NOTES

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1 I am grateful to one of the readers of the initial manuscript for the term "political grammar" and to both readers for their thoughtful and generous engagements.

2 I use the terms "story," "narrative," and "grammar" throughout the book. By "stories" I mean the overall tales feminists tell about what has happened in the last thirty to forty years of Western feminist theory and indicate too their status as "myth" or "common opinion." By "narratives" I mean the textual refrains (content and pattern) used to tell these stories and their movement across time and space. By "grammar" I mean the techniques (oppositions, intertextual reference, and so on) that serve as narrative building blocks. I also use the term "political grammar" by which I mean to indicate the stitching together of all these levels as well as the broader political life of these stories. I have tried to be consistent in how these terms are used, but there are moments when of course technique and repetition are not distinct, or where I use other terms such as "history" to get me out of trouble.

3 You will notice that I have not provided references to particular authors in my overview here, relying on an initial sense of these stories as familiar. And it is indeed that familiarity that I am interested in, that motivates the range

of "citation tactics" that I explore throughout, and that I explain later in this introductory chapter.

4 In Western feminist progress, loss, and return narratives postmodernism and poststructuralism are often represented as synonymous, or one or other is understood to stand in for both. I have tried not to reproduce the same slip, in part because I lean towards a poststructural approach myself. In representing my own understanding I tend to mark a (sometimes arbitrary, I admit) distinction by using "poststructuralism" to denote an attitude to text/subject/world over "postmodernism" as a critique of modernism or understanding of the social world as transformed by, for example, reflexive individualism.

5 One effect of postfeminist discourse is that even the most poorly served young women will refer to themselves as liberated and free to choose what they want in life, irrespective of the often woefully limited economic, social, cultural, or interpersonal opportunities available to them (Walkerdine, Lucey et al. 2001; Walkerdine 2003).

6 As a number of theorists have suggested, the desire to symbolically uncouple women's or gender studies from lesbianism (as accusation) assumes a heterosexual subject as the norm and positions lesbian or bisexual women very differently within the field (Munt 1997; Hesford 2005; hoogland 2007).

7 Also focusing on the Dutch example, Rosi Braidotti notes further that this official discourse assumes that "our women . . . are already liberated and thus do not need any more social initiatives or emancipatory policies. 'Their women,' however, . . . are still backwards and need to be targeted for special emancipatory social actions or enforced 'liberation' " (2005: 180).

8 Anne Phillips insists that we thus need "multiculturalism without culture" if the over-association of culture with gender inequality is to be moved on from. She argues, rightly I believe, that this is essential for feminist challenges to global gender inequality (2007).

9 While there have been many critiques of gender studies as itself a move from the political intent of women's or feminist studies (Evans 1991; Richardson and Robinson 1994; Threadgold 2000; Stromquist 2001), others have celebrated gender studies' de-emphasis on woman as the de facto ground of academic feminism (Gillis and Munford 2003; Zalewski 2003), in line with loss and progress narratives, respectively. My point here is not to take a position on these debates, but to highlight one aspect of the institutional life of feminist storytelling.

10 It would seem odd to attempt to cite "feminist history" in a footnote, so let me gesture to one (London-based) project that seeks to enrich our knowledge of the past by focusing on complexities that are often overlooked: "History of Feminism Network: Celebrating, Exploring and Debating the History of Feminism"—http://historyfeminism.wordpress.com/.

11 See also Benita Roth's account of the emergence of a black feminist "vanguard" in the 1960s and 1970s, and Nancy MacLean's work, which links affirmative action

to black and working class women's struggles in the same period (MacLean 1999; Roth 1999).

12 The above theorists all pay careful attention to the role of "the teller of tales" in the process of history making. Not only is the storyteller motivated to tell this history, not that history, but the storytelling subject is also produced, and produces herself, in the process of making that history. As Burton cautions: "If we fail to recognize this dynamic [between historian and archive] we neglect an obligation to investigate our sense of identification with the archive itself" (2001: 67).

13 See Iris van der Tuin's article "'Jumping Generations,'" which links generation and geography very particularly, and my own response to this tendency in the same special issue of *Australian Feminist Studies* on "Feminist Timelines" (Hemmings 2009; van der Tuin 2009).

14 This may be one historiographical reason why the French Marxist tradition, including Christine Delphy, has been overlooked in preference for the sexual difference tradition more commonly associated with "écriture féminine" (See Braidotti 2000; Delphy 2000; Jackson 2001).

15 Caren Kaplan warns us that this happens when the careful contextualization of feminist positioning is replaced with localized universalisms or aestheticization (Kaplan 1994).

16 This project thus owes a more than considerable debt to the work of Michel Foucault, in terms of my interest in mapping dominant knowledges (1970; 1975; 2000), their production, maintenance, and effects (1972; 1981), the links across discursive forms and functions (1980b), and strategies for imagining otherwise (1980a; 1988). The reason I describe the dominant threads of Western feminist storytelling as narratives rather than discourses for the most part is in order to emphasis their patterning rather than content or context. The close attention to ordering of meaning follows Foucault, as does the focus on oppositions, exclusions, and silences, but my interest remains on their narrative function, the rehearsal, repetition, and rhythm that are so central to the making of feminist community agreement. Where I do use the term "discourse" in the book, my use of it remains fundamentally Foucauldian.

