

**War in World Politics**  
**Code: SSC3012**

**2017/2018**





# SSC3012 War in World Politics 2017/2018

## Contents

<b>General Information</b>	<b>2</b>
Objectives	2
Description of the course	2
Essential reading	2
Recommended Reading	2
Instructional format	2
Course coordinator	2
Assessment	3
Instructions for the writing assignment	3
Criteria for paper assessment	4
Course Schedule	5
<b>Assignments</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Section 1</b> Different types of Conflict & Just War	<b>6</b>
1). The Ethics of War	
<b>Section 2</b> The Causes of Conflict	<b>8</b>
2). The International Arena	8
3). State Attributes: Imperialism and Economic Rivalry	10
<b>Information on Films and the consideration of Other State Attributes</b>	<b>12</b>
4). State Attributes: Revenge	14
5). The Minds of Men	16
<b>Section 3</b> Case studies	<b>18</b>
6). World War I	18
7). Vietnam & Korea	20
8). The Holy Land	22
9). India & Pakistan	24
<b>Information on the Film</b> <i>Control Room</i>	<b>27</b>
10). Yugoslavia	28
<b>Information on the film</b> <i>Why We Fight</i>	<b>31</b>
11). Saddam Hussein	32
<b>Endnotes</b>	<b>34</b>

## Objectives

The main objective will be to understand international conflict. To fulfill this aim, the course will examine different types of conflict and their various causes in the world. This course will also examine as case studies different conflicts throughout recent history.

## Description of the course

Why do nations and states go to war? This course will endeavor to give some answers to this question. To do that, the course will be divided into three sections that explicate the above objectives. The first section will focus on the different types of conflict and the ethics of conflict—is there such a thing as a “just war?” Section two will concentrate on the causes of conflict stemming from the systems level, the state level and the individual level. Part three will examine a number of modern conflicts, such as World War I, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the breakup of Yugoslavia, the War between India and Pakistan, the Arab Israeli conflict and Saddam Hussein’s Wars against Iran and Kuwait.

## Essential reading

Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. 2010. *Causes of War*. Wiley-Blackwell.

Stoessinger, John G. 2011. *Why Nations Go to War*. Eleventh Edition.\* Thomson, Wadsworth. \*(Earlier editions are also acceptable)

E-readers as listed on the Blackboard environment. The assigned reading is extensive; students should develop a working strategy for absorbing the material.

## Recommended Reading

Beach, Derek. 2012. *Analyzing Foreign Policy*. Palgrave-Macmillan. (In the UCM Reading Room).

## Instructional format

Tutorial group meetings, lectures and documentaries.

## Course coordinator

Dr. Roberta Haar  
UCM, Zwingelput 4  
Room 1.040  
roberta.haar@maastrichtuniversity.nl

## Assessment

Students will have two opportunities to be assessed, via a written exam and a research paper. Each will be worth 50% of the final grade. The final exam will be part multiple choice, part true or false and part essay and will take place in week 7 of the course.

As stipulated in the student handbook, attendance is 85% compulsory. As the course has 12 scheduled meetings, students can have 2 valid misses. Please do not be late for class; it is not fair to your peers who arrive on time. Students who have not met the attendance requirement will be given a provisional overall grade, but will not receive credits until they have successfully completed an additional assignment. Applications for the additional assignment are available at the Office of Student Affairs, within 10 working days after completion of the course.

The resit for this course will be administered in the week **January 29 - February 2, 2018**. The resit will be an exam for those students who failed the final and a new research paper assignment for those students who failed the paper. Students who fail both the research paper and the exam will have to resit both. Resits will only be available to students who have complied with the attendance requirement and completed all the assignments.

## Instructions for the writing assignment

Papers should be 3,000 words. This does not include references, the title page or the bibliography. **Paper topic approval is Monday 27 November 2017 by 16:00.** **Papers are due on Monday 4 December 2017 at 16:00.** A hard copy should be submitted to the Office of Student Affairs and a soft copy submitted to Safe Assignment. **Late papers will not be graded.** Students should also be aware that plagiarism will result in a failing grade.

Topics must center on applying the information and theories on the causes of conflicts brought forth in the first part of the course to conflicts that are **not** amongst the case studies found in the second part of the course. In other words, students must choose a conflict and analyze it using theory as it relates to the causes of war. Students must also have at least 10 academic sources.

### **Criteria for paper assessment**

10-8.0 Excellent: An outstanding answer. The essay is well written, logical and clear. It contains evidence of a wide knowledge of the subject matter. It combines a good understanding of theoretical issues and empirical applications, with some originality of approach. The essay presents ideas that are logically developed and carefully formulated. Its arguments are clear and accurate. The use of concepts, theories or research findings is precise and accurate. The essay builds from current theory and empirical work to reflect originality and insight in the student's thinking and analysis.

7.9-7.0 Good: A reasonably comprehensive and well-organized answer. The argument presented is clear and logical, with evidence of having understood the issues and an ability to think about them effectively. The essay states ideas and develops its topic clearly, logically and adequately. Its ideas are supported with arguments that are clear and accurate. Its use of concepts, theories or research findings is largely precise, although there may be a few minor factual errors or inaccuracies.

6.9-6.0 Satisfactory: This mark reflects an essay that is adequately organized and a full answer to the question. It is mostly accurate, but limited in scope and does not express any real development of argument. The essay is a satisfactory response to the assignment. Its central ideas are expressed and developed clearly enough to be understood by the reader. Although the essay may seem correct, it lacks the originality and clarity of thought that would entitle it to an above average grade. The use of concepts, theories or research findings may reflect more than minor inaccuracies, such as basic factual errors or errors of omission. It shows some grasp of theory and its relation to empirical data, but with little insight or grasp of wider issues.

5.9-5.5 Pass: This essay shows evidence of course reading, but it is deficient in organization and scope. The information it contains is insufficient. The essay indicates below average achievement in the development of its ideas, which may be unclear or supported illogically or inconsistently. Its use of concepts, theories or research may contain errors, omissions and irrelevancies. It shows no grasp of theory and its relation to empirical data, and it has little insight or grasp of wider issues.

