

Chinese Dialectics

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From Yijing to Marxism

Chenshan Tian

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For my mom and dad
Gao Xiufen and Tian Xilu.

My father taught me
if there are three broad roads,
take the middle one.

Contents

Acknowledgments	ix
Introduction	1
1 <i>Tongbian</i> : A Chinese Strand of Thought	21
2 Marxism in China: Initial Encounters	47
3 <i>Tongbian</i> in Preliminary Reading of Dialectics	71
4 Qu Qiubai's Reading of Dialectical Materialism	87
5 Popularizing Dialectical Materialism	107
6 Ai Siqui: Sinifying Dialectical Materialism	127
7 Mao Zedong: The Mature Formulation of Dialectical Materialism	143
Conclusion: Marxian Dialectics after Mao	173
Glossary	185
Bibliography	211
Index	219
About the Author	237

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Introduction

Marxism is perhaps the most significant element in Western thought that has provided an opportunity for a conversation with its Chinese counterpart. And, in this conversation, a Chinese version of Marxism has developed which comes to fruition in the thought of Mao Zedong. This conversation incorporates a striking feature of “dialectics,” or *bianzhengfa*, which not only pervades philosophical levels of discourse in China, but also the thinking and speech of ordinary persons in their everyday lives.

However, I would like to argue that dialectics, wherever one finds it in the West is different from what appears to be the Chinese analogue. Marxian dialectics in China is not the same as the inherited legacy of Marxian dialectics in Europe. What is this form of “Marxian dialectics” in China, then? What are the differences between the Chinese form and the original Western form? This study aims to address directly the important questions of how and why Marxism has assumed the form it has taken in China.

There are at least five corollaries to this thesis: (1) There is a clear style of “thought” (philosophy) that is distinctly but not necessarily uniquely Chinese that is powerful and available to Chinese intellectuals. (2) There is a strand of Chinese Marxism that draws on the Chinese tradition and that overcomes some of the difficulties that have attended Western Marxisms. (3) This form of Chinese Marxism is found in a number of writers, including Qu Qiubai, Ai Siqui, and Mao Zedong, and it exemplifies this powerful strand of Chinese philosophy. (4) Mainstream Western Marxisms find their roots in Engels whose formulations are alien to Chinese thought. And (5) although Chinese Marxism finds some of its roots in Engels as well, Chinese Marxians read his philosophy in a different way.

We can conclude from this thesis and its corollaries that many standard interpretations of Chinese Marxism are problematic. Chinese Marxism is clearly similar to Western Marxism in some important respects; however, it can probably be safely claimed that it represents a third alternative between Marxism on the one hand and traditional Chinese thought on the other.

Before this work can begin, however, there is an important point that requires clarification. It cannot be assumed outright that there is a clear and uncontested doctrine (or doctrines) of dialectics in the West, or even that there is a doctrine of Marxist dialectics. The word ‘dialectics’ has different meanings in the writings of different Western philosophers. For example, the early Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, Hegel, Marx, Engels, and Lenin all understand something different by the term. This makes a comprehensive comparison of the many doctrines of dialectics in the West in addition to a comparison with dialectics in Chinese thought an enormous undertaking. Hence, this book cannot be a project concerning Western dialectics in general or Marxist dialectics in particular. It is rather an examination of how and what the Chinese conceived the dialectics of Marxism to be at about the turn of the last century and following. This project will also provide an account of *bianzhengfa*—a Chinese translation of “dialectics”—in terms of how that term was and is understood in China. My interest is to show how *tongbian* (continuity through change) as a style of thought incorporates a feature of dialectics, and why the Marxist version of dialectics has received such a favorable reception in China.

This project is valid on account of the problematic reading of “dialectical materialism” given to Chinese Marxism by Western scholars. Similarly, Chinese Marxists identify *bianzhengfa* as Marxist dialectics, without adequately realizing the difficulties attending that concept. This issue has not been deemed significant enough to warrant detailed study; some interpreters of Chinese Marxism, often applying reductionist approaches, either juxtapose dialectics with *bianzhengfa*, or simply ascribe the origins of *bianzhengfa* to purely genealogical roots in the Chinese tradition.¹ There seems to be a common pattern in Western scholars’ understanding of Chinese Marxism. There are those who hold that Chinese Marxism is Chinese in some important sense, but fail to see what is involved in such a position, and on the other hand, there are those who fail to see anything particularly Chinese about Chinese Marxism. There is a general consensus among many “China field” scholars that Marx is determinist while Mao Zedong is voluntarist.²

Here we need to get clear about “determinism” versus “voluntarism.” Broadly in Western philosophy, “determinism” refers to assumptions regarding causality, that is, everything is caused. Moreover, and critically, causality takes the form of lawfulness: “Whenever this, then that.” This owes primarily

to Hume but is now taken for granted among all empiricists. Critically, empiricist philosophy of science thoroughly dominates thinking about science. Determinism in social theory means that what happens had to happen, that human “will,” ultimately, is irrelevant. That is to say, assumingly a determinist Marx has a theory that economic foundation antecedently determines (or causes) superstructure.

Andrew G. Walder has an accurate characterization of voluntarism: “Voluntarism”—in this case denoting a social analysis and revolutionary strategy stressing human will as the primary causative agent in producing desired social change—is thus a commonly accepted characterization of Mao’s thought.³ Mao is charged with voluntarism because of, among others, the relative emphasis he places on subjective human effort in activist politics over objective economic forces to produce social change. In this sense Mao is said to have inverted Marx’s dialectic, so that in his method of analysis “superstructure” rather than “economic base” is the primary.⁴

Reputed to be one of the most distinguished specialists on Mao Zedong and Mao Zedong thought, Stuart Schram assesses Mao’s dialectic as handed down from certain modes of Daoist thinking—that is, the dialectics of yin-yang relationship,⁵ and other roots in the Chinese tradition.⁶ As he observes, the fact that Mao replaces the four principles of Stalin’s dialectics and the three laws of Engels’ dialectics with the principle of the unity of opposites (*duili tongyi*) as the fundamental law demonstrates the strong impact of the Chinese tradition on Mao’s thought.⁷ Schram says that the dialectic of Mao Zedong is not the same as that of Marx; their difference simply lies in the fact that Mao’s dialectic of yin and yang undermines both Engels’ and Stalin’s formulations of dialectic. Schram seems convinced that a dialectic based on yin-yang dialectic is significantly different from that of Marx.

The virtue of Schram’s interpretation is that he understands the importance of yin and yang to Chinese thinking, and he does not simplistically juxtapose dialectics with *bianzhengfa* but rather ascribes the origins of *bianzhengfa* to genealogical roots in the Chinese tradition.⁸ But he fails to perceive the far-reaching implications of this interpretation, in terms of what makes it distinct from Western Marxism. He does not explain why Mao takes his version of (yin-yang) dialectic to be analogous to Marx’s understanding of dialectic. Thus, Schram falls into the determinism/voluntarism dichotomy.

As Schram claims, Mao never truly understood Marxism.⁹ This claim is closely related to his judgment that Mao was a voluntarist who opposed Marx’s determinism. In his view, Mao was simply either a Prometheus, “attempting the impossible for the sake of humanity, or a despot of unbridled ambition, drunk with his own power and his own cleverness.”¹⁰ For him, Mao’s particular stress on the role of will and the Sinification of Marxism

places Mao against Marxist “determinism.” According to this reading, Mao’s voluntarism is so strong that it has no relevance to Marx. Schram’s understanding of Marxism as determinism is not ambiguous: “I am quite unrepentant in referring to Marx’s determinism,” he says.¹¹ Here, two points are clear: first, the differences between Mao’s *bianzhengfa* and Marx’s dialectics and thus, presumably that between the Chinese tradition and Marx’s philosophy; and second, the striking dichotomy of Mao as a representative of voluntarism, and Marx (or Marxism) as a representative of determinism. But what is the significance of these two points? Schram does not make clear the exact differences between Mao’s yin-yang dialectic and Marx’s dialectic. This must be the reason for his acceptance of the common consensus of “determinism versus voluntarism.”

Frederic Wakeman, Maurice Meisner, Peter Zarrow, Benjamin I. Schwartz, and Michael Y. L. Luk, to cite only several scholars, also exhibit this approach of understanding Chinese Marxism in Western terms, especially with respect to positing a dichotomy between determinism and voluntarism.

In an exchange with Walder, Wakeman states that he would “balk” at the efforts to minimize Marx’s own economic determinism; he asserts that we must in any case recognize the great contrast between Marx’s determinism and the Chinese statement that “line determines everything” (*luxian jueding yiqie*), that is, superstructure determinism, or voluntarism.¹² Meisner treats Mao’s thought as strongly voluntarist, nationalist, and populist.¹³

Similarly, Zarrow indicates that he holds a deterministic view of Marx by referring to Mao as experimenting with abandoning the material base that Marx considered to be necessary or determining.¹⁴ His *Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture* gives a great deal of credit to Chinese anarchism and maintains that its significance lies in the roles that the anarchists played in the transition from imperial Confucianism to Marxism as they presented their contemporaries with new options and in their historical position as carriers and transformers of a worldview that changed drastically between the 1890s and the 1930s.¹⁵ He also discovers rich antecedents and auguries of anarchism in traditional Chinese thought. “The truest forms of traditional anarchism in China,” Zarrow claims, “were thoroughly Daoist.”¹⁶ In addition, Zarrow also notices “the first modern Chinese anarchists were not Daoists but were primarily educated as Confucians and originally considered themselves to be scholars in the line of their ancestors.”¹⁷ He traces anarchism to Zhu Xi and even Confucius since, as he believes, an anarchist element can be found in Zhu Xi’s explicit reduction of the chief function of the ruler to that of a teacher,¹⁸ as well as in Confucius’ concept “*wuwei*” (ruled by inactivity) in the *Analects*.¹⁹ Although Zarrow’s work outlined above represents considerable achievement, it is also problematic. This is because the elements in tra-

ditional Chinese philosophy that he labeled with John P. Clark's definition of anarchism were too broad and vague to meet the key standard in the definition, that is, antiauthoritarian ideal. I would argue that what Zarrow has traced in traditional Chinese philosophy as anarchism could not be labeled so because these thinkers he cites in Chinese history did not cherish a political theory that held all forms of governmental authority to be unnecessary and undesirable nor did they advocate or practice Western anarchistic principles. To label them so makes a simplistic and imposing treatment with Western theoretical categories. Chinese intellectuals about the turn of the last century were interested in Western anarchism, like any other Western concepts such as materialism, dialectics, etc., merely because it was indeed relevant to the problems of revolutionary change. They understood anarchism as a vehicle to carry particular elements of Chinese thought rather in the original sense of Western political theory. Unfortunately, this is not the focus of our project and we may leave the topic for some other opportunity.

Luk maintains that the Chinese Marxists' commitment to taking a noncapitalist path makes it a non-Marxist voluntarism; he argues that Chen Duxiu and Shi Cuntong make a serious attempt to reconcile their voluntarist thinking with the deterministic notions of Marxism.²⁰ For him, the origin of Chinese voluntarism was entirely ascribed to Leninist Bolshevism, which is considered to be contrary to Marxism. As he views it, even when the *Communist Manifesto* was translated by Zhu Zhixin in 1906, "the deterministic implications of the doctrine were either not recognized or deliberately ignored"; "The Communists' insistence on a noncapitalist path was well in line with the general inclination of the modern Chinese mind."²¹ For him, Chen Duxiu and Shi Cuntong developed the Chinese Communist Party's ideology with their "strong voluntarist orientations."²² His conclusion is that Chen Duxiu and Peng Shuzhi were voluntarist to the same degree as Qu Qiubai and Mao Zedong, although there were differences between them in their detailed deliberations of revolutionary strategy.²³

Like Schram, Nick Knight also comprehends the vital significance of yin-yang thinking, albeit inconsistently. On the one hand, he thinks that Mao has Sinified dialectics and turned it into a way of thinking characteristic of the Chinese tradition; on the other hand he uncritically reads *bianzhengfa* in terms of Western philosophical categories. Hence Mao appears to be a determinist, a rationalist and a dualist. Knight argues that Mao's basic law of *mao-dun*, or the unity of contradictions, was taken from Soviet Marxism while the unity of opposites in Lenin was taken from Engels.²⁴ But, since there are differences between the philosophies of Marx and Engels, it is a necessary result of this hypothesis that Mao does not share any of Marx's philosophical points of view.²⁵ For him, the traditional elements in Mao's thought are the

ideas of yin and yang, a tradition from the commentaries on the *Yijing* (*The Book of Changes*), the *Daodejing*, the *Hanshu* (*A History of the Han Dynasty*), and the *Hanfeizi*. Mao mentions many stories in his works that were taken directly from the classical literature—for example, *Shuihuzhuan* (*Water Margin*), *Xiyotiji* (*Journey to the West*), and *Sanguo Yanyi* (*Romance of the Three Kingdoms*).²⁶ The expressions Mao uses in his essays, such as *xiangfan xiangcheng* (contradictory but complementary), *yi fen wei er* (One divides into two), *shibai shi chenggong zhi mu* (Failure is the mother of success), and *dongfeng yadao xifeng* (The west wind is overwhelmed by the east wind), all constitute a Sinification of Marxist dialectics. They suggest the way of thinking Mao has inherited from the Chinese tradition.²⁷ Knight contends that Mao's Sinification and application of Marxism-Leninism to the particular cultural environment of China is a new development in this school of sociopolitical philosophy.²⁸

However, an inconsistency lies in Knight's simplistic juxtaposition of dialectics and *bianzhengfa*. He is critical of Schram's view, contending that Mao is determinist, ontological, and dualistic,²⁹ that Mao's essay "On Practice" is empiricist and his "On Contradictions" rationalist. As he sees it, Mao's law of *maodun* is a priori; Mao's works contain an essentialistic assumption about objects. Knight says that in Mao's view of the universe there is a rational order, and, in everything, a rational structure in accordance with a universal law.³⁰ This is a contradiction, however. On the one hand, Knight maintains that Mao has Sinified dialectics and turned it into a style of Chinese thinking; on the other hand, he claims that Mao entirely gave up his Chinese tradition in favor of Western thought. Knight seems to suggest that the Chinese philosophical tradition can be characterized as exhibiting the same dualism, ontology, and universalism as the conceptual and rationalistic thinking characteristic of the West.

In opposition to both of the foregoing views, Joseph Needham claims that, since neo-Confucianism is a form of materialism, it is closely related to dialectical materialism.³¹ In his view, the two fundamental ideas of neo-Confucianism are *qi* and *li*. *Qi* originally meant something rather like the Greek word for "breath" (*pneuma*), a vapor, but by the Song period, it had come to mean "all matter, the grossest as well as the most tenuous." The original meaning of *li* was a way of cutting jade according to its natural pattern, but eventually it came to mean "all structure in nature itself." It is easy to see that the profound unitariness of Chinese thinking favors its attaining a kind of "synthesis."³² Needham holds that Western dialectical materialism can be traced even further back than Marx, to Leibniz, whose philosophical thinking either had found in neo-Confucianism much precious support and confirmation, or had been somewhat derived from it.³³ Just as Knight uses

Western philosophical categories in his analysis, Needham seems to assume that there has been a clear and uncontested notion of dialectical materialism in the West even before Marx, and that neo-Confucianism is capable of being analyzed by means of this Western philosophical apparatus.

Likewise, Tsung-I Dow proposes a remedy of the Marxian "qualitative leap" with the yin-yang dialectics. Quantum theory claims that chaos is order, that disorder creates order, and that a microscopic perturbation can be amplified to affect macroscopic behavior. Because of this, Dow assumes that the advancement of the theory has thus rediscovered the twofold dialectical nature of enduring existence and change, and has forced an acceptance of the insight of *xiangfan xiangcheng*, or complementarity in contradiction, as a viable observation of nature and human cognition. This rediscovery put a limit on the causal linear thinking involved in predicting the course and development of things and events. It strengthens rather than weakens the dialectical worldview. "Without doubt," Dow asserts, "the affinity between the Marxian and Confucian philosophical systems is far greater than between any other systems." A reformulated yin-yang dialectics with features of rationalistic metaphysics, empirical epistemology, and an axiology of creativity may be able to alleviate the Marxian difficulty in its concept of the "qualitative leap" without basic alteration of either system.³⁴

Dow, like Needham, seems to believe that there is a clear and uncontested notion of Marxian dialectics in the Western tradition. He thus also seems to hold that there is no deep difference between European cultures on the one hand and the philosophical traditions of China that have developed independently of Europe on the other.³⁵ Hence, he holds that the philosophy of yin-yang in the Chinese tradition can be reformulated with features of rationalistic metaphysics and empirical epistemology. One can pursue a remedy to this so-called "qualitative leap" by means of the thought of yin-yang without altering either the basis of the Marxian philosophical system or that of Confucianism.

Finally, in the exchange in *Modern China* between Andrew Walder, Stuart Schram, and Frederic Wakeman, Walder attacks "the China field" for assuming a dualism between "determinism" and "voluntarism."³⁶ Walder holds that a systematic reading of Marx should not ignore the important role Marx attributed to all aspects of the superstructure and his frequent statements that elements of superstructure continually react on one another and on the economic base itself. According to Walder, Engels states Marx's position on the relationship between superstructure and economic base unequivocally in his famous letter to J. Bloch of September 22, 1890: human material life was only the "ultimately" determining factor in the sense that it profoundly shaped the superstructure in distinctive ways.³⁷ Walder also maintains that

Engels had explained the “dialectical unity” of superstructure and the economic base thirty years earlier, i.e., as a simultaneous shaping of the base by superstructure and vice versa—a constant, dynamic process whereby superstructure and base shape each other into a coherent social structure.³⁸ And yet, like the others, Walder juxtaposes Marx’s dialectics with Mao’s *bianzhengfa*, assuming that there is no difference between these. Hence, he contends that it is not the case that Marx is *essentially* a determinist and Mao *essentially* a voluntarist. To separate Marx and Mao in this manner is to assume an inveterate dualism.

Even though Walder is correct in saying that Marx is not essentially a determinist and Mao is not essentially a voluntarist, he does not show the specific ways in which Marx and Mao escaped these attributions. At the same time, he does not seem to appreciate the necessity of distinguishing fundamental differences in the thought of Mao and Marx. Moreover, Walder’s solution to the “voluntarism/determinism” dichotomy rests on views that Marx probably did not hold. Marx, Engels, and Marxism should be separated.³⁹ As Peter Manicas argues, what Marx does in *Capital* is theorizing relevant mechanisms so that change is truly to be explained “dialectically,” as the outcome of contradictory processes. Based upon everything that Marx wrote, both early and late, there is no doubt that he was not a “dialectical materialist”; the philosophical naturalism sketched out and presupposed in the *German Ideology* makes a successful effort that transcends the idealist/materialist dichotomy.⁴⁰ Moreover, readings of Marx ought to be challenged. Not only interpretations of Marx proliferated, but also that of Engels, and, in addition, at issue is the relation of Second International Marxism to both of these interpretations. First and Second International Marxism was powerfully influenced by “positivism” and Darwinian naturalism. Some of Marx’s key texts were not available; there are problems that were created by Engels’s later interventions, therefore there were problems of reading Engels against Marx or of Engels against Kautsky or Plekhanov. And, as with Lenin, the issue is that “Leninism” is not what Lenin believed, but what people came to understand what he believed.⁴¹ Mao could hardly have appreciated the problems here, since most of the materials were not available when he was attracted to Marxism and even though he knew some central texts, he understood all of this through the eyes of his own Chinese experience. In any case, Walder, like the other scholars discussed here, fails to give an adequate account of the specifically Chinese character of Mao’s thought.

Arif Dirlik’s view in this respect deserves our special attention. As he suggests, the articulation of a “Chinese Marxism” underwent a process of “recreating,” “rephrasing,” and “restructuring” Marxism, since Mao—as well as many others of his time—did not just read Marxism in accordance with a Chi-

nese historical experience. These writers also insistently read the Chinese historical experience into Marxism. Dirlík points out with some astuteness that the Sinification of Marxism was made into a theoretical project for revolutionary problems (especially the problem of a Marxist revolution in agrarian China).⁴² Marxism was vernacularized in China. "The Marxism (Marxism-Leninism) that Chinese Communists inherited was a Marxism that had already been 'deterritorialized' from its original terrain in European history"; and at the same time it was reterritorialized upon a Chinese terrain.⁴³ Dirlík notes that Mao did not approach Marxism as a "blank sheet of paper," and that there are tantalizing traces in his philosophy of various traditions in Chinese thought.⁴⁴ As he claims, it is important that the presence of these traces is not deliberate (that is, Mao made no formal effort to integrate his Marxism with any of these traditions); and any parallels drawn between his Marxism and native traditions are of necessity speculative.⁴⁵ Then, what is the role of Chinese thought in the vernacularization or reterritorialization of Marxism upon a Chinese terrain? How are we to understand this process?

We can assume that although the past decades have seen a massive scholarly effort to interpret and comment on twentieth-century Chinese cultural history and Chinese Marxism, the questions of how and why Marxism has assumed the form it has taken in China have not been dealt with satisfactorily in Chinese or English.

Unlike the approaches of previous scholars, this work draws attention to the fundamental issue that certain cosmological assumptions embraced by the Western tradition have resulted in significant differences between Western Marxism and the particular philosophical current in the Chinese tradition, known as *tongbian* (continuity through change), which developed independently of Western Marxism. Following the assumptions of David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames concerning a "correlative" modality of thinking, I argue that the philosophy of *tongbian* had tremendous significance in the discourse of "dialectical materialism," or *bianzheng weiwu zhuyi*, and it facilitated reading Marxist "dialectics" into a worldview of continuity among all things or events, a worldview devoid of transcendence and order, in which the complementary and contradictory interactions of the two basic elements of the polarity of yin and yang produce change. This distinct modality of thinking has precluded the dichotomous approaches to issues and the similar difficulties that have attended Western Marxisms.

Roger T. Ames holds that the different cosmological assumptions of European cultures on the one hand and the philosophical traditions of China that have developed independently of Europe on the other are greatly significant and worthy of scholarly attention.⁴⁶ The late Cambridge scholar I. A. Richards has raised the same problem. In his *Mencius on the Mind* (1932),

Richards suspects that if “analysis” is introduced as a methodology for understanding Mencius, it smuggles in with it a worldview and a style of thought that is alien to the text itself.⁴⁷ In 1939, Chang Tung-sun contrasted a Western “logic of identity” with a Chinese “logic of correlation” which is neither monistic, nor dualistic, nor reductionistic.⁴⁸ Angus Graham draws a contrast between “causality” and “correlativity” as alternative means by which philosophical discourse has been shaped in modern Western and traditional Chinese cultural milieus.⁴⁹ Ames probes further into correlative thinking in the Chinese tradition. He cites Hellmut Wilhelm, who wrote, “The explanation of the creative process in terms of the interaction of complementary opposition is fundamental to the Chinese tradition.”⁵⁰ Ames explains further, “In the absence of the Western-style dualisms that establish an ontological separation between some determinative principle and that which it determines, the interconnectedness of all things promotes a correlative mode of philosophizing and of explaining order in the world.”⁵¹

In challenging the principal understanding of Confucian thought, especially among the mainstream thinkers of the Anglo-European tradition, Hall and Ames present three assumptions in their collaborate work *Thinking through Confucius*: an immanent cosmos, conceptual polarity, and tradition as interpretive context.⁵² Here I consider two briefly.

First, Confucianism entails an ontology of events, not one of substance. Since the Confucian worldview does not need an abstract understanding of moral virtues, the Confucians are primarily concerned with an explication of the activities of specific people in particular contexts. The Confucian characterization of a person in terms of events is expressed in a correlative pattern of the agent and his act. The situation is given primacy over agency.

Second, Confucian philosophy involves no sense of transcendence. All things in the world are inextricably interconnected with all other things and thus, any two things are said to be correlative to each other. Unlike Western dualisms, the Confucian “polarity” implies a relationship of two events, each of which constitutes a necessary condition of the other for what it is. Each particular is both self-determinate and determined by every other particular. A polar explanation of relationships requires a contextualist interpretation of the world in which events are strictly interdependent. This correlative polar metaphysic precludes the problematic dualistic mind/body conception.

The principal Western understanding of Chinese Marxism is plagued with problems similar to those that Hall and Ames challenge in the mainstream Western interpretations of the Confucian tradition. The assumptions they present with respect to Confucianism apply also to Chinese Marxism. That is to say, embedded in Chinese Marxism is an ontology of events, not one of substance. The characterization of a person in terms of events is expressed in

a correlative pattern of the agent and his act. There is no sense of transcendence within Chinese Marxism, which entails the natural worldview of correlative, rather than dualistic or dichotomous, thinking. Unlike the dichotomous underpinnings of Western Marxisms, the dialectics, or *bianzhengfa*, of Chinese Marxism is still the kind of “polarity” that implies a relationship of two events, each of which constitutes a necessary condition of the other for what it is.

We find that the kind of correlative polar metaphysics of Chinese Marxism’s “dialectics” (*bianzhengfa*), or Confucianism’s “polarity,” may be traced back to the ancient philosophical text of the *Yijing* (*Classic of Changes*), wherein the functional analogue of the meaning of *bianzheng* is conveyed in terms of *dao* (way), *yi* (change), *yin-yang*, and, in particular, *biantong* (change with continuity). According to the *Xici Zhuan*, a commentary transmitted along with the text, “a door shut may be called an [analogy to] *kun*, and the opening of the door, *qian*. The opening succeeding the shutting may be comprehended as a [case] of *bian* (change); the passing from one of these states to the other may be called *tong* (the constant course of [things or events]).”⁵³

It is important to note that *bian-tong* may be reversed into *tong-bian*, which implies that humanity comprehends and follows the succeeding way of *bian* and *tong* (change and getting through), and thus *tiaoxia wanwu* (the ten thousand things or events under *tian* [nature, the sky]). As the *Yijing* states, “To comprehend change(s) is [our] affair,”⁵⁴ “transforming and shaping is what we called *bian* (change);”⁵⁵ and “following and carrying this out is called *tong*.”⁵⁶ Now the meaning of “*tong*” has changed from “the constant course of [things or events]” into “following and carrying it out,” which suggests that “*tong*” entail a continuum getting through the changes of the ten thousand things under the sky as well as one getting through humanity’s thinking and doing accordingly. These two “continuums” are interdependent and correlative. This is how the modality of the strand of Chinese thought *tongbian* establishes itself as a correlative way of thinking in the *Xici Zhuan* of the *Yijing*. This modality of correlative thinking construes *dao* as “ways of change and transformation,”⁵⁷ or ways of change as a constant course of things or events.

Yin-yang symbolically suggests any pair of polar opposites in the world. “A *yin* and a *yang* are what we call *dao*.”⁵⁸ Hence, the successive movement of *yin* (the shaded or inactive) and *yang* (the bright or active) [operations] constitutes what is called *dao*. In terms of *yi*, the *Yijing* says, “Birth and rebirth is what we call *yi*,”⁵⁹ which indicates the creative process entailing the interaction and interdependence of complementary opposition. It suggests that opposites of *yin* and *yang* are intimately linked, each depending on the other in order to be what it is and having the germ of the other immanent in

it; what is going on depends on what has been going on and where the process is heading. A paragraph of the *Yijing* reads: "What is it that *yi* does? It opens up [the knowledge of] a variety of things or events and accomplishes the undertakings [of humanity]."⁶⁰ This indicates a way of knowing that "exhibits the past, and enables us to discriminate [the issues of] the future; it manifests what is minute, and brings to light what is obscure."⁶¹

Dao, *yi*, *yin-yang*, and *tongbian* can all be understood as entailing an ontology of events, not one of substance. Without any sense of abstraction, they suggest both the way of a natural world and that of specific persons. They also involve a characterization of a person in terms of events that is expressed in a correlative pattern of the agent and his act.

Therefore, it is appropriate to suggest an interpretation of the concepts of *dao*, *yi*, *yin-yang* and *tongbian* that significantly involves the following four ideas: (1) Every thing (or event) in the world correlates with another. (2) The manifold and diverse relationships of things (or events) to any other things (or events) are of interconnectedness, and can be viewed as of a basic pattern as *yin* and *yang*, namely, the interaction and interdependence of complementary opposition. (3) It is this basic pattern that ceaselessly brings every thing (or event) in the world into constant change or movement. And (4) everything is in a process of change and presents itself as a focus and field of relationship. Each item is understood as "this particular focus" which articulates the totality of things from its perspective; and, as of the totality, it focuses totality in its entirety. The totality is itself nothing more than the full ranges of particular foci, each defining itself and its own particular field. In characterizing an item as focal, we are indicating that it inheres in its immediate context in such a manner as to shape and be shaped by that context as field.⁶²

A worldview is sedimented into these ideas that entails a world of continuity among all things or events. It is a worldview in which strict notions of transcendence, order, and abstract principles are absent. It is a way of correlative thinking that tends to preclude the kind of metaphysics, dualisms, ontologies, epistemologies, and even the foundations of objective certainty itself, which include the forms of Plato, the will of God, the spirit of Hegel, and the impersonal reason of Kant.

For this reason, when Western versions of dialectics are engaged in a dialogue with the style of correlative thinking that developed in the light of *dao*, *yin-yang*, and *tongbian*, among other concepts, they undergo a process of development which results in their being altered, and calling upon the meaning of *xiangfan xiangcheng*, that is, "complementarity in opposition." If we say, "the relationship between *yin* and *yang* is *xiangfan xiangcheng*," we are in fact saying that it is *bianzheng* or "dialectical." Here *xiangfan xiangcheng* and *bianzheng* ("dialectic") convey exactly the same understanding, that is, "(of

two things to) be both opposite and complementary to each other, opposite to each other and yet also complementary to each other.”⁶³

This style of *dao* or *tongbian* philosophy, “dialectics” in particular, is not something that could simply be comprehended through definition; it is not even definable. For example, David A. Dilworth defines “dialectical method” as one in which “one observes a logic of higher agreement, which presupposes and accomplishes a synthetic unity of opposites, in which contrasts, or multiplicities, and in which partial, abstract views are subsumed and reconciled—whether aesthetically, actively, or propositionally—in an emerging whole.”⁶⁴ But this is not the understanding that dialectics conveys for the Chinese; for them, Dilworth’s definition is capable of explaining little or perhaps nothing at all.

Dialectics became a worldview and a way of correlative understanding in the Chinese environment. It sensitizes one to the identifiable yet interdependent, interpenetrable and intertransformable pairs in contradiction, as is symbolized in yin and yang, or, in Mao Zedong’s vocabulary, *mao* (spear) and *dun* (shield).⁶⁵ The dynamic interaction between the two in the relationship of complementary opposition makes the inevitability of change both internal and external. This system tends to bear an empirical character and is also a coherent and inclusive modality of philosophical thinking which covers a full range of diverse phenomena and human experience.

For the Chinese, the concerns of *bianzhengfa* (“dialectics”) are with relationships and change in and among all things and/or events in a manifold, complex, and diverse world, as opposed to anything understood as “a logic of higher agreement.” Agreement and disagreement, in the sense of *bianzheng*, are always correlative. “Dialectics” does not “presuppose” and “accomplish” “a synthetic unity,” but rather uncovers the interaction of complementary opposition. In addition, “whole” and “parts” are correlative in the sense of *bianzheng*. “Whole” is not in the sense of something with strict boundaries but rather means “*tong*,” or “getting though,” that is to say, a sense of constancy and continuity, inseparability, a contextualized focus which is not “emerging” but always involved in a correlative relationship with other foci in the field. Moreover, “unity” is highly inclusive, and does not necessarily mean “reconciling” or “subsuming” various points of view, but rather interdependence, complementarity, or sharing the same field. “Unity” denotes any kind of relationship in which one thing’s (or event’s) *becoming* and fleeting existence are a result of the *becoming* and fleeting existence of its opposite. “Dialectical unity” could thus be understood as coexistence, or mutual becoming, or complementarity between any two interdependent things. Whenever a possible relationship could be established between two things or events, the relationship itself already makes sense of “unity,” or we can say, contradiction can also be comprehended to possess the significance of

“unity.” “Dialectics” is an effort to discover what “unity and contradiction” is in a specific case.

From the perspective of *tongbian*, what Dilworth’s definition suggests is only a commonsensical notion. The commonsensical notion of contradiction is that it applies merely to ideas but not the world itself, that there is a logical relation between propositions. For example, in logic, the Law of Non-Contradiction states $-(P \text{ and } \neg P)$, where P is an independent variable standing for an entire sentence. Translated into plain English, this law of logic reads, “It is a theorem that it is not the case that P and not- P .” This view is in fact based on a conception of reality divided into separate and independent parts, leaving their interdependence and correlations in a real world in oblivion.

Indeed, the Chinese have accepted “Marxian dialectics” as something similar to their ancient doctrine of yin and yang. Many scholars in the West who either juxtapose dialectics with *bianzhengfa* or employ a determinism/voluntarism dichotomy in understanding the origins of Chinese Marxism are superficial, for none of them has guarded against the tendency to force a structure—for example, the special kind of training, such as “dialectics,” “anarchism,” “determinism,” “voluntarism,” etc., upon types of Chinese thinking. Chinese thinking may very well not have any such structure at all and may not be capable of being approached in such a way.

For many influential Chinese intellectuals, “dialectics” is rather thought as *dao*, a modality of thinking that brings into focus the full range of changes and interactions that occur in the world. Perhaps, Bertell Ollman’s view is more comfortable to the Chinese since he states that with dialectics we are made to question what kind of changes are already occurring and what kind of changes are possible. Many may not deny that everything in the world is changing and interacting at some pace and in one way or another, and that history and systemic connections belong to the real world.⁶⁶ But the difficulty is how to convey adequately such a reality not to miss or distort the real changes and interactions that we know, and how to give them the attention that they deserve. Dialectics offers a solution to this difficulty insofar as it expands our ideas to include, as aspects of what they are, both the process by which they have become that and the broader interactive context in which they are located.⁶⁷

Tradition has played an important role in understanding and representing Marxian dialectics in China. A more plausible way of making sense of Chinese Marxism must first examine the distinctive current of thought, *tongbian*, or continuity through change, and then to analyze the roots of Marxism in the West and how the Chinese understood Marxism in a significantly different way. This may seem to be a misinterpretation, but the Chinese understanding

of Marxism makes an important contribution to the development of this philosophy. The approach undertaken in this book may sometimes appear to lack focus in terms of answering the questions of how and why Marxism has assumed the form it has taken in China. However, it is necessary to study the precise cultural particularities that significantly effected China's reception of Marxist thought from the West. This process will also involve an introduction of the historical conditions of the encounter between Western Marxism and the Chinese tradition around the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. Direct responses to the questions of how Marxist thought has been engaged in a dialogue with Chinese culture will be addressed in discussing the texts of the Chinese dialecticians, Qu Qiubai, Ai Siqui, and Mao Zedong.

In order to trace the fundamental differences between Marxist dialectics and Chinese Marxism's *bianzhengfa*, the first chapter of the book proceeds from a discussion of the distinct cosmological assumptions of the Chinese tradition by investigating into the ancient philosophical text, the *Xici Zuan* of the *Yijing*. It is a systematic and comprehensive attempt to identify *tongbian* (continuity through change) as a clear style of "thought" (or philosophy) that is distinctly but not necessarily uniquely Chinese and that is both powerful and available to Chinese intellectuals. In the discussion, *tongbian* will be addressed on the basis of a set of characteristics that outlines the parameters of a distinct natural worldview.

Chapter 2 sketches the critical historical background for the inception of Marxism's historical encounter with China around the turn of the twentieth century and the process of its acceptance by the Chinese, which involve how "dialectics" was first translated into Japanese (and expressed in *kanji*), and then into Chinese, undergoing a fundamental change philosophically in the process. Chapter 3 is an examination of the elements of *tongbian* involved in the preliminary stage of reading dialectics when Western thought encountered China through the Japanese language; the particular Chinese vocabulary, *bianzhengfa*, for Marxian dialectics gives a thread of clue to possible compatibility on a surface level between Marxian dialectic and *tongbian*, and perhaps makes basis for many Chinese intellectuals to be enthusiastic about Marxian dialectic. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 demonstrate how the encounter of dialectics and dialectical materialism were reacted upon and treated in the writings of Qu Qiubai, Ai Siqui, and many other leading intellectuals as to how they turned out to be a reproduced discourse of the thought of *tongbian*. As a result, in the discursive context of Chinese correlative thinking, Marxist dialectical materialism was popularized and Sinified. Chapter 7 deals with how Marxian dialectics finally came to fruition as a distinctive Chinese form in the thought of Mao Zedong. The history of dialectical materialism's encounter

with China demonstrates that Chinese Marxism draws on the Chinese tradition and overcomes some of the difficulties that have attended Western Marxisms.

The form that Marxism has assumed in China is not the same as the inherited legacy of Marxian dialectics in Europe. It is in some respects close to Marx but articulates a third alternative, which lies between the Western Marxism on the one hand and Chinese tradition on the other. The last section is a conclusion, which relates a seemingly breakup of the trend of *tongbian* or "dialectics" and a replacement by Western neoliberalism in both official ideology and the community of intelligentsias twenty-seven years after Mao's death. Then, I will analyze three scenarios of the future of *tongbian* or "dialectics": permanent replacement of *tongbian* by neoliberalism, a confusion of liberalism and *tongbian*; or the return of *tongbian*. This section offers a warning that *tongbian* is still available and functioning to articulate the current discourse of liberalism in China.

NOTES

1. Francis Y. K. Soo, *Mao Tse-Tung's Theory of Dialectic* (Boston: D. Reidel, 1981), xi.
2. There is a general consensus in the literature of Western China scholars on Marx, Marxism, and Mao that suggests that Marx and pre-Leninist Marxism are determinist. By contrast, Lenin and Mao are considered to be voluntarists. Marx is understood as determinist because of his theory of economic foundation and superstructure. This is the famous text in *The Critique of Political Economy*:

The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises the legal and political superstructure and to which corresponds definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of people that determines [bestimmt] their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. (Marx, 1970, 20f)

3. Andrew G. Walder, "Marxism, Maoism, and Social Change," *Modern China* nos. 1-2, (Jan./Apr. 1977): 103.
4. Walder, "Marxism, Maoism, and Social Change," 103.
5. Stuart Schram, *The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 8.
6. Schram, *Thought of Mao Tse-Tung*, 63.
7. Schram, *Thought of Mao Tse-Tung*, 140.
8. Stuart Schram places heavy weight on the traditional roots in Chinese Marxism or Mao Zedong's thought. As he discovers, of the twenty-odd textual quotations in one of Mao's articles written long before he was exposed to any signifi-

cant Marxist influences, "there are a dozen to the Confucian canon; one to the Confucian realist Xun Zi, and two to the Sung idealist interpreter of Confucianism, Zhu Xi, as well as one to his late Ming critic, Yen Yuan. There are also three references to Mao's favorite Taoist classic, the *Zhuangzi* . . . [Mao] refers in passing to obscure biographical details regarding a number of minor writers of various periods. (It is all the more noteworthy that eleven out of twelve references to the Confucian classics should be to the basic core of the Four books)." See Stuart Schram, *The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 15.

9. Schram, *Thought of Mao Tse-Tung*, 200.
10. Schram, *Thought of Mao Tse-Tung*, 206.
11. Schram's response to Andrew Walder in a debate about Marxism and Mao Zedong thought in *Modern China*, 3, no. 2 (April 1977): 169.
12. Frederic Wakeman, "A Response," *Modern China*, 3, no. 2 (April 1977): 161.
13. Maurice Meisner, *Li Ta-Chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 94. Peter Kien-hong Yu, a specialist of Chinese dialectics also shares the similar view in chapter 17 of in his *Crab and Frog Motion Paradigm Shift: Decoding and Deciphering Taipei and Beijing's Dialectical Politics* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002).
14. Peter Zarrow, *Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture*, 1990), 237.
15. Zarrow, *Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture*, 254–55.
16. Zarrow, *Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture*, 253.
17. Zarrow, *Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture*, 12.
18. Zarrow, *Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture*, 16.
19. Zarrow, *Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture*, 12.
20. Michael Y. L. Luk, *The Origins of Chinese Bolshevism* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1990), 44, 46, 50.
21. Luk, *Origins of Chinese Bolshevism*, 16.
22. Luk, *Origins of Chinese Bolshevism*, 46.
23. Luk, *Origins of Chinese Bolshevism*, 232.
24. Nick Knight, *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), 15–19.
25. Knight, *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism*, 9.
26. Knight, *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism*, 51.
27. Knight, *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism*, 51.
28. Knight, *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism*, 44.
29. Knight, *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism*, 10–11.
30. Knight, *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism*, 25–28.
31. Joseph Needham, "The Past in China's Present," *The Centennial Review*, 4 (1960): 286, 291.
32. Needham, "Past in China's Present," 290.
33. Needham, "Past in China's Present," 291.
34. Tsung-I Dow, "Remedy the Marxian 'Qualitative Leap' with Confucian-Taoist Yin-Yang Dialectics," *Asian Profile*, 17, no. 2 (April, 1989): 123.

35. David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, *Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 238.
36. Andrew G. Walder, "Marxism, Maoism, and Social Change," *Modern China*, no. 1–2 (Jan./Apr. 1977): 101.
37. Walder, "Marxism, Maoism, and Social Change," 111.
38. Walder, "Marxism, Maoism, and Social Change," 112–23.
39. Although the literature is vast, see Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Derek Sayer, *Marx's Method: Ideology, Science, and Critique in "Capital"* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1979); Terrel Carver, *Marx and Engels: The Intellectual Relationship* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983); and, more recently, Terrel Carver (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Marx* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
40. Peter T. Manicas, "Marx, Marxism, and Maoism: An Outline," an unpublished paper, 1992, and *A History & Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 105–108.
41. Manicas, "Marx," 105–108.
42. Arif Dirlik, "Mao Zedong and 'Chinese Marxism,'" *Companion Encyclopedia of Asian Philosophy*, ed. Brian Carr and Indira Mahalingam (London and New York, 1997), 602.
43. Dirlik, "Mao Zedong," 613–14.
44. Dirlik, "Mao Zedong," 611.
45. Dirlik, "Mao Zedong," 593–615.
46. Roger T. Ames, "Mengzi Zhuxue yu Zhixu de Weijuexing (Cosmos in the Accosmotic Han Dynasty)," in Li Minghui, *Mengzi Sixiang de Zhuxue Tantao* (Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Zhongguo Wenzhe Yanjiusuo Choubeichu, 1995), 39.
47. I. A. Richards, *Mencius on the Mind* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1932), 86–87.
48. Chang Tung-Sun, "A Chinese Philosopher's Theory of Knowledge," *Yenching Journal of Social Studies* (Peking: 1939), p. 180. See David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, *Anticipating China* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 104.
49. Hall and Ames, *Anticipating China*, 123.
50. Hellmut Wilhelm, *Heaven, Earth, and Man in the Yijing* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), 35–40.
51. David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, *Thinking from the Han* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 235.
52. David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, *Thinking through Confucius* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 11–25.
53. Z. D. Sung, *The Text of Yi King: Chinese Original with English Translation* (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1969), Xici I, ch. 11.
54. "Tong bian zhi wei shi," Sung, Xici I, ch. 11.
55. "hua er cai zhi," Sung, Xici I, ch. 11.

56. "tui er xing zhi," Sung, *Xici I*, ch. 11.
57. "bian hua zhi dao," as in Chincsc.
58. "Yi yin yi yang zhi wei Dao," Sung, *Xici Zhan I*, ch. 4.
59. "Sheng sheng zhi wei yi," Sung, *Xici I*, ch. 5.
60. "Fu yi he wei ye? fu yi kaiwu chengwn," Sung, *Xici Zhuon I*, ch. 11.
61. "Fu yi zhangwang er cha lai, er xianwei chanyou," Sung, *Xici Zhuon II*, ch. 6.
62. The focus/field model results from understanding an item's relation to the world to be constituted by acts of contextualization. A correlative order emerges from the coordination of so many "thiscs" and "thats" as various foci and the fields they focus. The act of contextualization involves appreciation of harmonious correlations of the myriad unique details (*wanwu*), which make up the world. For this model, see Hall and Ames, *Anticipating China*, 234, 236, 239, 242–44, 268–78.
63. *A Chinese English Dictionary* (Beijing: Commercial Publishing House, 1985), 752.
64. David A. Dilworth, *Philosophy in World Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 29–30.
65. It is interesting to note that the etymology of "maodun" can be traced to the work of Hanfeizi (d. 233 B.C.E.), which tells the following story: Once upon a time in the Chu state there was a man who made a living by selling both *mao* (spear) and *dun* (shield). He hawked in turn his spear and shield. Holding his shield, he bragged that it was so solid and hard that no spear could damage it. Then picking up his spear, he reassumed boasting that it was so sharp and powerful that no shield could withstand it. He was not able to make any response, however, when someone from the crowd asked him: "How about jabbing your shield with your own spear?" In later generations, *mao* and *dun* became a compound to indicate mutual contradiction between events and things. The concept *maodun* may be distinguished from yin-yang in terms that *maodun* involved genuine contradiction, while they cannot be differentiated from each other in the sense that both concepts entail correlative rather than dualistic thinking.
66. This view is debatable, though. For example, Parmenides is often understood as having articulated an ontological theory of permanence in contrast to Heraclitus' ontology of flux. And it is commonly thought that Plato's "Two-Worlds" ontology was an attempt to reconcile permanence and change. In fact, it is probably accurate to argue that the mainstream of the Western philosophical tradition has focused on permanence rather than change.
67. Bertell Ollman, *Dialectical Investigations* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 10, 24.

Tongbian: A Chinese Strand of Thought

Stuart Schram, Joseph Needham, and Nick Knight state that there is something distinctly Chinese about Chinese Marxism. Arif Dirlik even has pointed out that the Marxism that Chinese Communists inherited was a Marxism that had already been deterritorialized from its original terrain in Europe history. As a continuous study, my interest is to look into this “distinctness” in Chinese Marxism, what it exactly is and how it differs from the Marxism of Marx or of later “Marxists.” Or, to use Dirlik’s words, what is this “Chinese terrain” upon which European Marxism was “reterritorialized”? I will trace the fundamental differences of Chinese Marxism’s *bianzhengfa* from Marxist dialectics to the distinct cosmological assumptions of the Chinese tradition; the kind of cosmological assumptions of the Chinese tradition that underlines the Chinese reading of Marxist thought. I would like to argue that *bianzheng weiwu zhuyi*, which both Western scholars and Chinese Marxists have taken for granted as dialectical materialism, is indeed a modern version of traditional thought. It is the “distinctness” about this traditional thought that has rendered the “distinctness” about Chinese Marxism.¹

Many contemporary thinkers both within and outside China have tried to explore the “distinctness” of Chinese tradition vis-à-vis that of the Western. The effort dates at least as far back as Marcel Granet’s *La pensée chinoise* (1934), and has been continued more recently by Claude Levi-Strauss, Nathan Silvin, Agnus C. Graham, and David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames. In the immense literature of their work, the terminology they have employed to characterize the strands of Chinese philosophy are many, including “yin-yang cosmology,” “the *Ijing* way of thinking,” “*bianzheng siwei*” (dialectical thinking), “correlative thinking,” and so forth.

Hall and Ames have explored with profundity the modality of correlative thinking of the Chinese tradition. As they clarify it, this strand of correlative thinking is "to explain an item or event is, first, to place it within a scheme organized in terms of analogical relations among the items selected for the scheme, and then to reflect, and act in terms of, the suggestiveness of these relations."²

I found that the meaning of the distinctiveness of Chinese Marxism is best expressed in the two Chinese characters: *tong* and *bian*, which can be seen as a mode of thought perhaps first formulated in the *Ijing*. It has since been carried on and developed through history; it has not only been heavily influential in the development of classical Chinese culture, but persisted as a powerful trend of thought in contemporary China. In the classic *Shuo wen* lexicon, the explanations of the *tong* are given as events and analogical relations with other characters. For example, it may mean to clear away, to open up, to go through (a path) without any obstruction, as well as road by which one may reach nine places.³ *Bian* is also explained as events and has a number of analogical relations with other characters. These include a pictographic character of a home-guarding lizard, meaning to trade or exchange, or "to avoid by retreating." It also conveys the meanings of "difficult," "hurry and quick," "to teach from above and to learn from below," "one making his steps," and "correct something over done."⁴

The kinds of analogical relations and events constitute necessary conditions for what *tong* and *bian* mean, as well as the meanings of those characters with which they have analogical relations.

As I mentioned in Introduction, an obvious functional analog of the meaning of *tong bian* is found in the event of a door: "A door shut may be called [an analogy to] *kun*, and the opening of the door, to *qian*. The opening succeeding the shutting may be comprehended as [an event] of *bian* (change); the passing from one of these states to the other endlessly may be called *tong*."⁵

As we see, both *bian* and *tong* have analogical relations with two events—a door's opening and shutting—both refer to the process of *becoming* from opening to shutting, or vice versa. Whereas *bian* suggests becoming in light of difference, *tong* expresses the kind of *becoming* in light of continuity—a "becoming" from one event to another. This suggests that there is a continuity in *becoming*, or if there is continuity between one and the other, there would not be a *becoming*; and, in turn, if one does not vary from the other, then there can not be this "becoming."

Many notable Chinese thinkers find *bian* and *tong* in all relationships among *wanwu* (ten thousand things) under the sky, which can be seen as something discovered in the objective material world if conceptualized in a

Western sense. Moreover, *bian-tong* is also seen reversed, that is, *toung-bian*, which means "knowing *bian*." Here *tong* has changed from the meaning "the opening succeeding the shutting" and "the passing from one of these states to the other endlessly" to "comprehending changes and doing in accordingly changing manners" and "what to carry out and what to operate with."⁶ Thus, *bian-tong* extends its analogical relations into *toung-bian*; *tong-bian* is to comprehend *bian-tong*, to comprehend humanity as continuity and to follow (get through) *bian* and *toung*, or, to put it concisely, to think and do correlative as the world does. The analogical relations of *tong-bian* and *bian-tong* may well suggest a correlative pattern of subjectivity and objectivity, rather than a dichotomy.

It is crucial to note that what *tongbian* looks for is continuity through change. *Tongbian*, or continuity through change, emphasizes that it is between the door's opening and being shut, or between a correlated pairing, that continuity through change takes place. Perhaps we can presume that the notion of *tongbian* that originated in the *Yijing* contains three related key ideas: continuity, change, and polarity. If expressed in one phrase, then, *tongbian* is "continuity through change between any correlative pairing." Here, continuity itself always entails movement, change, processes, and events. Change is an embodiment of interaction in correlative polarity; and, in turn, interaction itself is an embodiment of correlativity and continuity. This is how *tong-bian*, or continuity through change, establishes itself as a distinct mode of thought in the Chinese tradition.

The *Yijing* is an ancient Chinese classic that dates back at least two thousand years. Most *Yijing* students in China agree that it is a composite work. Fu Xi is thought to be the first sage who invented the eight groups of three strokes known as trigrams, and then on the basis of the Eight Trigrams, developed the sixty-four original combinations of strokes, called Hexagrams. The later sages, King Wen, the founder of the Zhou dynasty, and the Duke of Zhou, one by one, added explanations to the Hexagrams, which were known as *Guaci* (Old Text) and *Yaoci* (Later Text). Later on, further explanations were attached and known as treatises, namely *Tuan zhuan* (Treatise on Line Caption); *Xiangzhuan* (Treatise on Symbolism); *Wenyan* (Supplementary Text to Old and Later Texts), *Xici* (Great Appendix); *Xugua* (Orderly Sequence of the Hexagrams); *Shuogua* (Treatise on Trigrams Remarks); and *Zagua* (Treatise on the Hexagrams). These treatises were also called *Shiyi* (the Ten Wings) in the Han dynasty, although no one knows exactly who had written these treatises. Despite over a thousand years of debates, scholars still cannot agree on who was/were the author(s).⁷

Because the original text of *Yijing* was so symbolic yet aesthetic, and its meaning so obscure yet profound, the number of thinkers who have tried to

understand it has been countless, their interpretive literature voluminous and diverse. For instance, whereas the Confucians of the Han dynasty emphasized the significance of *xiang* (image, model) and *shu* (numbers), the Confucians of the Song dynasty dedicated themselves particularly to an exposition of the notion of *yi* (appropriateness, meaning) and *li* (coherence, or pattern). As the interests of different schools varied, no unanimous conclusion could be drawn about what the *Yijing* was supposed to convey.

Since modern times, scholars have attempted to launch studies of the *Yijing* from even more varied perspectives. Historians have expected to discover new traces of prehistoric China; natural scientists have made an effort to bring to light the mysteries of the cosmos through the images of *yi*; poets have identified “*gua*, *yao*, and *ci*” as specific styles of ancient folk songs. Although studies of the *Yijing* have been diversely oriented, most students have reached a consensus that the *Yijing* provides a primordial strand of philosophy for most of the schools of thought in the Chinese tradition. I selected the *Xici* section of the ancient document especially because *tong-bian* as a strand of thought was formulated here and has extended to shape the philosophical milieu of Confucianism, Daoism, and even Buddhism in China. *Tongbian* has been sedimented into Chinese high culture, as well as diffused into folk culture.

Huxi may offer a plausible Chinese translation of the English word “correlativity,” which immediately presents an image of two things being tied to each other. The image can be an analogical way of suggesting *tong* and *bian*; and *huxi* can be seen in the analogy of the two things, each of which “*tongs*”—constitutes a continuity with—the other. And *huxi* is always seen associated with a change from one thing into the other, or vice versa.

How do things *tong* to—or constitute a continuity—with each other? In what ways are they tied to each other? Are they entirely bound together, or are they respectively tied to the ends of a rope? How long is this rope, or how far are they from each other? Are they tied to each other very closely or very loosely? These questions are all a matter of *bian*, an analogical reference to differences, for it can be understood as a continuity in terms of differences, a *becoming* from one to the other, or vice versa. Change entails *huxi*, or correlativity; changes are possible because of *huxi*, a correlativity, or because of *tong*—because two things constitute a continuity with each other.

In addition, *tong* may be of any type of *huxi*, and any type of change; *tong* always means a continuity that is only made possible through *bian*, or change. *Tong* is not a static continuity; this strand of thought does not entail a metaphysics of static continuity. *Tong* always suggests a change in a particular thing in its correlations with other things. We can draw seven statements that are pertinent to the strand of *tongbian* philosophy we identify with the *Yijing*.

STATEMENT 1: A WORLD OF CORRELATIONS

From the event of a door's opening succeeded by its being shut, we learn that the constant passage from one of these states to the other means *tong*. This, then, is the first statement that we may draw from the *tong-bian* strand of philosophy of the *Yijing*: Everything constitutes a continuity to everything else. This strand of thought conceives the world as one of *tong*—of continuity, or of correlations. The *Yijing* states, "The sages having the means to survey all things that move under the sky observed them meeting to become continuous with each other."⁸ It also states, *tong-bian*, or continuity through change, which we find in the event of a door, can also be found in the succession of the four seasons.⁹ Continuity through change also fits in with the sky and earth, the ten thousand things, the male and female, husband and wife, fathers and sons, ruler and minister, the high and the low, the ritual and the appropriate, and so on. The *Yijing* says:

There were the sky and earth. Then afterwards there were myriads of things. From a myriad of things afterwards were male and female. From male and female afterwards were husband and wife. From husband and wife afterwards were father and son. From father and son afterwards were ruler and minister. From ruler and minister afterwards were high and low. From high and low afterwards were the arrangements of ritual actions and propriety.¹⁰

We should be aware that the world seen here in the strand of *tong-bian* philosophy should not be mistaken as one of a single order, of causality, or of the "a decides b." or "If . . . then" formula. As Ames contends, there is no "Being" behind the myriad beings (*wane* or *wan you*), no One behind the many. This is not a Judeo-Christian universe in which all phenomena are identical in the sense that they are dependent upon and explicable by reference to a transcendent, Creator deity.¹¹ This world of *tong* and *bian* does not have boundaries, but rather continuity through *shen* (to grow into or from): *You* (something) grows from *wu* (nothing); one grows into two; two grows into three; three grows into ten thousand things.¹²

STATEMENT 2: ANY TYPE

The second statement concerns what types of correlation, or in which ways the myriad things are correlated with each other. They can be any way. "Any way" first means that the correlations of things may be in any magnitude, either loose or tight. Second, "any way" means any category in which things correlate with each other, that is, correlations that might be either internal or

external, and can be multilevel, multidimensional, multifold, or in a word, of multicategories. Throughout the *Yijing* text, types of correlations, or “*tong*,” are many and diverse. For example, we can say

- that the door’s opening and shutting is a type of correlation as succession and alteration;
- that “in the yang trigrams there are more of the yin lines, and vice versa”¹³ is a correlation of being in each other;
- that “mountain and lake have a free flow of *qi* into each other”¹⁴ is a correlation of continuity;
- that “reaching the extreme becomes a continuity [of a beginning]”¹⁵ is a correlation of ending and beginning;
- that “spirituality is unconditioned by place, [the sage’s dealing with things] is in a changing way that is not restricted to any formality”¹⁶ is a correlation rejecting any boundary;
- that “all [the processes taking place] under the sky would eventually return to the same destination, though by different paths”¹⁷ is a correlation between differences;
- that “hard and pliant push themselves each into the place of the other”¹⁸ is a correlation of interaction;
- that “water and fire contribute together to the one thing (or event)”¹⁹ is a correlation of complementation;
- that “thunder and wind press on with each other”²⁰ is another example of a correlation of complementation;
- that “sky and earth intermingle with each other”²¹ is a correlation of intermingling;
- that “male and female mix seminal essence”²² is a correlation of intercourse;
- that “hard and pliant exchange their places”²³ is a correlation of exchange;
- that “the cold season goes and the warm one comes; the warm season goes and the cold one comes; it is by the mutual succession of the cold and warm seasons that the year is completed”²⁴ is a correlation of coming and going, of taking the place of each other, and of succession.

Of the above-mentioned types of correlations, the one of being in each other as between yin and yang may be seen as a tight correlation whereas the one of making a continuity of each other with *qi*, as between mountain and lake, might be seen as very loose. There are so many polarities and each one of them has a different category of correlation. Indeed, the *tong-bian* philosophy views each polarity as a category of correlation that produces two events, each of which requires the other as a condition for being what it is;

any two elements, or aspects, of polarity are a correlative pattern and symmetrically related, each requiring the other for adequate articulation. (We will return to polarities in statement 5.)

To sum up, correlations can be of any type, can be loose or tight, and can be multilevel, multidimensional, multifold, and of multicategory. This is, in fact, a world in which, as Hall and Ames contend, there is no element or aspect that in the strictest sense transcends the rest: Every element is related to one another, and all elements are correlative.²⁵

STATEMENT 3: HUMANITY AS CONTINUITY

The third statement is that the human being constitutes continuity with *tian* and *di* in a world of correlations. It invokes the first statement that a continuity through change fits in with the sky and earth, ten thousand things, male and female, husband and wife, father and son, ruler and minister, and so on. Since there is not a domain that in the strictest sense transcends the rest, all elements are correlative, including the human being.

The crucial point here is the idea of humanity as continuous with the world. We often conceptualize that the material world as being in contradiction to human subjectivity. In the *Yijing*, however, knowing and doing, exploring and comprehending, and other such activities of human subjectivity have the same reference to *tong* and *bian* (continuity through change), and are believed to be continuous in a world of correlations. In other words, what happens in *tianxia* (under the sky) is what happens in human thought.

Humanity as a continuity is “*tong tianxia*,” or a thorough comprehension of everything between the sky and earth; “In all the operations forming itself, ‘the *Yi* has no thought and no action, and is still and without movement; but when acted on, it penetrates forthwith to the roots of the ten thousand things under the sky.’”²⁶ Here, *tong tianxia* means penetrating forthwith to the roots of the ten thousand things under the sky; the *Yijing* text goes on, “The [operations forming the] *Yi* are the way by which the sages come to the most profound view and investigate exhaustively the minutest springs of things. Only with the most profound view can the sages come to a thorough comprehension of the tendencies of events all under the sky.”²⁷

Hence, *tong* is a thorough comprehension; *tong tianxia* is a thorough comprehension of the tendencies of the events all under the sky.

What does it mean by “a thorough comprehension”? The text explains it in these words: “to scrutinize the ways of continuity of all movements and changes under the sky,” “to obtain a thorough comprehension of *bian*”; “to obtain a thorough comprehension of the mysterious.”²⁸

From the passage that “the sages survey all movements under the sky, and scrutinized the ways in which they meet and are continuous with one another,”²⁹ we learn that *guan qi hue tong* means “to scrutinize the ways of a continuity through all the movements and changes all under the sky.” In addition, to scrutinize a continuity also means, in fact, attaining a thorough comprehension of *bian* or, say, *guan bian* (scrutinize the changes), or *tong qi bian*, as in “to scrutinize the changes of yin and yang,”³⁰ and in “After Shen Nong dies, Huang Di, Yao, and Shun succeeded him one by one. They had a thorough comprehension of the changes of things, and made the people not feel wearied [by constantly sifting through the old to bring forth the new].”³¹

As for a thorough comprehension of the meaning of “*tong shen ming zhi de*”—to attain a thorough comprehension of the mysterious—it is important to explain the Chinese character *shen*, which used to be translated as “God.” It is a descriptive term suggesting what it would be like when a human being acquires continuity with *tian* and *di*. That is to say, when a human being attains a thorough comprehension of change, he accesses to *shen*, for “changing” always presents itself as something spirit-like or mysterious, and frequently takes unpredictable and unfathomable turns that defy human comprehension, making “change” an enduring issue for inquiry. As the *Yi-jing* states, “those who have obtained a comprehension of the way of change [and used it in guiding people’s practices] would obtain a comprehension of how ‘mysterious undertakings’ operate.”³² In this respect, a good example is Bao Xi:

In ancient times, when Bao Xi had come to the rule of all under the sky, looking up, he scrutinized the movements and changes in the sky, and looking down, he surveyed the ways that continue on earth. He also scrutinized the colorful feathers of birds and fur patterns of beasts, and the crops that were appreciative to the conditions of the soil. In an appreciation of a continuity as close as with his own body, and as far as with everything out there, he started inventing his eight triagrams. He thus obtained a thorough comprehension of the mysterious.³³

In *tong-bian* philosophy, however, a continuity of the human with *tian* and *di* does not just suggest obtaining a thorough comprehension of change and the mysterious. Humanity needs not only *tong-bian*, but also *bian-tong*. This is because “Transformation and shaping is what we call change; carrying this out and operating with it is what we call *getting through* (continuity).”³⁴ To put it succinctly, comprehending changes put us only half way in our endeavors; it is also necessary to do things accordingly to effect changes. Comprehending changes also really means doing things and effect changes. Hence, the *bian-tong* in the physical world is continuous with the *bian-tong* of human subjectivity. *Bian-tong*, or changes with a continuity, changes as time changes and

conditions vary.³⁵ Therefore, to do things through changes based on thorough comprehension is the way to achieve the greatest success.³⁶

In this understanding of *tong-bian*, and a continuity of the “universe,” we see no separation of the human being from nature, and no contradiction between human subjectivity and the physical world. Also, knowing and doing are continuous with each other. What happens in *tiaoxia* is what happens in human thought and undertakings. As for what would occur as humanity makes itself continuous with *tian* and *di*, the *Yijing* explains that continuity this way: How humanity comprehends and does is simply how *tian* and *di* change; there is no conflict between them. Human plans are never made in separation from a continuity of the changing *tian* and *di*, and never go wrong. By an ever-varying adaptation, human beings achieve successes in his undertakings without any loss; the way in which they comprehend continuity between day and night enables them to penetrate all knowledge. Therefore, spirit-like, human beings are not conditioned by any boundary; their undertakings in an ever-varying manner are not restricted by any formality.³⁷ Here, we encounter another important point in the *tong-bian* strand of philosophy, that is, the spiritual and the intelligent reside in humanity,³⁸ which we will discuss in the following section.

