

Theories of social order

Course manual, course SSC2065
University College Maastricht

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1. Introduction

The course “Theories of social order” focuses on one of the most important problems in sociology: the problem of social order. The root of the problem of social order lies in the distinction between the interests of individuals and those of groups (and societies), which these individuals constitute. Whenever individual interest conflicts with group interest, social order is put at some kind of risk. A solution to the problem requires the reconciliation of individual and collective interest, but theorists have provided several distinct strategies for doing so. In this course, we will consider the five most prominent mechanisms to produce social order: individuals, hierarchies, markets, groups and networks. Classical and foundational texts by important sociologists like Marx, Weber, and Durkheim are combined with contemporary extensions and empirical applications that, in some form or another, apply the arguments made by these earlier scholars. The editorial introductions by Hechter & Horne provide the background for each of these texts and link them to the central problem: how to achieve social order. Throughout the course, the strengths and weaknesses of the various theories are discussed, and attempts are made to relate them to contemporary events whenever feasible. In this way, students will improve their understanding of the social world and will learn to apply the analytical tools to real-life phenomena.

2. Goals

This course has two goals. The first is to introduce students in one of the core theoretical issues in the social sciences – the problem of social order. The second goal is to develop skills in identifying and *analyzing* theoretical arguments, and in *applying* abstract theories to new concrete empirical situations. The problem of social order is not only of theoretical interest, but is also prominent in many areas of social life. Understanding theories of social order includes thinking about their implications for practical problems. Thus, this course is as much about learning certain concepts and theories as it is about developing skills to apply this knowledge to current problems of social order.

3. Organisation

The course consists of regular lectures, guest lectures, tutorial sessions and presentation sessions:

- The purpose of the *regular lectures* is to introduce the topic and to provide an overview of the different theories. These lectures should help you to keep the ‘big picture’ of the course. There will be three such lectures.
- Beside the regular lectures we will have three *topical lectures*. The purpose of these lectures is to explore a certain theorist or a particular topic more in-depth.
- The *tutorial sessions* (10 in total) are organised around the tasks in this manual. The purpose of these meetings is to gain a full understanding of the mandatory literature in this course.
- The last three sessions are *presentation sessions*. In sessions 11 and 12 the individual papers are being presented and discussed. In session 13 we will have the group presentations. The purpose of these sessions is that individual students or groups of students can show their mastery of the course literature by applying certain theories to contemporary problems of social order.

4. Time schedule

Date*	Meeting	Subject	Literature
Week 15			
11-4	1	Introduction: The problem of social order. What is theory?	Hechter & Horne preface and p.1-16 Olson in Collins (1994) p. 162-170
11-4	Lecture	Regular lecture 1: introduction	
13-4	2	Task 1: Motives and mechanisms	Hechter & Horne p. 17-40 De Waal (2013) p. 223-240 Kahneman & Tversky p. 341 – 350
Week 16			
18-4	3	Task 2: Individuals	Hechter & Horne p. 41-81 Berger and Luckmann, p.65-85
18-4	Lecture	What is society?	
20-4	4	Task 3: Development of society	Collins (1986) p. 47-59 Weber in Collins (1994) p. 37-57 Becker & Woessmann p. 531-542, 581-582 Piketty p. 571-577 Krugman p. 1-12 Milanovic p. 519-534 Thompson (1967): p. 56-97
Week 17			
25-4	5	Task 4: Hierarchies	Hechter & Horne p. 82-133 Machiavelli Ch. 6, 9, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25
25-4	Lecture	Regular lecture 2: looking back, looking forward	
Week 18			
2-5	6	Task 5: Markets	Hechter & Horne p. 134-198 Balafoutas et al. 15924-15927
2-5	Lecture	Hobbes, Marx, and the State	
4-5	7	Task 6: Groups– part I	Hechter & Horne p. 199-209; 222-260 Stockard & O'Brien p. 854-858, 868-870
Week 19			
Discuss topics of individual papers and presentation with your tutor ultimately in this week!			
9-5	8	Task 7: Groups– part II	Hechter & Horne p. 261-295 Coleman in Collins (1994) p. 171-189 Goffman, p. 124-139
9-5	Lecture	Regular lecture 3: how does all this relate?	
Week 20			
16-5	9	Task 8: Networks	Hechter & Horne p. 296-339 Putnam (1995) p. 65-78 Putnam (2000) 298–320 Flaxman et al. (2016)p. 298-320
16-5	Lecture	What about institutions?	
18-5	10	Task 9: Conclusion	Hechter & Horne p. 340-344
Week 21			
21-05 (1000)		Hand in first version individual paper	
23-5		No tutorial meetings!	
25-5	11	Individual paper discussions	
Week 22			

Exam week!			
30-5	12	Individual paper discussions	
30-5	13	Group presentations	
Week 23			
04-06 10.00 hrs		Hand in final version individual paper (for those who received feedback in session 11)	
07-06 10.00 hrs		Hand in final version individual paper (for those who received feedback in session 12)	

This schedule can be used as an instrument for efficient time planning

*Period 5

IMPORTANT: you should **start with the preparation** of the individual papers and group presentations ultimately in **week 19**.

NOTE: Not all literature is related to the task as described. You will **still need to read and discuss** this literature during the tutorial meeting.

5. Grading policies

Attendance requirements

Following UCM regulation, the minimum attendance requirement is 85% for tutorial meetings (meetings 1-10) and 100% for the practical meetings (meetings 11-13). This means you are allowed to miss 2 tutorial meetings. If you miss 3 tutorial meetings, you can submit a 'request for an additional assignment because of insufficient attendance' to the Office of Student Affairs, within 10 working days after completion of the course. The contents of this assignment will be determined by the planning group in due course. In case of too late submission or too low quality of the work, the student will fail the course. If you miss more than 3 tutorial meetings, you will automatically fail the course.

Note that attendance to the discussion of the individual papers (meeting 11 and 12) and group presentations (meeting 13) is **mandatory**.

Grading policy

Students are expected to prepare themselves sufficiently and to participate actively in all sessions. Note that you will be asked in each session to link one of the discussed articles to a current or historical problem of social order. We think it is essential in this course that you learn to apply theories to a practical problem and thus show that you understand what the theory is about. In each post-discussion of a task, we will spend roughly half of the time to discuss these applications. Make sure you prepare this well in advance. To assess the preparation and the participation during the tutorial, we will grade your participation in the tutorial sessions (meetings 1-10), as well as in the discussion of the individual papers (meetings 11 and 12). The participation will be graded by your tutor on a scale from 1 to 10. We will publish 2 grades, one after meeting 6 and one after meeting 12. The overall participation grade (calculated as the average of the two grades) will determine 20% of your final grade

In weeks **22 and 23** (the exam weeks), individual papers (see section on individual papers) will be discussed in two additional tutorial sessions: half of the papers in session 11 and the other half in session 12. Attendance to these two meetings is mandatory for all students. A final version of the

paper should be submitted through 'safe assignment' in ELEUM. Students who received the comments on their papers in session 11 should submit their final version before **Monday, June 4th, 1000 hrs**. Students who received the comments on their papers in session 12 should submit their final version before **Thursday, June 7th, 1000 hrs**. This final version will be graded by the tutors and will count for 60%. Grades will be based on the logic of arguments and the correct application of the conceptual and analytic tools (for more information on the paper grading, see next section). Any use of ad-hoc and/or common-sense theorizing will be penalized.

In the last session in week 22, presentations will be held by small subgroups of students. Maximum group size is 4 students. Each presentation will take about 25 minutes, including discussion. In the presentation, students are expected to apply the concepts and theories learned in this course to a specific contemporary problem of social order (see instruction on group presentations in this manual). Attendance to this meeting is mandatory for all students. The presentation will be graded by the tutors. Grades will be based on the logic of arguments and the correct application of the conceptual and analytic tools. Any use of ad-hoc and/or common-sense theorizing will be penalized. The members of each subgroup are jointly responsible for the contents of the presentation and will be graded equally in this respect. The presentation will determine 20% of the total grade.

To pass the course, students should:

1. have a minimum grade of at least 5 for the individual paper;
2. have an average grade of at least 5.5.

If a student fails the course, then a resit is possible only if the student has passed the attendance requirements or had his/her additional assignment approved. Moreover, students should have made a fair attempt to do all the parts of the assessment. In practice this means that the average grade should be at least 4.5, in order to be eligible for a resit. In the case of a resit, a second individual paper needs to be written (see section on individual papers).