5.4-0.0 Fail: This essay shows little evidence of course reading, it is deficient in organization and scope. Its ideas are poorly developed and are not sufficiently supported. It may also contain numerous errors, omissions and irrelevancies.

## Course Schedule

Week 1: 30/10 – 3/11 2017

Lecture: *Different Types of Conflict*

First meeting

Second meeting

Assignment

start 1

finish 1 & start 2

Week 2: 6/11 – 10/11

Film: *The Man who Armed the World*

Third meeting

Fourth meeting

finish 2 & start 3

finish 3 & start 4

Week 3: 13/11 – 17/11

Film: *Iraq for Sale: The War Profiteers*

Fifth meeting

Sixth meeting

finish 4 & start 5

finish 5 & start 6

Week 4: 20/11 – 24/11

Lecture: *War Propaganda*

Seventh meeting

Eighth meeting

finish 6 & start 7

finish 7 & start 8

Week 5: 27/11 – 1/12

Film: *Control Room*

**Monday 27 November 2016**

Ninth meeting

Tenth meeting

**Paper topics by 16:00**

finish 8 & start 9

finish 9 & start 10

Week 6: 4/12 – 8/12

**Monday 4 December 2016**

Film: *Why We Fight*

Eleventh meeting

Twelfth meeting

**Paper due 16:00**

finish 10 & start 11

finish 11

Week 7: 11/12-15/12

**Final Exam**

**Section 1:                      Different types of conflict & Just War**

**Assignment 1:              The Ethics of War**

“Over the years, people I’ve met have often asked me what I’m working on, and I’ve usually replied that the main thing was a book about Dresden.

I said that to Harrison Starr, the movie-maker, one time, and he raised his eyebrows and inquired, ‘Is it an anti-war book?’

‘Yes,’ I said, ‘I guess.’

‘You know what I say to people when I hear they’re writing anti-war books?’

‘No. What *do* you say, Harrison Starr?’

‘I say, ‘Why don’t you write an anti-*glacier* book instead?’ ’

What he meant, of course, was that there would always be wars, that they were as easy to stop as glaciers. I believe that, too.”

—Kurt Vonnegut, *Slaughterhouse-Five* <sup>1</sup>

“For millennia, and long before the Enlightenment or even the teachings of Jesus, people have understood that war inverts all normal morality; that it is, by any sane standard, a criminal undertaking.”<sup>2</sup>

“While researching this book, I compiled a list of...seventy non-warring cultures...The list is far from exhaustive. Although not included on the list, certain religious ‘enclave societies’—groups existing within larger societies—such as the Amish, Hutterites and Quakers have pacifist belief systems and consistently have forsaken warfare. Certain nations also have not been involved in warfare for very long periods of time. Sweden has not been to war in over 170 years; Switzerland, known for its neutrality and aided by natural mountain barriers, has not engaged in war for almost two hundred years; and Iceland has been at peace for over seven hundred years.”<sup>3</sup>

“Early on the morning of June 6, 1944, a cluster of ships huddled 4,500 meters off the French coastline between Vierville-sur-Mer and Ste.-Honorine-des-Pertes, which for the purposes of that day had been rechristened Omaha Beach...in a lot of ways, the deck was stacked in favor of the Allies. They had the advantage in numbers in every category—land, sea and air—while the Germans were badly depleted by the war on the Eastern front. The Germans were also hamstrung by their unbelievably Byzantine and incoherent command structure...which had a delusional Hitler at its apex.

But the Germans had better weaponry and...on top of it all, many of the German soldiers truly believed that the very existence of Germany—and therefore civilization itself—was at stake, and they fought with fanatic zeal.”<sup>4</sup>



### **Readings**

Ehrenreich, Barbara. 1997. *Blood Rites, Origins and History of the Passions of War*. pp. 7-22.

Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. 2010. *Causes of War*. Wiley-Blackwell, Chapter 1.

Freedman, Lawrence. ed. 1994. *War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 156-167, 172-174, 180-184).

Reichberg, Gregory, M., Syse, Henrik & Begby, Endre. Eds 2006. *The Ethics of War*. pp. 625-632; 653-658; and, 660-668.

### **Additional readings**

Howard, Michael. 1983. *Clausewitz*. pp. 34-57.

Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. 2010. *Causes of War*. Wiley-Blackwell, Chapter 8. (This last chapter of Levy and Thompson may help students think about the methodology of their research paper.)

## Section 2                      The Causes of Conflict

### Assignment 2:              International Arena

“After the formation of the Triple Entente Europe found herself divided into two hostile alliances. The purpose of the alliances had been security, but they had actually heightened the insecurity instead of dissipating it. Each group began to fear that the other would overwhelm it...which in turn gave rise to an armament race. The European states vied with one another in strengthening their armies and navies. All the large states except Great Britain remodeled their armies along Prussian lines and spent huge sums on military equipment; so much, in fact, that many of the governments lacked the necessary funds to deal with domestic problems. Nevertheless, no nation dared withdraw from the race for fear of being annihilated by the others.”<sup>5</sup>

“Throughout history the primary means of resolving the disequilibrium between the structure of the international system and the redistribution of power has been war, more particularly, what we shall call a hegemonic war. In the words of Raymond Aron, describing World War I, a hegemonic war ‘is characterized less by its immediate causes or its explicit purposes than by its extent and the stakes involved. It affected all the political units inside one system of relations between sovereign states.... Thus, a hegemonic war is the ultimate test of change in the relative standings of the powers in the existing system.”<sup>6</sup>

“[Halford] Mackinder’s theory, first propounded in 1904, was that the inner area of Eurasia is the pivot region of world politics. He warned that rule of the heart of the world’s greatest landmass could become the basis for world domination. Mackinder felt that it was entirely possible for the land power that gained control of the pivot area (be it Russia, or even China) to outflank the maritime world. Eleven years later, James Fairgrieve was to point out even more forcefully that China was in an excellent position to dominate Inner Eurasia.”<sup>7</sup>

#### Long Cycles of World Leadership

<i>Long cycle</i>	<i>World Power</i>	<i>Global war</i>
I      1494-1579	Portugal	Italian & Indian Ocean Wars (1494-1516)
II     1580-1689	Netherlands	Spanish-Dutch Wars (1580-1609)
III    1689-1792	Britain	Wars of Louis XIV (1688-1713)
IV    1792-1914	Britain	Wars of the French Revolution & Napoleon (1792-1815)
V     1914-	USA	WW I & WWII (1914-1945)

Source: G. Modelski and P. Morgan, 1985. “Understanding Global War,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 29 (3), p. 396.