STATEMENT 4: SHEN DEPENDS ON HUMANITY

The fourth statement is a fundamental claim that *shen* is not a god, and that it depends on humanity. We need to first track down what *shen* meant in China. According to the *Shuo wen*, a book about the origin of Chinese characters that was compiled by Xu Shen in 100 C.E., *shen* was composed of *shi*, to show, and *shen*, to stretch or continue. An analogy is associated with *shi*, which is that figures (images) hang down from the sky (*chui xiang*), from which good and bad fortunes are seen, and thus communicates them to humanity.³⁹ In addition, the event associated with *shen* or spirituality is explained as “Mysteriously the sky communicates and stretches to lead to the growth of ten thousand things.”⁴⁰

From this, we can draw the conclusion that *shen* (spirituality), as associated with the meaning of “stretching out” and “to tell or to communicate,” implies a continuity. Two other associated characters are *zhi* and *mi*. According to the same lexicon, the sky communicating and stretching to lead to the growth of the ten thousand things is called *shen*, and the earth communicating and stretching out to a vast expanse to raise ten thousand things is called *zhi*.⁴¹ *Mi* means *shen*, too—to tell and to stretch out—except that it also has connotations of “secret or hidden.” Thus, *shen* was an ancient expression suggesting a kind of continuity between the sky, the earth, and humanity.

The *Yijing* has a number of analogical explanations for *shen*. One is this: "As for 'shen,' it means that something goes so mysteriously and wonderfully all through the ten thousand things and by this means it speaks."⁴² The second is, "That the change which takes place between yin and yang is unfathomable and called *shen*."⁴³ And the third,

The opening succeeding the shutting [of a door] may be comprehended as [an even] of *bian*; the passing from one of these states to the other endlessly may be called *tong*. What is seen to be appearing, we may call *xiang* (image or figure); for what is physically seen, we may call it a definite thing; what is employed in making things, we may call *fa* (shaping). What is used for going out or entering, the ordinary people all use it [but without a true comprehension of it]; therefore, they call it *shen*.⁴⁴

With these analogous associations, *shen* can be understood as the mysterious, the unfathomable, and the incomprehensible, or something that is too intriguing and wonderful for words or explanation. Hence, *shen* may be seen as a mysterious continuity through changes and between differences, which is described as "a continuity without boundaries" in the text,⁴⁵ and often defies human comprehension; *shen* is message conveying through doing, or stretching, rather than through words.

We have so far come to a noteworthy point, that is, for the kind of *tong-bian* in the *Yijing*, *shen* is not God, but rather, depends on humanity. *Shen* is only spoken of to those who could not comprehend a continuity through changes or between differences all around the world and would interpret them as relations to *tian* and *di* through "God" or religious belief. Whether something is *shen* or not may entirely depend upon how much humanity develops his intelligence. As the *Yijing* states, "the spiritual and the intelligent are stored with humanity."⁴⁶ Some may be spirit-like, capable of teaching in order to make the people learn (the inscrutable), and adapt themselves to it.⁴⁷ We can grasp the intangible continuity (of things) and thereby have ourselves enter the spirit-like state of comprehension.⁴⁸ When we reach that state—thoroughly comprehending what is presumably *shen*, or the mysterious—and teach people to learn and do the same in their undertakings, we may be said to have attained fullness of achievement.⁴⁹

STATEMENT 5: *BIAN* AS CONTINUITY

The fifth statement is that *bian* is also seen as continuity. It is continuity that endures from one time to another, from one place to another, from something to something else, from one way to another and so on. A change denotes a

correlation in motion, and, as continuity, makes it possible for a process to occur, from one process to another, and for an event to occur, from one event to another. Continuity always presents itself in change, motion, and in movement, and makes correlation possible.

As we discussed *bian* previously, both *tong* and *bian* refer to the process of *becoming* from one event to another. *Tong* indicates becoming in the light of continuity—there is continuity in becoming. If there were not continuity between one event and another, “becoming” would be impossible.

Bian signifies “becoming” in the light of continuity between differences and varieties; that there is a becoming from one event to another is because one varies from the other; a becoming could never have occurred if there were no differences.

As in the constant processes of a door’s opening and shutting, *tong*, or “getting through,” is possible because of *bian*, because a becoming occurs from opening to shutting, and because opening and shutting are different. And yet, when a series of changes has run its entire course, one more (series of) changes ensues; as long as there is a change, it means that there is getting through, a continuity; and “getting through” is to be enduring.⁵⁰

Change could be of any kind; correlation and “*sheng*” comprise particularly crucial change. According to *Shuo wen*, *sheng* is associated with “*jin*; “like grass, a tree grows from earth.”⁵¹ The idea of *sheng* evokes a positive attitude toward life and is central in Chinese thought. The *tian-di-ren* (the sky, earth, and humanity) worldview—a view of continuity running through nature and humanity—presents the “world” as a dynamic process of life’s production and reproduction, which the *Yijing* states as *yi*, the primary source of changes; *yi* is ceaselessly creative creativity.⁵² As the sky and the earth intermingle with each other and generate the ten thousand things, these things thus obtain their abundant varieties; as male and female intercommunicate their seminal essence, the ten thousand things are thus born and grow.⁵³ Therefore, the great attributes of the sky and earth are called “*sheng*,” giving and maintaining life.⁵⁴

Crucial to an understanding of change is the word “*yi*.” Pictographically, it is associated with either a lizard watching the house, or the sun and the moon, which together make up the symbol of yin-yang.⁵⁵ Literally speaking, however, *yi* alludes to several operations, such as trading, withdrawing, simple and easy, and forgetting and neglecting. As Pan Liwen explains the *Yijing* text, *yi* may mean “change,” “not change,” “simplicity,” and “exchange.” For change, it means changes and transformations of the ten thousand things. For “not change,” the changes and transformations of the ten thousand things have a *xu*, or a continuity. And for simplicity, the processes are covered from beginning, through the middle phase, to the end.⁵⁶

From one more perspective, *yi* suggests *bian* and *tong*, which emphasizes the process of *becoming*, the characteristic of succession, one after the other (or another), one changing into the other, one exchanging with the other, one taking the place of the other, and so on. *Yi* is spoken of as two events having continuity, or correlation—for example, a door's opening and shutting, birth and rebirth—indicating polarities of complementary oppositions. The *Yijing* states that a event such as a tree growing from the earth (or production and reproduction) is what is called *yi*.⁵⁷ It is polarities such as *qian* and *kun*, or yin and yang, alternating one after the other, changing into each other, exchanging with each other, and taking the place of one after the other. *Qian* and *kun* have their own positions while the events of *yi*, that is, the alternation and succession of one after the other, changing into each other, exchanging with each other, taking the place of the other, and so forth continue all the time.⁵⁸ The sky and earth have their positions while the events of one changing into the other, or one exchanging with the other go on between them.⁵⁹ If there were not the polarities like *qian* and *kun*, or yin and yang, then the process of *yi* could not occur; and in turn, if there were not the event of *yi*, then *qian* and *kun* would break down and cease.⁶⁰ It is the *yi* events that occasion the primal beginning, giving rise to *tian* and *di*, bringing about the four seasons.⁶¹ The *yi* events are in accord with the sky and earth, and manifest the patterns, or *dao* (way), in both of them.⁶²

If understood from the perspective of *yi* events, then what the *yi* does is to open up knowledge of a great variety of things in the world and assists in accomplishing the undertakings of humanity, for *yi* embraces the *daos* (ways) of all things under the sky. This and nothing more is what *yi* does, and human beings can find the continuity in all under the sky by attaining a thorough comprehension of *yi*.⁶³ The *yi* way displays the past, and enables us to discriminate the issues that will arise in the future; it manifests what is minute, and brings to light what is obscure. With it, one can open up and distinguish things in accordance with their names, all of one's comments being correct and his explanations being decisive. Thus everything can be done properly.⁶⁴ In addition, the *yi* way of thinking is regarded as simple and easy because the *yi* way of change is one of ease and simplicity. With the attainment of such ease and freedom from laborious effort, one achieves a mastery of all under the sky.⁶⁵

In summary, it is the constant way of *yi* events—the process of alternation and succession, one changing into the other, one exchanging with the other, one taking the place of the other—that entails *bian* (changing). And since things are changing, it entails *tong*, getting through and continuity, where “getting through” entails enduring.⁶⁶ *Yi* implies process of change as the continuity of complementary relationships of polarities.

STATEMENT 6: POLARITIES OF COMPLEMENTARY OPPOSITION

The sixth statement is a nucleus of *tong-bian* because explanations of social, political, and cosmological processes in China have always been grounded in conceptual polarities and in terms of the interaction of complementary contrasts. As Hall and Ames contend, however, the Chinese conceptual polarities are not "dualistic principles of light and dark, male and female, action and passivity, where light and dark exclude each other, logically entail each other, and in their complementarity constitute a totality."⁶⁷ The polarities in the sense of *tongbian* always involves a continuity or correlation, such as *qian* as a "becoming"—*kun*, *kun* as a "becoming"—*qian*—likewise with *yin* and *yang*, *gang* (the firm) and *rou* (the soft), and so on. Moreover, in the Chinese tradition, these polarities are in invariably site specific, applicable to specific situations, enabling us to make specific distinctions.

Thinking in terms of continuity or correlation between two basic elements or contrasting concepts such *yin* and *yang*, entailing emphasizing the relationship of two events, each of which requires the other as a necessary condition for being what it is. "The distinguishing feature of polarity is that each pole can only be explained by reference to the other," Hall and Ames say, for "'Left' requires 'right,' 'up' requires 'down,' and 'self' requires 'other.'"⁶⁸ Or, as Feng Youlan puts it, "they contradict each other but could not be without each other."⁶⁹ Not only in complementarity but also in contradictarity, they constitute a continuity with each other.

The polarities (or pairing, paired)—*dui ou wu*—that are found in the *Ijing*, are pervasive and cover all parts of speech. For example, they are nouns: *yin/yang*, roots/twigs, sun/moon, ruler/people, *qian/kun*, *junzi* (exemplary person)/small person, sky/earth, male/female, winter/summer, father/mother, day/night, past/future, beginning/ending, and water/fire; adjectives: big/small, leading/following, firm/soft, near/far, low/high, superior/inferior, in motion/still, auspicious/dangerous, respective/humble, good/evil, safe/dangerous, chaotic/in order, live/dead, and difficult/easy; and verbs: close/open, go/come, advance/back up, live/die, begin/end, follow/go against, rule/store,⁷⁰ coil up/straighten, and lose/benefit.

The correlative pairings echo an understanding of the world in the framework of *tong-bian* philosophy, which requires that everything be seen as having two aspects, or *yi wu liang ti*,⁷¹ and that one thing must always stand in a contradictory relation to another.⁷² The polarities are described differently from time to time as two sides, two factors, two basic elements, two basic attributes, two poles, or two contrastive images. They can be of any category, including action, modality, manners, quality, position, value and so on, so

long as they constitute a pairing, entailing interaction of complementary opposition.

It is in terms of complementary and contradictory interactions in these correlative pairs that some ancient Chinese thinkers began to understand the nature of change. This is not the one world, or "this Cosmos," or "this universe" in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle, which is bounded, self-contained, and self-sufficient, limited, and static, and whose natural state of reality as stasis makes a prime mover a logical necessity. Instead of being moved by any transcendental Being, the Chinese world is *ziran* or *self-so-being*, and *ziwei* or *self-so-going* or *self-so-doing*. The moving forces, or changes, come from the interactions of the complementary and contradictory polarities, from the ten thousand things themselves all under the sky rather than from an external mover. The *Yijing* states that interactions, which are complementary and contradictory, are *xiang tui* (mutually pushing), *xiang yi* (mutually substituting), *xiang mo* (mutually touching), *xiang dang* (adding to each other), *xiang gan* (mutually influence), *xiang bo* (to press on with each other), *za ju* (to appear mixed in each one else), *he de* (to entail each other with their own characteristic), *tong qi* (to have a free flow of *qi* into each other), *yin yun* (to intermingle), *xiang dai* (to contribute together to the one thing), and so forth; for instance:

Gang and *rou* push themselves each into the place of the other, and hence produce changes and transformations.⁷³

Thus water and fire contribute together to the same thing (or even); thunder and wind do not act contrary to each other; mountains and collections of water interchange their influences. It is in this way that they are able to change and transform, and give accomplishment to all things.⁷⁴

The sun goes away and the moon comes; the moon goes away and sun comes; the sun and moon thus mutually push each other away and their shining is the result. Winter goes away and summer comes; summer goes away and winter comes; it is by this mutual succession of winter and summer that the year is completed. That which goes becomes less and less, and that which comes becomes more and more; it is by their influence upon each other of contraction and expansion that the varieties of advantages [of different conditions] are produced.⁷⁵

It is in the intermingling with each other of the sky and the earth that the ten thousand things are thus generated and obtain their abundant varieties.⁷⁶

Therefore, correlative pairing has been a fundamental principle of explanation in the initial formulation and evolution of a strand of classical cosmology. It explains the dynamic cycles and processes of existence, which have no relevance to God. The correlation of "time" and "being" differentiates it from the transcendental, metaphysic cosmology of the classical West.

Its understanding of *tianxia* provides a kind of macro-perspective rather than a pee-hole view. *Tianxia* is constantly creating itself, just as things are constantly coming from themselves; *nothing* (*wu*) is the source of *something* (*you*), and there is always the possibility for something to become nothing; something and nothing generate each other without beginning and ending; each moment is both an ending and beginning. There is no dualism, no creation myth involved in the *tong-bian* philosophy. Apart from the way of change expressed in the interaction of complementary opposition between paired elements, nothing stands immutable and eternal to guarantee a lineal cause/effect order in *tianxia*. As for what moves the ten thousand things, the authors of *Yijing* narrate,

The ten thousand things are made to issue forth in *zhen*.⁷⁷

For putting all things in motion, there is nothing more intense than thunder; for scattering them there is nothing more effective than wind; for drying them up (making them restless and uneasy) there is nothing more perching than fire; for giving them pleasure and satisfaction, there is nothing more than a lake or marsh; for moistening them, there is nothing more enriching than water; and for bringing them to an end and making them begin again, there is nothing more fully adapted than *gen*.⁷⁸

A momentous characteristic of change is, according to *tong-bian*, the reversion of one element to the other as the process approaches an extreme, or *wu ji bi fan* in Chinese. In the *Yijing*, it is called *fu*, which means that *qian* is no longer a “becoming-*kun*” but has now entered the phase of *kun* as “becoming-*qian*; or that yin-becoming-yang has entered the phase of yang-becoming-yin. Things cannot decline forever; when decadence approaches an extreme, reintegration commences. Therefore, *bo*, decay, is followed by *fu*, returning.⁷⁹ Things cannot maintain forever in a state of repression, and hence *gen*, stopping, is followed by *jian*, advancing.⁸⁰ Things cannot remain forever in a state of difficulty, and hence *qian*, difficulty, is followed by *jie*, relaxation and ease.⁸¹ For many ancient Chinese thinkers,

Things cannot have free course (or *tong*) forever;
 Things cannot forever be shut up;
 Things cannot forever be in a state of extraordinary (progress);
 Things cannot long abide in the same place;
 Things cannot be forever withdrawing;
 Things cannot remain forever in the state of vigor;
 A state of separateness cannot continue forever.⁸²

What is change? Change spatially is continuity across varieties and differences, and, taken as a whole, is a temporal continuity in an advancing spiral;

complementarity and contradiction are two phases of this advancing spiral. This is because change is seen not from the ontological viewpoint, which gives formal privilege to the formal aspect of phenomena and separates time and space, but rather in light of the ceaseless transformation of things, in which "things" are rather seen as "events." And, since the temporal aspect is never abstract, fictive, or replicated, a seemingly "cyclical" process from yin to yang and yang to yin, again, indicates an advancing spiral.

It is this way of correlative pairing and the conceptual interaction of complementary contrasts that has become a defining feature of *tong-bian* philosophy. The feature is salient and prevalent; it is not restricted to particular philosophical discourses—it manifests in the thinking and living of philosophers as well as ordinary people in their everyday lives. It is evident in explanations of social, political, and "cosmological" processes in terms of conceptual polarities and interaction of complementary opposition, focusing on continuity between the two elements of a polarity. That which is seen in the Western tradition as loose and separated, many Chinese thinkers see as a correlation. With the *tong-bian* philosophy, it is often the case that talking about one factor or one aspect of a polarity necessarily entails talking about the other. Thinking about change always evokes the correlation of two poles, and particular attention is often paid to continuity between two seemingly loose and separate poles. A celebrated dictum often consciously involves symmetrical polar concepts, with an emphasis on their correlativity, or analogical comparisons. For example, "the superior must have the inferior as root; the high must have the low as base,"⁸³ "It is on disaster that good fortune perches; It is beneath good fortune that disaster crouches,"⁸⁴ and so forth. Chinese thinkers comprehend things (or events) through things (events), one through the other, through the continuity between the two polar elements that are implicated in them.

STATEMENT 7: DAO, THE WAY OF CONTINUITY THROUGH CHANGE

The seventh statement may be thought of as a conclusion of the six earlier statements, since the correlative *tong-bian* philosophy can also be called the philosophy of *dao*. *Dao*, which is the most enigmatic expression, may be understood here as *tong bian zhi dao*, or the way of continuity through change.

First and foremost, *dao* is, as it is spoken of in the *Ijing*, and then in later philosophical literature, a way of expression in which the intricate and volatile correlations of the ten thousand things under the sky are generalized. Everything constitutes a continuity of every other thing. *Dao* is the way in

which these correlations among *wanwu* are affected, from the loosest to the tightest. *are also ways in which the sky, the earth, and humanity correlate with each other, and the way through which humanity may develop its intelligence to obtain a thorough comprehension of the mysterious and wonderful *dao* in which the ten thousand things change constantly. Hence, *dao* has as much to do with the subjects of knowing and their quality of understanding as it does with the object of knowledge. Ordinary people can employ *dao*—although it is enigmatic and beyond any physical form—and they often call it *shen* (spirit-like).⁸⁵ The *junzi* (exemplary person) may undertake projects and accomplish them wonderfully and spiritually if they follow *dao*; and humanity thus makes himself a continuity of the sky and earth.*

Dao is *bian hua zhi dao* (the way of change). The *Yijing* tells us that to know *dao* is to know the way in which things change, and to know what *shen* is.⁸⁶ *Dao* is an expression of opulent philosophical implications, and it is, in fact, fully addressed in one sentence: A *yin* and a *yang* exemplify *dao*.⁸⁷ *Dao* is the constant way of *yi* events, the way in which one alternates after the other, one changes into the other, one exchanges with the other, one takes the place of the other, which ensues *bian*, changing or becoming, and transformation. *Dao* refers to all processes of change as continuity of complementary relationships between polarities.

Some Chinese thinkers claim that *dao* never changes. Dong Zhongshu of the Han dynasty contends: “*Tian* ever changes, *Dao* never changes.”⁸⁸ This should not be understood to mean that there is only one *dao*, the *dao* never changes, and the universe follows the same one way. Here “never changes” indicates that *dao* always refers to continuity; it is in the sense that there is nothing under the sky that does not find itself gotten through (or make a continuity) with anything else and in a particular way. Change always follows the way of polarity as *yin-yang*, or the way of the two basic elements of a correlative pairing. “*Bu bian*” or “never changes,” indeed, denotes that continuity never breaks up, suspends, or comes to an end. As Laozi stated in the *Daode jing*, “Soundless, formless, it [*dao*] stands solitary and does not reform; it revolves without pause. This can be considered the pregnant mother of all under the sky.”⁸⁹

Likewise, as stated in *Yishu*, “Without *yin* and *yang*, there would be no *dao*, that’s why *yin* and *yang* constitute *dao*.⁹⁰ “Never changes” actually suggests that all changes can be explained in terms of conceptual polarities such as *yin* and *yang*, *wu* and *you*, and so on. *Dao* is constantly a way of interaction of complementary opposition between the two basic elements, or contrastive concepts, in a correlative pairing.

On the other hand, however, *dao* never stops changing, and is always different from time to time and from place to place. It is in this sense that the

daos of the ten thousand particular things—or events—are all different and varying, all entailing the processes of change. “As for *dao*, it is marked by frequent changing,” states the *Yijing*—“It changes and moves without a rest; it is flowing through the six spaces, rising and falling, ever inconstant. The strong and the weak—or yin and yang—are mutually changing so that an invariable and compendious rule cannot be derived from them. Only change presides.”⁹¹ Hence, continuity makes *dao* one; difference makes *dao* myriad. There is not only One Dao, or The Dao; there are ten thousand particular *daos*. *Tian* (the sky), *di* (the earth), *ren* (humanity), *junzi* (exemplary person), *xiao ren* (small person), and husband and wife, all have their particular *daos*. As Hall and Ames explain, *dao* (or such polarities as yin-yang) is “no more than a convenient way of organizing ‘thises’ and ‘thats.’”⁹² And, “All aspects of this order—yin and yang, time and space, heaven and earth—must be historicized as a contingent vocabulary for the world order as we know it. These categories cannot stand as universal principles, as necessary *a priori* conditions that give us a single-ordered world.”⁹³

It is important to note here that the emphasis of the correlative *tong-bian* philosophy lies with particular difference rather than sameness or strict identity. Things are not supposed to be the same because they possess identical essences but are perceived to have analogous resemblance. Any particular situation or phenomenon of a correlative pairing, as understood in such elements as yin and yang, involves in fact a contextualization—an unraveling of the relationships and conditions of the phenomenon’s context. The categories adapted in describing the phenomenon are seen as correlative and crossing the borders of time, space, and matter. It is through the categories that are correlative and do not have boundaries that *Dao tong* (goes everywhere without obstruction). As Wang Bi says, “*Dao*, as the name of *wu*, can get through nowhere but everywhere, and constitutes a source of nothing but everything.”⁹⁴

Dao is *tong*. We also find evidence in support of our understanding of *dao* as continuity through change in the analogous associations of the word found in the ancient dictionary, *Shuo wen*. Whereas *tong* is “getting through [a path] without obstruction,” *dao* is referred to as a “path to get through.”⁹⁵ Thus, we can say that *dao* denotes *tong* (getting through without obstruction) or continuity of the myriad of things between each other. Or *dao* can be said to be the path of continuity—the way in which one thing constitutes a continuum with another. We may also identify *dao* here as *what*, and *tong* as *how*. In addition, *dao* is also explained as “a *da*,” an event of getting through [a path] without obstruction,⁹⁶ that is, it can be both *what* and *how*. If generalized, *Dao* is both *what* and *how* of continuity through change (*tong-bian*).

As thus established in the *Yijing*, *tong-bian* is a strand of thought about correlation. Any item or event is explained through a contextualization defined

by the analogical relations that obtain among the concerned items. It involves a reflection and engagement in terms of unravelling of these relations.

The world so defined is one of correlations, or one of continuity through change. The types of correlations are multifarious, multilevel, multidimensional, multifold, and multicategory. There is continuity through change, whereupon the sky, earth, ten thousand things, male and female, husband and wife, father and son, ruler and minister, and so on, correlate with each other; humanity thus makes himself continuous with nature through correlations, as well as through a thorough comprehension of nature.

In the *tong-bian* discourse, *shen* is not God, but rather a spirituality that counts on the human being; whether something becomes *shen* relies entirely on how much humanity develops its intelligence. The spiritual and the intellectual are stored with human beings. This strand of thought recognizes change itself as an embodiment of correlation in motion, or continuity between differences and varieties. It is the constant way of alternating one with another, changing into each other, exchanging with each other, displacing each other, and so on, that ensues the occurrence of change, where *shen* describes the efficacy of these interactions of complementary opposition.

The nucleus—the most salient feature—of *tong-bian* philosophy is that it is not God's work, but the complementary and contradictory interactions of the two basic elements of correlative pairings such as yin-yang, that constitute the forces and produce change. In this distinctly Chinese modality of thought, particular attention is always paid to the correlation between two presumably loose and separate *duans* (poles); there often involves symmetrical polar concepts and an emphasis on their correlativity and analogical associations.

Perhaps the *tongbian* thought of the Chinese tradition could be considered an alternative to causal thinking. What places *tongbian* in a distinct direction is the absence of constructions of the standard model of causality that might be predicted as ontological background on the following philosophical principles. As Chung Ying Cheng states,

- (1) Principle of discreteness: Substances are discrete entities.
- (2) Principles of externality: Laws of causation are laws externally governing things. One would say that things conform to laws or are determined by laws. Laws are not exactly what things are.
- (3) Principle of external source of motion: If the world is not a static one and motions are actual, not merely possible, the laws of causation lead to the positing of an ultimate cause, which has been called by Aristotle the Unmoved Mover. The Unmoved Mover or God is the source that gives initial movements to things. Later Western philosophers have alternatively conceived that God provides continual motion of things. But even without this assumption it seems that the initial motion or energy as imparted by God is sufficient to explain the movement of things according to causal laws.⁹⁷

As Cheng continues, the model of causality is made possible simply because God has created a world of things governed by laws of causation. God can be made responsible for the creation of such laws. Thus, the ultimate explanation of the model, the world, the causal law, and the motion may be traced to God as an infinite existence. The model has developed to involve an ontology of Being and nonbeing, a teleological order from beginning to end, and dualisms such as a final distinction between nature and human culture, time and space, mind and body, ontology and epistemology, and so on. It has also led to the development of principles of universalist theory and methodology, causal reductionism or simplistic determinism, abstract speculation and conceptualization, categorical distinctions, and efforts to make objective statements about the world.

It does appear that divergent paths were taken with a number of crucial turnings at the origins of Chinese and Western cultures. The Western causal thinking and the Chinese *tongbian* thought might have respectively employed different approaches to a similar but very fundamental question: What is that unfathomably wonderful “thing” that at the very beginning created the ten thousand things and brought them into “ordered” actions? Both approaches made a practical choice in answering the question: one gave this untellable “thing” (or being) a name; the other only offered a description. As a result, this untellable “thing” (being) obtained a seriously assigned name in Western tradition, which was “God,” something given in the image of man but with unlathomable power and intelligence, which a human does not have. God has a good mind and a good body, and says good words; and the two images of God and man are thus often separated.⁹⁸

Tongbian on the other hand, is perhaps more practical because its thinkers do not rack their brains trying to name it, but simply describe its manifestations, that is, “*shen*” or “*dao*.⁹⁹” As Laozi tells his story, “There is a thing, which is confusingly in shape, born even before *tian*, the sky and *di*, the earth, Soundless, formless, it stands solitary and does not change; it revolves without pause. This can be considered the pregnant mother of all under the sky. I know not its name, so I style it *Dao* (Way).”

The thing that Laozi named as *Dao* is not an untellable “thing”; it is manifest in the interaction of complementary opposition as it occurs in relationships such as that between yin and yang, or the shady side and the sunny side of a hill. The successive movement of yin and yang constitutes what is called *dao* (the moving path); that which is unfathomable in the movement of yin and yang is called *shen*. “*Shen* is,” as Guan Zi puts it, “the capacity of bringing changes.”¹⁰⁰ What is implied here is that there is nothing among the ten thousand things that does not possess the two contrastive and complementary elements of yin and yang.

CONCLUSION

It is precisely from this conceptual polarity, which looks like a simple analogue, that ancient Chinese thinkers developed distinctly Chinese philosophy. The alternation between the two basic elements of a correlative pairing provides explanations for the moving forces of our world and all manner of phenomena—"cosmological" (*yuzhou*), social, and political. It is this strand of thought that we find it to be exceedingly powerful—still available to Chinese intellectuals in the twentieth century; it provides the roots of "dialectical" philosophy, and was incorporated into Marxist dialectics in China, leading the development of a strand of Chinese Marxism that overcame some of the difficulties attending Western Marxisms.

This form of Chinese Marxism is found in a number of writers, including Qu Qiubai, Ai Siqui, and Mao Zedong that, on the surface, takes on the terminology of Marxism from the West but in depth is embedded within the traditional *tongbian*. The following sections of the study will be a historical review as well as a comprehensive study on how Chinese Marxists drew on the Chinese tradition in their reading and accepting Marxism, and applying its terminology to the distinct form of *tongbian* in the process of Marxism's encounter and assumption of the form it has taken in China. To begin with, the following chapters will sketch the critical historical background for Marxism to be ushered into China, how it was translated into Chinese, and then popularized and/or Sinified in the Chinese cultural milieu.

NOTES

1. However, I would consider my project a work following the line of the literature as regards the correlative thinking of the Chinese tradition, rather than claiming what makes the Chinese mind and offering a dichotomy between the "Western" and the "Chinese" systems of thought. Here the work is to identify *tongbian* as a clear style of "thought" (or philosophy), which is distinctly but not necessarily uniquely Chinese.

2. David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, *Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 124–25.

3. *Tong* has *che* and *da* as analogical relations and events. See Qingyan Sha, compiled, *Shuo Wen Dictionary* (*Shuo Wen Da Zidian*) (Tianjin: Classics Bookstore [Guji Shudian], 1982), 7: 64. Also see Axel Schuessler, *A Dictionary of Early Zhou Chinese* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 107, s.v. *da*.

4. *Bian* is explained in terms of *yi hua* and *geng*. *Yi* was originally a pictographic character of a home-guarding lizard, meaning "to trade or exchange," or "to avoid by

retreating." It was an antonym to "difficult," but could also be a reference to *hu*, which was further referred to *shu* and *shu hu*, hurry and quick. *Hua* is *jiao xing*. *Jiao* means to teach from above and to learn from below, and *xing*—one makes his steps. *Geng* is referred to by *gai*, to correct something overdone. See Sha, *Shuo Wen*, 7: 31; 4: 13; 2: 44.

5. Z. D. Sung, *The Text of Yi King: Chinese Original with English Translation* (New York: Translation (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1969), Xici I, ch. 11. For this study, I have used very few existing English translations of Chinese philosophical works; and they have been used only as a reference. Almost all of the English translations I use in the book are my own, based on references to other translations. I have been rather cautious about using existing translations because of problems regarding cultural translation; many translations have been unreliable because of these problems. In his "Kosmos in the Acosmotic Han Dynasty," Ames makes strong points regarding the deep structural differences that can hinder accurate intercultural translation. He points out that our current dictionaries are disastrous. The act of translation is not complete until readers themselves have read the text. See Roger T. Ames, in *Meng Zi Sixiang de Zhexue Tantao*, ed. Li Minghui (Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Zhongguo Wenshe Yanjiusuo Choubeichu, 1995), 39, 42.

6. *Yijing*, Xici Zhuan I, ch. 5; *Yijing*, Xici I, ch. 12.

7. See Z. D. Sung, "Introduction" in his *The Text of Yi King: Chinese Original, with English Translation* (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1969), x–xi. Also see Shouqi Huang and Shanwen Zhang, *Zhouyi yizhu* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1989), 5–14.

8. "Shengren you yi jian tianxia zhi dong, er guan qi hui tong," Sung, Xici I, chap. 8.

9. "Bian tong pei si shi" Sung, Xici I, chap. 6.

10. Sung, Xugua zhuan II.

11. Roger T. Ames, "Mengzi Zhexue yu Zhixu de Weijuxing (Kosmos in the Acosmotic Han Dynasty)," in ed. Li Minghui, *Meng Zi Sixiang de Zhexue Tantao* (Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Zhongguo Wenzhe Yanjiusuo Choubeichu, 1995), 12–13.

12. Laozi, *Daode jing*, chap. 42.

13. "Yin gua duo yang, yang guo duo yin" *Yijing*, Xici II, chap. 4.

14. "Shan ze tong qi," Sung, Shuogua zhuan, chap. 3.

15. "Qiong er tong," Sung, Xici II, chap. 7.

16. "Shen wu fang, yi wu ti," Sung, Xici I, chap. 4.

17. "Tong gui er shu tu," Sung, Xici II, chap. 5.

18. "Gang rou xiang tui," Sung, Xici II, chap. 1.

19. "Shui huo xiang dei," Sung, Shuogua zhuan, chap. 6.

20. "Lei feng xiang bo," Sung, Shuogua zhuan, chap. 3.

21. "Tian di yin yun," Sung, Xici II, chap. 5.

22. "Nan nü gou jing," Sung, Xici II, chap. 5.

23. "Gang rou xiang yi," Sung, Xici II, chap. 8.

24. "Han wang ze shu loi, shu wang ze han lai, han shu xiang tui er sui sheng yan," Sung, Xici II, chap. 5.

25. Hall and Ames, *Thinking through Confucius*, 18.
26. *Yi jing*, Xici I, chap. 10.
27. Sung, Xici I, chap. 10.
28. "guan qi hui tong" "tong qi bian" "tong shen ming zhi de" *Yijing*, Xici I, chap. 8. Xici II, chap. 2, and Xici II, chap. 2.
29. "Jian tian xia zhi dong, er guan qi hui tong," Sung, Xici II, chap. 12.
30. "Guan bian yu yin yang," Sung, Shuogua zhuan, chap. 1.
31. "Shen Nong shi mo, Huangdi Yao Shun shi zuo. tong qi bian, shi min bu juan," Sung, Xici II, chap. 2; A translation in Chinese by He Jiebing and Yang Weizeng, see *Zhou yi ji chu*, Huacheng chubanshe, Guangzhou China, 1994, p. 377.
32. "Zhi bian hua zhi dao zhe, qí zhì shen zhi suo wei hu" *Yijing*, Xici I, chap. 9.
33. Sung, Xici II, chap. 2.
34. "Hua er cai zhi wei zhi bian, tui er xing zhi wei zhi tong," Sung, Xici I, chap. 12.
35. "Bian tong zhe, qu shi zhe ye," see Sung, Xici II, chap. 1.
36. "Bian er tong zhi yi jin li," see Sung, Xici I, chap. 12.
37. See "Yu tian di xiang si, gu bu wei . . . Fan wei tian di zhi hua er bu guo, qu cheng wan wu er bu yi. Tong hu zhong ye zhi dao er zhi, gu shen wu fang er yi wu ti" *Yijing*, Xici I, chap. 4.
38. "Shen er ming zhi cun hu qi ren" *Yijing*, Xici I, chap. 12.
39. Also, the analogical association with *shen* is that the yin *qi* of the seventh month has come into shape, which stretches but has its own boundary. *Shuo wen*, reprinted by Gugi shudian, Tianjin, China, 1993, 5, pp. 36 and 65.
40. "Tian shen yin chu wan wu zhe ye," *Shuo wen*, p. 66.
41. "Di zhi tichu wanwu zhe ye," *Shuo wen*, p. 65
42. "Shen ye zhe, miao wan wu er wei yan zhe ye" *Yijing*, Shuogua zhuan, chap. 6.
43. "Yin yang bu ce zhi wei shen" Sung, Xici I, chap. 5.
44. Sung, Xici I, chap. 11.
45. "Shen wu fang," Sung, Xici I, chap. 4.
46. "Shen er ming zhi, cunhu qi ren" *Yijing* Xici I, chap. 12.
47. "Shen er hua zhi, shi min yi zhi" *Yijing*, Xici II, chap. 2.
48. "Jing yi ru shen" *Yijing*, Xici II, chap. 5. According to *Shu wen*, *jing* is explained as best, select, and pick; *yi*, appropriateness, but it could be rather understood as a kind of continuity in a philosophical sense.
49. "Qiong shen zhi hua, de zhi sheng ye," Sung, Xici II, chap. 5.
50. "Yi qiong ze bian, bian ze tong, tong ze jiu," *Yijing*, Xici II, chap. 2.
51. *Shuo wen*, "jin ye, xiang cao, mu sheng chu tu shang" *Shuowen*, 5, p. 35.
52. "Sheng sheng zhi wei yi" *Yijing*, Xici I, chap. 5.
53. "Tian di yin wen, wan wu hua chun, nau nü gou jing, wan wu hua sheng" *Yijing*, Xici II, chap. 5.
54. "Tian di zhi da de yue sheng" *Yijing*, Xici II, chap. 1.
55. *Shuo wen jie zi*, Photo print by Zhonghua shuju, 1992, p. 198.
56. Pan, Liwen, *Yijing yao yi wen da*, Zhong xi wenhua chubanshe, Hong Kong, 1975, p. 1.
57. See note 52.

58. "Qian kun qi yi zhi yun xie. Qian kun cheng lie, er yi li hu qi zhong yi" *Yijing*, Xici I, chap. 12.
59. "Tian di she wei, yi xing hu qi zhong" Sung. Xici I, chap. 7.
60. "Qian kun hui ze wu yi xian yi, yi bu ke xian, ze qiatu kun huo ji hu xi" *Yijing*, Xici I, chap. 12.
61. "Sli gu yi you tai ji, shi sheng liang yi, liang yi sheng si xiang" *Yijing*, Xici I, chap. 11.
62. "Yi yu tian di zhuu, gu neng mi lun tian di zhi dao" *Yijing*, Xici I, chap. 4.
63. "Fu yi he wei zhe ye, fu yi kai wu cheng wu. Mao tian xia zhi dao, ru si er yi zhe ye. Sli gu sheng ren yi tong tian xia zhi zhi" *Yijing*, Xici I, chap. 11.
64. "Fu yi zhang wang er cha lai, er wei xian chan you. Kai er dang mitu biau wu, zhettu yan duan ci, ze bei yi" *Yijing*, Xici II, chap. 6.
65. "Yi jiatu er tian xia zhi li de yi" *Yijing*, Xici I, chap. 1.
66. "Yi qiong ze bian, bian ze tong, tong ze jiu" *Yijing*, Xici II, chap. 2.
67. Hall and Ames, *Atticipating China*, 261.
68. Hall and Ames, *Thinking through Confucius*, 18.
69. "Xiang fan er bu ke xiang wu ye." Youlan Feng, *Zhongguo zhexue shi* (Hong Kong: Taiping yang tushu gongsí, 1956), 638.
70. "Qian yi jun zhi, kun yi cang zhi" *Yijing*, Shuogua zhuan, chap. 4.
71. "Yi wu liang ti." Feng, *Zhongguo zhexue shi*, 854.
72. "You yi wu bi you yu zhi xiang farr zhe yi dui zhi." Feng, *Zhongguo zhexue shi*, 856.
73. "Gang rou xiang tui er shetug bian hua" *Yijing*, Xici I, chap. 2.
74. "Gu shui huo xiang dei, lei feng bu xiang bei, shan ze tong qi, ranhou neng bian hua, yi cheung wan wu ye" *Yijing*, Shuogua zhuan, chap. 6.
75. *Yijing*, Xici II, chap. 5.
76. "Tiatt di yin yun, watt wu hua chun" *Yijing*, Xici II, chap. 5.
77. "Wan wu chu hut zhen"; zhen is, according to *Shuo wen*, that which makes motion like a thunder. See *Yijing*, Shuogua zhuan, chap. 5.
78. *Yijing*, Shuogua, chap. 6.
79. "Wu bu ke yi zhong jin, bo qiong shang fan xia, gu shou zhi yi fu" *Yijing*, Xugua zhuan I.
80. "Wu bu ke yi zhong zhi, gu shou zhi yi jian, jian zhe jin ye" *Yijing*, Xugua zhuan II.
81. *Yijing*, Xugua zhuan, II.
82. "Wu bu ke yi zhong tong" sect. I; "wu bu ke yi zhong fou" sect. I; "wu bu ke yi zhong guo" sect. I; "wu bu ke yi jiu ju qi suo" sect. II; "wu bu ke yi zhong dun" sect. II; "wu bu ke yi zhong zhuang" sect. II; "wu bu ke yi zhong li" sect. II; *Yijing*, Xugua zhuan.
83. "Gui yi jian wei ben; gao yi xia wei ji." Lao Zi, *, chap. 39, trans. D. C. Lau, *Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching* (London: Penguin Books, 1963), 100.*
84. "Huo xi, fu zhi suo yi; Fu xi, huo zhi suo fu" *Ibid.* Lau: chap. 58, 119.
85. "Min xian yong zhi wei zhi shen" *Yijing*, Xici I, chap. 11.
86. "Zhi bian hua zhi dao zhe, qi zhi shen zhi suo wei hu" *Yijing*, Xici I, chap. 9.

87. “*Yi yin yi yang zhi wei dao*” *Yijing*, Xici I, chap. 5.
88. “*Tian bu bian dao yi bu bian*.” “Dong Zhongshu zhuan,” *Qian Hanshu* (Biography of Dong Zhongshu, A Pre-Han History) 56: 18; see Feng Youlan, p. 534.
89. “*Ji xi liao xi, du li bu gai, zhou xing er bu dai, ke yi wei tian xia mu.*” Laozi, *Daode jing*, chap. 25. An example of this assumption is also found in Zhuangzi, where *Dao* finds itself a general source from which ten thousand things under the sky have come. This is the following:

Zhi Bei You:

Dong Guo Zi wen yu Zhuang zi yue: “Suo wei dao e hu zai?”

Zhuang Zi yue: “Wu suw bu zai.”

Dong Guo Zi yue: “Qi er hou ke.”

Zhuang Zi yue: “Zai lou yi.”

Yue: “He qi xia ye?”

Yue: “Zai zibai.”

Yue: “He qi yu xia ye?”

Yue: “Zai wa bi.”

Yue: “He qi yu shen ye?”

Yue: “Zai shi ni.” . . .

Zhuang Zi yue: “Fu zi zhi wen ye, gu bu ji zhi. Zheng Huo zhi wen yu jian shi liu xi ye. Mei kuang yu xia, ru wei mo bi. Wu hu lao wu, zhi dao ruo shi, da yan yi ran. Zhou bian xian san zhe, yi ming tong shi. Qi zhi yi ye.”

90. *Yi shu*, 15.

91. “*Wei dao ye hu qian, bian dong bu ju, zhou lin lin xu, shang xia wu chang, gang rou xiang yi, bu ke wei dian yao, wei bian suo shi*” *Yijing*, Xici II, chap. 8.

92. Hall and Ames, *Anticipating China*, 147, 234.

93. Hall and Ames, *Anticipating China*, 147, 186.

94. “*Dao zhe, wu zhi cheng ye. Wu bu tong ye, wu bu you ye.*” See Wang Bi, *Lun yu shi yi*.

95. Sha Qingyan, compiled, *Shuo wen Dictionary* (*Shuo Wen Da Zidian*), Classics Bookstore (*Guji Shudian*), Tianjin, 1982, 7, p. 66.

96. Xu Shen, Han Dynasty, *Shuo wen jie zi*, reprinted by Zhonghua shu ju, 1992, p. 42.

97. Cheng Chung Ying, “Model of Causality in Chinese Philosophy: A Comparative Study,” *Philosophy East and West* 26, no. 1 (1976): 6.

98. This brings to mind Nietzsche’s critique: “The whole of teleology is constructed by speaking of the man of the last four millennia as of an eternal man towards whom all things in the world have had a natural relationship from the time he began” (“Human, All Too Human,” [1878] in *A Nietzsche Reader* [London: Penguin Books, 1977], 2).

99. Laozi, *Daode jing*, chap. 25.

100. “*Yi wu neng hua wei zhi shen.*” *Guanzi, Nei ye. Treasure of Chinese Thought* (Beijing: China Broadcasting and TV Press, 1990), 54.

Marxism in China: Initial Encounters

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the ancient Chinese thinkers developed a distinctly Chinese philosophy from the conceptual polarity, the alternation between the two basic elements of a correlative pairing which looks like a simple analogue. But what is the historical process for *tongbian* to provide the roots of “dialectical” philosophy and be incorporated into Marxist dialectics in China? The following is an account of the critical historical background for Marxism’s first encountering China as well as the Chinese intellectuals’ interest in and their preliminary literature of the concepts of “socialism,” “dialectics,” and “materialism” around the turn of the twentieth century

LEARNING FROM JAPAN

China’s defeat in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War and the failure of the 1898 reform led by Kang Youwei can be considered the historical background immediately relevant to the growing interest in orthodox Marxist socialism among Chinese intellectuals before 1917.

Of great importance in Chinese history is the year 1895 which witnessed that the Chinese began relinquishing their traditional thinking about their “cultural superiority over Japan.” The victory of Japan was a trigger for Chinese intellectuals to acknowledge Japan was a power and to inspire them to learn from Japan. The general trend was reflected in the growing numbers of Chinese students going to Japan and the books translated from Japanese in the following decade.

It had been true that Chinese students began to study in Europe and the United States during the early 1870s, but only after the Japanese victory in

the 1895 Sino-Japanese War that the Chinese government sent a group of thirteen students to study in Tokyo.¹ The year 1898 saw over seventy Chinese students in Japan, of whom about half were army officers studying at military colleges. Most of them appeared to have been sent on scholarships given by the modernizing governors general. Later on there followed a continuous stream of students going to Japan. Four years later, in 1902, there were more than 650 students in Japan, over half of whom were provided their own funds. The figure was already greater than the total number of Chinese students studying elsewhere in the world.² By 1903 the number of students going to Japan had reached 1,300.³ In 1906 there were 13,000 to 14,000 Chinese students in Japan.⁴

The reasons the Chinese went to Japan were complicated. As well as a result of the series of post-Boxer educational reforms adopted by the Qing government, it was also because of geographical proximity, cultural affinity, and Japan's offering of short-term courses in education and law which enabled Chinese students to secure posts in teaching or government service upon their return home. Among the students were brothers, fathers and sons, husbands and wives, and even whole families. In addition, many reformers and revolutionaries at that time took refuge in Japan, and government officials of different rankings visited Japan for varied reasons.⁵

Accompanying the stream of Chinese students going to Japan was encouragement for translating Japanese books into Chinese. By 1900 there had been more than thirty newspapers, journals, and book publishers that assumed large-scale translation activities. Particularly because of the promotion of the reformers, the number of books translated from the Japanese language surpassed those from English, French, German, and Russian. According to Yang Shouchun's estimate on the basis of the catalog entitled *Yi shu jing yan lu* (An Incomplete Collection of Titles of Books Translated from Foreign Languages), there were 533 titles translated from foreign languages during the ending period of the Guanxu reign of the Qing dynasty; among these, 321 were from Japanese.⁶ Between 1902 and 1903, translating books from Japanese became even more popular and fashionable. For instance, in Shanghai there had been twenty-three publishers and journals whose names carried the character "yi" (translation) by 1911.⁷ Many publishers, including Haizuo xin-she, Jing jin shuju, Guoxue she, and Dong dalu tushu ju, were founded by revolutionaries.

Study shows that until 1895 there had been only one title translated from Japanese into Chinese. Since that year, however, the number had reached twenty each year, and between 1897 and 1917 the books translated from Japanese amounted to as much as 60 percent of all the books translated from foreign languages. These books were mainly on politics, economics, educa-

tion, the military, law, and sociology.⁸ Of course, the most active force for translating Japanese books was Chinese who were studying in Japan. Since 1900 they founded translation groups, such as Yi shu hui bian she (Book Translation and Compilation Group), Jiaokeshu yi ji she (Textbooks Translation and Compilation Group), Hui wen xue she (Hui wen Study Group), Guo xue she (National Study Group), Dong xin yi she (East and New Translation Group), and Min xue hui (Fujian Study Group). Some of the groups also published journals of translated literature, and many of the translators were well-known and distinguished figures. Between 1900 and 1915, there were 958 titles translated from Japanese; the largest number was in the social sciences: 366, about 38 percent of the total. The average annual amount of translation reached to 63.86.⁹

Since 1898, when Yan Fu published his translation of the theory of evolution, the business of translating books from foreign languages reached its highest point around 1902. Particularly 1903, called the year of philosophy, witnessed publication of more than twenty titles.¹⁰

In my view, we can assume (1) that the concepts of dialectic and materialism had been introduced into China during a time when a continuous stream of Chinese were going to study in Japan and the Chinese were energetically engaging in "Xixue" (Western learning); (2) that the idea of dialectical materialism came to China as part of Marx's theories; (3) that Marxism had been introduced as part of *Xixue* and, more important, as socialism; and (4) that anarchism was introduced as socialism, too, and mingled with Marxism. A striking characteristic of all that occurred in the introduction of *Xixue* into China was the importance of socialism.

It can be clearly seen that many important figures were concerned about the social problems in the West and rather socialist oriented. Yan Fu noted even in 1895 that scientific progress in the West had led to extreme economic inequality, which in turn gave rise to what he called "the parties for the equalization of the rich and poor."¹¹ Kang Youwei's *Da Tong Shu* (The Book of the Great Community) mentions the economic practices in the West and the United States and the revolutionary parties and struggles there. It points out that all measures failed because they had not gotten to the root of economic ills—the institution of private ownership of property.¹² In his "Chinese Socialism," Liang Qichao asserts, "Marx says that contemporary economic society is actually formed by the minority who have stolen the land of the majority." He introduced socialist ideas and terminology through popular writings in *Xin min cong bao* and founded a publishing house that published translations of books on socialism from Japanese.¹³

It was the hegemony of socialism that had made both anarchism and Marxism the most popular trends of thought in China.¹⁴ As Bernal maintains, the

period from November 1905 to June 1906 can be considered the highest point of interest in orthodox Marxist socialism among Chinese intellectuals until the 1920s.¹⁵ In addition, as Dirlıç observes, socialism in China had a history of nearly two decades when the October Revolution erupted.¹⁶ Before 1918 “historical materialism,” “successive revolutions,” “class struggle,” and many other Marx’s terms had already entered Chinese vocabulary.

Another characteristic of the introduction of *Xixue* into China was that those who introduced socialist thought to their fellow Chinese intellectuals included important figures in the reformist and revolutionary decade before 1911. They were not merely ivory-tower dwellers who talked about socialism only for pure knowledge and from a safe distance, but rather had developed their own form of articulation aiming at the very center of political events. They looked for solutions to issues of China and tried to put theory into practice. A typical example can be found in an announcement of the *Recent Socialism* by Guangzhi shuju in 1903:

What can be seen as this book's concerns of the future of China are two points: first, when China becomes rich and strong in the future and her industry develops in an immeasurably rapid manner, it is hard to tell what the situation of the working people will be like. This forthcoming title will give a detailed explanation of the labor issues of the countries in Europe and the United States, from which we may draw lessons for our future. Second, because this is just the beginning for those who are learning to organize political parties in China, people are often led in the wrong direction due to confusing principles and various goals. The vague ideas of socialist and anarchist parties are particularly confusing. For example, nowadays people welcome socialists while disliking anarchists; it may lead to a big mistake if we simply see them as the same. The book gives a very clear and detailed explanation and is very informative, and those who are interested in political parties may have an option.¹⁷

Chinese pragmatism became a reasonable explanation for why the Chinese pursue *Xixue* through the intermediary of the Japanese language and why they translate books from Japanese rather than directly from Western languages. The Chinese believed translating from Japanese was faster and more efficient; they had been eager to look for solutions to their own issues and tried their best to put what they learned into practice. Both Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao preferred translation from Japanese. Their argument is, “In the thirty years since the Meiji Reform Japan has been seeking new knowledge from all parts of the world. The Japanese have translated and written as many as several thousand books, particularly on political science, economics, philosophy, and sociology. They are all necessary in expanding our knowledge and empowering our nation.”¹⁸

The Japanese language is similar to ours, as Kang says, "in the thirty years since reform, the Japanese have translated all the good books of new learning on politics, literature, and the military"; "The Japanese language is 80 percent Chinese. Therefore, translating books from Japanese takes less effort and time."¹⁹

Another argument was that learning Japanese was faster than learning Western languages. As Liang maintains, "If you want to be able to read books on politics, economics, and philosophy in Western languages, the fastest way may take you at least five or six years. If you study any of those languages in a usual and gradual way, you must spend over ten years"²⁰; but "you may simply spend a few months achieving decent success in learning Japanese."²¹ It was clear that the Chinese welcomed elements of *Xixue* as long as it was socialist and also practical.

SOCIALISM AND MARX

We still do not know exactly when Marxism was first introduced into China, but we do find that under the historical conditions we mentioned previously Marx's name and some of his theories were first mentioned in scholarly articles and talks. According to an incomplete collection of the sources, as early as 1899 a Chinese translation of Benjamin Kidd's *Social Evolution* was published in *The Review of the Times*.²² Marx was mentioned three times, and Engels, once.²³ In a summary of a section of the first chapter, the translator wrote: "The person who is well known as the leader of hundreds of workers is an Englishman named Marx (Makesi). Marx has stated that the power of the capitalists will extend across state boundaries to all of the five continents."²⁴

Although it was not until 1899 that there was any reference to Marx and other socialists by name, the Review's predecessor *The Church News* and its earlier incarnation *The Global Magazine* had earlier carried news items about Western socialist groups. In 1871 *The Church News* reprinted reports of the Paris Commune; and in 1878 *The Global Magazine* gave more detailed news items about an attempted assassination of the Kaiser and Bismarck's use of the incident as a pretext to ban the rapidly growing German Social Democratic Party. In 1899, the journal carried frequent reports on the Western labor movement, especially on the agitation for an international holiday on May Day and the associated struggle for an eight-hour day.²⁵

According to Li Yu-ning, *The North China Herald* of Shanghai published articles on activities of European social revolutionaries as early as 1890. An article entitled "Socialism in Germany" reported the rising influences of the

Social Democrats in the Parliament and ascribed the growth of socialism to Germany's poverty and the increase of industrial workers.²⁶ In addition, Li notes that the first Chinese reference to Western socialism seems to be in an essay by Yan Fu, a famous translator and advocate of social Darwinism, who studied naval science in England between 1877 and 1879. In an article entitled "*Yuan qiang*," or "The Source of Power," Yan reported that scientific progress in the West had led to drastic economic inequality and thus the rise of the parties for the equalization of the rich and the poor.²⁷

In 1866, *Shiwu bao of Shanghai* (*The Shanghai Times*), which had been printed in Japan but widely circulated in China, carried a news item translated from the Japanese newspaper *Kokumin Shimpo* (*The National News*) on the Third Congress of the Second International held in London. In 1898, the same newspaper gave a specific reference to the political parties in Germany. It reported the number of seats the Reform Socialist Party and Social Democratic Party had in the Parliament.²⁸

The Shanghai Times was one of the widely read journals at the turn of the twentieth century. Along with other journals, it had been founded and run by the constitutionalists led by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. This group of intellectuals had considered introducing new knowledge as an essential means to promote reforms. By general consensus, Liang had greater influence upon Chinese intellectual development than any other individual during the period between 1898 and 1905. Liang himself wrote an essay entitled "*Lun qiang quan*" (On Power), claiming that the proletariat's revolution against the power of capitalists and the women's revolution against the power of men were two inevitable movements in the future. "After these two revolutions," he said, "Everyone would possess power, and thus reach the supreme advanced stage of power, which is called grand peace." The article was published in the *Qing yibao* in 1899; Robert A. Scalapino and Harold Schiffrin considered it probably the first essay on socialism in Chinese.²⁹

Liang was definitely among those intellectuals who had first encountered socialist ideas and learned the name of Marx through extensive reading of Western writings. In October 1902, he wrote "*Ganshe yu fangren*" (On Intervention and Laissez Faire), which appeared in *Xin min cong bao* (*The New People's Journal*). As Martin Bernal comments, Liang's evolutionary scheme in the article "is similar to the development described by Marx in the *Poverty of Philosophy* by which Kidd appears to have influenced either directly or indirectly."³⁰ Moreover, in the same year, Liang's "*Jinhua lun geming zhe Jie De zhi xueshuo*" (The Theory of Kidd, the Revolutionary Evolutionist) contained his first reference to Marx. He transliterated Marx as Mai-ke-shi, identifying him as "the polestar of German socialism".³¹ In the article, Liang made clear Marx's materialism and its role in the theory of the German So-

cial Democratic Party. As the leader of Socialism, Marx was contrasted with Nietzsche, the protagonist of individualism. Liang wrote,

In Germany there are people who have been called materialists, Nationalists, Conservatives, and Socialists. Generally speaking, these groups all take realism (*xianzai zhuyi*) as the foundation of their doctrines. The two most powerful schools of thought currently in Germany are first, Marx's socialism, and then, Nietzsche's individualism. Nietzsche had been an extremist thinker of power, who died of madness the year before last. His school prevails throughout Europe and it has been called New Religion at the conclusion of the nineteenth century. As Marx states, the current social ills is that the rich minority is oppressing the weak majority. On the other hand, Nietzsche says that the inferior majority is holding up the superior minority.³²

Liang played a leading role in publishing the earliest books introducing socialism and Marx in Chinese. In 1901, together with other constitutionalists, he established *Guang zhi shuju* (the Diffusion of Knowledge Book Company) in Shanghai. The year 1903 saw an explosion of information on socialism and Marx in Chinese, and an expansion in which the book company published translations of the three Japanese books on socialism: (1) Fukui Junzo, *Modern Socialism*, Tokyo, 1899, which was translated into Chinese by Zhao Bizen under the title *Jin shi shehui zhuyi*; (2) Murai Chishi, *Socialism*, Tokyo, 1899, which was translated into Chinese by Luo Dawei under the title *Shehui zhuyi*; and (3) Nishikawa Kojiro, *The Socialist Party*, Tokyo, 1901, which was translated into Chinese by Zhou Baigao under the title *Shehui dang*.³³

Ma Zuyi claims that Zhao Bizen's translation of Fukui Junzo's *Modern Socialism* in 1903 was probably the first comprehensive introduction of Marxism into China.³⁴ The book is in two volumes with four sections describing the history and current development of socialism. The second section, "German Socialism," deals with Marx and his socialism. Prior to Marx, socialism "had been talked of as pure imagination." Only Marx's socialism is "based on profound scholarship and thorough investigation. It reveals truth and justice through studies of economic laws. As a result, the majority of the proletariat (*lao min*) easily grasps his socialism and receives it with thunderous support, so [his socialism] is easy to achieve success. . . . And even those who hate socialism have found it difficult to refute his theory." The fourth section, "The Contemporary Situation of Socialist Parties in the Countries of Europe and the United States," says, "The International Federation of Working Men, organized by Marx, has become the center of control for the contemporary socialist movement."³⁵ In Zhao's translation, Karl Marx is transliterated as Jia-lu-ma-lu-ke-si, and Engels, as Ye-qi-lu-si. The book also provides information on how Marx and Engels wrote and completed *The*

Poverty of Philosophy (transliterated as *Zi zheli shang suojian zhi pinkun*), *The Current Situation of the British Working People* (*Yingguo laodong shehui zhi zhuangtai*), *A Critique of Political Economy* (*Jingji xue zhi pinglun*), and *The Capital*, which was especially praised as “great work of the generation” (*yi-dai zhi da zhu shu*).³⁶

Zhou Baigao’s translation of Nishikawa Kojiro’s *The Socialist Party* gives a detailed description of social democratic parties and their leaders, including such figures as George Plekhanov. The book claims, “Among modern European socialism the most popular is Marxism (*Ma-ke-zhu-yi*).”³⁷

The name of Marx is found more and more in Liang’s works around 1903. In his *Xin dalu youji*, an extensive narrative of his traveling experience in Canada and the United States beginning in February 1903, Liang stated that the works of Marx (the polestar of German socialism) are highly respected by the socialists he met, and that “the socialists belief in Marx is like the respect Christians have for the Bible.”³⁸ In another article written in 1903, Liang said, “Marx, the founder of socialism, is a German and author of many books.”³⁹ Liang wrote in 1904 in an article entitled “*Zhongguo zhi shehui zhuyi*” (Chinese Socialism): “Marx says that contemporary economic society has actually been formed by the minority, who have stolen the land of the majority.” Liang cited an edict issued by Wang Mang and a quotation from Su Xun, which presented a statement similar to Lassalle’s that landlords and capitalists were thieves and robbers.⁴⁰

Among the books with the earliest references to Marx and his socialism, Kotoku Shusui’s *Shehui zhuyi jingsui* (*The Essence of Socialism*) was probably the most influential. The first publication of the book was in *Zhejiang chao* (Tides of Zhejiang) in September 1903. The work was based upon the *Communist Manifesto* and *Socialism, Scientific and Utopian*, and was considered the most valuable and systematic introduction of Marx. It was republished many times by various publishers. Wu Yuzhang, one of the earliest Chinese Marxists, described it more than forty years later:

In 1903 when I was in Tokyo I read the *Essence of Socialism* by Kotoku Shushui and found the new teachings quite fascinating. But because I had then to study in school on the one hand and take part in practical revolutionary work on the other, I did not make an in-depth study of these teachings but let them pass. As I came across these teachings again I felt as though I had met an old friend. The noble ideas of equality among all people and the elimination of the distinction between rich and poor, as described in this book on socialism, greatly inspired me.⁴¹

The same *Zhejiang chao*, one of the journals of the Chinese students in Tokyo, started in October 1903 a series on “the new social theory,” in which the author described two “schools”: communism (*gongchan zhuyi*) and ex-

treme democracy (*jiduan minzhu zhuyi*). In the passage regarding communism, the article says: "This school was established by the Frenchman Babeuf. Its later leader was the Jew named Marx; its present manifestation is the Workers' International." Here, the name of Marx was transliterated as Mai-ha-si.⁴²

Other sources that had the earliest reference to Marx include *Shehui zhuyi gaiping* (A General Critique of Socialism) and *Jinshi zhengzhi shi* (A History of Modern Politics). The first was a survey of socialism written by Shimada Saburo in 1901 and published by Zuo xin she of Shanghai in 1903. Saburo showed great respect for Marx and Lassalle, whom he described as the "only true socialists."⁴³ The second, written by Ariga Nagao, was a serialized work starting with the first issue of *Yi shu hui bian* (The Selected Translation Works Magazine), a magazine that consisted entirely of translations from or through Japanese.⁴⁴ Nagao devoted the first section of his work to Germany. The third chapter deals with Bismarck's suppression of the Socialist Party and the social policies he adopted to undercut its appeal. In a note the translator gives a standard commentary on the rise of Western socialism and states that it is the same as the Well-field system. With the title "The German Branch of the Workers' International," the chapter's first section reported on the activities of Marx and Lassalle. "Both Marx and Lassalle advocated the idea of freedom in 1848," it says, "and both parties exerted powerful influence, although their principles are not the same. Marx started a newspaper in Cologne to encourage communism (*jun-fu zhi shuo*). Later, because the government did not tolerate him, he fled to London. In 1862, the workers' leaders from many countries met in London." Nagao went on to describe Marx's involvement in the International and the policies of the workers' organization.⁴⁵ Here Marx's name was transliterated as Mai-ke-si. During the period of 1899 and 1913, Marx's name had at least ten transliterated forms in the Chinese language.⁴⁶

Here it is important to mention Sun Yat-sen's visit to the Secretariat of the Second International in Brussels in 1905. Although Marx's name was not directly brought up in the coverage of the visit, the event sufficiently indicated that by 1905 Sun probably initiated the first contact with the socialist parties in Europe and that he had not only been familiar with the name of Marx but also identified himself with the world's socialist movement. The report that covered Sun's visit and his discussions with the Secretariat, appeared in the Flemish socialist newspaper *Vooruit*, on May 18, 1905, as well as in its French-language equivalent, *Le Peuple*, a few days later. It says,

This week I had the chance to be the mediator between our comrade Sun Yat-Sen, chief of the Chinese Revolutionary Socialist Party, and our friends Vandervelde and Huysmans.

Comrade Sen has come to Belgium to ask for the affiliation of his party to the Bureau of the Socialist International, which Comrade Huysmans is the Secretary. . . . Comrade Sen first of all outlined the objectives of the Chinese socialists. . . . The first point of their program is China for the Chinese, Drive out the usurping strangers (Manchus)! The second point is that the land is entirely or almost entirely common property in China. . . .

Our yellow comrades wish to improve this system still further in conformity with the principles of our party to prevent forever one class expropriating another as has happened in all the European countries. . . .

Chinese socialists on the other hand want to introduce European modes of production and to use machines, but without the disadvantages. They want to build a new society in the future *without any transition*. They accept the advantages of our civilization but they refuse to become its victims. In other words, with them the medieval mode of production will pass directly to the state of socialist production without passing through the misery of the exploitation of workers by the capitalists.⁴⁷

The terminology of the journalist was obviously Marxian; and here, as Bernal observes, Sun's statement was one of the earliest examples of the concept of "skipping historical stages" and of advancing directly from feudalism to socialism in China.