6. The individual papers

Each student is obliged to write a paper of max 2.250 (this corresponds roughly to 5-7 pages, there is no 10% rule) on a problem of social order. Students should choose a specific contemporary problem of social order in which the concepts and theories of this course can be applied. The topic should be different from the ones that were chosen for the group presentation (see next section). The paper should present an original view on the problem at hand using the concepts and tools learned during the course. You should apply at least two theories of the course. We specifically welcome if you use additional literature (for related literature, see appendix of this manual).

Each topic needs prior approval from your tutor. You should hand in a topic and table of contents in week 19 and discuss that with your tutor. Note that at that time you will not yet have discussed all the theories of the course! In order to get some early idea which theories and concepts you can use, **we strongly advise you to read all the editorials of the book in advance**. In these editorials Hechter and Horne summarize the main theories of a particular mechanism. By reading these editorials you get a good overview of the different relevant theories on social order.

A first version of the paper should be submitted through 'safe assignment' in ELEUM before Monday **May 21st** 1000 hrs. The papers will be discussed in two tutorial meetings (11 and 12). During the tutorial sessions the paper will be discussed by the tutor and your fellow students. There will be no time for presentation of the paper. Each paper will have an allocated timeslot of some 20 minutes. Attendance to these two meetings is mandatory for all students. Students are expected to read all the

other papers in their group and prepare questions and suggestions for improvement. During the two tutorial sessions you will receive feedback on your paper by the tutors and your fellow students.

With this feedback you can improve your paper. A final version of the paper should be submitted through 'safe assignment' in ELEUM. Students who received the comments on their papers in session 11 should submit their final version before Monday **June 4th**, 1000 hrs. Students who received the comments on their papers in session 12 should submit their final version before Thursday, **June 7th**, 1000 hrs.

Paper grading

The paper grade will be based on the following subgrades: content (60% of final grade), readability (20%) and scientific standard (20%). The final paper grade and all subgrades will be published.

Content (60% of final paper grade)

The content grade will be mainly based on the logic of arguments and correct application of the theories. These are some of the questions which will be considered when grading the content:

- Is the research question clear?
- Is the research question answered?
- Does the student give adequate background information (enough to understand the conflict of social order and the application of theories but no irrelevant or distracting information)?
- Is there a good logic of arguments?
- Are the theories correctly applied?
- Do the theories fit the situation?
- If necessary, are the limitations of the theories in this context discussed?
- Is it clear to the reader which elements of the theory represent which elements of the situation (e.g. who ruling class is)?

Readability (20%)

The readability grade reflects how easy it is to read your paper. A clear structure and short and clear sentences are central to this. These are some of the questions which will be considered when grading the readability:

- Does the paper have a clear structure?
- Does each paragraph discuss one main idea?
- Does the paper 'sound' right – does it 'flow'?
- Does the paper have unnecessary complicated wording or sentences?

Scientific standard (20%)

The paper should have a scientific style. The most important aspect of this scientific style is having precise language and proper referencing. This means that you should avoid vague and non-academic writing style and provide the source of facts and ideas which are not your own and not common knowledge. Unsupported claims which are not common knowledge will be penalized. Have a look at the "A Guide to Academic Writing Skills" (Eleum → 'course material') for further details on the scientific standard. These are some of the questions which will be considered when grading scientific standard:

- Does the student use proper referencing?
- Is the paper written in 'academic' rather than 'everyday' language?
- Does the student use correct spelling and grammar?

Maximum length is 2.250 words excluding references. Papers exceeding this limit and/or papers that are handed in after the deadline(s) will not be considered.

Please note that UCM has a Writing Center. The Writing Center helps students with any aspect of their writing, such as finding a topic and creating an outline, checking papers for grammar and structure, and discussing any language or writing-related issues we notice in students' papers. Students can either drop by during walk-in hours (room 2.018) or send an email to make an appointment: ucm-writingcenter@maastrichtuniversity.nl.

More guidelines on how to write the paper is presented in problem task 10 in this manual.

7. Group presentations

Form subgroups with a maximum size of 4 persons. Each subgroup will deal with a problem of social order. You may choose one of the problems listed below, but we encourage you to choose another problem as long as it is clearly related to social order. Other themes need approval from your tutor. Discuss the title of the topic in week 19 with your tutor. The aim is to use the various concepts and theories you have learned in this course to give a sociological explanation on a problem of social order, for example:

1. Europe, the Greek crisis and Brexit: how do we deal with trust and solidarity between states?
2. The US president: what does the victory of Trump teach us about legitimacy of political parties?
3. How does the sudden rise of migration and refugees affect social order in Europe?
4. The Syrian civil war and the disruption of social order
5. The relation between Europe and Russia: are we heading towards a new cold war era?
6. Wikileaks: how central authorities react to leaking classified documents
7. Social media and social order
8. Vaccinations: individual motivations and social outcomes
9. Fire alarms and mass panicking
10. Global warming and social order

Participation in this meeting is **mandatory** for all students. The presentations will be graded by the tutors. Grades will be based on the logic of arguments and the correct application of the conceptual and analytic tools provided during the course.

More guidelines on how to prepare the presentation is presented in problem task 11 in this manual.

8. Mandatory literature

You should purchase the following book (**make sure you have the 2nd edition, not the 1st**):

- Hechter, Michael & Christine Horne (2009). *Theories of social order. A reader*. **2nd edition** Stanford University Press. ISBN: 978-0-8047-5872-7 or ISBN: 978-0-8047-5873-4

E-reader:

- Balafoutas, L., N. Nikiforakis and B. Rockenbach (2014), Direct and indirect punishment among strangers in the field, *PNAS*, vol. 111 (45), p. 15924 – 15927.
- Becker, S. O. and L. Woessmann (2009). Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital Theory of Protestant Economic History. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124 (2): p. 531-542, 581-582.
- Collins, R. (1986). *Max Weber. A Skeleton Key*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, p. 47-59.

- Collins, R. (1994). *Four Sociological Traditions. Selected Readings*. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 37-57 (Weber), p. 162-170 (Olson), and p. 171-189 (Coleman).
- De Waal, F.B. (2013). The bonobo and the atheist: In search of humanism among the primates. Ch. 8 (pp. 223-240). WW Norton & Company.
- Goffman, E. (1963), *Behavior in Public Places*, The Free Press, p. 124-139
- Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1984), Choices, values and Frames, *American Psychologist*, vol. 39, 4, p. 341 – 350.
- Krugman, P. (2014). Why we're in a New Gilded Age. *The New York Review of Books*, 61 (8), p. 1-12.
- Machiavelli, N. [1532] (2005). *The Prince*. New York: Oxford University Press, Ch. 6, 9, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25.
- Milanovic, B. (2014), The Return of "Patrimonial Capitalism": A Review of Thomas Piketty's *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, *Journal of Economic Literature*, 52(2): 519-534.
- Piketty, T. (2014). *Capital in the Twenty-first Century*. Conclusion. Harvard University Press, p. 571-577.
- Putnam, R. (1995). Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital. *Journal of Democracy* 6.1: 65-78.
- Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, p. 15-28.
- Stockard, J. & R. M. O'Brien (2002). Cohort Effects on Suicide Rates: International Variations. *American Sociological Review*, 67: 854-872.
- Thompson, Edward P. "Time, work-discipline, and industrial capitalism." *Past & present* 38 (1967): 56-97.
- Berger, P. and T. Luckmann (1991 [1966]), *The Social Construction of Reality*. London: Penguin Books
- Flaxman, S., S. Goel, and J.M. Rao. "Filter bubbles, echo chambers, and online news consumption." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 80.S1 (2016): 298-320.

For further reading, consult the references provided at the end of this course manual. The backbone of the course is the book by Michael Hechter & Christine Horne. The editorial introductions help you to easily grasp the essence of the texts and provide the overall structure of the different theoretical approaches.

The book 'Theories of Social order' can be bought from Universalis, the Study Store shop (at Tongersestraat 12A, Maastricht) or the Study Store homepage <http://www.studystore.nl/webshop/>. All other articles will be made available in the e-reader. However, we strongly advise to buy the book. A limited number of copies is also available in the UCM reading room and the UM library.

There are several movie scenes linked to this course. Examples are provided in this course manual. These are not mandatory but can improve your understanding of the topic.