**Readings**

Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. 2010. *Causes of War*. Wiley-Blackwell, Chapters 2 & 3.

Craig, Gordon A. and George, Alexander L. 1995. *Force and Statecraft*. pp. 25-43.

**Additional readings**

Buzan, Barry. 2004. *The United States and the Great Powers*. pp. 46-63.

Crozier, Andrew J. 1997. *The Causes of the Second World War*. pp. 3-27.

Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power," in *Theory of International Politics*. pp. 102-120.

### Assignment 3: State Attributes: Imperialism and Economic rivalry

“Trade must be driven and maintained under the protection and favour of your own weapon....Trade cannot be maintained without war, nor war without trade.”

—Jan Coen, Governor General of the Dutch East Indies Company<sup>8</sup>

“In 1896 a best-selling British pamphlet, *Made in Germany*, painted an ominous picture: ‘A gigantic commercial State is arising to menace our prosperity, and contend with us for the trade of the world.’...Equally popular books warned of German invasion plans, of guns hidden in preparation under London and of the 50,000 waiters in British restaurants who were really German soldiers. Many Germans reciprocated. The naval and colonial lobbies argued that Germany ought to have its place in the sun, in Europe of course, but as a global power too.”<sup>9</sup>

“Men were beginning to forget the dark ages in which the weak were pitilessly crushed, the useless were brutally cast off, and the ideals of the nations were conquest, slaughter, and pillage. But the belief that the progress of civilization had once and for all destroyed the barbarous customs of primitive periods was a dangerous illusion, for new hordes of savages, whose ancestral ferocity the centuries have not mitigated, even now dream of enslaving the world that they may exploit it.

The ideas which dominate Germany inspire apprehension because they have come to assume a religious form. Like the Arabs of Mohammed’s day, the Teutonic nations are deluded by a dream which makes them fancy that they are a superior race, destined first to conquer the world and then to regenerate it.”

—Gustave LeBon *Psychology of the Great War*, originally published in 1916.<sup>10</sup>

“[T]he Rwandan genocide needs to be thought through within the logic of colonialism. The horror of colonialism led to two types of genocidal impulses. The first was the genocide of the native by the settler. It became a reality where the violence of colonial pacification took on extreme proportions. The second was the native impulse to eliminate the settler....Faced with the violent denial of his humanity by the settler, the native’s violence began as a counter to violence.”<sup>11</sup>

### **Readings**

Ergang, Robert. 1954. *Europe since Waterloo*. pp. 253-272; 275-276.

Fanon, Frantz. 2001. *The Wretched of the Earth*. pp. 27-46.

Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. 2010. *Causes of War*. Wiley-Blackwell, Chapter 4.

Mamdani, Mahmood. 2001. *When Victims Become Killers*. pp. 10-14 & 76-91.

### **Additional readings**

Arendt, Hannah. "Race-Thinking Before Racism." In *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, pp. 158-175.

LeBon, Gustave. 1999. *Psychology of the Great War*. (Originally published in 1916). pp. 141-165.

\*Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. 2010. *Causes of War*. Wiley-Blackwell, Chapter 6.

\*This chapter of Levy and Thompson may also help students think about the methodology of their research paper. How decisions are made according to state structures is an important part of explaining conflict.

### **Information on the Films and the consideration of Other State Attributes**

In previous offerings of this course “The Merchants of Death & the Military Industrial Complex” was a separate assignment in the State Attributes section. The question of whether armaments manufacturers have unduly influenced policy makers has been asked at least since World War I, when for example, the U.S. Senate Munitions Committee investigated whether they factored in the American decision to enter the war in 1917.<sup>12</sup> Similarly, President Truman investigated war profiteering in World War II. Truman found that “Millions of dollars were being squandered. Had there been such mismanagement of federal help for the poor and unemployed a few years earlier, he thought, the outcry would have been overwhelming. As it was, no one seemed to care or to be saying anything. If national defense was the issue, the sky was the limit.”<sup>13</sup> Today, Members of Congress support military contractors in their district because it means jobs for their constituents.<sup>14</sup>

But does building weapons and having stockpiles mean war is a likelier choice? Hans Morgenthau argues that “Men do not fight because they have arms. They have arms because they deem it necessary to fight. Take away their arms, and they will either fight with their bare fists or get themselves new arms with which to fight.”<sup>15</sup>

As this state attribute is explored in several of the films shown in this course, it will not be discussed in a separate assignment. It is anticipated that the role of the armaments industry will become a talking point in the discussions after each film.

### **Readings for “The Merchants of Death & the Military Industrial Complex”**

Adams, Gordon. 1982. *The Politics of Defense Contracting*. Transaction, pp. 19-29 and 43-50.

Baack, Ben and Ray, Edward. 1985. “The Political Economy of the Origins of the Military-Industrial Complex in the United States,” *The Journal of Economic History* 45, no. 2. Available via the University Library; the UM has a subscription.

Craft, Cassady. 1999. *Weapons for Peace, Weapons for War*. New York: Routledge. pp. 15-38.

Haar, Roberta. 1995, April. “The Merchants of Death and the Origins of War.” Conference paper, 56<sup>th</sup> Annual Pennsylvania Political Science Association Meeting.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. 17 January 1961. “Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People.” <<http://www.eisenhower.utexas.edu/farewell.htm>>.

Hartung, William D. 2000. “Military-Industrial Complex Revisited: How Weapons Makers are Shaping U.S. Foreign and Military Policies.” In Martha Honey and Tom Barry ed. *Global Focus: U.S. Foreign Policy at the Turn of the Millennium*. Macmillan, pp. 21-38.