Seven years later, as temporary president of the Republic of China, Sun published his article entitled "The Societal Significance of the Chinese Revolution" in the same *Le Peuple* in Brussels. Lenin happened to read Sun's article and wrote an article commenting on it.⁴⁸

THE EARLIEST WORKS OF MARX AND ENGELS IN CHINESE

Zhu Zhixin probably pioneered in translating into Chinese the works of Marx and Engels. Zhu was born in Panyu, Guangdong Province. In 1902 he founded Qun zhi she, or the Group Wisdom Association, and raised funds to buy publications of new learning. Afterward he went to Japan and joined the Tongmenghui there. He was seen as the first person to bring an effort to understand Marxism in the publication *Min bao* (The People's Paper). After he returned from Japan Zhu became a revolutionary activist and one of the most important assistants to Sun Yat-sen. In 1920 the warlord in Humen, Guangzhou, executed him.⁴⁹

In January 1905, Zhu published an article entitled "Short Biographies of the German Social Revolutionaries," which came out in two parts in issues II

and III of *Min bao* (November 26, 1905, and April 5, 1906) and provided sketches of Marx and Lassalle. He described Marx in more detail than had anybody else, explained the operation as well as the injustice of the capitalist production system, and accordingly claimed that the only feasible way to attain socialism was to go through a structural reform of the economic system. Zhu quoted in several instances that "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles." The biography contained several references to, and quotations from, *The Communist Manifesto*, and offered the first translation into Chinese of the ten-point program in section II of the *Manifesto*. In addition, Zhu gave Marx's version of the theory of labor value and his concept of surplus value. He also commented on Marx's works such as *History of Capital* and *Capital*.⁵⁰

According to some recent Chinese sources, it was Shu Hun who conducted the first complete translation of *The Communist Manifesto* in 1907.⁵¹ On the back cover of the book *The Essence of Socialism*, which was published by Shehui zhuyi yanjiu she in 1907, was a list of forthcoming titles that included *The Communist Manifesto*, whose translator was Shu Hun. Perhaps this was the first translation into Chinese of the complete works of Marx and Engels. However, nobody has claimed to see the book so far.⁵² The year 1908 saw one of the earliest translations of Engels' 1888 "Introduction to *The Communist Manifesto*," the first and second chapters of the *Manifesto* itself, and sections from Engels's *The Origin of the Family, Private Ownership, and State*, which came out in the fifteenth issue and the joint issue of No. 16 through 19 of the Chinese anarchist journal *Tian yi*.⁵³ The translator was Min Ming.

Following the translation of Engels's 1888 "Introduction" to the *Manifesto*, the editorial note says: "*The Communist Manifesto* is actually a creative theory of class struggle and the most salutary from a historical perspective. What the "Introduction" claims can be employed in investigating the changing currents of thought today. Those who intend to engage themselves in studies of socialism ought to begin here with a reading of the Introduction. The editor's note also listed the contents for the next issue of the journal, which includes a translation by the same translator of the full text of the *Manifesto*.⁵⁴

As expected, the translation came out in the joint issue of numbers 16 through 19 of *Tian yi*. It begins: "A specter is haunting Europe—the specter of communism." In fact, Min translated the *Manifesto* from the Japanese, which had been a translation from a Western language by Kotoku Shusui and Sakai Toshihiko. This gave Min's translation a clear trace of the Japanese language. For instance, *shen jun-fa* and *ping-min*, the Japanese terminology for the French bourgeoisie and proletariat, were incorporated directly into the Chinese translation.⁵⁵

Following the translation of the first chapter of the *Manifesto*, there is another notice from the editor that says: "All societal changes from ancient times to the present were caused by class competitions. Such a theory makes a great contribution to the field of historiography. Therefore, discussions on historiography must be within the context of this principle."⁵⁶

Although during the period of 1908 and 1918 there were few articles introducing Marxism and translations of the works of Marx and Engels, the year 1912 witnessed the earliest translation into Chinese of Engels's *Socialism, Scientific and Utopian*, which was serialized in issues 1 through 7 of *Xin shijie* (The New World).

THE EARLIEST DEBATE ON SOCIALISM AND MARX

The above exposition should be sufficient to indicate that thousands of Chinese intellectuals came to know the names of Marx and Engels at the beginning of the twentieth century. The following will show that Chinese intellectuals learned more about Marx and Engels from the earliest discussions on the nature of Chinese society from a Marxist standpoint and introduce several themes recurrent in later controversies. Marx's name came up repeatedly in the arguments of intellectuals.

Perhaps, the earliest discussion was the one between Liang Qichao and Tongmenghui in 1904. By that time, Liang had come to grasp some of the important tenets of Marxism, for example, that capital was the key to economy and society. He propounded a striking thesis—imperialism of the powers stemmed from the fact that surplus capital had to find markets in nonindustrialized countries such as India and China. He then divided foreign capital into three categories: (1) loans to government; (2) loans to either public or private financial organizations; and (3) foreign investment independent of local government or organizations. Liang feared that foreign capital would bring to China the social ills that had plagued the West.⁵⁷

In the controversy, Liang and the anarchists agreed with Marx's critique of capitalism in broad terms, but their responses to his solutions were different. Liang was interested in the prevention of social violence. Although Liang and the revolutionaries all shunned the method of class war, the latter found Marx's proposed reform outlined in *The Communist Manifesto* acceptable.⁵⁸ The programs included the nationalization of land, banks, and transportation, state enterprises, progressive taxation, the abolition of inheritance laws, and free education.⁵⁹ In fact, the controversy can be traced to 1900 when Liang and Sun Yat-sen unsuccessfully attempted to work out a program of cooperation. Nationalization of land was reportedly an issue on which they disagreed.

Liang's argument consisted of three parts: the first was that a social revolution was not needed in China for the economic-social structure of China was vastly different from that of Europe. China did not have extremely rich and extremely poor classes as in Europe. Second, a social revolution should not be carried out in China because the primary task for the development of China's economy was "to encourage the capitalists"; "protecting the proletariat" should be only secondary. The reason was that native capitalists were needed in order to resist foreign capitalists, who had swarmed into China seeking cheap labor and making use of surplus capital. And third, a social revolution could not be carried out in China. For Liang, if social problems were to be solved, that of capital had to be solved first and the land issue second. The social problems would not be solved completely and thoroughly, in concert with the nationalization of land.⁶⁰

Hu Hanmin, an important spokesman for Tongmenghui whose writing often had Sun Yat-sen's personal endorsement, replied to Liang, suggesting that the West's inability to create socialism did not rule out the possibility in China. Hu denied Liang's statement that a socialist revolution could not be considered completed before all the means of production are nationalized and social problems thoroughly solved. Hu argued that those who stuck to the principle would take extreme actions. For Hu, Liang, an enemy of socialism, seemed to sound even more extreme than the extreme socialists like Marx and Engels. He said,

Now the people who most terrify the world today with their theory of capital (*Das Kapital*) are Marx and Engels. But these two gentlemen not only recognize the private ownership of personal belongings for one's own use, but even the private ownership of capital by farmers and artisans. The Japanese scholar Kawakami has said that socialism often exaggerate, saying that all capital will be publicly owned and private property prohibited; that is why people fear socialism. . . . He also said that when Abe Iso and Kotoku Shusui use the words entirely (*shitsu*), or all (*subete*), in their discussions of the nationalization of capital, they are not in fact using them correctly. Thus one cannot say that all capital will be nationalized, even in the most extreme form of socialism.⁶¹

Here we note that the names of Marx and Engels were transliterated as Ma-er-ka and Yan-ge-er-shi.

According to Tang Tingfen, before 1917 Chinese anarchists had been interested in the works of Marx and Engels and particularly praised their theory of class struggles. In 1908, when the anarchist journal *Tian yi* carried the Chinese translation of the first and second chapters of *The Communist Manifesto*, Liu Shipei published his "A Preface to *The Communist Manifesto*," which reminded readers of Marx's theory of class struggle.⁶² The anarchists not only

explained their struggle against the Manchus from Marx's standpoint of class struggle, but also cited Engels in their critique of nationalism.⁶³ Marx's name came up frequently in the debate between Liu Shifu and Sun Yat-sen, and Jiang Kanghu in 1913 and 1914. In one of his lectures given to a gathering of the Chinese Socialist Party in 1912, Sun Yat-sen reiterated his commitment to socialism and elaborated on the socialist program he had advocated since the Tongmenghui days. He embarked on a prolonged discourse on socialism, in which he acknowledged Marx as the father of socialism but insisted that Marx's ideas be complemented with Henry George's. Sun also described communism as the highest ideal of socialism, but expressed doubt that people were morally prepared for the realization of that ideal.⁶⁴ This brought Sun into Liu's polemics, that is, the nature of socialism was at issue.

In his attacks on Sun and Jiang, Liu charged both of them with ignorance of socialism. He drew upon his considerable knowledge of the history of socialism to clarify questions on the evolution of terminology. For Liu, Jiang was wrong in his assertion that until Bakunin's split with Marx in 1871 anarchism had been indistinct from socialism. Liu was willing to acknowledge Marx's contributions to socialism, but he rejected the view that Marx was the "pope" of socialism. Liu viewed Marx as a state socialist who had derived most of his collectivist ideas from Saint-Simon, and he claimed that anarchism was more scientific than Marxism. Marx was a scientific socialist, but Kropotkin had given socialism a firmer scientific basis.⁶⁵

DIALECTICS AND MATERIALISM

Similar to the question of when Marxism was first introduced is that of when dialectical materialism was first ushered in. It is quite certain that the earliest introduction of Western dialectics and materialism into the Chinese vocabulary occurred in the midst of an enormous flow of Western thought into China at the turn of the last century, among the most influential schools were Darwinism, socialism, anarchism, and Marxism, and that Simada Saburo's *A General Critique of Socialism* was among the sources that carry the earliest references to Marxian dialectics. As Martin Bernal mentions, the book gives a rough outline of the dialectical materialist interpretation of history.⁶⁶ Its Chinese translation was published by Zuo xin she of Shanghai in 1903.⁶⁷

Again the sources that carry the earliest references to dialectics and materialism include the writings of Liang Qichao. As Bernal states, like all dialectical evolutionists after Hegel, Liang was concerned about the issue of the "negation of the negation," a basic law of dialectics. Was the process one of

progress or merely one of alternation? Liang discussed the issue in his "*Lun qiang quan*" (On Power) in 1899:

Some people ask . . . How different is the third epoch from the first? This view is mistaken. In the first epoch no one has power over anyone else, so there is equality. In the second epoch some have power over somebody else, and others are powerless, therefore there is no equality. In the third epoch everyone has power, therefore equality returns. . . . Nowadays in the European countries the people who have power have been many times more than those two hundred years ago. Has the power of the Westerners developed to the utmost point? Not yet. Today the classes (*jie-jì*) of capitalism (*zi-ben-jia*) and workers, and men and women, have still not been eliminated. There are still great differences between them. Therefore two events are certain to happen in the future, that is, the economic revolution and the women's rights revolution. Only after these two revolutions will all mankind have power.⁶⁸

In the very same article of 1902 on Kidd, which contained his first mention of Marx, Liang introduced Marx's materialism. "This is the time materialism prevails and idealism dies," Liang claims:

Marx challenges the popular saying that "the recent development of sciences has smashed religious beliefs, concluding that human kind has evolved from the ape. He asked: Is the human kind the final stage of evolution? Is there any step for human kind to still evolve further in the future? These questions remain to be answered." . . . Marx . . . only raises questions, but does not have an answer.⁶⁹

For Liang, it was Kidd who gave answers to these questions, "it was Kidd who had made further progress in theory. In the beginning of 1894, he wrote 'On Social Evolution,' giving solutions to these issues."⁷⁰

Liang's view of Marx's materialism and its role in the theory of the German Social Democratic Party was made clear in the following passage:

. In Germany there are people who are called Materialists, Nationalists, Conservatives, and Socialists. Generally speaking, these groups all make realism (*xianzai zhuyi*) the foundation of their doctrines. Currently in Germany, the two most powerful schools of thought are, first, Marx's socialism and, second, Nietzsche's individualism. . . . As Marx states, the current social ill is that the rich minority is oppressing the weak majority. On the other hand, Nietzsche says, it is the superior minority who are being supported by the inferior minority. Although both of them sound reasonable as they argue, they show concern only for the present; it seems that there is no such thing as future ahead of them.⁷¹

It is obvious that Liang's reference to Marx here is made only to reject Marx and further Kidd's social Darwinism.

In 1902, Liang published "The Big Events of Changes in Western Academic Thought" (*Tai xi xueshu sixiang bianqian zhi da shi*). He states that what the earliest Greek thinkers did was pursue a permanently fixed principle as a cause of the uncertain and changing world. Liang uses the terms of materialism and idealism as he gives a general description of the thought of Aristotle. For him, Aristotle, who tries to settle the disputes between the mysticism of the old philosophical schools and the conceptualism of Socrates and Plato, has a kind of philosophy just like *idem mani*, that is, it varies, depending on the point of the viewer. It can be viewed as either idealism, like that of Plato, or materialism, like that of Democrititus. "The discourse of idealism and materialism," Liang adds, "can be made comprehensible through a careful inquiry in terms of Buddhism."⁷²

In the essay, Liang also introduces Heraclitus and Parmenides. While Parmenides discusses "*you*" (Being), Heraclitus prefers "*cheng*" (Becoming), Liang says. Parmenides's theory is that the reality of "*wanfa*" (a world of plurality and change) is *yiru* (One Being), that is unchanging, and by contrast, Heraclitus' becoming is the doctrine of perpetual flux.

"Things that exist are merely being," Liang cites Parmenides, "things that are Not-being do not exist." It is not only that they do not exist, but also that they are unknowable. "Being" exists without beginning or end; it is the reality that is ungenerated, that is indestructible and indivisible, that is one, rather than two, and that is equal to Truth. It is nameless, but impulsively called "*te an*" (Truth). This *te an* is still and motionless, and the root of ten thousand things; it is their true form. Their appearances, which are changing, coming into being, and perishing, and innumerable and immeasurable, have been arbitrarily taken as reality only because mankind's six sense organs themselves all vary from one another.⁷³

On the other hand, as Liang comments, Heraclitus states that all phenomenal forms are neither *you* nor *wu*. *You* and *wu*, as two respective aspects of form, appear at the same time. It is only *cheng* (Becoming) that makes them move toward a goal. Again and again they are gathering together and scattering away. They are scattering away while they are gathering together. They are coming and going constantly. As everybody sees, like things emerging and dying in the world, and the alternation of success and failure, there is nothing that is not changing yet remains the same; change is constant. Therefore, the ten thousand things exist between the past and the future. As so-called "today," it is rather difficult to define. Anything that is under question is that things are mutually becoming, flowing, and alternating ceaselessly. But is there any kind of causation by following which one can get to know the world? That is, you should know that change and transformation entail changelessness, and that in the flow and alternation of things there is consis-

tency (or continuity). What is this consistency then? It is literally called natural evolution. Natural evolution follows a *ze* (*ze* as in *faze*, law).⁷⁴ Therefore, *ze* makes it possible that all ten thousand things are coming out of and entering *ji* (opportunity, occasion)—Heraclitus names it *logos*, which has the meaning of principle in the Greek language.⁷⁵

Liang holds that the explanation of the process of change in all things can be ascribed to two forces: one is resisting, the other, oppressing; it is these two forces that constitute a tied up relationship (*yin yuan*) of all things and make them fight each other. Over countless periods of time, or timelessly, these two forces have been accompanying each other; but it is not a paradox . . . it ought to be acknowledged that they together make father of the ten thousand things. Generally speaking, the issue of world process had been the most important question of philosophy; all things have two *xiang* (forms), that is, *you* and *wu* (something and nothing). For the Elean thinkers the two forms are opposite and paradoxical, while the proponents of Heraclitus believe they are complementary rather than paradoxical to each other.⁷⁶

CAI YUANPEI'S TRANSLATION OF HEGEL'S DIALECTICS

An important trend of thought that should be broached as to the earliest introduction of Western dialectics in the midst of an enormous flow of Western thought into China at the beginning of the twentieth century was the dialectic of Hegel. Jun Wu's "The Theory of Hegel, A Giant of Idealism" in *Xin Min Congbao* in 1903 was unquestionably one of the earliest articles on Hegel's philosophy,⁷⁷ in which he reported on his life, his success as a philosopher, and his doctrines such as "absolute idealism," "logic," and "historical philosophy."⁷⁸ This was very probably the most preliminary piece of the kind at the times, since the Chinese translation of Hegel's name was Hei Zhier instead of Hei Geer as in later translation. Moreover, we find the earliest Chinese translation of Hegel's triad or three steps (*Dreischritt*) of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis as *zhengmian, fanmian, and fanmian zhi fanmian*. And yet, perhaps, the most systemic introduction to the dialectic of in Hegel is found in Cai Yuanpei's translation of a lecture on Western philosophy from Japanese in 1903.

Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940), who had successfully passed the highest level of the Confucian examination system, became interested in German philosophy and aesthetics, particularly those of Kant. As a young man he was attracted to anarchism and to the free exchange of ideas. Cai did the translation when he stayed in Qingdao between May and July 1903. The lecture had originally been presented in English by a German professor named Keppel at the University of Liberal Arts in Japan and then translated into Japanese

by Shimoda Jiro.⁷⁹ Cai's translation was entitled "Zhexue yaoling" (Some Essentials of Philosophy) and published in September 1903. It had a far more detailed explanation of Western dialectics than anywhere at the time. Although I did not find the English or Japanese original, an analysis of the earliest Chinese translation of dialectics by Cai demonstrates that, when it is translated into Chinese, the discussion becomes a discourse of the strand of *tongbian* philosophy.

In the West, although the dialectics of Hegel is a contentious topic, all disagreements over the issues of Hegel's dialectics can be subsumed into a conceptual discourse that follows from the characteristics of metaphysics. As Roland Hall claims, Hegel is commonly supposed to have presented his doctrines in the form of the triad or three step (*Dreischritt*) of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. This view appears to be mistaken insofar as Hegel did not actually use the terms; and even though he evinced a fondness for triads, neither his dialectic in general nor particular portions of his work can be reduced simply to a triadic pattern of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The legend of this triad in Hegel has been bolstered by some English translations that introduce the word "antithesis" where it is not required.⁸⁰

Apparently, in his lecture in Japan at the turn of the last century the German professor, Keppel, introduced the Hegelian dialectic as involving the achievement of evolution through contradictions; it is a world process—not merely a process of thought but also found in history and in the universe as a whole. In Hegel's view, the "passing over into the opposite" was seen as a natural consequence of the limited or finite nature of a concept or thing; the triad or three step (*Dreischritt*) of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis involved refers to its original unity, the phase as contradictions and opposites, and the achievement of a higher unity. This was what Cai had tried to translate Keppe1's presentation of these ideas of Hegel's dialectics into a Chinese text. However, as it was first translated into Japanese, and then into Chinese, Keppe1's lecture in English underwent a major change in meaning when it became a text in Chinese. I will examine this change by reviewing the origins of some important terminologies of the Chinese version of dialectics in Chapter 3 of the book.

As sketched in this chapter, the preliminary stage of Marxism's encountering China followed a clear historical process. China's defeat in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War and the failure of 1898 reform gave rise to Chinese nationalism and relinquishing the traditional mentality of "cultural superiority." Chinese intellectuals were inspired to learn from Japan and through Japanese Western thought. As they became aware of the social problems in the West that scientific progress led to extreme economic inequality, the Chinese were more and more attracted to socialism that included Marxism and anarchism. And yet, it

was this historical process that also brought in the concepts and terminology of "dialectics" and "materialism" that included the dialectic of Hegel, which is closely related to the Chinese acceptance of Marxian dialectics. However, the new high tide of ushering into China and more serious discussion of Marxist dialectical materialism had not started until after the 1917 Russian Revolution.⁸¹

NOTES

1. Ma Zuyi, *Zhongguo fanyi jianshi* (An Outline History of Chinese Translation of Foreign Literature) (Beijing: Zhongguo duiwai fanyi chuban gongsi, 1984), 270.
2. Martin Bernal, *Chinese Socialism to 1907*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), 129.
3. Ma Zuyi, *Zhongguo fanyi jianshi*, 270.
4. Li Yu-ning, *The Introduction of Socialism into China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 108.
5. Ogawa Hiroshi, *A Comprehensive Catalogue of Chinese Translation of Japanese Books* (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 1980), 58.
6. Ma Zuyi, *Zhongguo fanyi jianshi*, 250.
7. Ma Zuyi, *Zhongguo fanyi jianshi*, 272.
8. Hiroshi, *Comprehensive Catalogue of Chinese*, 31.
9. Hiroshi, *Comprehensive Catalogue of Chinese*, 41.
10. Zhong Shaohua, "Qing mo Zhongguo ren dui yu zhixue de zhuiqiu" (The Chinese Quest for Philosophy in the Late Qing Period) (Taibei: Zhongguo wen zhe yanjiu tongxun, 1992), 165.
11. Li Yu-ning, *The Introduction of Socialism into China*, 4.
12. Li Yu-ning, *The Introduction of Socialism into China*, 4–6.
13. Li Yu-ning, *The Introduction of Socialism into China*, 10, 13.
14. As for the strong elements in the flow of Western thoughts into China during this historical period, see Arif Dirlik, *Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Tang Tingfen, *Zhongguo wuzhengfu zhuyi yanjiu* (A Study of the Chinese Anarchism) (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 1991); and Peter Zarrow, *Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
15. Bernal, *Chinese Socialism to 1907*, 107.
16. Arif Dirlik, *The Origins of Chinese Communism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 20.
17. Ma Zuyi, *Zhongguo fanyi jianshi*, 277.
18. Liang Qichao, "Lun xue Riben wen zhi yi," (On Efficiency of Learning Japanese)," 1899; see *Yin bing shi he ji*, sec. 4, 2, *Zhonghua shuju*, Shanghai, 1932, p. 80.
19. Kang Youwei, "Guang yi Riben shu sheli jing shi yi shu ju zhe." This was a memorandum Kang wrote to the throne of the Qing dynasty in 1898; see Ma Zuyi, p. 249.

20. Liang Qichao, "Dong ji yue dan," 1899; see *yin bing shi he ji*, sec. 4, 2, Zhonghua shuju, Shanghai, 1932, p. 82.
21. Liang Qichao, "Lun xue Riben wen zhi yi" (On Efficiency of Learning Japanese), 1899; see *Yin bing shi he ji*, sec. 4, 2, Zhonghua shuju, Shanghai, 1932, p. 80.
22. *The Review of the Times*, or *Wanguo gongbao*, was essentially the creation of two missionaries, an American named Young J. Allen and a Welshman, Timothy Richard. It had a predecessor, *Jiaohui xinbao*, or *Church News*, between 1868 and 1874. In 1875, Allen, a southern Baptist, established *Wanguo gongbao*, *The Global Magazine*, whose publication was suspended in 1882. It was revived as a monthly with a different English title, *The Review of the Times*. Richard was a Welsh Baptist who had been in China since 1869 and took the position of General Secretary of the Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge among the Chinese (S.D.K.) in 1891. Allen and Richard, who had retained the editorship of the journal, became its leading contributors. During the height of the reform movement, from China's defeat by the Japanese in 1895 to the abortive Hundred Days of Reform in 1898, they became national figures. See Bernal, *Chinese Socialism to 1907*, 22–23.
23. Jin Chongji, "Preface to the Chinese Edition," in Qiu Quanzheng et al., *1907 Nian yiqian zhongguo de shehui zhuyi sichao* (Chinese translation of Bernal, *Chinese Socialism to 1907*) Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1985), ii.
24. Bernal, *Chinese Socialism to 1907*, 37. The passage in Chinese is as follows: "Qi yi bai gong lingxiu zhuming zhe, ying ren makesi ye. Makesi zhi yan yue: 'jiu gu ban shi zhi ren, qi quan louzhao wuzhou, tu guo yu jun xiang zhi fanwei yi guo.'" See *Wanguo gongbao*, [273], I21, (February 1899): 13; "Ji De de gaishu" (A General Introduction of Kidd) see [64], pp. II–13. (*The Review of the Times*, CXXI (2/99), 13–13b; the summary is of Kidd, II–13.
25. Bernal, *Chinese Socialism to 1907*, 34–36.
26. Li Yu-Ning, *The Introduction of Socialism into China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 3, II2n2.
27. Li Yu-ning, *Introduction of Socialism*, 3.
28. *Shanghai shiwu xinbao* (Shanghai Times) and *Guomin xinbao* (National News). See Li Yu-ning, *Introduction of Socialism*, 16.
29. *Qingyi bao*. Liang Qichao, *Yin bing shi.wen ji*, lei-bian, 2, Hua zheng shuju, 1974, Taipei, p. 683. See Robert A. Scalapino and Harold Schiffrin, "Early Socialist Currents in the Chinese Revolutionary Movement: Sun Yat-sen versus Liang Chi-chao," *Journal of Asian Studies*, XVIII, no. 3, May 1959, p. 335.
30. Bernal, *Chinese Socialism to 1907*, 93n10.
31. "Ri-er-man-ren shehui zhuyi zhi taidou ye," Liang, *Yin bing shi he ji*, sec. 12, 5, Zhonghua shuju, Shanghai, 1932, p. 79.
32. Liang, *Yin bing shi he ji*, sec. 12, vol. 5, p. 86.
33. Li Yu-ning, *Introduction of Socialism*, 13.
34. Ma Zuyi, *Zhongguo fanyi jianshi* (An Outline History of Chinese Translation of Foreign Literature) (Beijing: Zhongguo duiwai fanyi chuban gongsi, 1984), 277.

35. Li Yu-ning, *Introduction of Socialism*, 13–14; and Bernal, *Chinese Socialism to 1907*, 94–95.
36. Ma Zuyi, *Zhongguo fanyi jianshi*, 277.
37. *The Socialist Parties*, 13. There is a copy of the book by Nishikwa Kojirō, trans. Zhou Baigao (Shanghai, 1903), in the library of the University of California Berkeley. See Bernal, *Chinese Socialism to 1907*, 95; and also Li Yu-ning *Introduction of Socialism*, 13–14, 116n28–29.
38. Liang, *Xin dalu youji*, supplement to *Yin bing shi wenji*, pp. 60–61.
39. Liang, "Er shi shiji zhì ju líng tuo-la-si" (The Huge Soul of Trust of the 20th Century), written under the pen name Zhongguo zhi xinmin, *Xin min congbao*, no. 42–43: 107. See Li Yu-ning, *Introduction of Socialism*, 9, 115n23. Also see Liang, *Yin bing shi wenji*, sec. 14, 5, *Zhonghua shuju*, Shanghai, 1932, p. 54.
40. *Xin min congbao*, no. 46–48, published in February 14, 1904. See Li Yu-ning, *Introduction of Socialism*, 10.
41. Ma Zuyi, *Zhongguo fanyi jianshi*, 277; also see Bernal, *Chinese Socialism to 1907*, 225.
42. *Zhejiang chao*, VIII (October 10, 1903): 17. See Qiu Quanzheng et al., *1907 nian yiqian Zhongguo de shehui zhuyi sichao* (a Chinese translation of Bernal) (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1985), 85–86.
43. Quanzheng et al., *1907 nian yiqian Zhongguo de shehui zhuyi sichao*, 85–86.
44. Chinese students in Japan started the magazine in January 1900.
45. *Yi shu hui bian*, Tokyo, 1900, I, p. 15.
46. See the following table 2.1:

Table 2.1. Transliterated forms of Marx's name in Chinese

Author/Translator	Publication	Year	Chinese	
			Marx	Engels
Translation of Kidd	Wanguo Gongbao	1899	Ma ke si	
Ariga Nagao	Yi shu hui bian	1900	Mai-ke-si	
Liang Qichao	Xinmin congbao	1902	Mai-ke-shi	
Liang Qichao	Xin dalu you ji	1903	Mai-ke-shi	
	Zhejiang chao	1903	Mai-ha-si	
Zhao Bizhen	Jin shi shehui	1903	Jia-lu Ma-lu-ke-si	Ye-qi-lu-si
Zhu Zhixin	Min bao	1905	Ma-er-ke	
Liao Zhongkai	Min bao (Bliss)	1906	Mai-ke-shi	Ying-gai-er
Hu Hanmin	Min bao	1907	Ma-er-ke	Yan-ge-er-shi
	Communist Manifesto	1907	Ma-er-ke	Yan-ji-er
Liang Xin		1913	An-ge-er-si	

47. *Le Peuple*, May 20, 1905. See Bernal, *Chinese Socialism to 1907*, 65–66.

48. Both the Russian translation of the article and Lenin's comments appeared in the Russian publication in July 15, 1912. See Lenin, *Selected Works*, II, in Chinese (Beijing: People's Publisher, 1974), 423–428, 943n150.

49. Ma Zuyi, *Zhongguo fanyi jianshi*, 280.

50. Zhu Zhixin, "Deyizhi shehui gemingjia lie zhuan," *Ming bao*, II, p. 4.

51. A popular understanding had conceived that Chen Wangdao first translated *The Communist Manifesto* in 1920 before the discovery revealed that Shu Hun did a complete translation as early as 1907. See Fang Xiao, *The Unidentified Facts in the History of the Chinese Communist Party* (Taiyuan: Shanxi Education Press, 1991), 14–15.

52. Ma Zuyi, *Zhongguo fanyi jiaushi*, 277–78.

53. Tang Tingfen, *Zhongguo wuzhengfu yanjiu* (A Study of the Chinese Anarchism), Beijing: falu chubanshe, 1991, p. 182.

54. Ma Zuyi, *Zhongguo fanyi jianshi*, 280.

55. Ma Zuyi, *Zhongguo fanyi jianshi*, 280.

56. Ma Zuyi, *Zhongguo fanyi jiaushi*, 280.

57. Liang, "The Problem of the Inflow of Foreign Capital," *Xin min cong bao*, no. 52 (September 10, 1904); no. 53 (September 24, 1904); no. 54 (October 9, 1904): 61–90.

58. Although the Chinese translation of the *Manifesto* had not been available by 1905 according our research as previously introduced, the Chinese intellectuals had known about the basic content of the *Manifesto* through reading Japanese Marxist literature at the time.

59. Michael Y. L. Luk, *The Origins of Chinese Bolshevism* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1990), 16.

60. Li Yu-ning, *Introduction of Socialism*, 35–38.

61. Hu Hanmin, pen name Min Yi, "To the Denouncers of the *Minsheung zhuyi*," *Min buo*, XII (March 1907): 100. See Bernal, *Chinese Socialism to 1907*, 149.

62. Tang Tingfen, *Zhongguo wuzhengfu yanjiu*, 182.

63. Tang Tingfen, *Zhongguo wuzhengfu yanjiu*, 183–84.

64. Arif Dirlik, *Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 140–41.

65. Liu Shifu, *Shifu wencun* (Writings of Shifu) (Guangzhou: Gexin shuju, 1927), 140–42.

66. Bernal, *Chinese Socialism to 1907*, 96.

67. I filed an interlibrary search order through the Hamilton Library of the University of Hawaii at Manoa in March 1996, since Bernal informs us that there is a copy of this book in the library of the University of California, Berkeley. What came out as a result of my request was that the Hamilton Library contacted the National Diet Library of Tokyo, Japan, after it had been told that there was not such a title in the catalog of the library of the University of California, Berkeley. As a final result, I received a photocopy of the original book in Japanese from the National Diet Library in Tokyo.

68. Liang, "Lun Qiangquan," *Qiugyi bao*, XXXI (October 25, 1899): 6–7; see *Yin bing shi wenji lei bian*, 2, Hua zheng shuju, Taipei, 1974; also see Bernal, *Chinese Socialism to 1907*, 92.

69. Liang, "Jinhua lun geming zhe jie de zhi xueshuo," *Yin bing shi he ji*, sec. 12, 5, (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1932), 79.

70. Liang, "Jinhua lun geming zhe jie de zhi xueshuo," 79.

71. Liang, "Jinhua lun geming zhe jie de zhi xueshuo," 86.

72. Liang, "Jinhua lun geming zhe jie de zhi xueshuo," 2; (Hua zheng shuju, Taipei, 1974), 91.

73. Liang, *Yin bing shi wen ji lei bian*, p. 93.
74. *Ze*, or *faze*, which has been a transliterated equivalent to law, has indeed the meaning of "pattern of continuity" as indicated by the Chinese characters.
75. Liang, "Jinhua lun geming zhe jie de zhi xueshuo," 93.
76. Liang, "Jinhua lun geming zhe jie de zhi xueshuo," 93–94.
77. *Xiu min congbao*, no. 27, 1903.
78. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Archive. *A Critique References to Bourgeois Thought*, 9 (internal publication) (Beijing: Shangwu yin shu guan, 1961), 8–15. This was very probably the most preliminary piece of the kind at the times, since the Chinese translation of Hegel's name was Hei Zhier instead of Hei Geer as in later translation. Moreover, we find the earliest Chinese translation of Hegel's theory of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis as *zhengmian*, *fannian*, and *fanmian zhi fanmian*.
79. Here "Keppel" is adopted phonetically from the Chinese transliteration of the German professor's name; it may not necessarily be exact.
80. Paul Edwards, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 1 (New York: Macmillan, Inc., and Free Press, 1972), 387–88.

Tongbian in Preliminary Reading of Dialectics

Did the preliminary stage of reading dialectics involved elements of *tongbian* when Western thought encountered China through the Japanese language? To answer this question, perhaps we need to examine three issues: (1) how “biauzheung” was utilized by the Japanese to translate dialectics; (2) what “biauzheng” means in Chinese language and how it differs from dialectics; and (3) how the Chinese understood dialectics through “bianzheng” when they first adopted the Japanese usage of “bianzheng” for dialectics. If “bianzheng” or the Chinese reading of dialectics indeed entailed *tongbian*, then it may suffice to say that in the historical process of Western dialectics’ being ushered into China from Japanese language there involved a change from a Western conceptual thinking into a style of Chinese correlative thinking, a change that is fundamental and structural in the fact it occurred in the worldview and cosmological consumptions of the West.

BIANZHENG: A CLASSICAL CHINESE EXPRESSION

According to *Xiandai hanyu wailaici yanjiu* (A Study of Terms of Foreign Origin in the Modern Chinese Language), *bianzhengfa* is not on the list of the numerous “terms that had existed in classical Chinese but were utilized by the Japanese to translate Western words with meanings that frequently differed from the original classical Chinese.” Rather *bianzhengfa* is found among those in the category of “compounds which had not existed in Classical Chinese but were invented by the Japanese” to translate Western terms. That is to say, there had been no such compound as *bianzheng* in classical Chinese; it was the Japanese who first combined three *kanji* (Chinese characters), *bian*,

zheng, and *fa* to denote “dialectics.”¹ This is not necessarily true, however, since *bianzheng* had existed as a compound word before it was first adopted by the Japanese as a translation for “dialectic.”

An example is found in the following quotation from the classical Chinese text of “The Biography of Qian Hui” in *A History of the Tang Dynasty*: “As long as I do not feel guilty at heart, why should I bother myself by taking up the business of argumentation to let people hear my explanation that I am not guilty.”²

Here, *bianzheng* implies the analogical relations of *bianbie* and *zhengming*, “to make something clear in displaying its differences” and “to demonstrate it and let people learn. . . .”³ If we look into the more detailed meaning of “*bianzheng*,” then it is interesting to discover that, in the Han dynasty *Shuo wen* lexicon, the character *bian* means to argue, to dispute, to debate, or to contend. It is also “to talk cleverly.” The meanings are indicated by the character’s composition that has the basic component *yan*, to talk, in the middle of the two same radicals, *xin*.⁴

Xiandai hanyu cidian (A Contemporary Chinese Dictionary) defines *bianzheng* as the associate analogue of *bianxi kaozheng*, which may entail meanings overlapped with “distinguish,” “analyze,” “discriminate,” “judge,” “decide,” “determine,” “divide,” and “dissect.” Here, although the *bian* (to distinguish) in *bianxi* consists of a basic component *dao* (knife) in the middle of the two same radicals *xin*, it is interchangeable with that which means “to argue” in the case it is used in the word *bianzheng*. As *Shuo wen* explains *bian* as to distinguish, tell apart, judge, or determine, it gives an analogy, that is, to investigate (examine) and ask questions in order to reach an appropriate determination. Classical dictionaries also remind us that a basic structural part *dao* (knife) instead of *yan* (talk) sandwiched between the two identical radicals *xin* stimulates the imagination to underdetermine the meaning “divide” or “dissect.”⁵ The imagination is fortified in the combination with the character *xi*, the analogical references of which are to break up and to break a tree or timber.⁶

Zheng (prove or verify) has a basic structural component, which also pronounces *zheng* and means “appropriateness or straight”; its radical *yan* (speak) means to draw people’s attention to appropriate (*dang*) and straightforward remarks (*shi*).⁷ “Appropriateness or straight” is referred to by *ze*, or rule, that is, un-wrongdoing, or something people can do accordingly. Therefore, *zheng* may suggest attracting people to listen to right talk, or talk as regards rules, un-wrongdoing, or something people can do accordingly.⁸ In addition, *zheng* is also supposed to indicate *jian*, “to present convincing remarks to the head of the masses (*renjun*), suggesting that he act appropriately and exemplarily.”⁹

And yet, like all Chinese concept, *bianzheng* is explained with events or analogical relations. Both *bian* and *zheng* are implicated in analogical relations with other related characters, which involve the association of image, or image clusters related by meaningful disposition. Indeed, it is not "conceptual" but particular image. For instance, the *bian* (argue) is correlated with the cognate *bian* (differentiate) and thus, in presenting an issue, can be translated variously as "differentiating," "distinguishing," "telling apart," "dissecting," "cutting up," "judging," "determining," "deciding," "dividing," and so on. The variety of suggestive descriptions of *bian* (to distinguish) not only have productive vagueness characteristic of metaphorical expressions that is lacking in precise literal language, but also are underdetermined analogical references which stimulate the imagination to fill in the details. Without philosophical presuppositions, the association of the *bian* (argue) with that of "distinguish" is in fact a practice of developing abstract philosophical vocabulary out of concrete actions. The *bian* used for argumentation is in a sense an abstraction from all those possible concrete actions, "differentiating," "distinguishing," "dissecting," "judging," etc.

As the priority of process over fixed form is evident in the classical Chinese, the notion of *bian* (argue) is often translated variously as concrete events: (1) to argue, dispute, debate, contend, and *qiaoyan* (talk resourcefully); (2) to cause people to listen with appropriate and straightforward remarks; (3) talk as regards rules, un-wrongdoings, or something people can do accordingly; and (4) to present convincing remarks in front of the head of the masses (*renjun*), suggesting that he act appropriately and exemplarily.¹⁰ For this reason, there is no way for *bianzheng* to be a concept seeking out and isolating some original principle—a more real and enduring formal aspect that lies behind the process of change. *Bianzheng* does not involve a correspondence between the state of mind of the arguing person and the actual facts of the matter. Instead, it is defined based upon varying situations.

In the correlative mode of *tongbian*, *bian* (or argue) is a mutual discourse entailing both rhetoric and action, saying and doing, and the one who argues and whom he is arguing with. To engage in arguing is to acquire a functional understanding of the particular circumstances while trying to say and do appropriately. The line between what to argue and how to argue, between its nominal and verbal sense, and between a thing and event, is often at best tentative. The imaginistically suggestive ways of *bianzheng* and tactics exploit the ambiguity between the *bian* of "argue" and *bian* of "distinguish," and between the *bian* of "argue" and that of to be argued about, combining the structure of arguing and how it is being applied.

Perhaps the original meaning of the two-character expression *bian-zheng* before it was employed as an equivalent to dialectic could adequately be

recovered in the Chinese medicine vocabulary *bianzheng shizhi*. In *Cihai*, an encyclopedic dictionary of the Chinese language, *bianzheng* is explained in the following terms:

According to the traditional teachings of Chinese medicine, one follows the methodology of *si zhen*, (“four exams”) and *ba gang* (“eight key points”) in order to distinguish diverse symptoms. From a macro-perspective established in the classic theories of the internal organs of the body and the *jingluo*, or collateral channels,¹¹ one analyzes his patients’ physical conditions and characteristics and their reactions to diseases in combination with an investigation into diverse factors in terms of season, geography, and circumstances, as well as a study on particularity and generality of pathogenic possibilities and actual incidence of the disease, until accomplishes a precise diagnose in the process of seeking diverseness in continuity, and vice versa. *Shizhi* (offering treatment) is to make a plan for curative treatment, which is based upon the results of the *bianzheng* diagnose and particular conditions of the patient as to where major sickness exists and what the concern of priority is.¹²

Let us take a look at the particular structure of *bianzheng* from the above functional analogue, *bianzheng shizhi*: (1) *Bianzheng*: to distinguish diverse symptoms from a macro-perspective.¹³ This is an appeal to correlative thinking and a worldview seeking continuity through differences. As a view of *tongbian*, what *zhengti*—literally, “the whole body”—suggests is continuity or correlativity; it does not mean wholeness, or totality, but rather refers to the connectedness, or correlations of symptoms to each other. (2) Continuity runs through diverse categories, such as those that define various symptoms, the different internal body organs, and collateral channels, seasons, geographical areas, and circumstances. The particularity and generality of pathogenic possibilities and actual incidents of diseases are correlative. (3) The expressions *tong zhong qiu yi* (seeking difference in continuity) and *yi zhong qiu tong*, (seeking continuity in difference) can not be seen as conceptual assumptions, but rather are an abstraction from concrete actions that advocates philosophizing and the consequent explanation of order in terms of correlativity. (4) The expressions do not describe conceptual processes isolating the origina-tive principle to identify the more real and enduring formal aspects that lie behind diversities, differences, and changes. It is rather a precise diagnosis that emerges as an entirely situational accomplishment, establishing a focal point within the continuity of its context. Judging by all that we have discussed, including the traditional Chinese medical approach, perhaps it is now not difficult to comprehend that it involved a significant equivocation in the process for *bianzheng* from its ancient form to become a modern translation of the Western concept “dialectics.”

BIANZHENG: FIRST UNDERSTANDING OF DIALECTIC

In exploring the way in which the first time the Chinese read dialectic through “*bianzheng*” and adopted the Japanese usage of “*bianzheng*,” we find that *Xin erya* was one of the dictionaries around the turn of last century that had the earliest entries of Western philosophical and sociological terminology, including “dialectics” and “materialism.” The lexicon was compiled by Wang Rongbao and Ye Lan and published by Ming chuang she in Shanghai. Soon after in 1903, it was also printed in Tokyo. One passage introducing “dialectics” (*bianzheng*) reads, “The common education in Middle Ages Rome was ‘the seven liberal arts,’ including the three fields, Grammatic, Rhetoric and Dialectics, and the four disciplines, Mathematics, Geometry, Music, and Astronomy.”¹⁴ The reference to materialism (*weiwu lun*) runs, “The claim that all spiritual phenomena are action of material is called materialism.”¹⁵ For idealism, it says, “The claims that material can be seen as nothing but human experience of mind and even that there exists a universal and real Truth, that is, the Soul, which contradicts materialism and is called *wei ling lun* (theory of the spirit), also known as idealism.”¹⁶

Xin erya was very important as an indication that at the turn of the last century the Japanese *kanji* translation of Western terminology permeated the writings of many Chinese intellectuals, comprising a substantial part of their vocabulary. Therefore, it can well be assumed that, since the Chinese for dialectics was *bianzheng*, which had existed in classical language and might still carried its classical meaning. In finding this out, I will examine the key terms relevant to the development of a Chinese version of “dialectics” in later chapters where I discuss how a number of important Chinese writers read, accepted, and adopted the terminology of Marxist dialectical materialism yet maintained the elements of *tongbian* philosophy. In the following, however, I will review briefly Liang Qichao and Cai Yuanpei whose works contains a preliminary reading of the Western concept of dialectics through the eye of *tongbian*.

In the previous chapter, I mentioned the Chinese expressions “*you*,” “*wu*,” “*cheng*,” “*wanfa*,” “*ze*,” “*xiang*,” etc., were employed for the concepts “being,” “not-being,” “becoming,” “the world of plurality and change,” “law or rule,” “form,” etc., in Liang’s reading of Western philosophers. We need to sensitize ourselves to the likelihood that these Chinese expressions that Liang utilized might have brought in with them a worldview and way of thinking that articulated a structure, which was no longer the same as that of the original concepts but entailed the elements of *tongbian*.

For Liang, it seems that the discourse of idealism as in Plato and materialism as in Democritus can be made comprehensible through a careful inquiry

in terms of Buddhism.¹⁷ When introducing Parmenides' theory as that the reality of a world of plurality and change is One Being, Liang is actually saying that the actuality (*shi zai*) of ten thousand things (*wanfa*) entails a continuity and so-ingness (*yiru*). Here, although *wanfa* and *yiru* are Buddhist concepts, which may suggest "everything that has noumenal or phenomenal existence" and "the absolute in or ultimate reality behind everything," as explained in the dictionary of William Edward Soothill and Lewis Hodous,¹⁸ they are capable of carrying the meaning as of the classical Chinese language, in which *fa* denotes enduring (*chang*), way (*fangfa*), and following the example (*xiao*);¹⁹ *yi*, continuity which gives birth to *dao* (way), in following which the ten thousand things are emerging;²⁰ and *ru*, so-ing. *Wanfa* and *yiru* preclude implications of essentiality of the ultimate reality and dualism of the determining "Truth" and all things that "It" determines, or the noumenal and phenomenal.

In his comparison of Parmenides with Heraclitus, Liang's explanation of Heraclitus sounds even more like that of *tongbian* because his usage of *you* for "being" and *wu*, "not-being." Since the *tongbian* modality is absent of the dualism between being and not-being, as well as the transcendence of Being, it is impossible for *you* and *wu* to be understood as "being" and "not-being" under the "One" universal and determining principle. For this reason, as Liang comments Heraclitus's stating that all phenomenal forms are neither "being" nor "not-being" and that being and not-being, as two respective aspect of form, appear at the same time, what he says in Chinese is really something like, the ten thousand things are both something and nothing, which are not separated but correlated; something and nothing are two basic elements of the same thing or same event that share a continuity through *sheng* (to grow into or from)—*you* (something) and *wu* (nothing) grow into and from each other. This distinctive *tongbian* discourse of *you* and *wu* can be differentiated from Heraclitus' doctrine of perpetual flux by absence of teleology and Logos (a governing law or principle) in terms of the "Becoming" that makes being and not-being move toward a goal and natural evolution follow a law. Liang acknowledges clearly Heraclitus' teleology and Logos. However, because his Chinese term for law or Logos is *ze* and for forms, *xiang*, *ze* suggests continuity, and *xiang* presents rather than represents a configured world at the concrete and historical levels and assumes considerably more explanatory force than would a logical account,²¹ Liang's reading of Heraclitus can a great deal be of a Chinese correlative way of thinking.

If we leave aside the elements of telos and Logos, Liang's interpretation of Heraclitus may well fit in with the *tongbian* philosophy, and his usage of *cheng* for "Becoming" may well make a case of reversing the Western preference of rest and permanence over becoming and process in Chinese culture.²² As he says,

As everybody sees, like things emerging and dying in the world, and the alternation of success and failure, there is nothing that is not changing yet remains the same; change is constant. Therefore, the ten thousand things exist between the past and the future. As so-called "today," it is rather difficult to define. Anything that is under question is that things are mutually becoming, flowing, and alternating ceaselessly... you should know that change and transformation entail changelessness, and that in the flow and alternation of things there is consistency (or continuity).²³

CAI YUANPEI: INTRODUCING HEGEL'S DIALECTICS

The Japanese first utilized *bianzhengfa* to denote dialectics. Based upon the Japanese usage of Chinese characters the Chinese reintroduced this term into the Chinese language. The situation led to the reading of dialectics through Chinese eyes. The historical phenomenon is found in particular in the most systemic introduction of Hegel's dialectics in Cai Yuanpei's translation of the German professor Keppel's lecture on Western philosophy from Japanese in 1903.

First of all, in Cai's work, we discover that *jinhua* could not be really understood as "evolution" in English, for *jinhua* is explained as the endless changes of passing over, transforming, pushing, and moving location.²⁴ The meaning of *jinhua* is implicated with analogical relations, which have related characters calling on image or image clusters.²⁵ The character clusters include:

- (1) passing over, successively: (a) alternate, change; (b) the passing on at courier stations; (c) change, alter;
- (2) transform: (a) a verbal command delivered by chanting loudly three times, as in the *Records of the Historian* (*Shiji*); (b) slow, delay, continuity; (c) pass on, hand over, convey;
- (3) push: (a) rinse, shake; (b) push against, squeeze in;
- (c) move forward, ascending a vehicle;
- (d) push against, exclude and
- (4) (a) high; (b) as in *Shijing* climb a tree; (c) ascend;
- (d) move place;
- (e) change;
- (f) change one's mind the moment one sees something better;
- (g) move the capital to a new place.

As *jinhua* is presented with image clusters and concrete actions, it can be translated diversely as any one of them. It makes another example of developing an abstract vocabulary in philosophizing order out of concrete actions and images. The analogical references worked through *jinhua* entail continuity through change as order in a world of correlations, epitomized by the analog of passing over (*di*), transforming (*shan*), pushing (*tui*), and moving place (*qian*) and as *becoming* in light of difference—*becoming* from one event to another; and changing endlessly (*bian geng bu yi*). As such it may be called *tong*, continuity in *becoming*, since *jin* indicates *sheng*, grasses or trees

emerging as a continuity growing out of the earth, and *hua*, changing and transforming.

It seems that *jinhua*, as “gradual change of things from simple to complex, and from low to high levels” as defined in the *Contemporary Chinese Dictionary*, is closer to the meaning of evolution. The explanation is supposed to be the one employed originally in denoting the old Darwinian and Spencerian naturalism as formulated in Huxley’s *Evolution and Ethics* (translated into Chinese in 1898).²⁶ It should not be misunderstood, however, that the Chinese think in the same linear pattern, that “gradual development from low to high, or from simple to complex,” necessarily means it is not fast, or that it does not move from high to low, or from complex to simple. This is similar to the historical materialist relationship between superstructure and economic foundation; in its Chinese interpretation, economic foundation determining superstructure does not necessarily mean that superstructure can be clearly separated from, and is unable to determine economic foundation. In the style of *tongbian* philosophy, *jinhua* (evolution) and its opposite *tuihua* (retrogradation) are correlative and entail each other. This is explained in *Xin erya*, where things “undergo evolution increasingly and decreasingly.”²⁷

Maodun, another two-character compound is often thought to be a Chinese equivalent for the concept of contradiction in English; this is an important equivocation in between. Like other concepts of Chinese philosophy, *maodun* is also explained with image clusters and concrete actions and from the perspective of continuity through change (*tong-bian*). The complex semantic associations reflect into one another to provide a rich, indefinitely “vague” meaning. In this case, *maodun* has the following concrete images and actions:

Mao and *dun* [spear and shield] were two kinds of weapon in ancient times. A story tells about a man trying to sell his spear and shield on the market. He first boasted that his shield was the most solid and defied attacks by any sharp weapon. However, as soon as he finished these remarks, he picked up spear, starting bragging about it by saying, “It is the sharpest and can penetrate even the hardest shield in the world.” At the moment a man in the crowd posed a question, “What would you say if I stab your shield with your spear?” The seller was unable to respond (See *Han Fei Zi*). The *mao-dun* compound has been adopted in referring remarks or behaviors that contradict themselves.²⁸

In Cai’s work, the term *maodun* is brought up as having pertinence to *chong-tu*, or conflict, which is understood as “*maodun* that emerges to the surface” (*jinhua sheng yu chongtu*). *Maodun* is a key notion in the passage, “Motionless in correlation with motion, and something (*you*) in correlation with nothing (*wu*) are, in fact, nothing but ‘contradiction,’ which is found everywhere” (*jing zhi yu dong, you zhi yu wu, gai chu chu wufei maodun zhe*).

As Cai uses it here, *maodun* is no longer limited to "remarks and behaviors" as in the ancient story but becomes a unique conceptual polarity in terms of continuity (or correlation), between two basic elements or contrasting concepts like yin and yang, emphasizing the relationship that each of them requires the other as necessary for being what it is. For this reason, *maodun* is incapable of being an equivalent to the concept of contradiction, for it precludes the concept's assumption of disjunction, negation, or exclusion (*p* and not-*p*). The two sides of *maodun* are rather seen in complementarity constituting a totality. In Chinese, *mao* and *dun*, *jing* (motionless) and *dong* (motion), *you* (something) and *wu* (nothing) are not regarded as essentially different kinds of existence but rather particular aspects on a continuum. They do not stand in a dualistic relationship wherein one aspect is independent of or determining the other. But in the contrary, one is always "becoming the other." There is no aspect that in the strictest sense transcends the rest.

These dyadic pairs *jing-dong* and *you-wu* are utilized in translation as equivalents for stillness/motion, and being/not-being. In this way, the two pairs are rendered something that is outside the conceptual inventory of a host of disjunctive concepts. *Jing-dong* ward off the sense of an end or aim (*telos*), as it exists in "stillness/motion" and transcends the natural world. *Jing-dong* is a nondualistic category in which "stillness" and "motion" are a shared continuum and differ from each other in degree rather than in kind.

Scholars have paid more attention to the differences between *you-wu* and "being/not-being." D. C. Lau has opted for the nontechnical words "something" and "nothing" as English equivalents to *you* and *wu*. However, when Cai (or Liang Qichao as mentioned in previous section) used "you" and "wu" as equivalents for "being" and "not-being," he certainly did not realize that the fundamental cosmological implications sedimented in these two English words were lost in the translation.

In Japanese usage, the *kanji*, *zhengti*, *fanti*, and *shelun* were invented particularly for translation of the three concepts: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. However, as Chinese words, they hardly carry the implications of Hegel's triad law, the dialectic as reason and logical process in the speculative conception of reality. This is because Chinese intellectual tradition is absent of the kind of (absolute) spirit that presupposes the self-generating, self-differentiating, and self-particularizing process of reason.²⁹ As for the claim that one observes a logic of higher agreement, which presupposes and accomplishes a synthetic unity of opposites, contrasts, and reconciliation—whether aesthetically, actively, or propositionally—in an emerging whole,³⁰ it has simply been submerged in the new and particular Chinese discourse. *Zhengti* is nothing but suggests an indication of concrete circumstances in which contradictions have not yet emerged to the surface to become *chong-tu* (conflicts). *Fanti*, or more

directly, *maodun* (contradiction) has become apparent and concrete, and *shelun*, a concrete image of the emerging and more stable situation before new contradiction emerges again to the surface.

It becomes more interesting when Cai uses *taiji* as equivalent for synthesis in describing Hegel's dialectics as mutual opposite and thesis, mutual combining and integrating (*di xiang fan zheng*, *dixiang jiehe*), and thus, an endless yin-yang process of opposing and combining, which brings forth *wuji*, a harmony and great continuity. What Cai has presented is indeed a distinctive but not necessarily unique Chinese acosmotic worldview.

Indeed, in Cai's translation, differences from Hegel's dialectic were made right there with the very use of Chinese character clusters or compounds in referring to (or in representing) Hegel's original concepts, and reinforced with the very use of the sentence structures and grammar in a newly reproduced text. The Chinese text brings with it rich analogical associations, which provide image clusters as a practice of philosophizing order out of concrete actions. In this way the Chinese acosmotic worldview and modality of *tongbian* thinking reproduces a process, in which the central discursive issues are often in regard to the idea of continuity through changes with no relevance to Western philosophical debate.

It is true that Hegel's dialectic is critical of the metaphysical assumptions in Hume, which are abstract in that they consider things merely in themselves, merely as what they are, as self-subsistent, as isolated and abstracted from their context. Hegel argues, "A determinate, a finite, being is one that is in relation to another; it is a content standing in a necessary relation to another, to the whole world" (*Science of Logic*, 86). The metaphysical outlook has the effect of arresting all movement and the development in things and considering them as static. For Hegel, such a view is abstract, while everything concrete is in a process of "becoming" as a unity of being and nothing. He also argues: "We are aware that every thing finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient" (*Encyclopedia of Logic*, sec 81 Z, 150).

Nevertheless, what constitutes the central problem in Hegel is that he ascribes necessity to things in a priori fashion. The development of his dialectic is still formulated on the traditional essentialism of Platonism and Christian philosophy with its tendency to identify the human being himself as essentially mind, or spirit, and with appeal to soul/god in the image of man, yet with unfathomable power and intelligence. He attempts to deduce all the essential categories of reality, starting from the concept of mere abstract Being. Hegel is sure that reality has an organic structure and things exist as organized wholes or systems. For Hegel, an organic system makes a promising model for his conception of spirit's activity, and his comprehension of ult-

mate reality as spirit requires comprehending reality as an organized system. Everything that is actual must be an expression of manifestation of spirit.

We can find from Hegel's early philosophy of religion that the basis for his development of the dialectic is provided by his reflection on the Christian doctrine of the trinity. In Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, there is a rationalized version of the trinitarian elements—"pictorial representations" (*Vorstellungen*), and the dialectical structure of the absolute is considered as immediacy, mediation, and reflexive unity, or *an sich, fuer sich*, and *an-und-fuer-sich*. In fact, God the Father is presented as the bare notion of idea as immediate; the Son is self-existence as mediated for consciousness; and the Holy Spirit is the expression of the unity achieved through the reflexive return to self as subject. This secularization of the trinitarian doctrine begun with Hegel, continues in both idealist and materialist forms after Hegel.³¹

When we turn to the text Cai reproduced in Chinese from the passage in Keppel's lecture regarding Hegel's dialectic, we observe that the central problem of Hegel, his comprehension of ultimate reality as spirit based a metaphysics on the mechanisms of dualism, transcendence, ontology, as well as issues such as dialectic as a priori reason, the teleological explanation of organic system, and so on, are all superseded by a Chinese sensibility. The following English retranslation of Cai's Chinese text will show what kind of version, which it may be hard for a Western person to imagine, that Hegelian dialectic has finally become in Cai's translation,

His [Hegel's] dialectic is one that enlightens us in terms of a general view of things as *jinhua* (growing, changing, and transforming). For him, things grow, change, and transform through complementation in opposition; there is no exception whatsoever for things to *jinhua* from the inorganic world into plant, animal, or even humanity. The relationships of polarities such as oppressive and resistant elements, stillness and motion, and *yin* and *wu* are everywhere; they are nothing but the two elements' complementation in opposition. As a starting period before contradictions become apparent, we may call it *zhengti* (appropriateness or upright); when there comes the period in which contradictions emerge to the surface, we call it *fanti* (opposition); and when there emerges a stable situation in which the opposite elements are relatively balanced and mainly complement each other, *shelun*, which can be considered an accomplishment in *jinhua* (growth, change, and transformation) process. New contradictions would arise under the circumstances of *shelun*, and there would come a new balance of the opposite elements and another accomplishment of process in *jinhua*. In this way, things (or events) entail an endless succession of mutual opposing and mutual integrating into *wuji*, a harmony of great continuity; this is not something exclusively true only in the material world; it is also the way in which we think.³²

As we find it here, when he states that Hegel's dialectic is enlightening, Cai does not understand it from the point of Hegel's comprehension of ultimate reality as spirit, a metaphysics with the mechanisms of dualisms, transcendence, ontology, nor issues such as dialectic as a priori reason and the teleological explanation of organic system. It is the fact that Hegel's dialectic reads discursively somehow like the strand of *tongbian* philosophy and Cai probably understands it from the perspective of Chinese acosmotic worldview, which does not involve a comprehension of ultimate reality as spirit based on metaphysics and a priori conception. It may suffice to say when Hegel's dialectic became *bianzhengfa* in Cai's reproduced Chinese text, the Hegelian dialectic was rephilosophized into a new process and a new context and field of focus. This practice gave a thread of clue to compatibility on a surface level between Hegel's dialectic and *tongbian* and it was especially true in many Chinese intellectuals as they introduced Marxian dialectic into China

MARXIAN DIALECTICS IN TONGBIAN

Dialectics in Marxist thought is conceived as the most contentious topic. The most common emphases of the concept claimed to be found in Marx are (1) "as a method, most usually scientific method, instancing epistemological dialectics"; (2) "a set of laws or principles, governing some sector of the whole of reality, ontological dialectics"; and (3) "the movement of history, relational dialectics."³³ Unlike Hegel, labor for Marx always presupposes (1) "A material substratum ... furnished without the help of man" (*Capital* I, ch. 1, sect. 2) and (2) "involves real transformation, entailing irredeemable loss and finitude and the possibility of genuine novelty and emergence."³⁴ Dialectics in Marx (and Marxism) may not specify a *unitary* phenomenon, but a number of different figures and topics. Thus it may refer to patterns or processes in philosophy, science or the world; being, thought or their relation (ontological epistemological and relational dialectics); nature or society, "in" or "out" of time (historical vs. structural dialectics); which are universal or particular, transhistorical or transient, etc. Thus any epistemic dialectic may be metaconceptual, methodological (critical or systematic), heuristic or substantive (descriptive or explanatory); a relational dialectic may be conceived primarily as an ontological process (e.g., Lukacs) or as an epistemological critique (e.g., Marcuse). Such dialectical modes may be related by (1) a common ancestry and (2) their systematic connections within Marxism without being related by (3) their possession of a common essence, kernel or germ, still less (4) one that can be read back (unchanged into Hegel).³⁵

For the present writer, the general thrust of Engels's intervention is his claim that dialectics is "the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought" (*Anti-Dühring*, part 1, chap. 13), laws which can be "reduced in the main to three" (*Dialectics of Nature* 'Dialectics'): (1) the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa; (2) the interpenetration of opposites, and (3) the negation of the negation. It is held that the laws are supposed to be more or less a priori truths or super-empirical generalizations, or indispensable for scientific practice, or that they are merely convenient expository devices. The relevance of Engels's dialectics for Marxism, conceived as a putative social science, may be questioned, since, although there is some evidence that Marx agreed with the general thrust of Engels's intervention, his own critique of political economy neither presupposes nor entails any dialectics of nature.³⁶

The foregoing provides a good example of the Western philosophical structure including the metaphysical, ontological, and cosmological assumptions embedded in language, which makes broad theoretical and methodological claims, subscribes causal reductionism and simple determination, and reveals a separation between thought and matter, the epistemological and ontological, and so on. Unless the deep structure in Western tradition can be transplanted into Chinese, it would be a misunderstanding to simplistically juxtapose, as many students of China do in the West, that dialectics in Marx simply translates as *bianzhengfa*. Our effort needs to be directed at discovering if the Chinese Marxist dialectics entails the same deeper philosophical structure of dialectics.

We find Marxian dialectics is sketched in relevant entries of *Xiandai hanyu cidian* as follows,

Bianzhengfa: (1) A philosophy regarding the general *guilu* [laws] of contradictory motion, development, and changes of things. It is a worldview and methodology as well which is opposed to metaphysics, considering things as existing in the state of constant movement, change, and development; this is so because there are internal conflicts between contradictory elements in things themselves. Dialectics has historically undergone three phases: spontaneous, idealist, and materialist. Spontaneous dialectics is simple, intuitive, making merely a general description of the world. Idealist dialectics reveals a dialectical reality in the objective world, but it explains the issue from the perspective of mysticism and idealism. Only when it develops into Marxist materialist dialectics has dialectics become a true science. (2) esp. materialist dialectics.³⁷

The Chinese dictionary seems equating *bianzhengfa* and dialectics, whereas, with an absence of the Western philosophical structure of the metaphysical, ontological, and cosmological assumptions embedded in language

and irrelevance to the ongoing philosophical debate in the West, the explanation of *bianzhengfa* can sharply be distinguished from that in the Bhaskar's dictionary.³⁸ The former may be read as in a reproduced discursive context of the Chinese intellectual tradition. Like Hegel's dialectic in the text of Cai, the particular Chinese vocabulary, *bianzhengfa*, for Marxian dialectics gives a thread of clue to possible compatibility on a surface level between Marxian dialectic and *tongbian*; it perhaps makes basis for many Chinese intellectuals to be enthusiastic about Marxian dialectic and, in turn, for Marxian dialectics to exert enormously a doctrinal impact on *tongbian*, eventually resulting in joining the new terminology with traditional mode of thinking and forming a Chinese version of Marxist dialectics, which may sufficiently be traced back to the *Yijing*. In the following chapter, I will start with Qu Qiubai, the first systematic reader of Marxian dialectics in China in examining details of the whole developing process of this Chinese version of Marxist dialectics.

