



Web application firewalls: Analysis of OWASP modsecurity core rule set and detection logic




Josna Joseph

Agenda

- What is a Web Application firewall?
- Operation modes & workflow
- Detection Logic
- What is Core rule set?
- Anomaly scoring/Thresholds
- Paranoia levels
- Handling of false positive


What is WAF?

“A WAF may be a hardware/software that sits between the Client and Web application in order to determine/block malicious requests before they are sent to the web application”.



Layers of Insecurity

The Seven Layers of OSI



Modes: Passive or Reactive?

Passive:


- WAF will act like as ID.
- Used during the first days, to prevent real users being blocked by false positives

Reactive:

- It will block the malicious requests.
- In production environments most WAF systems runs in reactive mode


Operation models and work flow

- Negative model (black list based)
- Positive model (white list based)
- Hybrid model (mix positive and negative model protection)






Workflow




How detection logic works?



/^[Reg]ular[Ex]pressions\$/

Sequence of symbols and characters expressing a string or pattern to be searched for within a longer piece of text.



Weak places in regular expressions

- Regexp should be case-insensitive (**?i:**)
- It is possible to bypass regex using upper or lower cases in words

Vulnerable regex example: http

Bypass example: hTtP

Weak places in regular expressions

- Number of repetitions of set or group **{}** should be carefully used,
- It is possible to bypass such limitation by lowering or increasing specified numbers.

Vulnerable regex example: `a{1,5}`

Bypass example: `aaaaaa` (6 times)

Weak places in regular expressions

- Regexp should not be vulnerable to **ReDoS**.
- Produces a denial-of-service by providing a regular expression that takes a very long time to evaluate.

Vulnerable regex example: (a+)+

Bypass example: aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa!

Weak places in regular expressions

- Usage of the wrong syntax in POSIX character classes

Vulnerable regex example: `a[digit]b`

Bypass example: `aab`

Regular expressions: Security cheatsheet

<https://github.com/attackercan/regexp-security-cheatsheet>

GitHub, Inc. [US] | <https://github.com/attackercan/regexp-security-cheatsheet>

attackercan new markdown parser

Latest commit ec7d510 on Aug 21, 2017

RegexpSecurityParser

Upd: now counting *reg_* (ereg_replace etc)

2 years ago

README.md

new markdown parser

a year ago

README.md


Regexp Security Cheatsheet

Research was done to find "weak places" in regular expressions of Web Application Firewalls (WAFs).
Repository contains SAST, which can help you to find security vulnerabilities in custom regular expressions in own projects.
Contribution is highly welcomed.

High severity issues:

#	Requirement	Vulnerable regex example	Bypass example
1	Regexp should avoid using <code>^</code> (alternative: <code>\A</code>) and <code>\$</code> (alternative: <code>\Z</code>) symbols, which are metacharacters for start and end of a string. It is possible to bypass regex by inserting any symbol in front or after regex.	<code>(^a a\$)</code>	<code>%20a%20</code>
2	Regexp should be case-insensitive: <code>(?i:</code> or <code>/regex/i</code> . It is possible to bypass regex using upper or lower cases in words. Modsecurity transformation commands		

Fingerprinting WAF



Tricks to detect WAF

- Cookie values
- HTTP Response code.
- Connection close
- Server cloaking



Cookies

Example – Citrix Netscaler:

```
GET /news.asp?PagelD=254 HTTP/1.1
Host: www.SomeSite.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.2; en-US; rv:1.8.1.12)
Accept: image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Keep-Alive: 300
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.SomeSite.com
Cookie:ASPSESSIONCWKSPSVLTF=OUESYHFAPQLFMNBTKJHGQGXM;
ns_af=xL9sPs2RIJMF5GhtbxSnol+xU0uSx;
ns_af_.SomeSite.com_%2F_wat=KXMhOJ7DvSHNDkBAHDwMSNsFHMSFHEmSr?nmEkaen19mlrw
Bio1/lsrcV810C&
```




HTTP Response: Dot Defender

Dot Defender [HTTP Response Codes]



HTTP Response: WebKnight



Profiling WAF using WAFw00f.py

WAFW00F identifies and fingerprints Web Application Firewall (WAF) products.




```

      _____^_____  

    //7//./'\_//7//./'\_//7//./'\_//  

| V V // o // | V V // @ // @ //  

| _n_, '\_n_/_/_ | _n_, '\_n_/_/_  

      ^_____  

      .....  

WAFW00F - Web Application Firewall Detection Tool  

By Sandro Gauci & Wendel G. Henrique  

Can test for these WAFs:  

Profense  

NetContinuum  

Incapsula WAF  

CloudFlare  

USP Secure Entry Server  

Cisco ACE XML Gateway  

Barracuda Application Firewall  

Art of Defence HyperGuard  

BinarySec  

Teros WAF  

F5 BIG-IP LTM  

F5 BIG-IP APM  

F5 BIG-IP ASM  

F5 FirePass  

F5 Trafficshield  

InfoGuard Airlock  

Citrix NetScaler  

Trustwave ModSecurity  

IBM Web Application Security  

IBM DataPower  

DenyALL WAF  

Applicure dotDefender  

Juniper WebApp Secure  

Microsoft URLScan  

Aqtronix WebKnight  

eEye Digital Security SecureIIS  

Imperva SecureSphere  

Microsoft ISA Server  

root@sunnyhoi:~#

