

Lab Assignment 2

Volatility Memory Forensics

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Cridex.vmem file

- ♦ `volatility -f cridex . vmem imageinfo` -

To get the information about this image file

```
D:\cyber\volatility_2.6>volatility -f cridex.vmem imageinfo
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
INFO : volatility.debug : Determining profile based on KDBG search...
      Suggested Profile(s) : WinXPSP2x86, WinXPSP3x86 (Instantiated with WinXPSP2x86)
      AS Layer1 : IA32PagedMemoryPae (Kernel AS)
      AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (D:\cyber\volatility_2.6\cridex.vmem)
      PAE type : PAE
      DTB : 0x2fe000L
      KDBG : 0x80545ae0L
      Number of Processors : 1
      Image Type (Service Pack) : 3
      KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xffdff000L
      KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xffdf0000L
      Image date and time : 2012-07-22 02:45:08 UTC+0000
      Image local date and time : 2012-07-21 22:45:08 -0400
```

- ♦ `volatility -f cridex . vmem pslist` - This command give us list of all processes running (it doesnot include all the hidden processes and to get hidden processes use *psxview*)
- ♦ From the pid and ppid we can tell if a cretain process is parent / child.

```
D:\cyber\volatility_2.6>volatility -f cridex.vmem pslist
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Offset(V)  Name                PID  PPID  Thds  Hnds  Sess  Wow64  Start                Exit
-----
0x823c89c8 System              4    0    53   240  -----  0
0x822f1020 smss.exe          368   4     3    19  -----  0 2012-07-22 02:42:31 UTC+0000
0x822a0598 csrss.exe          584  368    9   326    0    0 2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
0x82298700 winlogon.exe        608  368   23   519    0    0 2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
0x81e2ab28 services.exe      652  608   16   243    0    0 2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
0x81e2a3b8 lsass.exe           664  608   24   330    0    0 2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
0x82311360 svchost.exe         824  652   20   194    0    0 2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
0x81e29ab8 svchost.exe         908  652    9   226    0    0 2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
0x823001d0 svchost.exe        1004 652   64  1118    0    0 2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
```

- ♦ `volatility -f cridex.vmem pstree`

- ♦ Observation :

- ♦ reader_sl.exe is the child of explorer process so it should have formed after 2:42:36
- ♦ So they shouldn't have initiated at same time so this is a suspicious file .
- ♦ we can get this observation from pslist as well but pstree gives better understanding of the parent child relationship

```
D:\cyber\volatility_2.6>volatility -f cridex.vmem pstree
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Name                                     Pid  PPid  Thds  Hnds  Time
-----
0x823c89c8:System                        4      0    53   240  1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC+0000
. 0x822f1020:smss.exe                    368     4     3    19  2012-07-22 02:42:31 UTC+0000
.. 0x82298700:winlogon.exe                608    368    23   519  2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
... 0x81e2ab28:services.exe               652    608    16   243  2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
.... 0x821dfda0:svchost.exe               1056    652     5    60  2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
..... 0x81eb17b8:spoolsv.exe              1512    652    14   113  2012-07-22 02:42:36 UTC+0000
..... 0x81e29ab8:svchost.exe               908    652     9   226  2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
..... 0x823001d0:svchost.exe              1004    652    64   1118  2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
..... 0x8205bda0:wuaucflt.exe              1588   1004     5   132  2012-07-22 02:44:01 UTC+0000
..... 0x821fcd0:wuaucflt.exe              1136   1004     8   173  2012-07-22 02:43:46 UTC+0000
..... 0x82311360:svchost.exe               824    652    20   194  2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
..... 0x820e8da0:alg.exe                   788    652     7   104  2012-07-22 02:43:01 UTC+0000
..... 0x82295650:svchost.exe              1220    652    15   197  2012-07-22 02:42:35 UTC+0000
... 0x81e2a3b8:lsass.exe                  664    608    24   330  2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
.. 0x822a0598:csrss.exe                   584    368     9   326  2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
0x821dea70:explorer.exe                 1484   1464    17   415  2012-07-22 02:42:36 UTC+0000
. 0x81e7bda0:reader_sl.exe                1640   1484     5    39  2012-07-22 02:42:36 UTC+0000
```