NOTES

1. Gao Mingkai and Liu Zhengtan, *Xiandai wailaici yanjiu* (A Study of Terms of Foreign Origin in the Modern Chinese Language) (Beijing: Wenzi gaige chubanshe, 1958), 88. Also see Li Yu-ning, *The Introduction of Socialism into China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 69. Li cites Gao and Liu as linguistic evidence to indicate that the Japanese played the key role in introducing socialism to China, for almost all the essential Chinese terms used in the documents under survey came from Japanese. He has, in my view, overstated the role of the Japanese.
2. "Qian Hui Zhuan," *Hanshu* (A History of the Han Dynasty).
3. *Zhong wen da ci dian*, *The Encyclopedia Dictionary of the Chinese Language*, 8 (Taipei: Chinese Culture University, 1973), 1, 797.
4. Sha Qingyan, compiled, *Shuo wen Dictionary* (*Shuo Wen Da Zidian*) (Tianjin: Classics Bookstore [Guji Shudian], 1982), 7: 60.
5. Qingyan, *Shuo wen da zidian*, 7: 59; as well as, *Zhong wen da cidian*, *The Encyclopedia Dictionary of the Chinese Language*, 8 (Taipei: Chinese Culture University, 1973), 1, 795.
6. *Zhong wen da cidian*, 4: 24.
7. Qingyan, *Shuo wen da zidian*, 7:19; 4: 14. We should notice that the character *zheng* (to prove or verify), which has a basic structural part also pronounced *zheng*, is interchangeable with that having a basic structural component pronounced *deng* (to climb).
8. *Bu fei zhi shi* (not wrong doings) and *ke wei ren fa* (something people can do accordingly), 4, p. 14.
9. "yi li yan jian jun qin you zheng ye" (to present convincing remarks in front of ruler), Qingyan, *Shuo wen da cidian*, 7:19, 25.
10. According to *Shuo wen da zidian*, *jun* was explained as the respectful (*zun ye*) and senior or head of the masses (*zhang min*). See 2: 57.

11. *Zangfu*, a Chinese medicine terminology referring to the internal body organs such as heart, liver, spleen, lungs and kidneys, stomach, gall, intestines and bladder; viscera; and *jing luo*, as referring to main and collateral channels regarded as a network of passages, through which vital energy circulates and along which the acupuncture points are distributed.
12. *Cihai*, (Shanghai: Shanghai Cishu Chubanshe, 1989) 3: 4,544.
13. The original Chinese text is “*bianbie gezhong butong zhenghou*” and “*cong sheugti guandiau chufa*,” “to differentiate diverse symptoms” and “start with a macroperspective for investigation.” *Cihai*, 3: 4, 544
14. Wang Rongguo and Ye Lan, *Xin erya*, 54.
15. Wang Rongguo and Ye Lan, *Xin erya*, p. 58.
16. Wang Rongguo and Ye Lan, *Xin erya*, p. 58.
17. Liang, *Yin bing shi wenji lei bian*, 2 (Taipei: Hua zheng shuju, 1974), 91.
18. William Edward Soothill and Lewis Hodous, *A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms* (with Sanskrit and English Equivalents and a Sanskrit-Pali Index) (Taipei: Ch'en wen Publishing Company, 1976), 412.
19. Sha Qingyan, compiled, *Shuo wen Lexicon (Shuo Wen Da Zidian)* (Tianjin: Classics Bookstore [Guji Shudian], 1982), 4: 63–64.
20. *Kanxi zidian* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), 75. Hall and Ames rather explain *yi* as “aesthetic” instead of “rational” coherence. See Hall and Ames, *Anticipating China*, 197.
21. Hall and Ames, *Anticipating China*, 217
22. Hall and Ames, *Anticipating China*, 24.
23. Liang, *Yin bing shi wenji lei bian*, 93
24. “*Di shan tui qiau, bian geung bu yi*,” *Xin erya*, 70.
25. As we trace it further to the *Shuo wen*, the meaning of *jinhua* or *di shan tui qiau* is further explained by *di* (pass on): *geug-die* (replace), *chuan-di yi-di* (pass on, post), *geng-yi* (replace and change); *shan*: *haoling san shan* (a verbal command delivered by chanting loudly three times) as in *Shiji (Records of the Historian)*, *luan* (slow, delay), *chuan* (convey) *tui* (push): *dang* (shake), *ji* (squeeze in), *jiu-zhi* (move forward), *pai* (push against); and *qian* (move place): *gao* (high), *qiau yu qiaomu* (move to a tree) as in *Shijing*, *deug* (ascend), *xi* (move a place), *yi* (change), *jun zi yi jiau shan ze qian* (change one's mind the moment one sees something better), *xi-guo* (move the capital to a new place), etc.
26. *Xiandai hanyu cidian*, 591. (Beijing: Shang wu yin shu guan, 1992).
27. *Xiu erya*, 70.
28. *Xindai hanyu cidian*, 768.
29. Roy Bhaskar et al. *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1983), 122.
30. David A. Dilworth, *Philosophy in World Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 29–30.
31. Hegel, *On Christianity: Early Theological Writings*, ed. T. M. Know Hall (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961); cf., Hall and Ames, *Anticipating China*, 86.
32. Cai Yuanpei, *Cai Yuanpei quanji* (A Complete Collection of Cai Yuanpei's Works) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), 196.

33. Roy Bhaskar, et al., eds., *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983) 122.
34. Bhaskar et al., *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, 124.
35. Bhaskar et al., *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, 124–25.
36. Bhaskar et al., *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, 126–27.
37. *Xiandai hanyu cidian* (Contemporary Chinese Dictionary), Shangwu yinshu guan, Beijing, 1992, p. 66.
38. Bhaskar et al., *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, 122.

Qu Qiubai's Reading of Dialectical Materialism

A comparison of Qu's dialectical materialism with the classical text of the *Yi-jing* is an interesting experience of the knowledge that both suggest that continuity on the part of humanity with the world exists in the attaining of a thorough comprehension of the tendencies of all the events under the sky. Some functional analogues that convey this idea are, to cite only a few, *tong tianxia* (penetrate through to [the roots of the ten thousand things] under the sky); *jian tianxia zhi dong, guan qi hui tong* (survey everything that is moving under the sky and scrutinize how [the ten thousand things] are intermingling and continuous with one another); *guan bian* (scrutinize [or look into] to attain a thorough comprehension of changes or *becoming*); *tong qi bian* (gain a thorough comprehension of changes or *becoming*); and *zhi bianhua zhi dao* (obtain a comprehension of the way of change and *becoming*).

These analogues and their idea are well corresponded by the modern language of Qu's essays on dialectical materialism. For instance, as Qu states,

In acquiring a thorough comprehension of the time, proper position, and circumstances, etc., as regards the state of things or events, one would become capable of actively looking for solutions to all problems.¹

*In studying all things or events (*xianxiang*), dialectics (*hubian fa*) looks into: firstly, the continuity (*buduanlianxi*) between them, and secondly, their moving patterns (*dong xiang*).²*

*While the universe (*yuzhou*) exists always in motion, therefore, a study of things or events ought to be investigating their continuity.³*

Acquiring the knowledge of such continuity constitutes the utmost mission of sciences.⁴

Serious discussions on and transmission of Marxism in China started after the 1917 Russian Revolution and lasted well into the late 1930s. Initially, the

debates over historical materialism arose after the publication of the special issue of *Xinqingnian* in 1919,⁵ then the translation of dialectical materialism from Russian in 1920s and 1930s including Qu Qiubai's lectures in Shanghai. This early period also involved the vulgarization campaign of dialectics headed by many leading communist theoreticians like Li Da and Ai Siqui. The final phase ended with Mao Zedong's sinification of Marxism and his essays "On Contradictions" and "On Practice."

Initially, the intellectual vitality was due in large part to the activities of Li Dazhao, Chen Boxian, Hu Hanmin,⁶ and Chen Duxiu. Marxist theories of historical materialism and economics were systematically introduced and discussed for the first time. It is worthwhile noting that, although they were clearly aware of then, the Chinese intellectuals either did not pay much attention to the deterministic pattern of historian change or pointed out that superstructure and economic base should affect each other. Chinese Marxists adopted the theories of historical materialism based upon a most undogmatic and flexible reading.⁷ As historical materialism was so enthusiastically discussed in the first period, almost no one mentioned the concepts of dialectical materialism, which is supposed to be closely correlative with the former in a comprehensive theoretical system.⁸

Qu Qiubai first enlightened the Chinese with the theories of dialectical materialism and made the greatest contribution to the earliest introduction of Marx's philosophy. He was born in Changzhou, Jiangsu in 1899. In October 1920, he was dispatched as a special correspondent for *Morning News (Chenbao)* to work in the Soviet Union, to send back direct reports on the first country that was run by Communists. The stories he wrote in the more than two years of his stay in the Soviet Union were so impressive that they exerted tremendous influence on Chinese intelligentsia. After his return to China in the beginning of 1923, Qu became an enthusiastic advocate of historical materialism and also the first teacher of dialectical materialism in China. As he said, he would like to let the Chinese know that Marxism was not limited to historical materialism and the theory of political economy.⁹ And he did become the one who wrote more than anyone else on the issues of dialectic in the 1920s. From 1923 to 1924, as a lecturer at the Shanghai University and for the Shanghai Summer Study Program (*Shanghai xialing jiangxue hui*), Qu presented his reading of the dialectics of Marxism mainly in the form of lecture handouts. In his seminal lectures, he demonstrated great intelligence in attempting to make the philosophical issues of the Western tradition understandable to his Chinese students by using classical expressions rather than inventing terms or borrowing words from other languages. In the same period, as a pioneer in encountering the revolutionary thought of the West, he also developed based upon his lecture handouts his understanding of the di-

ialectics of Marx (or Marxism), which was epitomized in such works as “Zizhou shijie yu biran shijie” (The Realms of Freedom and Necessity) (1923),¹⁰ “Shehui zhixue gailun” (Outline of Social Philosophy) (1923),¹¹ “Xiaodai shehui xue” (Modern Sociology) (1924), “Shehui kexue gailun” (An Outline of Social Science) (1924),¹² “Shiyan zhuyi yu geming zhixue” (Pragmatism and Revolutionary Philosophy) (1924),¹³ “Weiwlun de yuzhonguan gaishuo” (Outline of Materialistic Cosmology) (1926), and “Makesi zhuyi zhi yi” (The Significance of Marxism) (1926).¹⁴ Qu also translated Gorrie's *Materialism: The Proletariat Philosophy* in 1926.¹⁵

What Qu found in dialectical materialism was something similar to the style of *tongbian* in the Chinese tradition. Qu's reception may be rather superficial as a mere preliminary introduction and discussion of Marxist philosophy. Yet this is where we gain an understanding why, in comparison with other schools of thought in the West, Marxism provided an opportunity to be engaged in conversation while not colliding with its Chinese counterpart. And, this is also where things get interesting—this is the beginning of the conversation in which a very Chinese version of Marxism was developed. This conversation proceeded in the works of many Marxist theorists and revolutionary activists—among them was Ai Siqui, the most prominent—and eventually comes to fruition in Mao.

What Qu did not know, however, was that the history of Marxism had begun with the writings of the young Marx, and that much of Marx's actual corpus was not available. He would never be able to think of whether the body of thought, which was codified in the Second International and then became the materials for developments by Lenin and other Russian Marxists, was true to the original insights of Marx. How could he know that there could have even been two Marxes and that Marx, Engels, and Marxism could be separated by major differences?

As we know now, with the appearance of the 1844 manuscripts, as well as *The Holy Family* and *The German Ideology*, the nature of Marxism appeared to change fundamentally. One could rethink all of Marx's writings, down to *Capital*, in the light of the idea of alienation, as the Communist party of France did in the late 1940s and the 1950s, and the structuralists did in the 1960s. The idea of alienation was only central to Marx's youthful, pre-Communist, Hegelian period, and the “mature” Marx of the 1850s, 1860s, and 1870s rid himself completely of his early “romanticism.” In this case, except for the French commentators on the manuscripts such as Henri Lefebvre¹⁶ and others, almost all the important Western Marxists took it for granted that there were two Karl Marxes, not one. There was a scientific, revolutionary, old Marx, the founder of socialism, and a philosophical young Marx with much stronger Hegelian speculations evidencing a romantic, humanistic inspiration. Lukács,

Gramsci, Marcuse, and Sartre seemed to have taken the line of the young Marx, whereas Althusser and Poulantzas, that of the old. Furthermore, there is a separation of Marx from Engels. In fact, Western Marxism was also to start with a decisive double rejection of Engels' philosophical heritage by Korsch and Lukács; and thereafter, an aversion to the later texts of Engels was to become common to virtually all currents within it, from Sartre to Colletti, and from Althusser to Marcuse. Colletti particularly tended to counterpose Marx against Engels in an extremely radical way in his work.

It is indisputable that Qu could hardly have appreciated the complexity of these problems. When he was attracted to Marxism, as well as when he first discussed dialectical materialism in China, the key texts from which Qu derived his own version of dialectical materialism were all in Russian after the October Revolution. His *An Outline of Social Philosophy* entails a general introduction of Engels's *Anti-Dühring* and an examination of China as correlative to the worldwide situation.¹⁷ In his *Modern Sociology*, Qu quotes views taken from Marx's *The Poverty of Philosophy* and *A Critique of Political Economy*, Engels's *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy*, and the philosophical works of George V. Plekhanov.¹⁸ As for his *An Outline of Social Sciences*, it echoes the position of Bukharin's *The Theory of Historical Materialism*.¹⁹ In 1924, Qu published three pieces of work on dialectical materialism, two of which were translations of Plekhanov's *Dialectics and Logic* and *Several Laws of Marxist Dialectic*.²⁰ Qu might have read the materials he had access to through the eyes of the Second International, which was powerfully influenced by positivism and Darwinian naturalism, and by those which came to be understood as Leninism.

As we know, a critical feature of the debates within the First International was that, on the one hand, there was an unsettled conception of science, on the other hand, there were socialists who were materialists representing their positions as "scientific." Good examples are Dühring and Ernst Mach—one was an old-fashioned materialist and the other, a phenomenalist—who both spoke in the name of science. In Engels's response to the Hegelians and materialists, he had differentiated Marxists as materialists from Hegel, who was an idealist, and had also asserted that the old materialism was reductive. It could not account for chemical and organic processes and could not "comprehend the universe as a process—as matter developing in an historical process." Thus, there came up the term "historical materialism."

Marx seemed to have supported a technologically determinist reading of historical materialism, which constituted the center of what might be called the "Second International Marxism." However, as Peter Manicas contends, dialectical materialism as a philosophical materialist dichotomy was probably used first in 1891 by Plekhanov, who, speaking in 1908 for the mainstream of

the Second International (founded in 1889 and controlled by Marxists), asserted that with the *Anti-Dühring*, Marxist doctrine has taken "its final shape."²¹ Thus, presumably, mind and matter are opposites, joined dialectically but matter primary. That is to say, bodies can exist without minds, but minds cannot exist without bodies, and the same holds as regards the objective economic base and superstructure. This must be a dualism and a dichotomy rooted in the philosophy of Descartes. In addition, in Engels, "contradictions" were metaphysical postulates. He aimed to show in effect that Marxism could formulate laws of nature and that ontology could embrace nature and humanity.

Lenin attached intense power to this view with his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* in 1908. His defense of realism probably goes so far that it turns out to be a defense of materialism. As a result, dialectical materialism became the official philosophy of the Soviet Union and was sermonized in all the standard texts. This had thus provided a historical environment in which the Marxism accessible to Qu and many other Chinese intellectuals was from Russian. Therefore, it seems plausible to judge that Qu's pioneer essays of dialectical materialism, which were based on standard Russian texts full of terms and formulas and had all the look of the orthodox view, could have been strongly contaminated with positivism and dualism.

However, Qu was a Chinese. He was once probably the best student at the Russian Language School (Ewen zhuanxiu guan), an educational institution affiliated with the Foreign Ministry of the Republic. Besides Russian, Qu also learned English and French.²² He was among a few Chinese who were able to speak Russian at the time, and had ever had a chance to meet with Lenin. A study shows that, between January 1923 and July 1927, Qu wrote more than 200 essays on political theories, which totaled about one million Chinese characters; about 50 percent of them had been written before May 1925.²³ In addition, he also translated a massive amount of Russian Marxist works into Chinese. Nevertheless, with these accomplishments, he was reluctant about calling himself a Marxist theoretician, but merely admitted that he was "a pupil of Marxism." As he stated,

There is an urgent need for a great number of proletarian theorists in revolutionary practice. They have to be very capable in handling the issues of Chinese revolution, which are not only strenuous but also extremely complex. "When farm cattle is not available for farming, dogs are forced to do ploughing. It is indeed similar to the fact that Marxists are badly needed in China when I am not but a mere pupil of Marxism."²⁴

Qu was serious when making these remarks. In fact, he expressed it so many times. One time he told one of his closest friends: "I know only a smattering

of Marxism.”²⁵ In his “The Unnecessary Remarks,” Qu even warned: “Please do not think what I have written so far makes any kind of ‘-ism.’”²⁶ As Qu was so cautious about giving much credit to himself, however, his statement should not make us think his writings are not worth studying and should be shunted. His self-criticism does not suggest that he had taken into consideration that Marxism could have varied readings. In fact, what that in his mind was his practice of Marxism in the particular Chinese circumstances had been so naive that it proved he had not been a qualified revolutionary leader in the first place. This is because, as he views, one can never become a qualified true Marxist theoretician by merely showing a command of Marxism in theory, even though he is very knowledgeable of the doctrines of Marxism. One has to be both sophisticated in knowledge and successful in practice before he could claim to be a Marxist theoretician. As he states, “revolutionary theories can never be separated from revolutionary practice”; his failure was exactly due to his being incompetent in applying into practice his knowledge of Marxism.²⁷

Our sensitivity ought to be aroused by the fact that Qu was Chinese and came to a reading of all the texts of dialectical materialism he had access to through the eyes of his own Chinese experience and cultural tradition. Qu was very learned at the age of twenty; he had diligently studied classical philosophers, particularly Laozi and Zhuangzi.²⁸ He even had a substantial command of *Shuo wen*, a classical lexicon. And yet, he cherished an obvious sense of being a Chinese. As one time he said to one of his friends:

Being a Chinese, particularly as an intellectual, one must be highly developed in Chinese literature, history, and philosophy—as for literature, such as Confucius and the five classics, the poems of the Han Dynasty, the diverse styles of the literatures of Jian'an, Taikang, and the South and North Dynasties, and the characteristics of the poetry of the Tang and Song Dynasties, the verses of the Yuan Dynasty, and the novels of the Qing Dynasty; . . . there are diverse schools of thought in the pre-Qin period, the Confucian classics of the Han Dynasty, Buddhism of the Wei, Jin, South and North Dynasties, and the Li studies of the Song and Ming Dynasties. One must have at least some general ideas of all these, or how could one be called a Chinese?²⁹

Qu wrote excellent Chinese. Hu Qiuyuan, an obstinate anti-Communist and a long-time enemy of Qu, even praised him for having a sophisticated command of Russian and for his being able to do high-quality translation from foreign languages.³⁰ Judging from all the testimonies to Qu’s deep roots in Chinese tradition—his knowledge, his skillfulness in using Chinese language, and, particularly his awareness of being a Chinese—one would not have difficulty in assuming that Qu gains his understanding of the West-

ern ideas from the perspective of Chinese tradition and his own experience and culture, in particular, through the eyes of Chinese correlative thinking, *tongbian*.

Marxists in the West have produced massive literature to suggest that Marx, Engels, and Marxism ought to be separated. Some assume that the Chinese could hardly have appreciated the problems with Marxism, since most of the materials, which provoked the fairly recent debate, were not available when the Chinese were attracted to Marxism. However, Qu, as well as many Chinese Marxists, could have hardly been sensitive to the problems of the various interpretations of Marx in the West. As I see it, even if Qu had learned about the diverse interpretations of Marxism, he might probably have still had the same attitude and responded just as he had, for an important explanation for this is that, entrenched in the particular historical context of China, as well as thinking correlative in the *tongbian* mode of Chinese tradition, Qu would simply not ask the same questions that had been asked in the West.

For Qu, what that was significant was to discover something that could work within the circumstances of China; a theory could never be more significant as a mere theory; or put it in other words, it becomes significant only when people apply it to their practice to successfully change China. Qu, and many more Chinese Marxists, would for sure abandon the kind of debate in the West, but rather insist on looking for continuity between Marx and other different versions of Marxism, since diverse interpretations are not something uncommon, but happening all the time. Continuity is more important than differences. From the perspective of *tongbian*, the kind of concerns about "which decides which" and "restrictive distinction"—for instance, with respect to economic base and superstructure, or any other Western polarities—is simply as if taking a tree's branches as its trunk, *benmo daozhi*. In the West, there has been a mind-set to highlight differences in all the interpretations, meanwhile neglecting their continuity as of trivial significance. In Qu's thought, however, there involves an attitude that gives prominence to looking for continuity through differences, and comprehending differences as due to varying situations.

With this kind of attitude and in his trying to discover continuity in what is seemingly divergent and varying, Qu thus developed a very *Chinese* version of dialectical materialism, or Marxist philosophy at the very beginning of his discussion. In this version, the causality formula "whenever this, then that" with regard to economic base and superstructure was precluded, and the determining and determined, thought and matter, agent and act, the objective and subjective, epistemological and ontological, and so on, have all become correlative and entail each other, or *tong* (getting through) to each other.

Many important terms Qu used in his discussions of dialectical materialism appeal to the correlative mode of *tongbian*. The terminology along with his discourse can indeed be viewed as a scheme organized in terms of continuity and suggested in analogical relations; and therefore, involves associations of image—or concept—clusters related by meaningful disposition. It is critical to learn what dialectical materialism means to Qu and realize that it is the natural cosmology aforementioned in part I. The Chinese characters that Qu used as a translation for dialectical materialism were *hubian fa weiwulun*, or a mutual-changing view of materialism, which is, in fact, a modern expression of *tong-bian*. And yet, *guilü* (law), *donglü* (law of motion), *xiansuo* (clue), *yuanyin* (causality), *lianxi* (link), or *guanxi* (connection), *luoji* (logic), *yingxiang* (influence or impact), and so on, all can be understood as alternate channels or expressions of *dao*; *xitong* or *tixi* (systems) exemplifies continuity; *shehui* (society), mutual movement (*hudong*); and *xianxiang* (phenomenon), concrete images or events. Moreover, *shuliang zhiliang de hubian* (the mutual change of quantity and quality), *fouding zhi fouding* (negation of the negation), and *zhengti-fanti-heti* (thesis-antithesis-synthesis) are more easily comprehensible as denoting alternate characterizations of the functional analog of a door's opening and shutting: “quantity” as referring to continuity between opening and shutting, “quality,” as either opening or shutting, and “dialectical,” or “mutual changing,” in Qu's term, as succession and alteration of opening and shutting. For opening, shutting is a “negation,” and vice versa; and opening and shutting make a “negation of the negation” to each other. “Negation of the negation” may refer to the succession and alteration of the door's opening and shutting, whereby either opening or shutting of the door can be seen as a “synthesis,” each as an “antithesis” of the other, and “synthesis” as referring to the continuity between opening and shutting. From Qu's discussion on dialectical materialism, we can draw the same seven statements as we did in part I as regards the modality of *tongbian* in the *Yijing*:

A WORLD OF CORRELATIONS

Dialectical materialism is taken as a philosophy of continuity (or correlations) in the sense of mutual *becoming* (*hubian*) into each other of the ten thousand things (or events) all under the sky; and the world seen through “dialectical materialism” is one of correlations and everything constitutes a continuum with everything else. For Qu, since continuity (*lianxi*) goes through all events and things, one simply cannot draw any strict line of demarcation.³¹ Causal implications or entailments of anything like the sort in Aristotelian and modern Western logic—natural kinds, part-whole relations, an implicit or explicit

theory of types—have been transformed into a discourse on continuity in Qu's discussions of dialectical materialism. Qu claims, *bufen* and *quanti* (parts and whole), and *huanjing* and *geti* (environment and any individual thing or event itself), have continuity run through each other and thus there are no absolute boundaries among them.³² Qu points out, in particular, that any minor change in a part may have an impact on other parts and thus leads to a change in the entire situation.³³

ANY TYPE

We can find suggestive and indefinite answers in Qu's discussions of dialectical materialism as to the question "In what ways do all things correlate with each other?" He does not construe dialectical materialism as a development of formal concepts and as setting finite boundaries on diverse types of correlations. In suggesting differences, Qu depends upon exemplary instances rather than strict definitions. Therefore, so-called norm or law, clue, cause, relations, impact or influence, system, law of movements, logic and so on, all suggest diverse types of continuity and correlations rather than causal relations in their Chinese equivalents *guilü*, *xiansuo*, *yuanyin*, *tianxi* or *guanxi*, *yingxiang*, *xitong* or *tixi*, *dongli*, *luoji*, and so on; there lie all the structural differences between correlativity and causality.

HUMANITY AS CONTINUITY

Qu's reading of dialectical materialism reflects his thinking in the classic *tongbian* philosophy that views humanity as continuity and even inseparable constituent of the physical world that consists of ten thousand things. As he states plainly in modern Chinese language: "Humanity is part of nature. . . . he who is able to think is not thanks to God. . . . humanity is a product of nature, a part of nature, and belongs to the realm of nature."³⁴

Qu stresses that there is not a strict line of demarcation between things and events,³⁵ and somehow echoes the traditional view that there is no aspect that in any strict sense transcends and stands independent of the rest amid the ten thousand things, including male and female, husband and wife, and so on. He particularly asserts that even a single act or move on the part of humanity would produce an effect on nature and society, although it is very slight, sometimes too slight to make any difference observable, the influence does take place.³⁶ In Qu's discussions we can find nothing that is familiar to the kind of assumption that there is a material world in contradistinction to

human subjectivity, but rather that activities of human subjectivity such as knowing and doing, exploring, and comprehending are continuous with what happens in the objective world. A comparison of Qu's dialectical materialism with the classical text of the *Yijing* makes an interesting experience in finding that both recommend that a continuity on the part of humanity with the world be made possible by gaining a thorough comprehension of the tendencies of all the events under the sky; the classic image—or character—clusters that convey this idea can be found in the phrases in the *Yijing*, to cite only a few, are as follows:

tong tianxia: penetrate through to [the roots of the ten thousand things] under the sky

jian tianxia zhi dong, guan qi hui tong: survey everything that is moving under the sky and scrutinize how [the ten thousand things] are intermingling and continuous with one another

guan bian: scrutinize (or look into) to attain a thorough comprehension of changes or *becoming*;

tong qi bian: gain a thorough comprehension of changes or *becoming*

zhi bianhua zhidao: obtain a comprehension of the way of change and *becoming*, etc.

These classic expressions are echoed in the modern Chinese language of Qu's essays on dialectical materialism. For example,

Gain a thorough comprehension of time, proper position, etc., of things or events and be able to voluntarily provide solutions to all problems.³⁷

In surveying all the things or events (*xian xiang*), dialectical materialism (*hu bian fa*) looks into: firstly, the continuity (*buduanlianxi*) between them, and secondly, the ways in which they move (*dong xiang*).³⁸

Since the cosmos (*yuzhou*) always involves movements, any study of things or events ought to include an investigation of continuity between the movements.³⁹

Obtaining such continuity is the first of the missions of sciences.⁴⁰

SHEN DEPENDS ON HUMANITY

From the perspective of *tongbian*, the mysterious is not God but something that is too intriguing and wonderful for words or explanation (or *miaobukeyan*) but requires human intelligence and comprehension. It is indeed the spirit-like continuity that goes through changes and between differences. So called "mysterious," it is only spoken of for those who cannot comprehend such continuity but need to gain a feeling of certainty by naming it

"God," or other religious belief. We can find the idea plainly represented in the modern language in Qu's essays on dialectical materialism. For example, as he states, continuity (*guilü*) in the universe is not teleological.⁴¹

As Qu holds, the barbarians (or *yemanren*), who cannot comprehend the mysterious, unfathomable, and incomprehensible, would appeal to a god (*shen*) and thus believe that everything in nature has a goal, assuming there is something as an enigmatic power that has established the goal.⁴² He asserts that teleology attaches itself to religion,⁴³ and that it goes on until eventually turns into the idea of God.⁴⁴ He argues, "All religious explanations insist that the goal is hidden in some mysterious power which defies human intelligence,"⁴⁵ and advocates dependence upon the God of Heaven, who has made certain plans and goals for everything including humanity.⁴⁶

BIAN AS CONTINUITY

Qu's reading of dialectical materialism contains the idea of change as continuity. Continuity endures from one time to another, from one place to another, from something to something else, and from one fashion to another. *Becoming*—or change—is correlation in motion; and becoming as continuity makes it possible that there is a process, from one process to another, and that there is an event, from one event to another. Continuity always presents itself in change, in motion, and movement. The idea that *becoming* is continuity is expressed in such character clusters in the *Yijing*: "As long as there is change, this means that there is getting through, a continuity; and 'getting through' is to be enduring."⁴⁷

In Qu's discussion, his modern terms that suggest *bian* (or change) include *bianyi* (becoming and alternating), *biandong* (changing and moving), *fazhan* (development), *hudong* (mutual moving or acting), *xianghu xingdong* (mutual actions), *hudong guanxi* (mutual acting or moving relations), *xianghu dongzuo* (mutual actions), and *hubian* (mutual becoming or changing); and those that denote continuity are *lü* (rule), *licheng* (process or the passed road), *xianghu guanxi* (mutual relationship), *guilü* (law), *huxiang yingxiang* (mutual influence), and *tiaoli* (orderliness). In Chinese, these two kinds of terms entail each other, and are correlative and often indistinguishable from each other in suggesting either *bian* or continuity. For instance, "mutual moving" suggests becoming as well as continuity, and, as relationship, it is both becoming and continuity at the same time. And in such concept clusters as continuity of mutual becoming (*hubian lü*), continuity of change and alternation (*bianyi lü*), the process of becoming and moving (*biandong de licheng*), continuity of development (*fazhan lü*), and continuity of movement (*dong lü*), both kinds

of expressions (of continuity and of *bian*) refer to the process of *becoming* from one event to another. Moreover, whereas expressions of continuity such as *lü*, *licheng*, *xianghu guanxi*, *guilü*, *huxiang yingxiang*, *tiaoli* all indicate *becoming* in the light of continuity—or, in other words, there is continuity in *becoming*—those of *bian*, such as *bianyi*, *biandong*, *fazhan*, *hudong*, *xianghu xingdong*, *hudong guanxi*, *xianghu dongzuo*, *hubian* all signify *becoming* in the light of continuity between differences and varieties. There is a *becoming* from one event to another just because one varies from the other; a *becoming* could have never occurred if there were not differences.

It is apparent in Qu's discussion that *bian* (change or *becoming*) as continuity constitutes an important idea in dialectical materialism and is represented as a philosophy of mutual *becoming* suggests that everything changes, and that the constant continuity in becoming and alternating is fundamental to all things.⁴⁸ For him, events of mutual movements among people are seen as social phenomena, and mutual movements are constant and continuous; therefore, the relationships, or mutual movements, among people are extremely complicated and continuous from time to time and a place to another.⁴⁹ Society makes a system exemplifying the continuity of mutual interactions among people.⁵⁰ The mutual interactions are extremely complex in terms of forms and volumes. Although the phenomena of mutual movements, which link each other intricately, make extremely complicated forms of social life, the continua among themselves are of continuity. If the forces of mutual movements that influence each other do not have any internal continuity, then there would not be a balanced state of diverse moving forces thereby society not even exist.⁵¹ Mutual movements are not something as chaotic as a tangle of threads, but entail a natural continuity.⁵²

POLARITIES OF COMPLEMENTARY OPPOSITION

Qu clearly reads dialectical materialism as *tongbian* in his claim that polarities of complementation in contradiction constitutes a nucleus for dialectical materialism. He explains all social, political, and cosmological processes in terms of conceptual polarities and the interaction of complementary contrasts; his terms include: mutual change materialism (*hubian fa weiwulun*), obverse and reverse complementary (*zhengfan xiangcheng*), law of mutual change (*hubian lü*), law of mutual moving (*hudong lü*), reciprocal movement of changing and alternating (*bianyi hudong*), and contradictoriness (*maodunxing*). He maintains that the relationship of *mao* and *dun* (contradictoriness) of things and the mutual *becoming* of events is the most basic proto continuity (*zui genben de yuanli*) and that there could not have been any motion if there

were not mutual *becoming* in contradiction. There could not have been life, nor event or thing, if there were no movement at all in the world.⁵³ As he contends, in the process of studying things' *becoming* and interacting, besides their attributes (*shuxing*) we can still discover many important types of proto continuity about events or things, the first of which is the concept of contradictoriness of society (or social relationships as *mao* and *dun*); it is the fundamental attribute (*genben shuxing*) of the real universe and society.⁵⁴ Qu argues, “*dong* (moving) by itself means *mao-dun* (complementation in opposition”); dialectic (*dialectique*) is a philosophy of mutual *becoming* (or interchange).⁵⁵

The contrastive concepts entailing continuity that are *qian/kun*, *yin/yang*, *gang/rou*, etc., in the *Yijing* becomes *mao/dun* in Qu's texts. On the one hand, *maodun* is a loan term for the concept of contradiction; on the other hand, however, it has become a correlative polarity embedded in *tongbian*, *mao* is “*becoming-dun*,” and *dun*, “*becoming-mao*.” In the continuity of two pairing elements of polarity, neither one stands on itself but rather is seen getting through the other, or they are seen through continuity or becoming. Hence, when Qu refers to dialectic as *maodun hubian*, or mutual *becoming* of *mao* and *dun*,⁵⁶ he emphasizes the relationship of two events (external *mao-dun*), or of two basic elements in an event (internal *maodun*), each of which requires the other as a necessary condition for being what it is; each is only explainable by referring to the other. And yet, *mao* and *dun* are invariably site specific, related to specific situations, and specifically distinctive. In Qu's view, *fouding zhi fouding* (negation of the negation), *shuliang zhiliang hubian* (mutual *becoming* of quantity and quality), and *zhengti-fanti-heti* (synthesis-antithesis-synthesis) are alternative representations of dialectic (or the mutual *becoming* of *mao* and *dun*) as discernable in specific situations.⁵⁷ Qu believes the nature of change as complementary and contradictory interactions of the correlative pairs such as *mao* and *dun*. In interpreting Heraclitus and Hegel, Qu states that any change or alteration is born from enduring internal contradictions.⁵⁸

Qu's modern discourse of dialectical materialism reflects the traditional one that explains all changes in terms of *yin* and *yang* in the *Yijing*. Large portions of Qu's discussion on dialectical materialism provide explanations of specific issues in social, economic, political, and cosmological processes, are ingrained in conceptual polarities and interaction of complementary contrasts. He presents dialectical materialism as a worldview in which everything and every event in the world and society is in the midst of floating, changing, alternating, and mutually *becoming*.⁵⁹ Nothing is static and unchangeable with a predetermined form. Everything is a *becoming* process.⁶⁰ All aspects of social life change constantly.⁶¹

Environment and individuals necessarily have a high frequency of connections thereby they mutually influence each other and the role of "dialectic" (*hubian liu*, continuity as mutual *becoming*) is discernable.⁶² It is true that individual entities and their biological or social environment have "contradictions" (*maodun*) between them; these "contradictions" (*maodun*) are not static but moving, because both of them appropriate themselves to each other—individual entities change in order to get themselves accustomed to the environment while environment changes accordingly as individuals change. For this reason, each individual entity is constantly changing due to its correlativity with environment, sometimes backing up when facing oppression by environment or moving forward for an upper hand of environment. Moreover, besides external "contradictions," each individual entity has its own internal systems and components and thus internal "contradictions." And yet, there are also variable contradictions between various individual entities. In the similar pairing modality of yin and yang, Qu claims that "contradictions" (*maodun*) are everywhere.⁶³

For Qu, social phenomena (events) can be always seen from the perspective of dialectic (continuity as mutual *becoming*).⁶⁴ A contextualization of *maodun* in specific situations results in Qu's terminologies such as *jieji* (classes), landlord and peasants, capitalists and hired workers;⁶⁵ and inequity in distribution, the privileged versus the oppressed; the ruling and the ruled; the exploiting and the exploited, and so on. Like classical Chinese thinkers, who, regardless of what school they were from, would base order of society upon interrelations of people. Qu places heavy weight on social phenomena as mutual relations and states: "The broadest system consisting of all the frequent and mutual moving phenomena among people is what is called society."⁶⁶ In particular, Qu points to economic move, i.e., changing productive relations or mutual *becoming* in social material, as the most fundamental phenomena of society.⁶⁷

Whereas the terminology, which expresses Qu's "dialectical materialism," is translation of concepts from Marxist literature in the West, its implications are suggested as Chinese terminology and reorganized according to correlative thought of Chinese tradition. This process tremendously transforms the original concepts in making them to suggest a worldview embedded in the modality of *tongbian*, which replaces the ontological and dualistic assumptions accompanying Western concepts, for a correlative thinking modality and a contextual scheme. A striking example is the dichotomous concepts of superstructure versus economic base. Qu transforms these notions into correlative categories and states,

That economic material base gives rise to spiritual social phenomena is like growing leaves and blossoms in a tree; it is simply not for subjective pleasure

but objectively functions to obtain nutrition and help reproduce. Of course, politics and ideas would definitely return as effect upon economy.⁶⁸

For a scholar in the West, the above passage from Qu, which suggests possibility of mutual causality, may threaten the primacy of the foundation. This is because, to understand Qu from the perspective of *tongbian*, Qu has made an important point: there is not a boundary but continuity between superstructure and economic base, just like a tree with growing leaves and blossoms. As this point may be conflicting with Western metaphysics, it is expressed in such Chinese terminology, *chansheng* and *yingxiang*, which imply "continuity," "correlation," and "becoming."

DAO, THE WAY OF CONTINUITY THROUGH CHANGE

Like the seventh statement that we claimed in the first chapter about *tongbian* in the *Yijing*, the modern expressions of the traditional concept *dao* in Qu's discussion on dialectical materialism are *guilü*, *xiansuo*, *yuanyin*, *lianxi*, *yingxiang*, *xitong*, *lü*, and *tiaoli*; all denote the way of continuity through change, or patterns of correlations. These terms generalize all the intricate and volatile correlations of the ten thousand things under the sky. *Guilü* also suggests the way through which humanity develops its intelligence to open us a continuum with the world by obtaining a thorough comprehension of the mysterious and wonderful *guilü* in which the ten thousand things change and become regularized by themselves. Just as Chinese sages in ancient time called people's attention to comprehending and practicing *dao*, in the modern time, Qu makes the point clear that we study the way of continuity between things and between their movements and that doing "science" is to look for continuity and to discover *guilü*.⁶⁹

In Qu's reading of dialectical materialism, *guilü* is something like *dao* in the sense that it is *bianhua zhi guilü* (way of change or becoming). He also calls it *bianqian de quilü* (way of changing and moving) or *hudong guilü* (way of mutual moving). Dialectical materialism, whenever expressed in the phrase *maodun hubian lü* (way of mutual becoming of *mao* and *dun*), would indeed entail the philosophical implications of "yi yin yi yang zhi wei *dao*" (A yin and a yang are what we call *dao*) in the *Yijing*. Suffice it to say that both *dao* and *guilü* signify the correlative thinking of *tongbian*, but in different phases of history; both are comprehensible in terms of conceptual pairings such as *yin* and *yang*, or *mao* and *dun*. For Qu, "dialectic" is something that suggests *bu duan de bian yi lü* (constant changing continuity), or *guilü*, the way in which one alternates with the other, one changes into the other, one

exchanges with the other, one takes the place of the other, that ensures *becoming* and transformation. Without *mao* and *dun*, there could never be “dialectic” (*hubian*) and continuity (*guilü*). It would not be a problem for us to say that *yi mao yi dun zhi wei guilü* (A *mao* and a *dun* are what we call *guilü*) as Qu’s comprehension of dialectical materialism.

Guilü denotes continuity, and is *becoming* of things in the sense that change at all times follows the way of such polarity as *maodun*. Nevertheless, *guilü* never stops changing, and is always different from time to time and from place to place. *Guilü* is of diversity, referring to *guilü*s of the ten thousand particular things or events that are all different and varying, all entailing a changing process. *Guilü* changes; and there is no *guilü* that can be judged as a predicted, absolute, transcendent, and universal principle.

Indeed, this Chinese version of dialectical materialism in the first reading of Marxism by has developed through many Chinese Marxist theorists and revolutionary activists, among whom the most prominent is Ai Siqui, and comes to fruition in Mao. In the next chapter I will discuss the campaign of popularizing dialectical materialism following Qu. Having recovered Marx or not, what Qu and many Chinese intellectuals discovered in and have developed from dialectical materialism is a different version, a version pervaded by correlative thinking.

NOTES

1. Qu Qiubai, *Collected Works of Qu Qiubai* (Beijing: People’s Press, 1988), 2: 353.
2. Qiubai, *Collected Works of Qu Qiubai*, 2: 451.
3. Qiubai, *Collected Works of Qu Qiubai*, 2: 451.
4. Qiubai, *Collected Works of Qu Qiubai*, 411.
5. Knowledge of historical materialism at this time had mostly been obtained from Japan.
6. Michael Y. L. Luk, *The Origins of Chinese Bolshevism: An Ideology in the Making, 1920–1928* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1990), 24, 245n84. According to Luk, Hu Hanmin—a leading theorist of the Guomindang—wrote at length to defend historical materialism against all the criticisms he had come across, mainly by citing Karl Kautsky’s arguments. See his “Weiwu shiguan piping zhi piping,” *Jianshe* (Construction) 1, no. 5 (December 1, 1919): 945–89. Hu’s article is more than a direct rebuttal of Li Dazhao’s criticisms on historical materialism, as suggested by Tse-tsung Chow’s *May Fourth Movement* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 298–99. Hu discusses eight types of charges against historical materialism, including those that have been raised by Stannier, Struve, Tugan Baranovsky, Bernstein, Eugenio Rignano, Loria, and Shailer Mathews. His dependence on Kautsky can be seen quite clearly on pp. 937, 968, 976, 985, and 988–89 of his article.
7. Luk, *Origins of Chinese Bolshevism*, 23, 26.

8. Zeng Leshan, *Sinicification and Historical Development of Marxist Philosophy in China* (Shanghai: Huadong Normal University Press, 1991), 93.
9. Leshan, *Sinicification and Historical Development of Marxist Philosophy in China*, 95.
10. Qu Qiubai, "Zizou shijie yu biran shijie," in *New Youth*, no. 2 (December 20, 1923).
11. Qu Qiubai was chairman of the Department of Sociology, University of Shanghai in 1923. He edited the four-volume lecturing material *Shehui kexue jiangyi* (Social Sciences), which included "Xiandai shehui xue" (Modern Sociology), "Xiandai jiugji xue" (Modern Economy), "Shehui yundong shi" (A History of Social Movements), "Shehui sixiang shi" (A History of Social Philosophy), "Shehui wenti" (Social Problems), and "Shehui zhexue gailun" (Outline of Social Philosophy). Qu wrote on two of the topics, which were "Xiandai shehui xue" (Modern Sociology) and "Shehui zhexue gailun" (Outline of Social Philosophy) and published in Shanghai by Shanghai shudian in 1924.
12. This was lecture material by Qu Qiubai at the Shanghai xialing jiangxue hui (Shanghai Summer Seminars) in June 1924, which was published in Shanghai by Shanghai shudian in October 1924.
13. *New Youth*, no. 3, August 1, 1924, Beijing.
14. These two articles were supplementary to Qu's translation of *Wuchan jieji zhi zhexue—weiwulun* (Materialism: The Proletariat Philosophy), which was published by Xin qingnian she. See *Qu Qiubai Wenji* 4, p. 1.
15. Here "Gorrief" is adopted phonetically from the Chinese transliteration of the Russian author's name, Guo Lie Fu; it may not necessarily exact.
16. Xu Chongwen, *Biographical Dictionary of Neo-Marxism*, (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1990), 516.
17. Ding Shouhe, *Qu Qiubai sixiang yanjiu* (A Study on Qi Qiubai's Thought) (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1985), 127–28.
18. Ding Shouhe, *Qu Qiubai sixiang yanjiu*, 131. Also, as Huang Jiande and others view, Qu cites examples from Bukharin's well-known theoretical work *The Theory of Historical Materialism*; see Huang Jiande et al., *Xifang zhexue dong jian shi* (A History of Western Philosophy's Influence toward the East) (Wuhan: Wuhan chubanshe, 1991), 337.
19. Jiang Xinli, *The Tragedy of Qu Qiubai* (Taibei: Youshi wenhua shiye gongsi, 1982), 31.
20. Shouhe, *Qu Qiubai sixiaug yanjiu*, 132.
21. Peter Manicas, "Marx, Marxism, and Maoism: An Outline," a manuscript that was written especially for my project. For his detailed argument, see his *History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987).
22. Chen Tiejian, *Cong shusheng dao lingxiu* (Qu Qiubai: From Scholar to Revolutionary Leader) (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1995), 48.
23. Tiejian, *Cong shusheng dao lingxiu*, 155–56.
24. Wang Tiexian, *Qu Qiubai luu gao* (Essays on Qu Qiubai) (Shanghai: North China University Press, 1984), 35.
25. Yang Muzhi, "Wo suo zhidao de Qu Qiubai" (Qu as I knew about him), *Yi Qiubai* (In Memory of Qu Qiubai) (Beijing: Renmin wenzxue chubanshe, 1981), 72.

26. Qu Qiubai wrote "Duoyu de hua," (The Unnecessary Remarks) on May 22, 1935, when he was in jail under the Guomindang government and before he was executed. *Qu Qiubai wenji* [Selected Works of Qu Qiubai (Political Essays)], 7: 693–723.
27. *Tiexian*, pp. 35–42.
28. Zheng Zhenduo, "ji Qu Qiubai tongzhi zaonan de er san shi" (the early stories of Comrade Qu Qiubai), *Yi Qiubai* (*In Memory of Qu Qiubai*), Renmin wenxue chubanshe, Beijing, 1981, p. 107.
29. According to the memoirs by Yang Muzhi, a close friend of the young Qu Qiubai. See Chen Tiejian, *Qu Qiubai lun gao*, 22.
30. Jiang Xinli, Hu's preface, p. 31
31. Qu, 2: 451.
32. As in Qu's words, "yuzhou de yiqie xianxiang buduan huxianglianxi (All phenomena of the universe correlate with each other with nonstop continuity), *meiyou juedui yu waijie xiang gelie de dongxi*" (There is nothing that is absolutely separated from external world). See Qu, 2: 451, 458, 468.
33. "Shiji shang yuzhou de ge bufen huxianglianxi, yi bufen xiao you biandong bian neng yingxiang bie bufen, qiandong quanju" (In fact all parts of the universe are correlative with one another. Once a particular part has even a minor change, it may effect other parts, even the universe as a whole). See Qu, 2, p. 451. This does sounds like the quantum theory, as Dow introduced in his "Remedy the Marxian 'Qualitative Leap' with Confucian-Taoist Yin-Yang Dialectics," that a surprise phenomenon can occur in a system where a microscopic perturbation can be amplified to affect macroscopic behavior. See Tsung-I Dow, *Asian Profile* 17, no. 2 (April 1989): 115.
34. Qu, 2: 441–42.
35. Qu, 2: 451.
36. Qu, 2: 451.
37. Qu, 2: 353
38. Qu, 2: 451.
39. Qu, 2: 451.
40. Qu, 2: 411.
41. Qu, 2: 423.
42. Qu, 2: 413.
43. "Mudi lun de guodian yifu yu zongjiao" (Teleological views rely on religion). Qu, 2, p. 415.
44. "Mudi lun zongshi zou dao shen lun wei zhī" (Teleology always turns out to be in the position of theism). Qu, 2, p. 416.
45. Qu, 2, p. 415.
46. Qu, 2, p. 415.
47. *Yijing*, Xici II, chap. 2.
48. Qu, 2, p. 455.
49. "Shehui shi ren yu ren zhi jian de xianguhu dongzu zucheng shehui xianxiang, zhezhong "hudong" erqie shi jingchang bu duan de. Yinci, ren yu ren zhijian de lianxi (hudong) yichang fuza, shijian shang, kongjian li dou shi jixu bu duan de" (The events of mutual movements among people are seen as social phenomena. Mutual movements are constant and continuous; therefore, the relationships [mutual movements]

between people are extremely complicated as well as continuous in both time and space). Qu, 2: 467.

50. Qu, 2, 467.
51. Qu, 2, 467.
52. Qu, 2, 467.
53. Qu, 2: 355.
54. Qu, 2: 354.
55. Qu, 2: 334.
56. Qu, 2: 588.
57. Qu, 2: 457.
58. Qu, 2: 455.
59. Qu, 2: 354.
60. Qu, 2: 450.
61. Qu, 2: 453.
62. Qu, 2: 458.
63. Qu, 2: 460.
64. Qu, 2: 441.
65. Qu, 2: 358.
66. Qu, 2: 466.
67. Qu, 2: 357.
68. Qu, 2: 597.
69. Qu, 2: 451.



Popularizing Dialectical Materialism

Qu Qiubai presented a first systematic reading of dialectical materialism between 1923 and 1927. Then perhaps Ai Siqi was the most prominent of the leading popularizers of Marxian dialectics in 1930s. However, before starting to introduce Ai, I will in this chapter discuss some figures of the important historical campaign of transmitting Marxist philosophy in China and how they, as intellectuals in China, looked on the Western thought.

The transmission of Marxist dialectics to China culminated in a new wave with writings and discussions on dialectical materialism that swept across all of China¹ in the period following Qu Qiubai's lecturing on dialectical materialism in Shanghai University. As Guo Zhanbo recorded, "there was a boom of studying social sciences in 1927, in which dialectical materialism rose to prominence."² Rapidly, "Marxism or dialectical materialism, as it was commonly referred to, emerged as the defining feature of modern Chinese thought [in the early twentieth century]."³ Dialectical materialism was popularly called the "new philosophy." It represented the beginning of a new chapter of Chinese philosophy. Tan Fuzhi reported in 1936 "publications either advocated the literature of the proletariat, or introduced dialectical materialism and historical materialism. It also initiated a golden age for book business. A professor, or a student, would not be looked at with much respect if he or she did not have some books of Marx in his (her) studio."⁴ Even Zhang Dongsun (1886 to 1972), an opponent of dialectical materialism, was amazed at the explosion of this new philosophy. Zhang warned that "the publications which advocate dialectical materialism have overfilled every bookstore; the articles which reject the theory, however, could scarcely be seen carried in a few journals; and not a single book critical of dialectical materialism has ever been published so far."⁵ As He Lin

states, dialectical materialism "was in vogue for about ten years between 1927 and 1937 . . . almost all the promising young intellectuals were influenced by the trend of thought . . . the translations from Japanese congested every bookstore; and the new thought almost poured into the mind of all young intellectuals."⁶

According to Huang Jiande, approximately forty new titles of the works of Marx and Engels were published between 1928 and 1930, which included Engels' *Anti-Dühring*, *the Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, and *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy*. Later on came translations of Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* and Hegel's *Logic*, plus those that had been already published in earlier years—that is, *The Communist Manifesto*, *A Critique of the Gotha Program*, *Socialism from Utopia to Scientific*, and Lenin's *State and Revolution*. As Huang Dejian claims, the major philosophical works by Marx, Engels, and Lenin had been translated into Chinese.⁷ As Y. T. Wu reports, "Five-sevenths of the works on social science published from 1928 to 1930" (or 50 percent of the four hundred books published) were "related one way or another to Marxism and dialectical materialism."⁸ The voluminous translations from Russian, Japanese, and German of Marxist philosophy also included works by Plekhanov, Kawakami Hajime, Debórin, and especially those written by the younger generation of Soviet Marxists.

As more and more literature of dialectical materialism from Russian texts was available, there came the problem of how to make dialectical materialism understandable to the Chinese audience. Guo Moruo (historian, 1892 to 1978) was a pioneer in looking for dialectics in classical Chinese philosophy. In his "The Historical and Cultural Settings of the Classic *Zhouyi*," Guo claimed that he had discovered forms of dialectical thought in ancient Chinese literature. In addition, Zhang Jitong, Li Shicen, Chen Baoyin, and Guo Zhanbo were all well-known scholars for being engaged in exploring Chinese *bianzhengfa* (dialectics) in the philosophical classics of the pre-Qin dynasty period (c. 2100 to 221 B.C.E.). The *Yijing*, *Laozi*, and *Zhuang Zi* were found to be exemplary works of *bianzhengfa* (dialectics) in the Chinese philosophical tradition.⁹

The intellectual vitality of the campaign of dialectical materialism was due to many important individuals, including those who contributed to the rise of Hegel studies in China. The major figures that dedicated abundant time to the campaign of making dialectical materialism understandable in China were Li Da, Wu Liangping, Shen Zhiyuan, Zhang Ruxin, Chen Weishi, and, of course, Ai Siqui, who played a prominently leading role in popularizing Marxian dialectics. In the following section, let's first look at the debate on dialectics between Zhang Dongsun and Ye Qing.

ZHANG DONGSUN AND YE QING

Zhang Dongsun was an obstinate enemy of both Hegel's and Marx's dialectics. For him, there are fundamental errors due to a misconception of negation (*fouding*). In Hegel, Zhang contended, the term "antithesis" (*xiangfan*) embraces the meanings of three words—"opposite" (*dui-dai*), "negative" (*fumian*), and "contradictory" (*mao-dun*)—which may mean fundamentally different things.¹⁰ In his article entitled "*Xiangfan xiangcheng* and Pure Objective Law," Zhang claimed that, while Hegel's dialectics (*dui yan fa*) addressed *xiangfan xiangcheng* (contradictory but complementary), *xiangfan xiangcheng* could never lead to a conclusion of pure objective law."¹¹

Not only is Zhang's use of *xiangfan xiangcheng* as a reference to Hegel's dialectics remarkable, but also his three-character translation of "dialectic method," that is, *dui yan fa*, is a significant contribution. Zhang Foquan claims that this is a much better translation than both *maodun lü* (law of contradiction) and *bianzhengfa*. As he explains:

The character "dui" makes an adequate concept to generalize "opposites," or thesis and antithesis; *yan* conveys the meaning of "becoming" (*biandong*). Since it suggests *becoming*, *yan* also implies "synthesis" (*zonghe*). We may take you (being) as an example. First we got you (being), then we have *wu* (no-being); *biandong* (becoming) occurs in the process from you (being) to *wu* (not-being), as well as from *wu* (not-being) to you (being). Therefore, there is the phase *zonghe* (synthesis) between you (being) and *wu* (being), as well as between *zheng* (thesis) and *fan* (antithesis). . . . The idea of *becoming* is essentially important to Hegel's dialectic method. Hegel's addition of the idea of *becoming* to the conception of logic has made a major revolution in the history of logic. In translating the term "dialectic," the idea of *becoming* can never be neglected. This is why I would prefer to Mr. Zhang Dongsun's *dui-yan-fa* as translation of "dialectic method."¹²

Zhang Foquan certainly did not pay attention to the differences between the two Chinese characters *you* and *wu*, and the two concepts "being" and "not-being"; *you* and *wu*, which had been based upon the Chinese acosmotic world view.¹³ These concepts are significantly from the Western concepts "being" and "not-being," which have clear cosmological implications.¹⁴ Nevertheless, Zhang's emphasis on the idea of *becoming* as an essential element in Hegel's dialectic demonstrates a similar approach adopted by proponents of dialectical materialism.

The booming of dialectical materialism in China in the 1930s was also manifest in the polemics over dialectical materialism among philosophers Zhang Dongsun, Ai Siqui, Ye Qing (b. 1896), and others. As Jin Yu and Liu Senlin observed, the brand new features of the philosophical polemics in the

1930s were on dialectical materialism and its application to practice; and eventually Marxists won the polemics. Jin and Liu continue:

Just as someone described in 1935, the school of dialectical materialism was so fast transmitted nationwide, gladdening the heart and refreshing the mind as it encountered China. In all fairness, this school of thought was the strongest among all schools of thought which had been introduced from the West, and that no other school of thought was more competitive.¹⁵

In September 1931, Zhang Dongsun and his supporters published a series of articles attacking dialectical materialism in the column "Modem Thoughts" of *Dagong bao*, and in the journals *New China* and *Rebirth*. Among them are "A Number of Problems with Dialectic," "The Logic of Motion Is Possible," "Some Fashionable Issues of Ideological Discussions," etc. Ye Qing responded to their attacks.

The same year Ye Qing published his responses in the journals *Ershi shiji* (The Twentieth Century) and *Yanjiu yu pipan* (Study and Critique), which included *Guatiyu zhexue de xiaomie* (On Termination of Philosophy), *Xin zhexue de liangtiao zhanxian* (Two Front Lines of New Philosophy), *Dian duo Heige'er zhexue de zhenjie* (A True Understanding of the Reversal of Hegel's Philosophy), *Xingshi luoji yu bianzheng luoji* (Formal Logic and Logic of Dialectic), and *Kexue qian de weixin lun yu weiwulun* (Pre-science Idealism and Materialism). Whereas on the surface it looked as if by writing these essays Ye had been a supporter of dialectical materialism, in fact Ye severely denied dialectical materialism as philosophy. This was the cause of another crossfire between Ye and Ai. I will return to this later.

In 1934 and 1936, both Zhang Dongsun and Ye Qing respectively published their arguments against each other, which were entitled *Weiwu bianzhengfa lunzhan* (A Polemic on Dialectical Materialism) and *Xin zhexue lunzhan* (A Polemic on the New Philosophy). The publication of the two books probably marked the ending of the debates on dialectical materialism.

As Zhang claims in his "A General Critique of Dialectical Materialism," the more he read Hegel the more he realized that Marx's dialectic is wrong; and half of the blame ought to be laid upon Hegel, whose dialectic had been wrong in the first place.¹⁶ For Zhang, the problem with both Hegel and Marx is that they do not have a clear concept of negation. For both of them, negation may mean to deny. For Zhang, this is the beginning of all misunderstanding, for to negate is quite different than to deny. From this point of view, Hegel and Marx made one more serious mistake: that is, they developed the concept of contradictions into "struggle." The Marxist school advocated class struggle and social revolution, which have been derived from Hegel's proposition that contradiction is the fundamental moving principle of the world.¹⁷

As Zhang argued, however, dialectic is not necessarily true in all changes since from being cold to colder, from being hot to extremely hot, from half a bowl to a full bowl of water, from a four-leg to a three-leg table, from a small to a big fish, etc., all these are changes; these changes, however, do not contain contradiction, or transformation from quantity to quality, not to mention negation of negation.¹⁸

Ye Qing had been a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and studied in France. He had also studied in Moscow for a short period. After he returned to China he was engaged in CCP underground activity in Changsha and Pingjiang, Hunan, and later on was arrested there. Then he left the CCP after being discharged from jail and started to work for the Nationalist Party (Guomindang). His philosophical critiques pertaining to dialectical materialism in the early 1930s were primarily aimed at Hu Shi and Zhang Dongsun.

As Lu Xichen comments, for Ye, Hegel's philosophy is the end of philosophy and Marxian philosophy can not be regarded as philosophy¹⁹ Ye asserts in his "Philosophy Never Dies Out?" in 1937, "'Dialectical materialism' is driving philosophy to the peak of science,"²⁰ and the claim "that philosophy is disappearing is dialectical, for it bravely throws away philosophy and declare its death."²¹ As he argues, "Dialectics negates philosophy and confirms science, completely engaging in a knowledge revolution."²² "The original soil for philosophy is gone," he states in his *Where Is the Future of Philosophy* as early as in 1934, "Natural science took over the territory of natural philosophy, and social sciences have done the same to the philosophy of human life."²³ In addition, Ye considered the essence of development a unity rather than a contradiction,²⁴ as absorption (*xishou*)²⁵ or a higher-level synthesis of thesis and antithesis.²⁶ For Ye, "unity of contradiction" means "dialectical synthesis"; it acknowledges the major element that plays a leading role. Therefore, unity of opposites describes a situation where there are two elements wherein one absorbs the other; and thus, unity is absorption. Hence, the theory of the unity of materialism and idealism is to mean an absorption of idealism by materialism.²⁷

What does Ye mean by materialism absorbing idealism? He says, thinking determines existence, this is to mean, idea transforms into reality. Ye continues, although this is an intrinsic proposition of idealism, which may not be true as regards nature, it is adequately true in terms of social issues. When we say, "to transform the world," Ye says, we are adopting the idealist assumption, that is, "thinking determines existence"; that is in fact a claim of "idea transforms into reality"; and, therefore, the materialist conception of "transforming the world" provides evidence for its absorption of idealism.²⁸

Ye equates dialectic with evolution and treats dialectic as a form of evolution. For him, social formation in terms of dialectic is a form of social evolutionism or cultural evolutionism; and dialectic can even be called the orthodox

school of evolutionism.²⁹ In addition, he regards the dialectics of "productive forces" and "productive relations" as the "theory of productive instrument." The theory proposes: whatever the kind of "productive relations," they depend upon the extent of development of productive instruments and of the "productive forces." And, whatever type of political system and ideological formation depends upon the development of "productive relations" and "productive forces." In terms of technology, "productive forces" may include animal power, wind power, hydropower, electricity, machinery, tools, etc.; and as regards society, "productive relations" may mean the structural formation in which people join together in production.³⁰ Because he was affiliated with the Communist Party and Marxism from mid-1920s to 1928 and was adept at the "New Philosophy," Ye's position was much more influential than Zhang Dongsun's; and he had more chance to become a threat to the campaign of dialectical materialism.

When the debate between Zhang Dongsun and Ye Qing came to an end in 1936, the polemic between Ai and Ye was continuing. Ai Siqu and his comrades made their initial counterattack on Ye following the Soviet crash on Deborin in 1931. The latter incident provided a theoretical basis for the Chinese critique of Ye Qing. Ai played a major role in the debate with Ye Qing. He published several rebuttal essays to Ye. In 1937 Ai included these essays in a collection entitled *Philosophy and Life*, which had a long article responding to Ye's condemnation of his *Talks on Philosophy* in 1936. These polemics demonstrated the interest and curiosity many Chinese intellectuals had about the New Philosophy at that time. The debates drew tremendous attention from the nationwide campaign of transmitting dialectical materialism.

LI DA

Li Da (1890–1966) should be the first to be mentioned as one of the major figures that made a substantial amount of Russian literature on dialectical materialism available in China. He was born in a tenant-peasant family in Lingling, Hunan, in 1890 and, as a young intellectual, received sponsorship from the government to study in Japan in 1913. An ardent revolutionary like many students, he was heavily influenced by leftist thought and Marxism after the 1917 Russian Revolution and became one of the earliest Chinese Marxists. On his second trip to Japan in 1919, Li was passionately thirsty for Marxist ideas. He finished reading Marx's *Communist Manifesto*, *Capital*, and the *Preface to the Critique of Political Economy*, Lenin's *State and Revolution* and a large amount of other literature of Marxism in one year's time and became a believer of Marxism. He translated from Japanese *An Introduction to*

Historical Materialism (*Weiwu shi guan jieshuo*), *A Comprehensive View on Social Issues* (*Shehui wenti zonglan*), *The Economic Theory of Marx* (*Ma kesi jingji xueshuo*), etc.³¹ In order to be engaged in revolutionary activities, Li returned from Japan in the summer of 1920 and soon became one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. He then joined the editorial staff of the well-known *New Youth*, as it became the official journal of the Party in August 1921.

With the invitation of Mao Zedong, the year 1922 witnessed Li as the president of Self-Education University in Hunan; there he lectured on Historical Materialism, the Surplus Value Theory, and the Scientific Socialism, which were then considered basic components of thought of Marxism. Li also compiled teaching material entitled *Makesi zhuyi mingci jieshi* (The Terminology of Marxism) and also wrote a book entitled *Modern Sociology* published in 1926. In the book he discussed historical materialism and basic principles of scientific socialism. His other works included one of the earliest Chinese translations of Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Program* (*Deguo laodongdaug gaungling lanwei piping*) between 1922 and 1923.³²

In 1928 Li and his friend Deng Chumin opened a press named Kunlun in Shanghai and in 1932 he opened there a second one called Bigengtang under his wife's name. The two presses published many titles on Marxism; and in this period, either in collaboration with others or by himself, Li was engaged in translating five works on dialectical materialism. Li and Qian Tieru translated Sugiyama Shigeru's *A General Introduction to Social Sciences* (*Shehui xue gailun*), which was published by Kunlun in Shanghai in 1929.³³ This was a simple and succinct synopsis of the Second International dialectical materialism and historical materialism. What was new to the Chinese readership was that the book introduced the theory of a two-part social superstructure and three-process social life.³⁴

In the same year Li translated A. Thalheimer's *Modern World View* (*Xi-andai shijie guan*), which was published by the same press in Shanghai. The book had been published in Russian as a teaching text for the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow in 1927. In his preface to the Chinese translation, Li claimed that the work gave a concise illustration of the quintessence (*jingyi*) of dialectical materialism, which could be used as a guidebook for future studies of dialectical materialism. For Li, there were two points in the work especially worth mentioning: first, it addressed the concept of "horizontal" and "longitudinal" dialectic.³⁵ And second, it spelled out the essence and crux of Lenin's dialectical theory and gave prominence to the law of unity of opposites (*duili tongyi li*).³⁶

Li also collaborated with Wang Jing, Zhang Liyuan, Qian Tieru, Xiong Deshan, and Ning Dunwu in translating Kawakami Hajime's *A Rudimentary*

Reading of Marxist Economic Theory (*Makesi zhuyi jingji xue jichu lilun*), which was also published by Kunlun in Shanghai in 1930. The first part of the book was a three-chapter introduction to Marxist philosophy: materialism, dialectical materialism, and historical materialism. Li also translated Soviet writer E. K. Lupel's³⁷ *The Fundamental Issues of Social Science: Theoretical and Practical* (*Lilun yu shijian de shehui kexue genben wenti*), which was published by Xinxian in Shanghai in 1930 and received as a devoted work of comprehensive and systematic introduction to Lenin's philosophy, "the unity of theory and practice" as the aim of dialectical thought.

