

# **American Foreign Policy**

**Code: SSC3036**



**2017/2018**



**SSC3036**  
**American Foreign Policy**  
**Fall 2017**

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## **Objectives**

The main objectives of this course are to understand the history, to grasp the political process in which policy is made, to understand the instruments through which policy is implemented and finally to instill a greater awareness of the policy content of American foreign policy.

## **Description of the course**

Everyone appears to have an opinion on American foreign policy; however, often such opinions are based on emotion or rhetoric. This course does not want students to be less critical of the United States, rather it strives to inform and educate students on the history, process and sources of American foreign policy, so that opinions are based on a sound footing.

The course is divided into four sections. The first section will focus on the field of foreign policy analysis as a subfield in International Relations. An overview of the various analytical frameworks that might be used to examine U.S. foreign policy will also be covered. This first section will also consider the importance of scrutinizing American foreign policy in today's world and the global context in which American foreign policy is made.

Section two will concentrate on the historical foundations of U.S. foreign policy, starting from the newly independent United States and covering such events as western expansion, World War I, the interwar years, World War II, the Cold War, the Post-Cold War world, September 11<sup>th</sup> and ending with the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

Part three will examine the politics and the policy-making process of American foreign policy. Topics for discussion in this section will include the institutions involved in the policy making process, such as the President and various bureaucracies of the Executive branch, for example, the State Department, the Department of Defense and the CIA. This section will also consider the role that the American public and Congress play in the process of making U.S. foreign policy.

The final part will consider the instruments that America uses to implement its foreign policies, including diplomacy, covert action, economic mechanisms as well as military ones. This section finishes up with a consideration of the future of American Foreign Policy.

## **Essential texts**

Hastedt, Glenn P. (2015). *American Foreign Policy*. 10th edition, Rowman & Littlefield.

Kaufman, Joyce P. (2014). *A Concise History of U.S. Foreign Policy*. 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, Rowman & Littlefield.

## **Instructional format**

Tutorial group meetings, lectures and a documentary.

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**Course Schedule 2016**

<u>Week 1</u>		<u>Assignment</u>
September 4-8 First meeting	Lecture: <i>Foreign Policy Analysis</i>	start 1
<u>Week 2</u>		
September 11-15 Second meeting Third meeting	Lecture: <i>American Exceptionalism</i>	finish 1 & start 2 finish 2 & start 3
<u>Week 3</u>		
September 18-22 Fourth meeting Fifth meeting	Film: <i>Dead Wrong</i>	finish 3 & start 4 finish 4 & start 5
<u>Week 4</u>		
September 25-29 Sixth meeting Seventh meeting	Lecture: <i>U.S. Nuclear Strategy</i>	finish 5 & start 6 finish 6 & start 7
<u>Week 5</u>		
October 2-6 Eighth meeting Ninth meeting	Lecture: <i>Think Tanks</i>	finish 7 & start 8 finish 8 & start 9
<u>Week 6</u>		
October 9-13 <b>Monday October 9</b> Tenth meeting Eleventh meeting	Lecture: <i>U.S. policy &amp; the Middle East</i> <b>Papers due 16:00</b>	finish 9 & start 10 finish 10
<u>Week 7</u>		
October 16-20	<b>Final Exam</b>	

## Assessment

Students will have two opportunities to be assessed, via a final written exam and a research paper. The final exam will be part multiple choice, part true or false and part essay. Each assessment is worth 50% of the final grade. As stipulated in the student handbook, attendance is 85% compulsory. As the course has 11 scheduled meetings, students can have 2 valid misses. Students who have not met the attendance requirement will be given a provisional overall grade, but will not receive credits until they have successfully completed an additional assignment. Applications for the additional assignment are available at the Office of Student Affairs, within 10 working days after completion of the course.

The resit for this course will be administered in the week January 29 - February 2, 2018. The resit will be a comprehensive exam for those students who failed the final and a new research paper assignment for those students who failed the paper. Students who fail both the research paper and the exam will have to resit both. Resits will only be available to students who have complied with the attendance requirement and completed all the assignments.

## Course coordinator

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## Instructions for the writing assignment

Papers should be 3,000 words (indicate the number of words on the title page). This does not include references, the title page or the bibliography. **Papers are due Monday 9 October 2017 at 16:00.** A hard copy should be submitted to the Office of Student Affairs and a digital copy submitted to Safe Assignment. **Late papers will not be graded.** Students should also be aware that plagiarism will result in a failing grade.

There are two different directions that students must choose on the type of paper they will write. First, students can write about one particular American foreign policy/event and analyze it according to the levels of analysis or use the decision-making frameworks that are presented in the first lecture. But students can only choose **one** theoretical framework for the methodological part of their papers.

In the second option, students can write their papers on one of the various **sources** of American foreign policy and analyze how that source affects policy over time. The lecture on *American Exceptionalism* will provide an example for this type of paper. **The tutor must approve all paper topics no later than 2 October 2017.** Students must also have at least 10 academic sources.

