



## **Smart Contract Security Audit**

TechRate
June, 2021

## **Audit Details**



**Audited project** 

**HypeRise** 



Deployer address

0x67c8712FEFD905910681dA64AE0f0C84bfbD58bF



**Client contacts:** 

HypeRise team



Blockchain

**Binance Smart Chain** 





### **Disclaimer**

This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice as at the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the below disclaimer below – please make sure to read it in full.

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The analysis of the security is purely based on the smart contracts alone. No applications or operations were reviewed for security. No product code has been reviewed.

## **Background**

TechRate was commissioned by HypeRise to perform an audit of smart contracts:

https://bscscan.com/address/0xb56642f6d0e5e3bd8ae1f1900a254c644c6246e8#code

#### The purpose of the audit was to achieve the following:

- Ensure that the smart contract functions as intended.
- Identify potential security issues with the smart contract.

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The information in this report should be used to understand the risk exposure of the smart contract, and as a guide to improve the security posture of the smart contract by remediating the issues that were identified.

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
11001000100000

## **Contracts Details**

#### Token contract details for 22.06.2021


Contract name	HypeRise
Contract address	0xb56642F6d0E5E3bD8Ae1F1900A254C644c6246E8
Total supply	1,000,000,000,000
Token ticker	HypeRise
Decimals	9
Token holders	3,124
Transactions count	18,879
Top 100 holders dominance	86.45%
Liquidity fee	9
Tax fee	2
Total fees	91591023132774530597622
Uniswap V2 pair	0xdf931bbbda3b524e6d2590439a8ee725f1ef6326
Contract deployer address	0x67c8712FEFD905910681dA64AE0f0C84bfbD58bF
Contract's current owner address	0x67c8712fefd905910681da64ae0f0c84bfbd58bf

## **HypeRise Token Distribution**



(A total of 864,543,399,665,906.00 tokens held by the top 100 accounts from the total supply of 1,000,000,000,000,000.00 token)

# HypeRise Contract Interaction Details



## **HypeRise Top 10 Token Holders**

Rank	Address	Quantity (Token)	Percentage
1	Burn Address	263,925,423,621,832.593466011	26.3925%
2	PancakeSwap V2: HypeRise	137,217,010,993,886.395431069	13.7217%
3	0x4be9f49dfd5b8f8dc8b6503ac469f8ea75b60224	27,800,357,839,637.94369372	2.7800%
4	0xdac269fc700c2c9ec831949afd1863c593c6832a	20,840,114,351,263.161372968	2.0840%
5	0xb1a4ac0173628ba30b91d1091cb8ee35791c781e	17,652,483,942,475.596040055	1.7652%
6	0x39f4b3670652d1fd528919986640b1c3f60167cf	15,992,806,895,189.025449709	1.5993%
7	0x5fcba2e86558ebfdc5420fa6686373e989cb5f3b	15,471,015,927,200.40231816	1.5471%
8	0xd5cf3fb831d7c32c62925cb74b49803794f080f0	14,911,257,715,922.035212337	1.4911%
9	0x8654b267fbd583c7e3fcf2e00127e08418391cbf	14,479,208,316,244.097554125	1.4479%
10	0x368a8050ebe3d1e376d00fabf3614d0add0ac04b	12,918,191,808,683.796792246	1.2918%



### **Contract functions details**

#### + Context - [Int] \_msgSender - [Int] msgData + [Int] IERC20 - [Ext] totalSupply - [Ext] balanceOf - [Ext] transfer # - [Ext] allowance - [Ext] approve # - [Ext] transferFrom # + [Lib] SafeMath - [Int] add - [Int] sub - [Int] sub - [Int] mul - [Int] div - [Int] div - [Int] mod - [Int] mod + [Lib] Address - [Int] isContract - [Int] sendValue # - [Int] functionCall # - [Int] functionCall # - [Int] functionCallWithValue # - [Int] functionCallWithValue # - [Prv] functionCallWithValue # + Ownable (Context) - [Pub] <Constructor> # - [Pub] owner - [Pub] renounceOwnership # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Pub] transferOwnership # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Pub] getUnlockTime - [Pub] getTime - [Pub] lock # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Pub] unlock # + [Int] IUniswapV2Factory - [Ext] feeTo - [Ext] feeToSetter - [Ext] getPair - [Ext] allPairs - [Ext] allPairsLength

- [Ext] createPair #

```
- [Ext] setFeeTo #
 - [Ext] setFeeToSetter#
+ [Int] IUniswapV2Pair
 - [Ext] name
 - [Ext] symbol
```

