

**STREET GANGS:  
THE NEW URBAN INSURGENCY**

**Max G. Manwaring**

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## FOREWORD

The intent of this monograph is to identify some of the most salient characteristics of contemporary criminal street gangs (that is, the gang phenomenon or third generation gangs), and to explain the linkage to insurgency. As a corollary, Dr. Max G. Manwaring argues that gang-related crime, in conjunction with the instability it wreaks upon governments, is now a serious national security and sovereignty problem in important parts of the global community. Although differences between gangs and insurgents exist, in terms of original motives and modes of operation, this linkage infers that the gang phenomenon is a mutated form of urban insurgency. That is, these nonstate actors must eventually seize political power to guarantee the freedom of action and the commercial environment they want. The common denominator that can link gangs and insurgents is that some gangs' and insurgents' ultimate objective is to depose or control the governments of targeted countries.

Thus, a new kind of war is brewing in the global security arena. It involves youthful gangs that make up for their lack of raw conventional power in two ways. First, they rely on their "street smarts," and generally use coercion, corruption, and co-optation to achieve their ends. Second, more mature gangs (i.e., third generation gangs) also rely on loose alliances with organized criminals and drug traffickers to gain additional resources, expand geographical parameters, and attain larger market shares.

This monograph contributes significantly to an understanding of the new enemies and the new kinds of threats characteristic of a world in which instability and irregular conflict are no longer on the margins of global politics. For those responsible for making and implementing national security policy in the United States and elsewhere in the world, the analysis of the new threats provided by the author is compelling. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this cogent monograph as part of the ongoing debate on global and regional security.



DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MAX G. MANWARING holds the General Douglas MacArthur Chair and is Professor of Military Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. He is a retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of International Politics at Dickinson College. He has served in various civilian and military positions, including the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Southern Command, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Dr. Manwaring is the author and co-author of several articles, chapters, and reports dealing with political-military affairs, democratization and global ungovernability, and Latin American security affairs. He is also the editor or co-editor of *El Salvador at War; Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations; Deterrence in the 21st Century*; and *The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*. Dr. Manwaring holds a B.S. in Economics, a B.S. in Political Science, an M.A. in Political Science, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army War College.

## SUMMARY

This monograph explains the linkage of contemporary criminal street gangs (that is, the gang phenomenon or third generation gangs) to insurgency in terms of the instability it wreaks upon governments and the concomitant challenge to state sovereignty. Although differences between gangs and insurgents regarding motives and modes of operations exist, this linkage infers that gang phenomena are mutated forms of urban insurgency. In these terms, these "new" nonstate actors must eventually seize political power to guarantee the freedom of action and the commercial environment they want. The common denominator that can link the gang phenomenon to insurgency is that some third generation gangs' and insurgents' ultimate objective is to depose or control the governments of targeted countries.

The author identifies those issues that must be taken together and understood as a whole before any effective countermeasures can be taken to deal with the half-criminal and half-political nature of the gang phenomenon. This is a universal compound-complex problem that must be understood on three distinct levels of analysis: first, the gangs phenomena are generating serious domestic and regional instability and insecurity that ranges from personal violence to insurgent to state failure; second, because if their criminal activities and security challenges, the gangs phenomena are exacerbating civil-military and police-military relations problems and reducing effective and civil-military ability to control the national territory; and, third, gangs are helping transitional criminal organizations, insurgents, warlords, and drug barons erode the legitimacy and effective sovereignty of nation-states. The analytical commonality linking these three issues is the inevitable contribution to either (a) failing and failed state status of targeted countries, or (b) deposing or controlling the governments of targeted countries. In these

terms, we must remember that crime and instability are only symptoms of the threat. The ultimate threat is either state failure or the violent imposition of a radical socio-economic-political restructuring of the state and its governance.

In describing the gang phenomenon as a simple mutation of a violent act we label as insurgency, we mischaracterize the activities of nonstate organizations that are attempting to take control of the state. We traditionally think of insurgency as primarily a military activity, and we think of gangs as a simple law-enforcement problem. Yet, insurgents and third generation gangs are engaged in a highly complex political act – political war. Under these conditions, police and military forces would provide personal and collective security and stability, while they and other governmental institutions combat the root causes of instability and political war – injustice, repression, inequity, and corruption. The intent would be to generate the political-economic-social development that will define the processes of national reform, regeneration, and well-being. The challenge, then, is to come to terms with the fact that contemporary security and stability, at whatever level, is at base a *holistic* political-diplomatic, socio-economic, psychological-moral, and military police effort.

This monograph concludes with implications and strategic-level recommendations derived from the instability, civil-military jurisdiction, and sovereignty issues noted above that will help leaders achieve strategic clarity and operate more effectively in the complex politically dominated, contemporary global security arena.

## STREET GANGS: THE NEW URBAN INSURGENCY

The traditional problem of external aggression against a state's territory, markets, sources of raw materials and hydrocarbons, lines of communication, and peoples remains salient, but does not hold the urgency it once did. However, the Western mainstream legally-oriented security dialogue demonstrates that many political and military leaders and scholars of international relations have not yet adjusted to the reality that internal and transnational nonstate actors—such as criminal gangs—can be as important as traditional nation-states in determining political patterns and outcomes in global affairs. Similarly, many political leaders see nonstate actors as bit players on the international stage. At best, many leaders consider these nontraditional political actors to be low-level law enforcement problems, and, as a result, many argue that they do not require sustained national security policy attention.<sup>1</sup> Yet, more than half of the countries in the world are struggling to maintain their political, economic, and territorial integrity in the face of diverse direct and indirect nonstate—including criminal gang—challenges.<sup>2</sup>

For sovereignty to be meaningful today, the state, together with its associated governmental institutions working under the rule of law, must be the only source of authority empowered to make and enforce laws and conduct the business of the people within the national territory. The violent, intimidating, and corrupting activities of illegal internal and transnational nonstate actors—such as urban gangs—can abridge sovereign state powers and negate national and regional security.<sup>3</sup> The logic of the situation argues that the conscious choices that the international community and individual nation-states make about how to deal with the contemporary nontraditional threat situation will define the processes of national, regional, and global security and well-being far into the future.

