

European Foreign Policy

Code: SSC3002

Spring 2018



SSC3002 European Foreign Policy Spring 2018

Contents

General Information

Objectives	2
Description of the course	2
Essential Reading	2
Course coordinator	2
Assessment	3
Instructions for the writing assignment	3
Criteria for paper assessment	4
Course Schedule	5

Assignments

Section 1: Institutions, Processes & Policies	6
1). What is European foreign policy and how do you analyze it?	6
2). Institutional Framework & the Member states	8
3). Common Defense Policy & Homeland Security	10
4). EU as a Trade Power	12
5). Enlargement and ENP	14
 Section 2: Relations with important regions & states	 16
6). USA	16
7). Russia	18
8). Developing World	20
9). Emerging Economies	22
10). Evaluation & Consideration of the Future	24

Endnotes	26
-----------------	-----------

Objectives

The main objectives of this course are to understand the complexity of European Foreign Policy, to understand the political-institutional process in which the policy is made and finally to grasp its content.

Description of the course

The course is divided into two sections. The first section will start with a focus on the importance of European Foreign Policy for foreign policy analysis. It will also consider what theories in International Relations apply to European Foreign Policy. This section will then move on to consider the institutional framework of the EU's foreign policy, the role of the Member States in the formation of policy and then finally consider in more detail the main policies themselves within the realm of external relations. The main policy areas include Common Defense and Homeland Security Policy, Economic and Trade Policy and Enlargement Policy.

The second section deals with the important regions and particular states that the European Union has established strong foreign policy relationships. These important regions and states include the U.S.A., Russia, the Developing world and Emerging Economies. The second section ends with a consideration of the EU's future role as a global player.

Essential reading

Christopher Hill, Michael Smith, and Sophie Vanhoonacker. 2017. *International Relations and the European Union*. Third Edition. Oxford University Press.
ISBN: 9780198737322

E-readers as listed on the Blackboard environment.

Course coordinator

Dr. Roberta Haar
UCM, Zwingelput 4
Room 1.040
Roberta.haar@maastrichtuniversity.nl

Assessment

Students will have two opportunities of assessment, via a written exam and a research paper. Each will be worth 50% of the final grade. The final exam will take place in last week of the course.

As stipulated in the student handbook, attendance is 85% compulsory. As the course has 11 scheduled meetings, students can have 2 valid misses. Please do not be late for class; it is not fair to your peers who arrive on time.

The resit will be an exam for those students who failed the final exam and a new research paper assignment for those students who failed the paper. Students who fail both the research paper and the exam will have to resit both. Resits will only be available to students who have complied with the attendance requirement and completed all the assignments. The resit week is 2-6 July 2018; check the schedule as published by the Office of Student Affairs.

Instructions for the writing assignment

Papers should be 3,000 words. This does not include references, the title page or the bibliography. **Papers are due Monday 14 May 2018 at 16:00.** Submit a hard copy to the Office of Student Affairs and a virtual copy to Safe Assignment. Late papers will not be graded. Students should also be aware that plagiarism would result in a failing grade. **Students must also have at least 10 academic sources and have their paper topic approved one week prior to the due date (7 May 2018).**

Criteria for paper assessment

10-8.0 Excellent: An outstanding answer. The essay is well written, logical and clear. It contains evidence of a wide knowledge of the subject matter. It combines a good understanding of theoretical issues and empirical applications, with some originality of approach. The essay presents ideas that are logically developed and carefully formulated. Its arguments are clear and accurate. The use of concepts, theories or research findings is precise and accurate. The essay builds from current theory and empirical work to reflect originality and insight in the student's thinking and analysis.

7.9-7.0 Good: A reasonably comprehensive and well-organized answer. The argument presented is clear and logical, with evidence of having understood the issues and an ability to think about them effectively. The essay states ideas and develops its topic clearly, logically and adequately. Its ideas are supported with arguments that are clear and accurate. Its use of concepts, theories or research findings is largely precise, although there may be a few minor factual errors or inaccuracies.

6.9-6.0 Satisfactory: This mark reflects an essay that is adequately organized and a full answer to the question. It is mostly accurate, but limited in scope and does not express any real development of argument. The essay is a satisfactory response to the assignment. Its central ideas are expressed and developed clearly enough to be understood by the reader. Although the essay may seem correct, it lacks the originality and clarity of thought that would entitle it to an above average grade. The use of concepts, theories or research findings may reflect more than minor inaccuracies, such as basic factual errors or errors of omission. It shows some grasp of theory and its relation to empirical data, but with little insight or grasp of wider issues.

5.9-5.5 Pass: This essay shows evidence of course reading, but it is deficient in organization and scope. The information it contains is insufficient. The essay indicates below average achievement in the development of its ideas, which may be unclear or supported illogically or inconsistently. Its use of concepts, theories or research may contain errors, omissions and irrelevancies. It shows no grasp of theory and its relation to empirical data, and it has little insight or grasp of wider issues.

5.4-0.0 Fail: This essay shows little evidence of course reading, it is deficient in organization and scope. Its ideas are poorly developed and are not sufficiently supported. It may also contain numerous errors, omissions and irrelevancies.

