




Tunneling Traffic: ICMP and DNS Write Up

- Traffic Tunneling (Port Forwarding) transfers data and resources to a network.
- Provide anonymity and traffic security.
- Adversary can use tunneling to bypass security parameters using trusted protocols that are used in everyday traffic (ICMP and DNS)

ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) Analysis

- Reports network communication issues.
- Can be used for DoS (Denial of Services)
- Can be used for data exfiltration and C2 tunneling activities.
- ICMP tunneling attacks can start after a malware execution or vulnerability exploitation.
- Packets can be used to establish a C2 connection (TCP, HTTP, or SSH).

Notes	Wireshark filters
Global search	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• icmp
"ICMP" options for grabbing the low-hanging fruits: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Packet length.• ICMP destination addresses.• Encapsulated protocol signs in ICMP payload.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• data.len > 64 and



DNS (Domain Name System) Analysis

- Design to translate/convert IP domain addresses to IP addresses.
- Used for exfiltration and C2 activities.
- Attacks start after a malware execution or vulnerability exploitation

Notes	Wireshark Filter
Global search	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • dns
"DNS" options for grabbing the low-hanging fruits:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • dns contains "dnscat" • dns.qry.name.len > 15 and !mdns
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Query length. • Anomalous and non-regular names in DNS addresses. • Long DNS addresses with encoded subdomain addresses. 	

- Known patterns like dnscat and dns2tcp.
 - Statistical analysis like the anomalous volume of DNS requests for a particular target.
- !mdns:** Disable local link device queries.

The image shows a Wireshark packet capture of DNS traffic. The packet list pane displays a series of DNS queries and responses. The packet details pane for packet 33051 shows a Standard query for dnscat.3b80015aaf45c2a02977230080b68d0ea3. The packet bytes pane shows the raw data of the query.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
33051	52387750.081...	192.168.253.1	192.168.253.128	DNS	101	Standard query 0x536b MX dnscat.3b80015aaf45c2a02977230080b68d0ea3
33052	52387750.084...	192.168.253.128	192.168.253.1	DNS	158	Standard query response 0x536b MX dnscat.3b80015aaf45c2a02977230080b68d0ea3
33055	52387751.089...	192.168.253.1	192.168.253.128	DNS	101	Standard query 0x3402 TXT dnscat.473c015aaf45c2a02977230080b68d0ea3
33056	52387751.090...	192.168.253.128	192.168.253.1	DNS	148	Standard query response 0x3402 TXT dnscat.473c015aaf45c2a02977230080b68d0ea3
33061	52387752.095...	192.168.253.1	192.168.253.128	DNS	101	Standard query 0x68bc CNAME dnscat.2cdd015aaf45c2a02977230080b68d0ea3
33062	52387752.096...	192.168.253.128	192.168.253.1	DNS	156	Standard query response 0x68bc CNAME dnscat.2cdd015aaf45c2a02977230080b68d0ea3
33065	52387753.099...	192.168.253.1	192.168.253.128	DNS	101	Standard query 0x2102 TXT dnscat.19fa015aaf45c2a02977230080b68d0ea3
33066	52387753.100...	192.168.253.128	192.168.253.1	DNS	148	Standard query response 0x2102 TXT dnscat.19fa015aaf45c2a02977230080b68d0ea3
33069	52387754.105...	192.168.253.1	192.168.253.128	DNS	101	Standard query 0x39b2 CNAME dnscat.3c0e015aaf45c2a02977230080b68d0ea3
33070	52387754.106...	192.168.253.128	192.168.253.1	DNS	156	Standard query response 0x39b2 CNAME dnscat.3c0e015aaf45c2a02977230080b68d0ea3
33073	52387755.112...	192.168.253.1	192.168.253.128	DNS	101	Standard query 0x59c3 MX dnscat.60ee015aaf45c2a02977230080b68d0ea3
33074	52387755.113...	192.168.253.128	192.168.253.1	DNS	158	Standard query response 0x59c3 MX dnscat.60ee015aaf45c2a02977230080b68d0ea3

Frame 33051: 101 bytes on wire (808 bits), 101 bytes captured (808 bits) on interface 0

Ethernet II, Src: 00:50:56:c0:00:08, Dst: 00:0c:29:e6:4d:4a

Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.253.1, Dst: 192.168.253.128

User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 65518, Dst Port: 53

Domain Name System (query)

Transaction ID: 0x536b

Flags: 0x0100 Standard query

Questions: 1

Answer RRs: 0

Authority RRs: 0

Additional RRs: 0

Queries

- dnscat.3b80015aaf45c2a02977230080b68d0ea3: type MX, class IN

Name: dnscat.3b80015aaf45c2a02977230080b68d0ea3

[Name Length: 41]

[Label Count: 2]

Type: MX (15) (Mail exchange)


Class: IN (0x0001)

[Response In: 33052]

1. Which protocol is used in ICMP tunneling?

- Since we are looking for a protocol that is used in the ICMP tunneling, there are several protocols to look for – ftp, http, tcp, and ssh.
- We can input a filter that filters traffic to identify which protocol is being used.
- (data.len > 64) and (icmp contains “ftp” or icmp contains “ssh” or icmp contains “http” or icmp contains “tcp”) <--- this is filtering traffic with packets that have more than 64 bytes of data. Since ICMP echo request uses small payloads,

payloads larger than 64 bytes is a sign of unauthorized data being carried. And we are looking for protocols that can be used for tunneling exfiltration.