```

Profiling WAF using WAFw00f.py

wafw00f <http://www.targetsite.com>

```
root@sunnyhoi:~# wafw00f [REDACTED]
Files      ^      ^

  // // / . ' \ / _ // // // / , ' \ / _ /
 | V V // o // _ / | V V // 0 // 0 // _ /
 | _n , ' _n // _ / | _n , ' \ , ' \ , ' \ /
                                     <
                                     ...

WAFW00F - Web Application Firewall Detection Tool

By Sandro Gauci & Wendel G. Henrique

Checking [REDACTED]
The site [REDACTED] is behind CloudFlare
Number of requests: 1
root@sunnyhoi:~#
```




OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set

THE 1ST LINE OF DEFENSE

OWASP CRS

A set of generic attack detection rules for use with ModSecurity or compatible web application firewalls.

```
./base_rules:
modsecurity_40_generic_attacks.data
modsecurity_41_sql_injection_attacks.data
modsecurity_46_et_sql_injection.data
modsecurity_46_et_web_rules.data
modsecurity_50_outbound.data
modsecurity_crs_20_protocol_violations.conf
modsecurity_crs_21_protocol_anomalies.conf
modsecurity_crs_23_request_limits.conf
modsecurity_crs_30_http_policy.conf
modsecurity_crs_35_bad_robots.conf
modsecurity_crs_40_generic_attacks.conf
modsecurity_crs_41_phpids_converter.conf
modsecurity_crs_41_phpids_filters.conf
modsecurity_crs_41_sql_injection_attacks.conf
modsecurity_crs_41_xss_attacks.conf
modsecurity_crs_45_trojans.conf
modsecurity_crs_46_et_sql_injection.conf
modsecurity_crs_46_et_web_rules.conf
modsecurity_crs_47_common_exceptions.conf
modsecurity_crs_48_local_exceptions.conf
modsecurity_crs_49_enforcement.conf
modsecurity_crs_50_outbound.conf
modsecurity_crs_60_correlation.conf

./optional_rules:
modsecurity_crs_20_protocol_violations.conf
modsecurity_crs_21_protocol_anomalies.conf
modsecurity_crs_40_generic_attacks.conf
modsecurity_crs_42_comment_span.conf
modsecurity_crs_42_tight_security.conf
modsecurity_crs_55_marketing.conf

./util:
httpd-guardian.pl  modsec-clanscan.pl  runav.pl
```

Installation

- Clone the repository

```
$> git clone
```

```
https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs
```

- Copy the example config:

```
$> cp crs-setup.conf.example crs-setup.conf
```

- Include in server config(depends on path)

```
Include /etc/httpd/modsec.d/owasp-modsecurity-crs/crs-setup.conf
```

```
Include /etc/httpd/modsec.d/owasp-modsecurity-crs/rules/*.conf
```



Anomaly Scoring

Adjustable Limit • False Positives

Anomaly scoring

- In version 2.x of the CRS, OWASP introduced the concept of anomaly scoring as a better way to detect attacks more accurately.
- Each rule is built in such a way that it only holds one piece of the puzzle and is assigned a score.



- WAF parses a request through the multiple WAF rules .
- it keeps track of the rules that fire and adds the score of each rule to compute the total anomaly score for a request.
- The WAF will then compare the request anomaly score with an inbound risk score rule threshold.
- If the score exceeded, the request is more likely to be malicious,
- Otherwise the request is judged to be safe.

Paranoia levels:

- The Paranoia Level (PL) setting in `crs-setup.conf` allows us to choose the desired level of rule checks.
- Can adjust the Paranoia Level in the configuration file(`crs-setup.conf`).
- With each paranoia level increase, the CRS enables additional rules.
- Higher paranoia levels also increase the possibility of blocking some legitimate traffic

Paranoia levels:

Paranoia Level 1: Minimal amount of False Positives

Basic security

Paranoia Level 2: More rules, fair amount of FPs

Elevated security level

Paranoia Level 3: Specialised rules, more FPs

Online banking level security

Paranoia Level 4: Insane rules, lots of FPs

Nuclear power plant level security

Handling of false positives

- Fight FP's with Rule Exclusions.

<https://www.netnea.com>

Q&A