9. Planning group

The planning group consists of:

- Dr. Mark Levels (course coordinator) – Research Centre for Education and the Labour market (ROA)
- Christoph Janietz, MSc – Research Centre for Education and the Labour market (ROA)

For any questions relating to the course, you should consult your tutor Christoph Janietz (C.Janietz@maastrichtuniversity.nl) or Mark Levels (M.Levels@maastrichtuniversity.nl) .

10. Tasks

Preparation for all tutorial sessions 1-10: link the discussed articles to a current or historical problem of social order and present this during the tutorial.

Problem task 1: The problem of social order (to be prepared in meeting 1 and discussed in meeting 2)




Figure B.1 Three Types of Mechanisms in Social Explanation (*Hechter & Horne p. 17*)

Choose a problem of social order and apply the three mechanisms mentioned by Hechter & Horne on p.19 (see above).

Note: the text by De Waal is related to the text of Kanazawa on the evolutionary origins of human behaviour.

Related movies:

The problem of social order:

- *City of God*
Trailer: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ioUE_5wpg_E

Weber's types of motivation

- *A Man for All Seasons*
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5DpkNX2GxRw&feature=related>

Problem task 2: Individuals (to be prepared in meeting 2 and discussed in meeting 3)

The reactions to the anti-Islam Video are an example of conflicts that arise from differences in meaning and values. This is not necessarily related to religious differences (see Cohen and Vandello).

Anti-Islam film: Thousands protest around Muslim world

Source: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19625167>

17 September 2012 Last updated at 19:46 GMT

Fresh protests are taking place around the Muslim world over an amateur anti-Islam video produced in the US.

At least one protester was killed in violent protests in Pakistan and thousands attended an angry rally in the Philippines city of Marawi. Weapons were fired and police cars torched in the Afghan capital, Kabul. The leader of Lebanon's Hezbollah has said the US faces "very dangerous" repercussions if it allows the full video to be released. In a rare public appearance, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah told a rally in the capital Beirut that the world did not understand the "breadth of the humiliation" caused by the "worst attack ever on Islam". More than a dozen people have died since last Tuesday in protests sparked by the appearance on Youtube of a trailer for the obscure, poorly made film, which is entitled Innocence of Muslims. Youtube told the BBC it would not remove the trailer as it was within its guidelines but it had restricted access to the clip in countries where its content was illegal "such as India and Indonesia as well as in Libya and Egypt".

Flags burned

*Thousands of people were on the streets of Beirut, waving flags and chanting, "America, hear us - don't insult our Prophet". Sheikh Nasrallah, the influential leader of Lebanon's Shia Muslim militant group, earlier called for a week of protests - not only against American embassies, but also to press Muslim governments to express their own anger to the US. At least one protester was killed in **Pakistan** on Monday as violent demonstrations were reported in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and the country's biggest city, Karachi. Pakistan, as predicted, has blocked access to Youtube, accusing it of failing to remove blasphemous material. This is clearly an attempt by the authorities to show people they have responded on an emotive issue, the BBC's Aleem Maqbool reports from Islamabad. More protests were reported in Srinagar, in **Indian-administered Kashmir**. Elsewhere In a BBC interview, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair said the film was "wrong and offensive but also laughable as a piece of film-making". "What is dangerous and wrong is the reaction to it," said Mr Blair, who now serves as a Middle East peace envoy.*

Film mystery

The exact origins of the film are shrouded in mystery, although a man called Nakoula Basseley Nakoula, a convicted fraudster living in California has been questioned over his involvement. The eruption of anger has seen attacks on US consulates, embassies and business interests across the Middle East and north Africa. British, Swiss, German and Dutch properties have also been targeted. The US ambassador to Libya was among four Americans killed on the day protests first broke out. Libyan Interior Minister Fawzi Abdul Al has dismissed a claim on Sunday by the president of the national congress that 50 people were arrested in connection with the deaths. He said only four people had been detained so far, although up to 50 could be under investigation.


Related movies:

- The Gods must be Crazy (Scenes 2 and 3) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GorHLQ-jLRQ>
- The Mohammed cartoons: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xrq761M3CM>
- The Simpsons: Homer is not a catholic <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CZXzgo-931U>

- **Problem task 3: Development of society (to be prepared in meeting 3 and discussed in meeting 4)**

Could there be a causal link between Protestantism and GDP per capita?

The Cross-Country Pattern of Protestantism and GDP Per Capita



Source: Becker, S. O. & L. Woessmann (2009). "Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital Theory of Protestant Economic History*." Quarterly Journal of Economics 124(2): 531-596.

Note: the analysis used in this article is quite complex. It is not necessary to fully understand it.

Problem task 4: Hierarchies (to be prepared in meeting 4 and discussed in meeting 5)

Arrests and injuries as Hamburg gripped by mass anti-G20 protests

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/07/g20-protests-hamburg-altona-messehalle>

Hamburg, 7th July 2017

A day of violent clashes between police and protesters culminated on Friday evening with the bizarre spectacle of the heads of the world's 20 leading economies listening to Beethoven's Ode to Joy at the top of a shiny high-rise building while police used water cannon, teargas and speed boats to keep at bay an angry crowd of thousands.

Rising tensions between protesters and police had escalated with clashes in Hamburg's historic harbour area on Thursday night, and escalated further when masked anti-capitalist protesters torched cars and smashed shop windows in the Altona district on Friday morning.

Later on Friday afternoon Hamburg authorities spoke of 160 injured police officers and 70 arrested protesters. Organisers of Thursday's "Welcome to Hell" march said 14 participants had ended up in hospital, three of whom were seriously injured and one claimed to be in a critical condition.

[...]

Police and protesters accuse each other of having escalated the situation in the city, with police saying they had to use force after a hardcore bloc of activists had attacked them with bottles and sticks.

Sven Jahn, a police spokesman, said that a group of about 60 masked protesters attacked three police vehicles with molotov cocktails, and that a flare fired at a police helicopter only narrowly missed its target.

The German chancellor, Angela Merkel, who hosts the summit, condemned the violence. "I have every understanding for peaceful demonstrations, but violent demonstrations put human lives in danger," she said.

Andreas Beuth, a lawyer and protest co-organiser, accused authorities of deliberate provocation with heavy-handed tactics. "The escalation was clearly started by the police," said Beuth at a press conference inside the stadium of local football club FC St Pauli on Friday morning.

Christoph Kleine, one of the organisers of Saturday's G20 Not Welcome march, said police had "risked the loss of human life" by aiming water cannon at people standing on bridges and rooftops.

In the next tutorial meeting, we will simulate a court case on the G20 protests in Hamburg. The topic of the court case is the exercise of physical force by the German police. Students will be divided into three groups:

Group A is on the side of the police and is represented by lawyer Hobbes.

Group B is on the side of the protesters and is represented by lawyer Engels.

Group C acts as the judges who will thoroughly question the lawyers and who will reach a verdict at the end of the meeting.

The court case will be organised as follows:

5 min - Opening statement team A (Hobbes)

5 min - Opening statement team B (Engels)

10 min – Questions to team A by team C

10 min – Questions to team B by team C

1 min – Concluding statements by teams A and B

Discussion and motivated decision by team C

N.B.: In order to prepare for this court case, you should discuss in advance how you will organize your argument. For a good preparation, it is important that the groups meet between tutorial sessions. You will have to draw boat models using the theories from the readings to support your argumentation.

Related movies:

Hobbes' state of nature:

- Hotel Rwanda (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4dd8rX5Dy_Q)
- The Road (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bO8EqMsxOiU>)

Engels

- 1984 (<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z4rBDUJTnNU>)

Weber's types of legitimate domination: patrimonial/Traditional:

- The Godfather Part 1 (<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G9C59wgg2A8>)

Weber's types of legitimate domination: charismatic leadership:

- Gandhi (<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mVwCeGxTN-A>)

Weber's types of legitimate domination: bureaucracy:

- Charlie Chaplin's modern times (http://youtube.com/watch?v=2B3HGY_zLKk)

Problem task 5: Markets: spontaneous order (to be prepared in meeting 5 and discussed in meeting 6)

The following excerpts are quotes by Dr. Berwick, collected by Daniel Henninger and published in the Wall Street Journal after Dr. Berwick was appointed as head of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).

"I cannot believe that the individual health care consumer can enforce through choice the proper configurations of a system as massive and complex as health care. That is for leaders to do."

"Please don't put your faith in market forces. It's a popular idea: that Adam Smith's invisible hand would do a better job of designing care than leaders with plans can."