## Information on Films

### *The Man Who Armed The World*

From the BBC *This World* website: “Dubbed the ‘Merchant of Death,’ alleged Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout was thought to be one of the most prolific gun runners and sanction busters in the world. Following a manhunt that lasted for almost a decade, he was finally arrested in Bangkok in March 2008. Tom Mangold reports for BCC *This World* on the undercover operation to find Viktor Bout, masterminded by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The sting was hatched on the Caribbean island of Curacao in the Dutch Antilles in January, with undercover agents posing as members of the Colombian rebel group FARC.

Via clandestine meetings in Copenhagen and Bucharest, Mr. Bout and his associates were bugged and followed until the dramatic climax in Thailand, where he was caught apparently conspiring to sell weapons to the US agents. On the eve of a crucial extradition hearing in Thailand, *This World* examines Mr. Bout's extraordinary past. Thought to have links with the Russian military, Viktor Bout emerged after the collapse of Communism in the early 1990s as the director of an airfreight business with a lucrative sideline in weapons bought from a cash-strapped Red Army.

By the late 1990s he was considered one of the biggest illegal arms dealers in the world, defying UN arms embargos in Sudan, Rwanda, the Congo, Angola and Sierra Leone. He is said to have supplied weapons to the Taliban, and the FARC group in Colombia. According to intelligence and political sources from the U.S., the UK, South Africa and Holland, his heavy weapons—including surface-to-air missiles and helicopter gunships—escalated small, localized wars, into major protracted conflicts. With the co-operation of the DEA, *This World* tells a story of secret agents, covert surveillance and the multimillion dollar arms deal that ends with Mr. Bout behind bars at the central court in Bangkok.”

Broadcast on 17 November 2008

Director: Nick Davidson

### *Iraq for Sale: The War Profiteers*

Documentary portraying the actions of U.S. corporate contractors in the U.S.-Iraq war. Interviews with employees and former employees of such companies as Halliburton, CACI, and KBR suggest that government cronyism is behind apparent “sweetheart” deals that give such contractors enormous freedom to profit from supplying support and material to American troops while providing little oversight. Survivors of employees who were killed discuss the claim that the companies cared more for profit than for the welfare of their own workers and soldiers indicate that the quality of services provided is sub-standard and severely in contradiction to the comparatively huge profits being generated. Also depicted are the unsuccessful attempts by the filmmakers to get company spokesmen to respond to the charges made by the interviewees.

Written by Jim Beaver

#### Assignment 4: State Attributes: Revenge

“Under the peace terms dictated by Germany at Versailles in 1871, France had suffered amputation, indemnity, and occupation. Even a triumphal march by the German Army down the Champs Elysées was among the terms imposed....when the French Assembly ratified the peace terms, the deputies of Alsace-Lorraine walked from the hall in tears, leaving behind their protest: ‘We proclaim forever the right of Alsatians and Lorrainers to remain members of the French nation. We swear for ourselves, our constituents, our children and our children’s children to claim that right for all time, by every means, in the face of the usurper.’”<sup>16</sup>

“On May 7, 1919, the terms were handed by Clemenceau to the Germans, not for oral discussion but for written comment. This was a great disappointment to the delegation, which had brought a large staff of experts for purposes of negotiation. But the great shock came when the German people, who had expected a peace settlement on Wilson’s Fourteen Points, found in the treaty the huge reparation demands, the losses of German territory, the disarmament of the Reich, the loss of the Saar mines, and other unexpected terms [such as the secret distribution of German colonies between the victorious European powers and the ‘war-guilt clause’]. The opinion was widespread among the German people that they had been tricked.”<sup>17</sup>

Justice will be served  
And the battle will rage  
This big dog will fight  
When you rattle his cage  
And you’ll be sorry that you messed with  
The U.S. of A.  
Cause we’ll put a boot in your ass  
It’s the American way.

—Lyrics, *Courtesy of the Red, White and Blue*, a country music song by Toby Keith

Have you forgotten how it felt that day?  
To see your homeland under fire  
And her people blown away  
Have you forgotten when those towers fell?  
We had neighbors still inside going through a living hell  
And you say we shouldn’t worry about bin Laden  
Have you forgotten?  
Some say this country’s just out looking for a fight  
After 9/11, man, I’d have to say that’s right.

—Lyrics to a country music song by Darryl Worley



## Readings

Fattah, Khaled and Fierke, K.M. 2009. "A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East." *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 15(1): 67-93. Available via the University Library; Maastricht University has a subscription to this journal.

Friedman, Thomas. 2006. *The World is Flat*. pp. 479-494.

Harkavy, Robert E. 2000. "Defeat, National Humiliation, and the Revenge Motif in International Politics," *International Politics* 37: 345-368.\*

\*The Course Coordinator will make this reading available via the Discussion Leader)

Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. 2010. *Causes of War*. Wiley-Blackwell, Chapter 7. **(Since this chapter is on Civil War, one learning goal should address the general causes of civil wars).**

Power, Samantha. 2008. "A Question of Honor. Russia's assault on Georgia was wrong—but predictable. How humiliation can shape national interest." *Time* 25 August 2008.

## Additional Reading

Tuchman, Barbara W. 1962. *The Guns of August*. Macmillan. pp. 28-38.

Wang, Zheng. 2008. "National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China." *International Studies Quarterly* 52: 783–806. Available via the University Library; Maastricht University has a subscription to this journal.

## Assignment 5: The Minds of Men

“...people in the same situations behave differently. This is often the case because people differ in their perceptions of the world in general and of other actors in particular. Sometimes it will be useful to ask who, if anyone, was right; but often it will be more fruitful to ask why people differed and how they came to see the world as they did.”<sup>18</sup>

On November 5, 1937, [Hitler] called together his Foreign Minister...and his military chiefs...Hitler told those assembled that the subject was so important that it could not be discussed in a wider circle; that his views were the result of long and careful thought and experience; that they represented his basic ideas about Germany's international position; and that, in case of his death, they were to be considered his last will and testament. In almost every respect these ideas were the same as those expressed in *Mein Kampf*, the one important exception being that he no longer expected a British alliance.”<sup>19</sup>

“Mao's most formidable weapon was pitilessness. In 1948, when he moved on Changchun, in Manchuria, and a direct assault failed to take it, an order was given to starve it into surrender. The actual words used on 30 May by Mao's commander on the spot, Lin Biao, were ‘Turn Changchun into a city of death.’