## AN OVERVIEW OF THE GANGS-INSURGENCY PROBLEM

The primary thrusts of this monograph are to identify some of the most salient characteristics of contemporary criminal street gangs (that is, the gang phenomenon or third generation gangs). It also explains the linkage to insurgency with assertions that gang-generated crime, in conjunction with the instability it wreaks upon governments, is now a serious national security problem in important parts of the global community. Although gangs and insurgents differ in terms of original motives and modes of operation, this linkage infers that street gangs are a mutated form of urban insurgency. That is, these nonstate actors must eventually seize political power to guarantee the freedom of action and the commercial environment they want. The common denominator that can link gangs to insurgency is that some gangs' and insurgents' ultimate objective is to depose or control the governments of targeted countries. As a consequence, the "Duck Analogy" applies. That is, third generation gangs look like ducks, walk like ducks, and act like ducks—a peculiar breed, but ducks nevertheless!

This monograph will, then, identify those issues that must be taken together and understood as a whole before any effective countermeasures can be taken to deal with the half-criminal and half-political nature of the gang phenomenon. This is a universal compound-complex problem that must be understood on three distinct levels of analysis: first, the gangs phenomena are generating serious domestic and regional instability and insecurity that ranges from personal violence to insurgent to state failure: second, because if their criminal activities and security challenges, the gangs phenomena are exacerbating civil-military and police-military relations problems and reducing effective and civil-military ability to control the national territory; and, third, gangs are helping



transitional criminal organizations, insurgents, warlords, and drug barons erode the legitimacy and effective sovereignty of nation-states . The analytical commonality linking these three issues is the inevitable contribution to either (a) failing and failed state status of targeted countries, or (b) deposing or controlling the governments of targeted countries. In these terms, we must remember that crime and instability are only symptoms of the threat. The ultimate threat is either state failure or the violent imposition of a radical socio-economic-political restructuring of the state and its governance.

In describing the gang phenomenon as a simple mutation of a violent act we label as insurgency, we mischaracterize the activities of nonstate organizations that are attempting to take control of the state. We traditionally think of insurgency as primarily a military activity, and we think of gangs as a simple law-enforcement problem. Yet, insurgents and third generation gangs are engaged in a highly complex political act – political war. Under these conditions, police and military forces would provide personal and collective security and stability, while they and other governmental institutions combat the root causes of instability and political war – injustice, repression, inequity, and corruption. The intent would be to generate the political-economic-social development that will define the processes of national reform, regeneration, and well-being. The challenge, then, is to come to terms with the fact that contemporary security and stability, at whatever level, is at base a *holistic* political-diplomatic, socio-economic, psychological-moral, and military police effort.

This monograph concludes with implications and strategic-level recommendations derived from the instability, civil-military jurisdiction, and sovereignty issues noted above that will help leaders achieve strategic clarity and operate more effectively in the complex politically dominated, contemporary global security arena. In short, these recommendations establish the beginning point from which civilian and military

leaders might generate holistic civil-military success against the nonstate gang phenomenon and turn that success into strategic political victory.

#### **LINKING GANGS AND INSURGENCY I: THE CONFLICT CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH GANGS OPERATE**

Before examining the characteristics of street gangs, it is useful to sketch the basic outlines of the larger picture of the current conflict situation and the place of insurgency and gangs in it. First, Dr. Steven Metz and Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen argue that four distinct but interrelated battle spaces exist. They are (1) traditional direct interstate war; (2) unconventional nonstate war; (3) unconventional intrastate war, which tends to involve direct vs. indirect conflict between state and nonstate actors; and (4) indirect interstate war, which entails aggression by a state against another through proxies.<sup>4</sup>

#### **Nonstate Conflict and Gangs.**

Street gangs operate most effectively in the second category of nonstate battle space. Nonstate war involves criminal and terrorist actors who thrive among and within various host countries. This type of conflict is often called "guerrilla war," "asymmetric war," and also "complex emergencies." This kind of war is defined as acting, organizing, and thinking differently from opponents to maximize one's own advantages, exploit an opponent's weaknesses, attain the initiative, and gain freedom of action and security. In these terms, nonstate war exploits—directly and indirectly—the disparity between contending parties to gain relative advantage and uses insurgent and terrorist methods. Moreover, it can have political-psychological and physical dimensions, as well as

lethal and nonlethal dimensions; it can have both ideological-political objectives and commercial (search-for-wealth) motives; and it is constantly mutating.<sup>5</sup> As a consequence, there are no formal declarations or terminations of conflict; no easily identified human foe to attack and defeat; no specific territory to take and hold; no single credible government or political actor with which to deal; and no guarantee that any agreement between or among contending groups will be honored. In short, the battle space is everywhere, and includes everything and everyone.<sup>6</sup>

As a result, nonstate conflict is much too complex to allow a strictly military solution to a given national security problem. Likewise, it is too complicated to allow a strictly police solution to a law enforcement problem. Street gangs may be considered half political national security challenges and half criminal law enforcement issues in these unconventional terms.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, these are not the only difficulties generated by the gang phenomenon and other nonstate actors in nonstate conflicts. Additional, nontraditional complexities further define the problem and dictate thoughtful responses. As an example, in a national security scenario, the "enemy" is not a recognizable military group or formation. The enemy is now the individual political actor or gang member who plans and implements coercive intimidation, corruption, and instabilities, and exploits the root causes of violence for his or her own commercial or political purposes. The enemy is also a composite of poverty, disease, and other causes of criminality and societal violence that must be dealt with on its own terms.<sup>8</sup>