### **Criteria for research paper assessment**

10-8.0 Excellent: An outstanding answer. The essay is well written, logical and clear. It contains evidence of a wide knowledge of the subject matter. It combines a good understanding of theoretical issues and empirical applications, with some originality of approach. The essay presents ideas that are logically developed and carefully formulated. Its arguments are clear and accurate. The use of concepts, theories or research findings is precise and accurate. The essay builds from current theory and empirical work to reflect originality and insight in the student's thinking and analysis.

7.9-7.0 Good: A reasonably comprehensive and well-organized answer. The argument presented is clear and logical, with evidence of having understood the issues and an ability to think about them effectively. The essay states ideas and develops its topic clearly, logically and adequately. Its ideas are supported with arguments that are clear and accurate. Its use of concepts, theories or research findings is largely precise, although there may be a few minor factual errors or inaccuracies. The essay draws on a fairly wide range of empirical research and links these accurately to theory.

6.9-6.0 Satisfactory: This mark reflects an essay that is adequately organized and a full answer to the question. It is mostly accurate, but limited in scope and does not express any real development of argument. The essay is a satisfactory response to the assignment. Its central ideas are expressed and developed clearly enough to be understood by the reader. Although the essay may seem correct, it lacks the originality and clarity of thought that would entitle it to an above average grade. The use of concepts, theories or research findings may reflect more than minor inaccuracies, such as basic factual errors or errors of omission. It shows some grasp of theory and its relation to empirical data, but with little insight or grasp of wider issues.

5.9-5.5 Pass: This essay shows evidence of course reading, but it is deficient in organization and scope. The information it contains is insufficient. The essay indicates below average achievement in the development of its ideas, which may be unclear or supported illogically or inconsistently. Its use of concepts, theories or research may contain errors, omissions and irrelevancies. It shows no grasp of theory and its relation to empirical data, and it has little insight or grasp of wider issues.

5.4-0.0 Fail: This essay shows little evidence of course reading, it is deficient in organization and scope. Its ideas are poorly developed and are not sufficiently supported. It may also contain numerous errors, omissions and irrelevancies.

**Section 1: The Field of Foreign Policy Analysis****Assignment 1: The Study of American Foreign Policy**

“Almost as if according to some natural law, in every century there seems to emerge a country with the power, the will, and the intellectual and moral impetus to shape the entire international system in accordance with its own values. In the seventeenth century, France under Cardinal Richelieu introduced the modern approach to international relations, based on the nation-state and motivated by national interest as its ultimate purpose. In the eighteenth century, Metternich’s Austria reconstructed the Concert of Europe and Bismarck’s Germany dismantled it, reshaping European diplomacy into a cold-blooded game of power politics.

In the twentieth century, no country has influenced international relations as decisively and at the same time as ambivalently as the United States. No society has more firmly insisted on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, or more passionately asserted that its own values were universally applicable. No nation has been more pragmatic in the day-to-day conduct of its diplomacy, or more ideological in the pursuit of its historic moral convictions. No country has been more reluctant to engage itself abroad even while undertaking alliances and commitments of unprecedented reach and scope.

The singularities that America has ascribed to itself throughout its history have produced two contradictory attitudes toward foreign policy. The first is that America serves its values best by perfecting democracy at home, thereby acting as a beacon for the rest of mankind; the second, that America’s values impose on it an obligation to crusade for them around the world. Torn between nostalgia for a pristine past and yearning for a perfect future, American thought has oscillated between isolationism and commitment, though, since the end of the Second World War, the realities of interdependence have predominated.”

—Henry Kissinger in *Diplomacy*<sup>1</sup>

Howard Wiarda has written that “[c]ompared with other nations, the American historical experience has been unique, helping to shape a package of attitudinal and behavioral traits (political culture) that are peculiarly a part of the American heritage.” He lists seven behavior patterns that are illustrative of its distinctive kind of foreign policy: isolationism; superiority; impatience; peace as normal, conflict as abnormal; a missionary tradition; practicality; and, ethnocentrism.<sup>2</sup>



## Readings

Hastedt, Glenn P. (2015). *American Foreign Policy*. 10th edition, Rowman & Littlefield. Chapters 1, 2, 3 & chapter \*9.

Kaufman, Joyce P. (2014). *A Concise History of U.S. Foreign Policy*. 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, Rowman & Littlefield. Chapter 1.

\*These readings concern policymaking models and how foreign policy decisions are made and are important for the methodological part of student papers in this course. There is also some content overlap with the lecture on Foreign Policy Analysis.

