COMP 4109 - RSA-OAEP

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EME-OAEP

Based on Bellare and Rogaway's Optimal Asymmetric Encryption scheme [1], OAEP is an encryption scheme used to in tandem with the RSA encryption protocol in order to increase security. RSA-OAEP is semantically secure against adaptive chosen plain text attacks, provided the mask generating functions (MGF) is viewed as a black box. Following the guidelines laid out in the PKCS #1 v2.1 [2], a label L, and choice of a hash function and mask generating function can be provided to RSA-OAEP. The process of using RSA with OAEP padding is detailed below (Table 1).

Encryption

RSAES-OAEP-Encrypt((n, e), M, L)

Options:	Hash	hash function (hlen denotes the length of in octets the
		hash function output)
	MGF	mask generation function
Input:	(n, e)	RSA public key (k denotes the length in octets of the
		RSA modulus n)
	M	message to be encrypted octet string of length $mLen$
	L	optional label to be associated with the message
Output:	С	ciphertext octet string of length k

Table 1: Variables associated with RSA-OAEP encryption.

1. Length checking:

- (a) The label L is too long if $L > 2^{61} 1$ octets. (Using SHA-1 hash)
- (b) The message is too long if $mLen > k 2 \cdot hlen 2$

2. EME-OAEP encoding:




Figure 1: The EME-OAEP encoding process [2].

- (a) Let lHash = Hash(L), and octet string of length hlen.
- (b) PS is an octet string of zeros $k mLen 2 \cdot hLen 2$ in length.
- (c) Concatenate lHash, PS, 0x01 and the message M.

$$DB = lHash||PS||0x01||M$$

- (d) Generate random octet string seed length hLen
- (e) dbMask = MGF(seed, k hLen 1), same length as DB
- (f) $maskedDB = DB \oplus dbMask$
- (g) seedMask = MGF(seed, hLen)
- (h) $maskedSeed = seed \oplus seedMask$
- (i) Concatenate one octet of 0x00, maskedSeed, and maskedDB. This creates an encoded message of length k octets.

$$EM = 0x00||maskedSeed||maskedDB|$$

- 3. The octet string EM can now be encrypted by converting the value to an integer.
 - (a) Create message integer representation m.

$$m = OS2IP(EM)$$

(b) Run RSA encryption primitive for integer ciphertext c.

$$c = RSAEP((n, e), m)$$

(c) Return the ciphertext as an octet string C.

$$C = I2OSP(c, k)$$

Decryption

RSAES-OAEP-Decrypt(K, C, L)

Options:	Hash	hash function (<i>hlen</i> denotes the length of in octets the
		hash function output)
	MGF	mask generation function
Input:	\overline{K}	RSA private key (k is the length of the octet string rep-
		resenting the modulus n)
	C	ciphertext octet string, with length $k \geq 2 \cdot hLen + 2$
	L	optional label to be associated with the message
Output:	M	the message, an octet string of length
		$mLen \leq k - 2 \cdot hLen - 2$

Table 2: Variables associated with RSA-OAEP decryption.

1. Length checking:

- (a) The label L is too long if $L>2^{61}-1$ octets. (Using SHA-1 hash)
- (b) The length of C must be of length k or there is a decryption error.
- (c) There is also a decryption error if $l < 2 \cdot hLen + 2$.

2. RSA decryption:

(a) Convert C into its integer representation c.

$$c = OS2IP(C)$$

(b) Decrypt c to get the integer representation m using private key K.

$$m = RSADP(K, c)$$

(c) Convert to octet string EM of length k octets.

$$EM = I2OSP(m, k)$$

3. EME-OAEP decoding:

- (a) Let lHash = Hash(L), and octet string of length hlen.
- (b) Separate encoded message EM into its three original parts, a single octet Y, and octet string maskedSeed with length hLen, and an octet string maskedDB with length k hLen 1.

$$EM = Y || maskedSeed || maskedDB$$

- (c) seedMask = MGF(maskedDB, hLen)
- (d) $seed = maskedSeed \oplus seedMask$
- (e) dbMask = MGF(seed, k hLen 1)
- (f) $DB = maskedDB \oplus dbMask$
- (g) Separate DB into an octet string lHash' with length hLen, padded string PS, and M.

$$DB = lHash'||PS||0\mathbf{x}01||M$$

References

- [1] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway. Optimal asymmetric encryption. In *Advances in Cryptol-ogy—EUROCRYPT'94*, pages 92–111. Springer, 1995.
- [2] R. Laboratories. Pkcs #1: Rsa cryptography standard. URL http://www.emc.com/emc-plus/rsa-labs/standards-initiatives/pkcs-rsa-cryptography-standard.htm.