Course Schedule

<u>Week 1</u>	9-13 April 2018	<u>Assignment</u>
Lecture: Dr. R. Haar, “European Security Architecture”		
First meeting		start 1
Second meeting		finish 1 & start 2
<u>Week 2</u>	16-20 April 2018	
Lecture: Dr. Hylke Dijkstra, “Theories of European Foreign Policy Cooperation”		
Third meeting		finish 2 & start 3
Fourth meeting		finish 3 & start 4
<u>Week 3</u>	23-27 April 2018	
Lecture: Dr. R. Haar, “EU Enlargement & ENP Policies”		
Fifth meeting		finish 4 & start 5
<u>Week 4</u>	30 April-4 May 2018	
Lecture: Dr. R. Haar, “Transatlantic Relations”		
Sixth meeting		finish 5 & start 6
Seventh meeting		finish 6 & start 7
<u>Week 5</u>	7-11 May 2018	
Eighth meeting		finish 7 & start 8
<u>Week 6</u>	14-18 May 2018	
Papers due: Monday 14 May at 16:00		
Lecture: Dr. Tom Casier, “The EU and Russia”		
Ninth meeting		finish 8 & start 9
Tenth meeting		finish 9 & start 10
<u>Week 7</u>	21-25 May 2018	
Eleventh meeting		finish 9 & start 10
<u>Week 8</u>	28 May – 1 June 2018	
Final Exam		

Section 1: Institutions and Processes

Assignment 1 What is European foreign policy and how do you analyze it?

“There is already an extensive literature on the EC/EU-as-international-actor theme which finds a natural home within an FPA [foreign policy analysis] perspective. Scholars have been careful not to assume that the EU is a state but, as Jeremy Richardson argues, the EU is state-like in the sense that it has acquired for itself the policy-making attributes of a state across an increasingly wide range of policy sectors. It already constitutes both a policy and a system of governance. Without using familiar state-centric language, however, scholars have struggled to describe the actor qualities of the EU and to analyze the degree of ‘actorness.’”¹

“EFP [European foreign policy] as a system of foreign policymaking is a collective enterprise through which national actors conduct partly common, and partly separate, international actions. A decision-making system offers a useful and neutral characterization of EFP. It breaks free of debates over whether or not the EU can have a foreign policy and over whether liberalism or realism is the theory of choice. Since interpretations that focus exclusively on either intergovernmental or supranational features are ‘grossly misleading,’ EFP is better seen as a form of ‘European governance in the field of foreign policy.’”²

“The very development of EU foreign policy over the last two decades runs counter to the neorealist argument that, since foreign, security and defense policy lie at the heart of national sovereignty, states will not integrate in these fields and an international organization itself cannot have a foreign policy...In contrast to rationalist accounts of EU foreign policy, constructivism focuses on immaterial dimensions such as ideas, values, norms and identity...These are considered not only as influencing EU foreign policy, but also as providing the constitutive element of EU foreign policy...it hinges on the emergence of a shared understanding among EU member states’ elites and populations about what should be the EU’s role in the world and about what values it should sustain, promote and defend.”³

Readings

Christopher Hill, Michael Smith, and Sophie Vanhoonacker. 2017. *International Relations and the European Union*. Third Edition. Oxford University Press. Chapters 1-3 & 20.

White, Brian. (1999). "The European Challenge to Foreign Policy Analysis." *European Journal of International Relations*. 5: 1, pp. 37-66.

Assignment 2 Institutional Framework and the Member States

The EU has a complex institutional framework that implements its international policy. This framework includes the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. These institutions also influence the main policy areas, which will be discussed in the upcoming assignments (Common Defense and Homeland Security Policy; Trade and Global Economic Policy; and, Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy).

We also cannot understand European foreign policy making without the consideration of the separate policies of the Member States. However, it is also true that Member States' national foreign policies have greatly changed because of their EU membership—a process called Europeanization. For example, Great Britain historically wanted to strengthen the European contribution to NATO and to maintain a strong U.S. commitment to European security. However, over time Britain's membership in the EU has greatly influenced its foreign policy, especially its foreign economic policy. One can identify two important changes in British foreign policy that have come about because of its EU membership. First, Britain's foreign policy agenda has changed. The range of issues has expanded, which has in turn blurred the boundaries between foreign and domestic policy. The change in Britain's foreign policy agenda leads to the second important change: an increase in the institutional players and domestic actors involved in making foreign policy. These changes have led some, like Brian White, to speculate whether one can still identify a distinctive area of British foreign policy.⁴ White points to the omnipresence of the European context for British policy makers.

“Here are three factors that make the life of Catherine Ashton, the European Union's new foreign policy chief, pretty complicated.

First, most EU countries do not really have foreign policies. They have neighbourhood policies, which may or may not drag them into some nasty spats that make little sense to outsiders. Inasmuch as they have foreign policy machines, they are designed to extract the maximum advantage from relations with a handful of big powers, like America, Russia and China. Some may have former colonies, where they can play at being superpowers (just think of Belgium in the Congo). But ask them to opine about Sudan, Iran, North Korea or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and they have not much to say. In the words of one senior EU official, one of the great skills of Javier Solana, Baroness Ashton's predecessor, was to craft some line on the Middle East, the Balkans or whatever, and to convince most EU countries that whatever he was proposing had actually been their policy all along.

Secondly, a handful of EU countries have ambitions to be something like great powers: either globally, like France and Britain, or regionally, like Spain in Latin America. Then there are big countries which feel they have vital foreign policy interests to defend, even if they do not have strategic visions to promote: think of Germany's ties to Russia. Though Lady Ashton cannot afford to be seen as taking orders from the EU's big beasts, she must surely know if she forges too autonomous a line, and cuts across London, Paris or Berlin, she risks a sharp tug on the leash.