**Section 2:                   The Foundations of American foreign policy**

**Assignment 2:           Unilateralism to Engagement**

“Americans were once proud members of the British Empire. For more than 150 years that membership brought good profit at low cost and protection against the French in North America. But in the 1760s, after victory in the French and Indian War, Britain began to impose new taxes and regulations that shattered the relationship. In 1776 the American colonials chose independence through revolution. They selected that dangerous course not only because of perceived British perfidy but also owing to their own new World sense of themselves as different from—indeed, superior to—the Old World of monarchy, relentless international rivalry, and corrupt institutions.

Geographic isolation from Europe helped to spawn such notions of exceptionalism, as did the American doctrine of mission and God-favored destiny that the Puritans had etched on American memory... Yet when Americans declared independence and then worked to gain and preserve it in a doubting and hostile world, they felt compelled to appeal for help from Europe, particularly France. They became conspicuously uneasy about calling on the decadent Old World to save their fresh new World experiment, because linkage so violated what some scholars have labeled American ‘isolationism.’ At the same time, however, American leaders saw in their new treaties and nationhood the opportunity to reform traditional world politics to ensure the country’s safety and prosperity.”<sup>3</sup>

“A reinvigorated nationalism fueled the expansionist impulse. After the Civil War, national leaders sought to narrow sectional divisions. The 1876 centennial celebrations emphasized national unity... The nationalistic argument for expansion and empire seemed all the more urgent when Americans anticipated the closing of the frontier at home. In 1893 Professor Frederick Jackson Turner postulated his thesis that an ever-expanding continental frontier had shaped the American character... Turner did not explicitly say that a new frontier had to be found overseas, but he doubted that ‘the expansive character of American life has now entirely ceased... The dynamics of the international system also stimulated American participation. Victorian England, heretofore the dominant power with advantages over its rivals in wealth, production, colonies, and naval strength, started to suffer relative decline... With the world divided into ‘living’ and ‘dying powers,’ a British official noted that ‘the successful powers will be those who have the greatest industrial base.’ When the American economy surged after the Civil War and the United States surpassed Britain as the world’s leading industrial power in the 1890s, success seemed assured.”<sup>4</sup>

“I have always been fond of the West African proverb: ‘Speak softly and carry a big stick, you will go far.’”

—U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, 1900<sup>5</sup>

“Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled

wholly by their will, not by the will of their people... We enter this war only where we are clearly forced into it because there are no other means of defending our rights... It is a fearful thing to lead this great, peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace.”

—U.S. President Woodrow Wilson before a joint meeting of both Houses of Congress 2 April 1917. Congress officially voted for war 6 April 1917, at 3 o'clock in the morning.<sup>6</sup>

### Readings

Kaufman, Joyce P. (2014). *A Concise History of U.S. Foreign Policy*. 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, Rowman & Littlefield. Chapter 2.

Paterson, T. G., Clifford, J. G., & Hagan, K. J. (1995). *American Foreign Relations, a History since 1895*. (4th edition). Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, pp. 80 and 82-105.

McDougall, Walter A. (May 2008) “Throes of Democracy: the American Civil War Era, 1829-1877. *Footnotes*, The Newsletter of FPRI’s Wachman Center, Vol. 13, No. 12.

### Assignment 3: From Isolationism to Superpower

“The subtitle of Alan Beattie’s book [*False Economy: A Surprising Economic History of the World*] promises surprises. He keeps his word in the very first paragraph, which invites the reader to recall September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001. Everyone remembers that day’s terrorist attacks on the superpower, Argentina? Not so many remember the umpteenth collapse of the American economy a few months before.

Of course, says Mr. Beattie, in reality it was the other way around. But, he argues, it need not have been. For much of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the two countries had similar potential, not least in an abundance of empty, fertile land to be taken over by European immigrants. At the end of it Argentina’s economy, relative to its population, was a little bigger than France’s and much bigger than Italy’s. That America became the superpower and Argentina the basket-case was not preordained.”<sup>7</sup>

“The British people and their allies today are conducting an active war against this unholy alliance. Our own future security is greatly dependent on the outcome of that fight. Our ability to ‘keep out of war’ is going to be affected by that outcome. Thinking in terms of today and tomorrow, I make the direct statement to the American people that there is far less chance of the United States getting into war if we do all we can now to support the nations defending themselves against attack by the Axis than if we acquiesce in their defeat, submit tamely to an Axis victory, and wait our turn to be the object of attack in another war later on. ...

We must be the great arsenal of democracy. For us this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We must apply ourselves to our task with the same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism and sacrifice as we would show were we at war.”

—Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The Great Arsenal of Democracy, radio address delivered 29 December 1940<sup>8</sup>

“Before WWII, America’s army was smaller than Romania’s. But as the nation rearmed and GIs poured overseas, Britain felt its standing begin to wane.”<sup>9</sup>

“More than anything else, two events, the Soviet Union’s first successful atomic test in the fall of 1949 and the Korean War beginning in the late spring of 1950, confirmed the increasingly military definition of America’s global role. Indeed, the Soviet test was seen privately as something of a blessing. Acheson relates, ‘Once again the Russians had come to the aid of an imperiled nonpartisan foreign policy, binding wounds and rallying the divided Congress.’ Similarly, the crisis of communist military action in Asia pushed forward the rearmament advocated in NSC-68. One of Acheson’s aides remembered the trepidation the administration felt when contemplating the ‘sale’ of NSC-68 to the American people: ‘We were sweating over it, and then...thank God, Korea came along.’”<sup>10</sup>

### **Readings**

Kaufman, Joyce P. (2014). *A Concise History of U.S. Foreign Policy*. 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, Rowman & Littlefield. Chapters 3 & 4.

Roosevelt, Franklin Delano (1940). The Great Arsenal of Democracy, radio address delivered 29 December 1940, retrieved from <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrarsenalofdemocracy.html>.

#### Assignment 4: The Reagan to Obama Years

“The United States decided to support Arab military strongmen who acquired power through military coups, which they portrayed as revolutions. American policymakers thought at the time that these new rulers would be modern, introduce reforms in society, and act as a bulwark against communism. That these new rulers dismissed parliaments and abolished constitutions was overlooked. Most Western commentators argued that these parliaments were corrupt anyway and reflected the interests of plutocratic oligarchies that impeded progress...The easy road was chosen, the preference for dealing with strongmen established. Stability was sought even if it meant the silence of the grave.”<sup>11</sup>

“We are approaching the conclusion of an historic postwar struggle between two visions: one of tyranny and conflict, and one of democracy and freedom....And now, it is time to move beyond containment to a new policy for the 1990s—one that recognizes the full scope of changes taking place around the world and in the Soviet Union itself.”

—George H. W. Bush, remarks at the Texas A&M University Commencement Ceremony in College Station 12 May 1989<sup>12</sup>

“It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all-important question of power—the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power—American and European perspectives are diverging. Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Immanuel Kant’s ‘perpetual peace.’ Meanwhile, the United States remains mired in history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might. That is why on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus... The European caricature at its most extreme depicts an America dominated by a ‘culture of death,’ its warlike temperament the natural product of a violent society where every man has a gun and the death penalty reigns. But even those who do not make this crude link agree there are profound differences in the way the United States and Europe conduct foreign policy.”

—Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power, America and Europe in the New World Order*, 2003<sup>13</sup>

“Early on his presidency, U.S. President Barack Obama often extolled the benefits of multilateralism and the rule of law. For example, in his speech in Berlin in 2008 and again during his re-election campaign four years later. But over the years of his presidency Obama’s policy on the U.S. role in a multilateral world shifted from America being *the indispensable nation* to America being the *indispensable catalyst*—the country that helps rising powers to share in the burden of tackling security challenges while at the same time avoiding political risks. Obama projected a strategy that envisioned a U.S. that was present but not deeply involved. He further communicated to allies and partners that America’s post-WWII role of underwriting global security was time-bound. However, such views on America’s role in multilateral security

operations were at odds with the expectations, as well as the capabilities to share in the burdens, of America's long-reliable partners across the Atlantic. In fact, Obama's *indispensable catalyst* foreign policy, the 'helping others to share in the burdens,' ultimately led to discouraged partners and an uptick in Anti-Americanism."<sup>14</sup>

### Readings

Kaufman, Joyce P. (2014). *A Concise History of U.S. Foreign Policy*. 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, Rowman & Littlefield. Chapters 5, 6 & 7.

Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2002-2003). "Limits of American Power." *Political Science Quarterly* 117 (4), pp. 545-559.

Walt, Stephen M. (1998/1999). "The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart." *The National Interest*, 54.

### Additional Reading

Buzan, Barry. (2004). *The United States and the Great Powers*. Polity, pp. 153-178.

Ikenberry, G. J. (2004). "Liberal Hegemony or Empire? American Power in the Age of Unipolarity." In David Held & Mathias Koenigh-Archibugi Eds. *American Power in the Twenty-First Century*. Polity, pp. 83-108.

Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (1990). "Soft Power." *Foreign Policy* 80 (Autumn) pp. 153-171.





## Information on the Film

*Dead Wrong: Inside an Intelligence Meltdown* (CNN, 2005)

*Dead Wrong* reviews the intelligence run-up to the congressional authorization and the invasion. You hear from all the main characters: Vice President Dick Cheney says there is no doubt that Saddam has weapons of mass destruction; Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pushes the connection between Iraq and al-Qaida; National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice says the aluminum tubes are suited only for nuclear weapons; Tenet says the CIA's intelligence indicates a "slam dunk;" Secretary of State Colin Powell tells the U.N. that Saddam has biological weapons labs mounted on trucks; Bush says the smoking gun could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.