Perhaps among Li's translations of dialectical materialism literature, *Teaching Material of Dialectical Materialism* (*Bianzheng weiwu lun jiaochetug*) was the most influential. This book was translated from Russian, originally written by the younger school of Soviet philosophers headed by Shirokov at the Soviet Union Communist University in Leningrad. Collaboratively translated by Li and Lei Zhongjian, the work was published by Biegengtang Bookstore in Shanghai in 1932. As Huang Jiande views, it systematically expounds dialectical materialism based upon the doctrines of Marx and Lenin, attempting a comprehensive understanding of theory and praxis, and philosophy and politics. The work criticizes idealism and mechanism, bringing to light a correlation between dialectic, epistemology, and logic, basic laws and categories of dialectical materialism, and the thinking modality of dialectical materialism.³⁸

The Chinese translation of *A Textbook on Dialectical Materialism* had enormous impact not only on Li Da's own later writings, such as *Outlines of Social Studies* (*Shehui xue da gang*), but also on Mao Zedong's speech, "The Teaching Outlines of Dialectical Materialism" in 1937. Mao's speech contained the original versions of Mao's "On Contradictions" and "On Practice." According to some Chinese scholars of Mao Zedong's annotations and marginalia, it was the text of *A Textbook on Dialectical Materialism* that was heavily annotated by Mao in the period prior to writing his own three philosophical essays. Shi Zhongquan's study shows that there is a direct relationship between Mao's essays "On Contradiction" and "On Practice," on the one hand, and the Soviet texts of *A Textbook on Dialectical Materialism* (by Shirokov and Aizenberg) and *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* (by Mitin et al.), on the other hand.³⁹ Mao read both the 1935 and 1939 editions of the translation by Li and Lei, wrote some 13,000 Chinese character annotations and marginalia, and drew significantly on the theoretical positions and philosophical perspective from the work.⁴⁰

In 1930s Li Da became well known for his translation and introduction of Marxist philosophy and his works was widely read by Chinese intellectuals. He was twice invited to give lectures on dialectical and historical materialism

to Feng Yuxiang, a well-known anti-Japanese Commander of the Guomin-dang Army in the Mt. Tai, Shandong, in May 1932 and September 1939. Li lectured on Marxist philosophy in Beijing and Shanghai between August 1932 and 1937. Once Hou Wailu, a distinguished historian, described Li as a sophisticated Marxist theoretician, stating that no one else in China could teach Marxism more clearly and coherently.⁴¹ And as O. Briere observes, "Li Da was the first systematic interpreter of Marx" in China.⁴²

Li was particularly well received for his *Outlines of Social Studies* (*Shehui xue da gang*) in 1935,⁴³ which was a weighty tome of more than eight-hundred pages and more than 470,000 Chinese characters, giving a complete account of materialist conception of history and dialectical materialism.⁴⁴ According to Briere, this was a veritable compendium of Marxism, explaining nearly all the important issues raised by Marx and his "disciples"; it constituted the most learned work published in China on this school.⁴⁵ It was based upon Soviet texts and had five sections: the first occupied half of the text and dealt with dialectical materialism; the other four sections addressed historical materialism, social economic structure, social political structure, and social ideology accordingly.

From Li's work we discover that the appearance of Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* did not lead him to ponder the question of two Marxes: one is philosophical and the other, scientific, as some asked in the West.⁴⁶ Regarding the issue that has established Marxist philosophy, almost all the popular literature on Marxism in China at that time started with Marx's *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law or The Holy Family*, leaving the 1844 Manuscripts in oblivion.⁴⁷ Li was the first in China who paid close attention to the Manuscripts and considered them important works of Marx. Li maintained that the founding of Marxist philosophy included the 1844 Manuscripts; and viewed them as a "fundamental moment" (*jiben qiji*). He argued that, with the Manuscripts, Marx had accomplished the foundational work of Marxist materialism. For Li, the momentous starting point was Marx's critique of the concept of praxis in Hegel's dialectic. Marx introduced the live concept of praxis, says Li, and developed in the theoretical context of materialism; materialism had gained a new content and nature and thereupon had undergone a revolution to the core. Li asserted that dialectical materialism was not only epistemological but methodological praxis, and thus that dialectical materialism was "the materialism for praxis." He contended "dialectical materialism" was "epistemological methodology based upon praxis" as well as "methodological praxis based upon epistemology."⁴⁸

Li's *Outlines of Social Studies* became immensely influential and was widely read by intellectuals in both revolutionary bases led by Chinese Communists

and in the areas ruled by the Guomindang. It was reprinted three times after its formal publication in May 1937. Mao managed to get a copy immediately from Li, and heavily annotated this text between January 17 and March 16, 1938. Some Chinese Mao scholars believe it possible that Mao had access to the content of the book even before it was published.⁴⁹ According to Guo Huaruo's recollections of Mao's studies of philosophy in Yan'an during the period of Anti-Japanese War in 1937 and 1945, Mao even claimed to have read the book ten times.⁵⁰

Mao had not only read Li's book enthusiastically but also recommended it to the Yan'an Philosophical Study Group and Anti-Japanese Military and Political University. He wrote to ask Li to send ten more copies to him,⁵¹ pointing out that the work was very valuable and was the first textbook of Marxism, which had ever been written by a Chinese; and Mao praised Li as "a true man" (*zhenzheng de ren*).⁵²

OTHER EXPONENTS OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

From the early 1930s many intellectuals may have been attracted to the Communist Party for its politics as well as for intellectual reasons. Through debates in the underground and semi-underground press in Shanghai, intellectuals for the first time began to discuss with great sophistication the issues of Marxism and dialectical materialism. Their interest urged an ample quantity of material from Marxist theory to become accessible in Chinese translations. Like Li Da, many Chinese scholars dedicated abundant time to the "mission."

Wu Liangping translated Marx's *Civil War in France*, Engels's *The Development of Socialism from Utopia to Science*, and Lenin's *Two Strategies and the State and Revolution* even before 1929.⁵³ He also did the first complete Chinese translation of Engels's *Anti-Dühring*, and translated and edited *Dialectical Materialism and a Materialist View on History* in 1930. Wu's translation of *Anti-Dühring* was popularly received and regarded as playing an important role in the Chinese revolution. For this reason, his name was often connected with Engels in China. Mao Zedong paid close attention to Wu's work and brought his translation of *Anti-Dühring* along with him in the years of the first Communist revolutionary base at Jinggang Mountain. Mao read it in the intervals of wartime.

Wu translated and compiled *Dialectical Materialism and a Materialist View on History* from Russian texts. He treated it as the best textbook of historical materialism in the Soviet Union. With Wu's translation and editing, "the reactionary nature of the superstructure on the economic base" was analyzed in terms of "the complexity of social life." Material production consti-

tutes the most important aspect of social life; however, as the productive forces and relations are the foundation for social life, this merely means that, for a final analysis, social development process is conditioned by these elements. The state, the judicial system, and sciences are conditioned phenomena; the conditioned phenomena are active, instead of being passively determined by the economic base. They not only exert influence upon each other but also have active impact on the development of productive forces and relations. This is the “counterinfluence” (*fanyingxiang*) of the superstructure on the economic base.⁵⁴

Wu argues, as viewed in terms of source and aftermath, the kin of “counterinfluence” “can never be the same as the impact of the foundation.” This is because “the counterinfluence” is a force that has drawn on and “developed from the power of the foundation” and “it can last and become significant” only when it does not contradict the developing tendency of the foundation. Sometimes the counterinfluence may delay and obstruct the process of economy, but “it may never be able to change the direction of the process.” Therefore, the reaction of superstructure and the decisive role of the foundation are not of “the same value”; “these two kinds of effects are never the same either in terms of source or in terms of aftermath. As he concludes, if we take the influence of ideas as precedent to economic significance, we would fall into the track of “historical idealism”; if we think the influence of superstructure and economic base on each other is “even and balance,” then we “would become dualistic”; and if we deny that there is any influence from the superstructure on foundation, then we would be “a mechanical materialist, rather than a dialectician.”⁵⁵

Zhang Ruxin (1908–1976) was in the same age and with similar experience to that of Wu. He went to Russia and studied at the University of Sun Yet-sen in Moscow in 1926. After he returned to Shanghai in 1929, Zhang devoted his studies to Marxist philosophy. Between 1930 and 1932, he edited four books: *Wuchan jieji de zhixue* (The Philosophy of the Proletariat), *Bianzhengfa xuexuo gailue* (A General Introduction to the Theory of Dialectical Materialism), *Su E zhixue chaoliu gailun* (A General Introduction to Philosophical Schools of Soviet Russia), and *Zhixue gailun* (Outlines of Philosophy).

As a well-known Marxist philosopher, Zhang’s language was concise, simple, and easy to understand. Zhang claims in his analysis of Hegel’s dialectical categories, that finite and infinite, form and content, phenomenon and essence, identity and discrepancy, universality and particularity, reciprocal relations of two elements in all these categories are not metaphysical contradictions, but dialectical joining (*bianzheng de heyi*). He holds that “transformation from quantity to quality,” “joining contradictions” (*maodun heyi*), and

“negation of negation” are basic principles of Marx’s dialectical materialism; in these three, however, joining contradictions are fundamental; as regards the other two, they are merely forms of the embodiment of moving contradictions. For Zhang, understanding any moving process requires one to find the key (*yaoshi*) in the two joining but contradicting (*duikang heyi*) elements. As Zhang conceives, in a mutual move (*hudong*) relationship, economic base is dominating (*zhipei*) as regards superstructure. However, the superstructure does have impact on the economic base under some given concrete conditions at the same time; and sometimes the superstructure may or must even go to the extent that it changes the monistic materialist view of history.⁵⁶

Shen Zhiyuan (1902–1965) was another exponent of dialectical materialism of the time. He was also among the people who had been sent by the Communist Party to Russia in 1926 and to study at the same University of Sun Yet-sen in Moscow. After his graduation from the university in 1929, Shen became a translator and editor at the Office of Translating and Editing Chinese Books and Periodicals affiliated to the Comintern. After he returned to China in 1931, Shen engaged himself in studies on Hegel and later on became a specialist in the dialectics of both Hegel and Marx. He translated and wrote many books and essays on political economy, philosophy, and Hegel’s dialectic. He demonstrated his sophistication and profoundness in understanding philosophical issues.

Shen’s contribution to the encounter of dialectical materialism in China included his translation of Mark Mitin’s *Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism* between 1936 and 1938; this work contains 720,000 Chinese characters; volume I of the book had been printed eighteen times, and volume II had been printed thirteen times by 1950. Mitin’s book was one of the major Soviet philosophical works that had been widely read and exerted great impact on Chinese readership. Indeed, Shen had written “*Su E zhixue sichao zhi jiantao*” (A Survey of Philosophical Trends in Soviet Russia) even earlier in 1934. However, what specially interests us here is his energetic role in the popularizing drive of dialectical materialism. In 1933 Shen compiled one of the earliest dictionaries of dialectic materialism *Xin zhixue cidian* (A New Philosophy Dictionary) and prepared a popular pamphlet, *Basic Issues of Modern Philosophy* in 1936. Shen was one of the strongest allies of Ai Siqui in the polemic against Ye Qing; he published “*Ye Qing zhixue wang hechu qu*” (What Is Ye Qing’s Philosophical Direction?) in response to Ye Qing’s claim that philosophy was a backward form of knowledge.⁵⁷

According to Shen, dialectical materialism is a kind of philosophy that may serve as a guide for the masses in everyday life and in their social practices. Popularizing dialectical materialism means to explain concisely the complicated theories to friends among the common people, who worked hard from

morning till night, but had little money for books and time for reading. Therefore, popularization or *tongsu* (to let it get through and reach the common) also means to "to make it easy to understand," to use common expressions, to expound a profound truth in simple language, etc. As he argues, no matter how one hates philosophy or is ignorant of it, every one of us is being dominated anyway by philosophical ideas; we can trace many of our popular ideas back to their original roots in philosophy. Shen believes philosophy is everywhere in real life, as well as in all disciplines of knowledge. And philosophy is nothing but a generalized summation (*zong jielun*) of our understanding as to real life and the world, which in turn becomes our fundamental attitude and methodology in gaining an comprehension of our real world, and thus a guide for our actions or practices (*xingdong* or *shijian*). Shen points out, the end of philosophy as Ye Qing claims is nothing creative (*dule*) but a blind echo of the Soviet school of mechanic materialism.⁵⁸

In Shen's reading of dialectical materialism, the laws of the unity of opposites, the quantitative and qualitative changes, and the negation of negation are three principal laws of dialectics. They are not only real laws in the objective world, but also the laws of knowing the world on the part of human beings. Here on the surface, Shen seems to have repeated the positivist jargons. He continues to elaborate, however, that "the unity of opposites means mutually going through each other (*huxiang guanchuan*) as well as mutually struggling against each other and is the source of self-moving and self-developing. For him, the internal driving power is caused due to internal contradictions and gives rise to internal impetus of development; and the law of reciprocally qualitative and quantitative changes discloses the process of development itself, including its particular qualitative stage and sudden bouncing as a style of revolutionary process, that suggests a suspension of continuity (*lianxu: jian bian*) as well as the inseparable mutual relationship between quality and quantity. In addition "the negation of negation" may even more deepen our comprehension of a developing process.⁵⁹ If we have the kind of *tongbian* thinking of the Chinese tradition in our mind, it would not be difficult for us to realize that Chen's such reading of dialectical materialism apparently reflects that kind of correlative thinking but in Western philosophical terms. In the *tongbian* modality, the Chinese world is *ziran* or *self-so-being*, and *ziwei* *self-so-going* or *self-so-doing*. The moving forces, or changes, come from the interactions of the complementary and contradictory polarities, from the ten thousand things themselves all under the sky rather than from an external mover.

We may consider Chen Weishi the most important popularizer of dialectical materialism apart from Ai Siqui. Chen was born in a poor peasant family in 1913. He fled to Beijing in 1934 when a local landlord outrageously persecuted his family. He met Ai in Shanghai and then became one of his closest

comrades in the campaign of popularizing dialectical materialism. Between 1936 and 1937, Chen wrote for *Dushu shenghuo* (Reader's Life) and also published *Tongsu bianzhengfa jianghua* (A Talk on Vulgarizing Dialectics), *Tongsu weiwu lun jianghua* (Talks on Vulgar Materialism), *Xin zhexue tixi jianghua* (Talks on the Systems of New Philosophy), and *Xin zhexue shijie guan jianghua* (Talks on the World View of New Philosophy). His *Tongsu bianzhengfa* was reprinted three times in four months after it was first published in June 1936 and still reprinted secretly in Beijing after the Guomin-dang government banned the book.

Chen openly advocated a “pragmatization” and “Sinification” (*shiyong hua, zhongguo hua*) of dialectics. As he states, dialectical materialism is a kind of learning that is extremely practical and applicable; therefore, it can be studied theoretically on the one hand, and more importantly, should be specified and pragmatized as explanatory examples and tested in practical issues, on the other hand. He urged that the language of dialectical materialism, should also be popularized (*tongsu hua*), Sinified (*zhongguo hua*), and made easier for the common people to understand, and that dialectical materialism as a world view and methodology be assumed from the starting point of practical use and comprehended in practical issues. He encouraged readers to apply dialectics to practical issues, to peel off and substitute the mysterious wrapping of philosophy for vulgar and popular expressions in order to give specified and concrete knowledge of what is life and society, what is the universe, and what is methodology.⁶⁰ In his *Xin zhexue tixi jianghua* (Talks on the Systems of the New Philosophy), which was published in April 1937, Chen regarded dialectical materialism as a scientific ontology as well as epistemology and methodology. He reiterates, the nature of the New Philosophy is practical and revolutionary; therefore, application is highly demanded and the most important issue is “practice.” The most significant tasks of philosophical campaign is to promote practicing the New Philosophy, he asserts, but warns at the same time, *tongsu hua* (popularizing) is by no means debasement; so-called *tongsu hua*, it means an interpretation on the serious and precise content of the New Philosophy to make it an easily understandable discourse with clear and candid expressions. This is by no means a simplistically strained interpretation of the content.⁶¹

Here, I would like to draw the reader's attention to the fact that, in order to rouse in the Chinese reader an affinity for dialectical materialism, Chen states that his effort is “to derive a comprehension of dialectical concepts from the perspective of classic Chinese thought.” Like Guo Moruo and others, Chen also includes in his book a special chapter dealing with the dialectic in Chinese tradition. He examined diligently various historical schools of thought and regarded highly *the Yijing, Laozi, and Zhuangzi* as rich sources of dialec-

tic in Chinese tradition. He claims that these classical texts contain a well-developed discourse of dialectics, which deserves our admiration.⁶² Chen discusses the correlativity of the two basic conceptual elements in the dialectical materialism categories: phenomenon and reality, form and content, conditions and root/base (*genjū*), cause and effect, contingency and necessity; possibility and actuality, etc. For instance, he has generalized seven points of correlativity between cause and effect: (1) cause and effect are of objective actuality; (2) cause and effect are transformable to each other; (3) explore where is the root/base (*genjū*) and where is the major leading (*zhidao*) and determining crucial juncture (*qiji*) among the diverse and complex mutual roles cause and effect play upon each other; (4) cause lies in internal root/base (*genjū*); (5) discover the necessity of change by getting onto the root/base cause; (6) cause and effect are changing or developing; and (7) cause and effect can only be proved in practice.

From the intellectual vitality of the campaign of dialectical materialism we have described so far in this chapter, we can conclude that the serious discussions and transmissions of dialectical materialism in 1930s came into a phase characterized by popularizing and Sinifying Marxist philosophy. The methodology includes, first, to popularize the language of dialectical materialism for the common people to understand by using vulgar and popular expressions in everyday life, and second, to derive a comprehension of dialectical concepts from the perspective of classical Chinese thought. Ai Siqui is regarded the most successful and influential figure in the campaign to popularize and Sinify Marxist dialectical materialism.

NOTES

1. Ai Siqui mentioned the year 1927 in particular as the start of the period in which dialectical materialism became fashionable throughout China. As he says, "the power [of the new philosophy] was so strong that it had never happened in the past twenty-two years." See Ai Siqui, "The Chinese Philosophical Trends of the Past Twenty-Two Years," in Cai Shangsi, ed., *A Concise Compilation of the Historical Material of the Modern Chinese Thought* (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Province People's Press, 1983), 3: 714.

2. Guo Zhanbo, *Chinese Thought in the Past Fifty Years* (Hong Kong: Dragon Gate Bookstore, 1965), 384.

3. Guo Zhanbo, *Chinese Thought in the Past Fifty Years*, 196.

4. Tan Fuzhi, "The Recent Years of Chinese Philosophy," *Cultural Reconstruction* 3, no. 6. (1936).

5. Zhang Dongsun, "A Statement on the Polemics Over Dialectical Materialism," in Cai Shangsi, ed., *A Concise Compilation of the Historical Material of the Modern Chinese Thoughts* (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Province People's Press, 1983), 3: 546.

6. He Lin, *Contemporary Chinese Philosophy* (Nanjing: Shengli Publishing Company, 1947), 72.
7. Huang Jiande et al., *A History of the Western Philosophy Meeting the East* (Xi-fang zhixue dong jian shi) (Wuhan: Wuhan Press, 1991), 476. In addition, according to Zeng Leshan, the works of Marx and Engels which were published this period also included *Capital*, *Anti-Dühring*, *The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, *the Poverty of Philosophy*, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, *On the Outline of Feuerbach*, *A Critique of Political Economy*, *Dialectics of Nature*, and *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*; see *Solidifying Marxist Philosophy* (Makesi zhuyi zhixue de Zhongguo hua jiqi licheng) (Shanghai: Huadong Normal University Press, 1991), 168–69.
8. Y. T. Wu, "Movements among Chinese Students," *China Christian Year Book* 17 (Shanghai, 1931), 265.
9. Guo Zhanbo, *Chinese Thought in the Past Fifty Years*, 265.
10. Zhang Dongsun, "A General Critique of Dialectical Materialism" (Weiwu bionghengfa zhi zong jiantao), in Cai Shangsi, ed., *A Concise Compilation of the Historical Material of the Modern Chinese Thoughts* (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Province People's Press, 1983), 3: 548.
11. Zhanbo, *Chinese Thought in the Post Fifty Years*, 263.
12. Zhang Foqian, "Heige er zhì dui yan fa yu Makesi zhì dui yan fa," *Da gong bao* (March 12, 1932).
13. David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames use the term in describing the modality of Daoist thinking of Chinese tradition. Since the concept *doo* construes, as nameable and nameless *dao*, characterizes the process of existence and experience as Becoming-Itself. What this means in relation to our typology of ways of entertaining the notion of difference, is that Daoism expresses a radical acosmology. See their *Thinking from the Heart: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture* (New York: SUNY Press, 1998), 61–67.
14. As Hall and Ames state, "acosmological" is in the sense that the particularities defining the order, which are irreplaceable items whose nonsubstitutability is essential to the order; "No final unity is possible on this view since, were this so, the order of the whole would dominate the order of the parts, canceling the uniqueness of its constituent particulars." For more on the Chinese acosmotic world view, see their *Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture* (New York: SUNY Press, 1995), 116, 232, 236, 272.
15. Jin Yu et al., eds., *New Studies on Mao Zedong's on Practice and on Contradictions* (Beijing: Chinese People's University Press, 1991), 191.
16. Dongsun, "A General Critique of Dialectical Materialism," 547–48.
17. Dongsun, "A General Critique of Dialectical Materialism," 551.
18. Dongsun, "A General Critique of Dialectical Materialism," 553–54.
19. Lu Xichen, *Zhongguo xiandai zhixueshi* (Jilin: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1984), 250.
20. Ye Qing, "Zhixue bu hui xiaomic ma?" in *Wei fazhan xin zhixue er zhan* (Zhenli chubanshe 1937) as compiled in Cai Shangsi, ed., *Zhongguo xiandai sixiang shi ziliao jianbian* (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 1983), 3: 853–54.

21. Qing, "Zhexue bu hui xiaomie ma?"
22. Qing, "Zhexue bu hui xiaomie ma?"
23. Ye Qing, preface, *Zhe xue dao hechu qu?* (Xinxing shudian 1934), 19, 230 as cited in Lu Xichen, *Zhongguo xiandai zhexueshi* (Jilin renmin chubanshe 1984), 249.
24. Ye Qing, "Dong de luoji shi keneng de—da Zhang Dongsun jiaoshou," *Xin Zhonghua* 1, no. 23, December 10, 1933, as cited in Lu Xichen (1984), p. 252.
25. Ye Qing, "Guannian lun bu ke xishou ma?" *Yanjiu yu pipan*, 2, no. 7, January 1, 1937, as cited in Lu Xichen (1984), p. 252.
26. Ye Qing, "Dong de luoji shi keneng de—da Zhang Dongsun jiaoshou," *Xin Zhonghua* 1, no. 23, December 10, 1933, as cited in Lu Xichen (1984), p. 252.
27. Ye Qing, "Guannian lun bu ke xishou ma?" *Yanjiu yu pipan* 2, no. 7, January 1, 1937, as cited in Lu Xichen (1984), p. 252.
28. *Ibid.* Lu Xichen, *zhongguo xiandai zhexue shi*, p. 255.
29. Ye Qing, "Jinhua lun yu bohua lun," *Yanjiu yu pipan* 1, no. 9, November 1935, as cited in Lu Xichen (1984), p. 253.
30. Ye Qing, "Lishi zhexue gailun," *Xin Zhonghua* 3, no. 5, November 1935, as cited in Lu Xichen (1984), p. 254.
31. Li Da, "Comrade Li Da's Life," in *Selected Works (Li Da wenji)* (Beijing: People's Press [Renmin chubanshe], 1980), iv. The book does not provide the date, place, or the original authors of the books Li translated.
32. Li Da, *Selected Works (Li Da wenji)*, (Beijing: People's Press [Renmin chubanshe], 1980), XI.
33. The English name of the author could also be Sugiyama Hisashi according to P. G. O'Neill's *Japanese Names*, (New York: Weatherhill, 1995).
34. The two parts of social superstructure include political and legal systems, and social ideology; three processes of social life are material as well as means of life, political life, and spiritual life. See Huang, p. 479.
35. As interpreted in Chinese, "vertical dialectic" refers to the dialectic of change (*bianhua*), as in Heraclitus; "horizontal dialectic," the dialectic of "simultaneity" (*tongshi xing*), as in Plato and Aristotle. Hegel is understood as having a combination of both "vertical" and "horizontal" dialectic. "Vertical" dialectic is also understood as the dialectic of historical change, and "horizontal" dialectic, as dialectic of relations in systemic structures. See Huang, p. 480.
36. According to Thalheimer, as understood by the Chinese through Li's translation, of the three laws of dialectics, the unity of opposites (*duili tongyi*) makes the fundamental principle of dialectics; it is the principle of every particular event or thing and individual phenomenon, therefore it is applicable to the entire world. On the other hand, the other two laws, negation and negation, and qualitative and quantitative change, are merely specific cases of the fundamental law—the unity of opposites. Huang Jiande, p. 480.
37. E. K. Lyppel (1883–1936), Soviet philosopher. See *Mao Zedong zhexue pizhu ji*, Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1988, p. 514, note 62.
38. Huang, p. 481.

39. Nick Knight, *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), 56–65; and Jin Yu et al., *New Studies on Mao Zedong's On Practice and On Contradictions* (Mao Zedong Shijianlun Maodunlun xintan) (Beijing: The Chinese People's University Press, 1991), 164–89.
40. Huang, p. 482.
41. Hou Wailu, *Ren de zhiqu (Persistent Effort)*, Sanlian shudian (Sanlian Bookstore), 1985, p. 36.
42. O. Briere, *Fifty Years of Chinese Philosophy*, New York: Praeger, 1965, p. 76.
43. According to Huang, Law and Commerce School, Peking University first published Li's *An Outline of Sociology* as teaching material in 1935. Its formal publication was by Bigengtang Bookstore in Shanghai in May 1936. See, Huang, 482 fn.
44. Li's manuscripts on dialectical materialism were first published by the Commercial School at Peking University in Beijing in 1935, and then published by Bigengtang Bookstore in Shanghai in 1937. In the following years, it was reprinted many times.
45. Briere, p. 76.
46. Perhaps Peter Manieas is a typical example by strongly arguing that Marx had repudiated all that he had derived from Hegel, and that the later "scientific writings" had made an "epistemological break" with the earlier "philosophical" writings. "Having 'settled accounts' with 'the German ideology,'" Manicas contests, "Marx no longer wrote 'philosophy' or concerned himself with the 'problems' thereof, in particular, with those of epistemology or ontology. From then on he would do 'science.'" See Manieas, *A History & Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (Basil Blackwell), pp. 107–108.
47. That the Chinese Marxists seem not to be fully aware of or overly concerned with Marx's *1844 Manuscripts* may have two reasons. One is because the translation of the work had not been available until 1930s; and the other reason may be, as Joshua Fogel states regarding Ai Siqu's case, that is, "probably because philosophical explanation constituted only one element of" the larger enterprise of Chinese Marxists." "The central goal for the Chinese Communists during the 1930s was to rouse the people to resist Japan and eventually to change the prevailing order." See Fogel, *Ai Siqu's Contribution to the Development of Chinese Marxism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 51.
48. Huang, pp. 482–84.
49. Knight, p. 57.
50. Guo Huaruo, "Mao zhuxi kangzhan chuqi de zhixue huodong" (Chairman Mao's Philosophical Activities during the Period after the Starting of Anti-Japanese War), p. 34.
51. Guo Huaruo, p. 34.
52. Zeng Leshan, *A Sinification of Marxist Philosophy*, East China Normal University Press, 1991, p. 190.
53. Wu was born in Fenghua, Zhejiang, in 1908. He was sent by the Party to study in the University of Sun Yet-sen in Moscow in 1925. After he returned from the Soviet Union in 1929, he was engaged in studying Marxist theory for the Party. He died in 1987.

54. Huang, p. 494.
55. Huang, pp. 494–95; Wu's analysis is based upon the second edition of his translation which was published by Xinxian Bookstore, Shanghai, in 1932.
56. Huang, p. 499.
57. *Dushu shenghuo*, 4, no. 5, 1936.
58. Huang, p. 505.
59. Huang, p. 502.
60. Huang, p. 517.
61. Huang, p. 520.
62. Huang, p. 518.



Ai Siqi: Sinifying Dialectical Materialism

Like Chen Weishi, Ai Siqi made it plain that the sinification¹ of Marxism included not only a study of “Chinese history, the Chinese conditions today, and the experiences of Chinese revolution, but also full reflections on the modality of thinking that is particular to Chinese and all schools of thought in both the past and present.” It also encompasses the effort “to study China’s own philosophy and further develop the elements of ‘materialism and dialectic’ in our own tradition.”² We ought to be sensitive about what Ai meant by “sinification.” This chapter is a discussion on the important role Ai played in popularizing and sinifying Marxist philosophy in China.

ACTIVITIES AND WRITINGS

Ai Siqi was born in 1910 in Tengchong, Yunnan, which is situated in Southwest China. Ai read *the ABC of Communism* by Bukharin and Preobrazhensky even when he was a middle school student in Kunming in 1920s. That was the time when more translations of Marxism became available, and among them, dialectics and class struggle drew close attention. As a teenager, Ai was arrested in Nanjing in the winter of 1926 simply because the military police found him in his elder brother’s room when they came to arrest his brother who was a Communist. After he was released with the help of one of his father’s friends, Ai took advantage of an opportunity to study in Japan and afterward he joined the Tokyo branch of the Chinese Communist Party. He actively participated in a study group on socialism organized by the Party. As Zheng Yili recalls, Ai said he loved philosophy and started to learn Hegel from a Japanese translation after he had studied some basic courses in Japanese. Ai

said that he was able to learn both philosophy and advanced Japanese at the same time.³ According to Zheng, in order to read more Marx and Engels in original languages, Ai began to teach himself English and German. While he was having a curriculum of scientific study, Ai found time to read voluminously in European and Japanese Marxist and philosophical literature.

However, Ai's incessant studying during this period made him neglect his health and by the late spring of 1928 he had to return to recuperate in Kunming. On his return Ai brought with him a large quantity of Marxist texts in Japanese, German, and English, which included *The Communist Manifesto*, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, *the Foundations of Leninism*, etc. Indeed, Ai's activities in popularizing dialectical materialism started as early as the period of his stay in Kunming in 1928 and 1929. Lu Wanmei recalls a more than three-hour's evening chatting with Ai, who was usually a very quiet person, but that evening he was so articulate in elucidating on the works of Francis Bacon, Baruch Spinoza, Immanuel Kant, and George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. As Ai stated, however, that all their work was fuzzy and abstruse and that he suddenly saw the light in the works of Marx and Engels since their worldview and philosophy of life were clearer and more rational.⁴ Ai wrote most for the *Yunnan minzhong ribao* (Yunnan People's Daily) in that period, including over a dozen of essays on the New Philosophy (i.e., dialectical materialism and historical materialism). In the writings, Ai tried to present a popularized and concise form of dialectical materialism and the materialist view of history.⁵ These were the earliest links to his career as a dialectical materialism popularizer in China.

Ai went to Japan again after convalesce in 1929 and began to teach himself Russian. However, Ai gave up his study two years later, leaving Japan together with many angry young Chinese intellectuals because Japan had invaded and occupied northeast China in 1931. Ai only had a brief visit with his family in Kunming before going to Shanghai in early 1932, since the local authority of Kunming had assumed immediate surveillance on his activity after he returned from Japan. In Shanghai, Ai was engaged in the activities of the Chinese Alliance for Left-Wing Writers. The first issue of the Alliance's new monthly journal *Zhenglu* (Correct Road) carried Ai's "Chouxiang zuoyong yu bianzhengfa" (The Use of Abstractions and the Dialectical Method). The essay was the beginning of Ai's lifetime work of popularizing dialectical materialism. As Joshua Fogel comments,

The essay reveals that he had already mastered an engaging vernacular style to explain the complexities of philosophical matters. In this piece he describes the distinction between formal and dialectical logic with illustrations drawn from the everyday lives and political concerns of his readers. He cites Plato and Kant;

quotes Hegel; draws an example from classical Chinese logic at Gongsun Long; disparages in the strongest language the philosophy of life of Bergson and Dilthey as well as Nishida Kitaro's "existentialism"; and praised highly the (unnamed) author of *Capital*.⁶

In spring 1934 Ai started working for Li Gongpu at the library affiliated with the serial *Shen bao* (Shanghai News), and wrote for the column "Dushu wenda" (Response for Readers). This was the first time he used the pen name Ai Siqi. Readers from all walks of life asked Ai so many questions, even about philosophical issues and problems, that a new semimonthly entitled "Dushu shenghuo" (Reader's Life) was inaugurated with the support of Li Gongpu and others in November 1934. Li Gongpu was editor in chief and Ai, in charge of the editorial work. In his writings, Ai closely linked himself with thousands of readers and he learned deeper and deeper about many young intellectuals, who suffered spiritual depression greatly in an uncertain age. Ai became more and more determined to break up the intricacies of philosophical issues and make dialectical materialism understandable to people by using simple terms, everyday language, and vivid live examples.

Reader's Life featured some columns with the columns *Wenxue jianghua* (Talks on Literature), *Kexue jianghua* (Talks on Science), and *Zhexue jianghua* (Talks on Philosophy). In charge of *Talks on Philosophy*, Ai published from November 1934 to October 1935 twenty-four essays, introducing idealism, dualism, and, as he named, the epistemology, the basic *guilü* (laws) and *fanchou* (categories) of dialectical materialism. He argued that dialectical materialism was a kind of philosophy ordinary people could comprehend. His writing style was common expressions and talk-like. Ai also pointed out that from *ganxing* (perceptual) to *lixing* (rational), and vice versa, there was an intellectual development in *renshi* (knowing). Subsequently, Ai published a collection of these essays with the title *Zhexue jianghua* (Talks on Philosophy). The book was warmly received and printed in a frequency of four times in four months. However, the Guomindang government quickly banned the book, because it contained ideas of historical materialism and class struggle. When it was printed for the fourth time, the book's title was changed to *Dazhong zhexue* (Philosophy for the Masses), which was afterward printed ten times from 1935 to 1938, and had its thirty-second printing in 1948. Zeng Leshan views the book as the best popular work in history on Marxist philosophy.⁷ According to Zheng Yili, the book was so influential that many young intellectuals became interested in Marxist philosophy, and many took part in revolution after reading Ai's *Philosophy for the Masses*. Ai was rather more popular in the revolutionary base Yan'an; He Jingzhi, a distinguished Chinese revolutionary poet called the book "Our *Dazhong zhexue*" in his poem.⁸

Translating was another important part of Ai's effort to popularize Marxist philosophy, which included a selection of the correspondence between Marx and Engels. It came out in 1934 and was later enlarged and reprinted in 1951 and 1962. He joined Zheng Yili in translating the entry on dialectical materialism from the *Bol'shaja Sovjetskaja Entsiklopedia* (Great Soviet Encyclopedia), which was published with the Chinese title *Xin Zhixue Dagang (An Outline of the New Philosophy)*. Its original Russian text was written under the guidance of Soviet philosopher Mark Borisovich Mitin of Stalin's time, which was considered the leading Soviet philosopher of the 1930s. The Chinese translation eventually came out as a 450-page tome that hit the bookstores in Shanghai and elsewhere in June 1936.⁹ It is interesting to notice that, as Ai tells in his "Translator's Preface," he and Zheng have relied heavily on the Japanese translation as well as the original Russian text, and that the sub-headings of their chapters were taken directly from the Japanese edition.¹⁰

An Outline of the New Philosophy has an introduction to Greek dialectics, the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries' dialectics of European philosophy, and German idealistic dialectics. The book claims that Lenin's is the dialectical materialism of the age of imperialism and proletarian revolution, which developed from the primary aspect of Marx's theory, that is, the *tongyi xing* (correlativity) between dialectic, epistemology, and ethics. It also states that Lenin developed *fanying lun* (theory of reflection) in terms of the theory of dialectics, and that he paid close attention to *duili tongyi* (unity of opposites) and considered it the central issue of dialectical materialism and the core of dialectic. The translation acknowledges that the nature of dialectical materialism has two fundamental points: it has to be put in practice and only serves the interests of the proletarian.

The year of 1936 also witnessed the publication of Ai's two more books, *Xin zhixue lunji* (A Collection of Essays on the New Philosophy) and *Sixiang fangfalun* (Methodology of Thought). The former collects Ai's essays on philosophy, literature, and natural science as well as critique of Ye Qing's mechanical materialism. As Ai points out in the book, the New Philosophy deals with the most *pubian* (universal) and *yiban guilü* (general laws) of the world's development. The latter addresses the relationship between transforming oneself and the world. For Ai, the New Philosophy was both worldview and methodology; he urges, as required by an implementation of dialectics, try best to (1) understand all aspects of things and *bawo* (gain a full command of all-around aspects of things); (2) discover the developing direction by taking into consideration all aspects of things and discern through *maodun* "the self-generated movement in things themselves" (*zishen yundong*) and "the original dynamic to bring change" (*bianhua de yuan dongli*); and (3) correctly assess and explain the movement and change in things be-

ginning with an analysis of concrete information about each thing.¹¹ Ai's *Methodology of Thought* was well known in Yan'an, and Mao Zedong read it.

The Guomindang government in Shanghai shut down *Reader's Life* in 1937. Very soon, Ai and others started a new journal with a similar title *Dushu shenghuo banyue kan* (*Reader's Life Semimonthly*), which was shortly changed to *Shenghuo xuexiao* (*School of Life*) after being forced again to cease publication. Ai continued his writing on philosophy and answered reader's questions and contributed regularly to other serial publications such as *Tongsu wenhua* (*Popular Culture*). In addition, Ai started a major theoretical journal under his own editorship entitled *Zhishi yuekan* (*Knowledge Monthly*), which carried articles on various issues of dialectical materialism and criticism of metaphysics and idealism. In April 1937, Ai's another essay collection, *Zhexue yu shenghuo* (*Philosophy and Life*), was published, which included a number of previous essays he had written as response to the readership of *Reader's Life* and *Chen bao*.

In *Philosophy and Life*, Ai discusses the issue of *juedui* and *xiangdui* (absoluteness and relativity). As he asserts, *ming* (nouns), *guannian* (concepts), and *fanchou* (categories) are all reflection of actuality; as for *juedui* and *xiangdui*, they cannot be separated from affairs of daily life. Ai claims that *xiangdui baohan juedui* (relativity entails absoluteness, and, vice versa). For him, everything is of relativity even though in any stage of its development a thing involves certain "regularity" (or law), that may mean absoluteness; and in turn, absoluteness makes an expression of relativity at certain stage. Ai contended that we do not necessarily go to relativism in order to acknowledge relativity, and that we may admit absoluteness, but not absolutism.¹²

Philosophy and Life caught the eye of Mao Zedong, who was then far off in northwest China. Mao not only read but also wrote down a great number of notations on Ai's book in September 1937. Mao regarded the book highly, as attested by a letter of congratulation he wrote to Ai in which he related that he had copied a number of passages from the book. He complimented that this work was so profound that he had learned a lot from reading it.¹³ But meanwhile, Mao presented his different position toward the issue of if difference could mean *maodun* (contradiction). Ai had argued, "Different things are not in contradiction" but that "their difference may become a contradiction under certain conditions." Mao pointed out, however, that this was an "inappropriate" (*butuo*) way to put it. Differences exist in all things in the world, and under certain conditions are contradictions, and the reason is, Mao argued, that difference does mean contradiction, so called concrete contradiction.¹⁴

Ai was a lifetime popularizer of dialectical materialism. He wrote more than twenty books and approximately three hundred essays and speeches. All

of his works suggested his effort to effectively make the complexities and jargons of philosophical thought understandable to the common people. Since the Party sent him to Yan'an in 1937, Ai had virtually become an official thinker of the Party. For most of his time he worked as lecturer in philosophy at the Marx-Lenin Institute and the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University. At the same time, he was also editor in chief of the Party's paper *Liberation Daily* as well as *Zhongguo wenhua* (Chinese Culture), a major theoretical research institute of the Party. Translating was still the most significant part of Ai's work. He was in charge of the translation project of the Russian philosopher Mitin's *Dialectical Materialism*, which afterward appeared in a Chinese edition entitled *Zhexue xuanji* (Philosophical Selections) in Shanghai in March 1939. The book included as appendices a translation of Stalin's "Dialectical and Historical Materialism" and Ai's own essay entitled "*Yanjiutigang*" (Outline for Study). The same year he also published a collection of eighteen essays he had written in Shanghai and Yan'an, with the title of *Shijian yu lilun* (Practice and Theory), as well as his translation of Lenin's *Notes on the Dialectic*.¹⁵ In collaboration with Wu Liping, Ai prepared a textbook entitled *Weiwu shi guan* (The Materialist View of History) for Party members and others in 1939, which addressed the issues like philosophy of life and its relevance to worldview. In addition, Ai was also primarily responsible for translating some of the Soviet texts selected for several prescribed reading documents in the 1942 rectification campaign in Yan'an.

POPULARIZING DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

In fact, as we mentioned previously, the first time Ai presented a popularized and concise form of dialectical materialism and historical materialism was in 1929 when he published over a dozen of essays in the *Yunnan minzhong ribao* (Yunnan People's Daily). He would have continued to do so if he had not gone to Japan. Ai finally resumed the work of popularizing dialectical materialism in 1933, when his "*Chouxiang zuoyong yu bianzhengfa*" (The Use of Abstractions and the Dialectical Method) was published in Shanghai.¹⁶ His endeavor became extremely successful as he wrote twenty-four "talks" on philosophy to compose an exposition of dialectical materialism between 1934 and 1935, which became so popular so rapidly and turned out to be a commemorative milestone of the campaign of Chinese dialectical materialism. As a prominent popularizer of the philosophy of Marxism in China, Ai demonstrated great intelligence; virtually all his articles and speeches sought to explain the complexities of philosophical analysis and the categories of thought to the common people.

Ai made plain his purpose of popularizing dialectical materialism in the preface of the fourth printing of *Talks on Philosophy* by stating that from beginning to end he had no intention at all to make the book enter the university classroom. As a hope, he would rather like it to make friends on streets, in stores, and villages, talking to those who could not afford to study in school; like a pancake, the book had been made to satisfy the starving, not to cater to people at university.¹⁷ In a word, for Ai, the target readership was rather on lower social status. He wanted them to comprehend philosophical complexities through simple language and common sense of everyday life. In *Philosophy for the Masses*, he told his readers, "We are all *suren* (ordinary people), we all feel easy to communicate by common language. Therefore, nothing is more effective than using an everyday phrase to start our discussion. ... To start with such a common saying may not be too much as to make people sleepy as a mesmerizing philosophical lecture in university classroom."¹⁸

Ai's idea of popularizing philosophical complexities had derived from his strong belief in continuity or correlativity between the philosophical (or theoretical) and the actual (*shiji*). "Have a target before shooting an arrow," or *youdi fangshi*, was a famous saying he uses in explaining philosophy (or theory) as correlative with actual circumstances. Using a philosophy (or a theory) is just like shooting an arrow; one has to get a target, or a problem to work on. If nothing is there that matters as target, then it doesn't make sense to have an arrow. However, to some people, it seems as if it could still make sense to hold an arrow when a target does not exist. The purpose of theory is to serve as solution to practical issues. A theory would die if it separates from actual circumstances. Some bourgeois scholars may take theory for theory's sake, but theory for theory's sake can never be a Marxist revolutionary theory. Why does Ai use the analog of arrow and target to indicate a correlation of theory with actual circumstance? He states, "This is not only because we want to explain theoretical principles by citing Chinese examples, but also because we must take theoretical principles as our guide to resolve many issues of Chinese revolution."¹⁹ As Fogel comments, Ai's work and its popularity over the years suggest a related reason for the rise of Marxism among Chinese intellectuals: they began to understand it philosophically and it appealed to them.²⁰

As Ai conceives it, this purpose requires one to make essential categories of philosophy specific and simple with clear links to real life. In "How Did I Write Philosophy for the Masses?" Ai says that he had been following such mottoes, that is, "In expression, don't fear being juvenile; just seek to explain things concretely"; "In writing, one must intentionally not do pruning; just don't fear being redundant."²¹

This does not indeed mean vulgarization, since Ai claims plainly and seriously that he would not allow even a tiny thread of theoretical distortion in his popularization.²²

Ai denies that philosophy was a highbrow enterprise. He often tells his readers that philosophy is no mystery but a continuity of life,²³ and explains that popularization could not rely on abstractions but had to be concrete with clear links to real life.²⁴ Philosophy starts to grow in soil of everyday life; it is not something mysterious or abstruse but lays everywhere and all the time in details of everyday life. Philosophy should be constantly applied to and proved mutually with practical life. In order to understand a philosophy, just start from recognizing traits of philosophy and understanding life.²⁵ Ai's approach to popularizing dialectical materialism involves using repeatedly commonsensical or everyday life expressions and examples; he stresses on application and applicability, specifying concept with concrete content, and on establishment of continuity between theory and practice. Ai often changes terms that are more abstract into specific expressions. He cites examples in order to render abstract concepts concrete meanings. He analyzes specific examples, giving philosophical concepts historical relevance. As Father Briere comments, Ai shows his unique talent in the deed; he had mastered an appropriate way of making Marxist-Leninist philosophy accessible to virtually any one who could read.²⁶

Ai's argument always comes to commonsensical or simple examples of everyday life. His development of dialectical materialism involved a scheme of enriching meanings of terminology and philosophical concepts with actual things and events. As he claims, all nouns, like concepts (*gainian*) or categories (*fanchou*), are reflection (*fanying*) of actual things or events (*shiwu*).²⁷ We have the word "horse" because we do have actual horses in our actual life. We have the concept of "capitalism" because there do exist capitalist systems in the world. Even the two concepts "relativity" and "absoluteness" could not separate from their correspondent actual things in the world. Ai explains why some people often have themselves stick to abstract concepts when they are engaged in discussions; it is because old philosophers have taken them in, making them ignorant of the fact that there are actual references as continuity to so-called terms or concepts. These people often tried to have themselves transcendent of concrete events, solely playing with terms or concepts.²⁸ And yet, the meaning of terminology depends upon how people use them; terminology means differently when people use it differently.²⁹

Ai argues that one cannot not use a concept but ignore "the stuff it represents (*ta suo fanying de dongxi*)."³⁰ Ai's popularizing dialectical materialism undergoes a process in which he specifies and reorders content of concepts whereby establishing continuity between philosophical concepts and actual-

ity. He accomplishes this by drawing on new and historical events, citing examples, and fortifying images to make philosophical terminology, which has been translated into Chinese from Western languages, obtain full meanings the common people have in their daily life. This is just as what Wang Bi asserted, "Things of diverse categories have their images; images have continuity, giving a symbol meanings," in his "*Ming Xiang* (elucidating the images)," *Zhouyi lueli* in the third century.³⁰ Ai reorders newly added images to a terminology or concepts, reconstructing and reformulating a discourse that acknowledges and reestablishes continuity between concepts and actuality. This turns out to be a process of making a Western philosophical discourse into a strand of modern thought in China that had drawn on the Chinese tradition. As Fogel conceives, the process is to some degree the entire neo-Confucian enterprise since the Song dynasty embodied a move toward popularization in which Zhu Xi (1130–1200) had made effort to pare down the Confucian canon to four essential classics (The Four Books).³¹ Many key Western concepts have undergone such a process of Chinese translation and became Chinese terminology, which symbolizes concrete images and events out of Chinese circumstances. In the process of Ai's popularization the concepts were explained with even more concrete images and events of new and specific historical circumstances. Hence, the strand of dialectical materialism obtained rich Chinese significance and turned out to be very different than what looks like the Chinese analogue. It was no longer exactly the same inherited legacy of Marxian dialectics in the West.

DIALECTIC AND BECOMING-TONGBIAN: SINIFYING DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

We can well agree that Ai's conception of dialectical materialism has been derived from Engels and Russian literature. Like Qu Qiubai, however, what he found in it was something similar to *tongbian*. In the two following chapters we will examine the differences between the English terminology and the Chinese translation and learn that dialectical materialism has become *tongbian* even beginning with the process of translation as it was first introduced to China. It became even closer to *tongbian* as Ai employs Chinese philosophical expressions in his explanation. This had been an ongoing process particularly as the Chinese were engaged in the campaign of "Sinification of Marxism" and in Ai's case of both sinification and popularization. It may suffice to suggest that it is superficial to either juxtapose dialectics with *bianzhengfa* or employ a determinism/voluntarism dichotomy in reading Ai's philosophy. Ai finds the roots of dialectical materialism in Engels

and Russian texts, but reads them in a distinctly different way. What truly matters to us is that the European debate was simply precluded in a process of *dialectic becoming tongbian*. Ai did not take any place in the European debate; what he precisely did was to pursue a Chinese discourse of *tongbian* loaded with Marxist terminology from the West. Perhaps it can be called an engagement, and just in this process, Ai contributed to the development of a Chinese version of Marxism.

As we know from previous sections, Russian Marxism began to have influence on Ai's thought when he was a teenager reading Bukharin's *ABC of Communism*. He learned Japanese by translating Hegel from Japanese. Then, in order to read original works Marx and Engels, Ai learned English and German. At the age of less than twenty, Ai became learned of *The Communist Manifesto*, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, *Materialism and Empiro-Criticism, and the Foundations of Leninism*, which were in Japanese, German, and English. And yet, his knowledge was not only limited to Marxism, but also included Francis Bacon, Baruch Spinoza, Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and other European philosophers, though all their works were fuzzy and abstruse in his view. Ai started learning Russian in 1929 and later translated a selection of letters of Marx and Engels in 1934; and since then most of his translations were from Russian texts, including the works of the Russian philosopher Mark Borisovich Mitin.

However, like Qu Qiubai, Ai was a Chinese. This means that although he was so sophisticated in foreign languages and learned of Western Marxism, he read all the texts he had access to through the eye of his own Chinese experience and culture, and in particular through the style of thought *tongbian*. Fogel made an important point in this regard. As he says, "Ai would seem to have adopted a stance for which orthodox Marxists have been much criticized: not making the cardinal distinction between the human-social realm and the external material world."³² Fogel is right, but does not see that Ai's view is from the perspective of *tongbian*, where the human social existence and "external existence" are not separated but two aspects on a continuum. We will inspect the next part, even with the translation of "social," "existence," and "environment" into *shehui*, *cunzai*, and *huanjing*, the sense of distinction between man and nature of the Western language has been precluded. Translation made dialectic enter a discourse of *tongbian* and became views of *tongbian*.

What particularly leads to Ai's "dialectical materialism" being different from Engels and Russian Marxist literature is the so-called "Sinification of Marxism" campaign in 1938 and over the "Rectification Campaign" in 1942, which legitimized a popularization of Marxism in China. The rise of Sinifying Marxism probably started with Mao who eventually pointed out,

Marxism must be made engaged with the specific and particular of Chinese situation and come to fruition in specific forms of the nation. The great power of Marxism-Leninism lies in its continuity with the revolutionary practices in various countries. For Chinese Communists, [we] must learn how to apply the theories of Marxism-Leninism to specific situations in China. . . . To make Marxism particularized, let it possess natures that are necessarily and particularly Chinese in each circumstance. . . . This means, use Marxism in accordance with Chinese particularities." We must substitute doctrinism with forms that are "popular to common people, and with Chinese styles and endowment.³³

According to Zeng Leshan, Mao emphasizes a Sinification of Marxism, including its philosophy.³⁴ It was indeed Chen Weishi that first used the term "Sinification" in April 1936 and then Ai followed him in 1938 by saying that "now we needed a sinification and pragmatization campaign in philosophical study."³⁵ What does "Sinification of Marxism" mean? As Ai holds, in principle, there are two points: first, a good command of philosophical thoughts of the Chinese tradition and their modalities; and second, a good awareness of our experiences and lessons in Anti-Japanese War practices.³⁶ Zeng comments that Ai seeks a comprehension of Chinese revolutionary experiences in the light of Marxist philosophy and traditional philosophies of China.³⁷ The meaning of "Sinification" is made even more clearly in Ai's "Comments on Several Important Philosophical Trends since the Anti-Japanese War."³⁸ He points out that an important aspect in Sinifying Marxist philosophy and using it in practice is "to study China's own philosophy and further develop the elements of 'materialism and dialectic' in our own tradition."³⁹ Here what Ai calls "the elements of 'materialism and dialectic' in our own tradition" may sufficiently be referred to the strand of *tongbian* thought. For him, dialectical materialism in Marxism is something similar to *tongbian* in the Chinese tradition; and there is continuity between the two strands of thought.

Ai's "Sinification of Marxism" includes apparently popularization and reading dialectical materialism as a continuity of the elements of "materialism and dialectics" in traditional philosophy. In his "*Yanjiu tigang*," or "An Outline for Study," attached to the Chinese translation of Mitin's dialectical materialism, as a guideline for dialectical materialism study, Ai clearly advises his readers that there is a rich heritage of "materialism and dialectics" that grew naturally from China's own philosophical tradition, that is, Marxist philosophy has roots [precisely, continuity] in Chinese thoughts,⁴⁰ for example, Laozi and Mozi.

In Ai's view, there are some basic points of the kind of "materialism" that has naturally grown in Chinese tradition, i.e., the guest (*keguan*, or objective)

world is regarded an exisience that is *self-so-ing* (*ziran*) and *coming-from-itself* (*benyuan*); a comprehension of the exisience of the objective world, and connecions as well as changes in things, does not require the principle in terms of the role of any spiritual being, soul, or other spirit-like entities; the basic attitude of “dialectic” is to comprehend things as changing and continuous (with each other).⁴¹ As for “principles” of “dialectic,”

There was Laozi in China, whose “*ziran*” (*self-so-ingness*) meani “*zhou xing er bu dai*,” (that [I]da[o] revolves without pause), “*dong er yu chu*” (that it moves, reproducing without a rest), and, [as a principle of “dialectic,”] that comprehending continuity in changes in light of the continuity of the opposites (pairing aspects) in things. As Laozi indicates, “*fan zhe dao zhi dong*” (Returning is what *dao* does as moving), “*you wu xiang sheng, nan yi xiang cheng*” (Nothing and something grow from each other, difficultness and easiness are *becoming-each-other*), etc.⁴²

It seems Ai is not fully aware of, or overly concerned with, the overriding determinism or materialistic reductionism of Marxist philosophy. The answer could be as simply as this: for Ai, the debate in the West has been irrelevant.

Fogel implies that if we address Ai’s Marxism as part of an ongoing debate within the Marxist system of thought, he clearly rests with the majority wing of the movement most heavily influenced by Engels’ and others’ efforts to include the natural world within the purview of dialectical analysis.⁴³ As to this view, I would say yes; but we should be clear about what kind of “natural world” we are talking about. For Ai, nothing was wrong with Engels’ claims of the dialectical interrelatedness of all things in nature as well as human society, since he reads this as *tongbian*. He regards Engels’ dialectic rather with the kind of implications that has been embedded in analogously pairing categories like *yin* and *yang*. Ai’s “interconnectedness” rather means continuity, and “dialectical interconnectedness” as a compound rather indicates continuity through changes.

Of course, there are elements in the debate on dialectical materialism that are less comprehensible from the perspective of *tongbian*. Many cases showed that Ai and other exponents of dialectical materialism did not try to force everything to fit in with the modality of *tongbian*. They were simply either left in oblivion or rejected. We will analyze the case of “agnostics,” in which Ai’s “*bu ke zhi lun*” is a Chinese translation of “agnosticism” that directly came from Lenin, and Ai’s “arguments” against “agnostics” sound very much like Lenin’s and Engels’. However, we will find Ai criticizes “*bu ke zhi lun*” for other different reasons. Ai simply stood off the philosophical battles pledged to which determines which. His standpoint is rather a *tongbian* in that the world is comprehensible to us and that we can attain the stage of grasp-

ing the intangible continuity between things and so can enter the spirit-like state of comprehension. Ai does not refute Kant on the question "Is thinking capable of cognition of the real world?" For Ai, what concerns is not *noumenon*, or unknowable substance, but *daoli* (ways), continuity and correlation. All the way in his refutation, Ai simply takes neither Kant, nor Kantianism nor even neo-Kantianism as his major concern but simply leaves them in oblivion. Nor does Ai seem to have concerns with the critique of Engels within the Marxist movement in 1923. In his *History and Class Consciousness*, Georg Lukács expressly attacks Engels for his following Hegel's mistaken lead and extending dialectics to apply to nature.⁴⁴ Ai may have very probably learned of Lukács' attack since he reads German well and the Comintern's denunciation of Lukács was renowned. In addition, there was also a partial Japanese translation (by Mizuto Hozaburo) of *History and Class Consciousness* available in 1927, which Ai may have encountered when he was in Japan. On top of that, Mitin was among the Soviet philosophers who lodged rebuttal to Lukács. However, Ai never incorporated the episode into his works. There is a sound philosophical reason, that is, it was very probably because both Lukács' attack and the repudiation by Comintern and Russia philosophers may sound alien from the perspective of *tongbian*. The attack and repudiation remained within the European philosophical combat. It made little sense in the point of view of Chinese thought.

We will notice that in Ai's discussion of the three laws of dialectic logic, there is a change in the order of the three laws. While for Engels, the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa goes first, the interpenetration of opposites, second; this order is switched in Ai's *Talks*, with the unity of contradiction first, and the mutual change between quality and quantity second. This certainly shows that a *tongbian* reading requires that "the unity of contradiction" go first; and this is in a sense a rejection of the order set by Engels. In addition, beyond Engels's schematic picture of the law of the unity of contradiction, Ai indeed assumes a discussion on "internal changes"; he contests, external change is merely mechanical whereas internal change is substantive. Ai seems not interested in Engels's view of the penetrating of opposites as change of place consisting in approaching or separating when two bodies act on each other, nor as "contracting or expanding," nor as "attracting or repulsion." He has simply left this view in oblivion. Little is seen in Ai's discussion of the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another. Little can be found that can be identified with Engles's law of unity of contradiction in which all motion consists in the interplay of attraction and repulsion, and the form of motion conceived as repulsion is the same as that which modern physics terms "energy." Furthermore, when Ai criticizes Yang Xianzhen in 1964, Mao came down on the same side of

Ai's critique of Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. As a copy theory of knowledge, Lenin explains knowledge as a perceptual reflection of senses that denies a mediating function to consciousness. Lenin's view finds an avid follower Yang Xianzhen, who almost took the work of Lenin as "Bible."⁴⁵ Although it had been accepted on the surface when it was first introduced and understood in light of *tongbian* by Ai or other exponents of dialectical materialism, the theory of reflection was finally rejected because from the standpoint of *tongbian* it was unintelligible. It is in the enterprise of either obtaining a *tongbian* reading or leaving some elements in oblivion or rejecting the views in Engels and Russian texts that sound too alien that Ai contributed to the development of a Chinese version of Marxism, which came later to fruition in Mao Zedong.

NOTES

1. The "Sinification of Marxism" campaign, which legitimized the popularization of Marxism in China, arose following Mao Zedong's pointing out that Marxism must engage the specifics and particulars of Chinese situation and come to fruition in specific forms of the nation in 1938. It was indeed Chen Weishi who first used the term "Sinification" in 1936 when he published *Tongsu bianzhengfa jianghua* (A Talk on Vulgarizing Dialectics). Ai Siqu also used the same term, saying: "Now we need a Sinification and pragmatization campaign in philosophical study." See Zeng Leshan, *The Road to Simplify Marxist Philosophy* (East China Teachers University Press, 1991), p. 214.
2. Ai, "A Commentary on Some Important Philosophical Trends since the Start of Anti-Japanese War," *Ai Siqu wenji*, 1, pp. 563 and 556.
3. Ai arrived in Tokyo and moved in with Zheng. See Zheng, "Ai Siqu and His *Dazhong zhixue*," *Yi ge zhixue jia de daolu* (A Philosopher's Road) (Kunming: Yunnan Renmin chubanshe, 1987), p. 45.
4. Lu Wanmei, "Huiyi Ai Siqu tongzhi zai Yunnan minzhong ribao pianduan" (Reminiscences of Comrade Ai Siqu's Work with the *Masses Daily*), *Yi ge zhixue jia de daolu* (A Philosopher's Road), p. 26.
5. *Yi ge zhixue jia de daolu*, p. 25.
6. Joshua A. Fogel, *Ai Ssu-ch'i's Contribution to the Development of Chinese Marxism*, 1987, p. 21.
7. Zeng Leshan p. 190.
8. Huang, p. 510.
9. Fogel, p. 26.
10. Fogel, p. 68.
11. Huang, p. 514.
12. Ai Siqu, *Zhixue yu shenghuo* (Philosophy and Life), Shanghai, Dushu shenghuo chubanshe, 1937, p. 10.

13. According to Huang Jiande, Mao copied nineteen pages, totaling over 4,500 characters from Ai's *Philosophy and Life*; perhaps this was the only time Mao had ever done so after he read a book.
14. See *Mao Zedong zhexue pizhu ji* (*A Collection of Mao Zedong's Marginalia to Philosophical Works*), Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe (Central Documentation Press), 1988, p. 201.
15. Fogel, p. 64.
16. Ai, "Chouxiaug zuoyong yu bianzhengfa," *Zhenglu* (Correct Road), June 1, 1933.
17. Ai, "About Talks on Philosophy," *Ai Siqi wenji* (Selected Works of Ai Siqi), 1, Renmin chubanshe, 1981, 1, pp. 283–84.
18. Ai, "Philosophy for the Masses," *Ai Siqi wenji* (Selected Works of Ai Siqi), 1, Renmin chubanshe, 1981, 1, p. 198.
19. Ai, "Aiming an Arrow at Target and Other Issues," *Ai Siqi wenji*, p. 641.
20. Fogel, p. 32.
21. *Ai Siqi wenji* (Selected Works of Ai Siqi), 1, pp. 283–84.
22. *Ai Siqi wenji*, 1, pp. 283–84
23. Ai, "Philosophy for the Masses," *Ai Siqi wenji* (Selected Works of Ai Siqi), 1, p. 135.
24. Ai, "How Did I Write *Philosophy for the Masses*?" reprinted in *Philosophy for the Masses* (1979 edition), pp. 278–280.
25. Ai, "Philosophy for the Masses," *Ai Siqi wenji* (Selected Works of Ai Siqi), 1, p. 135.
26. O. Briere, *Fifty Years of Chinese Philosophy: 1898–1948*, London, 1965, p. 78–79.
27. Ai, *Philosophy and Life*, Shanghai, Shanghai dushu shenghuo chubanshe, 1948, p. 1. Here, *fanying* is not reflection, but continuity of concrete image and/or actual event.
28. Ai, *Philosophy and Life*, Shanghai, Shanghai dushu shenghuo chubanshe, 1948, p. 2.
29. Ai, "Relativity and Absoluteness," *Philosophy and Life*, Shanghai, Shanghai dushu shenghuo chubanshe, 1937, p. 2.
30. Wang Bi, "zhu lei ke wei qi xiang, he yi ke wei qi hui" from "Ming Xiang," Shanghai, Zhouyi lucli, Zhonghua shuju, 1922.
31. Fogel, pp. 31–32.
32. Fogel, p. 40.
33. Mao, *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, combined volumes, pp. 449–500.
34. Zeng Leshan, *The Road to Sinify Marxist Philosophy*, East China Teachers University Press, 1991, p. 214–15.
35. Ai, "The Current Situation and Tasks in Philosophy," *Ai Siqi wenji*, 1, (1981), p. 387.
36. Ai, "On Formal Logic and Dialectics," *Ai Siqi wenji*, 1, (1981), p. 420.
37. Zeng Leshan, *The Road to Sinify Marxist Philosophy*, East China Teachers University Press, 1991, p. 215.
38. Ai, "Comments on Several Important Philosophical Trends since the Anti-Japanese War," *Ai Siqi wenji*, 1, (1981), p. 563.