Finally, a lot of people are setting considerable store by Lady Ashton bringing one particular big beast—her own country, Britain—to the European security and defence

policy (ESDP) table. There are many reasons she ended up being appointed to this rather terrifying job: she was a member of the Party of European Socialists, she was a woman, and her prime minister, Gordon Brown, needed a big job to brandish right away in return for dropping Britain's support for Tony Blair for the post of President of the European Council. But one of the biggest reasons for her surprise appointment is that there was a strong feeling among many EU governments that it would be a good idea to choose someone British."⁵

"Mogherini does what she can. She is more accomplished at maneuvering inside the Brussels bubble than was her British predecessor...But Mogherini can only operate within the limits of the possible when national interests dictate different outcomes, varying coalitions, and contradictory policies. She has been absent on Putin and Ukraine, where Merkel has done all of the diplomatic heavy lifting...The Ukraine crisis shows the failings of EU soft power when confronted with old-fashioned military bludgeoning."⁶

Readings

Christopher Hill, Michael Smith, and Sophie Vanhoonacker. 2017. *International Relations and the European Union*. Third Edition. Oxford University Press. Chapters 4, 5 & 7.

Assignment 3 Common Defense and Security Policy

“Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm.”

-Belgian Foreign Minister, Mark Eyskens, 1992⁷

“Paradoxically, Europeans have spent much of the past decade defending a European security system that their own governments realize is dysfunctional.”

- European Council on Foreign Relations November 2012⁸

“It should be borne in mind that none of the activities subsumed under ‘crisis management intervention’ has anything to do with European defence per se. Collective defence remains, in all official discourse, the responsibility of NATO. The EU27, in 2008, nevertheless spent \$301 billion on ‘defence,’ less than half the US defence budget for that year of \$696 billion....The collective EU spend is equivalent to the combined defence budgets of the eight next biggest defence spenders (China, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, India, Brazil, South Korea, and Australia: \$289,108), which include all the ‘rising powers.’ And yet the EU gets very little bang for its euros.”⁹

“The EU itself sometimes displays a puppyish eagerness to have its military pretensions stroked: ‘Please, please, don’t just look at us as a big free-trade area,” pleaded Federica Mogherini, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs, at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore last year. She insisted that the EU is also ‘a foreign-policy community, a security and defense provider.’ Its diplomats like to boast of the success of Operation Atalanta, in which, since 2008, an EU naval force has helped protect ships off the Horn of Africa from pirates.”¹⁰

“The EU should take Donald Trump’s arrival as U.S. president as a major wake-up call to upgrade its foreign and security policies. Trump’s comments on foreign policy during the election campaign suggest he might bring the most significant rupture in the transatlantic order since World War II. His transactional approach to long-standing alliance commitments and skepticism about trade liberalization could cause the United States to stop serving as the anchor of the liberal world order, at least for the next four years.”¹¹

Readings

Bailes, A. (2008) “The EU and a ‘Better world’: what role for the European Security and Defence Policy?” *International Affairs* 84: 1 pp. 115-130.

Duke, Simon. 2018. “The Enigmatic Role of Defense in the EU: From EDC to EDU?” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 23: 1 pp. 63-80.

Howorth, Jolyon, 2014. *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*. 2nd edition. Palgrave. pps. 70-91.

Christopher Hill, Michael Smith, and Sophie Vanhoonacker. 2017. *International Relations and the European Union*. Third Edition. Oxford University Press. Chapters 15 & 16.

Hooft Paul van. 2017. “Big plus small plus small.” *Atlantisch Perspectief*, No. 3, pp. 24-28.

Schilde, Kaija, 2017. “European Military Capabilities: Enablers and Constraints on EU.” *Power? Journal of Common Market Studies* 55: 1. pp. 37–53

Additional Reading

Duke, Simon. (2009). “Consensus building in ESDP: The lessons of Operation Artemis.” *International Politics* 46, pp. 395–412.

Haar, Roberta. (2000). “The Kosovo Crisis and its Consequences for a European Security Architecture.” In *Kosovo: Lessons Learned for International Cooperative Security*, ed. Kurt R. Spillmann and Joachim Krause. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, pp. 103-126.

Techau, Jan. 2015. “The Politics of 2 Percent: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe.” Carnegie Europe, September.

Whitman, Richard G. and Wolff, Stefan. (2010). “The EU as a conflict manager? The case of Georgia and its implications.” *International Affairs* 86: 1, pp. 87–107.

Assignment 4

Trade and Global Economic Policy

Today the EU has the largest internal market in the world, which includes 500 million people. In terms of gross domestic product, it rivals the power of the United States' share of the world total GDP. Europeans have also found themselves in the chairs that make important economic policy decisions. For example, four of the members of the G8 group of rich countries and two-thirds of the members of the OECD are European. Additionally, Europeans hold over 30 % of the voting rights in the postwar financial and monetary institutions created at Bretton Woods (the IMF and the World Bank). Indeed, within these institutions, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy have more power than big emerging market economies such as China, India and Brazil. Jean Pisani-Ferry, the head of Bruegel, a think tank in Brussels, points out "the potential power of the EU25 in the IMF is 50% higher than its voting weight. Add to this, by tradition, the Managing Director of the IMF is a European.