"A progressive policy regime will control and rationalize financing—control supply."

"For-profit, entrepreneurial providers of medical imaging, renal dialysis, and outpatient surgery, for example, may find their business opportunities constrained."

"I would place a commitment to excellence—standardization to the best-known method—above clinician autonomy as a rule for care."

"Young doctors and nurses should emerge from training understanding the values of standardization and the risks of too great an emphasis on individual autonomy."

"Political leaders in the Labour Government have become more enamored of the use of market forces and choice as an engine for change, rather than planned, centrally coordinated technical support."

Source: Wall Street Journal,

<http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703792704575367020548324914>, updated July 15, 2010 12:01 a.m. ET

The following is a reply by a reader of the Wall Street Journal:

Regarding Daniel Henninger's "Berwick: Bigger Than Kagan" (Wonder Land, July 15): I am writing to expose Dr. Donald Berwick's suggestions for reform as being naively "cookbook" and unrealistic.

Dr. Berwick puts faith in standardization and systemization of services, resulting in efficient "best known" care. I would be first in line to administer this plan if I believed it would work. Its working depends on the initial diagnosis of the patient being correct.

I am an ear/nose/throat specialist. Maybe 40% of my referrals were initially misdiagnosed, usually because of misleading symptoms. My patients are referred or come on their own because their treatment plan was not working. "Best care" has to be based on an all-too-infrequent "right diagnosis."

As a specialist, I have better equipment to diagnose illness. I have better cure rates than others because I am able to actually see what is wrong with patients using in-office fiberoptic cameras, CT scans and audiologic testing. I can use these test results, along with elements of the patient's history, to show the patient that his ear pain is temporomandibular joint disease and not an infection, that his sinus problem is actually migraine, and that his throat infection is a manifestation of reflux. I can spend more time with patients because I can charge for these tests.

I challenge you to tell me that I am more expensive in the long run than weeks or months of inappropriate treatment for incorrect diagnoses. If I am wrong in my diagnosis or treatment, I need to worry about losing that patient and that patient's referring doctor to a competing ENT specialist in the area. This competition in results keeps me on my toes better than any government bureaucrat ever could. This competition keeps the fees that I charge for surgery at my surgery center down to 65% of what hospitals charge, and keeps my CT-scan fees at one-half of what hospitals charge.

I am successful because of the market forces which Dr. Berwick condescendingly dismisses. Medicine is truly an art. Dr. Berwick's ideal health-care system will only replace our current rationing of health care from those who have insurance and money, to rationing by government bureaucracy. This will be even more inefficient and will disproportionately depress research and development which is important for the treatments of tomorrow. It replaces freedom of choice with the tyranny of government. Better means of reform are available.

Keith R. Jackson, M.D.

Source: Wall Street Journal,
<http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704913304575371210975895460>, updated
July 22, 2010 12:01 a.m. ET

In the next tutorial meeting, we will have a “parliamentary debate”, in which you will have to defend or attack propositions related to the “privatization in public goods markets”, using arguments from theories about hierarchies and markets. This does not only relate to the health care sector as in the discussion above, but also to other sectors like education, public transport, safety etc. You will not be able to choose your side, so be prepared to be on either!

Each student should think about two propositions related to the above discussion. These propositions need to be sent to the tutor the day before the meeting, by 4 p.m.. Try to formulate propositions which are precise (rather than vague) and challenging (rather than conferring an obvious advantage to defenders or opponents of the proposition). The tutor will select two propositions for the debate. If your proposition is selected, you will be assigned a role as judge.

There will be two rounds in the debate, each on a different proposition. In each round, the students will be divided in three groups: the jury, the defenders and the opponents of the proposition. The goal of the debate is to show convincing, logical, well-grounded arguments to the jury, rather than ‘to be right’.

In each round, the debate will be as follows:

- Announcement of the selected proposition and of the group composition
- 8 minutes preparation time
- 3 minutes argumentation by the defenders. (Select one person to make a strong opening statement. Then others can add more arguments.)
- 3 minutes argumentation by the opponents. (Select one person to make a strong opening statement. Then others can add more arguments.)
- 2 minutes response by the defenders
- 2 minutes response by the opponents
- 1,5 minute closing statement by the defenders
- 1,5 minute closing statement by the opponents
- Discussion by the jury and motivated decision on who won the debate
- All allocated time slots will be carefully looked after by the jury. The jury may ask questions while the parties are making their arguments.

Note that there is a debating club at UCM that organizes workshops and might provide you with some tips and tricks. You can contact: rhetoricdebating@gmail.com and <https://www.facebook.com/rhetoricdebating> Students are always welcome to drop by the debating club’s weekly sessions to attend the workshops and practice the debating skills or gain more confidence when speaking in public.

Related movies:

Spontaneous order

- *Hanoi Street scene without any traffic lights or signs*
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eC4BN9klnXg>

Adam Smith

- *Capitalism: A Love Story*
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XbkFNw4wJtk>

Problem task 6: Groups – Part I (to be prepared in meeting 6 and discussed in meeting 7)

The following table is from a cross-national survey on suicide rates in different groups in different countries in the period 1950 - 1995. What does it tell you about the social determinants of suicide?

Table 2. Suicide Rates by Sex for 15-to-19-Year-Olds and 50-to-54-Year-Olds for Each Country in the Analysis: 14 Western Industrialized Countries, 1950 to 1995

Country	Statistic	15-to-19-Year-Olds		50-to-54-Year-Olds	
		Males	Females	Males	Females
Australia	Mean	9.4	2.8	24.3	9.5
	Range	4.3–17.2	1.0–4.4	19.2–39.0	6.5–13.3
Canada	Mean	12.3	3.08	27.8	10.9
	Range	2.6–21.4	1.1–4.9	21.8–29.9	7.4–14.5
Denmark	Mean	8.5	3.5	58.3	33.5
	Range	3.7–11.9	1.1–6.2	22.8–78.8	15.3–44.7
United Kingdom	Mean	3.9	1.5	15.5	8.6
	Range	2.5–5.9	.8–2.1	13.6–17.6	4.2–11.6
Finland	Mean	20.0	4.2	55.2	18.7
	Range	7.3–40.1	2.6–7.0	48.7–65.5	15.1–25.3
France	Mean	6.3	3.0	40.5	15.8
	Range	3.9–9.1	1.9–4.3	37.5–45.0	12.7–18.7
Ireland	Mean	4.6	.8	16.1	5.7
	Range	0–16.9	0–3.1	5.0–22.6	0–9.2
Italy	Mean	3.0	1.9	13.5	6.3
	Range	2.1–4.4	.8–3.4	10.4–15.6	5.0–7.5
Netherlands	Mean	3.8	1.3	18.0	13.9
	Range	1.2–6.7	.5–2.4	13.6–23.1	12.2–15.5
New Zealand	Mean	12.2	4.4	21.9	11.9
	Range	1.6–33.0	0–10.6	16.5–25.0	5.6–23.7
Norway	Mean	8.8	2.5	25.9	10.8
	Range	1.0–20.3	0–8.4	17.6–33.2	8.0–19.6
Sweden	Mean	8.6	4.3	40.7	19.2
	Range	4.8–13.1	.9–7.7	32.9–53.5	15.9–31.7
Switzerland	Mean	15.3	5.4	47.0	19.0
	Range	9.4–22.9	3.7–7.3	34.0–62.5	12.7–21.8
United States	Mean	10.5	2.6	25.1	9.4
	Range	3.5–18.1	1.3–3.7	22.8–29.0	6.5–12.7
Total	Mean	9.1	2.9	30.4	13.8
	Range	0–40.1	0–10.6	5.0–78.8	0–44.7

Note: N = 140 (10 in each country) for ages 15 to 19 and N = 84 (6 in each country) for those 50 to 54 years of age.

Note: The numbers above are based on measures of the suicide rates taken every 5 years in each country during the observation period. The rates are per 100 000. The analysis used in this article (hierarchical linear model – p. 865) is quite complex. It is not necessary for the completion of this task to fully understand this model.

Source: Jean Stockard & Robert M. O'Brien (2002). Cohort Effects on Suicide Rates: International Variations. *American Sociological Review*, 67: 854-872.