39. Ai Siqui *wenji*, 1, p. 556.
40. Ai Siqui, ed., *Zhexue xuanji*, 1939, p. 449.
41. Ai Siqui, ed., *Zhexue xuanji*, 1939, p. 447.
42. Ai Siqui, ed., *Zhexue xuanji*, 1939, p. 447.
43. Fogel, p. 48.
44. Fogel, p. 48–49.
45. Fogel, p. 25.

Mao Zedong: The Mature Formulation of Dialectical Materialism

MAO'S READINGS

In the engagement of dialectical materialism with the thought of *tongbian* of the Chinese tradition, which involved thousands of Chinese intellectuals and translations of voluminous foreign literature, a Chinese version of Marxism eventually developed. It came to fruition in Mao Zedong. As we review this process, we note that Mao's infatuation with philosophy starting in the 1930s involves a voracious consumption of texts and almost entirely depends upon Chinese translation. As he reads widely the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, Mao pays most attention to the texts of a number of Soviet and Chinese authors like Mitin, Shirokov, Li Da, and Ai Siqui. Mao's view of dialectical materialism could have been heavily contaminated with positivism and dualism since he has obtained his knowledge mostly from Russian texts, which are full of terms and formulas of Soviet orthodox Marxism. Nevertheless, Mao identifies many elements in dialectical materialism with the *tongbian* and appeals to classical Chinese expressions in his reading.

Mao demonstrates even stronger Chinese characteristics than Qu Qiubai and Ai Siqui; and perhaps is far more sophisticated in Chinese history and philosophy. He is convinced that there is continuity between dialectical materialism and the kind of *tongbian* in ancient Chinese thinkers. This may explain why Mao does not entirely accept whatever is in the foreign literature. For instance, he is very critical of Stalin's view. For him, Stalin is quite "*xing er shang xue*" for he does not understand that there is continuity between opposites.¹ Mao has his own version of dialectical materialism, which makes an enterprise of seeking continuity between differences or changes. His discourse develops into a new phase of the traditional strand

of *tongbian* in modern times, but with Marxist terminology. The maturity and sophistication of this new phase of *tongbian*, or Chinese version of Marxism, is betrayed in the fact that Mao is not only an advocate but also a performer of his theories. His thought clearly informs his practices. His new version of dialectical materialism does not only constitute his own thought but also becomes a major thinking modality for the general theoretical realm of Chinese Marxism. It is his thought that shapes the Chinese revolution and leads it to victory.

Mao's version of Marxism is saturated with correlative thinking. Although he does not formulate a view that has in some way "recovered Marx" from Second International Marxists, Leninists, and Stalinists, we do see that on certain points Mao seems close to Marx, and thus that there is an dialogue between them. For instance, both Marx and Mao are not materialists of Engels's category, and they have a similar view on 'internal relations.' In Bertell Ollman's reading, Marx's dialectic is categorized as the philosophy of internal relations that does not allow absolute distinctions between society and the natural world, which is similar to Mao's.

Mao had not been able to read any Marxist literature in a foreign language until he read the English version of *The Communist Manifesto* at the age of sixty-three, even though he did study English as early as 1920.² According to Lin Ke, Mao learned English from him in 1954, but still had difficulties in answering foreign visitor's questions in English after four years. He did read, however, the *Manifesto*, *A Critique of Gotha Program*, *The Preface to the Critique of Political Economy*, and some texts in English on logic, and he made detailed marginalia.³

Mao read a Chinese translation of the *Manifesto* and Karl Kautsky's *Class Struggle* as early as 1920. He first quoted Lenin's *State and Revolution* in May and September, 1926 when he taught at the Peasants Movement Lecture School, even before the first complete translation of the book by Ke Bonian appeared in January 1927.⁴ In April 1932, the Red Army took Zhangzhou City, the second largest city of Fujian Province, apprehending some Marxist books including Engels's *Anti-Dühring*, Lenin's *Two Strategies of the Social Democratic Party in the Democratic Revolution*, and "*Left Wing*" *Communism, an Infantile Disorder*. Mao read the three books during the Long March according to the memoirs of Wu Liping and Peng Dehuai.⁵ In the years of Yan'an, Mao widely consumed Marxist-Leninist works. A number of books that he read then are still kept in his house today, which include Marx's *Capital*, *The Development of Socialism from Utopia to Science*, *Selected Works of Lenin*, Lenin's *the State and Revolution*, and Stalin's *Theory and Strategy* (a collection including *The Foundation of Leninism*), and *Several Issues of Leninism*, and also Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin on Arts.⁶

Pang Xianzhi records in his diary of October 23, 1959 that, as preparation for one of his inspection trips, Mao ordered hundreds of books, which include *Capital*; *Selected Works of Marx and Engels*; *Wage, Price and Profit*; *A Critique of Gotha Program*; *The Critique of Political Economy*; *Anti-Dühring*; *The Dialectics of Nature*; *The Letters of Marx and Engels*; *Selected Works of Lenin*; Lenin's *From the February Revolution to the October Revolution*; *the Proletariat Revolution and the Traitor Kautsky*; *State and Revolution*; "Left Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder; Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism; *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*; *One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward*; *What Is to Be Done*; *What Is "the People's Friend"*?; Anarchism or Socialism; Stalin's *The Foundation of Leninism*; *The Issues of Leninism*; *A History of the Soviet Communist Party*; *A Textbook of Political Economy (Soviet)*; Mitin's *Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism*; and Kawakami Hajime's *An Outline of Political Economy*. Mao's order also listed some works by Hegel, Feuerbach, and other Western writers, and on top of those, there were also more than ten titles of Laozi, Xunzi, *Hanfeizi*, and Zhang Zai.⁷

Mao read a great deal of Lenin and loved his writings. As he stated on April 21, 1965, "I studied Lenin first, then the writings of Marx and Engels. Lenin is easier to read."⁸ The works of Lenin that Mao read most were *The Two Strategies of the Social Democratic Party in the Democratic Revolution*, "Left Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder, *The State and Revolution*, *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, and *Notes of Philosophy*. Mao studied *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* in Yan'an, and considered it a classic of Marxist philosophy. He mentioned it many times in the 1950s and 1960s. On one occasion he commented, "This book is not that easy to read, but we must read it."⁹ Yet, Mao's interest in the book was not because he was impressed by the ongoing philosophical battles regarding materialism or positivism, or by Lenin's theory of reflection. Like Ai, Mao did not conceive that reflection implied separation of thinking from being, and thus had no problem with that. Mao's interest was rather in articulating Lenin's theory of reflection with specific issues around him, to say precisely, the problem of some people's pessimistic attitude, which Mao believed was exactly due to their inclination to think in merely abstract terms that separated thought from the actual situation. As he talked about the book, Mao insisted on two critiques: 1) of "idealism" (i.e., *weixiu zhuyi*, if more exact, to think in ways lacking a continuity with actual situation); and 2) of pessimism as a result of this "idealism."¹⁰

Besides Marxism, Mao had adequate knowledge of other Western philosophy. He had showed great enthusiasm about Western thought as a young man. When John Dewey lectured in Peking University in 1919, Mao was not

in Beijing but he kept track of the coverage of Dewey's lecturing activities in various newspapers and magazines. Mao did attend one of Dewey's lectures entitled "The Three Contemporary Philosophers" at Peking University in 1920. He actively participated in the preparation for the visiting event of Dewey and Bertrand Russell in Hunan in October 1920 and was one of the stenographers at the symposiums Dewey and Russell gave presentations.

Cai Yuanpei influenced Mao heavily during the time when Mao was in Peking University. In his marginalia to Friedrich Paulsen's *A System of Ethics*, Mao developed views on the line of Cai's *An Outline of Philosophy*, which had adopted the ideas of Auguste Comte. Mao showed great interest in Cai's lecture on Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche and Henri Bergson.¹¹

Mao also studied Hegel as he was in the Hunan First Normal School between 1914 and 1918. He read introductory essays on Hegel in the *New Youth* and other magazines and continued reading on Hegel even after he was attracted to Marxism. Hegel was an important topic in the agenda of his study group. Li Weihan published representing the study group an essay "A Critique of Idealist View of History," which was a fairly systematic exposition of Hegel's idealist dialectic, and, indeed, a result of collective discussion by Li, Mao, and Cai Hesen. Mao regarded the translation of Hegel's *Monistic Philosophy* by Ma Junwu an important book; he read it a number of times and also recommended it to his study group. Even more than forty years later when he met with a foreigner on August 5, 1965, Mao still claimed that one must read Hegel.¹²

Mao read even more on Western thought in the period of Yan'an and after 1949 the People's Republic was established. He demonstrated well familiarity with Western philosophical history, particularly some classical philosophical works; of course, he had learned a lot from reading Marxist literature. As he claimed, reading other Western thinkers helped his understanding of dialectical materialism. He read *A History of European Philosophy* by Deborin in 1932.¹³ At a meeting with a foreigner in 1965, he mentioned his reading of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and betrayed high regard for Feuerbach, who asserted for the first time that the idea of God was mere reflection of the human mind. Mao stressed that one must read his work. Mao was familiar with ancient Greek philosophy and classical German philosophy, which is represented by Kant, Hegel, and Feuerbach, can be regarded two pinnacles in Western philosophy development.¹⁴

Mao never treats philosophy as a mere university affair and never talks philosophy for the sake of philosophy; whoever had been around him witnessed his infatuation with philosophy, especially in the 1930s. In his interviews with Mao in 1936, Edgar Snow recorded: "Mao was an ardent student of philosophy. Once, when I was in the process of interviewing him in evenings on the

history of Chinese communists, a visitor brought him a number of new books on philosophy and Mao requested to suspend our appointments. He spent three or four nights intensely consuming these books, and seemed to have forgotten about everything else.”¹⁵ In Mao’s own words, the purpose of his studies on philosophy was a matter of obtaining tools. In a letter of January 1939, Mao wrote: “I do not have enough tools. For this year I will still have to study for more tools—to study philosophy. . . . Leninism, primarily the philosophical elements.”¹⁶

Indeed, two points can be drawn as regard Mao’s knowledge of Marxism, first, it was almost all learned from Russian texts; and second, it was all from Chinese translation. Although not too many, the books that Mao had read in Yan’an and have been preserved in Mao’s former residence include the writings by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, as well as by both Soviet and Chinese authors of the early 1930s.¹⁷ Mao read the third print of the Chinese translation of *A Textbook on Dialectical Materialism* by Shirokov and Aizenberg, which had been translated by Li Da and Lei Zhongjian between November 1936 and April 1937. The book was thought to be a systematic discussion on dialectical materialism based upon the writings of Marx and Lenin. Mao made his marginalia to the book that were about twelve thousand Chinese characters.¹⁸ Mao concentrated his notes on chapter 3, “The Fundamental Laws of Dialectical Materialism”; the longest note, which was of as many as one thousand characters had heavy impact on Li Da’s own later writings, for example, *Outlines of Social Studies (Shehui xue da gang)*. The note was later reflected in Mao’s speech “The Teaching Outlines of Dialectical Materialism” in 1937. The speech contained the original versions of Mao’s well-known essays “On Contradictions” and “On Practice.” Shi Zhongquan holds that there is a direct relevance between Mao’s essays “On Contradiction” and “On Practice” and *A Textbook on Dialectical Materialism and Dialectical and Historical Materialism* by Mitin et al.¹⁹

Mao had read Mitin’s *Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism* before July 1937, which was translated by Shen Zhiyuan and published in December 1936. The book had 720,000 Chinese characters; volume I was printed eighteen times and volume II, thirteen, as of the year 1950. It was widely read and had great impact on the Chinese readership. Mao made enormous marginalia to that work, too.

Mao read Li Da’s *Outlines of Social Studies (Shehui xue da gang)* between January and March 1938, which was a weighty tome of more than eight hundred pages, or more than 470,000 Chinese characters, and regarded as a comprehensive account of “materialist conception” of history and “dialectical materialism.” It was popularly received as a veritable compendium of Marxism that explained nearly all the important issues. The work drew on Soviet

texts and had five sections: the first dealing with dialectical materialism made half of the entire text; the other four sections addressed “historical materialism,” social economic structure, social political structure, and social ideology, respectively. Li sent a copy to Mao shortly after the book was printed in May 1937. Mao was delighted because he thought it was well written and this was the first Marxist textbook written by a Chinese. Mao heavily annotated the text with 3,500-character marginalia. As Guo Huaruo’s remembers, Mao recommended the book to the Yan’an Philosophical Study Group and Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, claiming that he had read it ten times.²⁰

An important portion of Mao’s reading in the 1930s were the writings of Ai Siqui, including *Sixiang fangfa* (Methodology of Thought), *Zhexue xuanji* (Philosophical Selections), *Xin zhexue dagang* (Outlines of the New Philosophy), *Dazhong zhexue* (Philosophy for the Masses), and *Zhexue yu shenghuo* (Philosophy and Life), which he claimed his favorite. *Sixiang fangfa* addressed the issue of changing oneself through changing the world and became very influential in Yan’an. Mao wrote marginal notes while reading the book. We find *A Collection of Mao Zedong’s Marginalia to Philosophical Works (Mao Zedong zhexue pizhu ji)* includes Mao’s notes to Ai’s *Philosophical Selections* two months later after the book was published in Shanghai in March 1939.²¹ The Liberation Press of Yan’an published it too in the same year. The sources of the selection were *A Textbook on Dialectical Materialism* by Shirokov and Aizenberg, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* by Mitin et al., Li Da’s *Outlines of Social Studies*, and the entry on “dialectical materialism” from the *Bol’shaja Sovjetskaja Entsiklopedija* by Mitin and others. There were also appendices, which were Stalin’s *Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism* and Ai’s “*Yanjiu tigang*” (An Outline for Study). Mao devoted plenty of time reading the book three times. He made marginal notes with black, red and blue pencils, and writing brush, respectively, and his marginalia totaled over 3,200 Chinese characters.²²

I could not find the information of exactly when Mao read the entry on “dialectical materialism” in the *Bol’shaja Sovjetskaja Entsiklopedija* by Mitin and others, which was translated by Ai and Zheng Yili and entitled *Xin zhexue dagang* (An Outline of the New Philosophy). The work included an introduction to Greek dialectics, the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries’ dialectics of European tradition, and the German idealistic dialectics. Lenin’s dialectic was regarded as the dialectical materialism of the period of imperialism and proletarian revolution, which had developed from the primary aspect of Marx’s theory, that is, the *tongyi xing* (correlativity) between dialectic, epistemology, and ethics. Lenin was said to have developed *fanying lun* (theory of reflection) as within the category of dialectics; he emphasized *duili*

tongyi (unity of opposites) as the crucial issue of dialectical materialism or the kernel of dialectic. The translation acknowledged two fundamental points as the nature of dialectical materialism, that is, it had to be put into practice and only serves the interests of the proletarian. Mao apparently had read the book for he recommended certain chapters of both *An Outline of the New Philosophy* and *Philosophical Selections* as “study documents after the Sixth Party’s Congress.”²³

It is apparent that Mao also read Ai’s *Philosophy for the Masses* since he mentioned the book several times, particularly as regards a popularization of Marxist philosophy. He sent a telegram to Ye Jianying and Liu Ding in Xi’an on October 22, 1936, advising them to purchase books on social sciences and philosophy that were easy to read; as he suggested that “they have to be well-chosen, really easy to read and worthwhile reading, like Ai Siqu’s *Philosophy for the Masses*.” And yet, together with his letters of January 31, 1941 to his two sons and their “young fellow comrades” who were then studying in the Soviet Union, Mao sent some books of literature, history, and philosophy, including a copy of Ai’s *Philosophy for the Masses*.²⁴

Mao loved Ai’s *Philosophy and Life*. Published in April 1937, the book included several essays that had been rebuttals to Ye Qing, among which was a long article responding to Ye’s condemnation of *Talks on Philosophy*.²⁵ There were also a number of previously published essays in reply to the readership of *Reader’s Life* and *Chen bao*. Ai explained the correlativity between “relativity and absoluteness,” “spirit and material,” “dialectical logic,” “internal and external causes,” “truth,” and “perceptual and rational knowledge.” Mao spoke highly of the work. He wrote a congratulation letter to Ai, saying, “Of all your works, *Philosophy and Life* is even more profound. My reading of it has benefited me greatly. I’ve copied out a bit of it [nineteen handwritten pages] and would like you to take a look, see if there is any place that I did not copy correctly. There is a point I have some slight doubts about (no fundamental disagreement, though). Please give it second thoughts and then talk about it with me. I’ll drop by to see you when you have some time.”²⁶ In fact, although he copied out these passages word for word of Ai’s text, Mao did it with revisions in wording and meaning. Perhaps this was the only time Mao had ever done so after he read a book.

Mao’s marginalia reflected his thought in responding to the content that he was reading, his marginalia contained restatement, key point emphasis, summation, conclusion, and further development of the points of views of the book that he was reading. They also included his doubts, questions, and his own standpoint. Many points in the marginalia were scantly seen in his officially published works, though. Of course, the sources for his development of a Chinese version of Marxist philosophy had been far more than the texts we

have mentioned. The works that he had made marginalia to made only a small proportion of all the sources he had accessed to; too much more material was lost during wartime and the years of revolution. His love for philosophy during his stay in Yan'an should be considered a continuity of his passion for philosophy as a young man. His philosophical study continued and improved even after 1949, particularly in the 1960s.

MAO'S ROOTS IN TONGBIAN

It is not difficult to assume that Mao's appeal to many classical Chinese expressions in reading Marxist dialectical materialism was a result of his deep roots in *tongbian*. Mao had studied little Western philosophy before 1909 when he was sixteen. What he had learned by then were the *Four Books*, namely *The Great Learning* (*Daxue*), *The Doctrine of the Mean* (*Zhongyong*), *The Analects of Confucius* (*Lunyu*), and *Mencius* (*Mengzi*), and the *Five Classics*, namely *The Book of Songs* (*Shijing*), *The Book of History* (*Shujing*), *The Book of Changes* (*Yijing*), *The Book of Rites* (*Liji*), and *The Spring and Autumn Annals* (*Chunqiu*). He had loved Confucius. Mao had never suspended his study of classical Chinese philosophy, especially pre-Qin Confucianism, Daoism, the Li Learning (*lixue*) of Song and Ming dynasties, even though he was heavily influenced by Western thought during the New Culture period around 1920s. According to Li Yongtai, Mao was particularly interested in classical Chinese dialectics, sophisticated in the dialectic of Confucius, Mencius, Laozi, Zhuangzi, Xunzi, Mozi, Qu Yuan, Sima Qian, Zhu Xi, Zhang Zai, and Wang Fuzhi, and finally developed his early dialectical style of thought and employed it in his own thinking and writings. He did not accept ancient thought rigidly, though.²⁷

Nurtured in classical Chinese thought, Mao had a worldview fostered with striking characteristics of *tongbian*. First, *tong*: In his view, the world was one with the continuity of *tian-di-ren*, or a view of continuity running through nature and humanity, which gave a "world" as a dynamic process. In his letter to Li Jinxi of August 23, 1917, Mao claimed that "all the human beings under the sky constituted a continuity of the universe."²⁸ Second, *bian*: In his *Classroom Notes* of October and December 1913, Mao wrote: "There are ten thousand events under the sky and they are changing in ten thousand ways without pause";²⁹ "for instance, so deep as water is and so scorching as fire is, it is nothing but movement that is presenting itself."³⁰ In his marginal notes to Friedrich Paulsen's *A System of Ethics*, Mao pointed out that "changes make ten thousand varieties."³¹ There is nothing that never revolves, and never changes. Human ideas and their physical conditions are all the time changing.

"We love change and have a sense of curiosity. We cannot even suspend changes in ourselves for even a minute."³² As he believed, humanity and the ten thousand things are like in revolving and changing without pause, "human bodies are changing every day," and "The sky and earth are nothing but rather movement."³³

Mao's deep roots in *tongbian* is seen in two concurrent respects, on the one hand, his comprehension represents a *tongbian* reading of Marxist texts, and on the other hand, he read elements of classical thought as dialectical materialism (*weiwu bianzhengfa*). Mao regarded Mozi as a Great Master (*dajia*) of dialectical materialism.³⁴ In his letter to Chen Boda, who was then compiling a manuscript on Mozi, Mao highly praised his findings of Mozi as a Chinese Heraclitus. The title Mao suggested for Chen's work was: "The Philosophy of Mozi, a Great Ancient Master of 'Dialectical Materialism.'" Mao also explained Mozi's in the terminology of "dialectical materialism," arguing that both "*liang er wu pian* (With two aspects, no inclination is tended to one side) in Mozi" and "*zhi liang yong zhong* (Hold to the two aspects, but to adopt the stand in the middle) in Confucius" suggested a relatively stable *zhi* or "quality." As he said, "A 'quality' has two aspects with one is the principal in a particular process. This requires that *zhi* has to be *pian* (an inclination to one side), or relatively stable one-sidedness. For a (certain) *zhi*, it does mean the one-sidedness of dominance. Otherwise it would mean a negation of *zhi*. What Mozi meant by "non-one-sidedness (*wupian*)" was "not to incline to an 'alienated quality' (*yizhi*) either on the right or left side," it did suggest an inclination to the one that dominates the other of the two aspects of a particular *zhi*. (This is exactly what by which *zheng* is meant). "If the Mo school was indeed 'dialectical materialism,' it must be interpreted as such."³⁵

A fruitful proportion of classical philosophy that nurtured Mao's *tongbian* thought had come from Laozi. By the age of twenty, Mao had been well familiar with Laozi. In his *Classroom Notes*, we find perhaps his earliest quotation from him: "In the world there is nothing more submissive and weaker than water, Yet for attacking that which is harder and strong nothing can surpass it."³⁶ One time Mao picked up a conversation with an old hermit on traveling together with one of his friends in 1917. He mentioned to him Laozi and Zhuangzi, stating that he had read the *Thirteen Classics* (*shi san jing*), Laozi, and Zhuangzi, and commented that Wang Bi made the best annotations to Laozi, and Guo Xiang, to Zhuangzi. We can also find his following marginal notes to Paulsen's *A System of Ethics*:

sure that once we entered a reign of Great Harmony, waves of competition and friction would inevitably break forth that would disrupt the reign of Great Harmony. It is for this reason that the conception of a society in which the sage is

exterminated and the wise discarded, and the people of one stage grow old and die without having had any dealings with those of another, put forward by Laozi and Zhuangzi, remains but an ideal society and nothing more.³⁷

The passage was a condensation of chapters nineteen and eighty of Laozi's *Daode jing*.

We mentioned previously that Mao ordered a list of over a hundred books to be brought with him on a trip on October 23, 1959, which included not only many Marxist works, but also more than ten titles on Laozi, Xunzi, Hanfeizi, and Zhang Zai.³⁸ Mao named Laozi's simple dialectics, and particularly, continuity of opposites, and mutual transformation between *mao* and *dun*. Mao quoted the same analogue from Laozi, the interdependence of good and bad fortunes, in his "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People": "We must learn to look at problems from an all-around perspective, seeing the reverse as well as the obverse side of things. In given conditions, a bad thing may give rise to good results, and a good thing to bad results. Laozi had said even two thousand years ago that good fortune lieth within bad, bad fortune lurketh within good."³⁹

As mutual transformation between *mao* and *dun*, Laozi emphasizes "take withdrawal as moving forward, have movement conditioned by staying still, overcome hardness with softness, and make the weak defeat the strong." Mao was so impressed by Laozi's "dialectic" that he quoted him in his essay "The Strategy of Chinese Revolutionary War" in discussing a strategic withdrawal by giving up some land and cities, "If you want to lay a thing aside, you must first set it up; if you would take from a thing, you must give to it."⁴⁰

Mao had studied Zhuangzi before he was twenty. According to Chen Jin, Mao quoted Zhuangzi in many of his writings from 1913 to 1965. In particular, we find that, of the several paragraphs of the quotations in his *Classroom Notes from Zhuangzi*, there was the famous anecdote of *Hundun* (Chaos):⁴¹

The ruler of the North Sea was "Swift," the ruler of the South Sea was "Sudden," and the ruler of the Central Sea was Lord of *Hundun*— "Chaos." Swift and Sudden had on several occasions encountered each other in the territory of Chaos, and Chaos had treated them with great hospitality. Swift and Sudden, devising a way to repay Chaos' generosity, said: "Human beings all have seven orifices through which they see, hear, eat and breathe. Chaos alone is without them." They then attempted to bore holes in Chaos, each day boring one hole. On the seventh day, Chaos died.⁴²

Mao regarded Qu Yuan (340–278 B.C.E.) of the Chu Kingdom in the Warring States Period, Liu Zongyuan (773–819 C.E.) of the Tang dynasty, and Liu's contemporary, Liu Yuxi as "materialist." Qu was the famous author of *The Songs of Chu (Chuci)*, a classical type of Chinese verses. In one of his works

entitled “Questioning the Sky,” Qu raised over 170 questions about the formation and structure of the sky and earth as a refutation to conventional myths. Mao saw “materialism” in the work and commented that “Questioning *Tian*” (*Tianwen*) was extraordinary since Qu raises these questions even thousands years ago, all regarding the universe, nature, and history.⁴³ A thousand years later, Liu Zongyuan wrote “A Reply to the Questions about the *Tian*” (*Tiandui*), and “The Discourse of *Tian*” (*Tianshuo*). Liu rejected all interpretations of *Tian* as something supernatural, arguing that the ten thousand things between the sky and earth had grown from the changing *qi* of *yin* and *yang*. Mao mentioned Liu a number of times, referring him as having simple materialism and dialectics.⁴⁴ Among the three ancient materialists, Mao particularly recommended Liu Yuxi, who wrote “On *Tian*” (*Tianhun*), explaining *tian* as “*wu* or things.” As he exceptionally suggested, *tian*’s domination over humanity was not necessarily true; humanity will triumph over *tian*.⁴⁵ Mao took this view as a development from the materialist elements in Liu Zongyuan.⁴⁶

Mao found dialectical elements in Confucius, too, even though Mao did not particularly like him. Mao mentioned in one of his letters to Zhang Wentian of February 20, 1939 that Chen Boda’s *The Philosophy of Confucius* did not plainly recognize many dialectical elements in Confucius, despite that his thought was by large “metaphysical,” especially his views on learning and on society. As he contends, it contains “dialectical elements” when Confucius explains correlations of “naming” (*ming*) with “actuality” (*shi*), of “culture” (*wen*) with “quality” (*zhi*), and of “talking” (*yan*) with “doing” (*xing*) as well as in his view on “nature” (*ziran*) suggested by the famous phrase: “While standing by a river, the Master said, what passes away is, perhaps, like this, day and night it never lets up.”⁴⁷ One of Mao’s favorite concepts was *neng-dong xing* (active role), which is thought to have come from Russian Marxist texts. In his essay “On New Democracy,” we read, “Lenin developed the basic point of view profoundly of the active revolutionary theory of reflection. We should not forget this basic point of view when we discussions Chinese culture.”⁴⁸

In reading *A Textbook of Dialectical Materialism* by Shirokov and Aizenberg between November 1936 and April 1937, Mao marked two lines beneath the phrase “active process” in the following passage:

We should not think that our cognition is like a camera, taking pictures unconditionally of all objects in a field of vision. Human cognition is considered an active cause involved in the *active process* of many respects of social practice. In production as well as class struggles, human cognition acts as an *active cause* of active role, taking part in transforming the world.

Then he added the following note on the margin: "Reflection is not passively taking pictures, but an *active* process. In production as well as class struggles, knowing is an *active* element, playing a role in transforming the world."⁴⁹ In 1939 when he read Ai Siqui's *Philosophical Selections*, Mao underlined some words in the passage, "[Bernstein] has assumed revisions in the most important respects of dialectics—*active role* and revolution. He did not try to rouse activity and enthusiasm in the proletariat, but promoted that a transform of capitalist reality was impossible." Mao attached the following marginalia: "The most important aspect is *active role*. Rouse activity and enthusiasm in Chinese people and promote that transformation of the reality in China is possible."⁵⁰

Chen Jin points out that a heavy weight on active role of humanity was a striking characteristic of Mao's philosophical thought. In both his essays "The Strategic Issues of Chinese Revolutionary Wars" of 1936 and "On Protracted War" of 1938, Mao advocated full play of active roles of commanders under the existing material conditions in the effort to control wartime situation and win the war. For Chen, this means to follow the principle of dialectics, which is, "have a full play of human active role on the basis of showing respect for objective laws."⁵¹

Has Mao's concept of *nengdong xing* (active role) come from Russian texts? As Zeng Leshan claims, it came from the concept of "*neng wei*" or literally, "able to act [win]" in *Sunzi: The Art of Warfare*, a military classic of the Warring Kingdoms Period (c. 403 to 221 B.C.E.). The literature is regarded to contain affluent "dialectical thought," and the weight of the entire text placed upon able to win, which requires a standpoint of understanding thoroughly the actual circumstances and conditions as well as full play of a commander's active role.⁵² The typical phrases as regards *neng wei* of the text include

Know the other, know yourself,
And the victory will not be at risk;
Know the ground, know the natural conditions,
And the victory can be total.⁵³

Neng wei suggests a firm command of natural conditions and a comparison of the forces of both sides in politics, economy, and military. Mao speaks highly of the phrase "know the other, know yourself, fight one hundred times and will not be at risk." Mao warns that we never underestimate the phrase.⁵⁴ For Mao, *neng dong xing* makes a special characteristic of humanity and could be named "active role out of self-awareness." He states that leaders of wartime could not expect winning a war in transcendence of the existing con-

ditions that only allow you with limitations. However, they could but must initially try to win a war within limitations of existing conditions.⁵⁵ We should not forget here, however, that *neng wei* in Sunzi and *neng dong xing* in Mao is significantly different from what is meant by “active role” in Russian Marxist texts. This is because *neng wei* and *neng dong xing* are deeply embedded in *tongbian* with a world view of correlations in which continuity runs through natural conditions and human activity, and Sunzi and Mao indeed suggest appropriateness of specific time, particular natural conditions, and harmonious human relationships.

Besides *bianzhengfa* (dialectic method), *duili tongyi* (the unity of opposites), and *xiangfan xiangcheng* (contradictory but complementary), Mao has other expressions to suggest “dialectics,” which are *mao-dun* (spear-shield), *yifenweier* (one divides into two), and *liangdian lun* (the two-point theory). These expressions all come from classical texts of *tongbian*. Hanfeizi, a pre-Qin dynasty thinker first used the analogue of *mao-dun* in referring to something or idea that entails “inconsistency,” “internal contradiction,” or “self-contradiction.”⁵⁶ Many intellectuals used *maodun* as equivalent to “contradiction” when Western dialectics was introduced into China. Mao adopted the analogue in his *tongbian* reading of dialectical materialism, especially the law of the unity of the opposites, or *duili tongyi*. He entitled his famous essay on *duili tongyi*, “On Mao-dun.”(On Contradiction).

Mao frequently used *yifenweier* (one divides into two) for dialectics in 1960s; the expression was first used in the classical texts of the *Yijing*: “In the *Yi*, there is *taiji* (the Supreme Ultimate), from which grow the two elementary aspects. From the two aspects grow the four emblematic images. And from the four emblematic images grow the Eight Trigrams.”⁵⁷

Shao Yong, a Lixue School philosopher of the Song dynasty further developed the passage as “*Taiji* indeed means one, which never moves and begets two. Two is spirit-like, and from the spirit-like grows numbers, from numbers grow images, and from images grow tangible things.”⁵⁸ Furthermore, Zhu Xi, the best-known Song dynasty Lixue School philosopher, categorized the passage as “Here it simply means one divides into two, and things go generation after generation as such as a continuity without an end. Everything grows from one to two.”⁵⁹

It was from such texts that Mao inherited the expressions as well as the thought of *tongbian* in his reading of the unity of opposites in Marxist philosophical literature.

As for *liangdian lun*, or the two-point theory, Mao himself confirms that it has roots in the *Yijing*. We examined in the first part of the book the passages “*Gang* and *rou* push themselves each into the place of the other, and hence produce changes and transformations,”⁶⁰ and “A yin and a yang are what is

called *dao*." As Mao makes it plain that these two analogues describe as what is in the "dialectical materialism," that is, the *pubianxing* (universality) of motion and change and developmental processes of the unity of opposites. For him, *gang-rou* and *yin-yang* are functional analogues of the meaning of the sources of development in things "as the law of the unity of opposites." Mao stresses the point by saying, "Ancient Chinese stated that a *yin* and a *yang* were what was called *dao*. There could not be *yin* without *yang*, or *yang* without *yin*. This is somewhat the kind of two-point theory of ancient times."⁶¹

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM AS SEEKING CONTINUITY

Even though Mao has derived all his understanding of "dialectical materialism" from Russian texts—entirely through Chinese translation, though—there could not be a plausible judgment that Mao's view of dialectical materialism has been contaminated with positivism and dualism, or orthodox Marxism, for he reads dialectical materialism from the perspective of *tongbian* and appealed to classical Chinese expressions. As regards this respect, Schram is correct in contending that Mao's view of dialectics is strongly marked by Daoism and other currents in traditional Chinese thought.⁶² However, he has failed in seeing the elements of *tongbian* in Daoism or other currents of traditional Chinese thought, which philosophize a world as *self-soing* in terms of continuity through change. Schram has not been able to point out that that difference in Mao's reading of Marxist dialectics is the fact that "the unity of opposites" (or *duili tongyi*), suggests a continuity of two pairing aspects and that the mutual transformation of quantity and quality and the negation of the negation are rather patterns of continuity or correlativity of two pairing opposites. For example, Mao has two interesting analogues for the concept of negation, or *fouding* one was from the *Yijing*, the other, *Nangong ciji*.⁶³ Mao wrote "wanquan fouding: qian kun huo jihu xi (entire negation, *qian* and *kun* would almost to cease to act)" on the margin to the paragraph in which Shirokov and Aizenberg quote Lenin, "If I grind wheat grain, or kill insects, I am accomplishing the first action of negation, but the second action becomes impossible."⁶⁴ The phrase that Mao quotes, "*qian* and *kun* would almost to cease to act," is from the text of Xici, the *Yijing*, the whole passage was:

May we not say that *qian* and *kun* (= the *yang* and *yin*, or the undivided and divided lines) are the secret and subtleties of the *Yi*? *Qian* and *kun* being established in their several places thereby a continuity of changes constitutes. If *qian* and *kun* were taken away, there would be no means of seeing this continuity; and if this continuity were not seen, *qian* and *kun* would almost cease to act.⁶⁵

For another analogue, Mao wrote “with the body of sister is brother, and with the body of brother, sister” to the paragraph in which Shirokov and Aizenberg claim, “‘dying out’ is also ‘preserving’” at the same time, dialectical negation is the dynamic cause of development process. On the one hand, it makes sublation, which is, overcoming the old thing. On the other hand it preserves the old thing as a subsidiary dynamic cause.”⁶⁶ Mao’s analogue of sister and brother is from *Suo nan zhi*, the book of Ming dynasty verses, which reads,

Brother, let us mould figures of the two of us with brown clay, making one to look like you, the other to look like me. Let’s mold them to be an exact replica of us; let’s make them to sleep in a same bed. Then we dash them and restart molding. Again, we make a figure to look like you and another to look like me. With the body of brother is sister, and with the body of sister is brother.⁶⁷

The function of these two analogues in Mao’s reading of negation demonstrates it adequately, that is, to indicate correlativity or continuity. For Mao, negation does not suggest separation, not clean cut, but rather that something going first entails (or in a continuum with) something else going after it, and vice versa.⁶⁸ As he argues, the continuity in *fouding zhi fouding*, or the negation of the negation, is not something that has been imposed externally.⁶⁹ As Chen Jin comments, Mao “appropriately” employs the two analogues in reading the implications of “negation.” In Mao, attention is closely paid to the negation of old things by new things as *yangqi* (sublation), which is not only negation but also continuity (*jishi fouding, you you jicheng*); this is an important characteristic of Mao’s thinking.⁷⁰ The commentary betrays that not only Mao, many intellectuals in China, tend to comprehend dialectical materialism in the thinking modality of *tongbian*.

Moreover, on the issue of internal and external contradictions, Mao adopts numerous classical Chinese expressions that suggest a continuity of inner changes with external conditions. As Mao writes,

A thing must be rotten first, and then worms start eating it. A person must be unsure first, and then he would believe slanderous talks. That it was not that I was defeated, but that the Heaven did not want me to win are wrong. Running water never is stale; it is not that flowing water becomes stale. A door-hinge never is worm-eaten; it is not that the door-hinge becomes worm-eaten. How well is a thing in itself makes a primary reason? If one never feels sorry for an inner self-inspection, then there would be nothing for him to be worried about and afraid of.⁷¹

There are many more examples that may require a separate project on how Mao reads Marxism distinctly and represents *tongbian*. Mao’s focus of attention has been on reading correlativity or continuity in dialectical materialism, or say,

wherever relations (relationship) are spoken of, Mao would conceive them as correlativity and continuity. As Mao himself claims, so far and so much people have studied dialectics, it is exactly continuity and interdependence of the opposites that matter.⁷² In reading the following passage of Shirokov and Aizenberg, “the reality of capitalism and the development of class struggles render the proletariat realize that it is necessary to comprehend various phenomena through internal connections and as a whole...,” Mao made his emphasis by drawing two straight as well as two wavy lines beneath “through their internal connections” and “as a whole,” and then stated on the margin, “rational perception: as a whole, in nature, and interconnectedly.”⁷³ For him, “connection” means continuity, and “as a whole,” a field of relationships; and then, as to the passage “they [Deborinists] do not link epistemology with dialectics, but study them as separate from each other,” he wrote “It is not that you need to link them up, but rather that they are not separated from each other as two independent things, and that they indeed make a complete (continuity) thing.”⁷⁴ Interestingly, we note that Shen Zhiyuan’s translation of Engels’s “the interpenetrating of the opposites” is “mutual and through continuity” or “thoroughly getting through (*xianghu guantong*).”⁷⁵ And Mao attached his marginal note “here mutually and ‘thoroughly getting through’ is more specific” to the passage “that the working class having lost productive means create surplus value for the capitalist class purchasing their labor and that the capitalist class occupying productive means exploit their labor make a process of unity. . . . Yet, that the ‘mutually and thoroughly getting through’ of this unity (agreement) is conditioned is also obvious.”⁷⁶

What dialectical materialism is about? For Mao, it is about “continuity,” or *tongyi*. As he repeatedly states, the kernel of *bianzhengfa* (dialectics) was *duili tongyi*, or continuity of opposites, to juxtapose the three laws, as has been always in the old texts, is not appropriate, and those categories (perhaps there are more than a dozen of them) should all be explained as continuity of contradictions and opposites in things.⁷⁷

Many scholars, including Schram, acknowledge that Mao’s most notable contribution to the science of dialectics was his development of the concepts “principal contradiction” and “the principal aspect of the principal contradiction.”⁷⁸ Indeed, these concepts are all meant in terms of seeking continuity. In his “On Contradiction” we read,

If in any process there are a number of contradictions, one of them must be the principle contradiction playing the leading and decisive role, while the rest occupy a secondary and subordinate position. Therefore in studying any complex process in which there are two or more contradictions, we must devote every effort to finding its principal contradiction. Once this principal contradiction is grasped, all problems can be readily solved.⁷⁹

Of the two contradictory aspects, one must be principal and the other secondary. The principal aspect is the one playing the leading role in the contradiction. The nature of a thing is determined mainly by the principal aspect of a contradiction, the aspect which has gained the dominant position.⁸⁰

Here, the English translation is rather misleading, for such expressions as "leading and decisive role," "secondary and subordinate position," "is determined," and "dominant position" tend to lead people to the old issue of which determines which. It seems that the principal "contradiction" and the principal aspect of the principal "contradiction" are the determining that do not require reference to the determined for explanation and deny that both the determinate and indeterminate elements in the process are important. It seems that from the determining to the determined is a single causal order that separates what determines and what is determined, and thus can be understood as a "whatever this, then that," therefore there can be the problems of causal reductionism and simple determinism.

But this is not the case in Mao; rather, as from the perspective of *tongbian*, Mao's conception of principal "contradiction" and the principal aspect of the principal "contradiction" is to indicate the correlativity of the determinate with indeterminate aspects of a continuity process. "The principal contradiction" is rather seen as a focus of correlations in a specific field. To say "leading and decisive," "secondary and subordinate position," "is determined" and "dominant position" is to locate the focal center of correlations in the richly vague field of relationships where the energy of change is found. To grasp the principal contradiction relies on an appreciation of continuity of the focus with the field. As corollary to this, the principal "contradiction" and the rest elements of the continuity process, as focus and field, are never finally fixed or determinant. This is not a matter of the determining versus the determined, but rather that of the site-specific, appropriate situation, and proper time on the part of the principal "contradiction."

The relations of the principal contradiction to its field of relationships are not established by the presumption "essences" or "natural kinds" defining membership. This is particularly not true with the principal aspect of the principal "contradiction." For Mao, the principal aspect and the other aspect of the principal contradiction are certainly an analogue of paired aspects *mao* and *dun*. To name one of them as "principal," "with the leading role" and "dominant position," and the other, "secondary," Mao plainly suggests the right time and position on the part of one of them that manifests as the nature or *zhi* of a thing. As the words "principal," "with the leading role," and "dominant position" are so adopted as an analogue of *tongbian*, they do not contain the same implications in English. Perhaps it would be more suitable to say that they mean *zheng* (appropriateness) and *shi zhong* (right time and in a

proper situation). It is exactly the same point Mao makes in terms of *zhongyong* (free from being inappropriate, “not change”). As his mentioning Mozi in his letter of February 1, 1939 to Chen Boda, Mao construes that a *zhi* has two aspects in an ongoing process, with either of them as the principal and comparably stable. And he adds, *zhi* has to be one-sided (or *pian*) toward the principal aspect. *Zhi* exactly means that aspect; it is not *zhi*, otherwise. By “having the two but being free from one-sidedness to each (*liang er wu pian*),” what Mozi proposes is “free from going to a different *zhi* on either the side of left or right. To be one-sided with either aspects of a *zhi* would not make one-sidedness but *zheng* (appropriateness). It is here that we find what Mao’s “principal,” “with the leading role,” and “dominant position” exactly suggest by *pian* (one-sidedness) and/or *zheng* (appropriateness). And *pian* and *zheng* entirely rely on continuity of paired aspects.⁸¹

An important continuity of paired aspects that Mao is most interested in is that of theory with practice and *yingyong* (use Marxist standpoint and views as guidance of revolution); and relevant to this are many of the claims of continuity such as intention with results of doing (*dongji yu xiaoguo*), thinking with actual circumstances (*sixiang yu shiji*), knowing with doing (*zhi he xing*), a continuity with the masses (*lianxi quzhong*), his analogue of arrow and target (*youdi fangshi*), his pet phrases “seeking continuity through actual things” (*shishi qiushi*) and “change the world and remodel world views” (*gai zao shijie he gaizao shijieguan*), his emphasis on “active reflection” theory (*nengdong fanying lun*), and so on. In fact all these claims were relevant to the classical *tongbian* to view humanity as continuous with the world.

We often perceive that there is a material world in contradiction to human subjectivity. But *tongbian* suggests that knowing and doing, exploring and comprehending, and other activities of the like of human subjectivity have the same reference to continuity through change and are believed to be continuous with a world of correlations. Continuity requires humanity not only to have a thorough comprehension of change, but also to do things accordingly with continuity to effect changes in actual circumstances as well as in himself. In such a view of *tongbian*, we see no separation of humanity from nature, and no dichotomy of human subjectivity vs. the physical world. As humanity makes himself continuous with the physical world, what he comprehends and does is simply the way in which the world changes; and thus there is no contrariety. Human plans are never made away from a continuity of the changing world, and would not go wrong. By an ever-varying adaptation humanity achieves successes in his undertakings. Such a perspective from the modality of *tongbian* has been so profoundly rooted in Chinese tradition that that makes a Chinese “logic” in which Mao tends to hold a view that Marxism must turn up as a continuity with the specific

characteristics of China and that the real power of Marx-Leninism lay in the fact that it would make a continuity with particular revolutionary practices in different countries.⁸²

For Mao, doing is continuous with both thinking and actual circumstances; doing (or practice) itself may make a continuum, "practice goes through the entire process of our knowing."⁸³ He even asserts that doing goes first, and then knowing,⁸⁴ for him, both reading and applying know, and applying is an even more important kind of knowing. It is often not a matter of knowing first, and then doing, but that of doing first, and then learning, for doing itself knows.⁸⁵ Of course, doing is more a manifestation of the characteristic of active role of humanity, if doing is indeed assumed as continuity with actual circumstances, then it does make a continuum of thought and the physical world and would be successful in rendering positive results. If it goes astray from continuity, it would end up with failure. And yet, humanity is able to learn from failure, adjust him-/herself not to go off continuity, and then makes himself a continuity. It is in this sense that Mao regards highly of doing and the phrase "failure is the mother of success" (*shibai shi chetugouzhi mu*).

Many China students in the West, including Schram, view Mao as voluntarist, but they seem to have forgotten that Mao never assumes that people are capable of doing whatever they want; but rather, from the perspective of *tongbian*, what Mao truly suggests is, humanity is unable to accomplish anything if he goes off a continuity with actual circumstances. Mao seemingly places heavy weight on the active role of humanity but indeed makes humanity a focus of correlations in the field of relationships where he is. It is at this standpoint that Mao emphasizes "the theory of active reflection," or "assume a full play of the active role of subjectivity."⁸⁶ What this was about is indeed "seeking a continuity of thinking with actuality." In Mao's view, even though there is not a dichotomy of thought versus the physical world but rather that, as foci of correlations with the field of relationships, thought is continuous with actual circumstances; continuity could not be comprehended automatically. If it could, then this would indeed be a dichotomy, since continuity is correlative, rather than single-sided. Hence, the active role of thinking is exactly what continuity is about. Only there is doing (including thinking) on the part and as active role of humanity, and a continuity of field with focus have been comprehended, can there be an adequate continuity. Otherwise, there would only be separateness, looseness, and one-sidedness, or what as Mao criticizes, *xing er shang xue*, or *zhuguan zhuyi* (subjectivism), or *pianmian* (one-sidedness).

Continuity of theory with practice lies in *yingsheng*, or "applying Marxist theory and method as guidance in doing." *Yingsheng* as active role on the part of humanity requires taking into full account of specific circumstances and

proper time. As regards this point, Mao refers to “attaching importance to study of current circumstances and history,” which include “the current circumstances of politics, economy, military, and culture in both China and the world” and historical circumstances from the time of “Confucius to Sun Yat-sen.”⁸⁷ One of Mao’s famous analogues that functions to indicate the active role of humanity in continuity with actual circumstances is that of “arrow and target (*youdi fangshi*).” As Mao states, continuity of Marxism-Leninism with Chinese revolution is just like that of arrow and target . . . the arrow of Marxism-Leninism must shoot the target of Chinese revolution.”⁸⁸

Mao’s “*shi shi qiu shi*” is another well-known phrase expressing continuity of knowing with actual circumstances. Many commentators believe it is the quintessence of Mao’s thought⁸⁹ whereas it is a classical expression that has been used by many Chinese thinkers over history in suggesting appreciation of actual circumstances and continuity of things and events in a complex and changing situation. As Mao explains, *shi shi* means everything that exists objectively; *shi*, the internal relationships of the objective things, that is, *guilü xing* (law); and *qiu*, our investigation or study.⁹⁰ Mao uses Marxist terminology in explaining the classical Chinese expression, the implicit *tongbian* meaning may well be: *shi shi*—actual (changing) things and events, *shi*—becoming; and *qiu*—seeking. Therefore, the entire phrase would be “seeking becoming (or continuity through change) of particular things and events.” The expression sounds very positivist with the terminology “objectively exists,” “law,” and “investigation,” while it is typical *tongbian* that appreciates the active role of humanity in continuity with the actual circumstances.

In addition, continuity of humanity with actual circumstances and the active role in seeking continuity are expressed in “changing the world and remolding humanity’s own world view,” a phrase Mao has learned from Marxist texts. We read in his *Marginalia* to Mitin’s *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, “philosophical study is not for the sake of curiosity, but with the purpose of changing the world.”⁹¹ To *A Textbook of Dialectical Materialism* by Shirokov and Aizenberg, he also writes, “A dialectical unity of subjectivity and objectivity shall be realized in practice. Change the external world, but at the same time change [our]selves.”⁹² We should paraphrase this note as, “continuity of humanity (host) and actual circumstances (guest) shall go through each other in doing.” The issue becomes the most important one of Mao’s theoretical concerns. He addresses this point frequently and on various occasions until “change the world and remodel our world views” eventually spreads among the masses as a popular saying. Indeed this view which has been addressed with Marxist rhetoric is made an expression of the important concern of the *tongbian* tradition, that is, continuity of humanity does not only mean a thorough comprehension, but also doing things accordingly with

continuity to effect changes in actual circumstances as well as in humanity himself.

As Mao states again and again, so far and so much as dialectics is concerned, it is nothing else but continuity as long as we think about opposites.⁹³ It may suffice to say that for a Chinese version of dialectical materialism, which has developed amid Marxism's encountering Chinese tradition, and comes to fruition in Mao, it is explicitly about *tongyi* (continuity), rather than dichotomy. Mao has developed the concept of sinification of Marxism from the perspective of *tongbian*, that is, to construe continuity of Marxism with particular circumstances of China. His thought with Marxist rhetoric marks a new and more sophisticated phase of the traditional strand *tongbian*. Its sophistication and maturity lies in the fact that Mao not only advocated but also performed it. His modern version of *tongbian* is so articulate that it not only becomes a major thinking modality for the general theoretical realm of Chinese Marxism but also has a profound impact on the entire history of modern China due to the revolution under his leadership.

MAO'S CRITIQUE

Apparently, Mao's *bianzhengfa* is not a carbon copy of dialectical materialism from Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Russian texts. And indeed, Mao does present his criticism from the *tongbian* point of view. I would like to summon but a few examples, since to investigate the many cases of Mao's critique may require a separate project.

Mao has evidently had problems with the three laws of Engels's dialectic for a long time. He points out in his reading notes as well as on other occasions that, among the three laws of dialectics, the "unity of opposites" is the fundamental. As regards dialectics, he argues, it is continuity and interdependence that is what we understand about opposites.⁹⁴ In "On Contradiction," which he had written as early as in 1938 when he was infatuated with Marxist dialectical materialism, Mao merely mentioned Engels's three dialectical laws, but did not give any comments.⁹⁵ When he republished the essay after the founding of the People's Republic, he deleted them at all from the texts. Instead, in the very beginning of the republished essay he claims that "the law of contradiction or the unity of opposites is the most fundamental law of dialectics."⁹⁶ Mao eventually presented his critique of the three laws in a conversation with Kang Sheng and Chen Boda, on August 18, 1964. As he says:

Engels talks about the three categories, but as for me I don't believe in two of them. (The unity of opposites is the most basic law, the transformation of quality

and quantity into one another is the unity of the opposites, quality and quantity, and the negation of the negation does not exist at all.) The juxtaposition on the same level of the law of transformation of quality and quantity into one another, and that of the unity of opposites is "tribalism," not monism. . . . Affirmation, negation, affirmation, negation . . . in the development of things, every link in the chain of events is both affirmation and negation.⁹⁷

The following year, at the Hangzhou Conference of December 1965, Mao once again summed up this view, "It used to be said that there were three great laws of dialectics, then Stalin said there were four. In my view there is only one basic law and that is the law of contradiction. Quality and quantity, positive and negative . . . content and form, necessity and freedom, possibility and reality, etc., are all cases of the unity of opposites."⁹⁸

Some Western scholars, like both Frederic Wakeman and Stuart Schram, have seen Mao's critique as a turn, or reversion, on Mao's part toward a more traditional approach to dialectics.⁹⁹ But, if we take into account the strand of *tongbian* in Mao's thinking, we may see plainly it was not a turn but continuity. Mao has simply reserved his view for a long time. He has repeatedly stated that, so far and so much as "dialectics" is concerned, it was continuity and interdependence that is what we understand about "opposites." From the view of *tongbian*, a functional analogue either of yin and yang or of *mao* and *dun* here in Mao's case is sufficient for addressing continuity or correlations between the two basic elements, or contrastive concepts. The emphasis had adequately been placed on correlativity. A polar explanation of correlative relationships appeals to a contextualist interpretation of the world in the sense of many various mutual foci and fields in the coordination of many pairing "thises" and "thats," and it always brings into focus from one particular locus. The field of relationships is not definite or holistic but a boundaryless pool of particular foci that keeps open and ready for further inclusion. The transformation of quality and quantity into one another and the negation of the negation carry little sense of *tongbian*, or continuity through changes, instead still appeal to the category of necessity and determinism. Thinking in *tongbian* requires no such thing in which change is simply caused by addition and subtraction, or change suggests the negation of the negation. It is in this sense that Mao asserts that the two laws simply do not exist.

In Mao's substitution of affirmation and negation for the negation of negation, there is a fundamental change in which affirmation and negation are rather like the basic elements, or paired contrastive concepts, that cannot be differentiated distinctively. And between the pairing elements there is not a relationship as determining and determined, or negating and negated. With the claim that in things' development, every link in the chain of events is both affirmation and negation, Mao is really saying that there does not exist a sin-

gle causal order between the two; they constitute a continuum to each other, and are centered as a focus in field. For Mao, all the categories like quality and quantity, positive and negative, content and form, necessity and freedom, possibility and reality, so on and so forth, are explainable with the analogue of *mao* and *dun*; these categories are either redundant or less adequate in conveying the full sense of *tongbian*, because, as compared with *mao* and *dun*, each of them is a mere particular locus from which the field of relationships may be centered as a focus.

Mao is particularly critical of Stalin's view. For him, Stalin has a lot of *xing er shang xue* (metaphysics), since he does not understand things as having continuity with each other.¹⁰⁰ In his speech of January 1957 to provincial Party Secretaries, Mao explicitly criticized the philosophical inadequacy of Stalin's fourfold classification of dialectics:

Stalin says Marxist dialectics has four principal features. As the first feature he talks of the interconnections of things, as if all things happened to be interconnected for no reason at all. . . . It is the two contradictory aspects of a thing that are interconnected. . . . As the fourth feature he talks of the internal contradiction in all things, but then he deals only with the struggle of opposites, without mentioning their unity.¹⁰¹

Mao's critique is comprehensible from the *tongbian* perspective. Things are not interconnected but interdependent, correlated, and in a continuum. To say that the two pairing aspects are correlated and have continuity is because "contradiction" and "unity" all make continuity. The central problematic with Stalin's fourfold classification of dialectics is that he has missed continuity, or in another word, for him, "interconnection" still suggests fundamental separation. Mao continues:

Stalin has a lot of *xing er shang xue* . . . and he taught many people *xing er shang xue*. The fourth edition of the *Soviet Concise Dictionary of Philosophy* has an entry of *tongyixing* (identity), which reflects Stalin's point of view. The dictionary says, "the phenomena such as war and peace, bourgeoisie and proletariat, life and death, do not have identity (continuity) because they are fundamentally opposite and mutual excluding." This is indicating that these phenomena with fundamentally opposite aspects are not "interconnected" and could not transform into each other. This is entirely wrong. As the struggle and unity between the opposite aspects, Stalin simply could not think them as correlated.¹⁰²

Indeed, *xing er shang xue* is a Chinese translation for "metaphysics." Obviously, however, here it does not mean metaphysics, but refers to anyone who thinks without seeing things or two opposite aspects of a thing as having a continuity with each other. To avoid confusion, we do not attach metaphysics to

the meaning of *xing er shang xue*. Also, for Mao, *tongyi xing*, a Chinese translation for identity is indeed an expression of continuity. “Interconnected,” as its Chinese equivalent is *lianjie*, surely means correlation for Mao. Therefore, in Mao’s view, the central problematic with Stalin is that he misses continuity, and thus that Stalin is not “dialectical.” Mao’s rejection of Stalin’s dialectic is explicitly seen in his marginal notes of 1965 to Li Da’s *Outlines of Marxist Philosophy*. Mao restated his view that the principle of *duili tongyi*, or the unity of the opposites, makes the kernel of dialectics; all other categories, as Mao said, such as mutual transformation of quantity and quality, the negation of the negation, etc., could all be well elucidated in terms of the kernel principle. Mao advised Li Da that “it is not necessary to copy from Stalin.”¹⁰³

In fact, that the first time Mao explicitly rejected Stalin was as early as in September 1941 when he proposed that the party assume a theoretical study on “methods of thinking.” He recommended four books, which were Lenin’s *Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, sections on dialectical materialism from Ai’s *An Outline of the New Philosophy* and Li Da’s translation of *A Textbook of Dialectical Materialism*, and Kawakami Hajime’s *An Outline of Economics*. Mao did not recommend Stalin’s section on dialectical and historical materialism in *A History of the Communist Party of Soviet Union*. This drew attention from Gong Yuzhi, who commented many years later that Mao’s rejection of Stalin’s text gave much food for thought.¹⁰⁴

Like many other Chinese proponents of Marxist philosophy, Mao never has any problem with the conception of superstructure and economic base as regards which determines which. For him, this is adequately one more polar explanation of relationships from *tongbian* perspective. Like many pairing elements, between superstructure and economic base there is not a relationship of the determining and the determined, not a single causal order; they are rather correlated, interdependent, constitute a continuum and mutually determine each other. To speak of economic base as determinant, it is not a claim of the economic base as contrastive to superstructure; this is not a dichotomy, and not that superstructure is reduced to economic base. It is rather a statement of specification of situation and time in which the continuity of superstructure with economic base presents it as coming from economic base. Here *jueding* is indeed a particular way that makes it possible for economic base to be distinguishable from superstructure through comparison. Mao makes this view clearly in a passage of “On Contradiction,”

True, productive forces, practice, and economic base generally play a major and decisive role. Whoever does not acknowledge this point is not a materialist. But, the aspects of productive relations, theories and superstructure also play a major and decisive role in turn under specific conditions. This point also has to be acknowledged. . . . When superstructure (e.g., politics, culture, etc.) arrests the

development of economic base, the change of politics and culture become something determining.¹⁰⁵

Indeed, if the *tongbian* element in Mao's thinking is not taken into account, the passage may sound much like an inconsistent mixture of determinism and voluntarism. We must remember Mao is not talking which determines which but continuity. The first sentence is definitely easy for a determinist reading. Instead, however, in Marxist terminology, Mao indeed emphasizes the relationship in which each requires the other as a necessary condition for being what it is. Economic base is a necessary reference to superstructure in the fact that superstructure requires more frequently economic base as a necessary condition for its being what it is. Mao simply takes acknowledging the necessity as *weiwuzhe*, or "materialist." However, this has not yet been complete, since *tongbian* requires not one-way path, but correlation. Therefore, as Mao continues, in specific situation and proper time, as economic base is concerned, a necessary condition for economic base being what it is then in turn requires superstructure. Here, one needs to pay attention, the said situation is not one in which superstructure is dominant, determining, or causing, but one in which economic base requires superstructure even more as a necessary condition for what it is, this is to say, superstructure is now weak. What Mao says is exactly this: between the two pairing elements whichever is weak would become more required by the other. Hence, in the sense of *tongbian*, Mao's *jueding* means "interdependence" rather than "determining." And *jueding* (determine) is, in an exact sense, not superstructure but the *change* in structure.

Therefore, as regards superstructure and economic base, Mao is neither determinist nor voluntarist because which determines which is never Mao's concern. What really matters to him has almost always been the issue of continuity (or *tongyi*). Like his critique of Stalin, the expression *xing er shang xue* seems to have almost entirely missed the original meaning of "metaphysics," instead become Mao's special term of critique in reference to whoever has lost a vision of things as in continuity through change.

NOTES

1. *Xing er shang xue* is Chinese translation for "metaphysics" though it is originated from the classical phrase "*xing er shang zhe wei zhi dao*" in the *Ijing*. The modern Chinese expression may mean "not dialectical," or not *tongbian*. For Mao's critique of Stalin, see Chen Jin, ed., *Reading Notes of Mao Zedong*, Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1996, pp. 865–66.

2. Mao told of his study of English, philosophy, and newspaper in his letter of June 7, 1920 to Li Jinxi. See Chen Jin, p. 692.
3. Lin Ke, "Memoirs of Mao Studying English," Gong Yuzhi et al., *Mao Zedong's Reading Life*, Sanlian shudian, 1987, pp. 249–51.
4. Pang Xianzhi, "The Marxist-Leninist Works Mao Read," *Mao Zedong's Reading Life*, p. 22.
5. *Mao Zedong's Reading Life*, pp. 23–25.
6. *Mao Zedong's Reading Life*, p. 24.
7. *Mao Zedong's Reading Life*, p. 18.
8. Chen Jin, ed. *Analyzing Mao Zedong's Reading Notes*, Guangdong People's Press, 1996, p. 700.
9. Chen Jin, p. 700.
10. Chen Jin, p. 704.
11. Chen Jin, pp. 692–93.
12. Chen Jin, p. 694.
13. Chen Jin, p. 694
14. Chen Jin, pp. 694–95.
15. Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*, p. 77. Gong Yuzhi, "Mao Zedong's Reading Life Seen from His Writing 'On Practice,'" *Mao Zedong's Reading Life*, p. 44. Schram also mentioned Mao's serious study of philosophy in the same period, but sent a misleading message, which is, Mao had never been serious about philosophy, this was the first time he became serious since he was preparing his lectures on dialectical materialism and having read these books he proceeded almost immediately to deliver a series of lectures, which are now known as "On Practice" and "On Contradiction." According to other sources, Snow's interviews took place in October 1936, Mao wrote the two essays in July and August 1937. These two episodes did not have direct relevance. See Schram, 1989, p. 61, and Zeng Leshan, p. 205.
16. Chen Jin, p. 824.
17. Gong Yuzhi, Pang Xianzhi, and Shi Zhongquan, *Mao Zedong and Books* (Hong Kong: Sanlian Shudian, 1995), 24.
18. As recorded in Gong Yuzhi's *Mao's Reading Life*, Mao read the book even earlier before August 1936, since Mao mentioned his reading of the book in a letter to his friend Yi Lirong. See Gong (1986), p. 44.
19. Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong zhuxue pizhu ji* (A Collection of Mao Zedong's Marginalia to Philosophical Works), pp. 41–136. See Jin Yu et al, 1991, p. 166.
20. Guo Huaruo, "Mao zhuxi kangzhan chuqi de zhexue huodong," (Chairman Mao's Philosophical Activities during the Period after the Start of Anti-Japanese War) p. 34.
21. Mao, p. 303.
22. Chen Jin, p. 824.
23. Gong et al. 1986, p. 55.
24. *Mao Zedong's Reading Life*, p. 65.
25. According to Fogel, Ai's article "A Critique of the Critique of the *Talks of Philosophy*," was a response to the "queries" of three readers. Actually it was a frontal

assault on Wang Yizhi, a pen name used by Ye Qing. See Fogel, note 46, p.102, and Ai, *Philosophy and Life*, p. 67.

26. Mao, p. 204. See Fogel's translation in Fogel, p. 11.
27. Li Yongtai, *Chinese and Western Cultures and Mao Zedong's Early Thought*, University of Sichuan Press, 1991, p 234.
28. "Tiaoxia zhi shengmin gewei yuzhou zhi yiti," Zeng Leshan, 1991, p. 61.
29. "Tiaoxia waushi, wanbian wuqiong," Li Yongtai, 1991, p. 206.
30. "Ru shui yi shen, ru huo yi re, yi yuu zhi er yi yi," Li Yongtai, 1991, p. 206.
31. "Biaoluwa wanshu," Li Yongtai, 1991, p. 206.
32. "Wuren you hao bianhua, haoqi zhi xi, ren buueng you e qing bu biauhua zhe," Li Yongtai, 1991, p. 206.
33. "Ren zhi shen gai ri ri bianyi zhe," "tiandi gai weiyou dong eryi," Li Yongtai, 1991, p. 206.
34. Mao Zedong, *Selected Letters of Mao Zedong*, 1983, p. 140.
35. Mao Zedong, *Selected Letters of Mao Zedong*, 1983, pp. 140–42.
36. Laozi, *Daode jing*, chapter 78. The English text is a nearly verbatim quote from D. C. Lau trans. *Lao Tze, Tao Te Ching*, Penguin Books, 1963.
37. Mao wrote this marginal note to the following passage of Paulsen:

But not this alone; the content of historical life is also lost. The forms of historical life are nothing other than the forces of the struggle between good and evil that develop with the times. If states had no schemes for aggression there would be no military preparations. If no one acted improperly there would be no need for laws. Military forces and laws are the means by which the state fights against foreign and domestic disorder. If all disorder, both domestic and foreign, were eliminated, and all observed the way of justice, peace, kindness and tolerance, then war and diplomacy, courts and police, and all the aggressive features of government would disappear, and the perfect state would also vanish. Religion, too, is nothing but a form of the struggle between good and evil. If there were no evil acts, human beings would all be gods, and religion too would vanish. (pp. 109–110; Thilly 327)

See Stuart Schram, ed., *Mao's Road to Power*, M. E. Sharpe, 1992, p. 238.