The defending commander, General Cheng Tung-kuo, was a hero of the war against Japan, and refused to capitulate. As there was only enough food to see the 500,000 civilians through until the end of July, he tried to evacuate civilians.

Lin Biao's response, endorsed by Mao, was: ‘Strictly ban civilians from leaving the city.’ The Communists let people go who had arms or ammunition, so as to encourage the Nationalist soldiers to defect, but specifically blocked civilians. Mao's calculation was that General Cheng was a ‘nice sort of guy,’ as he described him to Lin Biao, and could be pressured into surrendering by massive civilian deaths. Though completely without pity himself, Mao knew how to manipulate others...By the end of the five-month siege the civilian population had dropped from half a million to 170,000. The death toll was higher than the highest estimate for the Japanese massacre at Nanjing in 1937...The Changchun model, based on starving civilian to death in order to force the defending troops to surrender was used in ‘quite a few cities,’ according to the Communist general Su Yu, who was understandably unspecific.”<sup>20</sup>

“This list of misperceptions preceding World War II is also impressive. Capabilities again were misjudged, although not as badly as in the previous era. Few people expected the blitzkrieg to bring France down; the power of strategic bombardment was greatly overestimated; the British exaggerated the vulnerability of the German economy...Judgments of intention were even less accurate. The appeasers completely misread Hitler; the anti-appeasers failed to see that he could not be stopped without a war. For his part, Hitler underestimated his adversaries' determination. During the summer of 1939 he doubted whether Britain would fight and, in the spring of 1940, expected her to make peace.”<sup>21</sup>

## Readings

Haar, Roberta. 2010. "Explaining George W. Bush's Adoption of the Neoconservative Agenda after 9/11." *Politics & Policy* 38 (5) pp. 965-990. Available via the University Library.

Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. 2010. *Causes of War*. Wiley-Blackwell, Chapter 5.

Stoessinger, John G. 2010. *Why Nations Go to War*. Chapters 2, 9 & 10.\*

\*Students are advised to read this first before the Levy & Thompson pages.

## Additional readings

Caldicott, Helen. 1986. *Missile Envy*. pp. 235-250 and 259-265.\*\*

\*\*This reading is within Feminist theory, i.e. that men are more prone to conflict than women.

Ehrenreich, Barbara. 1997. *Blood Rites, Origins and History of the Passions of War*. pp. 117-125.\*\*

Jervis, Robert. 1988. "War and Misperception." In Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein & Jay M. Shafritz. 2006. *Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations*. pp. 485-501.

### Section 3                      Case studies

#### Assignment 6:              World War I

“A merely theoretical assertion of their racial superiority would not have been enough to make the Germans consider it possible to put a system of universal domination into actual practice, and the notion was accordingly nothing but an idealist’s dream at first. But the enormous increase of military strength and the development of industrial power in the German nation operated as two essential causes which seemed to work together for the realization of this dream.”<sup>22</sup>

“When the statesmen who took Europe to war in 1914 came to write their memoirs, they agreed on one thing: the war had been inevitable—the result of such vast historical forces that no human agency could have prevented it. ‘The nations slithered over the brink into the boiling cauldron of war,’ wrote David Lloyd George in a famous passage in his *War Memoirs*. Nor was this only metaphor he employed to convey the vast, impersonal forces at work. The war was a ‘cataclysm,’ a ‘typhoon’ beyond the control of the statesmen. As Big Ben struck ‘the most fateful hour’ on 4 August, it ‘echoed in our ears like the hammer of destiny...I felt like a man standing on a planet that had been suddenly wrenched from its orbit...and was spinning wildly into the unknown.’”<sup>23</sup>

“On becoming Kaiser in 1888 in succession to a father who had died from cancer after only a few months on the throne, Wilhelm set out to rule as an absolute monarch over what in many respects was Europe’s most advanced industrial society. Thanks to the disastrous ‘monarchical principle’ kept alive by the long-serving chancellor, the arch-conservative Otto von Bismarck, the young Kaiser had extraordinary authority...Ambitious politicians and military officers had to be fawning, sycophantic courtiers...How much of the Kaiser’s deeply unattractive personality was the result of psychological damage done during childhood can only be guessed at. But it would have been surprising if things had turned out well. In their efforts to repair the left arm crippled at birth, the doctors inflicted one well-intentioned torture after another...His mother, Queen Victoria’s daughter Vicky, tried and failed to hide her revulsion at his deformity...His personality combined with the militaristic, authoritarian culture of the Prussian court...”<sup>24</sup>

“...Schlieffen decided, in the event of war, to attack France by way of Belgium. His reason was ‘military necessity.’ In a two-front war, he wrote, ‘the whole of Germany must throw itself upon *one* enemy, the strongest, most powerful, most dangerous enemy, and that can only be France.’ Schlieffen’s completed plan for 1906, the year he retired, allocated six weeks and seven-eighths of Germany’s forces to smash France while one-eighth was to hold her eastern frontier against Russia until the bulk of her army could be brought back to face the second army....The German and French armies each required two weeks to complete mobilization before a major attack could begin on the fifteenth day. Russia, according to German arithmetic, because of her vast distances, huge

numbers, and meager railroads, would take six weeks before she could launch a major offensive, by which time France would be beaten.”<sup>25</sup>

“After nearly a decade of war in Afghanistan, Britain has lost fewer than 370 of its service people; on the first day of the Battle of the Somme in July 1916, 57,500 British soldiers were killed or wounded. Above all, 1914-18 has come to symbolize the futility of war....But even George Lansbury, a pacifist journalist and future Labour Party leader, who had argued that it was madness for Europe’s workers to be killing each other on behalf of the ruling classes, confessed to feeling carried along by the ‘sense of danger and service.’”<sup>26</sup>