Related podcast:

Suicide

- *Freakonomics* <http://www.freakonomics.com/2011/08/31/new-freakonomics-radio-podcast-the-suicide-paradox/>

Problem task 7: Groups – Part II (to be prepared in meeting 7 and discussed in meeting 8)



There are more or less strict codes for the behaviour in the public domain. For example, if you enter a bus in which only one person is sitting, you will not choose the seat directly next to this person. And in an elevator you will make sure there is enough space between you and the other persons, avoiding too close physical contact. What happens if you 'break' these codes? Is there a second-order problem here?

Sometimes, there are situations in which these behavioural codes do not hold anymore. In what kind of situations would that occur?

Related movies:

Norms:


- Male Restroom Etiquette http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5_HrzDoSHn4
- Pleasantville
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dSDm62Hmbf4>
- Free hugs
http://youtube.com/watch?v=vr3x_RRJdd4

Groups

- Hooligans:
<http://youtube.com/watch?v=JOrvmGwfbpl>
- Witness (the barn-raising scene)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Wo_VSc9iyc

Problem task 8: Networks (to be prepared in meeting 8 and discussed in meeting 9)

Romantic and sexual networks at Jefferson High



Source: Bearman, Moody and Stovel (2004). Chains of Affection: The Structure of Adolescent Romantic and Sexual Networks. *American Journal of Sociology* 110 (1): 44-91.

Discuss why it is interesting to show the romantic and sexual relationships with a network diagram? What can we learn from this perspective? Think of possible other applications.

More information on networks: <http://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/kleinber/networks-book/networks-book.pdf>

Related movies:

Networks

- *Strangers on a train*:
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1iSS5r0OVE>
- *Six degrees of freedom*:
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HLIyuYwbVnA>

Problem task 9: Conclusion (to be prepared in meeting 9 and discussed in meeting 10)

Both the article by Coleman and the concluding chapter by Hechter and Horne present a summary of the main concepts of this course. In the next meeting we will discuss how these theories and concepts can explain the historical decrease of violence.

The Decline of Violence

Source: <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=the-decline-of-violence>

By Michael Shermer | Friday, October 7, 2011 | 21

On July 22, 2011, a 32-year-old Norwegian named Anders Behring Breivik opened fire on participants in a Labour Party youth camp on the island of Utoya after exploding a bomb in Oslo, resulting in 77 dead, the worst tragedy in Norway since World War II.

English philosopher Thomas Hobbes famously argued in his 1651 book, *Leviathan*, that such acts of violence would be commonplace without a strong state to enforce the rule of law. But aren't they? What about 9/11 and 7/7, Auschwitz and Rwanda, Columbine and Fort Hood? What about all the murders, rapes and child molestation cases we hear about so often? Can anyone seriously argue that violence is in decline? They can, and they do—and they have data, compellingly compiled in a massive 832-page tome by Harvard University social scientist Steven Pinker entitled *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined* (Viking, 2011). The problem with anecdotes about single events is that they obscure long-term trends. Breivik and his ilk make front-page news for the very reason that they are now unusual. It was not always so.

Take homicide. Using old court and county records in England, scholars calculate that rates have plummeted by a factor of 10, 50 and, in some cases, 100—for example, from 110 homicides per 100,000 people per year in 14th-century Oxford to fewer than one homicide per 100,000 in mid-20th-century London. Similar patterns have been documented in Italy, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Scandinavia. The longer-term trend is even more dramatic, Pinker told me in an interview: "Violent deaths of all kinds have declined, from around 500 per 100,000 people per year in prestate societies to around 50 in the Middle Ages, to around six to eight today worldwide, and fewer than one in most of Europe." What about gun-toting Americans and our inordinate rate of homicides (currently around five per 100,000 per year) compared with other Western democracies? In 2005, Pinker computes, just eight tenths of 1 percent of all Americans died of domestic homicides and in two foreign wars combined.

As for wars, prehistoric peoples were far more murderous than states in percentages of the population killed in combat, Pinker told me: "On average, nonstate societies kill around 15 percent of their people in wars, whereas today's states kill a few hundredths of a percent." Pinker calculates that even in the murderous 20th century, about 40 million people died in war out of the approximately six billion people who lived, or 0.7 percent. Even if we include war-related deaths of citizens from disease, famine and genocide, that brings the death toll up to 180 million deaths, or about 3 percent.

Why has violence declined? Hobbes was only partially right in advocating top-down state controls to keep the worse demons of our nature in check. A bottom-up civilizing process has also been under way for centuries, Pinker explained: "Beginning in the 11th or 12th [century] and maturing in the 17th and 18th, Europeans increasingly inhibited their impulses, anticipated the long-term consequences of their actions, and took other people's thoughts and feelings into consideration. A culture of honor—the readiness to take revenge—gave way to a culture of dignity—the readiness to control one's emotions. These ideals originated in explicit instructions that cultural arbiters gave to aristocrats and noblemen,

allowing them to differentiate themselves from the villains and boors. But they were then absorbed into the socialization of younger and younger children until they became second nature."

That second nature is expressed in the unreported "10,000 acts of kindness," as the late Stephen Jay Gould memorably styled the number of typically benevolent interactions among people for every hostile act. This is the glue that binds us all in, as Abraham Lincoln so eloquently expressed it, "every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land" through "the mystic chords of memory" that have been touched again by these better angels of our nature.

Related movies:

- Stephen Pinker: The surprising decline in violence
https://www.ted.com/talks/steven_pinker_on_the_myth_of_violence

Problem task 10: Individual papers (meetings 11 and 12)

On Eleum ('course material') you can find some general guidelines how to prepare a paper ("A Guide to Academic Writing Skills") and a writing check list. These will help you in preparing your paper, especially if you are a first year student. Writing a good paper is very difficult and you should not underestimate the amount of work involved. We have provided some examples of last year's papers that we think represent good academic papers. Have a look at them and let them inspire you!

Please note that UCM has a Writing Center. The Writing Center helps students with any aspect of their writing, such as finding a topic and creating an outline, checking papers for grammar and structure, and discussing any language or writing-related issues we notice in students' papers. Students can either drop by during walk-in hours (room 2.018) or send an email to make an appointment: ucm-writingcenter@maastrichtuniversity.nl.

Here are some Do's and Don'ts that you should keep in mind.

Do's

- "Less is more": try to limit your paper to one strong argument. You should be able to formulate this message in 1 or 2 sentences. Make sure you have a consistent way of proving this argument.
- Have a good structure of the paper: it makes it easier for the reader to follow your argument if you use a standard structure like the one presented below. Also use clear headings and subheadings.
- Make sure that statements you make are backed up by other sources: e.g. "like Hannan (2007) showed in his article on .." instead of "it is well-known that ...".
- Use empirical data from trustworthy sources to make your argument stronger. This course is about combining theory with empirical research. Relate these two in your paper.
- Make sure you use adequate theories that were presented in the course: look at the editorials for a quick check whether theories can be applied or not.
- Use a reference manager, e.g. Mendeley, EndNote, etc.

Don'ts

- Avoid vague and non-academic writing style
- Don't use all the theories and concepts that might possibly relate to the topic. It is better to concentrate on the most relevant ones.
- Do not just repeat theories that you use: we have all read the book and the articles. Just refer to the theories by briefly summarising them and spend more time to elaborate how it applies in this particular situation.
- Don't get too personally involved in the topic (and if you are, don't show it). The reader is not interested in your personal feelings, but in an academic, objective and original view on the topic.

Structure your paper as follows.

Title

A catchy head title attracts attention of the reader, but be aware of overkill. A subtitle can then explain what it is about.

Introduction

Having a good introduction is essential for any good paper or article. Here the reader decides whether it is interesting or not. Catch the reader's attention and convince the reader why he/she should read the rest.

A good introduction starts with a relevant puzzle or research question for the purpose of your paper. This attracts the attention of the reader immediately. Show why the puzzle is relevant from the perspective of social order. After you have described the puzzle you raise the central question of the paper ("the central question of this paper is").

Then you are going to tell the reader *how* you will be approaching the question from a theoretical point of view and what the crucial ingredients are ("This will be explored by applying theories X and Y ...").

Then you show the main outcomes of the paper ("We will show that").

Finally, you present the set-up of the paper ("The remainder of this paper is structured as follows ...").

Description of the problem

Present an empirical description of your problem. Incorporate facts that illustrate how the problem emerged and/or what the consequences are in terms of outcomes for society.

