financed by CEF action No: 2017-LU-IA-0099

# Part 2 - DDOS analysis D4 project objectives

## Current DDOS mitigation limitations

#### Detection and reporting time

- Large detection time  $\rightarrow$  customer reports  $\rightarrow$  debugging
- Identify targets
- ullet Analyse a sample of traffic o derive some counter measures
- ullet Notify DDOS to third parties o take actions upstream
- ullet Call ISP ask for help o take actions upstream
- Switch infrastructure
- Set up communication channel with customers
- ...

Reference: https://www.circl.lu/pub/dfak/DDoSMitigation/

## D4 objectives