"The Americans should not think they are going to make us (Europeans) buckle under, because there have to be balanced concessions between the two elephants on the world market."

- Jacques Delors on the GATT trade negotiations, October 1992¹²

"More broadly, the ruling confirms that Brussels is becoming the world's regulatory capital...One American official says flatly that the EU is 'winning' the regulatory race, adding: 'And there is a sense that that is their precise intent.' He cites a speech by the trade commissioner, Peter Mandelson, claiming that the export of 'our rules and standards around the world,' was one source of European power."¹³

"Despite decades of intervention in their own markets, the EU, both at the WTO and through its own bilateral trade agreements, is not supporting developing country initiatives...coupled with the EU's extensive subsidy regime, the EU 'won' the top place in Oxfam's 'Double Standards Index'—which sought to gauge the gap between the rhetoric of free trade and the reality of trade protectionism of the major trade powers."¹⁴

"Climate change poses a very different challenge because of the high economic stakes involved if effective action is to be taken and because of the ways in which it impacts upon the security of the Union. Most particularly it conjoins environmental and energy policy. In the initial stages of involvement in the climate regime the EU was able to claim leadership without the assistance of an internal carbon tax and to agree the Kyoto Protocol under the rather favourable circumstances of the burden-sharing agreement."¹⁵

Readings

Elgström, Ole. 2007. "Outsiders' Perceptions of the European Union in International Trade Negotiations." *Journal of Common Market Studies* vol. 45 (4): pp. 949-967.

Christopher Hill, Michael Smith, and Sophie Vanhoonacker. 2017. *International Relations and the European Union*. Third Edition. Oxford University Press. Chapters 10, 11 & 12.

Assignment 5 Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy

“Since the end of the Cold War debates about Europeanness, of who are and who are not members of this privileged category have been intimately tied to membership of the European Union. In the early part of the 1990s, idealism about creating a ‘Europe whole and free’ was widespread and was closely associated with EU enlargement. As we know, turning rhetoric into reality has been a slow process and following the 2004 enlargement, questions about the EU’s (and hence Europe’s) final borders—which have never been far from the surface—have become matters of considerable debate at both political and popular levels. This has been particularly evident in the debate over Turkey’s possible future membership, which has left people raising questions as to what the characteristics of Europeanness are and whether they are culturally, racially, religiously or geographically grounded.

Beyond concerns over preserving particular essentialized notions of ‘European’ identity, there have also been concerns over the need to preserve the significant gains of the European project. Enlargement fatigue has been accompanied by worries that the recent expansion to 27 members may turn the EU into a bureaucratic dinosaur and further undermine the democratic legitimacy of the Union. In this respect, the desire to draw the final borders of (EU) Europe has become a matter of existential importance for many in the Union, the belief being that continued expansion will not only make the Union unworkable, but may actually threaten its durability....

...Questions of the Union’s borders, however, cannot be separated from questions regarding the Union’s security. This is particularly so since the EU has explicitly used the promise of future membership in order to promote stability along its borders. Drawing ‘final’ borders therefore poses the EU with a dilemma of how it will promote stability and security in its neighbouring regions if the carrot of enlargement is no longer available. The EU’s current answer to these issues, of where to draw the final borders of the Union and how to promote security and stability beyond that border, have been presented in its developing European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).”¹⁶

Readings

Berk, Simone. 2013. "Why were Romania and Bulgaria allowed to access the EU even though the countries did not meet the Copenhagen criteria." UCM Student paper, European Foreign Policy.

Christopher Hill, Michael Smith, and Sophie Vanhoonacker. 2017. *International Relations and the European Union*. Third Edition. Oxford University Press. Chapter 14.

Johansson- Nogués. 2018. "The EU's ontological (in)security: Stabilising the ENP area ... and the EU-self?" *Cooperation and Conflict*. pp. 1–17, DOI: 10.1177/0010836717750197

Section 2: Important regions and states

Assignment 6

U.S.A.

“...The United States rarely ever began major diplomatic efforts with the French, although it never excluded them. This reflected the peculiarities of the Franco-American relationship. French politics (and culture) had long been tinged by anti-Americanism. France’s continued refusal to rejoin NATO’s integrated military command (a Gaullist legacy from 1966), its snide comments about the American ‘hyperpower’ and its portrayal of the European Union as a potential competitor to the United States suggested at the least a deep ambivalence about the transatlantic connection....dealing with France meant dealing with a professed ally that often defined its power and prestige in opposition to the United States.”¹⁷

“Responding to the U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s famous dismissal of France and Germany as ‘old Europe,’ the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk wrote: ‘old Europe, honourably represented by France and Germany, is the advanced faction of the West, which, learning the lessons of the twentieth century, has turned to a post-heroic cultural style, and a corresponding policy; the United States, by contrast, is stuck in the conventions of heroism.’”¹⁸

“More generally, there is no consensus or single line in Washington about ESDP. Indeed, a survey of the relevant literature reveals at least three ‘American’ positions:

- (i) That ESDP is no more than a ‘paper tiger’ with little real long-term potential – hence it should be ignored.
- (ii) That ESDP is a potential rival that will move ‘Europe’ outside US control – hence it should be opposed.
- (iii) That it has the potential to become a robust or useful partner that will assist the US in addressing security threats—hence it should be encouraged.”¹⁹