- ♦ `volatility -f cridex.vmem cmdline -p 1640` - to get the path of this reader_sl.exe file

- ♦ Observation :

- It shows that it is coming from adobe

```
D:\cyber\volatility_2.6>volatility -f cridex.vmem cmdline -p 1640
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
*****
reader_sl.exe pid: 1640
Command line : "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Reader 9.0\Reader\Reader_sl.exe"
```

- ♦ `volatility -f cridex.vmem connscan` - To know with what all external ip addresses this file is making connections


```
D:\cyber\volatility_2.6>volatility -f cridex.vmem connscan
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Offset(P)  Local Address          Remote Address          Pid
-----
0x02087620 172.16.112.128:1038    41.168.5.140:8080      1484
0x023a8008 172.16.112.128:1037    125.19.103.198:8080    1484
```

- ♦ `volatility -f cridex.vmem procdump -p 1640 --dump-dir.` - This command creates a procedure dump of the reader_sl.exe

- ```
D:\cyber\volatility_2.6>volatility -f cridex.vmem procdump -p 1640 --dump-dir .
```

| Process(V) | ImageBase  | Name          | Result                  |
|------------|------------|---------------|-------------------------|
| 0x81e7bda0 | 0x00400000 | reader_sl.exe | OK: executable.1640.exe |

Using virustotal we can check the percentage of virus in this procdump file



- Here in details we can see what other file names this same

**Names** ⓘ

- executable.1640.exe
- reader\_sl.exe
- AcroSpeedLaunch.exe
- file1.exe
- executable.1640.exe.vir
- executable.1640 Троянец.11
- 1640.ex\_
- module.1640.207bda0.400000.dll
- executable.1640exe
- virusjuga.awokawokawok

virus has been seen

- ```
volatility -f cridex.vmem malfind -p 1640 -D.
```

 – finds the code that malfind assumes as corrupted and now this is being dumped in a directory D We can upload this on virustotal to check.



- ```
volatility -f cridex.vmem memdump -p 1640 --dump-dir.
```

 – This

generates memory dump of the file

- ♦ `strings 1640.dmp > 1640.txt` – this creates a txt file with all the strings in text format

```
D:\cyber\volatility_2.6>volatility -f cridex.vmem memdump -p 1640 --dump-dir .
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6

Writing reader_sl.exe [1640] to 1640.dmp

D:\cyber\volatility_2.6>strings 1640.dmp > 1640.txt

Strings v2.54 - Search for ANSI and Unicode strings in binary images.
Copyright (C) 1999-2021 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com
```

- ♦ `strings 1640.dmp | grep -i "41.168.5.140:8080"` – Checks if the ip we got from connscan is present in this mem dump file.

```
D:\cyber\volatility_2.6>strings 1640.dmp | grep -i "41.168.5.140:8080"
http://41.168.5.140:8080/zb/v_01_a/in/
Host: 41.168.5.140:8080
|
```

- Run this ip on <http://passivedns.mnemonic.no>
- ♦ Conclusion
  - In the above process we got to know that the Cridex.vmem file has virus in reader\_sl.exe file and we also found to which ip it is making connection with.

♦ Stage 2 :The malware can persist on both ram and hard disk

### Checking for persistence

- ♦ `volatility -f cridex.vmem hivelist` – to check if this virus is trying to

persist

```
D:\cyber\volatility_2.6>volatility -f cridex.vmem hivelist
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Virtual Physical Name

0xe18e5b60 0x093f8b60 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\Robert\Local Settings\Application Data\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat
0xe1a19b60 0x0a5a9b60 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\Robert\NTUSER.DAT
0xe18398d0 0x08a838d0 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\LocalService\Local Settings\Application Data\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat
0xe18614d0 0x08e624d0 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\LocalService\NTUSER.DAT
0xe183bb60 0x08e2db60 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\NetworkService\Local Settings\Application Data\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat
0xe17f2b60 0x08519b60 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\NetworkService\NTUSER.DAT
0xe1570510 0x07669510 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\software
0xe1571008 0x0777f008 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\default
0xe15709b8 0x076699b8 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\SECURITY
0xe15719e8 0x0777f9e8 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\SAM
0xe13ba008 0x02e4b008 [no name]
0xe1035b60 0x02ac3b60 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\system
0xe102e008 0x02a7d008 [no name]
```

This is showing registry info



- ♦ `volatility -f cridex.vmem printkey -K`

"Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" – this cmd to get key

```

Registry: \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\Robert\NTUSER.DAT
Key name: Run (S)
Last updated: 2012-07-22 02:31:51 UTC+0000

Subkeys:

Values:
REG_SZ KB00207877.exe : (S) "C:\Documents and Settings\Robert\Application Data\KB00207877.exe"

```

- This is suspicious bec it comes from documents from user Robert
- This was the file that was brought into hardisk which persisted the malware.