In this context, the harsh realities of the new world disorder are caused by myriad destabilizers. The causes include increasing poverty, human starvation, widespread disease, and lack of political and socio-economic justice. The consequences are seen in such forms as social violence, criminal anarchy, refugee flows, illegal drug trafficking and organized crime,

extreme nationalism, irredentism, religious fundamentalism, insurgency, ethnic cleansing, and environmental devastation. These destabilizing conditions tend to be exploited by militant nationalists, militant reformers, militant religious fundamentalists, ideologues, civil and military bureaucrats, terrorists, insurgents, warlords, drug barons, and organized criminals working to achieve their own narrow purposes. Those who argue that instability and conflict—and the employment of terrorism and generalized violence as a tactic or strategy in conflict—are the results of poverty, injustice, corruption, and misery may well be right. We must remember, however, that individual men and women are prepared to kill and to destroy and, perhaps, die in the process to achieve their self-determined ideological or commercial objectives. In the end, Zbigniew Brzezinski reminds us that, “behind almost every [violent] act lurks a political problem.”<sup>9</sup>

Consequently, “power” is no longer combat fire power or police power. It is the multilevel, combined political, psychological, moral, informational, economic, social, police, and military activity that can be brought to bear holistically on the causes and consequences, as well as the perpetrators, of violence. At the same time, success or “victory” is not a formal document signed by responsible authorities terminating a conflict. Also, it cannot be defined in terms of killing or jailing a given number of “enemies.” As a result, success is being defined more frequently as the establishment of a viable circular linkage between individual and collective security and sustainable societal peace. Ultimately, then, success in nonstate conflict comes as a result of a unified effort to apply the full human and physical resources of the nation-state and its international allies to achieve individual and collective well-being that leads to societal peace.<sup>10</sup>

## **The Challenge and the Threat.**

At base, nonstate guerrilla war, asymmetric war, or a complex emergency situation is ultimately a zero-sum game, in which there is only one winner or, in a worst-case scenario, there are no winners. It is, thus, total. This is the case with Osama bin Laden's terrorists, Maoist insurgents, the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult, Mafia families, warlords, transnational criminal organizations, institutionalized criminality in West Africa, and street gangs, among others. It is also the case with the deliberate, direct financial attack or hacker attack that can allow anyone with access to the appropriate knowledge and technology—including gang members—to impair the security of a nation as effectively as with a nuclear bomb.<sup>11</sup> Significantly, this is also the case with more subtle and indirect confrontation than the usual direct military-political challenges to the state. That is, rather than directly competing with a nation-state, sophisticated and internationalized street gangs and their criminal/narco allies can use a mix of complicity, indifference, corruption, and violent intimidation to co-opt and seize control of a state or a portion of a nation-state quietly and indirectly.<sup>12</sup>

In these terms, the destabilizing commercial and political activities of third generation gangs may be characterized as a game of "Wizard's Chess." In that game, protagonists move pieces silently and subtly all over the game board. Under the players' studied direction, each piece represents a different type of direct and indirect power and may simultaneously conduct its lethal and nonlethal attacks from differing directions. Each piece shows no mercy against its foe and is prepared to sacrifice itself in order to allow another piece the opportunity to destroy or control an adversary—or checkmate the king. Accordingly, all the above threats can be seen as methods of choice of globally connected commercial and ideological movements, dedicated to self-enrichment at the

expense of others, to the destruction of the contemporary international system of cooperation and progress, or both. Over the long-term, however, this ongoing game is not a question of instability, illegal violence, or unconscionable commercial gain. Ultimately, it is a question of survival. Failure in "Wizard's Chess" is not an option.

As a consequence, nonstate conflict will likely have different names, different motives, and exert different types and levels of violence. Nevertheless, whatever they are called, these unconventional nonstate wars can be identified by their ultimate objectives or by their results. That is, they are the organized application of coercive military or nonmilitary, lethal or nonlethal, direct or indirect, or a mix of all the above illicit methods, intended to resist, oppose, gain control of, or overthrow an existing government or symbol of power and bring about fundamental political change.<sup>13</sup> Thus, according to El Salvadoran Vice-Minister of Justice Silvia Aguilar, "Domestic crime and its associated destabilization are now Latin America's most serious security threat."<sup>14</sup>

## **LINKING GANGS TO INSURGENCY II: THREE GENERATIONS OF URBAN GANGS**

This part of the monograph briefly reviews the evolution of street gangs from small, turf-oriented, petty-cash entities to larger, internationalized, commercial-political organizations. Also outlined here are the development of street gang violence from the level of "protection," gangsterism, brigandage to drug trafficking, global criminal activity, and taking political control of ungoverned territory and/or areas governed by corrupt politicians and functionaries. Additionally, this threat to the state is exacerbated by the instability generated through the corruption and the destruction of democratic governance, by the disruption of equitable commercial transactions and the distortion of free market economic mechanisms, and through

the normalization of intimidating violence by degrading personal and collective security. In sum, it would appear that gangs present much more than annoying law enforcement problems. Actually and potentially, they are national security problems that threaten the effective sovereignty of the nation-state.

### **First Generation Gangs: Organization, Motives, and Level of Violence.**

An analysis of urban street gangs shows that some of these criminal entities have evolved through three generations of development. The first generation—or traditional street gangs—are primarily turf-oriented. They have loose and unsophisticated leadership and focus their attention on turf protection to gain petty cash and on gang loyalty within their immediate environs (designated city blocks or neighborhoods). When first generation street gangs engage in criminal enterprise, it is largely opportunistic and individual in scope and tends to be localized and operates at the lower end of extreme societal violence—gangsterism and brigandage. Most groups stay firmly within this first generation of development, but more than a few gangs have moved to the second generation.<sup>15</sup>

### **Second Generation Gangs.**

This generation of street gangs is organized for business and commercial gain. These gangs have a more centralized leadership, and members tend to focus on drug trafficking and market protection. At the same time, they operate in a broader spatial or geographic area that may include neighboring cities and other nation-states. Second generation gangs, like other more sophisticated criminal enterprises, use the level of violence necessary to protect their markets and control their

competition. They also use violence as political interference to negate enforcement efforts directed against them by police and other security organizations. And as they seek to control or incapacitate state security organizations, they often begin to dominate vulnerable community life within large areas of the nation-state. In this environment, second generation gangs almost have to link with and provide services to transnational criminal organizations. In this context, these gangs have been known to develop broader, market-focused, and sometimes overtly political agendas to improve their market share and revenues.<sup>16</sup>