“It is unsatisfactory that 450 million European rely so much on 250 million Americans to defend them. There is no such thing as a free defence.”²⁰

“Keeping the Europeans on board in Afghanistan and furnishing them with airlift and other means of transport proved so arduous and time-consuming that some former American defense officials, upon leaving government, questioned whether it had been worth all the trouble, if the Europeans weren’t going to fight anyway. The NATO mission in Afghanistan was formally called ISAF, shorthand for International Security Assistance Force. Some European intellectuals, joking about their countries’ reluctance to put troops in harm’s way, confided that ISAF really stood for “Interested in Seeing Americans Fight.”²¹

“In total, more than 180,000 European companies export to the U.S. today, and almost 90 percent of them are smaller firms with less than 250 employees. These companies would be the first beneficiaries of improved trade relations between the EU and the U.S.”²²

Readings

Duke, Simon and Roberta Haar. (2015). "A Reassessment of Transatlantic Security: Europe, the United States and NATO." In *Europe Today*. Edited by Erik Jones. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.; 5th edition. **(hard copies to be made available by the tutor).**

Christopher Hill, Michael Smith, and Sophie Vanhoonacker. 2017. *International Relations and the European Union*. Third Edition. Oxford University Press. Chapter 17.

Michael Smith. (2011). "European Responses to U.S. Diplomacy: 'Special Relationships', Transatlantic Governance and World Order." *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 6, 299-317.

Additional Reading

Clark, David. (2009). "European Foreign Policy and American Primacy" *International Politics* 45, pp. 276-291.

Hallams, Ellen and Benjaminn Schreer. 2012. "Towards a 'post-American' alliance? NATO burden-sharing after Libya." *International Affairs* 88 (2): 313-327.

Nijhuis, Ton. (2007). "America and the search for a European political identity." In *Reviewing Europe: Missed opportunities and possible potential*, Tanneli Blom, ed. Universitaire Pers Maastricht.

Smith, Michael. (2004). "Between Two Worlds? The European Union, the United States and World Order." *International Politics* Vol. 41. pp. 95-117.

Assignment 7 Russia

“The timeline of the collapse of the Soviet Union can be traced to September 13, 1985. On this date, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the minister of oil of Saudi Arabia, declared that the monarchy had decided to alter its oil policy radically. The Saudis stopped protecting oil prices, and Saudi Arabia quickly regained its share in the world market. During the next six months, oil production in Saudi Arabia increased fourfold, while oil prices collapsed by approximately the same amount in real terms.

As a result, the Soviet Union lost approximately \$20 billion per year, money without which the country simply could not survive.”²³

“Foreign aid to Russia had come in dollops. It had been administered by the IMF, which treated Russia with near contempt; its prescriptions for the Russian economy were ludicrous... To many Russian observers the benefits of the Western option had turned out to be minimal... Yeltsin warned that Europe was in danger of plunging into a ‘cold peace.’ He said that if the purpose of NATO’s expansion was to guard against fears of ‘undesirable’ developments in Russia, ‘it’s too early to bury democracy in Russia.’”²⁴

“The effect of our feebleness in handling Russia is as bad for Russia itself as it is for us. Negotiations are endless and do not get very far. In every discussion the Russians try to ‘cherry-pick,’ focusing on the issues that concern them and ignoring the ones that bother Europe. Because we are not consistent and firm, we do less business than we would like and so do the Russians... Why did the bigger member states—France and Germany in particular—find it so difficult to develop a sensible, principled strategy on Russia? In Germany’s case, maybe Chancellor Schröder was affected by Mr. Putin’s fluency in German, though it is odd to like someone for an attribute acquired in order to function as a spy in your own country. I imagine there were three main reasons for the Chirac-Schröder approach. First, President Putin was seen as a useful occasional ally against the United States (for example, during the Iraq war)... Second, President Chirac in particular sees diplomacy in terms of great men, the leaders of great countries, talking together in mirrored, marbled halls.... Third, some Europeans assume that Russia’s energy resources give Moscow a hold over us.”²⁵

“Hugo Chávez embodies a new, post-cold-war model of authoritarian rule which combines a democratic mandate, populist socialism and anti-Americanism, as well as resource nationalism and carefully calibrated repression. This model has proved surprisingly successful across the world. Versions are to be found in countries as disparate and distinct as Iran, Russia, Zimbabwe and Sudan. In one way or another, these regimes claim to have created a viable alternative to liberal democracy.”²⁶

“The idea of ‘sovereign democracy’ has a number of functions. The first is to provide Putin’s authoritarianism with respectable ‘democratic’ clothes in order to strengthen it internally and insulate it from international criticism. The second is to challenge the West’s idea of democracy and human rights as a set of universal values and practices.”²⁷

Readings

- Cadier, David. 2014. "Eastern Partnership vs Eurasian Union? The EU–Russia Competition in the Shared Neighbourhood and the Ukraine Crisis." *Global Policy* 5: 76–85.
- Forsber, Tuomas and Hiski Haukkala. 2016. *The European Union and Russia*. Palgrave, pp. 220-240.
- Christopher Hill, Michael Smith, and Sophie Vanhoonacker. 2017. *International Relations and the European Union*. Third Edition. Oxford University Press. Chapter 19.
- Kiseleva, Yulia. 2015. "Russia's Soft Power Discourse: Identity, Status and the Attraction of Power." *Politics* 35(3-4): 316-329.