- [Ext] decimals

- [Ext] totalSupply

- [Ext] balanceOf

- [Ext] allowance

- [Ext] approve #

- [Ext] transfer #

- [Ext] transferFrom #

- [Ext] DOMAIN SEPARATOR

- [Ext] PERMIT\_TYPEHASH

- [Ext] nonces

- [Ext] permit #

- [Ext] MINIMUM\_LIQUIDITY

- [Ext] factory

- [Ext] token0

- [Ext] token1

- [Ext] getReserves

- [Ext] price0CumulativeLast

- [Ext] price1CumulativeLast

- [Ext] kLast

- [Ext] burn #

- [Ext] swap #

- [Ext] skim #

- [Ext] sync #

- [Ext] initialize #

#### + [Int] IUniswapV2Router01

- [Ext] factory

- [Ext] WETH

- [Ext] addLiquidity #

- [Ext] addLiquidityETH (\$)

- [Ext] removeLiquidity #

- [Ext] removeLiquidityETH #

- [Ext] removeLiquidityWithPermit #

- [Ext] removeLiquidityETHWithPermit #

- [Ext] swapExactTokensForTokens #

- [Ext] swapTokensForExactTokens #

- [Ext] swapExactETHForTokens (\$)

- [Ext] swapTokensForExactETH #

- [Ext] swapExactTokensForETH #

- [Ext] swapETHForExactTokens (\$)

- [Ext] quote

- [Ext] getAmountOut

- [Ext] getAmountIn

- [Ext] getAmountsOut

- [Ext] getAmountsIn

#### + [Int] IUniswapV2Router02 (IUniswapV2Router01)

- [Ext] removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #

- [Ext] removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #

- [Ext] swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #
- [Ext] swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens (\$)
- [Ext] swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #
- + HypeRise (Context, IERC20, Ownable)
  - [Pub] <Constructor> #
  - [Pub] name
  - [Pub] symbol
  - [Pub] decimals
  - [Pub] totalSupply
  - [Pub] balanceOf
  - [Pub] transfer #
  - [Pub] allowance
  - [Pub] approve #

  - [Pub] transferFrom #
  - [Pub] increaseAllowance #
  - [Pub] decreaseAllowance #
  - [Pub] isExcludedFromReward
  - [Pub] totalFees
  - [Pub] minimumTokensBeforeSwapAmount
  - [Pub] buyBackUpperLimitAmount
  - [Pub] deliver #
  - [Pub] reflectionFromToken
  - [Pub] tokenFromReflection
  - [Pub] excludeFromReward #
    - modifiers: onlyOwner
  - [Ext] includeInReward #
    - modifiers: onlyOwner
  - [Prv] approve #
  - [Prv] transfer #
  - [Prv] swapTokens #
    - modifiers: lockTheSwap
  - [Prv] buyBackTokens #
  - modifiers: lockTheSwap
  - [Prv] swapTokensForEth #
  - [Prv] swapETHForTokens #
  - [Prv] addLiquidity #
  - [Prv] tokenTransfer #
  - [Prv] \_transferStandard #
  - [Prv] \_transferToExcluded #
  - [Prv] \_transferFromExcluded #
  - [Prv] transferBothExcluded #
  - [Prv] \_reflectFee #
  - [Prv] \_getValues
  - [Prv] \_getTValues
  - [Prv] getRValues
  - [Prv] \_getRate
  - [Prv] getCurrentSupply
  - [Prv] \_takeLiquidity #
  - [Prv] calculateTaxFee
  - [Prv] calculateLiquidityFee
  - [Prv] removeAllFee #
  - [Prv] restoreAllFee #
  - [Pub] isExcludedFromFee
  - [Pub] excludeFromFee #

- modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Pub] includeInFee #
  - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] setTaxFeePercent#
  - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] setLiquidityFeePercent #
  - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] setMaxTxAmount #
  - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] setMarketingDivisor #
  - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] setNumTokensSellToAddToLiquidity #
  - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] setBuybackUpperLimit #
  - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] setMarketingAddress #
  - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Pub] setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled #
  - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Pub] setBuyBackEnabled #
  - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] prepareForPreSale #
  - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] afterPreSale #
  - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Prv] transferToAddressETH #
- [Ext] <Fallback> (\$)

(\$) = payable function # = non-constant function

## **Issues Checking Status**

Issue description	Checking status
1. Compiler errors.	Passed
2. Race conditions and Reentrancy. Cross-function conditions.	race Passed
3. Possible delays in data delivery.	Passed
4. Oracle calls.	Passed
5. Front running.	Passed
6. Timestamp dependence.	Passed
7. Integer Overflow and Underflow.	Passed
8. DoS with Revert.	Passed
9. DoS with block gas limit.	Low issues
10. Methods execution permissions.	Passed
11. Economy model of the contract.	Passed
12. The impact of the exchange rate on the logic.	Passed
13. Private user data leaks.	Passed
14. Malicious Event log.	Passed
15. Scoping and Declarations.	Passed
16. Uninitialized storage pointers.	Passed
17. Arithmetic accuracy.	Passed
18. Design Logic.	Passed
19. Cross-function race conditions.	Passed
20. Safe Open Zeppelin contracts implementation an usage.	d Passed
21. Fallback function security.	Passed

### **Security Issues**

High Severity Issues

No high severity issues found.