What *Dead Wrong* carefully demonstrates is that none of the above proved true. More important, using testimony from government and CIA officials now out of office, the documentary shows how the administration built its case for invading Iraq by "cherry picking"—using scraps of intelligence to build a worse-case scenario. The intelligence was rigged and Americans were scared into supporting the war. *Dead Wrong* makes a powerful, convincing case that the Bush administration hijacked the intelligence community. Watch it and make up your own mind.

A transcript of the show is available at  
<http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/21/cp.01.html>.

### Section 3: The Institutions and Process of American Foreign Policy

#### Assignment 5: Congress and the Public

“The Republican-controlled Senate voted to impose restrictions on the treatment of terrorism suspects, delivering a rare wartime rebuke to President George W. Bush. Defying the White House, senators voted 90-9 to approve an amendment that would prohibit the use of ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ against anyone in U.S. government custody, regardless of where they are held.”<sup>15</sup>

“Under the War Power Resolution a president must ask Congress’s permission if hostilities last more than 90 days. That deadline fell on June 17<sup>th</sup> [2011], but Mr. Obama did not ask, on the eccentric ground that America’s ‘supporting role’ no longer amounts to ‘hostilities.’ This has outraged even the war’s supporters, especially since the disclosure that Mr. Obama overruled the lawyers in the Justice and Defense Departments and turned to more pliant ones in the White House and State Department. Bruce Ackerman, a professor of law and political science at Yale, said in the *New York Times* that this could open the way for ‘even more blatant acts of presidential war-making in the decades ahead.’”<sup>16</sup>

“If the ordinary American wants to know who shapes fundamental foreign policy, all he has to do is look into a mirror... The President and the State Department, with various advisers are forced to devise policies that they think square with the basic desires of the electorate... The classic example is the Spanish-American War of 1898—an unnecessary and trouble-brewing conflict of immense significance. President McKinley did not want war; the State Department did not want war; Big Business did not want war. But the people did—and so violent were their demands that they forced McKinley to give in to them.”<sup>17</sup>

“If the State Department has any formal doctrine concerning its relationship with the public, it is the doctrine of all democratic institutions—that they can function only in symbiosis, that the public is to the State Department as the placenta is to the foetus. There is some ambiguity in this doctrine as to the level of generality or specificity at which the public is presumed to give nourishment, guidance, advice, support to its leaders. The working norm or operational code—call it what you will—as it is expressed and implied by Department officials cuts right through this ambiguity, denying to the public any but the most passive, general support functions. Speaking from the Defense Department, Adam Yarmolinsky made a rare statement of this usually internal point of view. Explaining to public opinion analysts why there was little room for public opinion research in government, he said, ‘There are surprisingly few operationally significant questions for the policy maker as to which any public opinion, in my view, exists at all. By an operationally significant question, I mean a question the answer to which will affect specific action of government officials.’

Most officials, whose policy work involves questions of just this kind, echo this sentiment in private. Thus, instead of the norm being something on the (meaningless) order of ‘We try to be as responsive to public opinion as possible,’ we find people all through the Department sharing the idea, if not the exact words, of the Office Director who said, ‘To hell with public opinion... We should lead, and not follow.’”<sup>18</sup>

## **Readings**

Hastedt, Glenn P. (2015). *American Foreign Policy*. 10th edition, Rowman & Littlefield, chapters 5 and 6.

Roberts, Alasdair. (2007). "The War We Deserve." *Foreign Policy*, vol. 163, November-December pp. 44-50.

## **Additional Reading**

Jentleson, Bruce. (1994). "The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force." In Eugene R. Wittkopf Ed. (2nd Edition) *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy*. pp. 57-78. (E-readers list this under Assignment 07)

## Assignment 6: The President and the Executive Branch

“In actuality, the situation that prevailed immediately after World War II, in which the president took the definitive lead in foreign policy and the Congress generally ratified his decisions, is unusual in American history. The postwar executive dominance in foreign policy grew out of the cold war with the Soviet Union; out of the emergency situations in Greece, Berlin, Iraq, China, and Eastern Europe right after the war; and out of the sense, which Congress shared, that in this era of instant communications as well as the potential for instant missiles and instant nuclear war, only the president had sufficient information and authority to make the quick decisions that foreign policy now called for.”<sup>19</sup>

“Regimes can draw legitimacy from a variety of sources—God, tradition, the soil, lineage, revolution, laws, and so on—but in the United States foreign policy legitimacy primarily depends on whether that policy is generally construed to be valued and proper within the overall domestic political context... Presidents work diligently to achieve domestic legitimacy for their foreign policies... or [to] ‘sell’—their foreign policies... Presidents and their foreign policy advisers try to provide interpretive images of the international situation that are compatible with domestic experience to justify the necessity, urgency, and character of their actions. Legitimation establishes the broad purposes of policy by translating its objectives into an understandable and compelling reflection of the domestic society’s dominant norms.”<sup>20</sup>