Additional Reading

- Asmus, Ronald D. (2008). "Europe's Eastern Promise." *Foreign Affairs* 87: 1.
- Averre, Derek. (2009). "Competing Rationalities: Russia, the EU and the 'Shared Neighbourhood.'" *Europe-Asia Studies* Vol. 61, No. 10, December 2009, 1689–1713.
- Johnson, Debra. (2005). "EU-Russian Energy Links: A Marriage of Convenience?" *Government and Opposition*, 40: 2, pp. 256-277.
- Light, Margot. (2008). "Russia and the EU: Strategic Partners or Strategic Rivals?" *The JCMS Annual Review of the European Union in 2007*. 46: 7-27.

Assignment 8 Developing World

“...Europeans need to play a much larger role on the world stage by making the European model of transnational peace and cooperation a global model. In Asia, Latin America, and Africa, efforts are underway to create transnational political spaces like the European Union. The EU can help facilitate the process by sharing ‘best practices,’ acting as a goad and conscience, and by building cooperative relationships with other regions that are preparing to make their own journey into a transnational global era.”

- Jeremy Rifkin, 9 May 2007, Maastricht University²⁸

“Many Europeans like to think of themselves as morally superior to Americans in their concern for the ‘Third World’—as some still call it, although the Second has disappeared in the meantime. When it comes to giving aid, they generally are; but not in openness for trade. In a darkly amusing parody of the indices now produced for almost every aspect of global development, Oxfam has compiled a Double Standards Index to show the level of protectionist trade policies against exports from developing countries deployed by the richest and most powerful trading nations. The European Union comes a clear first—that is, worst. In 2000, the annual dairy subsidy paid by the European Union was \$913 per cow. This was nearly double the average annual income of someone living in sub-Saharan Africa.”²⁹

“...the sugar beet industry has been well guarded by Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy. But, in recent years the EU has reformed its system of quotas and subsidies to lower food prices and enhance its farmers’ competitiveness; production quotas for milk were dismantled in 2015, for example. Now it is sugar’s turn. From October 2017, the year will abolish its minimum price and production quota for beet. Its complex restrictions on sugar imports will remain, however, as will its income support for farmers.”³⁰

“...human rights advocates have criticized the EU for eroding migrant rights....the EU has a fairly mixed record as an ‘ethical power’ if ‘globally responsible behaviour’ is the benchmark.”³¹

“Without Africa, France will no longer have a history in the twenty-first century.”

- Francois Mitterrand, 1957³²

Readings

Bale, Tim. 2017. *European Politics*. 4th edition. Palgrave/Macmillan. pp. 327-340.

Bengtsson, Rikard and Ole Elgström. 2012. “Conflicting Role Conceptions? The European Union in Global Politics.” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8 pp. 93-108.

Christopher Hill, Michael Smith, and Sophie Vanhoonacker. 2017. *International Relations and the European Union*. Third Edition. Oxford University Press. Chapter 13.

Isani, Mujtaba and Bernd Schlipphak. 2016. "The Desire for Sovereignty – An Explanation of EU Attitudes in the Arab World." *Journal of Common Market Studies*, doi: 10.1111/jcms.12485.

Additional Reading

Bindi, Federiga and Irina Angelescu. 2012. *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, 2nd edition. Brookings Institution Press, pp. 256-269.

Dumping on the world, Oxfam Briefing Paper. March 2004. Available at <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/>.

Fioramonti, Lorenzo and Poletti, Arlo. 2008. "Facing the Giant: Southern perspectives on the European Union." *Third World Quarterly*, 29 (1): 167-180.

Pace, Michelle 2009. "Paradoxes and contradictions in EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean: the limits of EU normative power." *Democratization* 16 (1): 39-58.

Assignment 9 Emerging Economies

“Constructive Engagement could be defined as the opposite of confrontation, sanctions or hostility in international relations, or, alternatively, as the opposite of refusing to deal with a country or regime; the presumption is that, through engagement, the other party can be drawn into more internationally accepted norms of behaviour.”³³

“...EU-Asia relations as a whole are a mixed bag, with light and shadow, possessing, as I would term it, both ‘enabling’ and ‘inhibitory’ potential...It seems to me that the European-Asian discourse on ‘individuality,’ ‘rights,’ ‘liberties,’ ‘entitlements’ and, conversely, on ‘communality,’ ‘duties,’ ‘restrictions’ and ‘commitments’ to society, explains and illustrates almost perfectly why there is so much that is promising and empowering in the EU-Asia political, cultural and broader, ‘civilisational,’ cooperation—and why, on the other hand, there is also so much that is inhibiting and obstructive, weighing down the other side of the scales.”³⁴

“China has scattered roads and football stadiums across Africa. By the hundreds, it has set up Confucius Institutes around the world to spread Chinese language and culture. More than anything, the Beijing Olympics were designed to showcase gentle President Hu Jintao’s notions of a ‘harmonious world.’”³⁵

“In the end, some in Washington fear, Europeans may be tempted to give China what it wants for the sake of commercial advantage and to avoid a quarrel. If so, that would recall the tussle over the arms embargo. It would also be in keeping with Europe’s role as a distant, detached observer of the geopolitical tussle under way between China and America for strategic primacy in Asia.”³⁶

“The same forces roiling American and European politics are also present in most of Asia: internal ethnic and communal tensions; protectionist fears about globalization and job losses; and angry, assertive nationalism. India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, seems unwilling or unable to control the extreme Hindu-nationalist wing of his own party...China’s Xi Jinping is encouraging a resurgence of national pride which can take ugly, xenophobic forms...The rise of nationalism at a time economic gloom and geostrategic uncertainty is alarming for the region’s security. Europe, preoccupied with its own problems, has long forsaken any serious role in Asia.”³⁷

Readings

Keuleers, Floor. 2015. “Explaining External Perceptions: The EU and China in African Public Opinion.” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12231, pp. 1-19.