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## Assignment 7: Vietnam & Korea

“The war fell into two distinct stages. The first was the struggle of the Communist Viet Minh against the French in northern Indochina. Guerrilla warfare began in December 1945 when waves of Viet Minh launched an attack on the main French garrisons and were repulsed, and driven back into the jungle. There they slowly built up liberated areas and began the process of transforming certain of their permanent guerrilla formations into a mobile regular army....General Vo Nguyen Giap used two of his regular 10,000 man divisions to bottle up the French garrison of 15,000 men...In March 1954 the battle began in earnest as cunningly camouflaged Viet Minh artillery pieces, 200 of them, and rocket launchers proceeded to pound the garrison to rubble. On May 7, the French, totally outgunned and with little hope of substantial airlifts of supplies or reinforcements, surrendered.”<sup>27</sup>

“For France it [Dien Bien Phu] was a name of shame, a tragic coda to the long story of French military glory. For America, it was a presage of the agony of Vietnam. The chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Admiral Arthur Radford, wanted to save the French camp with a few atom bombs. Sometimes Dulles seemed to agree. They were kept from this ultimate folly by the steady, if irritated, attitude of President Eisenhower. ‘You boys must be crazy,’ he said. American policy-makers were in two minds. They wanted to end colonialism, but they wanted even more to prevent the Asian dominoes falling to communism.”<sup>28</sup>

“A war in Korea fought by Chinese and Koreans would give the Soviet Union incalculable advantages: it could field-test both its own new equipment, especially its MiG jets, and America’s technology...both China and Korea would be completely dependent on Russian arms, so Stalin could fine-tune the degree of Russia’s involvement. Moreover, he could test how far America would go in war with the Communist camp.

But for Stalin, the greatest attraction of a war in Korea was that the Chinese, with their massive numbers, which Mao was eager to use, might be able to eliminate, and in any case tie down, so many American troops that the balance of power might tilt in Stalin’s favour and enable him to turn his schemes into reality. These schemes included seizing various European countries, among them Germany, Spain and Italy...

On 19 August [1950] Mao himself told Stalin’s emissary that America could send in thirty to forty divisions but that Chinese troops could ‘grind’ these up...on 1 March 1951, Mao summed up his overall plan for the Korean War to Stalin in chilling language: ‘to spend several years consuming several hundred thousand American lives.’”<sup>29</sup>

“It was an extraordinary achievement of modern warfare: between 12 and 25 October, the intelligence staffs of MacArthur’s armies failed to discern the slightest evidence of the movement of 130,000 soldiers and porters. A combination of superb fieldcraft and camouflage by the Chinese, with their lack of use of any of the conventional means of detecting modern military movement—wireless traffic, mechanised activity, supply dumps—blinded the UN High Command to what was taking place on its front. Above all, perhaps, the generals were not looking for anything of this

sort. They had persuaded themselves that the war was all but over. Their senses were deadened to a fresh consideration...”<sup>30</sup>

“...[the] McCarthyite frenzy turned American foreign policy into a ‘with-us-or-against-us’ crusade against communism. As a result, in Indochina America usually found it was on the side of the bad guys. Complex nations were grotesquely simplified for voters back home and the boys sent to fight abroad. President Kennedy deliberately mispronounced Laos as ‘Lay-os,’ lest Americans think he wanted to go to war with a small bug.”<sup>31</sup>

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## Assignment 8: The Holy Land

“We have always said that in our war with the Arabs we had a secret weapon—no alternative.”

—Golda Meir, former Israeli Prime Minister <sup>32</sup>

“The Arab-Israeli conflict is also in many ways a conflict about status: it’s a war between two peoples who feel deeply humiliated by the other, who want the other to respect them. Battles over status can be even more intractable than those over land or water or oil.”

—Alain de Botton, writer and philosopher

“Whoever thinks of stopping the uprising before it achieves its goals, I will give him ten bullets in the chest.”

—Yasser Arafat on the Intifada. <sup>33</sup>

“The pre-eminent obstacle to peace is Israel’s colonisation of Palestine.”

— Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, 10 March 2006

“Disproportionate violence is abhorrent. But a proportionate response isn’t an effective deterrent. But again, the condemnation that even proportionate violence invites also makes the deterrent less effective.”<sup>34</sup>

“The reality is that [Netanyahu’s] single-seat majority in the Knesset gives him no scope to move towards a deal even if he wanted to; his coalition includes right-wing and ultra-orthodox parties that will never accept one. Mr. Netanyahu is in fact one of the more moderate leaders in his coalition.”<sup>35</sup>

“Mr Abbas full-throatedly confirmed he had been ‘very close’ to a deal with Mr. Netanyahu’s predecessor, Ehud Olmert, who had to resign in 2009 amid allegations of financial misfeasance. The pair had been negotiating the details of land swaps based on one-for-one exchanges. ‘If it happens that way, I am ready,’ said Mr. Abbas. ‘If [Mr. Olmert] had stayed [in office] two or three months, we would have had an agreement.’ But ‘Olmert disappeared... and this man [Netanyahu] came, and nothing happened after that.’

A similar account of that missed opportunity appears in a just-published book by America’s then secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice. As she tells it, Ms Livni, then Israel’s foreign minister, balked at some of Mr. Olmert’s concessions and doubted his ability to garner sufficient political support to carry them.”<sup>36</sup>



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## Assignment 9: India & Pakistan

“The first generation of leaders in both states—the founding fathers, Mahatma Gandhi, Sardar Patel, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and Jawaharlar Nehru—were devoted to achieving independence and building new states and nations. With the exception of Gandhi, they did not believe that partition would lead to conflict between India and Pakistan. On the Indian side, many expected Pakistan to collapse, but did not see the need to hasten that collapse by provoking conflict with Pakistan. On the Pakistan side, once Independence was achieved, Jinnah hoped that the two countries would have good relations. In several important speeches delivered after the Independence Jinnah played down his earlier emphasis on Hindus and Muslims constituting ‘two nations.’ He set forth the vision of a predominantly Muslim but still-tolerant and multireligious Pakistan counterpoised against a predominantly Hindu India—in effect two secular states, in which religion was a private, not a public matter. Implicit in this arrangement was that the presence of significant minorities in each would serve as hostages to good relations.