38. Pang Xianzhi, "The Marxist-Leninist Works Mao Read," Gong Yuzhi et al., *Mao Zedong's Reading Life*, Sanlian shudian, 1986, p. 18.
39. Mao Zedong, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People" (February 27, 1957, first pocket ed.), pp. 66–67.
40. "Jiang yu fei zhi, bi gu xing zhi; jiang yu qu zhi, bi gu yu zhi," Laozi, *Daode jing*, chapter 36. Mao wrote the essay in December 1936, before he had read many texts of dialectical materialism translated from Russian. Regarding Mao's seeing dialectics from Laozi, see Chen Jin, 1996, pp. 620–22.
41. According to David Hall and Roger Ames, the anecdote describes the positive contribution of "chaos" and provides an ontological rendering of the characteristic of Chinese correlative sensibility. "Chaos" makes a dynamic sense of order, which, rather than separating what orders from what is ordered, locates the energy of change within chaos itself by insisting that order is always richly vague. See Hall and Ames, 1995, pp. 230–31.

42. "Nanfang zhi di yue Shu, Beifang zhi di yue Hu. Zhongyang zhi di yue Hundun. Shu yu Hu xiangyu yu Hunduu zhi ye, Hunduu dai zhi shen hou. Shu yu Hu mou suoyi bao zhi, yue: "Ren jie you qiqiao, yi shi ting shi xi, bi du wu you, chang shi zao zhi? Ri zao yi qiao, qi ri er Hundun si." Zhuangzi, Yingdiwang (Responding to the Emperors and Kings).
43. Mao made his comments in a conversation on August 18, 1964. Chen Jin, 1995, p. 636.
44. Mao commented that Liu as a materialist in 1959, 1963, and 1965. Chen Jin, 1995, pp. 636–638.
45. "Tiau fei wu sheng hu ren," "ren cheng wu sheng hu tian," Chen Jin, 1995, p. 638.
46. Chen Jin, 1995, p. 38.
47. "Zi zai chuuu shang yue, zhi zhe ru si fu, bu she zhouye," Mao Zedong, *Selected Letters of Mao Zedong*, 1983, p. 148; also refer to Chen Jin, 1995, p. 664. As for Mao's dislike of Confucius, see Chen Jin, 665. Mao made it plain in his speech at the Twelfth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of CCP that he perhaps was a little biased, not liking Confucius too much. The English of this passage is not a literal quote from *Lunyu* 9.17 in D. C. Lau's translation based on my assumption of *tougbian*.
48. Mao Zedong, *Selected Works of Mao Zedong* 1952, 2, p. 635. Here, I use my own translation because the English version of Mao's works provides "the basic concepts underlying the dynamic revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality which was later elaborated so profoundly by Lenin. These basic concepts must be kept in mind in our discussion of China's cultural problems." The translation certainly does not get "uengdong" (active) quite right. See *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1965, p. 341.
49. Mao, *Marginalia*, p. 15.
50. Mao, *Marginalia*, p. 311.
51. Chen Jin, 1995, p. 829.
52. Zeng Leshan, 1991, p. 249.
53. Sunzi, *The Art of Warfare*, chapter 10, "The Terrain"; for translation, see Roger Ames, *Sun-Tzu The Art of Warfare*, p. 151.
54. Mao, *Selected Works*, a combined volume, p. 166.
55. Mao, *Selected Works*, a combined volume, p. 446.
56. Hanfeizi (c. 280?–233 B.C.E.). I quoted the definition of *maodun* from *Xiandai Hanyu Cidian* in chap. 3, which contains Hanfei's first use of the analogue of *mao* and *dun*.
57. "Yi you taiji, shi sheng liangyi, liangyi sheng sixiang, sixiang sheng bagua," *Yijing*, Xici 1, chapter 11.
58. "Taiji yi ye, budong sheng er, er ze sheu ye, shen sheng shu, shu sheng xiang, xiang sheng qi," Shao Yong, *Guanwu waipian*, *Huangji jingshi*, 8, II, p. 23.
59. "Ci zhishi yi fen wei ei, jiejie ruci, yizhiyu wuqiong, jie shi yi sheng liang er," Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi yulei*, p. 67.
60. "Gang rou xiang tui er sheng bianhua," *Yijing*, Xici 1, chapter 2.
61. Mao, *Selected Works*, volume 5; Zeng Leshan, p. 248.

62. Schram, 1989, p. 63.
63. *Nangong ciji* is a collection of scattered Ming dynasty verses, compiled by Chen Suowen. They were a particular type of verse, very popular in the Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties, with tonal patterns drawn modeled on tunes drawn from folk music.
64. The English is my translation, since the original text is not available. However, translating from Chinese to English, it may sound more Chinese, and closer to what was understood by Mao. See Mao, *Marginalia*, 1988, p. 123.
65. Z. D. Sung, *The Text of Yi King*, p. 303. I did revisions in the English translation of the passage. For example I changed "system" into "continuity," which is more appropriate from the *tongbiao* perspective.
66. Like footnote 32, The English is my translation, since the original text is not available. See Mao, *Marginalia*, 1988, p. 124.
67. Chen Jin, 1996, p. 812.
68. Mao, *Marginalia*, 1988, p. 121.
69. Mao, *Marginalia*, 1988, p. 126.
70. Chen Jin, 1996, p. 813.
71. "Wu bi xiau fu ye, rauliou chong sheng zhi. Reu bi xiau yi ye, ranhou chan tu zhi. 'Fei zhau zhi zui, nai tian wang wo' de shuofa sli cuowu de. . . . Liu shui bu fu, fei liushui fu; hushu budu, fei hushu du. Wu zhi beushen ruhe, shi diyi yuanyin. . . . Nei xing bu jiu fu he you he jü." *Ibid.* pp. 106–108.
72. Here the language Mao uses is Marxist, though; that is, *bianzhengfa yanjiu zhe xuduo, jiushi duili de tougyixing huo xiaughu shentou*. Mao, *Marginalia*, 1996, pp. 81–82.
73. Mao, *Marginalia*, 1988, p. 26.
74. Mao, *Marginalia*, 1988, p. 400.
75. Mao, *Marginalia*, 1988, p. 154.
76. Mao, *Marginalia*, 1988, p. 173.
77. Mao, *Marginalia*, pp. 505–507.
78. Schram, 1989, p. 66.
79. Mao, *Selected Works*, 1, p. 332.
80. Mao, *Selected Works*, 1, p. 333.
81. Mao Zedong, *A Selected Collection of Letters* (Beijing: People's Press, 1983), pp. 142–43.
82. "Makesi zhuyi bixu he woguo jutu tedian xiang jiehe . . . Makesi Liening zhuyi de weida liliang jiu zaiyu ta shi he gege guojia jutu de geming shijiau xianglianxi de." Mao, *Selected Works*, a combined volume, p. 449.
83. Mao, *Marginalia*, p. 33.
84. Mao, *Marginalia*, p. 474.
85. Mao, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," *Selected Works*, 1, pp. 189–90.
86. Mao, *Selected Works*, 2. "Nengdong fauying lun." Although he develops this concept after mentioning Lenin in the essay, "On New Democracy," Mao emphasizes the idea of "fan hue zhuguan nengdong xing" (assume a full play of the active role of subjectivity) in many occasions until it becomes a popular phrase of the masses.

87. Mao, "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in National War," *Selected Works*, a combined volume, p. 499.
88. Mao, "Rectify the Party's Style of Work," *Selected Works*, 3, p. 38.
89. Zeng Leshan, 1991, p. 243.
90. Mao, "Reform Our Study," *Selected Works*, 3, p. 801.
91. Mao, *Marginalia*, p. 152.
92. Mao, *Marginalia*, p. 17.
93. Mao, *Marginalia*, 1998, pp. 81–82.
94. Mao, *Marginalia*, 1988, pp. 81–82.
95. *Supplements to Collected Writings of Mao Tse-tung*, 5, Tokyo, Clang she, 1983, p. 236.
96. *Chairman Mao's Four Philosophical Essays*, People's Publisher, 1964, p. 23.
97. Mao, *unrehearsed*, p. 226. Cf. Schram, 1989, p. 140.
98. Mao, *unrehearsed*, p. 240. Cf. Schram, 1989, p. 141.
99. Schram, 1989, p. 141.
100. Chen Jin, ed., *Reading Notes of Mao Zedong*, Guangdong People's Publisher, 1996, pp. 865–66.
101. Schram, 1989, p. 136.
102. The same talk as Scrim's quotation is from; Cf. Chen Jin, 1996, pp. 865–66.
103. Chen Jin, 1996, p. 942.
104. Gong Yuzhi, 1986, p. 58.
105. Mao, *Selected Works*, 1, p. 300.

Marxian Dialectics after Mao

In this study I have shown that the form that Marxism assumed in its encountering China was no longer the same inherited legacy of Marxian dialectics in Europe. It is found to be a third alternative, a rendered version that indeed articulates *tongbian*, a traditional Chinese modality of thinking in the language composed of the terminology of Western Marxisms yet in Chinese translation. In this sense we can consider it a modernized form of traditional thinking. Known as *bianzhengfa* (dialectics), the new strand finally came to a mature formation in the thought of Mao Zedong and is both powerful and available to people in all walks of life in China.

It seems twenty-seven years after Mao's death, however, what we see currently is an utterly different situation in which China is being encountered with the domination of Western thought of liberalism. The situation is characterized by the Chinese authority's engagement in economic reform, which has appealed to the doctrines of neoliberalism, and the more and more an account that has been made for China's future in liberal democracy's terms. The tendency is well seen as many students of and people with interested in Chinese politics, media of both international and Chinese, have watched closely not to miss any tiny piece of information which may insinuate a significant move of political reform that the Chinese authority is taking in the direction of liberal democratization. In this respect, Hu Jintao's ascendance to power as the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party at its Sixteenth Congress on March 15, 2003 is regarded a great opportunity for such a change. As it is typically stated in the "Call for Papers" of the special issue of *the Journal of Chinese Political Science*,

Can Max Weber's transition theory provide an adequate explanation for China's transition under the new leadership? Can a rational-legal system develop in

Chinese Confucian civilization in which enlightened despotism, rule of man, and elitist rule have always prevailed throughout the history? In other words, can China develop a constitutional democracy, true parliamentary body, the Rule of Law, civil rights, and competitive party system under the new generation of CCP leadership in the twenty-first century? . . . Can Chinese politics be fundamentally transformed as an authoritarian regime has promoted developmentalism and industrialization while successful growth in turn legitimates authoritarian rule?¹

Where is Marxian dialectics? Or *bianzhengfa*? Can *tongbian* is still capable of articulating what has been happening and is going to happen in China? As the last section of the project, it may be interesting to show that, just like the case of the encounter of Marxism in China, liberalism, wherever one finds it in the West may be significantly different from what appears to be now the Chinese analogue. As we pay close attention, it may be found that neoliberalism and liberal democracy have assumed a third form in China, a rendered version that articulates the traditional *tongbian* in the language composed of liberalism's terms yet in Chinese translation. As a clear style of thought of Chinese tradition, *tongbian* is still available; the current discourse of liberalism in China can be found has been drawing on tradition and overcoming the difficulties that attended its original form in the West. Although Chinese liberalism finds some of its roots in the Western ideology, it may have read it in a different way.

In this respect, it is helpful to mention Yan Fu, the case of perhaps the first Chinese liberalist. It was he that produced the first Chinese version of the evolutionary theory in 1898. While he was no doubt deeply impressed with Western liberalism, the original form of liberalism was rendered one in his hand that was rather highlighted individual as a means to the end of community; beyond this individual liberty found little room in his intellectual world.² The reason, as Benjamin Schwartz finds it sharply, is "what has not come through in Yan Fu's perception is precisely that which is often considered to be the ultimate spiritual core of liberalism—the concept of the worth of persons within society as an end in itself."³

Almost precisely one hundred years later, when Liu Rong, a professor of philosophy at Zhongshan University published his work in defense of Deng Xiaoping's articulation of a "dialectical" way of "incorporating capitalism into socialism" in 1998, he argues in exactly the terms of *tongbian*,

The two systems (socialist and capitalism) under one state are *xiangfan xi-angcheng* (contradictory yet complementary); "Deng's wisdom lies in his employing the dialectical method, *duili tongyi* (the unity of opposites), and viewing both contradictory relations and identical elements (*gongtong dian*) of the two systems, that is, unity, identity, sharing, and agreeability, their reliance on each other, penetrating into each other, and cooperation. Under certain condi-

tions, they complement and benefit from each other, glorifying and promoting each other.⁴

Right or wrong, capitalism as a practice of neoliberalism under the current Chinese circumstances is rendered in Liu's hand a new form which does not necessarily entirely contradict socialism, which is supposed to be a means to the end of community.

What are the typical patterns for the Chinese to read Western liberalism? Again, like the case of Western Marxisms's assumption of a *tongbian* form in China, an explanation needs to start with the issue of the absence in Chinese tradition of Western-style dualisms that establish an ontological separation between some determinative principle and that which it determines, and the correlative mode of philosophizing and explaining order in the world. It was in this setting that China developed its political thought and practices; this tradition plays a facilitating role in one's effort to understand better Chinese politics and practices. In what follows, let us look into some fundamental Chinese political concepts and the typical patterns in which the Chinese read Western ideas.

RATIONALITY: LIXING

Rationality is often translated *lixing* in Chinese. However, appeals to *li* (often translated "reason," but referring to correlation and continuity) in the modality of *tongbian* always presuppose a communal context. It is expected that the Chinese context is not so congenial to the strict logos style of accounting.⁵ In the lack of an ontological mode of thinking, the act of understanding and articulating the *dao* (ways of correlation) of things cannot have an ontological reference. Perhaps the Chinese reading of rationality can better be understood as *heli*, "to be in accord with *li*."⁶ Regarding *lixing*, *The Book of Later Han Dynasty* says, "Being too mindful may become willful, being too accommodating may become will-less. Therefore, the sage teaches being in accord with *li*, to restrain from being reckless, be prudent and appropriate, and curb inappropriateness."⁷ In Chinese, rationality (*li*) does not have the same meaning as in the West; it is performed with continuity between things, as time changes and as circumstance varies, and takes into account the appropriateness of both means and end.

POLITICS: ZHENGZHI

In *tongbian*, politics, or "*zhengzhi*," a classical word, means appropriateness (also uprightness, righteousness), flow,⁸ or "the *dao* extends appropriately to

all parts of the land, enriching populace's lives."⁹ There are no dualistic woes of the ruling and the ruled, since propriety and harmony is nurtured between them.¹⁰ It lacks a sense of acquiring power, referring more to handling the affairs of the people. The ruler has always been and continues to be defined by his personal character, so to object to the policies that articulate the existing order is to condemn the ruler's person. Good rulers take care of the people and promulgate good policies.¹¹

RULE OF LAW: FAZHI

In the West, the "rule of law" means the law of nature or God, and the contracted law in the form of the constitution serves the law of God, and the rule of man refers to tyranny or violation of the contracted law. But in China, "law" (*fa*) is rather a specification of administrative guidelines. Those who govern are not understood to be separated from the ruling guidelines, which are supposed to reflect the *dao* of society and nature and help maintain harmony. Whereas people in the West fear that the government will infringe on their private rights and so it should be checked, in China, people believe that every government has as its goal taking care of the people's livelihood. As a result, repudiating existing ruling guidelines suggests the ruler has failed in fulfilling his tasks. Whereas Westerners tend to think they obey laws but not bureaucratic officials, the Chinese sense is that the official cannot be separated from particular personality and conduct. In reality, law (*fa*) plays a secondary role; it assists in situations in which an individual fails in maintaining a moral and ethical performance. Law is resorted to only to correct by punishment. Invoking *fa* indicates failure to maintain harmony; and appeals to *fa* in Chinese society have little in common with Western appeals to the rule of law.¹²

RULE OF MAN: RENZHI

Tongbian's rule of man suggests more exactly the rule of *ren* (appropriate relationship or humaneness) and the rule of *de* (virtuous rule). Chinese thought gives preference for the rule of the most virtuously capable; in a social environment, everyone wants to acquire appropriate relationships in all aspects of society for better living. It is common understanding that all rules are conducted by men, and hence, that the critical issue is to get those men who are the most capable of comprehending continuity and correlations, and acquiring and maintaining the harmony of humans and society. The form of politics

must not be independent of ethics, or *renzheng* (rule of humane correlations) and *dezheng* (rule of moral virtue).

Lunli (ethics) and *daode* (virtue) literally mean having acquired the way, or in a full sense, having obtained a thorough comprehension of the appropriate and harmonious relationships of society and nurtured sophistication in pursuing, maintaining, and shaping them productively. As it suggests, appropriate and harmonious relationships can never be acquired by competition but require *li* and *rang* (ritual or propriety and receptiveness) as "an enduring yet always malleable syntax through which the human being can pursue refined and appropriate relationships."¹³ The rule of man precludes the psychological fear of tyranny.

RIGHTS: QUANLI

In a *tongbian* context, "right," or *quanli*, means propriety and harmony, or the righteous and appropriate location one should find for oneself in the context of community, or say, in the focused locale of relationships. It is not the providence of God or contractarianism; it is a natural tendency or effort through human experience. Such an effort entails realizing one's own freedom through one's equality to other individuals who share continuity and correlations within a context. In this case, equality is not defined in terms of property but a full range of conditions and obligations related to the individual as regards his/her appropriate position.

One finds there is no need to separate governmental powers when in *tongbian* are absent all the structurally preconditioned conceptions in the Western tradition, particularly the rule of man as necessarily tyrannical. In this respect, if seen from the perspective of *tongbian*, the separation of powers would not work if the rule were indeed tyrannical, since it is operable in reality through powers separated merely in form.

DEMOCRACY: MINZHU

One can see how different the Chinese read the Western political concept of democracy, by examining the ideas of the relationship between the ruler and the people as correlative and continuous. Some expressions reverberate the Chinese ancient idea of democracy. As Xunzi states, "Nature does not nurture the masses of human beings for the sake of the ruler, but rather in reverse, selects the ruler for the sake of the masses."¹⁴ As Confucius claims, "The people regard the ruler as their heart; the ruler takes the people as his body. . . . The

holiness of the body determines that of the heart; the damage of the heart happens when there is harm to the body. The existence of the ruler is determined by that of the people; the perishing of the ruler is due to that of the people.”¹⁵

Zuozhuan says, “The people are the master of spiritual beings, so the sage-king primarily devotes himself to the people, and secondly takes care of the spiritual beings.”¹⁶ As far as *zheng* (or politics) is concerned, “there is none in which the people are not taken as the paramount end.”¹⁷ These phrases all suggest that fundamental Chinese political concepts do not separate leaders from the people, placing them in opposition. A *tongbian* view of “democracy” (*minzhu*) preferences content and its harmony with form, over mere form; any form of democracy has to take into account the interest of the great majority of the population in society, particularly the weak and poor, since a state of suffering indicates the failure of *zhengzhi*. A democracy, *minzhu* (“the people’s governance”), is more a concept and practice of the government for the people, of the people, and by the people, which encourages the idea of equality based upon the communal sources of individuality rather than atomistic individualism. It might be said that the Chinese worldview and modality of thinking promote a sort of communitarian form of politics that is seriously at odds with the liberal democratic model.¹⁸

The Chinese worldview does not necessarily have the kind of psychological worry about the unsolvable problem of evil human nature, the emergence of tyranny, and hence, establishment of a checking mechanism as solution. Why? This is because the ruler has to be by a morally distinguished person through self-cultivation in the social environment wherein all people pursue ethical self-cultivation. Apparently, *tongbian*’s “authority” entailing indispensable moral and aesthetic content has somehow left little room for growth of tyranny. As Hall and Ames maintain,

From its inception, Confucianism has been concerned with the self-cultivation of individuals—preeminently that of rulers and ministers. The Confucian sensibility enjoins the ruler to rule by virtuous example. This can only be possible if rulers are themselves producers rather than producers of culture. . . . One cannot rule effectively without presenting himself as a moral leader.¹⁹

Of course, this does not mean that the modality of Chinese correlative thinking and the Confucian idea and practice of moral self-cultivation is capable of preventing immoral and amoral authority from happening in any moment and under any social condition. But it is often that, in a social environment wherein every person pursues ethical self-cultivation, immoral and amoral persons have to pretend to do good and behave in a deceptive manner if they want to perform evil. Perhaps this is the reason that there are plenty of popular sayings referring to such an immoral scenario, for instance, “*gua*

yang tou mai gou rou" (selling mutton only in name, while what sold is indeed dog meat); and "*man zui ren yi dao de manduzi nan dao nu chang*" (while one has intention as evil as committing adultery full in the mind, he is claiming himself of being humane, righteous, upright, and virtuous). In this respect, it occurs from time to time that distinguishing between one who inadvertently does something bad and one who is intentionally bad requires a tough and meticulous effort.

However, as Hall and Ames also observe, there is little evidence to suggest that contemporary China has abandoned any significant elements of its Confucian orthodoxy. The leadership of contemporary China maintains many of the same characteristics that have dominated Chinese government since the Han dynasty—namely, the nation understood as a family, the filial respect for the ruler as father, and the consequent sense of rule as a personal exercise.²⁰

Insofar as the current situation in China is characterized by the authority's engagement in a the economic reform projected for the commodity market system, which has appealed to the concepts of neoliberalism, and the more and more an account for China's future in liberal democracy's terms, what is most probable to be happening? What could be the future status of *tongbian*? Perhaps we should take into account the three following scenarios.

Indeed, although in the course of more than twenty years of economic reform, China is currently experiencing a rush for wealth and the slogan "To be rich is glorious" seems to have become the motto of the masses. If seen in the view of *tongbian*, which takes into account both the elements of rationality and irrationality in reality, it would be a foggy situation for both the masses and the government, if the society as a whole were to be dominated by the goal of pursuing unlimited money or profit. The attitude is far more paradoxical than merely models of liberalism can explain; that is, it is all right to become rich but not okay to be dominated by the goal of capitalistic profit seeking.²¹ There is currently no sign indicating a certain direction that China is going to take; a teleologic transition does not exist, particularly in terms of Weber's conception, apart from enormous uncertainty. For this reason, our only option is to consider various scenarios. The following scenarios are three possible social conditions relating to how China deals with the conflict of "being rich" and avoiding being dominated by the capitalistic life goal: (1) to be rich but also avoid being governed by the goal; (2) to be cautious at handling political issues; and (3) to experience inevitable domination of society by the capitalistic end.

1. Unlike the claimed Weberian approach, *tongbian* seeks continuity. There has been no sign so far showing that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intends to slow its ongoing project of economic reform, particularly in terms

of privatization. Nor do we know whether it has a chance to win its war against the rampant corruption caused by privatization. But continuity is seen clearly running through the policies of the eras of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin and the new era of Hu Jintao; Hu has carried on all the economic reform programs and might also have some ambitious plans for political reform, for example, to include “protect private property” in an amendment of the Constitution and to take up institutional democratization starting with the CCP itself.²² A *Washington Post Foreign Service* article reports on “China to Open Field in Local Elections,” a decision to allow multiple candidates to debate the need for reform. The story says, “President Hu Jintao is poised to announce limited but significant political reforms that would permit for the first time more than one candidate to compete for office in local legislatures, political sources said today.”²³ It revealed that instructors and researchers of the Central Committee Party School had been to Germany to establish contacts with leaders of its social democratic party, giving rise to speculations about Hu’s interest in reforming China’s Leninist party.²⁴ Hu approved sending high-ranking officials for training in administrative operation of modern capitalist society at Harvard University. Perhaps all these are potential elements for China’s change toward the direction of liberal democracy, or perhaps they suggest that Hu at least believes the mechanisms of modern capitalist society do not necessarily contradict, and may be beneficial to, noncapitalistic goals of life, since as Hu prominently stresses, the CCP’s existence is for the ultimate communal interest and it governs for the people; its use of political power is for the people; its concerns are always with the people; and it pursues the people’s interest.²⁵ In addition, Hu has shown that his leadership is a continuity of former communist politics by visiting Xibaipo Village in Hebei and Jinggangshan in Jiangxi, both of which were important spots where the Central Committee of the CCP had been situated in its revolutionary process. Visits to them signify maintaining the tradition of revolutionary leadership politics. Hu’s continuity from Deng and Jiang may certainly form a basis for the suspicion that there might be change under his leadership in the direction of constitutional democracy, true parliamentary body, rule of law, civil rights, and even some forms of competitive party system. However, based upon his demonstration of continuity with Xibaipo and Jinggangshan, it is also possible that in Hu’s mind the systems of liberal democracy are not supposed to contradict with noncapitalistic traditional life goals, the virtues and ethical values of the revolutionary tradition. There is hardly any possibility for Hu to construe the individualistic pursuit of profit as a single life goal governing the entire society.

2. Even though Hu believes modern Western capitalism is not necessarily opposed to noncapitalistic life goals and is conducive to maintaining tradi-

tional virtues and ethical values (and for that reason he has ambitious plans for political reform towards liberal democracy), he is a well-known prudent, wise, and sober person who tends to make political moves meticulously. Since he came to his current position, his political maneuvers in dealing with many situations have shown that he takes into account and is heavily influenced by multiple dimensions of society domestically and internationally.²⁶ He is seen as making a particular effort to build himself an image of affinity with the masses. It would not be a mistake to suspect that he might adjust a political operation according to domestic social conditions, for instance, the rampant corruption among high-ranking government officials, economic crimes—against which he has demonstrated a firm stand—public opinion's fervent protests against unemployment, and privatization. These may all become major obstacles to carrying out bold political reform for liberal democracy.²⁷ Perhaps Hu's only option is to push forward democratization programs within the boundaries of Communist Party (or even by then the Social Democratic Party) domination. Based on his political performance, as one of the leaders who handled the political turmoil in Tibet in 1988 and Tian'anmen in 1989, there is a consensus that he will not carry out his reform campaign in a reckless manner, regardless of the capability of society for making radical political changes and often creating chaos. The fact that he has somehow won popularity from both radical reformists and people who are suspicious about further capitalist-oriented reform, can be in part attributed to his rather ambiguous political signals. There is no question that ambiguity helps build his charisma. It is probable that what is happening under his leadership may not be fully satisfying the expectations of the proponents of liberal democracy both inside and outside China. Taking into account the current situation in China in which the CCP and People's Republic of China (PRC) government leaders face enormous pressure regarding many social problems and perilous international circumstances, it is not too difficult to predict that Hu will continue to approach the issues of political reform meticulously.

3. If adequate attention is paid to the actual and specific social reality of China as embedded in a particular tradition which developed independently (and is absent of the Western civilizational experience, intellectual history, worldview and mode of thinking, and conception of the individual within society as an end in itself), then it may not be wrong to suspect that at some point Hu and other major leaders of China might come to realize the domination of the capitalistic life goal. In this case, social and political crises will be unavoidable if many of the reforming programs are continued and pushed even further. At some point during the emerging crises, the new leadership may rethink the whole reform process, and as a result,

24. Yao Jin, "Hu Jintao: The Bird that Keeps Its Head Down," *China Brief*, The James Town Foundation, I, no. 10, November 21, 2001. edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/11/01/china.hubio/ (accessed September 1, 2003).
25. Hu's speech on July 1, 2003. See *China Internet Information Center*, www.china.org.cn/chinese/ch-sgdb/index.htm (accessed September 28, 2003).
26. Public opinions express a warm celebrity and popularity that he has won for his prudent manner of handling international and domestic affairs such as the U.S. war against Iraq, the Korean nuclear crisis, SARS, and his taking over the new "three represents" from Jiang but giving new interpretations.
27. An example may be seen in the fact, as some commentary states, that Jiang's persistent move to include "protecting private property" in the amendment of the Constitution of PRC has met strong resistance because there is currently a rampant "hatred for the rich" in China. See Tan Zhong, "A Reflection on Hu's July 1 Speech," *United Morning Post*, July 3, 2003. ref. huazhen.net/HuaShan/BBS/shishi/gbcurrent/105236.shtml (accessed July 3, 2003).

Glossary

INTRODUCTION

<i>bianhua zhi dao</i>	變化之道
<i>biantong</i>	變通
<i>bianzheng</i>	辨證
<i>bianzheng</i>	辯證
<i>bianzheng</i>	辯証
<i>bianzhengfa</i>	辯證法
<i>bianzheng weiwu zhuyi</i>	辯證唯物主義
<i>dao</i>	道
<i>Daode jing</i>	道德經
<i>dongfeng yadao xifeng</i>	東風壓倒西風
<i>duili tongyi</i>	對立統一
<i>Fu yi zhang wang er cha lai, er wei xian chan you.</i>	夫易彰往而察來, 而微顯闡幽
<i>Hanshu</i>	漢書
<i>hua er cai zhi</i>	化而裁之
<i>kun</i>	坤
<i>li</i>	理
<i>Lunyu</i>	論語
<i>luxian jueding yiqie</i>	路線決定一切
<i>maodun</i>	矛盾
<i>qi</i>	氣
<i>qian</i>	乾
<i>Sanguo yanyi</i>	三國演義
<i>shibai shi chenggong zhi mu</i>	失敗是成功之母
<i>Shuihu</i>	水滸
<i>tianxia</i>	天下
<i>tong</i>	通
<i>tongbian</i>	通變
<i>tongbian zhi wei shi</i>	通變之謂事
<i>tui er xing zhi</i>	推而行之
<i>wanwu</i>	萬物
<i>wuwei</i>	無爲
<i>xiangfan xiangcheng</i>	相反相成
<i>Xici</i>	繫辭
<i>Xiyou ji</i>	西遊記
<i>yi</i>	易
<i>yi fen wei er</i>	一分為二

CHAPTER ONE

Tongbian: A Strand of Chinese Thought

<i>an/wei</i>	安危
<i>ben</i>	本
<i>bian er tong zhi yi jin li</i>	變而通之以盡利
<i>biantong</i>	變通
<i>bian tong pei si shi</i>	變通配四時
<i>bian tong zhe, qu shi zhe ye</i>	變通者趣時者也
<i>bian ze tong tong ze jiu</i>	變則者通則久
<i>bianzheng siwei</i>	辯證思維
<i>bo</i>	剝
<i>che</i>	徹
<i>chuixiang</i>	垂象
<i>cun/wang</i>	存亡
<i>da</i>	達
<i>dao</i>	道
<i>Dao zhe wu zhi cheng ye</i>	道者無之稱也無不通也無不由也
<i>wu bu tong ye, wu bu you ye</i>	
<i>Daode jing</i>	道德經
<i>di zhi tichu wanwu zhe ye</i>	地祇提出萬物者也
<i>Dong Zhongshu zhuan</i>	董仲舒傳
<i>dui ou wu</i>	對偶物
<i>Fan wei tian di zhuhua er bu guo fu</i>	範圍天地之化而不過復
<i>fu xi huo zhi suo fu</i>	福兮禍之所伏
<i>gai</i>	改
<i>gang</i>	剛
<i>gang rou xiang tui</i>	剛柔相推
<i>gang rou xiang yi</i>	剛柔相易
<i>gao yi xia wei ji</i>	高以下爲基
<i>gen</i>	艮
<i>geng</i>	更
<i>guaci</i>	卦辭
<i>guan</i>	觀
<i>guan bian yu yin yang</i>	觀變於陰陽

<i>guan qi hui tong</i>	觀其會通
<i>gui/jian</i>	貴賤
<i>gui yi jian wei ben</i>	貴以賤爲本
<i>han/shu</i>	寒暑
<i>Hanshu</i>	漢書
<i>he/bi</i>	閼闌
<i>hede</i>	合德
<i>hu</i>	忽
<i>hua</i>	化
<i>hua er cai zhi wei zhi bian</i>	化而裁之謂之變
<i>huo xi fu zhi suo yi</i>	禍兮福之所依
<i>huxi</i>	互繫
<i>ji</i>	奇
<i>ji/xiong</i>	吉凶
<i>jian</i>	漸
<i>jian/shun</i>	健順
<i>jian tian xia zhi dong</i>	見天下之動
<i>jiao xing</i>	教行
<i>jing yi ru shen</i>	精義入神
<i>jin/tui</i>	進退
<i>jun/cang</i>	君藏
<i>jun/min</i>	君民
<i>junzi/xiaoren</i>	君子小人
<i>kun</i>	坤
<i>lei feng xiang bo</i>	雷風相薄
<i>li</i>	理
<i>liang yi sheng si xiang</i>	兩儀生四象
<i>luan/zhi</i>	亂治
<i>Lun yu shi yi</i>	論語釋疑
<i>Mengzi Zhexue yu Zhixu de</i>	
<i>Weijuexing</i>	孟子哲學與秩序的未決性
<i>ni</i>	秘
<i>min xian yong zhi wei zhi shen</i>	民咸用之謂之神
<i>mo</i>	末
<i>nan nü gou jing wanwu huasheng</i>	男女構精萬物化生
<i>nan/yi</i>	難易
<i>ou</i>	偶
<i>pu</i>	朴
<i>qi</i>	氣
<i>qian</i>	乾

Qian Hanshu

<i>qian kun hui ze wu yi xian yi</i>	前漢書 乾坤燬則無以見易
<i>qian yi jnn zhi, kun yi cang zhi</i>	乾以君之坤以藏之 窮而通
<i>qiong er tong</i>	窮神知化得之盛也
<i>qiong shen zhi hua de zhi sheng ye</i>	七月陰氣成體自申束
<i>qi yne yin qi cheng ti zi shen shu</i>	曲成萬物而不遺
<i>qu cheng wanwu er bu yi</i>	屈信
<i>qu/xin</i>	日月爲易象陰陽也
<i>ri yue wei yi xiang yin yang ye</i>	柔
<i>rou</i>	善惡
<i>shan/e</i>	山澤通氣
<i>shanze tongqi</i>	沙青岩
<i>Sha Qingyan</i>	申
<i>shen</i>	神
<i>shen</i>	神而化之使民宜之
<i>shen er hua zhi shi min yi zhi</i>	神而明之存乎其人
<i>shen er ming zhi cun hu qi ren</i>	生
<i>sheng</i>	生生之謂易
<i>sheng sheng zhi wei yi</i>	生死
<i>sheng/si</i>	神無方易無體
<i>shen wu fang, yi wu ti</i>	神也者妙萬物而爲言者也
<i>shen ye zhe miao wan wu er wei yan</i>	示
<i>zhe ye</i>	實
<i>shi</i>	始
<i>shi</i>	始終
<i>shi/zhong</i>	倏
<i>shu</i>	數
<i>shu</i>	水火相逮
<i>shui huo xiang dai</i>	順逆
<i>shun/ni</i>	說卦
<i>Shuogua</i>	說文
<i>Shuowen</i>	四方是維
<i>sifang shiwei</i>	捐益
<i>sun/yi</i>	天不變道亦不變
<i>tian bu bian dao yi bu bian</i>	天地
<i>tian di</i>	天地設位易行乎其中
<i>tian di she wei yi xing hu qi zhong</i>	天地綱蘊萬物化醇
<i>tian di yin yun wanwu huachun</i>	天地之大德曰生
<i>tian di zhi da de yue sheng</i>	

<i>tian shen yin chu wan wu zhe ye</i>	天神引出萬物者也
<i>tianxia</i>	天下
<i>tizhi</i>	體質
<i>tong</i>	通
<i>tongbiao</i>	通變
<i>tongbian zhi dao</i>	通變之道
<i>tongbian zhi wei shi</i>	通變之謂事
<i>toung gui er shu tu</i>	同歸而殊途
<i>tong hu zhongye zhi dao er zhi</i>	通乎晝夜之道而知
<i>tongqi</i>	通氣
<i>toung qi bian</i>	通其變
<i>toung shen ming zhi de</i>	通神明之德
<i>Tuanzhuān</i>	彖傳
<i>tui er xing zhi wei zhi tong</i>	推而行之謂之通
<i>Wang Bi</i>	王弼
<i>wang/lai</i>	往來
<i>wang lai bu qiong wei zhi tong</i>	往來不窮謂之通
<i>wanwu</i>	萬物
<i>wan wu chu hu zhen</i>	萬物出乎震
<i>wanyou</i>	萬有
<i>wenyan</i>	文言
<i>wu</i>	無
<i>wu bu ke yi jiu ju qi suo</i>	物不可以久居其所
<i>wu bu ke yi zhong dun</i>	物不可以終遯
<i>wu bu ke yi zhong fou</i>	物不可以終否
<i>wu bu ke yi zhong guo</i>	物不可以終過
<i>wu bu ke yi zhong li</i>	物不可以終離
<i>wu bu ke yi zhong tong</i>	物不可以終通
<i>wu bu ke yi zhong zhuang</i>	物不可以終壯
<i>xian nai wei zhi xiang</i>	見乃謂之象
<i>xiang</i>	象
<i>xiangbo</i>	相薄
<i>xiangdai</i>	相逮
<i>xiangdang</i>	相蕩
<i>xiang fan er bu ke xiang wu ye</i>	相反而不可相無也
<i>xianggan</i>	相感
<i>xiangmo</i>	相摩
<i>xiangtui</i>	相推
<i>xiangyi</i>	相易

Xiangzhan	象傳
Xici	繫辭
xing	性
xing er shang zhe wei zhi dao	形而上則謂之道
xing nai wei zhi qi	形乃謂之器
xiyi yan ting shou gong ye	蜥蜴蝘蜓守宮也
Xugua	序卦
Xu Shen	徐慎
yang guo duo yin	陽卦多陰
Yaoci	爻辭
yi	易
yi	義
yi bu ke xian ze qian kun huo ji hu xi	易不可見則乾坤或幾乎息
yi da wei zhi dao	一達謂之道
yi he yi bi wei zhi bian	一闇一闢謂之變
Yijing	易經
yin gua duo yang	陰卦多陽
yin qi	陰氣
yinyang	陰陽
yin yang bu ce zhi wei shen	陰陽不測之謂道
yi qiong ze bian	易窮則變
Yishu	道書
yi wu liang ti	一物兩體
yi wu neng hua wei zhi shen	一物能化謂之神
yi xian er tian xia zhi li de yi	易見而天下之理得矣
yi yan yi yang zhi wei dao	-陰一陽之謂道
yi you tai ji shi sheng liang yi	易有太極是生兩儀
yi yu tian di zhun gu neng mi lun tian di zhi dao	易與天地準故能彌綸天地之道
you	有
you yi wu bi you yu zhi	有一物必有與之相反者以對之
xiang fan zhe yi dui zhi	與天地相似故不違
yu tian di xiang si gu bu wei	
yuzhou	宇宙
Zagua	雜卦
zaju	雜居
zhi	祇
zhi bian hua zhi dao zhe	知變化之道者
zhi shen zhi suo wei hu	知神之所爲乎
zhi er yong zhi wei zhi fa	制而用之謂之法

<i>ziran</i>	自然
<i>ziwei</i>	自爲
<i>zun/bei</i>	尊卑

CHAPTER TWO

Marxism in China: Initial Encounters

<i>An ge er si</i>	安格爾斯
<i>cheng</i>	成
<i>Da Tong Shu</i>	大同書
<i>Deyizhi shehui geming jia lie zhuan</i>	德意志社會革命家列傳
<i>Dong dalu tushu ju</i>	東大陸圖書局
<i>Dong xin yi she</i>	東新譯社
<i>faze</i>	法則
<i>Fu yi he wei zhe ye? Fu yi lai, er xianwei chanyou</i>	夫易彰往而察來而顯微闡幽
<i>Ganshe yu fangren</i>	干涉與放任
<i>gongchan zhuyi</i>	共產主義
<i>Guang zhi shuju</i>	廣智書局
<i>Guo min xin bao</i>	國民新報
<i>Guoxuc she</i>	國學社
<i>Haizuo xinshe</i>	海作新社
<i>Hei ge er</i>	黑格爾
<i>Hei Zhier</i>	黑智兒
<i>Hiroshi, Ogawa</i>	實藤惠秀
<i>Hui wen xue she</i>	匯文學社
<i>ji</i>	機
<i>Ji De de gaishu</i>	頤德的概述
<i>Jia lu ma lu ke si</i>	加陸馬陸科斯
<i>Jiang Kanghu</i>	江抗虎
<i>Jiaohui xin bao</i>	教會新報
<i>Jiaokeshu yi ji she</i>	教科書譯軒社
<i>jiduan minzhu zhuyi</i>	極端民主主義
<i>jieji</i>	階級
<i>Jing jin shuju</i>	精進書局
<i>Jingji xue zhi pinglun</i>	經濟學之評論
<i>jinhua</i>	進化
<i>Jinhua lun geming zhe Jie De</i>	Jinhua lun geming zhe Jie De

<i>zhi xueshuo</i>	進化論革命者頡德之學說
<i>Jin shi shehui zhuyi</i>	近世社會主義
<i>Jinshi zhengzhi shi</i>	近世政治史
<i>jun-fu zhi shuo</i>	均富之說
<i>Kangxi zidian</i>	康熙字典
<i>Kang Youwei</i>	康有爲
<i>Kotoku Shushui</i>	幸德秋水
<i>laomin</i>	勞民
<i>lianxi</i>	聯系
<i>Liu Shifu</i>	劉師復
<i>Lun qiang quan</i>	論強權
<i>Lun xue Riben wen zhi yi</i>	論學日本文之易
<i>Ma er ke</i>	馬爾克
<i>Ma er ke</i>	馬爾喀
<i>Mai ha si</i>	埋蛤司
<i>Mai ke shi</i>	麥喀士
<i>Mai kc shi</i>	麥克士
<i>Mai ke si</i>	麥克司
<i>Makesi</i>	馬克思
<i>Makesi zhuyi zhi yiyi</i>	馬克思主義之意義
<i>Ma ke zhu yi</i>	馬科主義
<i>Min bao</i>	民報
<i>Min Ming</i>	民鳴
<i>minsheng zhuyi</i>	民生主義
<i>Min xue hui</i>	閔學會
<i>ping-min</i>	平民
<i>Qi yi bai gong lingxiu, zhuming zhe, ying ren makesi ye. Makesi zhi yan yue: 'jiu gu ban shi zhi ren, qi quan longzhao wuzhou, tu guo yu jun xiang zhi fanwei yi guo</i>	其以百工領袖著名者馬克思也。馬克思之言曰 糾股辦事之人其權籠罩五洲突過於君相之範圍 一國
<i>Qing yi bao</i>	清議報
<i>qiong er tong</i>	窮而通
<i>Qun zhi she</i>	群智社
<i>Ri er man ren shehui zhuyi zhi taidou ye</i>	日爾曼人社會主義之泰斗也
<i>Shanghai shiwu bao</i>	上海時務報

<i>shehui dang</i>	社會黨
<i>shehui zhuyi</i>	社會主義
<i>Shehui zhuyi gaiping</i>	社會主義概評
<i>Shehui zhuyi jingsui</i>	社會主義精髓
<i>Shehui zhuyi yanjiushe</i>	社會主義研究社
<i>shen junfa</i>	紳軍閥
<i>shitsu</i>	悉
<i>Shu Hun</i>	蜀魂
<i>subete</i>	凡
<i>Tai xi xueshu sixiang</i>	
<i>bianqian zhi da shi</i>	泰西學術思想變遷之人勢
<i>te an</i>	特安
<i>Tian yi</i>	天義
<i>tongbian</i>	通變
<i>Tongmenghui</i>	同盟會
<i>wanfa</i>	萬法
<i>Wan guo gong bao</i>	萬國公報
<i>wu</i>	無
<i>xiang</i>	象
<i>xianzai zhuyi</i>	現在主義
<i>Xin dalu youji</i>	新大陸遊記
<i>Xin min cong bao</i>	新民叢報
<i>Xin shijie</i>	新世界
<i>Xixue</i>	西學
<i>Yan ge er shi</i>	煙格爾士:
<i>Yan ji er</i>	嫣及爾
<i>Ye qui lu si</i>	野契陸斯
<i>yi</i>	譯
<i>yi dai zhi da zhu shu</i>	一代之大著述
<i>Yin bing shi he ji</i>	飲冰室合集
<i>Ying gai er</i>	英蓋爾
<i>Yingguo laodong shehui zhi zhuangtai</i>	英國勞動社會之狀態
<i>yin yuan</i>	因緣
<i>yiru</i>	一如
<i>Yi shu hui bian</i>	譯書彙編
<i>Yi shu jing yan lu</i>	譯書經眼錄
<i>you</i>	有
<i>ze</i>	則
<i>Zhejiang chao</i>	浙江潮
<i>zhengmian, fanmian,</i>	

<i>fanmian zhi fanwian</i>	正面、反面、反面之反面
<i>Zhexue yaoling</i>	哲學要領
<i>Zhongguo yi Riben shu zonghe mulu</i>	中國譯日本書綜合目錄
<i>Zhongguo zhi shehui zhuyi</i>	中國之社會主義
<i>Zhongguo zhi xinmin</i>	中國之新民
<i>Zhu Zhixin</i>	朱執信
<i>zibenjia</i>	資本家
<i>Zi zheli shang suojian zhi pinkun</i>	自哲理上所見之貧困
<i>Zuo xin she</i>	作新社

CHAPTER THREE

Tongbian in Preliminary Reading of “Dialectics”

<i>ba gang</i>	八綱
<i>bian</i>	辨
<i>bian</i>	辯
<i>bianbie</i>	辨別
<i>bianbie gezhong butong zhenghou</i>	辨別各種不同症候
<i>biangeng buyi</i>	變更不已
<i>bianxi kaozheng</i>	辨析考證
<i>bianzheng</i>	辨證
<i>bianzheng</i>	辯證
<i>bianzheng</i>	辯証
<i>bianzhengfa</i>	辯證法
<i>bianzheng shizhi</i>	辯證施治
<i>bu fei zhi shi</i>	不非之事
<i>chang</i>	常
<i>cheng</i>	成
<i>chongtu</i>	衝突
<i>chuan</i>	傳
<i>chuandi yidi</i>	傳遞驛遞
<i>Cihai</i>	辭海
<i>cong zhengti guandian chufa</i>	從整體觀點出發
<i>dang</i>	蕩
<i>dang</i>	當
<i>dao</i>	刀
<i>deng</i>	登
<i>di</i>	遞

<i>di shan tui qian, bian geng bu yi</i>	遞嬗推遷變更不已
<i>di xiang fan zheng, dixiang jiehe</i>	遞相反正遞相結合
<i>fa</i>	法
<i>fangfa</i>	方法
<i>fanti</i>	反題
<i>gao</i>	高
<i>geng die</i>	更迭
<i>geng yi</i>	更易
<i>guilu</i>	規律
<i>Hanfei zi</i>	韓非子
<i>Hanshu</i>	漢書
<i>haoling sanshan</i>	號令三嬗
<i>hua</i>	化
<i>huan</i>	緩
<i>ji</i>	擠
<i>jian</i>	漸
<i>jiau</i>	諫
<i>jingluo</i>	經絡
<i>jing zhi yu dong, you zhi yu wu,</i>	靜之於動有之於無
<i>gai chu chu wufei maodun zhe</i>	蓋觸處無非矛盾者
<i>jinhua</i>	進化
<i>jinhuasheng yu chougtu</i>	進化生於衝突
<i>jin zhi</i>	進之
<i>junzi yi jian shan ze qian</i>	君子以見善則遷
<i>ke wei ren fa</i>	可爲人法
<i>maodun</i>	矛盾
<i>pai</i>	排
<i>renjun</i>	人君
<i>qian</i>	遷
<i>Qian Hui Zhan</i>	錢徽傳
<i>qian yu qiaomu</i>	遷於喬木
<i>qiaoyan</i>	巧言
<i>renjun</i>	人君
<i>shan</i>	嬗
<i>shelun</i>	攝論
<i>sheng</i>	生
<i>shi</i>	適
<i>Shiji</i>	史記
<i>Shijing</i>	詩經
<i>shizai</i>	實

<i>Shuowen</i>	說文
<i>sizhen</i>	四診
<i>taiji</i>	太極
<i>tongbian</i>	通變
<i>tong zhong qiu yi</i>	同中求異
<i>tui</i>	推
<i>tuihua</i>	退化
<i>wanfa</i>	萬法
<i>weiling hun</i>	唯靈論
<i>weiwu lun</i>	唯物論
<i>wu</i>	無
<i>wuji</i>	無極
<i>xi</i>	徒
<i>xiguo</i>	徙國
<i>xiang</i>	象
<i>xiao</i>	效
<i>xin</i>	辛
<i>Xin erya</i>	新爾雅
<i>yan</i>	言
<i>yi</i>	易
<i>Yijing</i>	易經
<i>yi li yan jian jun qin you zheng ye</i>	以理言諫君親猶正也
<i>yinyang</i>	陰陽
<i>yiru</i>	一如
<i>yi tui wei jin</i>	以退爲進
<i>yi zhong qiu tong</i>	異中求同
<i>you</i>	有
<i>you wu</i>	有無
<i>zangfu</i>	臟腑
<i>ze</i>	則
<i>zheng</i>	證
<i>zheng</i>	証
<i>zheng</i>	正
<i>zhengming</i>	證明(證明)
<i>zhengti</i>	正題

CHAPTER FOUR

Qu Qiubai's Reading of Dialectical Materialism

<i>benmo daozh</i>	本末倒置
<i>bian</i>	變
<i>biandong</i>	變動
<i>biandong de licheng</i>	變動的歷程
<i>biandong guilü</i>	變動規律
<i>bianhua zhi guilü</i>	變化之規律
<i>bianqian de gnilü</i>	變遷的規律
<i>bianyi</i>	變易
<i>bianyi hudong</i>	變易互動
<i>bianyi lü</i>	變易律
<i>bu dnan de bian yi lü</i>	不斷的變易律
<i>buduan lianxi</i>	不斷聯系
<i>bufen</i>	部分
<i>chansheng</i>	產生
<i>Chenbao</i>	晨報
<i>dao</i>	道
<i>dong</i>	動
<i>donglü</i>	動律
<i>dongxiang</i>	動象
<i>Ewen zhuanxiu guan</i>	俄文專修館
<i>fazhan</i>	發展
<i>fazhan lü</i>	發展律
<i>fouding zhi fouding</i>	否定之否定
<i>gang/rou</i>	剛柔
<i>genben shuxing</i>	根本屬性
<i>geti</i>	個體
<i>guan bian</i>	觀變
<i>guilü</i>	規律
<i>huanjing</i>	環境
<i>lianxi</i>	關係
<i>hubian</i>	互變
<i>hubian fa</i>	互變法
<i>hubian fa weiwulun</i>	互變法唯物論
<i>hubian lü</i>	互變律
<i>hudong</i>	互動

<i>hudong lü</i>	互動律
<i>hudong guanxi</i>	互動關係
<i>huxiang yingxiang</i>	互相影響
<i>jian tianxia zhi dong, guan qi hui tong</i>	見天下之動觀其會通
<i>jieji</i>	階級
<i>Laozi</i>	老子
<i>lianxi</i>	聯系
<i>licheng</i>	歷程
<i>lü</i>	律
<i>luoji</i>	邏輯
<i>Makesi zhuyi zhi yiji</i>	馬克思主義之意義
<i>maodun xing</i>	矛盾性
<i>maodun hubian</i>	矛盾互變
<i>maodun hubian lü</i>	矛盾互變律
<i>miaobu keyan</i>	妙不可言
<i>qian/kun</i>	乾坤
<i>quanti</i>	全體
<i>Shanghai xialing jiangxue hui</i>	上海夏令講學會
<i>shehui</i>	社會
<i>Shehui kexue gailun</i>	社會科學概論
<i>Shehui kexue jiangyi</i>	社會科學講義
<i>Shehui wenti</i>	社會問題
<i>Shehui sixiang shi</i>	社會思想史
<i>Shehui yundong shi</i>	社會運動史
<i>Shehui zhuxue gailun</i>	社會哲學概論
<i>shen</i>	神
<i>shuliang zhiliang de hubian</i>	數量質量的互變
<i>shuxing</i>	屬性
<i>tiaoli</i>	條理
<i>tixi</i>	體系
<i>tongbian</i>	通變
<i>tong qi bian</i>	通其變
<i>tong tianxia</i>	通天下
<i>Weiwlun de yuzhonguan gaishuo</i>	唯物論的宇宙觀概說
<i>Weiwl shiguan piping zhi piping</i>	唯物史觀批評之批評
<i>Wuchan jieji zhi zhuxue · weiwulun</i>	無產階級之哲學－唯物論
<i>Xiandai jingji xue</i>	現代經濟學
<i>Xiandai shihui xue</i>	現代社會學
<i>xiangfan xiangcheng</i>	相反相成

<i>xianghu dongzuo</i>	相互動作
<i>xianghu guanxi</i>	相互關係
<i>xianghu guanxiguilu</i>	相互關係規律
<i>xianghu xingdong</i>	相互行動
<i>xiaosuo</i>	線索
<i>xianxiang</i>	現象
<i>Xiu qingnian</i>	新青年
<i>xitong</i>	系統
<i>ye man ren</i>	野蠻人
<i>yi mao yi dun zhi wei guilü</i>	一矛一盾之謂規律
<i>yi yin yi yang zhi wei dao</i>	一陰一陽之謂道
<i>Yijing</i>	易經
<i>yuugxiang</i>	影響
<i>yin/yang</i>	陰陽
<i>yuanyin</i>	原因
<i>yuzhou</i>	宇宙
<i>zhengti-fanti-heti</i>	正題反題合題
<i>zhi bianhua zhi dao</i>	知變化之道
<i>Zhuangzi</i>	莊子
<i>ziyou shijie yu biran shijie</i>	自由世界與必然世界
<i>zui genben de yuanli</i>	最根本的原理

CHAPTER FIVE

Popularizing Dialectical Materialism

<i>biandong</i>	變動
<i>bianluya</i>	變化
<i>bianzheug de heyi</i>	辯證的合一
<i>bianzhengfa</i>	辯證法
<i>Bianzhengfa xueshuo gailue</i>	· 辯證法學說概略
<i>Biauzheng weiwu lun jiaocheng</i>	辯證唯物論教程
<i>Bigengtang</i>	筆耕堂
<i>Da Zhang Dongsun jiaoshou</i>	答張東蓀教授
<i>Dagong bao</i>	大公報
<i>Diandao Heger zhixue de zhenjie</i>	顛倒黑格爾哲學的真解
<i>dong de luoji shi keneng de</i>	懂得邏輯是可能的
<i>dui</i>	對
<i>dui dai</i>	對待

<i>duikang heyi</i>	對抗合一
<i>duili tongyi</i>	對立統一
<i>duili tongyi lü</i>	對立統一律
<i>dui yanfa</i>	對演法
<i>Dushu shenghuo</i>	讀書生活
<i>dute</i>	獨特
<i>ershiji shiji</i>	二十世紀
<i>fau</i>	反
<i>fanyingxiang</i>	反影響
<i>fu-nian</i>	負面
<i>fouding</i>	否定
<i>genju</i>	根據
<i>guanchuan</i>	貫穿
<i>Guannian lun bu ke xishou ma</i>	觀念論不可吸收嗎
<i>Guanyu zhexue de xiaomic</i>	關於哲學的消滅
<i>hudong</i>	互動
<i>huxiang</i>	互相
<i>Jianbian</i>	漸變
<i>jiben qiji</i>	基本契機
<i>jingyi</i>	精義
<i>Kexue qian de weixin lun yu</i>	科學前的唯心論與唯物論
<i>weiwu lun</i>	唯物論
<i>Kunlun</i>	崑崙
<i>Laozi</i>	老子
<i>lianxu</i>	連續
<i>Lilun yu shijian de shchui</i>	理論與實踐的社會科學根本問題
<i>kexue genben wenti</i>	歷史哲學概論
<i>Lishi zhexue gailun</i>	馬克思經濟學說
<i>Ma kesi jingji xueshuo</i>	馬克思主義經濟學基礎理論
<i>Makesi zhuyi jingji xue jichu lilun</i>	馬克思主義名詞解釋
<i>maodun</i>	矛盾
<i>maodun heyi</i>	矛盾合一
<i>maodun lu</i>	矛盾律
<i>qiji</i>	契機
<i>Shehui wenti zonglan</i>	社會問題綜覽
<i>Shehui xue gailun</i>	社會學概論
<i>Shehuixue dagang</i>	社會學大綱
<i>shijian</i>	實踐
<i>shiyong hua</i>	實用化

<i>Su E zhuxue chaoliu gailun</i>	蘇俄哲學潮流概論
<i>Su E zhuxue sichao zhi jiantao</i>	蘇俄哲學思潮之檢討
Sugiyama Shigeru	杉山榮
<i>tongshi xing</i>	同時性
<i>tougsu</i>	通俗
<i>tongsuhua</i>	通俗化
<i>Tougsu bianzhengfa jianghua</i>	通俗辯證法講話
<i>Tougsu weiwu lun jianghua</i>	通俗唯物論講話
<i>Wei fazhan xin zhuxue er zhan</i>	為發展新哲學而戰
<i>Weiwu bianzhengfa lunzhan</i>	唯物辯證法論戰
<i>Weiwei bianzhengfa zhi zong jiantao</i>	唯物辯證法之總檢討
<i>Weiwei shi guan jieshuo</i>	唯物史觀介說
<i>wu</i>	無
<i>Wuchan jieji de zhuxue</i>	無產階級的哲學
<i>Xiandai shijie guan</i>	現代世界觀
<i>xiangfan</i>	相反
<i>xiangfan xiangcheng</i>	相反相成
<i>xingdong</i>	行動
<i>Xin zhuxue de liangtiao zhanxian</i>	新哲學的兩條戰線
<i>Xin zhuxue cidian</i>	新哲學辭典
<i>Xin zhuxue lunzhan</i>	新哲學論戰
<i>Xin zhuxue shijie guan jianghua</i>	新哲學世界觀講話
<i>Xin zhuxue tixi jianghua</i>	新哲學體系講話
<i>Xingshi luoji yu bianzheng luoji</i>	形式邏輯與辯證邏輯
<i>Xinxian</i>	心弦
<i>xishou</i>	吸收
<i>yan</i>	演
<i>Yanjiu yu pipan</i>	研究與批判
<i>yaoshi</i>	鑰匙
<i>Yijing</i>	易經
<i>you</i>	有
<i>zheng</i>	正
<i>zhenzheng de ren</i>	真正的人
<i>Zhe xue bu hui xiaomie ma</i>	哲學不會消滅嗎
<i>Zhe xue dao hechu qu</i>	哲學到何處去
<i>Zhexue gailun</i>	哲學概論
<i>zhipei</i>	支配
<i>Zhongguohua</i>	中國化
<i>Zhouyi</i>	周易

<i>Zhuangzi</i>	莊子
<i>zhidao</i>	主導
<i>ziran</i>	自然
<i>zwei</i>	自為
<i>zong jielun</i>	總結論
<i>zonghe</i>	綜合

CHAPTER SIX

Ai Siqu: Sinizing Dialectical Materialism

<i>bawo</i>	把握
<i>benyuan</i>	本源
<i>bianhua de yuandongli</i>	變化的原動力
<i>bianzhengfa</i>	辯證法
<i>bukezhi lun</i>	不可知論
<i>butuo</i>	不妥
<i>Chen bao</i>	晨報
<i>Chouxiang zuoyong yu bianzhenfa</i>	抽象作用與辯證法
<i>cunzai</i>	存在
<i>Dazhong zhexue</i>	大眾哲學
<i>dong er yu chu</i>	動而愈出
<i>daoli</i>	道理
<i>duili tongyi</i>	對立統一
<i>Dushu shenghuo</i>	讀書生活
<i>Dushu shenghuo banyuekan</i>	讀書生活半月刊
<i>Dushu wenda</i>	讀書問答
<i>Dushu xuexiao</i>	讀書學校
<i>fanchou</i>	範疇
<i>fanying lun</i>	反映論
<i>fanzhe dao zhi dong</i>	反者道之動
<i>gainian</i>	概念
<i>ganxing</i>	感性
<i>Gongsun Long</i>	公孫龍
<i>guannian</i>	觀念
<i>guilu</i>	規律
<i>huanjing</i>	環境
<i>juedui</i>	絕對
<i>Kexue jianghua</i>	科學講話

<i>keguan</i>	客觀
<i>Laozi</i>	老子
<i>lixiug</i>	理性
<i>maodun</i>	矛盾
<i>ming</i>	名
<i>Ming xiang</i>	明象
<i>Mozi</i>	墨子
<i>pubian</i>	普遍
<i>renshi</i>	認識
<i>shehui</i>	社會
<i>Sheubao</i>	申報
<i>shiji</i>	實際
<i>Shijian yu lilun</i>	實踐與理論
<i>shiwu</i>	事物
<i>Sixiang faugfalun</i>	思想方法論
<i>suren</i>	俗人
<i>tongbian</i>	通變
<i>tougyi xing</i>	統一性
<i>ta suo fanying de dongxi</i>	它所反映的東西
<i>Tougsu biauzhengfa jiaughua</i>	通俗辯證法講話
<i>tougsu wenhua</i>	通俗文化
<i>Weiwu shi gua</i>	唯物史觀
<i>Wenxue jianghua</i>	文學講話
<i>Wu Liping</i>	吳黎平
<i>xiangdui</i>	相對
<i>xiangdui baohan jueidui</i>	相對包含絕對
<i>Xin zhexue dagang</i>	新哲學大綱
<i>Xiu zhexue lunji</i>	新哲學論集
<i>Yanjiu tigaug</i>	研究提綱
<i>yiban</i>	一般
<i>yaudi fangshi</i>	有的放矢
<i>you wu xiang sheng, uan</i>	
<i>yi xiang cheng</i>	有無相生難易相成
<i>Yunnan minzhong ribao</i>	雲南民衆日報
<i>Zhenglu</i>	正路
<i>Zhexue jianghua</i>	哲學講話
<i>Zhexue xuanji</i>	哲學選輯
<i>Zhexue yu shenghuo</i>	哲學與生活
<i>Zhishi yuekan</i>	知識月刊
<i>Zhongguohua</i>	中國化

<i>Zhongguo wenhua</i>	中國文化
<i>zhou xing er bu dai</i>	周行而不殆
<i>Zhouyi lueli</i>	周易略例
<i>zhu lei ke wei qi xiang,</i> <i>he yi ke wei qi hui</i>	諸類可爲其象合一可爲其徵
<i>Zhuangzi</i>	莊子
<i>ziran</i>	自然
<i>zishen yundong</i>	自身運動

CHAPTER SEVEN

Mao Zedong: The Mature Formulation of Dialectical Materialism

<i>Aizenberg</i>	愛森堡
<i>bianhua wanwu</i>	變化萬殊
<i>bianzhengfa</i>	辯證法
<i>bianshengfa yanjiu zhe xuduo,</i> <i>jiushi duili de tongyixing huo</i> <i>xianghu shentou</i>	辯證法研究這許多，就是對立的統一性或相互 滲透
<i>Chen bao</i>	晨報
<i>Chuci</i>	楚辭
<i>Chunqiu</i>	春秋
<i>Ci zhishi yi fen wei er, jiejie ruci,</i> <i>yizhiyu wuqiong, jie shi yi sheng</i> <i>bang er</i>	此只是一分爲二，節節如此以至於無窮，皆 是一生二爾
<i>dajia</i>	大家
<i>Daode jing</i>	道德經
<i>Daxue</i>	大學
<i>Dazhong zhixue</i>	大衆哲學
<i>dongji yu xiaoguo</i>	動機與效果
<i>duili de tongyixing</i>	對立的同一性
<i>duili tongyi</i>	對立統一
<i>dun</i>	盾
<i>fa hui zhuguan nengdong xing</i>	發揮主觀能動性
<i>fanying lun</i>	反映論
<i>fei zhau zhi zui, nai tian wang wo</i>	非戰之罪，乃天亡我
<i>fouding</i>	否定
<i>fouding zhi fouding</i>	否定之否定

<i>gaizao shijie</i>	改造世界
<i>gaizao shijieguan</i>	改造世界觀
<i>gang rou</i>	剛柔
<i>gang rou xiang tui er sheng bianhua</i>	剛柔相推而生變化
<i>Guanwu waipian</i>	觀物外篇
<i>gudai bianzheng weiwu lun dajia</i>	古代辯證唯物論大家
<i>guilu xing</i>	規律性
<i>Hanfeizi</i>	韓非子
<i>hundun</i>	渾沌
<i>Huangji jingshi</i>	皇極經世
<i>hushu bu du, fei hushu du</i>	戶樞不蠹，非戶樞蠹
<i>luxiang shentou</i>	互相滲透
<i>Jiang yu fei zhi, bi gu xing zhi;</i>	將欲廢之必固興之，將欲取之比固與之
<i>jiang yu qu zhi, bi gu yu zhi</i>	既是否定，又有繼承
<i>jishi fouding you you jicheng</i>	決定
<i>jueding</i>	坤
<i>kun</i>	兩點論
<i>liangdian lun</i>	兩而無偏
<i>liang er wu pian</i>	聯結
<i>liangjie</i>	聯系群衆
<i>liangxi qunzhong</i>	老子
<i>Laozi</i>	禮記
<i>Liji</i>	劉禹錫
<i>Liu Yuxi</i>	柳宗元
<i>Liu Zongyuan</i>	流水不腐，非流水腐
<i>liushui bu fu, fei liushui fu</i>	理學
<i>lixue</i>	論語
<i>Lunyu</i>	
<i>Makesi zhuyi bixu he woguo juti</i>	
<i>tedian xiang jiehe... Makesi Liening</i>	
<i>zhuyi de weida liliang jiu zaiyu ta</i>	
<i>shi he gege guojia juti de geming</i>	
<i>shijian xiang xianxi de</i>	馬克思主義必須和我國具體特點相結合…馬克思列寧主義的偉大力量就在於它是和各個國家具體的革命實踐相聯系的
<i>mao</i>	矛
<i>maodun</i>	矛盾
<i>Mao Zedong zhexue pizhuji</i>	毛澤東哲學批註集
<i>Mengzi</i>	孟子
<i>ming</i>	名

Mozi	墨子
<i>Nangong ciji</i>	南宮訶紀
<i>neixing bu jiu, fu he you he ju</i>	內省不疚，夫何憂何懼
<i>nengdong</i>	能動
<i>nengdong fanying lun</i>	能動反映論
<i>nengdongxing</i>	能動性
<i>neng wei</i>	能爲
<i>pian</i>	偏
<i>pianmian</i>	片面
<i>pubianxing</i>	普遍性
<i>qi</i>	氣
<i>qian</i>	乾
<i>qiu</i>	求
Qu Yuan	屈原
<i>ren bi xian yi ye, ranhou chan ru zhi</i>	人必先疑之然後讒入之
<i>ren cheng wu sheng hu tian</i>	人誠務勝乎天
<i>ren zhi shen gai ri ri bianyi zhe</i>	人之身蓋日日變易者
<i>Ru shui yi shen, ru huo yi re,</i> <i>yi yun zhi er yi yi</i>	如水益深，如火益熱，亦運之而已矣
Shao Yong	邵雍
<i>Shehui xue da gang</i>	社會學大綱
<i>shi</i>	實
<i>shi</i>	是
<i>shibai shi chenggong zhi mu</i>	失敗是成功之母
<i>Shijing</i>	詩經
Shirokov	西洛可夫
<i>Shi san jing</i>	十三經
<i>shishi qiushi</i>	實事求是
<i>shizhong</i>	時中
<i>Shujing</i>	書經
<i>Sixiang fangfalun</i>	思想方法論
<i>sixiang yu shiji</i>	思想與實際
<i>Sunzi</i>	孫子
<i>Suonanzhi</i>	鎖南枝
<i>taiji</i>	太極
<i>Taiji yi ye, budong sheng er, er ze</i> <i>shen ye, shen sheng shu, shu sheng</i> <i>xiang, xiang sheng qi</i>	太極一也不動生二二則神也神生數數生象象生器
<i>tiandi gai weiyou dong eryi</i>	天地蓋唯有動而已

<i>tian-di-ren</i>	天地人
Tiandui	大對
<i>tian fei wu sheng hu ren</i>	天非務勝乎人
Tianlun	天論
Tianshuo	天說
Tianwen	天問
<i>tianxia wanshi, wanbian wuqiong</i>	天下萬事，萬變無窮
<i>tianxia zhi shengmin gewei</i>	
<i>yuzhou zhi yiti</i>	天下之生民，各為宇宙之--體
<i>tongbian</i>	通變
<i>tongyi</i>	統-
<i>tongyi xing</i>	同一性
<i>tongyi xing</i>	統一性
<i>wanquan fouding, qian kun huo</i>	
<i>jihu xi</i>	完全否定，乾坤或幾乎息
<i>weiwu bianzhengfa</i>	唯物辯證法
<i>weiwuzhe</i>	唯物者
<i>weixin zhuyi</i>	唯心主義
<i>wen</i>	文
<i>wu bi xian fu ye, ranhou chong</i>	
<i>sheng zhi</i>	物必先腐也然後虫生之
<i>wu zhi benshen qingkuang ruhe</i>	
<i>shi diyi yuan Yin</i>	物之本身情況如何是第一-原因
<i>wupian</i>	無偏
<i>wuren you hao bianhua, haoqi</i>	
<i>zhi xin, ren buneug you e qing bu</i>	吾人有好變化好奇之心，人不能有俄頃不
<i>bianhua zhe</i>	變化者
<i>xiangfan xiangcheng</i>	相反相成
<i>xianghu guantong</i>	相互貫通
<i>Xin zhexue dagang</i>	新哲學大綱
<i>xing</i>	行
<i>xing-er-shang-xue</i>	形而上學
<i>xing er shang zhe wei zhi dao</i>	形而上者謂之道
<i>yan</i>	言
<i>yang</i>	陽
<i>yangqi</i>	揚棄
<i>Yanjiu tigang</i>	研究提綱
<i>yi fen wei er</i>	一分為二
<i>yi yin yi yang wei zhi dao</i>	--陰--陽謂之道
<i>Yijing</i>	易經

yin

陰

yin-yang

陰陽

Ying diwang.