Maher, Richard. 2016. “The Elusive EU-China strategic partnership,” *International Affairs*, 92 (4), pp. 959-976.

Smith, Michael. 2013. "Beyond the comfort zone: internal crisis and external challenge in the European Union's response to rising powers." *International Affairs* 89 (3): 653-671.

Christopher Hill, Michael Smith, and Sophie Vanhoonacker. 2017. *International Relations and the European Union*. Third Edition. Oxford University Press. Chapter 18.

Additional Reading

Bindi, Federiga and Irina Angelescu. 2012. *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, 2nd edition. Brookings Institution Press, pp. 281-289.

Chaban, Natalia. 2012. "Image-ing the EU as an International Leader: A Survey of Asian Newsmakers' Perceptions from a Public Diplomacy Perspective." *European Foreign Affairs Review* 17(1): 69-92.

Assignment 10 Evaluation and Consideration of Future Roles

“A Senior individual in the Swedish defence ministry recently suggested to me that Europe might have only 10 to 15 years left to remain relevant in the twenty-first century. If it does not act swiftly, convincingly and responsibly, the opportunity to influence the world order might be lost forever....the main danger for the EU lies in its self-congratulatory and self-centered debate along the lines of ‘Europe is doing good for the entire world.’ In a world that is increasingly marginalizing Europe in terms of population, economic growth and innovation, Europe’s decline in relative power might lead also to a decline in its normative and ethical power.”³⁸

“The result is a policy vacuum in Europe — one that Russia, long dismissed as irrelevant to the continent, is now eagerly seeking to fill. This is most obviously the case in Syria, where absent any coherent Western strategy, Putin has decided to defend President Bashar al-Assad. In Ukraine, the Kremlin promotes anti-European propaganda and uses military and economic tools to destabilize the government. Inside the EU, the Kremlin uses money and media to support Euroskeptic ideas or parties, throwing its financial support to the far right (Jobbik in Hungary, the National Front in France) and moral support to the far left (Syriza in Greece). And there is still no sound continent wide response to this interference.

All this silence and inaction are strange because while no European state counts any longer as a first-league international power, the EU as a whole is the world’s largest and richest economy — a real partner for both the United States and China. If Europe’s leaders want to capitalize on that fact, reverse the disasters of 2015, exert real influence, and regain the respect of their own citizens, they must reinforce their institutions and promote their values in their immediate neighborhood. Indeed, if the EU even wants to maintain the peace and prosperity it has preserved for so long, it needs to become far more ambitious, both at home and abroad.”³⁹

“There is an old maxim in Brussels that the European project advances in times of crisis.”⁴⁰

“Obviously, the EU is not a state but a community of member states. But like states and regions, international organizations have their own image and brand. Where NATO stands for (military) security, the EU may be viewed as the ultimate affluence brand, radiating material comfort and family values...The European Union’s task is to find a new, postmodern *raison d’être* that inspires its own populace and appeals to the wider world as well, which is where branding comes in...”⁴¹

Readings

- Aggestam, Lisbeth and Markus Johansson. 2017. "The Leadership Paradox in EU Foreign Policy." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 55(6): 1203-1220, DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12558
- Mayer, Hartmut. (2008). "Is it still called 'Chinese Whispers'? The EU's rhetoric and action as a responsible global institution." *International Affairs* 84:1 pp. 61-79.
- McDougall, Walter. (2007). "Will 'Europe' survive the 21st century? A meditation on the 50th Anniversary of the European Community." E-notes, Foreign Policy Research Institute.
- Van Ham, Peter. (2008). "Place Branding: The State of the Art." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, March, pp. 126-149. Available through Maastricht University library e-Journals (students have to find it themselves)
- Walt, Stephen. 16 July 2016. "Does Europe Have a Future?" Foreign Policy.com, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/16/does-europe-have-a-future-stephen-walt-testimony-house-foreign-affairs-committee/>