17 Individual chapters in anthologies, or articles in journals I do not directly analyze here, may also reproduce or critique the stories I take as my object of inquiry, and they have had a clear influence on my thinking (Segal 2000; Felski 2001; Wiegman 2002; Moore 2006). And no doubt many readers will be familiar with other texts that endorse cultural and social understandings of feminism as anachronism (Sommers 1994; Hakim 1995; Coward 1999; Sommers 2000).

18 One clear danger of this approach is that it reduces an individual author's right of reply and makes it hard for readers to check the accuracy of my citation, too. I did try other approaches to citation of the journal glosses at one point, but author citation invariably drew me back into engaging with individual arguments, rather than the passing narratives an author might not even wish to claim. So, while

acknowledging that this is a risky strategy in several ways, this aspect of citation practice remains central to this project.

19 My "turn to affect" in this project might strike readers familiar with my earlier critique of this term as rather ironic (Hemmings 2005a). In "Invoking Affect" I intervene in debates that herald the affective turn as a cutting-edge means to move beyond epistemological and political dead-ends. Suggesting that such calls produce a history of poststructuralism stripped of its feminist and postcolonial antecedents, I argue that invoking affect as new fails to provide a history to affect and makes us (as critics) inattentive to affect's intertwining with and production through the social. The tone of this article is so critical that it might easily be read as a dismissal of the importance of affect altogether, although this was never my intention. My focus here then both starts from that interest in the social as lived in affective registers and results in the development of a warmer tone on my part.

20 Here I am making use of Silvan Tomkins' distinction between affects (as states) and emotions (as particular expressions of those states) (1963).

21 Elspeth Probyn understands the tension between the epistemological frames of gender and our ontological experiences of the same as the basis for feminist reflexivity (1993). A focus on affect as that which binds the epistemological and the ontological might also be thought of as part of a reflexive project.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE: **PROGRESS**

1 Almost all the extracts I cite in part 1 are included as good or typical examples of a given narrative tendency; other reasons are stated in introducing the extract. I have kept ellipses to a minimum, but have included these where long sections make the point otherwise difficult to follow. Readers will remember, I hope, that my citation practice foregrounds journals and date over author. This may feel odd, or even unethical, but I hope that the importance of this practice in establishing narrative forms within feminist theory will be borne out by my analysis.

2 For Wiegman, one of these effects is the reduction of a contested history to a generationally typecast one in which disagreements are cast as part of the march of time rather than spatially enacted. Generationalism is a consistent aspect of progress, loss, and return narratives, one I flag throughout the book and discuss more fully in my conclusion to part 1.

3 In this respect the object of analysis, e.g., woman, will be understood differently even where it remains in place. The shift is thus as much about what we mean by terms within feminist theory as it is about which terms are cherished or abandoned.

4 The above extract uses the term "post-modernism" to describe a particular set of approaches to research, politics, and culture that I would probably describe as "poststructuralist" myself. As flagged in note 4 of my introduction, in the extracts examined across all three dominant forms of Western feminist storytelling, "post-modern," "poststructuralist," or "deconstructionist," as well as related terms, tend

to be used interchangeably. In loss narratives, these slippages work to homogenize the set of accounts thus denoted; in return narratives all terms are likely to be brought together under the designation "cultural turn" or sometimes "linguistic turn" (again without attention to differences between these).

5 Indeed, so strong is the certainty that certain kinds of Western feminist thought belong in the past, it can be something of a shock to realize that radical feminists, for example, continue to write in the present that has—surely?—successfully debunked their claims to relevance.

6 See Anne Phillips's chapter, "What's wrong with essentialism?" in which she suggests that we need to distinguish between different kinds of essentialist ills at the very least (2010).

7 I return to the importance of the concept of agency in the representation of Western feminist theory as dynamic and open in the last chapter.

8 Jane Gallop argues that there are two distinct stories told about feminist theory in the 1980s: one prioritizing poststructuralism as precipitating a move to difference; the other emphasizing black feminist critiques of the category "woman" in feminism. She suggests that authors frequently struggle to bring these stories together (Gallop, in Lurie, Cvetkovich et al. 2001). For Gallop, the first story is often haunted by the second, where it does not make connections explicit (2001: 688). In my reading, attempts to bring them together are often also marked by an attempt to make sense of the same through temporal displacement.

9 Only occasionally (as in the *Feminist Studies* extract) is the 1980s represented in progress narratives as the decade inaugurating class critiques, despite the accusation of 1970s feminism as middle-class as well as white and heterosexual. No doubt this is due to the association of 1970s feminism with both radical and socialist feminisms, which would make this hard to narrate plausibly. This association does, however, facilitate the location of social concerns and material inquiry in the 1970s for return narratives, as we will see in chapter 3.

10 These comparisons are central to how Western feminist loss and return narratives function as well, and I will track these throughout the book.