## shylock.vmem file

- ♦ `pslist` :

- ♦ Observation :

- here we can see that parent and child are created at same time. There are other processes also like this .

```
0x814c9b40 winlogon.exe 636 384 16 498 0 0 2011-09-26 01:33:35 UTC+0000
0x81794d08 services.exe 680 636 15 271 0 0 2011-09-26 01:33:35 UTC+0000
0x814a2cd0 lsass.exe 592 636 24 356 0 0 2011-09-26 01:33:35 UTC+0000
```

- here explorer doesn't have a parent. Now this is going to be our first priority to check rather than all above proccesses.

```
0x813685e0 spoolsv.exe 1516 680 14 159 0 0 2011-09-26 01:33:39 UTC+0000
0x818f5cd0 explorer.exe 1752 1696 32 680 0 0 2011-09-26 01:33:45 UTC+0000
0x815c9638 svchost.exe 1812 680 4 102 0 0 2011-09-26 01:33:46 UTC+0000
```

- ♦ `cmdline` :

- We got the pid and its path

```

explorer.exe pid: 1752
Command line : C:\WINDOWS\Explorer.EXE

```

- ♦ `connscan` :

- ♦ Observation :

- All outside ips this explorer is contacting

```
D:\cyber\volatility_2.6>volatility -f shylock.vmem connscan
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Offset(P) Local Address Remote Address Pid

0x014f6ab0 10.0.0.109:1072 209.190.4.84:443 1752
0x01507380 10.0.0.109:1073 209.190.4.84:443 1752
0x016c2b00 10.0.0.109:1065 184.173.252.227:443 1752
0x017028a0 10.0.0.109:1067 184.173.252.227:443 1752
0x01858cb0 10.0.0.109:1068 209.190.4.84:443 1752
```

handles in whole memdump but I gave the explorer

- `dlllist -p 1752` id  
to get its dump
- Observation :
  - we can see it is running some cryptographic processes which explorer is not supposed to do.

```
0x77120000 0x8b000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\OLEAUT32.dll
0x7e290000 0x173000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\SHDOCVW.dll
0x77a80000 0x95000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\CRYPT32.dll
0x77b20000 0x12000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\MSASN1.dll
0x754d0000 0x80000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\CRYPTUI.dll
0x5b860000 0x55000 0xffff C:\WINDOWS\system32\NETAPI32.dll
```

- `malfind` :
  - it gave all the processes which have mlaware

```
D:\cyber\volatility_2.6>volatility -f shylock.vmem malfind
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Process: csrss.exe Pid: 612 Address: 0x7f6f0000
Vad Tag: Vad Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
Flags: Protection: 6

0x7f6f0000 c8 00 00 00 5c 01 00 00 ff ee ff ee 08 70 00 00
0x7f6f0010 08 00 00 00 00 fe 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 20 00 00
0x7f6f0020 00 02 00 00 00 20 00 00 8d 01 00 00 ff ef fd 7f
0x7f6f0030 03 00 08 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

0x7f6f0000 c8000000 ENTER 0x0, 0x0
0x7f6f0004 5c POP ESP
0x7f6f0005 0100 ADD [EAX], EAX
0x7f6f0007 00ff ADD BH, BH
0x7f6f0009 ee OUT DX, AL
0x7f6f000a ff DB 0xff
0x7f6f000b ee OUT DX, AL
0x7f6f000c 087000 OR [EAX+0x0], DH
0x7f6f000f 0008 ADD [EAX], CL
0x7f6f0011 0000 ADD [EAX], AL
0x7f6f0013 0000 ADD [EAX], AL
0x7f6f0015 fe00 INC BYTE [EAX]
```

- `malfind -p 1752` – for this explorer process
- Observation :
  - Result on virustotal clearly shows this file has virus

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55 security vendors and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious

4aec5d2fd891f0e512aeacfbef67b837971180d41907e23e08a260dd1fd5c9

process.0x818f5cd0.0x3380000.dmp

Size: 604.00 KB

Last Analysis Date: 7 months ago

pe.dll corrupt overlay

Community Score

DETECTION DETAILS RELATIONS BEHAVIOR COMMUNITY 1

Join the VT Community and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections, plus an API key to automate checks.