Endnotes

- ¹ White, Brian. (1999). "The European Challenge to Foreign Policy Analysis." *European Journal of International Relations*. 5: 1, p. 48.
- ² Ginsberg, Roy H. (2001). *The European Union in International Politics*. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 32.
- ³ Keukeleire, Stephan and MacNaughtan, Jennifer. (2008). *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*. Palgrave. pp. 328, 333.
- ⁴ White, Brian. (2001). *Understanding European Foreign Policy*. Palgrave. pp. 118-141.
- ⁵ "Catherine Aston and the British problem." *The Economist* 15 December 2009.
- ⁶ Traynor, Ian. (31 July 2015) Letter from the Brussels Bubble." Carnegie Europe at <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/60910>.
- ⁷ Lewis, B. (1992). Rethinking the Middle East. *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 71. No. 4.
- ⁸ Dimitar Bechev, Anthony Dworkin, François Godement, Richard Gowan, Hans Kundnani, Mark Leonard, Daniel Levy, Kadri Liik and Nick Witney. 15 November 2012. "Time to grow up: what Obama's re-election means for Europe." ECFR Policy Memo. Available at http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/time_to_grow_up_what_obamas_re_election_means_for_europe.
- ⁹ Howorth, Jolyon. (2011). "The EU's Security and Defence Policy: Towards a Strategic Approach," In Hill, Christopher and Smith, Michael. *International Relations and the European Union*. 2nd edition. Oxford University Press. p. 209.
- ¹⁰ "Banyan: The lost continent: Europe's frustrating search for strategic relevance in Asia." (16 June 2016). *The Economist* p. 55.
- ¹¹ Stefan Lehne and Heather Grabbe, "How Donald Trump Could Save EU Foreign Policy," Carnegie Europe, 12 January 2017, at carnegieeurope.eu.
- ¹² Delors Jacques on the Gatt trade negotiations, October 1992, In Buchan, D. *Europe: The Strange Superpower*. (1993) Dartmouth Publishing Company. p. 9.
- ¹³ "How the European Union is becoming the world's chief regulator." *The Economist* 22, 09, 2007.
- ¹⁴ Brown, O. (2005). *EU Trade Policy and Conflict*. International Institute for Sustainable Development, p. 5.
- ¹⁵ Vogler, John. (2011). "The Challenge of the Environment, Energy, and Climate Change." In Hill, Christopher and Smith, Michael. *International Relations and the European Union*. 2nd edition. Oxford University Press. p. 374.
- ¹⁶ Christopher S. Browning, C and Joenniemi, P(2008) "Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood Policy" *European Journal of International Relations* 14; 519 p. 520.
- ¹⁷ Sicherman, Harvey. (20 March 2003). "War." E-notes, Foreign Policy Research Institute, p. 3.
- ¹⁸ Garton Ash, Timothy. (2004). *Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West*." Vintage. p. 48.
- ¹⁹ Evidence presented by Professor Michael Cox (with the assistance of Felix Berenskoetter and Eva Gross) Department of International Relations, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2A. "The Security Strategy and the Future of the European Security and Defence Policy," Thursday 13 July 2006, hearing at the European Parliament.
- ²⁰ Cooper, Robert. (2003). *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century*. Atlantic Monthly Press. p. 165.
- ²¹ Mann, James. 2012. *The Obamians*." Viking, p. 124.
- ²² "EU exports to the U.S. support 5 million jobs – new tool shows where and in what sectors." (16 December 2016), European Commission at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1605>.
- ²³ Gaidar, Yegor. (April 2007). "The Soviet Collapse: Grain and Oil." *On the Issues*, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, www.aei.org.
- ²⁴ Hyland, William G. (1999). *Clinton's World*. Westport, Conn: Praeger, pp. 97, 99.
- ²⁵ Patten, Chris. (2005). *Not Quite the Diplomat*. Allen Lane. p. 205.
- ²⁶ "Hugo Chávez's government: The wrecking of Venezuela." (15 May 2010). *The Economist* p. 13.
- ²⁷ Nicu Popescu. October 2006. "Russia's Soft Power Ambitions." *CEPS Policy Brief*, No. 115, Centre for European Policy Studies, at <https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/book/1388.pdf>.
- ²⁸ Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream, "How Europe's Vision of the Future is offering an alternative model to the American Dream," Schuman Lecture 9 May 2007, Maastricht University.
- ²⁹ Garton Ash. (2004). p. 155.

- ³⁰ “Sugar in the EU, A sweet deal.” (22 April 2017). *The Economist* p. 63.
- ³¹ Mayer, Hartmut. (2008). “Is it still called ‘Chinese Whispers’? The EU’s rhetoric and action as a responsible global institution.” *International Affairs* 84:1 pp. 70, 72.
- ³² Quoted in Adebajo, Adekeye. (2002). *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- ³³ Fouquet, David and Lim, Paul. (2007). “Constructive Engagement and the policy of disposition: Three case studies of EU-Asia policy.” *The European Union and Asia: Reflections and Re-orientations*. Peter Anderson and Georg Wiessala eds. p. 129.
- ³⁴ Wiesala, George. (2007). “Political Morality, Normative Territories and Non-interference: Human Rights as ‘Enabling’ and ‘Inhibiting’ agents in EU-Asia Relations. *The European Union and Asia: Reflections and Re-orientations*. Peter Anderson and Georg Wiessala eds. p. 240.
- ³⁵ “From the charm to the offensive; China’s smile diplomacy shows its teeth.” *The Economist* 9 January 2010, p. 52.
- ³⁶ “Banyan: The 15-year hitch.” (7 May 2016). *The Economist* p. 45.
- ³⁷ “Banyan: Not gloating, but fretting.” (12 March 2016). *The Economist* p. 48.
- ³⁸ Mayer, (2008). “Is it still called ‘Chinese Whispers,’ p. 64.
- ³⁹ Applebaum, Anne. 2015. “Does Europe Even Matter? Dysfunction has sucked Brussels dry of any foreign-policy power or relevance.” *Foreign Policy* online, available at <http://2015globalthinkers.foreignpolicy.com/#!/decision-makers/detail/does-europe-even-matter>.
- ⁴⁰ “Charlemagne: Ever farther union.” (27 February 2016). *The Economist* p. 22.
- ⁴¹ Van Ham, Peter. (2008). “Place Branding: The State of the Art.” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, March, pp. 136-139.