11 I am encouraged in my desire to delve into what work "Butler" does for Western feminism storytelling by her own interest in such representations. She asks her reader to consider: "What are the institutional histories . . . that 'position' me here now? If there is something called 'Butler's position,' is this one that I devise, publish, and defend, that belongs to me as a kind of academic property? Or is there a grammar of the subject that merely encourages us to position me as the proprietor of those theories?" (1992: 8–9).

12 For broader social theory, it seems a Western feminist progress narrative has done much of its work for it, providing the perfect rationale—its irredeemable, racist essentialism—for not having to reference or engage feminist theory pre-Butler anymore. Not only that: as a "lesbian" who theorizes the limits of that location and the conditions under which this category operates as foundational for feminism and lesbian and gay politics (1992), Butler can provide a useful alibi, as suggested. Identification with Butler, whatever the sexuality of the author,

transfers responsibility for the consigning of the lesbian feminist subject to the past onto a subject least likely to be accused of homophobia.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO: LOSS

1 I am reminded here of the rage often expressed (by students and faculty alike) at, for example, the textual difficulties of Gayatri Spivak's work and at the consistent rendering of this as an aggressivity embedded in the text itself. A similar dynamic may be at play in the anger students express every year at "being forced" to read psychoanalysis and at the secondary texts that only add to their feelings of exclusion. Of course in the latter case particularly, a theory of projection may be helpful, but the case I am making here concerns the necessity of this affective displacement for loss narratives to function historiographically, for "Theory" to come to stand as the opposite of politics.

2 Mary Evans identifies and explores the limits of this opposition in her 1982 article "In Praise of Theory" (1982). In this piece Evans warns of the dangers of setting up a straw trope of the "political" in opposition to the "theory" that it cannot function without. Yet this tension remains one that often unreflexively structures feminist debate.

3 The lament of the loss of the political is familiar from social theory too, though frequently it is feminism (or identity/sectarian fragmentation more generally) that is blamed for its demise. The teleology is similar, though, as is its affect—melancholy—as Wendy Brown has suggested (1999). Paraphrasing and parodying Richard Rorty, Nancy Armstrong writes that what went wrong within the Left was that "a new generation of intellectuals stopped handing out leaflets at factory gates and devoted themselves to cultural politics" (2001: 21).

4 There are by now several texts that attempt to delineate academic feminism as multiply located, characterized by conflict rather than agreement, and as having a traceable history not simply reducible to external politics (e.g., Griffin and Braidotti 2002; Wiegman 2003; Braithwaite, Heald et al. 2004; Davis, Evans et al. 2006). These discussions do nevertheless tend to slip into overarching progress and loss narratives that reproduce rather than analyse these assumptions, or displace disagreements onto the generational presumptions that I discuss throughout part 1 (see also Looser and Kaplan 1997; Braidotti and Colebrook 2009).

5 The Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) was the U.K.'s national evaluation of academic research output, used as the basis for determining the allocation of the overall reduced research money. The exercise was enormously divisive in that it mitigated against projects that take considerable time to set up (Lewis 2000), created a counter-productive culture of competition (Knights and Richards 2003), prioritized conservative, mainstream work over innovation (Lee and Harley 1998), and made interdisciplinary work subject to disciplinary evaluation. The RAE was always considered problematic for Women's and Gender Studies, but the withdrawal of the sub-panel for the 2008 exercise absolutely confirmed this view. The RAE has been replaced by the Research Excellence Framework (REF), which

will evaluate academic work in a similar way (that is, through disciplines and on the basis of submitted outputs). Several factors suggest this is likely to be as, if not more, pernicious an audit: the inclusion of "impact" as a considerable percentage of institutionalized evaluation (where "impact" means "use" outside the academy); the exceptionally quick turnaround (REF submissions are due in December 2013 at time of writing); and the increasing brutal reduction in higher education funding in the U.K. more generally under a coalition government, suggesting we are likely to be competing for crumbs.

6 For direct commentary on the impact of neoliberal education agendas on academic feminism in the U.K. see Beverley Skeggs (1995) and Mary Evans (2006), and for its impact on Australian academic feminism before, during, and after John Howard, see the special themed section of *Feminist Review* "Mainstream or Muzzled?" (Genovese 2010).

7 Embedded in this critique of feminists who have come to feminism through text is an assumption Nina Lykke challenges, namely that feminists were never textually politicized in the 1970s (2004a).

8 Robyn Wiegman suggests in fact that feminist accounts of disciplinary differences are *always* generationally inflected (1999a: 363).

9 Loss narratives prioritize social scientific approaches, particularly sociology, as I have shown. The setting of this against an interdisciplinary humanities that prioritizes theory, however, means that its logic can also be taken up by other disciplines as part of a lament for lost rigour, and also as part of progress narrative where steady fragmentation challenges the need for an interdisciplinary feminist project at all (e.g., Brown 1997). I included two examples of loss narrative glosses that set literary rigour against interdisciplinary, cultural "turns" in feminist theory, but these are much less common than the setting of social science against "poststructuralist" approaches. Importantly, in all these calls for a return to disciplinary certainties, women's and gender studies are not understood as valid *disciplinary* homes in their own right.

