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Don’t Say No: Jailbreaking LLM by Suppressing Refusal

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Code is open-sourced at:
https://github.com/DSN-2024/DSN

1. Introduction

Learning-based jailbreaks (e.g., GCG) optimize prompt suffix via gradient-based loss minimization. However, we identify a crucial flaw: lower loss doesn’t necessarily lead to higher jailbreak success rate—a phenomenon we term as Loss-ASR Mismatch. This mismatch arises from the very nature of modern auto-regressive LLM next-token-prediction mechanism, where the vanilla target loss only accounts for the likelihood of generating one single pre-defined target output, while neglecting the essence of refusal pattern and its appearance location. Our key insight: to construct a more effective and performance consistent jailbreak target, we must explicitly suppress refusals across the entire response while encouraging early affirmation. We propose DSN, an elaborately designed and powerful learning-based method that reshapes the loss design motivation to bridge this mismatch—leading to consistent ASR gains across 15+ models.



Our contributions:
- We identify, uncover and mitigate the key issue within the learning-based jailbreak literature: Loss-ASR Mismatch problem, e.g., why the widely adopted vanilla target loss L_{target} is suboptimal, and implement the refusal suppression insight into it.
- We introduce the DSN attack, a learning-based approach that incorporates a novel objective to both elicit affirmative responses and suppress refusals, which is proven to be universal and transferable.
- We propose an Ensemble Evaluation pipeline to perform a more reliable jailbreaking evaluation. Shapley value is adopted to analyze the contribution of each component.

2. Intuition： Loss-ASR Mismatch



The lowest loss not necessarily lead to the optimal jailbreak ASR

For those 「Shallow Align」 corner cases, the first few token loss may be disproportionately large, and may ruin the attack since LLM operates in the Next-Token-Prediction nature.





Refusal-style output could be more constrained and predictable.

3. Methods



$$\mathcal{L}_{target}(x_{1:n}) = -\log p(\hat{x}_{n+1:n+H}|x_{1:n})$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{affirmative}(x_{1:n}) = -\log p_{CD}(\hat{x}_{n+1:n+H}|x_{1:n})$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{refusal}(x_{1:n}) = \sum_{y \in RKL} \sum_{i} \mathcal{L}_{Un}(y, x_{i:i+RTL(y)})$$

$$p(x_{n+1:n+H}|x_{1:n}) = \prod_{i=1}^{H} p(x_{n+i}|x_{1:n+i-1})$$

$$\mathrm{CD}(i) = 0.5 + 0.5 * \cos(\frac{i}{H} * \frac{\pi}{2})$$

$$p_{CD}(x_{n+1:n+H}|x_{1:n}) = \prod_{i=1}^{H} CD(i)\, p(x_{n+i}|x_{1:n+i-1})$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{CE}(p,q) = -\sum_{i} p_i \log(q_i)$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{Un}(p,q) = -\sum_{i} p_i \log(1-q_i)$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{DSN} = \mathcal{L}_{affirmative} + \alpha * \mathcal{L}_{refusal}$$

4. Experiments

ASR	AdvB	JBB	MI	CLAS	FQ	Average Ratio
PROMPTING$_{Long}$	0.03	0.21	0.08	0.27	0.43	
PROMPTING$_{Medium}$	0.06	0.44	0.37	0.43	0.64	0.50 : 1 : 0.73
PROMPTING$_{Short}$	0.05	0.25	0.20	0.38	0.52	
DSN$_{Long}$	1.0	0.97	1.0	0.93	0.98	
DSN$_{Medium}$	0.99	0.95	0.97	0.92	0.97	1.02 : 1 : 0.96
DSN$_{Short}$	0.93	0.94	0.97	0.85	0.92	

Suppress refusal by enforcing refusal keywords via prompting is not applicable, since the ASR is not desirable, and it is sensitive to keyword list selection.



DSN outperforms baseline in diverse hyper-parameter (logarithmic) selection range.



DSN suffixes are highly universal, directly related to its learning-based nature.

Target Model	GCG	PAIR	TAP	DR	Human	RS	RS$_{self\text{-}transfer}$	DSN
Llama-2-7b-chat	76%	10%	1%	0%	0%	15%	84%	**100%**
Llama-2-13b-chat	80%	9%	1%	0%	1%	21%	93%	**97%**
Llama-3-8B-Instruct	74%	14%	8%	4%	0%	83%	89%	**100%**
Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct	58%	6%	7%	2%	1%	64%	N/A	**81%**
Gemma-2-9b-it	88%	24%	26%	0%	94%	97%	N/A	**97%**
Vicuna-7b-v1.3	81%	54%	55%	11%	88%	93%	N/A	**93%**
Vicuna-7b-v1.5	88%	58%	51%	11%	87%	92%	N/A	**99%**
Vicuna-13b-v1.5	91%	47%	41%	4%	90%	98%	N/A	**100%**
Qwen2-7B-Chat	92%	42%	49%	7%	74%	96%	N/A	**100%**
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct	90%	44%	34%	5%	70%	99%	N/A	**99%**
Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2	99%	52%	61%	39%	98%	99%	N/A	**100%**
Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3	100%	52%	57%	44%	97%	99%	N/A	**100%**
Average (↑)	84.8%	34.3%	32.6%	10.6%	58.3%	79.7%	88.7%	**97.2%**

Many-trial ASR@N is reported, please see paper for more results.

Transfer Target Model	Qwen-2.5	Llama-3	Gemma-2	Mean
Gpt-4	16%	36%	46%	32.7%
Claude	6%	22%	10%	12.7%
Gemini	14%	65%	69%	49.3%
Deepseek	48%	99%	87%	78%
Mean	21%	55.5%	53%	-

Transferability is observed, also related to its learning-based nature.



Real-world safety concern arise directly due to the learning-based suffix nature: Being universal and transferable.

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Github Repo

Our code is available at:
https://github.com/DSN-2024/DSN

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