*Nanfang zhi di yue Shu, Beifang
zhi di yue Hu. Zhongyang zhi di
yue Hundun. Shu yu Hu xiangyu
yu Hundun zhi ye, Hundun dai
zhi shen hou. Shu yu Hu mou
suoyi bao zhi, yue "Ren jie yon
qiqiao, yi shi ting shi xi, bi du wu
you, chang shi zao zhi? Ri zao yi
qiao, qi ri er Hundun si.*

應帝王：南方之帝曰倏，北方之帝曰忽，中央之帝曰渾沌。倏與忽相遇於渾沌之野，渾沌待之甚厚。倏與忽謀所以報之，曰：人皆有七竅，以視聽食息彼獨無有，嘗試鑿之？日鑿一竅，七日而渾沌死。

yingyong

應用

*Yi you taiji, shi sheng liangyi,
liangyi sheng sixiang, sixiang
sheng bagua*

易有太極是生兩儀兩儀生四象四象生八卦。

yizhi

異質

youdi fangshi

有的放矢

Zhang Zai

張載

zheng

正

Zhexue xuanji

哲學選輯

Zhexue yu shenghuo

哲學與生活

zhi

質

zhi liang yong zhong

執兩用中

zhi he xing

知和行

zhongyong

中庸

Zhu Xi

朱熹

Zhuangzi

莊子

zhuguan zhuyi

主觀主義

Zhuzi yu lei

朱字語類

Zi zai chuan shang yue, zhi zhe

子在川上曰逝者如斯夫不舍晝夜

ru si fu, bu she zhouye

自然

ziran

CONCLUSION

Marxian Dialectics after Mao

<i>bianzhengfa</i>	辯證法
<i>dao</i>	道
<i>daode</i>	道德
<i>dao qia zhengzhi, zerun sheng min</i>	道恰政治澤潤生民
<i>de</i>	德
<i>dezheng</i>	德政
<i>dnili tongyi</i>	對立統一
<i>fa</i>	法
<i>fazhi</i>	法治
<i>Fu min, shen zhi zhn ye. Shi yi sheng wang xian cheng mn er hou zhi li yu shen</i>	夫民神之主也是以聖王先成民而後之禮于神 共同點
<i>gangtongdian</i>	挂羊頭賣狗肉
<i>guayang tou mai gou rou</i>	合理
<i>heli</i>	理
<i>li</i>	理性
<i>lixing</i>	倫理
<i>lunli</i>	
<i>man zui ren yi dao de manduzi nan dao nü chang</i>	滿嘴仁義道德，滿肚子男盜女娼
<i>Min yi jun wei xin, jun yi min wei ti... Xin yi ti quan, yi yi ti shang. Jun yi min cun, yi yi min wang</i>	民以君爲心君以民爲體心以體全亦以體傷君以民存亦以民亡
<i>minzhu</i>	民主
<i>quanli</i>	權利
<i>rang</i>	讓
<i>ren</i>	仁
<i>renzheng</i>	仁政
<i>renzhi</i>	人治
<i>Tian zhi sheng min, fei wei jun ye. Tian zhi li jnn, yi wei min ye tongbian</i>	天之生民非爲君也天之立君以爲民也 通變
<i>Wen zhi yu zheng ye, min wu bu wei ben ye</i>	聞之於政也民無不爲本也
<i>xiangfan xiangcheng</i>	相反相成

Xunzi
zheng
zhengzhi
Zuo zhuan

荀子
政
政治
左傳

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- Zuozhuan* 左傳

Index

The 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, 173
The 1844 manuscripts (*Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*), 89, 115
The 1898 Reform, 47, 64
The 1917 October Revolution, 50, 65, 87, 90, 112
The 1942 Rectification Campaign, Yan'an, 132, 136

a priori, 38; in Hegel, 80, 81, 82; in Marxian dialectics, 83
The ABC of Communism by Bukharin, 127, 136
Abe Iso, 59
Absoluteness and relativity. *See* *juedui yu xiangdui*
Active role. *See* *nengdong xing*
Advancing spiral, 35–36
Affirmation and negation, as Mao's view, 164
Ai Siqui, 1, 88, 89, 102, 107, 108, 109, 121; and Chen Weishi, 119; on man and nature, 136; and Mao, discussion on differences, 131; reads Marx and Engels, 128; as pen name, 129; popularizing dialectical

materialism, 132–35; polemic with Ye Qing, 112; read by Mao, 143, 148, 149; as recommended by Mao, 166; on reflection, 154; and Shen Zhiyuan, 118; Sinification of Marxism by, 127–40; writings of, 128–32
Agnosticism (bu ke zhi lun), 138
Aims of the study, 1; examining, 2; five corollaries to the thesis, 1
Aizenberg, A., 114, 147, 148, 153; as regards "negation" in Mao, 156–58; as to subjectivity and objectivity, 162
Althusser, Louis, 90
Ames, Roger, 9, 10, 22, 25; polarities not dualistic, 33
The Art of Warfare by Sunzi, 154
The Analects of Confucius (Lunyu), Mao studies, 150
Anarchism, John P. Clark's definition, 5
Anarchism or Socialism? by Lenin, 145
Analogical comparisons, 36
Anti-Dühring by Engels, 90, 91, 108, 116, 144
Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, 116, 132, 148
Aristotle, 34, 39; as described by Liang Qichao, 62; mentioned by Mao, 146

- Babeuf, Francois Noel, 55
Becoming, 13, 22, 24, 31, 102;
becoming *tongbian*, dialectics, 135;
as Cai reads Hegel, 77, 80; as
continuity in Qu Qiubai, 97–99; in
Heraclitus, 76; in polarity, 33; as *yi*,
32; as in Zhang Foquan, 109
Bacon, Francis, 128, 136
Bakunin, Mikhail, 60
Bao Xi, 28
Being, 34, 40; as Liang Qichao
discusses, 62, 76; in Hegel, 80
Beiyuan (coming-from-itself), 138
Bergson, Henri, 129, 146
Bernal, Martin, 50, 52, 56, 60
Bernstein, Eduard, 154
Bhaskar, Roy, 84
Bian (change), 21, 24, 27–28; as
continuity, 30, 31–36; in Qu Qiubai,
97–98; as in Mao, 150
Bian (distinguish and argue), 72–73
Biau-tong, 11, 23, 28, as of *yi*, 31
Biau-yi (becoming and altering), 97, 98,
101
Biandong (changing and moving), 97,
98
Biauhua de yuan dongli (“the original
dynamic to bring change”), 130
Bianzheng, as in *Han shu*, 72–73; as
Chinese medicine vocabulary, 74; as
first understanding of dialectic,
75–77
Bianzheng heyi (dialectical joining),
117
Biauzheng shizhi (Chinese medicine
vocabulary), 74
Bianzheng weiwu lun jiaocheng,
translation by Li Da, 114
Bianzheng weiwu zhuyi, 21
Bianzhengfa (dialectics), 11, 13; as
classical expression, 71–74;
exemplary works of, 108; first used
by Japanese, 77; as reading of
Hegel, 82; the kernel of, 158, 163;
as reading of the Marxian, 83, 84;
as in ordinary persons, 1; as
translation of dialectics, 2;
juxtaposition of with dialectics, 2, 6;
as Mao’s expression, 155; roots of,
3; as in *Xin erya*, 75
Bianzhengfa xueshuo gailun (A General
Introduction to the Theory of
Dialectical Materialism), edited by
Zhang Ruxin, 117
Bigengtang, a publisher under Li Da’s
wife, 113, 114
Bo (decay), 35
Bol’shaia Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia
(Great Soviet Encyclopedia), 130,
148
Bolshevism, origin of Chinese
voluntarism, 5
The Book of Changes. See the *Yijing*
The Book of History (*Shujing*), Mao
studies, 150
The Book of Late Han Dynasty, 175
The Book of Rites (*Liji*), Mao studies,
150
The Book of Songs (*Shijing*), Mao
studies, 150
Briere, O., 115, 134
Bu ke zhi lun (agnosticism), 138
Buddhism, 76; as mentioned by Qu
Qiubai, 92
Bufen and *quanti* (parts and whole), 95.
See also “whole” and “parts”
Bukharin, Nicolai, 90, 127, 136
Cao Heisen, 146
Cai Yuanpei, 63–64; on Hegel’s
dialectics, 77–82, 84; influence of on
Mao, 146; reading dialectics through
tongbian, 75
Canada, Liang Qichao’s traveling to, 54
Capital, 8, 54, 89, 112, 129; read by
Mao, 144–45
Causation (causality), 39–40, 93, 95; as
mutual, 101
Cause and effect, as correlative pairing
in Chen Weishi, 121

- The Central Committee Party School, 180
Chang (enduring), 76
 Chang Tung-sun, 10
 Change, 31–36, 38
 Chaos, 7. *See also* *hundun*
Chen-bao (*Morning News*), Qu Qiubai as correspondent of, 88; 131, 149
 Chen Baoyin, 108
 Chen Boda, 151, 153, 160, 163
 Chen Boxian, 88
 Chen Duxiu, 88; reconciles voluntarism with determinism, 5
 Chen Jin, 152, 154; comments on “negation” in Mao, 157
 Chen Weishi, 108, 119–21, 122, 137
Cheng (Becoming), 75; as Liang describes Heraclitus, 62, 76
Cheng Chung-ying, 39–40
 “China field” scholars, 2, 7
 Chinese Alliance for Left-Wing Writers, 128
 Chinese anarchism, 4; not of Western principles, 5
 Chinese Marxism, problematic reading of, 2; as to noncapitalist path, 5
 Chishi, Murai, 53
Chongtu (conflict), 78–79
“*Chouxiang zuoyong yu bianzhengfa*” (*The Use of Abstractions and the Dialectical Method*) by Ai Siqu, 128, 132
 Christian Philosophy, 80; doctrine of the trinity, 81
 The Chu State (or Kingdom), 152
Chuci (*The Songs of Chu*), 152
Chunqiu (*The Spring and Autumn Annals*), Mao studies, 150
The Church News, 51
Cihai, 74
Civil War in France by Marx, 116
 Clark, John P., definition of anarchism, 5
Class Struggle by Karl Kautsky, 144
Classroom Notes (*Jiang tang lu*) by Mao Zedong, 150, 151, 152
 Colletti, Lucio, 90
 “Comments on Several Important Philosophical Trends since the Anti-Japanese War” by Ai Siqu, 137
Communist Manifesto, 54, 108, 112; discussed by Chinese, 58; first Chinese translation of, 57; read by Ai Siqu, 128, 136; read by Mao, 144
 Communist Party of France, 89
 The Comintern, 118, 139
A Comprehensive View on Social Issues, Li Da’s translation from Japanese, 113
 Comte, Auguste, 146
 Conceptual polarities, 37; in Cai, 79; as in Qu Qiubai, 101
 Confucius, as mentioned by Qu Qiubai, 92; “dialectics” of, 150, 151, 153; on democracy, 177
 Confucianism, transition from, to Marxism, 4; worldview of, 10, 12; as moral self-cultivation, 178–79
 Contextualization, 38, 100
 Continuity, 23, 24, 25, 31; as between philosophy and actuality, 133; as *buduan lianxi* (constant change), 87; as in Cai, 79; and as *dao*, 36–39; as *duoli*, 139; as getting through, 28; humanity as, 27; as *jinhua*, 77–78; humanity as, in Qu Qiubai, 95–96, 97; in Liang Qichao, 62; as more important than difference, 93; as mutual becoming in Qu Qiubai, 100; as negation in Mao, 157–58; as opposite aspects and contradiction in Mao, 165; as in polarity, 33, 36; as of *yi*, 32; science looking for, 101; as between theory and practice, 160–61
 Contradiction, as in Engels, 91
The Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law by Marx, 115; read by Mao, 144
 Correlations, 24, 27, 37; types of, 26, 39. *See also* continuity

- Correlative pairing, 34, 36, 39; and contextualization, 38; as discussed in Chen Weishi, 121
- Correlative thinking, 9, 11; "logic of correlation," 10, 11, 12, 22; as in Chinese medical vocabulary, 74; Liang's reading of Heraclitus, 76; Mao as saturated with, 144; as in Qu Qiubai, 101
- Correlativity. *See continuity*
- Corruption, 181
- Cosmological assumptions, 9, 10, 21
- Counter-Influence (*Fanyingxiang*), 117
- A Critique of the Gotha Programme*, 108, 113; read by Mao, 144–45
- The Critique of Political Economy*, 54, 90, 112; read by Mao, 145
- The Current Situation of the British Working People* by Marx, 54
- Da* (reaching), 38
- Dagong buo*, 110
- Da Tong Shu* (The Book of the Great Community), 49
- , 11, 12, 14; as reference to *yi*, 32; continuity through change, 36–39, comparison to God, 40; as in Qu Qiubai, 101–2; as to "politics," 175; as to society, 176; as to *daode* (virtue), 177*
- Daode jing*, 152
- Daoism, traditional anarchism, 4; studied by Mao, 150, 156
- Darwinism, 90
- Daxue* (*The Great Learning*), Mao studies, 150
- Dazhong zhuxue* (Philosophy for the Masses) by Ai Siqui, 129, 133, 148. *See also Philosophy for the Masses*
- Deborin, Abram Moiseevich, 108, 112, 146
- Democracy (*minzhu*), as to Chinese ancient idea of, 177–78
- Democrititus, 62, 75
- Deng Chumin, 113
- Deng Xiaoping, 174, 180
- Descartes, René, 91
- Determining vs. determined, 159, 164
- Determinism, 88; versus voluntarism, 2–3, 4, 135, 166
- The Development of Capitalism in Russia* by Lenin, 145
- The Development of Socialism from Utopia to Science* by Engels, 116; read by Mao, 144. *See also Socialism, Scientific and Utopian*
- Dewey, John, 145–46
- Di* (the earth), 27
- Dialectical and Historical Materialism* by Mitin and et al., 114, 118, 145 148
- Dialectical and Historical Materialism* by Stalin, 132, 148
- Dialectical-interconnectedness, 138
- Dialectical joining (*bianzheng heyi*), 117
- Dialectical logic, 139; as a way to incorporate capitalism in socialism in Deng Xiaoping, 174
- Dialectical Materialism* by Mitin, 132, 137
- Dialectical materialism, becoming *tongbian*, 135–36; as continuity in Mao, 157–58; first discussed in China, 116; first ushered into China, 60; Mao sees in tradition, 151; as "new philosophy," 107; popularized in Chen Weishi, 119–21; as popularized in Shen Zhiyuan, 118–19; Qu Qiubai's reading of, 88–102; as philosophy of continuity, 94; as seeking continuity in Mao, 156–63; as sinized in Ai Siqui, 135–40; transmitted nationwide, 110, 112; as in Ye Qing, 111
- Dialectics, defined in *Xin erya*, 75; the horizontal and longitudinal, 113; as *hubian fa* (mutual change), 87; laws of, rejected by Ai Siqui, 139; as unity of opposites, 113. *See also bianzhengfa*
- Dialectics and Logic* by Plekhanov, 90

- The Dialectics of Nature* by Engels, 145
 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 129
 Dilworth, David A., 13, 14
 Dirlit, Arif, 8–9, 21; on socialism's encounter, 50
 "The Discourse of Tian" ("Tianshuo") by Liu Zongyuan, 153
The Doctrine of the Mean. See *Zhongyong*
 Dong dalu tushu ju (publisher name), 48
Dang lü (law of motion), 94, 95, 97
Dong xiaug (ways of move), 96; as moving patterns, 87
 Dong xin yi she (publisher name), 49
 Dong Zhongshu (Han dynasty), 37
 Dow, Tsung-I, 7
 Dualisms, 10, 40, 129, 175; in Hegel, 82; in orthodox Marxism, 156; as to the ruling and the ruled, 176; as to separation of powers, 177
Duans (poles), 39
 Dühring, Eugen, 90
Duikang heyi (joining but contradicting), 118
Dui yan fa (dialectics), 109
Duili tougyi [til], 113, 119, 130, 148–49; as Mao's expression, 155, 158; as the kernel of dialectics, 166; as in Liu Rong, 174. *See also* the unity of opposites
 "Dushu wenda" (Responsa for Readers), 129
 "Dushu shenghuo." *See Reader's Life*
 Economic base. *See* superstructure
The Economic Theory of Marx, Li Da's translation from Japanese, 113
 Engels, F., 1, 8, 116; Ai Siqu's critique of, 139, 144; Chinese translation of, 57; contradictions in, 91; dialectics of replaced by Mao, 3; laws of dialectic of, 163; Mao's critique of, 163; Qu Qiubai draws on, 90, 138; read by Mao, 143, 145, 147; on superstructure and economic base, 7–8; translated by Shen Zhiyuan, 158; Yan-ge-er-shi as in Chinese, 59; Ye-qi-lu-si in Chinese, 53
 Europe, Chinese went to study in, 47
 European dialectics, 130
 External contradictions, 100
Fa (shaping), 30; as "enduring," 76
Fanchou (categories), 129, 131, 134
Fanying (*Iun*), 130, 131, 134, 148. *See also* theory of reflection
Fauyingxiang (counter-influence), 117
Fazhan (development), 97, 98
 Feng Youlan, on polarity, 33
 Feng Yuxiang, 115
 Feuerbach, Ludwig, read by Mao, 145, 146
 First International, 90
The Five Classics, Mao studies, 150
 Focus/field, 12; as in Mao, 158, 164–65; as principal contradiction and the principal aspect of the principal contradiction, 159; as regards active reflection, 161
 Fogel, Joshua, on Ai Siqu, 128, 133, 135, 136, 138
The Foundation of Leninism by Stalin, 144–45
Founding zhi fouding, 94, 99, 156. *See also* the negation of the negation
The Four Books, of Confucianism, 135; Mao studies, 150
From the February Revolution to the October Revolution by Lenin, 145
 Fu (retuning), 35
Gang (the firm) and *rou* (the soft), as polarity, 33–34, 155–56
Gauxiug (perception), 129
Gen (stopping), 35
A General Introduction to Philosophical Schools of Soviet Russia, edited by Zhang Ruxin, 117
A General Introduction to Social Sciences by Sugiyama Shigeru, 113

- A General Introduction to the Theory of Dialectics Materialism* edited by Zhang Ruxin, 117
- George, Henry, 60
- German idealistic dialectics, 130, 148
- German Ideology*, 8
- German Social Democratic Party, 51, 52, 61
- The Global Magazine*, 51
- "God," as comparison to *dao*, 40
- Gong Sunlong (classical Chinese logician), 129
- Gong Yuzhi, 166
- Gorrie, 89
- Graham, Angus, 10, 21
- Gramsci, Antonio, 89
- Granet, Marcel, 21
- Great Harmony. *See taiji*
- The Great Learning (Daxue)*, Mao studies, 150
- Greek dialectics, 130, 148
- Gua yangtou mai gourou* (selling mutton only in name, while what sold is indeed dog meat), 179
- Guan qi hui tong*, 28, 96
- Guangzhi shuju (publisher name), 50, 53
- Guannian* (concept), 131
- Guanxi* (connection), 94, 95, 97, 98
- Guanzi, 40
- Guilü* (law), 83, 94, 95, 97, 98, 101, 129; as continuity, 102
- Guo Huaruo, 116, 148
- Guo Moruo, 108, 120
- Guo Xiang, read by Mao, 151
- Guo Zhanbo, 107
- Guoxue she (publisher name), 48, 49
- Haizuo xinshe (publisher name), 48
- Hall, David and Ames, Roger, T., 9, 22; polarities not dualistic, 33; on *dao*, 38; on moral self-cultivation, 178
- Hall, Roland, 64
- Hanfeizi, 78; read by Mao, 145, 152, 155
- The Hangzhou Conference, December 1965, Mao's critique of Stalin at, 164
- He de* (agree but with each other's own characteristic), 34
- He Jingzhi, 129
- He Lin, 107–8
- Hegel, G. W. F., 12, 90; as analyzed by Zhang Ruxin, 117; dialectics of, 63–64, 77–82; as translated and cited by Ai Siqui, 128, 136; as in Qu Qiubai, 99; read by Mao, 144–46; as studied by Ai Siqui, 127; as studied by Shen Zhiyuan, 118; as in Zhang Dongsun, 109–10;
- Heraclitus, 62–63, 76; in Qu Qiubai, 99
- Historical materialism, warmly received, 88; first used, 90
- History and Class Consciousness* by Lukacs, 139;
- A History of European Philosophy* by Deborin, 146
- A History of the Soviet Communist Party*, 145, 166
- Hodous, Lewis, 76
- The Holy Family and the German Ideology*, 89
- Hou Wailu, 115
- "How Did I Write Philosophy for the Masses?" by Ai Siqui, 133
- Hu Hanmin, 88, refutes Liang Qichao, 59
- Hu Jintao, 173, 180, 181
- Hu Shi, 111
- Huang Jiande, 108, 114
- Huanjing* and *geti* (environment and any individual thing or event itself), 95
- Hubian* (mutual becoming or changing), 97, 98, 100
- Hubian fa* (dialectics), 87; as a mutual change view of materialism, 94, 96
- Hubian fa weiwulun* (dialectical materialism), as in Ai Siqui, 98
- Hudong* (mutual movement), 94, 97, 98; as in Zhang Ruxin, 118

- Hudong guanxi* (mutual acting and moving relations), 97
- Hui wen xue she* (Hui wen study group), 49
- Human nature, as evil vs. self-cultivating, 178
- Humc, David, causality, 2–3; Hegel's critique of, 80
- Hunan First Normal School, 146
- “*Huadun*” (“Chaos”), anecdote in Zhuangzi as quoted by Mao, 152
- Huxi* (correlativity), 24
- Huxiang guanchuan* (mutually going through each other), 119
- Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics*, 78
- Idealism, as defined in *Xin erya*, 75; as Trinitarian doctrine, 81; as Ye Qing's comment, 111; Mao's critique of, 145
- Imperialism, the Highest State of Capitalism* by Lenin, 145
- Internal contradictions (or changes), 100, 119; as Ai Siqui's view, 139; as *zishen yundong* (self-generated movement), 130; as to internal and external causes, 149; as in Mao, 157–58
- Internal relations, in Marx and Mao, 144
- An Introduction to Historical Materialism*, Li Da's translation from Japanese, 112–13
- Japan, Chinese went to study in, 48
- Ji* (opportunity, occasion), 62
- Jian* (advancing), 35
- Jiang Kanghu, 60
- Jiang Zemin, 180
- Jiaokeshu yi ji shc (publisher name), 49
- Jie* (relaxation and ease), 35
- Jin* (grow), 31
- Jin Yu, 109
- Jing-dong* (motionless and motion), 79
- Jing jin shuju (publisher name), 48
- Jinggang Mountain, 116; Hu Jintao visits, 180
- Jinhua* (evolution), 77–78, 81
- Jinshi shehui zhuyi* (*Modern Socialism*) by Fukui Junzo, 50, 53
- Jiushi zhengzhi shi* (A History of Modern Politics) by Ariga Nagao, 55
- Joining contradictions (*maodun heyi*), 117–18
- Joining but contradicting elements (*duikang heyi*), 118
- The Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 173
- Juedui yu xiangdui* (absoluteness and relativity), 131, 134, 149
- Jun-fu zhi shuo* (communism), 55
- Jun Wu, 63
- Juizi (exemplary person), 38
- Junzo, Fukui, 53
- Kang Sheng, 163
- Kang Youwei, 47, 49, prefers translation from Japanese, 50–51; as constitutionalist, 52
- Kanji*, 75, 79
- Kant, Immanuel, 12, 63; as read by Ai Siqui, 128, 136; Ai Siqui's refutation to, 139
- Kautsky, Karl, 8; read by Mao, 144
- Kawakami Hajime, 59, 108, 113, 145; as recommended by Mao, 166
- Ke Bonian, 144
- Keguan* (the guest's view or objectivity), 137
- Keppel, 63, 64, 77
- Kexue jianghua* (Talks on Science), 129
- Kidd, Benjamin, 51, 52, 61
- Knight, Nick, 21, on Mao as determinist, 5–6; on Mao's Sinification of Marxism, 6
- Knowing and doing (*zhi* and *xing*), 160–61
- Kojiro, Nishikawa, 53, 54
- Kokumin shimpō* (*The National News in Japan*), 52

- Korsch, Karl, 90
Kotoku Shusui, 54, 57, 59
Kropotkin, P. A., 60
Kun, 11, 32; in polarity, 33; becoming-*qian*, 35; as regards to "negation" in Mao, 156
Kunlun, a publisher opened by Li Da, 113, 114
- Lao min* (proletariat), 53
Laozi, 37, 40; in Ai siqi, 137–38; as in Chen Weishi, 120; "dialectics" of, 150, 152; as mentioned by Qu Qiubai, 92; read by Mao, 145, 151
- Lassalle, Ferdinand, 54, 55, 57
Lau, D.C., 79
Law of Non-Contradiction, 14
Lefebvre, Hervé, 89
"Left Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder by Lenin, 144–45; as recommended by Mao, 166
- Lei Zhongjian, 114, 147
- Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, derives thinking from neo-Confucianism, 6
- Lenin, 89, 116, 130, 144; Ai's critique of, 140; as Ai Siqui draws on, 138; comments on Sun Yet-sen, 56; as Mao recommends, 166; *Materialism and Empiro-Criticism* by, 91; *Notes on the Dialectic* by, 132; the philosophy of, 114, 148; as read by Mao 143–45, 147; as regards to "negation" in Mao, 156
- The Letters of Marx and Engels*, 145
- Li*, 6, 24, as rationality, 175
- Li Da, 88, 108, 112–16, 148; comments on the 1844 Manuscript, 115; as founder of Chinese Communist Party, 113; lectures on dialectical materialism, 113, 114–15; on praxis, 115; read by Mao, 143, 147, 148, 166; translates Marxism, 112–13, translates Kawakami Hajime, 166
- Li Dazhao, 88
- Li Gongpu, 129
Li Jinxi, 150
Li Shicen, 108
Li Studies, as mentioned by Qu Qiubai, 92. *See also Lixue*
- Li Weihan, 146
- Li Yongtai, 150
- Li Yu-ning, 51; on first reference to socialism, 52
- Liang dian lun* (the two-point theory), as Mao's expression, 155–56
- Liang er wu pian* (with two aspects, no inclination is tended to one side), as in Mozi, 151, 160
- Liang Qichao, 79; on Aristotle, 62; compares Nietzsche and Marx, 53; as constitutionalist, 52; in debate, 58–59; on dialectics, 60; as first mentioning Marx, 49; on Heraclitus, 76; on materialism, 61; prefers translation from Japanese, 50–51; as regards reading dialectics through *tongbian*, 75; traveling experience, 54
- Lianxi (link), 94, 95, 96, 101
- Liberal Democracy, 174, 179, 181
- Liberalism, 173, 175
- Liberation Daily* (*Jiefang Ribao*), Yan'an, 132
- Liberation Press of Yan'an, 148
- Licheng* (process or passed road), 97, 98
- Liu Rong, 174–75
- Liu Senlin, 109
- Liu Shifu, 60
- Liu Shipei, 59
- Liu Yuxi, as materialist in Mao, 152, 153
- Liu Zongyuan, 152–53
- Lixing* (rationality), 129
- Lixue* (neo-Confucianism) in the Song and Ming Dynasties), studies by Mao, 150, 155
- Logic* by Hegel, 108
- Logos, 63, 76
- Long March, 144

- Lü* (rule, law), 97, 98, 99, 101
 Lu Wanmei, 128
 Lu Xichen, 111
Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, 90, 108; read by Ai Siqui, 128, 136
 Luk, Michael Y.L., 4; on Chen Duxiu and Shi Cuntong, 5
 Lukacs, George, 89, 90, 439
Luuli (ethics), 177
Lunyu (*The Analects of Confucius*), Mao studies, 150
 Luo Dawei, 53
Luoji (logic), 94, 95
 Lupel, E. K., 114
- Ma Junwu, 146
 Ma Zuyi, on first introduction of Marxism, 53
 Mach, Ernst, 90
 The Meiji Reform in Japan, 50
 Manicas, Peter, separates Marx from Engels, 8; on dialectical materialism first used, 90
 Mao Zedong, the 1937 speech of, 114; on affirmation and negation, 164; and Ai Siqui, 131, 139; on changing the world, 160, 162; critique of Stalin, 143–44; as determinist, 5; as differentiated from Marx, 8; inverts Marx's dialectics, 3; and Li Da, 113, 116, 148; “line determines everything” (*luxian jueding yiqie*) of, 4; on *nengdong xing* or active role, 154–55; as Prometheus, 3; readings of, 143–50; roots of in *tongbian*, 150–56; seeks continuity, 156–63; seems close to Marx, 144; on sinification of Marxism, 136–37; on theory and practice, 160–62; as voluntarist, 2, 3, 4, 88
Mao Zedong zhexue pizhu ji (A Collection of Mao Zedong's Marginalia to Philosophical Works), 148, 162
- Mao-dun*, 13; as in Ai Siqui, 130, 131; as continuity in Mao, 164–65; as equivalent for contradiction, 78–80, 98; as Mao's basic law, 5, 155; as polar explanation, 164–65; as in Qu Qiubai, 99–102; as taken from Laizi in Mao, 152
Maodua heyi (joining contradictions), as in Zhang Ruxin, 117–18
Maodun hubian, mutual becoming of, 99
 Marcuse, Herbert, 90
Marginalia by Mao. See *Mao Zedong zhexue pizhu ji*
 Marx, Karl, 116; the 1844 Manuscript, 89, 115; as determinist, 2–3, 90; as discussed by Liang Qichao, 61; as discussed by Sun Yet-sen, 60; as introduced by Zhu Zhixin, 57; as Jia-lu-ma-lu-ke-si, 53; as Ma-ke-shi as in Chinese, 52; as Ma-cr-ka, 59; Mai-ha-si and Mai-ke-si, 55; the naturalism of, 8; the *Poverty of Philosophy*, 52; read by Mao, 143–45, 147; as separated from Engels, 93; as in Zhang Dongsun and Ye Qing, 109–10
Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin on Arts, 144
 Marx-Lenin Institute, Yan'an, 132
 Marxist dialectics: as not uncontested doctrine, 2; as sinified, 3; as trinitarian doctrine, 81
 Materialism, as Ye Qing comments, 111
Materialism and Empiro-Criticism, 91, 108; critique of by Ai Siqui, 140; read by Ai Siqui, 128, 136; read by Mao, 145
Materialism, The Proletariat Philosophy by Gorrief, 89
 Means and end, 175
 Meisner, Maurice, 4
Mencius (*Mengzi*), 10; Mao studies, 150; “dialectics” of, 150

- Methodology of Thought (Sixiang fangfa hui)* by Ai Siqi, 130, 148; read by Mao, 131
- Mi* (stretch out, hidden), 29
- Min bao* (the People's Paper), 56–57
- Min Ming*, 57
- Min xue hui* (Fujian Study Group), 49
- Ming chuang she* (publisher name), 75
- Mitin, Mark Borsovich, 114, 118, 130, 132, 136, 137, 148; read by Mao, 143–45; rebuttal of to Lukacs, 139
- Mizuto Hozaburo, 139
- Modern China*, 7
- Modern Socialism (Jinshi shehui zhuyi)* by Fukui Junzo, 50, 53
- Modern Sociology* by Li Da, 113
- Modern World View* by Thalheimer, 113
- Monistic Philosophy* by Hegel, translated by Ma Junwu, 146
- Morning News (Chen-bao)*, Qu Qiubai as correspondent of, 88
- Mozi, 137; "dialectics" of, 150, 151, 160
- Nagao, Ariga, 55
- Nan'gong ciji*, 156
- Needham, Joseph, 21, on *qi* and *li*, and Leibniz, 6, 7
- The negation of the negation; as discussed by Liang Qichao, 60–61; as in Mao, 156–57; Mao's critique of Engels's, 164, as Mao's critique of Stalin's, 166; as in Qu Qiubai, 94; as in Shen Zhiyuan, 119; as Zhang Dongsun's critique of, 110–11; as in Zhang Ruxin, 118; as seen from *tongbian*, 164. *See also fouding zhi fouding*
- Nengdong xing* (active role), 153–55, 162; as *nengdong fanying*, 160
- Neng wei* (able to act), 154–55
- Neo-Confucianism, 6, 7, 135. *See also lixue*
- Neoliberalism, 173, 174, 175, 179
- New China and Rebirth*, 110
- New Culture (*Xin wenhua* marked by the May 4th, 1919), 150
- New Philosophy (dialectical materialism and historical materialism), 107, 112; as discussed by Ai Siqi, 128, 130
- A New Philosophy Dictionary* by Shen Zhiyuan, 118
- New Youth*, 88; Li Da as editorial staff, 113; read by Mao, 146
- Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, as compared to Marx by Liang Qichao, 53, as interest of Mao, 146
- Ning Dunwu, 113
- Nishida Kitaro, 129
- The North China Herald*, 51
- The Notes on the Dialectic* by Lenin, 132
- The Notes of Philosophy* by Lenin, 145
- "noumenon" as in Kant, 139
- Office of Translating and Editing Chinese Books and Periodicals affiliated to the Comintern, 118
- "On Contradiction" by Mao, 6, 88, 114, 147; on the laws of opposites, 155; principal contradiction and principal aspect of the principal contradiction, 158; replaces Engels's laws of dialectics, 163; on superstructure and economic base, 166–67
- "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions within the People" by Mao, 152
- "On New Democracy" by Mao, 153
- "On Practice" by Mao, 6, 88, 114, 147
- "On Protracted War" by Mao, 154
- "On Strategic Issues of Chinese Revolutionary Wars" by Mao, 154
- "On Tian" ("Tianhun") by Liu Yuxi, 153
- One Being, 75
- One *Dao*, 37, 38
- One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward* by Lenin, 145
- The Origin of the Family, Private Ownership, and State*, 57, 108

- The Outcome of Classical German Philosophy*, 108
- An Outline of New Philosophy* by Ai Siqi, 149, 166. *See also Xin zhuxue dagang*
- An Outline of Philosophy (Zhuxue dagang)* by Cai Yuanpei, 146
- An Outline of Political Economy* by Kawakami Hajime, 145; as recommended by Mao, 166
- Outlines of Marxist Philosophy* by Li Da, 166
- Outlines of Philosophy (Zhuxue gailun)* edited by Zhang Ruxin, 117
- Outlines of Social Studies (Shehui xue da gang)* by Li Da, 114, 115, 147, 148
- Pan Liwen, 31
- Pang Xianshi, 145
- The Paris Commune, 51
- Parmenides, 62, 76
- Paulsen, Friedrich, read by Mao, 146, 150, 151
- Peasants Movement Lecture School in Guangzhou, 144
- Peking University, 1919, 145–46
- Peng Dehuai, 144
- Peng Shuzhi, as voluntarist, 5
- Le Peuple* (French newspaper), 55
- Platonianology of Spirit, 81
- Philosophical Selections* by Ai Siqi. *See also Zhuxue xuANJI*
- The Philosophy of Confucius* by Chen Boda, 153
- Philosophy for the Masses* by Ai Siqi, 129, 133, 149. *See also Dazhong zhuxue*
- Philosophy and Life (Zhuxue yu shengluo)*, 131, 149
- The Philosophy of the Proletariat*, edited by Zhang Ruxin, 117
- Ping-min (proletariate), 57
- Plato, 12, 34, 62, 75; cited by Ai Siqi, 128; mentioned by Mao, 146
- Platonism, 80
- Plekhanov, George V., 8, 54, 108; Qu Qiubai's view taken from, 90
- "polarity(ies)," 10, 11, 26, 32, 37; of complementary opposition, 33–36; as in Qu Qiubai, 98–101; as in Shen Zhiyuan, 119
- Politics (*zhengzhi*), 175; as people's government, 178
- positivism as of orthodox Marxism, 156
- Poulantzas, Nicos, 90
- The Poverty of Philosophy*, 52, 54, 90
- Pragmatism ("shiyoung hua"), 120; as in Ai Siqi, 137
- Praxis, in Hegel, 115
- Preobrazhensky, Evgenii, 127
- Pre-Qin Confucianism, 150
- Prime Mover, 34
- Principal contradiction and the principal aspect of the principal contradiction, 158–60
- Privatization, 179–80
- Process, 73, 97–98; becoming process, 99
- Productive forces, 112, 117
- Productive relations, 112, 117
- The Proletariat Revolution and the Traitor Kautsky* by Lenin, 145
- Pubian xing ("universality"), 156
- Qi, 6, 26–27, 153
- Qian, 11, 32; becoming-kun, 35; in polarity, 33; as regards to "negation" in Mao, 156
- Qian (difficulty), 35
- Qian Tieru, 113
- Qing yi bao, 52
- Ollman, Bertell, 14, 144
- Qu Qiubai, 1, 84, 87–102, 107, 135, 143; compares dialectical materialism with the *Yijing*, 87; meets with Lenin, 91; works of, 89–91; as voluntarist, 5
- Qu Yuan, "dialectics" of, 150, 152–53
- Quantum theory, 7

- Quantity and quality. *See Shuliang* and *zhiliang*
- “Questioning the Sky” (“*Tianwen*”) by Qu Yuan, 153
- Qun zhi she (Group Wisdom Association), 56
- Rationality (*lixing*), 175, 179
- Reader’s Life (“*Dushu shenghuo*”), 120, 129, 131, 149
- Red Army, 144
- Reform Socialist Party (in Germany), 52
- Renshi* (knowing), 129
- “A Reply to the Questions about the Sky” (“*Tiandui*”) by Liu Zongyuan, 153
- The Review of the Times*, 51
- Richards, I. A., 9–10
- Rights (*quanti*), as harmony and equality, 177
- A Rudimentary Reading of Marxist Economic Theory* by Kawakami Hajime, 113–14
- Rule of law (*fazhi*), 174, 176
- Rule of man (*renzhi*), 174; as to rule of humanness and virtue, 176–77
- Russell, Bertrand, 146
- Russian Language School (Ewen zhuanxiu guan), Qu Qiubai studies at, 91
- Saint-Simon, 60
- Sartre, Jean-Paul, 90
- Scalapino, Robert A., 52
- Schiffrin, Harold, 52
- Schram, Stuart, on Mao’s dialectics, 3, 21; on Mao’s voluntarism, 3–4, 161; on Mao’s traditional roots, 156; on Mao’s contribution, 158; on Mao’s critique of Stalin, 164
- Schwartz, Benjamin I., 4; on Yan Fu, 174
- Second International, 8, 52, 89, 91, 113, 144; as influenced by “positivism,” 90; Sun Yet-sen’s visit to, 55
- Self-Education University in Hunan, 113
- Self-so-ing*. *See ziran*
- Selected Works of Lenin*, read by Mao, 144–45
- Selected Works of Marx and Engels*, 145
- Several Issues of Leninism* by Stalin, 144–45
- Several Laws of Marxist Dialectic* by Plekhanov, 90
- Shanghai, translation of Japanese books in, 48; Qu Qiubai lectures in, 88
- Shanghai Summer Study Program (Shanghai xialing jiangxue hui), 88
- Shanghai University, Qu Qiubai lectures at, 88
- Shao Yong, 155
- Shehui* (society), 94
- Shehui xue dagang* (*Outlines of Social Studies*) by Li Da, 147
- Shehui zhuyi gaiping* (A General Critique of Socialism) by Shimada Saburo, 55, 60
- Shehui zhuyi jingsui* (*The Essence of Socialism*) by Kotoku Shusui, 54, 57
- Shehui zhuyi yanjiu she* (Study of Socialism Society), 57
- Shen* (grow, stretching out), 25, 29
- Shen* (spirit-like continuity), 28, 30, 37; depends on humanity, 29; not God, 39, 40; 96
- Shen bao* (Shanghai News), 129
- Shen jun-fa* (bourgeoisie), 57
- Shen Zhiyuan, 108, 118–19, 147; translates Engels, 158
- Sheng* (grow), 31, 76
- Shenghuo xuexiao* (School of Life), 131
- Shi* (to show), 29
- Shi Cuntong, reconciles voluntarism with determinism, 5
- Shi san jing* (*The Thirteen Classics*), studied by Mao, 151
- Shi zai* (actuality), 76
- Shi Zhongquan, 114, 147

- Shibai shi chenggong zhi mu* (Failure is the mother of success), 161
- Shiji* (*Records of the Historian*), 77
- Shijian yu lilun* (*Practice and Theory*) by Ai Siqi, 132
- Shijing* (*The Book of Songs*), 77; Mao studies, 150
- Shimada Saburo, 55, 60
- Shimoda Jiro, 64
- Shirokov, N., 114; read by Mao, 143, 147, 148, 153; as regards "negation" in Mao, 156–58; as to subjectivity and objectivity, 162
- Shi shi qiu shi* (seeking continuity through actual things), 160, 162
- Shiwu bao of Shanghai* (*The Shanghai Times*), 52
- Shizhong* (right time and in a proper situation), 159–60
- Shu* (numbers), 24
- Shu Hun*, 57
- Shujing* (*The Book of History*), Mao studies, 150
- Shuliang, zhiliang de hubian* (mutual change of quantity and quality), 94, 99; of Ai Siqi, 139; of Engels, 139; of Mao, 156, 165; Mao's critique of Engels's, 164; Mao's critique of Stalin's, 164, 166; as in Zhang Dongsun, 111; as in Zhang Ruxin, 117; as in Shen Zhiyuan, 119
- Shuo wen*, 22, 29, 31; on *bian* and *zheng*, 72; as mentioned by Qu Qiubai, 92; on *tong*, 38;
- Silvin, Nathan, 21
- Sima Qian, "dialectics" of, 150
- Sinicification of Marxism* (*Zhongguo hua*), 6, 9, 121, 135, 136; as in Ai Siqi, 127–140; as in Chen Weishi, 120, 137; Mao's advocate of, 136–37, 163. *See also Dialectical Materialism*
- Sino-Japanese War (1895), 47–48 64
- Sixiong fangfa lun* by Ai Siqi. *See Methodology of Thought*
- Snow, Edgar, 146
- Social evolutionism, 111
- Socialism* (*Shehui zhuyi*) by Murai Chishi, 53
- Socialism, Scientific and Utopian*, 54, 58, 108
- The Socialist Party* (*Shehui dang*) by Nishikawa Kojiro, 53, 54
- Socrates, 146
- The Songs of Chu* (*Chuci*), 152
- Soothill, William Edward, and Hodous, Lewis, 76
- The Soviet Concise Dictionary of Philosophy*, 165
- Soviet Union, Qu Qiubai as correspondent in, 88; official philosophy, 91
- Soviet Union Communist University, 114
- Spinoza, Baruch, 128, 136
- The Spring and Autumn Annals* (*Chunqiu*), Mao studies, 150
- Stalin, Joseph Vissarionovich, 132; dialectics replaced by Mao, 3; Mao comments on the laws of dialectics of, 164–65; Mao's rejection of, 166–67; read by Mao, 143–45, 147, 148
- The State and Revolution* by Lenin, 108, 112, 116; read by Mao, 144–45
- "The Strategy of Chinese Revolutionary War" by Mao, 152
- Su E zhuxue chaoliu gailun* (*A General Introduction to Philosophical Schools of Soviet Russia*), edited by Zhang Ruxin, 117
- Su Xun, 54
- Subjectivity, 27, 28; as in Qu Qiubai, 96; as in Mao, 162
- Sublation (*yangqi*), in Mao, 157
- Sugiyama Shigeru, 113
- Sun Yet-sen, 55–56; with Liang Qichao, 58, 59; in debate with Liu Shifu, 60
- Sun Yet-sen University in Moscow, 113, 117, 118

- Sunzi, 154–55
- Suo nan shi* (the book of Ming Dynasty verses), 157
- Superstructure vs. economic base, 3, 7, 78, 88; as dualism, 91, 93, 113; as in Qu Qiubai, 100–101; as in Wu Liangping, 116–17; as in Zhang Ruxin, 118; as in Mao, 166
- A System of Ethics* by Paulsen, read by Mao, 146, 150, 151
- Taiji* (Great Harmony or the Supreme Ultimate), as in Mao, 151; as source of Mao's *yi fen wei er*, 155
- Talks on Philosophy* (*Zhexue jianghua*), 129, 133, 139, 149
- Tang dynasty, 152
- Tang Tingfen, 59
- te an* (Truth), 62
- "the Teaching Outlines of Dialectical Materialism" by Mao, 147
- Teleology, 76; in Hegel, 81; Qu Qiubai's comment of, 97
- Teleological order, 40, as in Weber, 179, 182
- telos*, 79
- The Terminology of Marxism*, compiled by Li Da, 113
- A Textbook on Dialectical Materialism* by Shirokov and Aizenberg, 114, 147, 148; Mao's *Marginalia to*, 162; read by Mao, 153; as recommended by Mao, 166
- A Textbook of Political Economy (Soviet)*, 145
- Thalheimer, 113
- The Theory of Historical Materialism* by Bukharin, 90
- The theory of reflection, as read by Ai Siqi, 130, 131; of Lenin, 145; rejection of Lenin's, 140; as in Mao, 153–54; as *nengdong fanying*, 160
- Theory and Strategy* by Stalin, 144
- Thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, 63, 64; as in Cai Yuanpei, 79; as in Zhang Dongsun and Ye Qing, 109–12. *See also zhengti, fanti, and heti*
- Thinking through Confucius* by Hall and Ames, 10
- The Thirteen Classics* (*shi san jing*), studied by Mao, 151
- Tian* (the sky), 27
- Tian di* (the sky and earth), 28, 30; as of *yi*, 32
- Tian di ren* (the sky, the earth, and humanity), 31, 38, 40, 150
- "*Tiandui*" ("A Reply to the Questions about the Sky") by Liu Zongyuan, 153
- "*Tianlun*" ("On Tian") by Liu Yuxi, 153
- "*Tianshuo*" ("The Discourse of Tian") by Liu Zongyuan, 153
- "*Tianwen*" ("Questioning the Sky") by Qu Yuan, 153
- Tianxia* (*under the sky*), 29, 35
- Tiaoxia wanwu* (ten thousand things under the sky), 11, 22
- Tian yi* (Chinese anarchist journal), 57, 59
- Tiaoli* (orderliness), 97, 98, 101
- Time and space, 36
- Tixi* (systems), 94, 95
- Tong* (continuity), 13, 22, 24–27, 31; as *jiuhua*, 77; as precluding causality, 93; as in Mao, 150
- Tong qi bian*, 28, 87, 96
- Tong shen ming zhi de*, 28
- Tong tiaoxia*, 27, 87, 96
- Tong zhong qiu yi* (seeking differences in continuity), 74
- Tongbian* (continuity through change), 9, 11, 12, 22–25, 28–30; as in Ai Siqi, 138; as in *bian* (argue), 73; as in *bianzheng shizhi*, 74; as in Cai Yuanpei, 80; and *dao*, 40; as dialectical materialism, 98; feature of, 36; as not dualism, 35; as in Mao, 150; and Marxism, 47; modern expression of, 94; new phase of, 144; nucleus of, 33; as

- particularity, 38; as in Qu Qiubai, 89, 100–101; reading dialectics through, 75–76, 82, as current Chinese politics, 182
- Tongmenghui, 56, 58, 59, 60
- Tongsu* (popularization: to let it get through and reach the common), 119
- Tongsu bianzhengfa jianghua* (A Talk on Vulgarizing Dialectics), 120
- Tongsu hua* (popularization), 120–21
- Tongsu wenhua* (Popular Culture), 131
- Tongsu weiwulun jianghua* (A Talk on Materialism in Common Language), 120
- Tongyi xing* (identity), 165–66
- Tongyi xing* (correlativity), 130, 148
- Toshihiko, Sakai, 57
- Totality, 12
- Tuihua* (retrogradation), 78
- Two Marxes, 8, 89
- the two-point theory of Mao. See *Liang dian lun*
- The Two Strategies of the Social Democratic Party in the Democratic Revolution* by Lenin, 116, 144, 145
- The United States, Chinese went to study in, 47; mentioned by Kang Youwei, 49; Liang Qichao's traveling to, 54
- "Unity," 13–14
- the Unity of opposites (contradictions), as in Shen Zhiyuan, 119; as inversion of Engels's view by Ai Siqui, 139; as the fundamental of dialectics in Mao, 155–56, 163; Mao's critique of Stalin's, 164
- The Unmoved Mover, 39
- Voluntarism, 3; Chinese, 5
- Vooruit* (Flemish newspaper), 55
- Wage, Price and Profit* by Marx, 145
- Wakeman, Frederic, on Mao's superstructure determinism, 4; on Mao's critique of Stalin, 164
- Walder, Andrew G., characterizes voluntarism, 3; on superstructure and economic base, 7–8
- Wanfa* (a world of plurality and change), 62, 75–76
- Wang Bi, *dao* as name of *wu*, 38; *Ming Xiang* of, 135; read by Mao, 151
- Wang Fuzhi, "dialectics" of, 150
- Wang Jing, 113
- Wang Mang (Song Dynasty), 54
- Wang Rongbao, 75
- Wanwu* (ten thousand things), 37. *See also Tianxia wanwu*
- The Warring States Period (c. 403–221 B.C.), 152, 154
- Washington Post Foreign Service*, 180
- Weber, Max, 173; as to teleological transition, 179
- Wei ling lun* (idealism), 75
- Weiwei shi guan* (*The Materialist View of History*) by Wu Liping, 132
- Well-field system, 55
- Wenxue jianghua* (Talks on Literature), 129
- What Is To Be Done* by Lenin, 145
- What is "the People's Friend"?* by Lenin, 145
- "whole" and "parts," 13. *See also bufen and quanti*
- Wilhelm, Hellmut, 10
- Worldview, 25, 27, 31; in comparison with Kosmos, 34; Chinese, 39; as in Mao, 150; as in Qu Qiubai, 94–95; on universe (*yuzhou*), 87; as to communitarian form of politics, 178. *See also Tianxia*
- Wu* (nothing), 25, 35, 37; as in Cai Yuanpei, 78–79; as Liang Qichao describes Heraclitus, 62, 63, 75–76; as in Zhang Foquan, 109
- Wuji bi fan* (reversion as process approaches an extreme), 35
- Wu, Liangping, 108, 116–17
- Wu Liping, 132, 144
- Wu, Y. T., 108

- Wu Yuzhang**, 54
Wuchan jieji de zhixue (The Philosophy of the Proletariat) edited by Zhang Ruxin, 117
- Xiandai hanyu wailaici yanjin** (A Study of Terms of Foreign Origin in the Modern Chinese language), 72
- Xiandai hanyu cidian** (A Contemporary Chinese Dictionary), definition of *bianzheng*, 72; entries of "dialectics," 83; defines *jinhua*, 78
- Xiang** (image, model), 24, 29, 30, 63, 75
 "Xiangfan xiangcheng," 12; as Mao's expression, 6, 155; as in Zhang Donsun, 109; as in Liu Rong, 174
- Xianghu dongzuo** (mutual actions), 97, 98
- Xianghu guantong** (thoroughly getting through each other), as in Shen Zhiyuan, 158
- Xianghu xingdong** (mutual actions), 97, 98
- Xiansuo** (clue), 94, 95, 101
- Xianxiang** (things and events or phenomenon), 87, 94
- Xianzai zhuyi** (realism), 53
- Xiaoren** (small person), 38
- Xibaipo Village, Hu Jintao visits, 180
- Xin dahu youji** by Liang Qichao, 54
- Xin erya**, 75, 78
- Xin min cong bao** (New People's Journal), 49, 52, 63
- Xin qingnian.** See *New Youth*
- Xin shijie** (the New World), 58
- Xin zhixue dagang**, 130, 148, 149. See also *An Outline of New Philosophy*
- Xin zhixue lunji** (A Collection of Essays on the New Philosophy), 130
- Xin zhixue tixi jianghua** ("Talks on the Systems of New Philosophy"), 120
- Xin zhixue shijieguan jianghua** ("Talks on the World View of New Philosophy"), 120
- Xing er shang xue**, as Mao's critique of Stalin, 143, 165, 167; as Mao's criticism, 161
- Xinxian** (publisher name), 114
- Xiong Deshan**, 113
- Xishou** (absorption), 111
- Xitong** (systems), 94, 95, 101
- Xixue** (Western Learning), 49, 50, 51
- Xu** (continuity), 31
- Xu Shen** (A.D. 100), 29
- Xunzi**, read by Mao, 145, 152; "dialectics" of, 150; on democracy, 177
- Yan Fu**, 49; first reference to socialism, 52; first Chinese liberalist, 174
- Yan'an Philosophical Study Group**, 116, 148
- Yang Shouchun**, on translation of Japanese books, 48
- Yang Xianzhen**, 139–40
- Yanjiu tigang** (Outline for Study) by Ai Siqi, 132, 137, 148
- Ye Lan**, 75
- Ye Qing**, 108; polemic with Zhang Dongxun, 109–12; as refuted by Shen Zhiyuan, 118–19; Ai Siqi's critique of, 130, 149
- Yi**, 11, 12, 27, 76; as process and way of thinking, 31–32; as *dao*, 37; with *taiji*, 155
- "**Yi fen wei er**" (One divides into two), Mao's expression of, 6; the roots of, 155
- Yi shu hui bian** (The Selected Translation Works Magazine), 55
- Yi shu hui bian she** (publisher name), 49
- Yi shu jing yan hu** (books translated into Chinese from foreign languages), 48
- Yi wu liang ti** (everything having two aspects), 33
- Yi zhong qiu tong** (seeking continuity in difference), 74
- The Yijing** (*The Book of Changes*), 11, 12, 22–23, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31;

- polarities in, 33; *dao* in, 38; as source of Chinese dialectics, 84, 108; change as continuity in, 97; as in Chen Weishi, 120; as in Qu Qiubai, 99, 101, source of Mao's *yi fen wei er* and *liang dian lun* in, 155; as roots of "negation" or *fouding*, 156
- Yin* and *yang* (dialectics), 7, 138; as *dao*, 37, 38, 40; as forces to make change, 39; of Mao, 3–4, 5, 11, 12, 164; as roots of two-point theory of Mao, 155–56; as polarity, 33; as *qi*, 153; as in Qu Qiubai, 99, 100; as mutual becoming, 35; as spirit-like, 30; as of *yi*, 32
- Yin ynn* (to intermingle), 34
- Yin yuan* (relationship), 63
- Yingxiang* (influence or impact), 94, 95, 97, 98, 101
- Yingyong* (to apply), as in Mao, 160–61. *See also youdi fangshi*; Mao Zedong, on theory and practice
- Yiru* (One Being), 62, 76
- Yishu*, 37
- You* (something) and *wu* (nothing), 25, 35, 37; in Cai Yuanpei, 78–79, 81; as Liang Qichao comments, 62, 63, 75–76; as in Zhang Foquan, 109
- Youdi fangshi* (Having a target before shooting an arrow), as in Ai Siqui, 133; as in Mao, 160, 161
- Yuanyin* (causality), 94, 95, 101
- Yunnan minzhong ribao* (Yunnan People's Daily), 128, 132
- Yuzhou* (universe), 87, 96
- Zarrow, Peter, on Mao's abandoning the economic base, 4
- ze* (as in faze, law), 62, 72, 75–76
- Zeng Leshan, 129, 137; on Mao's "*nengdong xing*," 154
- Zhang Dongsun, 107, 108; polemic with Ye Qing, 109–12
- Zhang Foquan, 109
- Zhang Jitong, 108
- Zhang Liyuan, 113
- Zhang Ruxin, 108, 117–18
- Zhang Wentian, 153
- Zhang Zai, read by Mao, 145, 152; "dialectics" of, 150
- Zhangzhou, Fujian, 144
- Zhao Bizhen, 53
- Zhejiang Chao* (journal in Chinese in Tokyo), 54
- Zhen* (makes motion like a thunder), 35, 44n77
- Zheng* (appropriateness), 159–60
- Zheng* (politics), as to democracy, 178
- Zheng* (prove or verify), 72–73
- Zhenglu* (Correct Road), 128
- Zheng Yili, 127–28, 129, 130, 148
- Zhengfan xiangcheng* (obverse and reverse complementary), 98
- Zhengmian, fanmian, and fanmian zhi fanmian* (thesis, antithesis, and synthesis), 63
- Zhengti*, as suggests continuity, 74, 81
- Zhengti, fanti, and heti* (thesis, antithesis, and synthesis), 79–80; as in Qu Qiubai, 94, 99. *See also* thesis, antithesis, and synthesis
- Zhexue gailun* (*Outlines of Philosophy*) edited by Zhang Ruxin, 117
- Zhexue jianghna* (Talks on Philosophy), 129, 133
- Zhexue xuanji* (Philosophical Selections) by Ai Siqui, 132, 148, 149; on reflection, 154
- Zhexue yu shenghno* (*Philosophy and Life*), 131, 148
- Zhi* (to tell and stretch out), 29
- Zhi* (quality), in Mao's analysis of Confucius, 151; as principal aspect of the principal contradiction, 159–60
- Zhi bianhua zhi dao* (obtain a comprehension of the way of change), 87, 96

- Zhi liang yong zhong* (hold to the two aspects, but to adopt the stand in the middle), in Confucius, 151
- Zhishi yuekan* (Knowledge Monthly), 131
- Zhongguo hua* (sinification), 6, 120, 121.
See also Sinification of Marxism
- Zhongguo Wenhua* (*Chinese Culture*), Yan'an, 132
- Zhongshan University in Guangzhou, 174
- Zhongyong* (*The Doctrine of the Mean*), Mao studies, 150, 160
- Zhou Baigao, 53, 54
- Zhouyi*, 108
- Zhongyi lueli* by Wang Bi, 135
- Zhu Xi, as traditional anarchist, 4; popularizes Confucianism, 135; "dialectics" of, 150; as source of *yi fen wei er* of Mao, 155
- Zhu Zhixin, first translator of *The Communist Manifesto*, 5, 56
- Zhuangzi, "dialectics" of 150; studied by Mao, 151, 152; as mentioned by Qu Qiubai, 92; as in Chen Weishi, 120
- Zhuguan zhuyi* (subjectivism), as Mao's criticism, 161
- Ziran* (*self-so-being*), 34, 119, 138, 156,
- Ziwei* (*self-so-going or -doing*), 34, 119
- Zuo xin she*, 55
- Zuozhuan*, as to democracy, 178

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