10 The volume *Feminism Meets Queer Theory*, taken from a special issue of *Differences*, provides a useful overview of the different positions in this area (Weed and Schor 1997). Feminist work lamenting the substitution of feminist politics with queer approaches includes Jackson 1999 and Jeffreys 2002b. For a more sustained account of the irreconcilable tension between queer theory and sociology see Steven Seidman's *Queer Theory/Sociology* (1996).

11 I am reminded once more of Sabine Hark's reading of feminist resistance to queer theory among German feminist academics, in which queer theory is consistently cast as predator (Hark 2002).

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE: **RETURN**

1 To avoid too much repetition, while I continue with the familiar focus on journal extracts and their production of a common sense of the recent Western feminist past, I combine this approach with wider-ranging reflections on material

turns and on some of the implications of sexuality's over-association with the cultural turn.

2 These two extracts foreground different conceptions of materiality—as concerned with economic and structural constraint, on the one hand, and ontological form, on the other. These distinctions are not relevant for the general point I am making here, but I discuss these different strands below.

3 My thanks go to one of the readers of this manuscript for helping me clarify this point.

4 As in other Western feminist narratives, return narratives tend to refer to postmodernism, poststructuralism, deconstruction, language, or cultural theory/turn interchangeably. As in previous chapters, I follow the term used in the textual glosses I am concerned with.

5 As discussed below, materialism may also be the property of philosophy or the arts, where "the material" is more fully theorized in relation to the body and affect. The move remains a disciplinary one, however.

6 The above excerpt is repeated from the last chapter, in which I more fully discuss the disciplinary regulation of loss narratives in particular. I include this extract here as highlighting the overlaps between loss and return narratives in particular, but will not include additional crossover examples to avoid repetition.

7 In return narratives, "representation" refers to textual or visual coding in its proximity to poststructuralism and can also occur as a synonym for "post" theories more broadly. It is usually qualified as "political representation" where it refers to acting on behalf of individuals or groups. See Gayatri Spivak's useful critique of the separation of the two uses of the term in "Can the Subaltern Speak?" (1988).

8 In her discussion of Martha Nussbaum's response to Judith Butler's work, Robyn Wiegman notes that, for the former, poststructuralism may be said to have "domesticated the feminist enterprise, leading to narcissistic performances that parody real feminist struggle" (1999/2000: 110).

9 A special issue of *Body and Society* from 2004 includes a range of positions in this tradition (Berg and Akrich 2004), including Bruno Latour's elaboration of the concept of "levels" to understand the body's insistent materiality (2004).

10 For Braidotti this temporality is shot through with sexual difference and is not a neutral bodily life experienced outside of the sexed body. Recent engagements with Braidotti's work in this vein form the basis of Nigianni and Storr's collection *Deleuze and Queer Theory* (2009) and a special issue of *Australian Feminist Studies* on "Feminist Timelines" (Braidotti and Colebrook 2009).

11 The rest of this chapter primarily interrogates the socially inflected strand of return narratives, although due to the doubled meaning of materiality, and to the overlap of tone and historiography effects between the two strands, these are of course not entirely separable. As discussed in the introduction to the book, I have engaged in a more sustained way with the use new materialist approaches make of "affect" in social theory elsewhere and do not want to repeat this work here (Hemmings 2005a).

12 While there have been multiple attempts to theorize "location" in Western feminist theory (notably, Rich 1986; Haraway 1990; Frankenberg and Mani 1993; Bailey 2000; Collins 2000), where this work focuses on privilege it tends to foreground the importance of undoing the same rather than thinking about privilege as a location from which to speak. Such a desire makes sense, of course; it acknowledges the importance of differential location and access to power. Yet, in many ways, the "difficulties of privilege" are thus circumvented or deflected onto the desire not to have any, or the insistence that one does not, even where such an assertion is absurd. Minnie Bruce Pratt's "Identity: Skin Blood Heart" remains a moving exception, in my view (Bulkin, Pratt et al. 1984).

13 As Vikki Bell has pointed out in relation to Nussbaum's tone, it is her certainty that allows Butler's theoretical approaches to be associated with "evil" (2002: 576–78).

14 My analysis of a formative opposition between "merely cultural" and "culture bound" has been influenced by the wide literature on feminism and multiculturalism (e.g., Cohen, Howard et al. 1999; Gunew 2003; Phillips 2007; Scott 2007). Although I do not engage substantially with this literature here, my work here reflects a debt to Anne Phillips's arguments in *Multiculturalism Without Culture* (2007). Phillips suggests that the "problem of culture" is not whether or not particular cultures are essentially bad for women, but why and how "culture" belongs to racially, ethnically, or religiously marked subjects and communities in Western political theory. Phillips further explores the connections between meanings of culture, gender, feminism, race, ethnicity, and religion in *Gender and Culture* (2010).

15 I borrow the idea of conceptual sticking from Sara Ahmed, who uses it to theorize the sticking of emotion to particular marked bodies (2004c).

16 In this vein, Rosemary Hennessy notes rather early for the literature that "for materialist feminists, sexuality, along with those features that often accompany how it is understood in the West (pleasure, consumption, cultural diversity), is part of a given global reality in which these terms have a very specific and privileged address" (1993: 965).