#### ◆ `procdump -p 1752` :

- dump - executable file is created

|                 |                  |             |          |
|-----------------|------------------|-------------|----------|
| executable.1752 | 17-01-2024 13:00 | Application | 1,010 KB |
|-----------------|------------------|-------------|----------|

#### ◆ Observation :

- Putting this executable on virustotal shows us less amount where as the malfind file which we uploaded showed more bec that one has all the code files which are malicious and this has everythingdumped inside.

b9352b0f0025a3fe6a8c41573b4c4869849e387733293a702d4cae13f980b286

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3 security vendors and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious

b9352b0f0025a3fe6a8c41573b4c4869849e387733293a702d4cae13f980b286

EXPLORER.EXE

pe.exe

Community Score

DETECTION DETAILS RELATIONS BEHAVIOR COMMUNITY 3

#### `memdump ans strings` : changes the dump file to txt file

```
D:\cyber\volatility_2.6>volatility -f shylock.vmem memdump -p 1752 --dump-dir .
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6

Writing explorer.exe [1752] to 1752.dmp
D:\cyber\volatility_2.6>strings 1752.dmp>1752.txt
```

#### ◆ Checking for persistence

`volatility -f shylock.vmem hivelist` - to check if this virus is trying to persist

◆

```
D:\cyber\volatility_2.6>volatility -f shylock.vmem hivelist
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Virtual Physical Name

0xe19d9a48 0x0e97ca48 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\NetworkService\NTUSER.DAT
0xe1610008 0x0c7d0008 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\software
0xe160e4c0 0x0c8424c0 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\SECURITY
0xe1610b60 0x0c7d0b60 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\SAM
0xe1618008 0x0c7da008 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\default
0xe13c4570 0x0246f570 [no name]
0xe1018388 0x02200388 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\system
0xe1008b60 0x020c4b60 [no name]
0xe17cf008 0x045e1008 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Application Data\
soft\Windows\UsrClass.dat
0xe17a1520 0x04572520 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\Administrator\NTUSER.DAT
0xe1e292a0 0x007d52a0 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\LocalService\Local Settings\Application Data\
soft\Windows\UsrClass.dat
0xe1e25b60 0x007d1b60 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\LocalService\NTUSER.DAT
0xe19e0008 0x0e90a008 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\NetworkService\Local Settings\Application Data\
soft\Windows\UsrClass.dat
```

- This is showing registry info
- `volatility -f cridex.vmem printkey -K "Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"` this cmd to get

key

```
D:\cyber\volatility_2.6>volatility -f shylock.vmem printkey -K "Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Legend: (S) = Stable (V) = Volatile

Registry: \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\NetworkService\NTUSER.DAT
Key name: Run (S)
Last updated: 2009-12-27 01:38:21 UTC+0000

Subkeys:

Values:

Registry: \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\Administrator\NTUSER.DAT
Key name: Run (S)
Last updated: 2011-09-30 00:25:35 UTC+0000

Subkeys:

Values:
REG_SZ ctfmon.exe : (S) C:\WINDOWS\system32\ctfmon.exe
REG_SZ {9198638F-D426-AA80-979B-DF55477F92A7} : (S) C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Application Data\Intuit\Quicken\Log\rdshost.exe

Registry: \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\default
Key name: Run (S)
Last updated: 2009-12-26 20:26:10 UTC+0000

Subkeys:

Values:

Registry: \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\LocalService\NTUSER.DAT
Key name: Run (S)
Last updated: 2009-12-27 01:38:24 UTC+0000

Subkeys:

Values:
```

- Conclusion :
  - We concluded explore file is corrupted
  - Then checked in virustotal
  - Found the persistence as well