Analysis

This is the crucial part of your paper. Show how the mechanisms and concepts which you have learned during this course help you to understand how this problem emerged or how this problem can be tackled. Be aware that not all concepts that you will learn during this course are relevant to the problem at hand. Use only those concepts that really fit within your analyses. You are encouraged to use additional literature if that is helpful for understanding the problem.

Conclusion

The conclusion (i) concludes the paper; (ii) summarizes very briefly the main findings; and (iii) presents avenues for future analysis. The central questions to be answered here are: what can be learned from this analysis? What are the implications for theory, research or policy?

References (not to be included in the 2250 Word count)

Maintain the following form.

- Journal article: Name, First name, and First name, Name (year), "Title of the paper," *Journal*, vol. X (no. Y), pp. ZZZ-ZZZ.
Example: Katz, Lawrence F., and Kevin M. Murphy (1992), "Changes in relative wages, 1963-1987: supply and demand factors," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. 107 (1), pp. 35-78.
- Book: Name, First name (year), *Title of the book*, publisher: city
Example: Helpman, Elhanan (1999), *General Purpose Technologies and Economic Growth*, MIT Press: Cambridge MA.

Maintain the following standard layout features

Line spacing: 1.5

Margins: 2.5cm everywhere

Paper size: A4

Font size: 11 pt

Page numbers: Bottom centre, roman numbers (1, ..., 11)

Alignment of text: Left or justify

Tables: Number the tables 1, ..., *n*. Each table has a self-containing title

Figures: Number the figures 1, ..., *n*. Each figure has a self-containing title

Organisation of the discussions

The aim of the sessions is to have a good discussion. We think that this is better achieved in a smaller group, leaving everybody more time to prepare and give good comments. Therefore:

- The tutorial groups will be split in half: each subgroup will only discuss their own papers

- The tutorial sessions will also be split into two: the first subgroup meeting will be in the first hour, the second subgroup meeting in the second hour.

Student's responsibilities for paper discussion

Hand in of individual paper:

- Upload on SafeAssign Monday, May 21st at 10.00 at the latest (as pdf)
- Upload your paper on the group discussion board in the folder PAPERS
- Hand in hard copy in the OSA mailbox on Monday, May 21st at 10.00 at the latest.

Student's preparation for paper discussion:

- Download and read all the papers of your subgroup before the session
- Print the papers + questions and bring them to the paper discussions.
- Your tutor will make a schedule for the discussions: half of the papers will be discussed in session 11 and the other half in session 12. You have to be present at BOTH sessions.
- Submit 1 question + 1 suggestion for improvement per paper to the tutor by email.
 - Deadline question and suggestion for Friday session → Wednesday 16:00
 - Deadline question and suggestion for Wednesday session → Monday 16:00

Problem task 11: Group presentations (meeting 13)

Present your sociological analysis (including causal relations, mechanisms and arguments) in about 15-20 minutes to the rest of your tutorial group. Each presentation will be followed by 10 minutes discussion. Structure your presentation in the following way:

- Introduction: why is this an important problem.
- Description of the problem: present some empirical data describing the problem.
- Analysis: show how the mechanisms and concepts that you learned during this course help you understand how this problem emerged or how this problem can be tackled.
- Conclusion: what can be learned from this analysis? What are the implications for theory, research or policy?

Be aware that not all concepts that you will learn during this course are relevant to the problem at hand. Use only those concepts that really fit within your analyses. You are encouraged to use additional literature if that is helpful for understanding the problem. Be aware of the danger that these topics lend themselves easily for twaddle ('borrelpraat'). However this is a scientific course and not a bar. Any use of ad-hoc and/or common-sense theorizing will be penalized!

On Eleum ('course material') you can find some general guidelines how to prepare a presentation ("Presentation Skills" and "Steps in preparing presentations").

Further reading for *Theories of Social Order*

The Problem of Social Order

- Banfield, Edward C. 1958. *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. The Free Press.
- Holldobler, Bert and Edward O. Wilson. 2008. *The Superorganism: The Beauty, Elegance, and Strangeness of Insect Societies*. W.W. Norton.
- Nossiter, Adam. 2009. "Nation in Disarray Holds Few Hopes for Vote." *New York Times*. June 28, 2009. Describes disorder in Guinea-Bissau, where the government is so weak and instability so great that even the drug traffickers have moved out.
- Wrong, Dennis. 1994. *The Problem of Order: What Unites and Divides Society*. NY: The Free Press. Surveys various approaches to the problem of order.

What is Theory?

- Hedström, Peter and Richard Swedberg, eds. 1998. *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Describes approaches to thinking about mechanisms.
- Little, D. 1991. *Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Science*. Boulder, Co: Westview Press.
- Stinchcombe, A. L. 1968. *Constructing Social Theories*. New York: Harcourt Brace & World.

Motives and Mechanisms

- Bunge, M. A. 1967. *Scientific Research*. Berlin and New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Bunge, M. A. 1997. "Mechanism and Explanation." *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 27:410-65
- Bunge, M. A. 2004. "How Does it Work?: The Search for Explanatory Mechanisms." *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 34: 182-210
- Craver, C. F. 2001. "Role Functions, Mechanisms, and Hierarchy." *Philosophy of Science* 68: 53-74.
- Machamer, P., L. Darden and C. F. Craver. 2000. "Thinking About Mechanisms." *Philosophy of Science* 67: 1-25.
- Elster J. 1983. *Explaining Technical Change: A Case Study in the Philosophy of Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Elster J. 1989. *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Elster J. 1998. "A Plea for Mechanisms", in *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory*, ed. P. Hedström and R. Swedberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Elster J. 1999. *Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hedström P., and R. Swedberg. 1996. "Social Mechanisms." *Acta Sociologica* 39: 281-308
- Hedström P., and R. Swedberg 1998. "Social Mechanisms: An Introductory Essay," in *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory*, ed. P. Hedström and R. Swedberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-31.

Individuals

The readings in this section focus on social meaning. The problem for these theorists lies not in overcoming individual self-interest, but in helping individuals to share the same understandings and, in turn, to be able to coordinate.

- Becker, Howard S. 1953. "Becoming a Marihuana User." *American Journal of Sociology* 59(3): 235-242.
- Chwe, Michael Suk-Young. 2001. *Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. A game-theoretic analysis of meaning as the production of common knowledge.
- Douglas, Mary 1966. *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. On the social construction of Hebrew dietary laws.
- Henrich, Joseph, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, and Richard McElreath. 2001. "Cooperation, Reciprocity and Punishment in Fifteen Small-scale Societies." *American Economic Review*, 91:73-78. Presents the results of field experiments in 15 cultures. The data show that groups react to the same incentive structures differently. The authors argue that people make decisions about how to behave in the experiment by comparing the experimental situation to more familiar circumstances. Their interpretation of the experimental setting varies depending on the extent to which groups depend on cooperation for economic well-being, and the extent to which people are integrated into the market.
- Mauss, Marcel. [Seasonal Variations of the Eskimo: A Study in Social Morphology](#). A classic analysis of the influence of environmental factors on social construction by Durkheim's nephew – a seminar theorist in anthropology.

Hierarchies

- Bowles, Samuel. and Herbert Gintis. 1976. *Schooling in Capitalist America*. Argues that American schools both reflect and legitimate existing economic structures, thereby maintaining inequality. Provides an empirical illustration of Marx's argument.
- Cooney, Mark. 1997. "From Warre to Tyranny: Lethal Conflict and the State." *American Sociological Review* 62: 316-338. Explicitly tests Hobbes' theory of order by describing data regarding the relation between state strength and numbers of violent deaths. Straightforward empirical application.
- Foucault, Michel. 1977. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. NY: Pantheon Books. Discusses the historical evolution of state-imposed sanctions.
- Robert O'Harrow, Jr., *No Place to Hide* (2005), an authoritative and vivid account of the emergence of a "security-industrial complex" that seeks to monitor Americans' consumption behavior for material – and potentially – political ends. Approaches Orwell's telescreen technology, if not surpassing it.
- Taylor, Michael. 1976. *Anarchy and Cooperation*. NY: Wiley. Argues that the state weakens community – thus weakening alternative sources of order and making itself more necessary.
- Useem, Bert., and Jack A. Goldstone. 2002. "Forging Social Order and its Breakdown: Riot and Reform in US Prisons." *American Sociological Review* 67:499-525. An empirical study of the determinants of prison riots. Two cases of prison reform in the 1990s had widely divergent results. New Mexico privatized several prisons and these prisons were quickly beset by multiple riots. By contrast, New York's publicly run Rikers Island prison adopted reforms that quelled violence. A state-centered (cf. Hobbes) theory of social order explains both cases, showing how prison administrators and state and national governments can create the conditions under which social order breaks down or is restored. Since prisons do not permit exit however (unlike most countries) , this study may not be readily generalizable to most other kinds of social order.