17 Thanks to Carolyn Williams for helping me think about this point.

18 Similar lines of argument predate my own. Robyn Wiegman has interrogated the presumption that materiality and oppression are co-extensive (Wiegman 1999/2000: 117) and Ratna Kapur asks the pertinent question "Why is 'material condition' assumed to refer only to women's experience of oppression and impoverishment?" (Kapur 2001: 83).

19 See responses to this article in the special issue of the *British Journal of Sociology* in which Butler's piece is published, which further situate the relationship between sexual identity and regulation of citizenship and migration (Ali 2008; Bhatt 2008; Modood 2008; Woodhead 2008), and Butler's engagement with these responses (2008a; 2009). My concern about this work, however, is that it easily slips into a demonization of sexual identity politics as white and Western

again with the trumping of supposed sexual freedoms by a focus on an opposed subjugated migrant.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR: AMENABILITY

1 I mentioned the U.K. Research Excellence Framework (REF) in chapter 2, which initially promised to make more extended use of "bibliometrics" in its evaluation of academic work. "Bibliometrics" refers to quantitative indicators of research quality based on citation of work within privileged journal sets. Although its use as part of assessment has been largely abandoned (at time of editing), its threat has already resulted in localized institutional pressure to publish in certain journals and not others.

2 As I have suggested throughout the book, a notable exception to this general lack of attention is Robyn Wiegman's work on institutional battles over the right kind of feminist theory (1999/2000; 2001; 2002; 2004). My own work remains in consistent dialogue with hers.

3 It has sometimes been a struggle to persuade editors and reviewers of journals of the importance of this de-authorization, in part because of the institutional pressures I have indicated and in part, too, because of the ways in which feminist theorists' contributions are too often sidelined in social theory already. I am grateful to the staff and the editors at Duke University Press for recognizing the importance of this tactic and for taking the risk with me.

4 As Lynne Segal has compellingly argued, the "crisis in masculinity" is as old as feminism and its attendant backlashes (Segal 1990; see also McDowell 2002). Discourses of masculine crisis in relation to feminist claims have also been theorized as discourses of white Western masculine crisis in particular (Wiegman 1999b; Robinson 2000).

5 I put "gay couples" in scare quotes here to indicate that these representations tell us little about the identities of those represented.

6 Unlike sexual freedom for men, sexual freedom for women is consistently marked as heterosexual, presumably on the basis that heterosexual freedom for men must already have been universally achieved. Mark Chiang's analysis of *The Wedding Banquet*, in which he critiques the gendered heterosexual presumptions that underpin homosexual liberation for men as always requiring the abandonment of family, is apt in this context (1998). For Chiang the understanding of homosexuality as transnational, and heterosexuality as national, relies on a prior belief in women (as symbols of both nation and family) as structurally and actually heterosexual.

7 I return to what I perceive to be a feminist over-investment in agency as the marker of subject status in considering gendered investment in norms or their transformation in the final chapter of the book.

8 The increase of generational language in accounting for shifts in feminist theory in the last decade may also be an effect of the postmillennium moment. Generational reflections include pre- and postmillennium feminist memoirs (e.g., Brown-

miller 1999; Jay 1999; Rowbotham 2000), and special issues of journals or collections (Hall, O'Sullivan et al. 1999; Howard and Allen 2000; Davis 2004b; Henry 2004) that encourage looking back and forward in generational modes. The proliferation of new feminist work on time must surely also be an effect of this taking stock (Felski 2000; Grosz 2002; Tronto 2003; Grosz 2005), though in a less autobiographical vein.

9 Drucilla Cornell's discussion of the attention to race and class difference central to consciousness raising in the 1970s would be one important exception (2000), as would the Feminist Review Collective's reflections on theoretical and political shifts and continuities across "feminist generations" through its thirty year history (2005).

10 Iris van der Tuin has made efforts to think about generation in a nonheteronormative, anoedipal way, arguing for "generation" as transposition rather than as inheritance within feminist theory. Yet the term itself is caught in its own history, and van der Tuin's own theorization substitutes geographical succession (of continental sexual difference over Anglo-American epistemologies) whatever her intentions, a point I have argued elsewhere (Hemmings 2009; van der Tuin 2009).

11 For a sense of these various circumstances see *The Making of European Women's Studies* journals vols. I–VIII and Gabriele Griffin and Rosi Braidotti's European women's studies reader, *Thinking Differently* (2002). Braidotti's chapter in this anthology importantly maps not just these differences across time and space, but their impact for feminist epistemology and institutional politics (2002b).

12 I use the term "Third Wave" here as distinct from "postfeminism," though the two are sometimes used co-extensively. "Third wavers" identify with feminist aims even as they may differentiate themselves from earlier theoretical or political endeavours (Heywood 2006); "postfeminism" usually marks a break from feminism, irrespective of potential shared agendas (Heywood and Drake 1997; Gillis, Howie et al. 2004). It is, in fact, rare for individuals to identify as postfeminist, and in this sense the latter term tends to describe a social or discursive formation rather than individuals or groups (Brooks 1997; Braithwaite 2002).