### **Third Generation Gangs.**

These gangs continue first and second generation actions as they expand their geographical parameters, as well as their commercial and political objectives. As they evolve, they develop into more seasoned organizations with broader drug-related markets, as well as very sophisticated transnational criminal organizations with ambitious political and economic agendas. In this connection, they inevitably begin to control ungoverned territory within a nation-state and/or begin to acquire political power in poorly-governed space.<sup>17</sup> This political action is intended to provide security and freedom of movement for gang activities. As a consequence, the third generation gang and its leadership challenge the legitimate state monopoly on the exercise of control and use of violence within a given political territory. The gang leader, then, acts much the same as a warlord or a drug baron.<sup>18</sup>

That is, once a gang leader has achieved control of a specific geographical area within a given nation-state and takes measures to protect the gang's turf from the state, that leader effectively becomes a warlord or drug baron. At the same time, that status takes the gang into another, somewhat different battle space—intrastate war. This unconventional



type of conflict pits nonstate actors (for example, warlords, drug barons, or insurgents) directly against nation-states and requires a relatively effective warmaking capability. That, in turn, takes us back to the relationship between warlordism/drug baronism and insurgency. Clearly, many differences exist, especially in terms of mode of operation and motivation.<sup>19</sup> The common denominators in both instances remain, however, to accomplish the following objectives: (1) depose or control an incumbent government, and (2) force a radical political-socio-economic restructuring of the nation-state and its governance.

### **Implications.**

The generic evolution of urban street gangs illustrates that this is a compound-complex issue that has implications at three different levels of analysis. First, all three generations of gangs generate serious domestic instability and insecurity. Of course, as gangs evolve, they generate more and more violence and instability, over wider and wider sections of the political map, and create regional instability and insecurity. Second, because of their internal (intrastate) criminal activities and their international (transnational) commercial and political actions, they exacerbate the confusion regarding the traditional distinctions between police law enforcement functions and military national security or defense functions—to the extent that very little that is effective or lasting can be done to control or eliminate them. Third, thus, second and third generation gangs erode the effective sovereignty of the nation-states within which they operate. Additionally, when linked with or working for transnational criminal organizations, insurgents, drug barons, or warlords, the gangs' activities further reduce police and military authorities' abilities to maintain stability and, in so doing, challenge the sovereignty of the states within and between which they move.

At base, successful third generation gang activity can lead to (1) their control of parts of targeted counties or subregions within a country and the creation of enclaves that are essentially para-states, or (2) their taking either indirect or direct control of an entire state and establishing a criminal or a narco-state—or a narco-criminal state. Even if unsuccessful, third generation gang activity still can contribute significantly to the degenerative processes of state failure and regional instability. In any case, none of the results of gang success or failure benefit the peoples of targeted countries or the international community. It is important to remember that the primary characteristics of a gang and its leadership are individual and group survival and personal gain. Beyond this, there are no rules.<sup>20</sup>

### **LINKING GANGS TO INSURGENCY III: EXAMPLES OF CHALLENGES TO THE STATE**

To further illustrate the points outlined above, we will examine some vignettes that relate to the gang phenomenon. We intend to show briefly how differing types of gang activities contribute to the instabilities that lead to the erosion of state sovereignty and the processes of state failure—as well as to the creation of new criminal or narco-states out of legitimate members of the international community. Three examples from the Latin American context will suffice: (1) the current Central American situation, (2) the Bolivian “Coca-Coup” of the early 1980s, and (3) a composite case that demonstrates the results of contemporary third generation gang activity in at least two Mexican states and one Brazilian state.

#### **The Central American Situation.**

Youth gangs from California began moving into all five Central American republics in the early 1990s. The main impetus came as a result of convicted felons being sent from prisons in

the United States back to the countries of their parents' origins. These gangs include the famed Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), Mara 18, and several others in El Salvador—Mao Mao, Crazy Harrisons Salvatrucha, and Crazy Normans Salvatrucha.<sup>21</sup> At the present time, the Salvadoran gang phenomenon is estimated to number approximately 39,000 active members in El Salvador. Additionally, several thousand individuals with direct links back to El Salvador are located in the United States, other countries in Central and South America, Mexico, Canada, and Europe. In the early stages of their development and through the present, virtually all the Central American gangs have flourished under the protection and mercenary income provided by larger criminal networks. The basis of this alliance is the illegal drug trade that is credited with the transshipment of up to 75 percent of the cocaine that enters the United States.<sup>22</sup>

Guatemalan gangs, as another example, appear to work closely with a clique of hard-line former military and police officers and intelligence and security officials that have transformed themselves into a highly profitable and powerful criminal cartel. As might be expected, that clique maintains strong links to contemporary politicians and customs, immigration, judicial, police, and army officers. In that connection, 217 Guatemalan police officials were fired on November 14, 2004, for failing to carry out their duties and alleged participation in criminal activities. This followed the firing of 320 officials of the Guatemalan equivalent of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in the late 1990s after the government discovered that they were on the payrolls of various national and transnational criminal organizations. This, in turn, followed the discovery that a large group of active military personnel, including Guatemala's Vice Minister of Defense, was operating a drug smuggling and robbery ring in conjunction with Colombia's Cali cartel.<sup>23</sup> More recently, Guatemala has been euphemistically dubbed the "Crown Prince" of Central American drug trafficking countries.<sup>24</sup>