Links

- Campbell, Duncan, "Inside Echelon," a description of the National Security Agency's project to intercept and process international communications passing via communications satellites. It is one part of a global surveillance system that is now over 50 years old. Shades of Orwell's 1984 (<http://www.heise.de/bin/tpl/issue/r4/dl-artikel2.cgi?artikelnr=6929&mode=html&x=8&y=8>).

Markets

In our treatment of spontaneous order in the reader, we focus on theories that describe how the interactions of self-interested actors produce predictable, and sometimes desirable, social outcomes. The spontaneous order approach, however, incorporates a variety of evolutionary arguments.

One type of argument focuses on the evolution of physical traits. For evolutionary psychologists, the brain, like any other body part, is subject to evolution. Thus, by thinking about the environment in which human beings evolved, we can gain insight into how the brain works. Those traits that were adaptive in the environment in which the bulk of human evolution occurred were selected for and can be observed in people today (though they are no longer necessarily adaptive). With better understanding of these traits, we can develop superior explanations of social behavior. Here, biological/genetic evolution is used to explain universal human characteristics that in turn can help to understand social phenomena.

Other scholars take the mechanisms at work in genetic evolution and apply them to explain social phenomena. Just as physical traits that are not adaptive die out, so do social practices. Those practices that are adaptive persist, those that are not fade. The extent to which these kinds of arguments apply to groups and not simply to individuals is disputed. Traditionally, genetic evolutionary arguments treat the individual as the unit of selection. Those individuals who carry non-adaptive traits die. Those individuals with adaptive traits survive and reproduce, thus passing on their traits to the next generation. Some researchers argue that a similar approach can also explain group traits. That is, those groups that have adaptive practices will survive while those whose practices are dysfunctional will fail.

Finally, some scholars argue that social practices can better be explained by models of cultural evolution – not by transplanted genetic evolution arguments. For these scholars, practices and ideas are transmitted from person to person. In a pure genetic model, individual actors are “born” with a trait; those with non-adaptive traits die. In cultural models, individual actors learn and change over the course of their life. As a result of their interactions, they may shift from holding non-adaptive beliefs, practices, and so forth to adhering to others that produce superior outcomes. While genetic and cultural models have many similarities, they may produce different predictions.

Each of these types of evolutionary explanations falls within the family of spontaneous order approaches. The list of supplemental reading includes examples.

- Alchian, Armen. 1950. "Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory." *Journal of Political Economy* 58:211-221. Argues that profit maximization is impossible under uncertainty. Hence, social scientists ought not to rely on internal states (motives) for their analysis; instead, in the face of uncertainty, success is most likely attained by imitating those who are already successful.
- Casti, John. Complexity – An Introduction. p. 1-35. at http://once-cs.csregistry.org/tiki-download_wiki_attachment.php?attId=405. Offers a typology of simple and complex systems.
- De Waal, Frans. 1996. *Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Argues that norms arise in the course of biological evolution.
- Friedman, Benjamin M. 2005. *The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Argues that economic growth increases generosity and is essential for healthy society.
- Henrich, Joseph and Natalie Henrich. 2007. *Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Johnson, Steven. 2001. *Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities, and Software*. New York: Scribner. Describes many contexts in which interaction leads to predictable patterns.

- Lyall, Sarah, 2005. "A Path to Safety with no Signposts," *New York Times*, January 22: 4. Discusses the work of Hans Monderman, a Dutch traffic engineer who uses principles of spontaneous order to create designs that improve traffic conditions in Friesland. His ideas are being adopted in a number of European countries.
- Macy, Michael W. and John Skvoretz. 1998. "The Evolution of Trust and Cooperation among Strangers: A Computational Model." *American Sociological Review* 63(5): 638-660. Uses a genetic evolution approach to explore the emergence of cooperation and trust among strangers.
- Macy, Michael W. and Robert Willer. 2002. "From Factors to Actors: Computational Sociology and Agent-Based Modeling." *Annual Review of Sociology* 28: 143-166. Reviews the sociological use of agent-based models (computer simulations) to explain emergent social structure and social order.
- Mark, Noah. 2003. "The Cultural Evolution of Cooperation." *American Sociological Review* 67(3): 323-344. Uses a cultural evolution approach to explain cooperation.
- Polanyi, Karl. 1943. *The Great Transformation*. Boston: Beacon Press. Classic theoretical and empirical critique of the theory of spontaneous order as applied to the laissez-faire policies of early nineteenth-century Britain.
- Scott, James C. 1998. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. Argues that state-led attempts to engage in social engineering -- to rationalize and deconstruct spontaneous orders, replacing them with planned orders -- are doomed to fail.
- Wilson, David Sloan. *Darwin's Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Supports group selection approaches. Argues that religion -- that is, a complex system of norms -- is adaptive for groups and that it results from evolutionary pressures.

Links

- The Santa Fe Institute. www.santafe.edu/index.html. A multidisciplinary research center with a focus on emergence processes.
- Human Behavior and Evolution Society. www.hbes.com. An interdisciplinary group of scholars who rely on evolutionary approaches to understand human nature.
- Society for Evolutionary Analysis of Law (S.E.A.L.) <http://law.vanderbilt.edu/seal/>. An interdisciplinary group of scholars with an interest in law, biology, and evolution.
- <http://www.princeton.edu/~icouzin/>. Iain Couzin looks at how the actions of individuals intersect to produce macro-level patterns across species.

Groups

- Anderson, Elijah. 1999. *Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City*. NY: WW Norton. Argues that violence in the inner-city is regulated by a "code of the streets." In order to survive, kids must learn and comply with this code.
- Angier, Natalie. 2002. "Why We're So Nice: We're Wired to Cooperate." *New York Times*. July 23, 2002. Discusses research showing that cooperation stimulates the same part of the brain that responds to positive things like good food and money. The original study can be found in James K. Rilling, David A. Gutman, Thorsten R. Zeh, Giuseppe Pagnoni, Gregory S. Berns, and Clinton D. Kilts. 2002. "A Neural Basis for Cooperation." *Neuron* 35(2): 395-405.
- Benedict, Ruth. 1946. *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Discusses two alternative solutions to the problem of order. Shame societies (such as Japan) rely extensively on external sanctions to promote compliance; guilt societies (such as the USA) rely much more on internalized norms to promote compliance. Note that shame societies would have to presuppose low privacy, and low monitoring costs. Guilt societies would be better adapted to societies that place a greater value on privacy (hence: have higher monitoring costs). The Protestant Reformation probably increased the value of privacy (cf.

Durkheim's Suicide). Benedict's analysis was carried out in order to aid the American occupiers of Japan in their efforts to bring about social order in the immediate postwar period. See <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/19/arts/19RUTH.html?ex=1059636574&ei=1&en=246a59522dae7c> for a discussion of the relevance of her book to the task of bringing social order to contemporary Iraq.