13 There is a further call that has gained recent institutional purchase, and that is to designate the project "women's and gender studies." While I have some sympathy with the choice not to choose, this attempt at inclusion reproduces theoretical and historical assumptions that the two refer to different projects in the first instance, and thus, in the context of my own interests, does not resolve (as it seems to) the historiographic issues embedded in these questions of nomenclature.

14 The Gender Institute's institutional history is recorded in a working paper published to celebrate its 15th anniversary (Armitage and Pedwell 2005).

15 In this respect I have been profoundly influenced by poststructuralist historians of the relationship between subject and object of both gender and feminism, such as Denise Riley (1988) and Joan Scott (1999) as well as Gayatri Spivak (1999b).

16 Unlike Janet Halley, for example, who has advocated taking "a break from femi-

nism" because of its inability to take account of sexual politics outside its own frames of recognition and because of its failure to reflect sufficiently on its own power (2006). There is much I agree with in Halley's argument, not least her attention to authority as part of, rather than antithetical to, feminist interventions. But in suggesting a "break" as a solution, my feeling is that Halley fixes feminism's meanings as those she identifies as institutionally compromised, while allowing queer sexual politics to emerge as the current saviour in the face of critical and political difficulty.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE: CITATION TACTICS

1 Poststructuralism and feminism are separated in social theory more generally, too. In work like Anthony Giddens's on the transformation of intimacy (1992), or Michael Hardt's and Antonio Negri's on new forms of "Empire" in the context of neoliberal globalization (2000), the lack of citation of feminist poststructuralists allows these (male) theorists to "rediscover" gender equality as pertinent in the present (in the case of Giddens), or to overlook feminist work that has made similar arguments (in the case of Hardt and Negri).

2 Sara Ahmed also argues that the erasure of black feminism from poststructuralism is fundamental to the "rediscovery" of the body in feminist theory after the cultural turn (2008).

3 Who is cited will be highly discipline specific, of course. Historian colleagues have indicated that Joan Scott is consistently given this role in feminist history journals, for example.

4 This section builds on my initial discussion of citation of Butler in chapter 1. I use a different range of extracts in this chapter to avoid repetition.

5 Because of Butler's inimitable influence beyond feminist theory, and in order to highlight further the overlaps between Western feminist storytelling and social theory more broadly, this chapter draws more than the others on both interdisciplinary feminist theory journals and other interdisciplinary theory journals such as *Body & Society*, *Critical Inquiry*, and *Theory, Culture and Society*.

6 As discussed more fully in the last chapter, the citation of feminist, women's, or gender studies as the proper name of the field is often a chronological indicator (from women's studies to gender studies) even though this is not always an accurate description of shifts in the naming of the field in a given location.

7 As one of the initial readers of this manuscript helpfully pointed out, the positioning of Foucault as "poststructuralist" is odd in these glosses in itself. Neither Foucault nor Butler have ever so identified themselves. But the focus of my analysis is on their citation in progress, loss, and return narratives, and part of this process is so to designate them. Indeed that characterization is key to the temporalities I am tracing here.

8 David Halperin's loving and ironic homage, *Saint Foucault*, makes the nature of this relationship most explicit (1995).

9 As above, there is enough intertextual evidence for reading this second extract as invoking, if not directly citing, Butler.

10 This ontological exploration might explain the otherwise odd insistence (given Butler's prominent position in the field) that queer theory is too *male* for feminist theory (e.g., Martin 1994; Jeffreys 2002b).

11 I am adapting Luce Irigaray's term "hom(m)osexuality" here (1985b). Irigaray uses the term to indicate proximity between male sociality and sexuality in the ordering of the social world. I use "hom(m)o-citational" to emphasize Butler's masculinization in feminist citation practices and to queer this attempt to domesticate her relationship with Foucault.

12 In addition to Sara Ahmed's article, see the following: (Ermarth 2000; Lorber 2000; Winter 2000). Related debates concern the exclusive nature of feminist production within academic hierarchies in terms of power relations and access to theory (see Skeggs 1997; 2004).

13 In line with Terry Lovell, then, I understand what "stars" mean and how they are represented as motivated rather than descriptive (2000).

14 Published sequentially in the journal *Gender Issues* and later collected in the collection *The Straight Mind and Other Essays* (Wittig 1992).

15 I would now be more inclined to think of Wittig's privileging of the category "lesbian" in terms of political provocation, rather than incitement to identity, and in this respect as elaborating Adrienne Rich's insistence on all women having lesbian attachments (1980).

16 Most famous among these critiques of Irigaray's essentialism, perhaps, is Gayatri Spivak's "French Feminism in an International Frame" (1981), later revisited less harshly in "French Feminism Revisited" (1993). More recently, Rosi Braidotti and Christine Delphy, among others, have sought to resituate "French" feminism's reception by a U.S. audience as a function and effect of international power relations (Braidotti 1991; Delphy 2000).