“Despite recently closing hundreds of bases in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States still maintains nearly 800 military bases in more than 70 countries and territories abroad—from giant ‘Little Americas’ to small radar facilities. Britain, France and Russia, by contrast, have about 30 foreign bases combined. By my calculation, maintaining bases and troops overseas cost \$85 to \$100 billion in fiscal year 2014; the total with bases and troops in warzones is \$160 to \$200 billion.”<sup>21</sup>

“David J. Kilcullen, a senior advisor to Gen. David Petraeus in Iraq, makes the following observation in a big-think paper that’s making the rounds: At present, the U.S. defense budget accounts for approximately half of total global defense spending, while the U.S. armed forces employ about 1.68 million uniformed members. By comparison, the State Department employs about 6,000 foreign-service officers, while the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has about 2,000. In other words, the Department of Defense is about 210 times larger than USAID and State combined—there are substantially more people employed as musicians in Defense bands than in the entire foreign service.”<sup>22</sup>

Negroponte “will have the authority to order the collection of new intelligence, to ensure the sharing of information among agencies, and to establish common standards for the intelligence community’s personnel,” Bush said. “It will be John’s responsibility to determine the annual budgets for all national intelligence agencies and offices and to direct how these funds are spent. Vesting these in a single official who reports directly to me will make our intelligence efforts better coordinated, more efficient and more effective.”

—George W. Bush, 17 February 2005<sup>23</sup>

## Readings

Hastedt, Glenn P. (2015). *American Foreign Policy*. 10th edition, Rowman & Littlefield, chapters 4, 7 and part of chapter 8 (201-216 & 222-229).

Sullivan, Andrew. (23 January 2006). "America Doesn't Need a New King George." *Time*. p. 48.

## Additional Reading

Hirsh, Michael. (2003). *At War with Ourselves*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 26-50.

\*Strong, R. A. (1992). *Decisions and Dilemmas: Case Studies in Presidential Foreign Policy Making*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, pp.168-192.

\*Student may find this case study on the Iran-Contra affair a good example of research that is focused on foreign policy analysis.

## **Section 4: The Instruments of American Foreign Policy**

### **Assignment 7: Open and Secret Instruments**

“The point about the United Nations is not that it is an alternative to the United States. It is a creature of the United States. And its resources are so much smaller than those of the U.S. government that its functions can never be more than complementary to American power. To be precise, the annual budget of the United Nations is equivalent to around 0.07 percent of the U.S. federal budget, 0.4 percent of the U.S. defense budget and 17.6 percent of the U.S. international development and humanitarian assistance budget. In the words of the former secretary of state Madeleine K. Albright, who from 1993 to 1996 was the American permanent representative to the UN, the total budget of the United Nations is ‘roughly what the Pentagon spends every thirty-two hours.’”<sup>24</sup>

“President Richard Milhous Nixon departed from his customary position in his reassessment of China policy, reaching a very different conclusion on what the future direction of U.S. policy toward the most populous country in the world should be. A self-styled realist, he could not have anticipated just how far peaceful engagement would take the two adversaries.

Ronald Reagan, who shared Nixon’s conservative internationalism and Republican credentials, later took a page from Nixon’s constructive or peaceful-engagement book in his own outreach as president to this Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev... The enormous economic, diplomatic, military, and other capabilities the United States enjoys give it a particular advantage in playing the peace-engagement card, whether dealing with North Korea, Iran, or Cuba.”<sup>25</sup>

“In popular history, clandestine operations, and their control by the executive, are a cancerous growth that began in the 20th century with the so-called ‘imperial presidency’ and the rise of the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency. This is fiction... As Jefferson noted, for the founders, the ‘laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger,’ overrode traditional standards of conduct or any written law... One of Washington’s first acts upon taking command of the Continental Army in 1775 was to hire a spy to go behind the enemy lines and report on British activities in Boston... General Washington’s successful use of intelligence and deception during the Revolutionary War led President Washington to conclude that the new executive office needed a secret service fund to handle the ‘business of intelligence,’ as John Jay referred to it in *The Federalist Papers*. Washington believed intelligence operations were the exclusive province of the executive, a hard-earned lesson taken from the inability of the Continental Congress to protect secrets.”<sup>26</sup>

“Following President Truman’s threat to use force in the Mediterranean in 1946 and 1947 and his use of troops in Korea between 1950 and 1953, the national security apparatus, and President Eisenhower in particular, turned to the CIA as a more efficient, and lower profile, enforcer of U.S. interests than was the military... As Eisenhower took office and made plans to quickly end the Korean War, some inside his cabinet already were calculating ways to aid the French [in Vietnam]—including the use of U.S. forces. Eisenhower, however, sensitively gauged what was politically possible in light of the popular distaste for violent overseas adventures with U.S. soldiers. Given that he also was unwilling to abandon U.S. control and

influence abroad, Eisenhower felt compelled to turn away from the use of overt military force and toward the covert violence of the CIA.