- Bicchieri, Cristina. 2007. *The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Braithwaite, John. 1989. *Crime, Shame and Reintegration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Attempts to explain why Japan has so little crime. He argues that shaming is pervasive in Japan (as Benedict claims), but that there are at least two forms of shaming. Japanese society offers deviants a means of reintegration after they have taken responsibility for their deviance. This is in contrast to the USA, where shaming is stigmatized.
- Brosnan, Sarah F. and Frans B. M. De Waal. 2003. "**Monkeys reject unequal pay.**" *Nature* 425: 297–299. Shows that female capuchin monkeys resist unequal rewards in an experimental setting. "A monkey willing to perform a task for a cucumber may refuse to do so if its partner is given a tasty grape. 'It's not fair,' the complaint of children the world over, is the message. In balking at this unequal pay, the monkey is surely being irrational, rejecting food that is on offer. But the negative emotion of 'unfairness' and the refusal to accept inequitable situations has been a positive influence in the long-term development of human society, and the same evolutionary pressures seem to have prevailed in other primates as well (taken from the abstract)." On this basis, the authors suggest that the norm of fairness is evolved, rather than socially constructed. For a description of this research, see <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/18/science/18MONK.html?ex=1064897764&ei=1&en=3730e53e5f5b6e3a>
- For an eloquent statement of the normative basis of social order, see Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790; many modern editions in paperback).
- Cancian, Francesca M 1975. *What are Norms? A Study of Beliefs and Action in a Maya Community*. NY: Cambridge University Press. Argues that norms are statements about identities and examines the actions that are appropriate for those identities.
- Coleman, James S. 1988. "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital." *American Journal of Sociology* 94: S95-S120. Describes the concept of social capital and the conditions that create it.
- De Waal, Frans. 1996. *Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. An examination of norms among higher animals.
- Durkheim, Émile. "Value Judgments and Judgments of Reality." In *Sociology and Philosophy* 90-97.
- Durkheim, Emile. [1893]. 1984. Preface to the Second Edition of *The Division of Labor in Society*.
- Elias, Norbert. [1939] 1994. *The Civilizing Process*. Provides an interesting discussion of the evolution of manners from late medieval Europe to the age of Absolutism.
- Ellickson, Robert C. 1991. *In Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Shows how cattle ranchers in Shasta County, California resolve disputes according to informal norms without turning to the law.
- Elster, Jon. 1989. *The Cement of Society*. New York: Cambridge University Press: 125-151. Presents the controversial idea that norms are more than commonplace incentives affecting individual action because they exercise a particularly strong grip on the mind.
- Erikson, Kai. 1994. "The Ojibway of Grassy Narrows." In *A New Species of Trouble: Explorations in Disaster, Trauma, and Community*. NY: WW Norton. Environmental degradation and government policies lead to community breakdown. Illustrates Durkheim's theory of suicide.
- Garfinkel, Harold. 1967. *Studies in Ethnomethodology*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Ch. 2 presents a method ('breaching experiments') of uncovering the taken-for-granted norms that govern informal social interactions. An intriguing analysis of the normative issues involved in changing one's sex and gender identity is in Ch. 4.

- Gintis, Herbert. 2003. "Solving the Puzzle of Prosociality." *Rationality and Society* 15:155-187. Attempts to provide a formal (e.g. mathematical) model that explains the internalization of norms. A rather technical presentation.
- Hechter, Michael. 1987. *Principles of Group Solidarity*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Identifies characteristics of groups that lead to greater solidarity.
- Hechter, Michael and Karl-Dieter Opp. 2001. *Social Norms*. NY: Russell Sage. Includes overview chapters describing sociological, legal, economic, and game theoretic approaches to understanding social norms. Also includes chapters providing explanations for a variety of substantive norms ranging from polygamy to national self-determination.
- Horne, Christine. 2009. *The Rewards of Punishment: A Relational Theory of Norm Enforcement*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Identifies factors and mechanisms that lead people to enforce social norms.
- Kanazawa, Satoshi. 2001. "De Gustibus Est Disputandum." *Social Forces* 79(3): 1131-1162. Argues that evolutionary psychology may provide an explanation for the origin of universally held values.
- Mackie, Gerry. 1996. "Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention Account." *American Sociological Review* 61:999-1017. Discusses the reproduction of norms. Whereas female genital mutilation in Africa persists despite modernization, public education, and legal prohibition, in China, footbinding lasted for 1,000 years but ended in a single generation. Mackie shows that each of these practices is a norm that is maintained by interdependent expectations on the marriage market.
- Miller, Allan and Satoshi Kanazawa. 2000. *Order by Accident*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. pp. 23-37. Explains the relatively high degree of social order in contemporary Japan by the high solidarity of its constituent groups.
- Miller, William Ian. 1990. "Feud, Vengeance and the Disputing Process." In *Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law, and Society in Saga Iceland*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Describes how group loyalties contribute to the maintenance of order in the context of a minimal state in 13th century Iceland.
- In 2002, nine miners were trapped underground for days in a collapsed coal mine in Pennsylvania. Their rescue was little short of miraculous, and their rescuers were lauded by a grateful nation. Shortly less than a year afterward, one of the lead rescuers committed suicide. For a recent, dramatic illustration of anomic suicide, see the following article from the New York Times Magazine, 7/27/03.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/19/arts/19RUTH.html?ex=1059636574&ei=1&en=246a59522dae7c>
- For an example of how norms strongly differ even across advanced industrial societies, see the description of the Finnish norm of stoicism in <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/11/international/europe/11HELS.html?ex=1080019516&ei=1&en=6684daba9e029fd6>. This article shows, for example, that whereas 90% of American women opt to use epidurals during childbirth (thereby minimizing pain), 80% of Finnish women do not.
- Parsons, Talcott. 1935. "The Place of Ultimate Values in Sociological Theory."
- Portes, Alejandro. 1998. "Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology." *Annual Review of Sociology* 24: 1-24. Discusses the concept of social capital and its origins. Identifies ways in which social capital may lead to undesirable outcomes rather than contribute to group welfare.
- Putnam, Robert. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Uses the concept of social capital to explain regional variation in political and economic well-being.
- Putnam, Robert (2007), E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the 21st Century, *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 30, 2, 137-174. Discusses the short and long term impact of ethnic diversity.

- Sampson, Robert J., Stephen W. Raudenbush, and Felton Earls. 1997. "Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy." *Science* 277:918-924. Argues that neighborhoods with "collective efficacy" are better able to control criminal behavior.
- Tsai, Lily L. 2007. *Accountability without Democracy*. Cambridge University Press. Explains how groups like temples, churches, and lineages, contribute to the ability of villages to provide services – roads, schools, running water, and so forth.
- Ullmann-Margalit, Edna. 1977. *The Emergence of Norms*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Develops a game theoretic account of norm emergence.
- Weber, Steven. 2004. *The Success of Open Source*. Harvard University Press. Suggests that the development of open source software (such as Linux) suggests the poverty of conventional rational choice accounts of social order that rely on incentives (flowing from property rights) to motivate contributions.

Links

- The Norms and Preferences Network. www.umass.edu/preferen
- An interdisciplinary team of economists and anthropologists are conducting experiments in cultures around the world. Their work shows that people from different cultures respond differently to the same material incentive structures.
- The Bowling Alone Website (contains data on trends in voluntary association membership in the United States). <http://www.bowlingalone.com>
- [This New York Times article argues that human beings and animals have always imposed taxes on group members.](#)

Networks

A contemporary version of the groups and networks approach focuses on the importance of social capital. Social capital and related concepts such as collective efficacy and cohesion are used to explain a range of social phenomena – educational outcomes, economic well-being, political vitality, crime, and so forth. The list of supplemental readings includes pieces focusing specifically on social capital, as well as other work relevant to the groups and networks approach more generally.

- Bearman, Peter S., James Moody, and Katherine Stovel. 2004. "Chains of Affection: The Structure of Adolescent Romantic and Sexual Networks." *American Journal of Sociology* 110(1):44-91.
- Blau, Peter and Joseph Schwartz. 1997. *Crosscutting Social Circles: Testing a Macrostructural Theory of Intergroup Relations*. Transaction Publishers.
- Burt, Ronald S. 2004. "Structural Holes and Good Ideas." *American Journal of Sociology* 110:349-399.
- Collins, Randall. 1998. *The Sociology of Philosophies*. Belknap Press.
- A good book on Networks is: D. Easley and Jon Kleinberg: *Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World*. <http://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/kleinber/networks-book/networks-book.pdf>
- An article from the New York Times explains that the American army has asked tribal leaders in the Sunni Triangle of Iraq to help them provide social order. However, after Saddam Hussein destroyed indirect rule – the network of tribal groups that was historically responsible for the maintenance of much social order in Iraq – tribal leaders no longer have the authority to control their members. Thus, they claim that they are unable to help.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/11/international/middleeast/11FALL.html?ex=1069565839&ei=1&en=3e1e5cd32633703a>

- McPherson, Miller, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and Matthew Brashears. 2006. "Social Isolation in America: Changes in Core Discussion Networks over Two Decades." *American Journal of Sociology* 71(3):353-375.
- Putnam, Robert. 2000. *Bowling Alone*. NY: Simon and Schuster. Pp. 18-24. Discussion of bridging and bonding social capital.
- Varshney, Ashutosh. 2002. *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life*. New Haven, Yale University Press. Provides evidence that cross-cutting ties foster social order by showing that Hindu/Muslim violence is minimized in Indian cities in which there is intergroup participation in voluntary associations, and maximized in Indian cities having segregated membership in voluntary associations.
- Watts, Duncan. 2004. *Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age*. W.W. Norton.