No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
46	32.726234	192.168.154.131	192.168.154.132	ICMP	886	Echo (ping) request id=
48	32.728764	192.168.154.132	192.168.154.131	ICMP	878	Echo (ping) reply id=
52	32.741523	192.168.154.132	192.168.154.131	ICMP	814	Echo (ping) reply id=

- We have 3 packets displayed. Now we must inspect each of those packets to see which protocol is being used.
- From the first traffic, using cyber chef to decode the hex dump, we see multiple ssh protocols being executed.



- [illegible]



BAKE!

We can use the `dns.qry.name.len > 15` mdns, however since we are looking for a suspicious domain, we should increase the size to reduce the amount of network traffic that will be displayed from the names of packets with less than 16 characters.

- `dns.qry.name.len > 40 && !mdns` <--- filters packets with domain names greater than 40 characters and we want to exclude local devices “!mdns” (Multicast DNS)

The image shows a Wireshark packet capture window titled 'dns.pcap'. The filter bar at the top contains the expression `dns.qry.name.len > 40 && !mdns`. The packet list below shows a series of DNS queries from source IP 192.168.94.132 to destination IP 192.168.94.131. The 'Info' column for the selected packet (No. 2622) shows 'Standard query 0x0'.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
2621	622.883450	192.168.94.132	192.168.94.131	DNS	222	Standard query 0x0
2622	623.361035	192.168.94.131	192.168.94.132	DNS	400	Standard query res
2627	623.466318	192.168.94.132	192.168.94.131	DNS	153	Standard query 0x0
2628	623.467387	192.168.94.131	192.168.94.132	DNS	217	Standard query res
2633	623.547710	192.168.94.132	192.168.94.131	DNS	108	Standard query 0x0
2634	623.548100	192.168.94.131	192.168.94.132	DNS	172	Standard query res
2639	623.608224	192.168.94.132	192.168.94.131	DNS	108	Standard query 0x0
2640	623.608600	192.168.94.131	192.168.94.132	DNS	172	Standard query res
2645	623.662623	192.168.94.132	192.168.94.131	DNS	108	Standard query 0x0
2646	623.663029	192.168.94.131	192.168.94.132	DNS	170	Standard query res
2651	623.726815	192.168.94.132	192.168.94.131	DNS	108	Standard query 0x0
2652	623.727150	192.168.94.131	192.168.94.132	DNS	170	Standard query res
2657	623.783874	192.168.94.132	192.168.94.131	DNS	108	Standard query 0x0
2658	623.784373	192.168.94.131	192.168.94.132	DNS	170	Standard query res
2663	623.844805	192.168.94.132	192.168.94.131	DNS	108	Standard query 0x0

- We can see here that there is a lot of traffic coming from IP “192[.]168[.]94[.]xxx”
- Now let's decode the hex dump using cyber chef to determine what is the domain name of the adversary

The image shows the CyberChef web interface. The 'Input' tab is active, displaying a hex dump of a packet. The 'Output' tab shows the decoded text, which is a domain name.

```

0000  41 41 33 45 34 41 33 37 36 41 32 44 39 31 36 35 CR
0070  45 37 38 30 39 45 3f 32 30 33 30 37 34 32 45 44 CR
0080  41 31 42 35 31 33 42 46 36 38 44 46 44 36 37 35 CR
0090  45 38 35 35 41 32 41 41 36 31 42 32 42 43 45 30 CR
00a0  41 37 38 38 39 38 31 31 44 31 32 42 33 34 38 30 CR
00b0  36 42 39 41 31 38 14 34 34 31 31 31 39 45 39 34 CR
00c0  36 32 38 45 41 33 35 46 46 46 39 09 64 61 74 61 CR
00d0  65 78 66 69 6c 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 0f 00 01 CR
  
```

Output:

```

NUL FF )ET84Y NUL FF )WVT VBS NUL E NUL NUL DHI NUL NUL • DCI 2 6A ^ ^ A ^ ^ 8h NUL 5 NUL % ; 2 NUL
ETX SOHNUL NUL SOHNUL NUL NUL NUL NUL NUL NUL ?
A8D603B0DE00000009AF29E902AB216780EAFD10AA3E4A376A2D9165
E7809E?
2030742EDA1B513BF68DFD675E855A2AA61B2BCE0A7889811D12B3480
6B9A18dc441119E94628EA35FFF9 dataexfil ETX com NUL NUL SZ NUL SOH
  
```

Answer: dataexfil[.]com