A second generation of Indian and Pakistani leaders was unprepared to solve the problems created by partition. Nothing in their experience had led them to place reconciliation ahead of their own political advantage and the temptation to ‘just say no.’ They did reach several agreements that cleaned up the debris of partition, and there were trade and transit treaties, hotlines, and other confidence-building measures installed as early as the 1950s.

However, two great post-partition traumas aborted the process of normalization. For India, it was the humiliating defeat by China in 1962, and for Pakistan, the vivisection of their country by Indian hands in 1971. The ten-year difference is important: the present generation of Indian leaders are further away from their national humiliation than are their Pakistani counterparts, even though the rise of China as a major economic power rekindled anti-Chinese fears in New Delhi.

In each case, that other side denies the seriousness of the other’s grievances, and doubts the sincerity of the other side’s claim. In 1962, Ayub Khan stated his skepticism that there was a real India-China conflict, and Pakistanis still belittle Indian obsessions with Beijing. Indians seem to assume that Pakistanis have more or less forgotten the events of 1971 and cannot understand why Pakistani officials remain suspicious when New Delhi professes its good intentions.

There have been few scholars or journalists—and no politicians—bold enough to suggest that Islamabad settle for anything short of ‘self-determination,’ or a plebiscite, leading to accession [with regards to Kashmir], lest they be attacked for being pro-Indian and anti-Islamic.”<sup>37</sup>

“Taliban support continues today, even though Pakistan is America’s supposed ally in Afghanistan’s anti-Taliban counterinsurgency. A new report [2010] by the London School of Economics claims that not only does Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy agency finance the Afghan Taliban, but the ISI is even represented on the Taliban’s leadership council...For years both Islamist and liberal generals have also backed jihadists fighting for a Muslim Kashmir. Though vastly outnumbered, the militants have managed to tie down a dozen Indian army divisions. Mr. Musharraf and

an aide once joked about having such jihadists by their *tooti*—i.e., literally, ‘taps,’ by which he meant their private parts.”<sup>38</sup>

“Eighty kilometer east of Skardu, [Pakistan], Mortenson noticed two neat white minarets piercing the greenery on the outskirts of a poor village called Yugo. ‘Where do these people have the money for a new mosque like this?’ Mortenson asked. ‘This also *Wahhabi*,’ Apo said. ‘The Sheikhs come from Kuwait and Saudi with suitcases of rupees. They take the best student back to them. When the boy come back to Baltistan he have to take four wives.’

Twenty minutes down the road, Mortenson saw the spitting image of Yugo’s new mosque presiding over the impoverished village of Xurd.

‘*Wahhabi*?’ Mortenson asked, with a gathering sense of dread.

‘Yes, Greg,’ ... ‘they’re everywhere.’

‘I’d known that the Saudi *Wahhabi* sect was building mosques along the Afghan border for years,’ Mortenson says. ‘But that spring, the spring of 2001, I was amazed by all their new construction right here in the heart of Shiite Baltistan. For the first time I understood the scale of what they were trying to do and it scared me.’

... ‘*Wahhabi*’ is derived from the term *Al-Wahhab*, which means, literally, ‘generous giver’ in Arabic, one of Allah’s many pseudonyms. And it is this generous giving—the seemingly unlimited supply of cash that *Wahhabi* operatives smuggle into Pakistan, both in suitcases and through the untraceable *hawala* money-transfer system—that has shaped their image among Pakistan’s population. The bulk of that oil wealth pouring in from the Gulf is aimed at Pakistan’s most virulent incubator of religious extremism—*Wahhabi madrassas*. ”<sup>39</sup>

“Neither President Asif Zardari nor Yusuf Raza Gilani, the prime minister, deludes himself that he is really in charge. Nor do outsiders. Just after they had killed bin Laden, the Americans first telephoned General Kayani...the armed forces scoop up roughly a quarter of all public spending and large dollops of aid, with no proper oversight...they also run big firms, employ over 500,000, grab prime land for retired officers, set foreign and counterterrorism policy and scotch peace overtures to India.”<sup>40</sup>

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**Information on the Film**     *Control Room*

The review from Top Documentary Film.com: “*Control Room*, by Jehane Noujaim (Startup.com), an award-winning Arab-American filmmaker who has lived within and embraced both worlds, provides an opportunity to re-examine what is perhaps the most pressing question of international relations today: ‘is America radicalizing or stabilizing the Arab world?’ Without miring itself in shadowy conspiracy theories, *Control Room* provides a balanced view of Al-Jazeera’s presentation of the second Iraq war to their worldwide Arab audience, and in so doing calls into question many of the prevailing images and positions offered up by the U.S. news media.

*Control Room*’s view inside Al-Jazeera—a network branded ‘Osama Bin-Laden’s mouthpiece’ and subject of intense criticism from U.S. administration officials for showing images of Iraqi casualties and American POWs that American viewers never saw—suggests that its views on news reportage might actually be more in tune with democratic ideals than those of its Western counterparts.

*Control Room* neatly bridges the gap between timeless and timely; timeless because it locates itself in the midst of the ongoing cultural clash between Western and Arab worlds, timely because it does so through the prism of satellite television’s impact on how viewers receive information worldwide—from news providers, driven by the patriotism of their audiences, to Army information officers, driven by military objectives. *Control Room* is a seminal documentary that explores how Truth is gathered, presented, and ultimately created by those who deliver it.”