In addition to drug smuggling, second and third generation gangs in Central America are known to be involved in smuggling people, arms, and cars; associated murder, kidnapping, and robbery violence; home and community invasions; credit card fraud; and other more petty criminal first generation activities. As a result, crime rates have increased dramatically to the point where the Honduran annual murder rate—as only one example—at 154 per 100,000 population, is double that of Colombia's. The comparison of Honduras with Colombia is interesting and important because Colombia, with its ongoing internal conflict, is widely considered to be the most violent society in Latin America. More specifically, 3,500 people, including more than 455 women, were murdered in Guatemala in 2004. A majority of those murders took place in public, in broad daylight, and many of the mutilated bodies were left as grisly reminders of the gangs' prowess. Clearly, the governments' corruption and lack of control of national territory have allowed criminal gangs and other organized criminal organizations to operate with impunity within each country of Central American—and across borders.<sup>25</sup>

Central American gangs' seeming immunity from effective law enforcement efforts and the resultant lack of personal and collective security in that region have created a dangerous synergy between organized criminality and terror that is blurring the traditional line between criminal and political violence. In that context, the greatest fear haunting many Central American officials and citizens is that criminal violence is about to spiral completely out of control and acquire a political agenda. This fear is exacerbated because second and third generation gangs and their mercenary allies are controlling larger and larger portions of cities, the interior, and the traditionally inviolate national frontiers—and have achieved almost complete freedom of movement and action within and between national territories. As a consequence, the effective sovereignty of all the Central American countries

is being impinged every day, and the gangs' commercial motives are, in fact, becoming a political agenda for control of state governing and security institutions and for control of people and territory.<sup>26</sup>

### **The Bolivian Coca Coup of July 1980.**

The level of corruption of the political, economic, social, and security organs of a nation-state is closely related to the degree of weakness of the governmental apparatus, and is a major agent for destabilization and state failure.<sup>27</sup> As such, governmental corruption is another point of entry from which the gangs phenomena—or a mutant clique—can exert control and/or depose a given government. Over the past several years, the transnational narcotics industry has exacerbated the corruption problem so much that it has achieved major destabilizing and legitimacy levels in Asia's Golden Triangle (a 350,000-square kilometer area overlapping the mountains of Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand) and South America's White Triangle (the "coca" producing areas of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru). In this connection, the Bolivian situation in the early 1980s is instructive.

Roberto Suarez Gomez was one of Bolivia's leading drug barons in the late 1970s and early 1980s. With his expanding wealth, Suarez became a factor in national politics and engineered his country's 189th coup d' état. This "Coca Coup" placed the Suarez gang/clique in political office. General Luis Garcia Meza was given the national presidency through a reported \$1.3 million bribe. Then, when Garcia Meza assumed office, he appointed Colonel Luis Arce Gomez, a relative of Suarez Gomez, as the Minister of the Interior, thereby giving him control of all counterdrug operations in Bolivia. Although the Garcia Meza regime lasted only until October 1982—ending in yet another coup—the fortune it generated for the Bolivian narco-elite clique, and the devastation it wreaked on the

national economy, were significant. One observer suggested the following: "Think of a preposterous figure, double it and know damn well that you've made a gross underestimate."<sup>28</sup> Another observer noted that 10 years later, Bolivia had still not recovered economically or politically from that experience.<sup>29</sup>

Bolivia's experience with narco-corruption shows that the buying and use (renting) of public office make it difficult for a government to pursue the interests of a nation-state. More important, that experience demonstrates what can happen when the necessity of meeting a specific client's needs and the intensity of the client's expectations and demands mitigate against responsible democratic government—and against any allegiance to the public well-being or respect for the consent of the governed. Thus, high levels of corruption within a government and society can lead to the collapse of the rule of law and a general weakening of the state in direct proportion to its legitimacy. Under these conditions, virtually anyone—not just a traditional street gang—can take advantage of the situation. The tendency is that the best motivated, best armed, and best financed organization on the scene will control that instability for its own purposes. In this particular case, Bolivia had the distinction of having become the Western Hemisphere's first narco-state.<sup>30</sup> Today, Bolivia is no longer a narco-state. It remains, however, a classic example of poor governance, lack of development, and rampant corruption that appears to be leading the country toward a radical populist solution to its political and socio-economic problems.<sup>31</sup>

#### **A Composite Examination of Nonmilitary and Nonlethal Methods for Establishing Control of a State or Part of a State.**

A transnational nonstate actor, such as a third generation gang (a gang in an alliance with another criminal organization), has the capability to challenge the *de jure* sovereignty of nation-

states over entire regions (or states) within those countries' own national territories. This has proven to be the case in at least two Mexican states and one Brazilian state.<sup>32</sup> John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker describe how unconventional attackers have wielded power in various parts of Latin America and other parts of the world:

As an example, if the unconventional attacker—terrorists, drug cartels, criminal gangs, militant environmentalists, or a combination of such actors—blends crime, terrorism, and war, he can extend his already significant influence. After embracing advanced technology weaponry, including Weapons of Mass Destruction (including chemical and biological agents), radio frequency weapons, and advanced intelligence gathering technology, along with more common weapons systems, the attacker can transcend drug running, robbery, kidnapping, and murder and pose a significant challenge to the nation-state and its institutions. Using complicity, intimidation, corruption, and indifference, the irregular attacker can quietly and subtly co-opt individual politicians and bureaucrats and gain political control of a given geographical or political enclave. Such corruption and distortion can potentially lead to the emergence of a virtual criminal state or political entity. A series of networked enclaves could, then, become a dominant political actor within a state, or group of states. Thus, rather than violently and directly competing with a nation-state, an unconventional nonstate attacker can indirectly and criminally co-opt and seize control of the state.<sup>33</sup>

Thus, taking the activities of the gangs' phenomena to their logical (and actual) conclusion can be a mix of possibilities only limited by the imagination and willingness to use "unethical" ways and means to disrupt, control, or destroy a targeted nation-state. In this type of nonstate war, the traditional lines between civilian and military, lethal and nonlethal, and direct and indirect attack on the state are eliminated, and the "battle space" is extended well beyond traditional military-police dimensions to relatively uncharted political, psychological, socio-economic, and moral dimensions.<sup>34</sup>

## **Conclusions on Gangs' Evolution.**

The United States, Europe, and those other parts of the global community most integrated into the interdependent world economy are embroiled in a security arena in which time-honored concepts regarding national security and the classical means to attain it, while still necessary, are no longer sufficient. War, or conflict, has changed. It is no longer limited to using military violence to bring about desired political change. Rather, *all* means that can be brought to bear on a given situation may be used to compel an enemy to do one's will. Superior firepower is no panacea, and technology may not guarantee a knowledge or information advantage. Thus, unless thinking, actions, and organization are reoriented to deal with the asymmetric, knowledge-based information realities outlined above, the problems of global, regional, and subregional stability and security will resolve themselves—and not in a manner designed to achieve the public good.