When Iranian leader Mohammed Mossadegh, an Islamic nationalist nationalized Iranian oil in 1953, Eisenhower ordered the CIA to topple him and replace his government with one friendly to U.S. interests. The Agency successfully arranged a coup in 1953, installing the pro-U.S. shah. Inside the national security apparatus, the Iranian coup was viewed as a successfully managed crisis. There is little evidence that policymakers thought seriously about what this intervention would do to the course of Iranian history or, indeed, to the future of U.S.-Iranian relations.”<sup>27</sup>

“In 1993, Bill Clinton was pondering whether to authorize what is now called an ‘extraordinary rendition,’ when American agents snatch a suspected terrorist abroad and deliver him to interrogators in a third country. The White House counsel warned that this would be illegal. President Clinton was in two minds until Al Gore walked in, laughed and said: ‘That’s a no-brainer. Of course it’s a violation of international law, that’s why it’s a covert action. The guy is a terrorist. Go grab his ass.’”<sup>28</sup>

“Asked recently about the CIA’s use of enhanced interrogation in secret prisons, George Tenet, the CIA’s director until 2004, replied that the agency’s widely condemned rendition programme had saved lives, disrupted plots and provided ‘invaluable’ information in the war against terrorism. Indeed, while denying the use of full-blown torture, he said that the programme on its own was ‘worth more than the FBI, the CIA and the National Security Agency put together have been able to tell us.’”<sup>29</sup>

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## Assignment 8: Armed Intervention and Military Instruments

“‘We should be prepared to defend our own shores’ [President Robert A.] Taft warned, ‘but we should not undertake to defend the ideas of democracy in foreign countries.’ Otherwise the United States would become a ‘meddlesome Mattie, interfering in the trouble throughout the world,’ with ‘our fingers in every pie.’”<sup>30</sup>

“Sometimes, countries commit crimes ‘on so vast a scale and of such peculiar horror,’ a president of the United States declared, that America had a duty to step in. Depending on the ‘degree of the atrocity and upon our power to remedy it,’ it might even on occasion require the ‘force of arms...to put a stop to intolerable conditions.’” The year, 1904; the president, Theodore Roosevelt; the cause, Spanish atrocities in Cuba.”<sup>31</sup>

“...both American political parties have been complicit in the vigorous assertion of American primacy that fuels the surprising continuity in the militarization of foreign policy. The differences between the policies of Clinton and Bush, and between the attitudes of principal figures in the Bush administration and those of the foreign policy advisers that surrounded John Kerry, were smaller than their political rhetoric implied. It has been said that the Clinton policy was ‘multilaterally if we can, unilaterally if we must,’ and that Bush’s is the reverse—which means that they disagree over process and the priority placed on cooperation, but not nearly so much on the outcomes sought. Democrats push primacy with a human face, dressed up in the rhetoric of multilateralism, and they use military power with much hesitancy and handwringing. Republicans push primacy ‘in your face,’ with unapologetic unilateralism, and they swagger brazenly. To a surprising degree, however, the two sides come out in the same place. Many liberals supported the war against Iraq. Even Kerry and his vice-presidential running mate John Edwards voted for the authorization for war.”<sup>32</sup>

“If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see further into the future.”

—U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in an interview, 19 February 1998<sup>33</sup>

“The United Nations is an organization that is still growing and maturing. It often lacks the cohesion to enforce its own mandates. And when Security Council members use the veto, on occasion, for reasons of narrow-minded interests, it cannot act. In Kosovo, the Russians did not approve NATO military action because of political, ethnic, and religious ties to the Serbs. The United States therefore could not obtain a Security Council resolution in favor of the action necessary to stop the dislocation and ethnic cleansing of more than a million Kosovar Albanians. However, most of the world was with us because there was a genuine emergency with thousands dead and a million driven from their homes.

—Floor Speech of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton on S.J. Res. 45, A Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq  
As Delivered on October 10, 2002

“If the past 25 years have taught us anything, it is that few foreign-policy problems can be solved simply by blowing things up. The United States is still unsurpassed at that sort of thing, but the real challenge is devising political solutions to conflicts once the guns have fallen



silent. We've been singularly bad at this in recent decades, and Trump's disdain for diplomacy and efforts to gut the State Department will just impair us even more."<sup>34</sup>

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## **Assignment 9: Economic Instruments**

“...on the cusp of the Napoleonic Wars, Jefferson confronted a world in which most trade was micromanaged by London and Paris. His response? He threatened to divert goods from one European power to another, as a way of guaranteeing the independence of American traders—and, more important, of the nation itself. The United States at the time was a small country, so this initial effort had limited effect. But looking ahead, Jefferson imagined a day when the president’s power to regulate foreign commerce would serve, in Adams’s words, as ‘the machinery for doing away with navies, armies, and wars.’ The goal was idealistic; the means, coercive. In place of military power, America would use trade power.”<sup>35</sup>

“The policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.”