## Assignment 10: Yugoslavia

“...the violence of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s was part of a broad strategy in which images of threatening enemies and violence were used by conservative elites in Serbia and Croatia: not in order to mobilize people, but rather as a way to *demobilize* those who were pushing for changes in the structures of economic and political power that would negatively affect the values and interests of those elites. The goal of this strategy was to silence, marginalize, and demobilize challengers and their supporters in order to create political hegemony at home. This in turn enabled conservatives to maintain control of existing structures of power, as well as to reposition themselves by converting state-owned property into privately held wealth, the basis of power in a new system of a liberal economy.”<sup>41</sup>

“In mid-June, a month after the bombardment of Sarajevo began, the people of Kozarac, in the Prijedor region, watched Serb forces drag weapons onto the surrounding hills. The first shots in the town were fired on June 22, a Sunday. On that day, a very small and poorly organised group of the Bosnian Territorial Defence attacked a tank that was in the convoy of military vehicles at the entrance to Kozarac. The shelling from the hills started immediately, and continued for three days.

The inhabitants of Kozarac decided to negotiate. They were promised that nothing would happen to them if they surrendered, and most of them did. But they didn’t know about the buses that were already assembled and waiting for them on the outskirts of the town. The women and children were taken to Trnopolje, to the railway station, and loaded onto cattle wagons, which had also been waiting. The trains headed for Banja Luka, and stayed there for three days. The sinister wagons drew the attention of some of the more observant journalists, but no press were allowed access. Finally the prisoners were sent to Travnik and Doboj; most of them have ended up in Croatia and Slovenia.

The men had a quicker journey. Most of those who surrendered, Muslims of course, and some Croats, were immediately bused to the camps, arriving on the afternoon of their surrender...The estimated number of detainees was between 2,500 and 3,000, and during the 10 weeks of the camp’s existence the number stayed more or less the same because new people were brought daily, village by village, replacing those who were killed. Only 1,400 survivors were found when the camp was finally closed on August 8. There was a sort of hierarchy of punishment meted out...but it eventually got out of control, and guards had free reign. But the killings were not only the result of the guards’ brutality. They were also part of a campaign of executing those deemed ‘guilty’ of participating in the Territorial Defence.”<sup>42</sup>

“Historians can argue about the role of the individual in history. I have no doubt that if Milosevic’s parents had committed suicide before his birth rather than after, I would not be writing a cable about the death of Yugoslavia. Milosevic, more than anyone else, is its gravedigger.”

—U.S. Ambassador Warren Zimmerman in a confidential cable to Secretary of State James Baker 12 May 1992<sup>43</sup>

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**Information on the film**      *Why We Fight*

The review from Top Documentary Film.com: “In 1961, as Dwight D. Eisenhower gave his final address to the nation before leaving the office of President of the United States, he warned that America ‘must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence...by the military-industrial complex.’ Nearly 45 years later, as the United States finds itself waging a war in Iraq for reasons that seem increasingly unclear with the passage of time, Eisenhower’s statement becomes all the more pertinent, and the question becomes more apt: has the machinery the United States established to wage war helped prevent conflict, or has it done more to inspire it?”

Documentary filmmaker Eugene Jarecki offers an in-depth look at how the United States has readied itself for battle, and why and how the nation goes to war in the film *Why We Fight*. Named for Frank Capra’s famed series of Defense Department films (which explained the motives behind America’s entry into World War II), *Why We Fight* features interviews with foot soldiers, Army recruits, Pentagon personnel, decorated veterans, members of Congress, national security advisors, top military strategists, and many more as they talk about the core philosophies of American military strategy and how they have changed since the end of the Second World War. *Why We Fight* received the Grand Jury Prize at the 2005 Sundance Film Festival.”

### **Assignment 11: Saddam Hussein and wars with Iran and Kuwait**

“Khomeini overthrew the shah in January 1979. In November, he humiliated the American Satan by seizing its embassy in Teheran and holding its personnel hostage, ultimately inflicting a fatal political wound on Jimmy Carter, its leader in the White House. After exacting his vengeance on the first two foes on his list, he was ready to turn his attention to the third [Saddam Hussein].

By mid-1979, Khomeini had already rebuffed a series of friendly Iraqi overtures and begun his campaign. Tehran radio barraged Iraq with condemnations of his expulsion the year before. The government organized mass demonstrations demanding Saddam Hussein’s death and the establishment in Iraq of an Islamic republic.”<sup>44</sup>

“The Iraqi armed forces are organized along Soviet lines and rely almost entirely on Soviet or Soviet-type equipment, which is rugged and easy to maintain under primitive conditions. Iran, by contrast, began the war relying heavily on U.S. and Western equipment, which is much more difficult to maintain and, because of its hostile relations with its former arms suppliers, extremely difficult to replace. Iran’s U.S. and Israeli arms shipments during President Reagan’s disastrous Iran-contra arms initiative, even together with American equipment obtained through other sources, are simply not enough for fighting a war.”<sup>45</sup>

“On July 16, 1979, Saddam emerged supreme...He began his rule by executing a select group of adversaries and allies in the party and the military. Stalin’s infamous aphorism became his guide: ‘Death solves all problems; no man, no problem.’

...After the war with Iran, Saddam confronted multiple constraints...Compounding Saddam’s problems, Iraq’s chief ally, the Soviet Union, was declining fast and ended subsidies. France also insisted on payment for arms. And the price of American support might be human rights in Iraq and peace with Israel.

Saddam chose a different way. Among his neighbors and creditors, the prickly and independent Emirate of Kuwait especially irritated the Iraqis, who believed that the wealthy territory had been unfairly separated from them by the British Empire.

Saddam also surpassed his peers in villainy. They were ruthless; he was more ruthless. They killed enemies; he killed enemies and friends. They killed thousands; he killed hundreds of thousands. They worked a regional balance of power; he worked to overthrow the balance.”<sup>46</sup>

“Those who call for preventive war begin by portraying Saddam as a serial aggressor bent on dominating the Persian Gulf. The war party also contends that Saddam is either irrational or prone to serious miscalculation, which means he may not be deterred by even credible threats of retaliation. Kenneth Pollack, former director for gulf affairs at the National Security Council and a proponent of war with Iraq, goes so far as to argue that Saddam is ‘unintentionally suicidal.’ The facts, however, tell a different story. Saddam has dominated Iraqi politics for more than 30 years. During that period, he started two wars against his neighbors-Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990. Saddam’s record in this regard is no worse than that of neighboring states such as Egypt or Israel, each of which played a role in starting several wars since 1948.”<sup>47</sup>

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