## **BASIC ISSUES THAT FURTHER DEFINE THE THREAT AND DICTATE RESPONSE**

It is increasingly clear that gangs are half-political and half-criminal nonstate actors that actually and potentially pose a dominant, “complex emergency” threat in a security environment in which failing states flourish.<sup>35</sup> At the same time, logic would point out that targeted governments and their global allies cannot treat gangs as a simple law enforcement problem or as a generic insurgency issue. A much wider, multidimensional strategic approach to gangs is needed—one that includes the three distinct levels of analysis that have already been mentioned but require elaboration. The primary issues that must be taken together and understood as a whole before any effective countermeasures can be implemented to deal with the gang phenomenon include the following:



- Gangs phenomena contribute significantly to national, regional, and global instability;
- These organizations help transnational criminal organizations, warlords, drug barons, and insurgents erode the effective sovereignty of the nation-state; and,
- Gangs phenomena are challenging the traditional ways of dealing with law enforcement and national security issues. Effective response requires not so much a redefinition of military and/or police missions as the holistic use of all the instruments of state and international power.

The common denominator(s) that links these three issues is the presence of one or both of the following:

- Targeted countries' failing or failed state status, and/or
- Criminal nonstate actors' goals of deposing or controlling the governments of targeted countries or parts of targeted countries.

This analysis, hopefully, will stimulate strategic thinking and action regarding a set of complicated security problems that—whether or not one likes them or is prepared to deal with them—are likely to be with the entire global community far beyond the year 2005.

### **Gangs and Instability.**

The current threat environment in Latin America and around the world is not a traditional security problem. While some international boundary disputes remain alive—such as the Bolivian desire to regain access to the Pacific Ocean, and the chronic problems between India and Pakistan, the Koreas, and Ethiopia/Eritrea—only a relatively few conventional formations of enemy soldiers are massing and

preparing to invade the territory of a neighbor. What we see instead are numerous nonstate and transnational actors, including gangs, actively engaged in internal disruption and destabilization efforts. This kind of action is not necessarily a direct attack against a government. It is, however, an effective means for indirectly weakening a regime. Whether brought about inadvertently or by a conscious effort, instability and its associated insecurity generate a vicious downward spiral that manifests itself in diminished levels of individual and collective security, diminished levels of popular and institutional acceptance and support for the incumbent regime, and diminished levels of governmental ability to control its national territory. The intent might simply be to create and maintain a climate of violence, chaos, and regime inadequacy that allows the actor's freedom of movement to pursue unconscionable personal and group enrichment.<sup>36</sup>

The instability process tends to move from personal violence to increased collective violence and social disorder to kidnappings, bank robberies, violent property takeovers, murders/assassinations, personal and institutional corruption, criminal anarchy, and the beginnings of internal and external refugee flows. In turn, the momentum of this coercive process tends to evolve into more widespread social violence, serious degradation of the economy, and further governmental inability to provide personal and national security and to guarantee the rule of law. Over the past several years, many decisionmakers, policymakers, and opinion leaders seem to have been consistently surprised at the chaos, violence, and governmental degradation that stems from the destabilizing activities of gangs and their drug-trafficking allies. These decisionmakers also have been confused and unable to decide what to do or how to do it beyond the usual crisis management and spin control tactics. This kind of piecemeal, ad hoc approach to the contemporary gang phenomenon reminds one of the frustration detailed in the following report, published by the West Indian Commission:

Nothing poses greater threats to civil society in [Caribbean] countries than the drug problem, and nothing exemplifies the powerlessness of regional governments more. That is the magnitude of the damage that drug abuse and trafficking hold for our Community. It is a many-layered danger. At base is the human destruction implicit in drug addiction; but, implicit also, is the corruption of individuals and systems by the sheer enormity of the inducements of the illegal drug trade in relatively poor societies. On top of all this lie the implications for governance itself—at the hands of both external agencies engaged in international interdiction, and the drug barons themselves—the “dons” of the modern Caribbean—who threaten governance from within.<sup>37</sup>

Thus, popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, lack of upward social mobility, and lack of personal security tend to limit the right—and the ability—of a regime to conduct the business of the state. As a government loses the rights and abilities to govern fairly and morally, it loses moral legitimacy. In turn, the loss of moral legitimacy leads to the degeneration of de facto state sovereignty. Conversely, stability begins with the provision of personal security to individual members of the citizenry. It extends to protection of citizens from violent internal nonstate actors (including gangs, organized criminals, and self-appointed vigilante groups) and external enemies. The security problem ends with the establishment of firm but fair control over the entire national territory and the people in it.<sup>38</sup>

### **The Civil-Military Challenge in Dealing with Law Enforcement and National Security Issues.**

Clearly, gangs and transnational criminal organizations are now powerful enough to destabilize, challenge, and destroy targeted societies and states. The continued growth and the increasing influence and power of these nonstate actors in individual countries are “spilling-over” into neighboring states and, in turn, generating associated transnational threats. The

Organization of American States (OAS) affirmed in 2003 that these "new threats, concerns, and other challenges are cross-cutting problems that may require appropriate hemispheric cooperation," and that "the traditional concept and approach [to security threats] should be expanded to encompass new and nontraditional threats. . . ." The final result of this affirmation was the *condemnation* of "transnational organized crime, since it constitutes an assault on institutions in our states and negatively affects our societies."<sup>39</sup>