17 Robyn Wiegman makes a similar point in "Un-Remembering Monique Wittig" (2007). As part of *GLQ*'s commemorative special issue on Wittig, Wiegman takes queer feminist theory to task for its privileging of less troublesome theorists within a queer canon, but warns against simple reclamation as well. For Wiegman, Wittig might remind us of the importance of critique in both intellectual and institutional life and of the productive nature of discomfort in working through rather than dismissing epistemological (more than ontological) difference.

18 It is thus also not surprising that Butler's work in *The Psychic Life of Power* (1997b) is rarely cited in these narratives, since this would make it difficult to sustain her position as "carrier of culture" over materiality, or as representative of a reductive attention to constraint over proliferation.

19 Adapted definition from Word "Reference Tools."

20 The three literary examples I have cited here are all concerned with rewriting colonial literary narratives from the perspective of marginal figures, whose racialized, sexualized, and gendered stereotyping in the original stories is turned to give these characters depth and visibility.

21 My thanks to Lisa Duggan for raising this issue in response to a lecture on recitation in Tampere, Finland, in November 2006.

22 While the process of developing this citation tactic involved experimenting with as many examples from the journals as possible, here I only include those that have already been mentioned in this chapter, so that readers can contextualize them in relation to my earlier argument, should they so wish.

23 I have included Irigaray as Wittig's partner in the last two extracts in order to respect Butler's engagement with her in *Gender Trouble*, the text most commonly alluded to in the glosses I am reciting. Irigaray's reanimation here also has the potential to reposition new materialism's framing of Butler and Irigaray only as antagonists.

24 In both Wittig and Butler I would argue the relationship between sexual identity and social reality remains in tension. Wittig sees the distinction between man and woman as a power-effect of heteronormativity and thus considers identities embedded in this distinction as social rather inevitable (1982). Butler insists that "lesbian" as an identity should be permanently called into question, but does not suggest that it should be abandoned (1992; 2004b).

25 This argument echoes Rosemary Hennessy's that materialist and what we now call queer perspectives have not always been anathema to one another (1993). It also invites a re-reading of the debates between Nancy Fraser and Judith Butler I discussed in the previous chapter (Butler 1997a; Fraser 1997).

26 As Rosi Braidotti enjoins, a new, creative space of possibility may be the only politically progressive imagination we can fully grasp at present (2006).

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX: AFFECTIVE SUBJECTS

1 Thus recitation might be thought of as a more politically attached variant of genealogy (Foucault 1972; 1980a).

2 This is rather different use of the term "limit" than that proposed by Rosi Braidotti in *Transpositions* (2006), although her use has certainly influenced my thinking in this respect. Braidotti focuses on the importance of "knowing one's own limits" in thinking through sustainable critical and political practice. Here, I focus on the historiographic and textual limit to the extension of the subject in relation to others, which is, I believe, embedded in our own capacity to think intersubjectively as feminists. Thanks to the readers of the original manuscript for suggesting I make the issue of "limit" more visible.

3 Empathy is thus closely tied to standpoint theories of a variety of kinds, where knowledge is understood as a struggle for visibility of hitherto excluded perspectives and meanings (Harding 1991; Harding 1993; Hartsock 1998). From a feminist standpoint perspective the success of a standpoint epistemology can be judged on the basis of whether marginalized subjects are (a) given a voice, and (b) recognize themselves in a given standpoint account (Smith 1987; Mies 1991). Standpoint has been critiqued on the basis of its universal claims about women's status, among other reasons (Hekman 1997; Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis 2002), but

one might see a more open "politics of location" (the term coined by Adrienne Rich [1986]) as an adaptation of standpoint theory. Important to Rich's delineation of this approach is her insight that one must start from where one is, but not place that view at the center of a given account. In this respect her approach is also concerned with shifting the centrality of a Western feminist subject.

4 One could consider the range of work on intersectionality currently popular as one example of this challenge to the idea of "common interest" on the basis of gender alone (e.g., McCall 2005; Yuval-Davis 2006). Interestingly, some work in this area expresses concern about the ways in which this term fixes rather than opens up complexity in the subject (Staunæs 2003; Brah and Phoenix 2004).

5 The questions of intention and implementation in respect of empathy are already contained in the dictionary definition, where to empathize with someone is "to identify with and understand another person's feelings or difficulties," *or* to "transfer . . . your own feelings and emotions to an object such as a painting" (OED). Within the feminist literature one might say that the first definition is understood as "good empathy" (Code 1995a), while the second might translate into Dean's "lazy and false empathy" (Dean 2003: 96).

6 The "ethic of care" (most famously delineated by Carol Gilligan [1982]) has been similarly critiqued for reinforcing the naturalizing association of women with qualities of care. Rather differently, Nancy Fraser has argued that instead of rejecting these qualities we should seek to make them universal (1994; 1996).

7 Donna Haraway's "Manifesto for Cyborgs" (1985), and *The Companion Species Manifesto* (2003), might be read as extending the understanding of good empathy still further to include the non-human, as might Rosi Braidotti's insistence on a non-anthropomorphic, posthumanist feminist ethics (2006).

8 And as I discuss later in this chapter, when empathy fails to manage these relations, affect comes right to the fore in justifying distinctions made.

