Don’t Say No: Jailbreaking LLM by Suppressing Refusal

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Code is open-sourced at:
https://github.com/DSN-2024/DSN

1. Introduction

A key limitation of learning-based attacks lies in their suboptimal optimization objectives. Existing approaches naturally assumes that the suffix with the lowest loss achieves the highest attack success rate (ASR), but this assumption does not hold. The below plot demonstrates the relationship between the loss and their ASR, with each dot representing an optimized suffix. This unexpected outcome arises because the loss in learning-based attacks, which is averaged across all tokens in the sequence, overlooks the critical role of the first few tokens in LLMs’ next token prediction mechanism (also known as Shallow Align issue), leading to low-loss sequences with poor ASR.



Our contributions:

- We identify, uncover and mitigate the key issue within the learning-based jailbreak literature: Loss-ASR Mismatch problem, e.g., why the widely adopted vanilla target loss L_{target} is suboptimal
- We introduce the DSN attack, a learning-based approach that incorporates a novel objective to both elicit affirmative responses and suppress refusals, which is proven to be universal and transferable.
- We propose an Ensemble Evaluation pipeline to perform a more reliable jailbreaking evaluation. Shapley value is adopted to analyze the contribution of each component.
- Extensive experiments demonstrate the potency of DSN attack among various of threat model setting, target model and dataset, as well as its transferability to black-box models.

2. Motivation： Loss-ASR Mismatch



The lowest loss not necessarily lead to the optimal jailbreak ASR

For those「Shallow Align」corner cases, the first few token loss may be disproportionately large, and may ruin the attack since LLM operates in the Next-Token-Prediction nature.



3. Methods



1: Wei, Alexander, Nika Haghtalab, and Jacob Steinhardt. "Jailbroken: How does llm safety training fail?."
2: Carlini, Nicholas, et al. "Are aligned neural networks adversarially aligned?."
3. Zou, Andy, et al. "Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models."
4. **DSN,** our work

$$p(x_{n+1}:x_{n+H}|x_{1:n}) = \prod_{i=1}^{H} p(x_{n+i}|x_{1:n+i-1})$$

$$CD(i) = 0.5 + 0.5 * \cos(\frac{i}{H} * \frac{\pi}{2})$$

$$p_{CD}(x_{n+1}:x_{n+H}|x_{1:n}) = \prod_{i=1}^{H} CD(i)p(x_{n+i}|x_{1:n+i-1})$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{CE}(p,q) = -\sum_i p_i \log(q_i)$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{Un}(p,q) = -\sum_i p_i \log(1-q_i)$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{target}(x_{1:n}) = -\log p(\hat{x}_{n+1:n+H}|x_{1:n})$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{affirmative}(x_{1:n}) = -\log p_{CD}(\hat{x}_{n+1:n+H}|x_{1:n})$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{refusal}(x_{1:n}) = \sum_{y \in RKL} \sum_i \mathcal{L}_{Un}(y, x_{i:i+RTL(y)})$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{DSN} = \mathcal{L}_{affirmative} + \alpha * \mathcal{L}_{refusal}$$

4. Experiments

ASR	AdvB	JBB	MI	CLAS	FQ	Average Ratio
PROMPTING$_{Long}$	0.03	0.21	0.08	0.27	0.43	
PROMPTING$_{Medium}$	0.06	0.44	0.37	0.43	0.64	0.50 : 1 : 0.73
PROMPTING$_{Short}$	0.05	0.25	0.20	0.38	0.52	
DSN$_{Long}$	1.0	0.97	1.0	0.93	0.98	
DSN$_{Medium}$	0.99	0.95	0.97	0.92	0.97	1.02 : 1 : 0.96
DSN$_{Short}$	0.93	0.94	0.97	0.85	0.92	

Suppress refusal by enforcing refusal keywords via prompting is not applicable, since the ASR is not desirable, and it is sensitive to keyword list selection.



DSN outperforms baseline in diverse hyper-parameter (logarithmic) selection range.



DSN suffixes are highly universal, directly related to its learning-based nature.

Target Model	GCG	PAIR	TAP	DR	Human	RS	RS$_{self\text{-}transfer}$	DSN
Llama-2-7b-chat	76%	10%	1%	0%	0%	15%	84%	**100%**
Llama-2-13b-chat	80%	9%	1%	0%	1%	21%	93%	**97%**
Llama-3-8B-Instruct	74%	14%	8%	4%	0%	83%	89%	**100%**
Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct	58%	6%	7%	2%	1%	64%	N/A	**81%**
Gemma-2-9b-it	88%	24%	26%	0%	94%	97%	N/A	**97%**
Vicuna-7b-v1.3	81%	54%	55%	11%	88%	93%	N/A	**93%**
Vicuna-7b-v1.5	88%	58%	51%	11%	87%	92%	N/A	**99%**
Vicuna-13b-v1.5	91%	47%	41%	4%	90%	98%	N/A	**100%**
Qwen2-7B-Chat	92%	42%	49%	7%	74%	96%	N/A	**100%**
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct	90%	44%	34%	5%	70%	99%	N/A	**99%**
Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2	99%	52%	61%	39%	98%	99%	N/A	**100%**
Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3	100%	52%	57%	44%	97%	99%	N/A	**100%**
Average (↑)	84.8%	34.3%	32.6%	10.6%	58.3%	79.7%	88.7%	**97.2%**

Many-trial ASR@N is reported, please see paper for more results.

Transfer Target Model	Qwen-2.5	Llama-3	Gemma-2	Mean
Gpt-4	16%	36%	46%	32.7%
Claude	6%	22%	10%	12.7%
Gemini	14%	65%	69%	49.3%
Deepseek	48%	99%	87%	78%
Mean	21%	55.5%	53%	-

Transferability is observed, also related to its learning-based nature.



Real-world safety concern arise directly due to the learning-based suffix nature: Being universal and transferable.

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Personal Webpage
Github Repo

Our code is available at:
https://github.com/DSN-2024/DSN