Nevertheless, there is a certain reluctance on the part of OAS member states to take a broadened definition of national security to its logical conclusion and correspondingly broaden the role of the military to a controversial internal protection mission. Many civilians are concerned about renewed military autonomy and immunities, as well as previous excesses. On the other hand, the violence and instability generated by the gang phenomenon in much of Latin America have fueled doubts about the problem-solving ability of those "democratically elected" leaders in power; public opinion polls indicate that resistance to authoritarian and/or populist solutions to the region's ongoing problems has declined.<sup>40</sup> In this environment, the security institutions of many states have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to confront the gang phenomenon. Reasons given to explain these problems are usually: (1) "This is not our mission"; and (2) "We are not trained, organized, or equipped to deal with this kind of mission." Within the context of that frustration, a new civil-military pragmatism appears to recognize that the modern world is much too interrelated, complicated, and dangerous to advocate a strictly law enforcement solution—or even a strictly military solution—to provide any viable response to contemporary security and stability problems. Thus what is required is a combined civil-military effort to apply the full human and physical resources of the nation-state and the international community to generate effective sovereignty and national security.<sup>41</sup>

Such a common effort for the general welfare must begin with a civil-military dialogue. That dialogue would be designed to help civilians understand the new realities of geopolitics and security and to help the military appreciate the nationalism and competence of civilians. The policy objectives would be for the military to join with civilian institutions to lend administrative and technical expertise, as well as human and physical resources to help the state grow out of its underdevelopment problems. That dialogue and understanding must be supported by long-term programs: (1) to professionalize and modernize the military, the police, and civil governance; (2) to canalize democratically the operational roles of professionalized and modernized civil-military institutions; and (3) to generate sufficient additional organization, funding, and staffing to create a critical mass from which to define and implement effective, legitimate security and stability actions.<sup>42</sup>

In the long term, governments cannot depend on an outside power, such as the United States, or an organization, such as the OAS or the United Nations (UN), to do these things for them. At the same time, no government can simply legislate or decree these qualities for itself. Governments can, however, develop, sustain, and enhance these qualities by their actions over time. Legitimization and internal stability derive from popular and institutional perceptions that authority is genuine and effective and that it uses morally correct means for reasonable and fair purposes. Establishment of legitimate authority and internal stability, in turn, implies a serious anticorruption campaign coupled with a strong public diplomacy effort.<sup>43</sup>

### **Gangs Phenomena: A Silent Challenge to Sovereignty.**

The brief snapshot presented above of gang-induced instability and state civil-military inability to control the national territory requires further elaboration. To do this

and better demonstrate why gangs and their national and transnational criminal allies are or can be a threat to the state, we will examine briefly their organization, operations, and profitability. The implications take us to the problems of sovereignty, state failure, and survival.

The organizations and activities of the gangs phenomena reflect expertise in communications, marketing, transportation, banking, and negotiations with other organizations. Senior U.S. and Latin-American officials have noted that gangs and their criminal allies function as a consortium in much the same way as virtually any multinational Fortune 500 company. Thus, the phenomenon is a business organization striving to control the price of commodities, such as oil, arms, microchips, automobiles, human body parts, or cocaine. By performing its business tasks with super efficiency and for maximum profit, the general organization employs its chief executive officers and boards of directors, councils, system of internal justice, public affairs officers, negotiators, and project managers. And, of course, the company has a security division—somewhat more ruthless than those of other major corporations.<sup>44</sup>

The equation that links narcotics trafficking to gangs turns on a combination of need, organizational infrastructure, development, ability, and the availability of sophisticated communications and weaponry. For example, traffickers possess cash and lines of transportation and communication. Gangs possess followers, discipline, and organization. Traffickers need these to help protect their assets and project their power within and among nation-states. Gangs are in constant need of logistical and communications support and money. Both groups possess relatively flat organizational structures that, when combined, can generate a more efficient and effective organization than any slow-moving bureaucratic, hierarchical governmental system. That combined organizational advantage of gangs and traffickers is a major source of power in itself. That is, a third generation

gang can generate the economic and military power to equal or better than that of many nation-states. The organization also has additional advantages. No formal officials have to be "elected," no national laws or boundaries must be respected, and no responsibility is owed to anyone outside the organization. Thus, the alliance acts as a state, demands to be treated as a state, yet escapes most of the restrictions imposed on the modern state.<sup>45</sup> To be sure, these loose and dynamic mergers are subject to many vicissitudes, but such marriages of convenience have lasted and appear to be getting stronger.

The annual net profit from gang-related activities is estimated to be in the billions of dollars. The precise numbers are not important. But the enormity of the amount of money involved is important, together with the additional benefits these financial resources can generate when linked to utter ruthlessness of purpose and no moral or legal constraints. In this connection, a third generation gang can afford the best talent—whether accountants, computer specialists, extortionists, or murderers—and the best equipment and technologies. With such extensive resources, a gang can bribe government officials, hire thugs to intimidate those who cannot be bought, and kill those who cannot be intimidated. Bottomless pockets mean that gangs can move, shift, diversify, and promote operations at will—and, most significantly, they can outspend virtually any legal political jurisdiction. Consequently, a gang can establish acceptance, credibility, and *de facto* legitimacy within and among the sovereign states where its general organization operates.<sup>46</sup>

In short, the gang phenomenon represents a triple threat to the authority of a given government and to those of its neighbors. First, through murder, kidnapping, intimidation, corruption, and other means of coercion, these violent nonstate actors undermine the ability of a government to perform its legitimizing functions. Second, by violently

imposing their will over the elected officials of the state, these actors compromise the legitimate exercise of state authority. Third, by taking control of portions of the national territory (including the borders), the various components of the gang phenomenon are directly performing the tasks of government and acting as states within a state.<sup>47</sup>

### **The Common Denominators.**

The sum of the political results of gang-related instability is an explosion of weak, incompetent, corrupt, and/or insensitive governments throughout large parts of Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America.<sup>48</sup> This explosion of weak states and resultant chaos is also a cautionary story of failing and failed states. The situation is disheartening, and too serious to ignore. Thus, we explore three related issues that are crucial to understanding the problem: (1) what a failed state is, (2) why states fail, and (3) why state failure matters.