9 Beverley Skeggs (2004) similarly critiques Anthony Giddens's (1991; Beck, Giddens et al. 1994) celebration of the reflexive subject of globalization, arguing that while reflexivity suggests an increasing flexibility on the part of Western, middle-class subjects, that flexibility does little to ameliorate (in fact it relies upon or extends) inequality between highly skilled subjects of globalization and working class subjects who are becoming more and more marginal.

10 My thinking about the interruption of grammatical temporality through refusal on the part of the "other-subject" has been developed in part out of shared insights from a reading group on performativity at the LSE. In reading J. L. Austin, several members of the group were particularly taken by the character of "George" who refuses to abide by the grammatical rules of performatives, who takes himself off, and, in Austin's vexed childhood scenarios does not cooperate. My favorite: "For example, at a party, you say, when picking sides, 'I pick George': George grunts, 'I'm not playing.' Has George been picked?" (1975: 28) The relationship between Austin's querying of the nature of the performative and my own interest in refusals is not a direct one, but I have still been interested in imagining a George in relation to my own concerns with empathetic grammar.

11 See Terry Lovell (2003) and Lois McNay (2000; 2003) for useful broad discussions of agency in Western feminist theory.

12 More recent articles in *Feminist Review* by both authors concern dominant representations of trafficked "sex slaves" in Europe and critique feminist approaches that reproduce understandings of trafficked women as victims (O'Connell Davidson 2006b; Andrijasevic 2007). Instead, both authors call for a nuanced contextualization of sex trafficking in relation to migration and citizenship.

13 See Catalina MacKenzie and Natalie Stoljar's collection that develops the idea of "relational autonomy" as a way of retaining the concept of autonomy as central for agency, while acknowledging the problems of liberal conceptions of the bounded individual (2000).

14 In the French context most infamously, feminists were split in this way over the "headscarf debates," which successfully sought to ban young women's wearing of religious head coverings in schools (Scott 2007: 21–41).

15 For scholars concerned with asylum seekers (Khanna 2007), camp detainees (Agamben 1998), migrant workers (Andall and Puwar 2007; Andrijasevic 2007), and targets of war (Butler 2004a), among others, a perceived lack of agency can often result in a diminution of a sense of ethical obligation to the other. One must first be understood as human enough to possess agency.

16 Volpp's comparisons between forced marriage (in India) and low legal ages of consent (in the United States) provoke a useful consideration of why some practices are considered "cultural" and others are not.

17 In work comparing Western body modification with female genital cutting, for example, and as Carolyn Pedwell has argued (2008), the former is understood as less extreme than the latter, but as providing a comparative basis for empathy.

18 There must be considerable pleasure to be had in the repeated resurgence of horror and its management, indeed, if the proliferation of sequels in this genre is anything to go by.

19 Spivak's critiques of Kristeva have focused on her failure to reflect on the consequences of her own "disinterested history" and her exoticization of "others" as less encumbered by, e.g., the limits of Western linguistic frames (Spivak 1981). More recently she has challenged Kristeva's acceptance of an East-West opposition that continues to find in favor of the latter term and thus reproduces its imagined conceptual, political, and gendered history (1999: 66).

20 Bliss Cua Lim draws together postcolonial theory and horror criticism in her discussion of temporalities (2009). Lim highlights ways in which "the supernatural" in horror movies, understood as remainder, can serve as a useful starting point for an ethics of temporality beyond national boundaries.

21 Spivak makes this argument via her discussion of J. M. Coetzee's *Foe* (1987). For Spivak, Coetzee's political integrity lies in his refusal to take the easy route of the guilty colonizer, and she defends him against critics who prefer their postcolonial fiction less allegorical or ambiguous.

22 Carolyn Pedwell warns us about the dangers of comparative approaches to

practices or subjects that are similar only because of the Western feminist perspective that binds them together (2007; 2008). Indeed she particularly singles out comparisons between FGC and body modifications (including transsexual surgeries) as problematic. My aim here is not to compare practices, though, but to highlight the similar use of horror as the basis of feminist judgment of these practices.

23 Hosken coined the phrase "female genital mutilation" (1981) to describe what later others have called "female genital surgery" or "female genital cutting," where the latter are considered less sensationalizing.

24 For Silvan Tomkins, the father of cognitive affect theory, it matters little whether affective response is innate or learned, since it can be taught by repetitive example (1963).

25 Janice Raymond's *The Transsexual Empire,* in which transsexuality allows men to move into the last women-only space—the female body—introduces this tradition (1980).

26 Doezema draws on Wendy Brown's (1993) development of the idea of "Wounded Attachments" in the latter's article of the same name.

27 Likewise, Millsom Henry-Waring's response fuses affect and theoretical judgment in his response to Njambi's article, stating that "there is a gut response as it is hard to view such specific acts of cliterodectomy to infibulation as acceptable" (2004: 319).

28 I am inspired in this reading of my own affect by Gilles Deleuze's account of T. E. Lawrence's experience of being raped: "In the midst of his tortures, an erection; even in the state of sludge, there are convulsions that jolt the body" (1997: 123). For Deleuze, such moments exemplify the unpredictable autonomy of the body. As in my own account, Laurence's experience of shame is not at the event itself but as a judgment on his own affective response.