-U.S. Government statement, 3 July 1900<sup>36</sup>

“The International Monetary and Financial Conference of the United and Associated Nations was convened in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, on July 1, 1944. By the time the conference ended on July 22...it had defined the outlines of the postwar international economic system. The conference also resulted in the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, or the World Bank)—the Bretton Woods twins...the central elements of the system outlined at Bretton Woods were the establishment of convertibility of currencies and of fixed but adjustable exchange rates, and the encouragement of international flows of capital for productive purpose...

The dollar became the key to the American managerial role [of the postwar international economic system]...Indeed, it was preferable to gold. Dollars earned interest...the problem in the immediate postwar years was how to get American dollars into the hands of those who needed them. One mechanism was the Marshall Plan...”<sup>37</sup>

“During the Cold War, lowering barriers to trade and investment, granting generous foreign aid, and strengthening international economic institutions—all in close cooperation with U.S. allies—were a central part of Washington’s fight against communism. After the Soviet Union collapsed, the administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton geared much of their foreign and domestic policy to enhancing U.S. competitiveness in global markets and to spreading U.S.-style capitalism abroad.”<sup>38</sup>

“Iran’s removal of IAEA seals from machinery at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility and brazen celebrations of nuclear achievements seemed to galvanize international organizations and western governments. The Governing Board of the IAEA issued a damning report to the UN Security Council recommending economic sanctions against Iran...Throughout 2007 and 2008, the Bush administration continued to demand a suspension of all enrichment and reprocessing as a precondition for reducing the sanctions regime...In September 2009, a report by intelligence agencies suggested Iran had enough nuclear fuel to make a rapid drive for a nuclear weapon. Weeks later, western intelligence agencies identified another secret plan designed for uranium

enrichment in Iran. President Obama sought out, and attained, Russian and Chinese cooperation in lending pressure on Iran to stop its clandestine weapons development program.”<sup>39</sup>

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**Assignment 10: The Future of American Foreign Policy**

“The United States is in danger of becoming merely first among major powers and heading to a level somewhere between its current still-exalted position and that of China today. This would be bad news for both the United States and the world. Were this to happen over time, it would leave nations without a leader to sustain world order and help solve international problems. No single country or group of countries, and no international institution, could conceivably replace the United States in this role—and leaders the world over know this well.”<sup>40</sup>

“It was in the [2009] West Point speech that Obama first hinted at a change in the international role America had been playing since World War II. The United States ‘has underwritten global security for over six decades,’ the president said, also noting that ‘we have not always been thanked for these efforts.’ Soon afterward, Obama said vaguely that America was entering a new age. To America’s old friends in Europe and Japan, these passages were unsettling. In the past, presidents had usually depicted America’s leadership role in the world as enduring, not something of possibly limited duration. They generally vowed that America would do whatever it took, regardless of cost. Since the end of World War II, presidents tended to say that America’s alliances, such as NATO and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, were what protected global security. Now Obama was abandoning the old formulas to say that, really, it was the United States that had been maintaining the international order—and yet it might not do so forever. ‘For the first time, I can envision the United States returning to isolationism,’ remarked one European journalist privately after listening to the West Point speech.”<sup>41</sup>

JONATHAN KARL: Do you think that Europe, right now, is a safe place for Americans to travel?

TRUMP: Well, I’m the only one that predicted it. I said Brussels is a hellhole and *The New York Times* mocked me and—and said, a couple of months ago, *The New York Times* did a big story about how dare Donald Trump say Brussels is a hellhole, how dare they? And then all of a sudden, it came out the attack took place in Brussels. I understand what’s going on around the world far better than these politicians do. I’m all over it. And I have friends that are all over the world. I will tell you, I was—I was really hit hard by *The New York Times* in an article, how dare I attack Brussels? And now this happened. And, you know, the biggest thing on the Internet, one of the big things on the Internet was that Trump was 100 percent right about Brussels...

KARL: Now, you—you gave a series of interviews, *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, on—on foreign policy. In both of those, you suggested that NATO, uh, needs to do more to carry its weight...

TRUMP: I think NATO is obsolete. NATO was done at a time you had the Soviet Union, which was obviously larger—much larger than Russia is today. I’m not saying Russia is not a threat. But we have other threats. We have the threat of terrorism. And NATO doesn’t discuss terrorism. NATO’s not meant for terrorism. NATO doesn’t have the right countries in it for terrorism. And what I’m saying is that we pay, number one, a totally disproportionate share of NATO...And I mean Ukraine is very far away from us...when Russia is going into Ukraine, we immediately get NATO...and we’re constantly telling Russia what to do. And it’s all fine if everybody partakes. But I don’t see other people partaking. And, by the way, I took a lot of heat for saying that and now everyone is agreeing with me. I mean I’m reading—I’m reading pages

of—of, uh, of media where now people are agreeing with me...Now everyone is saying Trump is right.<sup>42</sup>

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