 ✓ Medium Severity Issues

No medium severity issues found.

- Low Severity Issues
  - 1. Out of gas

Issue:

 The function includeInReward() uses the loop to find and remove addresses from the \_excluded list. Function will be aborted with OUT\_OF\_GAS exception if there will be a long excluded addresses list.

```
function includeInReward(address account1) external onlyOwner() {
    require(_isExcluded[account1], "Account is already excluded");
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < _excluded.length; i++) {
        if (_excluded[i] == account1) {
            excluded[i] = [excluded.length - 1];
            tOwned[account1] = 0;
            isExcluded[account1] = false;
            excluded.pop();
            break;
    }
}</pre>
```

 The function \_getCurrentSupply also uses the loop for evaluating total supply. It also could be aborted with OUT\_OF\_GAS exception if there will be a long excluded addresses list.

#### Recommendation:

Check that the excluded array length is not too big.

## Owner privileges (In the period when the owner is not renounced)

Owner can change tax and liquidity fees.

```
ftrace | function setTaxFeePercent(uint256 taxFee1) external onlyOwner() {
    _taxFee = taxFee1;
}

ftrace | funcSig
function setLiquidityFeePercent(uint256 liquidityFee1) external onlyOwner() {
    _liquidityFee = liquidityFee1;
}
```

Owner can change maximum transaction amount.

Owner can exclude from the fee.

```
function excludeFromFee(address account1) public onlyOwner {
    _isExcludedFromFee[account1] = true;
}
```

Owner can change marketingDivisor.

```
ftrace|funcSig
function setMarketingDivisor(uint256 divisor↑) external onlyOwner() {
    marketingDivisor = divisor↑;
}
```

Owner can change minimum number of tokens to add to liquidity.

```
ftrace|funcSig
function setNumTokensSellToAddToLiquidity(uint256 _minimumTokensBeforeSwap1) external onlyOwner() {
    minimumTokensBeforeSwap = _minimumTokensBeforeSwap1;
}
```

Owner can change buyBackUpperLimit.

```
ftrace|funcSig
function setBuybackUpperLimit(uint256 buyBackLimit ) external onlyOwner() {
   buyBackUpperLimit = buyBackLimit * 10**18;
}
```

Owner can change marketing address.

```
ftrace|funcSig
function setMarketingAddress(address _marketingAddress1) external onlyOwner() {
    marketingAddress = payable(_marketingAddress1);
}
```

Owner can enable and disable buyBack.

```
ftrace|funcSig
function setBuyBackEnabled(bool _enabled ) public onlyOwner {
   buyBackEnabled = _enabled ;
   emit BuyBackEnabledUpdated(_enabled );
}
```

Owner can enable before and after presale modes.

```
ftrace|funcSig
function prepareForPreSale() external onlyOwner {
    setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled(false);
    LaxFee = 0;
    LiquidityFee = 0;
    maxTxAmount = 10000000000 * 10**6 * 10**9;
}

ftrace|funcSig
function afterPreSale() external onlyOwner {
    setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled(true);
    LaxFee = 2;
    liquidityFee = 9;
    maxTxAmount = 3000000 * 10**6 * 10**9;
}
```

 Owner can lock and unlock. By the way, using these functions the owner could retake privileges even after the ownership was renounced.

```
function lock(uint256 time1) public virtual onlyOwner {
    _previousOwner = _owner;
    _owner = address(0);
    _lockTime = block.timestamp + time1;
    emit OwnershipTransferred(_owner, address(0));
}

function unlock() public virtual {
    require(_previousOwner == msg.sender, "You don't have permission to unlock");
    require(block.timestamp > _lockTime , "Contract is locked until 7 days");
    emit OwnershipTransferred(_owner, _previousOwner);
    _owner = _previousOwner;
}
```

### Conclusion

Smart contracts contain low severity issues! Liquidity pair contract's security is not checked due to out of scope. One third of the liquidity goes to marketing address.

Liquidity locking details provided by the team: https://dxsale.app/app/pages/dxlockview?id=3827&add=0&type=lpd efi&chain=BSC

#### TechRate note:

Please check the disclaimer above and note, the audit makes no statements or warranties on business model, investment attractiveness or code sustainability. The report is provided for the only contract mentioned in the report and does not include any other potential contracts deployed by Owner.