**What Is a Failed State?** First, whatever the causes, instability within a nation-state leads to a crisis of governance and a downward spiral into violence, loss of de jure and de facto sovereignty, and failing and failed state status. In the novel, *The Constant Gardener*, author John le Carré vividly and succinctly captures that linkage. He answers the question, "When is a state not a state?" from the point of view of a commonsense practitioner:

I would suggest to you that these days, very roughly, the qualifications for being a civilized state amount to—electoral suffrage, ah—protection of life and property—um, justice, health, and education for all, at least to a certain level—then the maintenance of sound administrative infrastructure—and roads, transport, drains, et cetera—and—what else is there?—ah yes, the equitable collection of taxes. If a state fails to deliver on at least a quorum of the above—then one has to say the contract between the state and citizens begins to look pretty shaky—and if it fails on all of the above, then it's a failed state, as we say these days.<sup>49</sup>



State failure is, thus, a process by which the state loses the capacity and/or the will to perform its fundamental governance and security functions. Over time, the weaknesses inherent in its inability to perform the business of the state are likely to lead to the eventual erosion of its authority and legitimacy. And, in the end, the state cannot control its national territory or the people in it.

**The Road to Political Failure.** The State Failure Project developed a series of circumstances under which states fail.<sup>50</sup> As suggested by le Carré in the above quotation, those circumstances center on legitimate governance functions. That is, if the state does not fairly and adequately provide for security, basic human needs and socio-economic development, and general freedoms under the rule of law, and if it does not promote trust and cooperation among communal groups, both motive and opportunity for instability and violence—and gangs—exist. Failure to deal with progressively worsening internal social, economic, political, and security problems results in virtually complete turmoil, generally ineffective institutions, and illegitimate governance. The ultimate result is state failure.<sup>51</sup>

Additionally, states fail for two other reasons. First, pressures to liberalize political and economic systems quickly and radically may result in the collapse of governmental authority and the rule of law. Simply holding “democratic” elections for national leaders without attending to other patterns of responsible democracy risks creating weak and vulnerable institutions. In this immature “democratic” situation, security and law and order are often progressively replaced by, at best, “irresponsible” democracy and corruption or, at worst, criminal anarchy and armed factional violence. In any case, the state collapses under the weight of irresponsible, misguided, insensitive, inept, and/or corrupt leadership.<sup>52</sup>

Second, states collapse as a result of the conscious violent efforts of nonstate actors to bring them down or control them for their own nefarious purposes. As noted above, the

thread that permits human destabilizers, such as gangs and other organized criminals, to develop, grow, and succeed is adequate freedom of movement and action over time. These groups attempt to attain and maintain their freedom of action through (1) establishing supporting underground infrastructure; (2) taking political control of ungoverned or corrupted rural and urban enclaves; (3) infiltrating government and social organizations for intelligence and political purposes and for recruiting popular support (whether willing, bribed, or intimidated); and (4) taking direct actions that distract and disburse security forces and correspondingly weaken the incumbent government. All these means of generating freedom of movement and action include deliberate acts of terror against key individuals and institutions associated with governance, economic development, and security. Gangs and drug cartels operating in Latin America and elsewhere call these activities "business incentives." But, whatever they are called, these gang actions are aimed at lessening regime authority—and replacing it with their own.<sup>53</sup>

**Why State Failure Matters.** The argument in general is that failing or failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host pernicious networks of all kinds, involving criminal business enterprises, narco-trafficking, and/or various forms of ideological insurgency. They spawn conditions and activities most people find repugnant, such as human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking in and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and weapons of mass destruction, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, they usually are unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.<sup>54</sup>

Threats involving the gang phenomenon come in many forms and in a matrix of different kinds of challenges that vary in scope and scale. If these threats have a single feature in common, it is that they are systematic, well-calculated attempts to achieve political ends.<sup>55</sup> In that connection, two of the many consequences that the gang-narco alliance has generated will be elaborated. First, we examine the erosion of the vital democratic institutional pillar of regime legitimacy and stability; then, we discuss the erosion of the central governance of the state.

*The erosion of democracy and associated institutions.* The policy-oriented definition of democracy that has been generally accepted and used in U.S. foreign policy over the past several years is probably best described as "procedural democracy." This definition tends to focus on the election of civilian political leadership and, perhaps, on a relatively high level of participation on the part of the electorate. Thus, as long as a country is able to hold elections, it is considered a democracy—regardless of the level of accountability, transparency, corruption, ability to extract and distribute resources for national development, and protection of human rights and liberties.<sup>56</sup>

In Central America and elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, we observe important paradoxes. Elections are held on a regular basis; however, leaders, candidates, and elected politicians are also regularly assassinated or corrupted, for example, in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, the Caribbean states, and Mexico.<sup>57</sup> Additionally, intimidation, direct threats, and the use of violence against a given person and his or her family play an important role prior to elections. As a corollary, it is important to note that, although the media and academia are generally free from state censorship, journalists and academicians who oppose the gang phenomenon are systematically assassinated.<sup>58</sup>

As a consequence, it is problematic to credit most Central American and some Latin American elections as "democratic"

or "free." Neither competition nor participation in elections (leaving aside accountability and transparency) can be complete in an environment where armed and unscrupulous gangs and their narco-allies compete violently to control the government before and after elections. Moreover, it is difficult to credit some of these countries as "democracies" as long as leaders and the media are subject to corrupting controls or vetoes imposed by vicious nonstate actors. As an additional example, Ambassador David Jordan argues that Mexico may be considered an "anocratic democracy." That is, Mexico is a state that has the procedural features of democracy but retains the features of an autocracy, in that members of the ruling elite face no real accountability.<sup>59</sup> Sullivan and Bunker write about the narcostatization of two of the Mexican states, Quintana Roo and Sinaloa. These states have achieved narco-state status as a result of an advanced level of governmental corruption and very low levels of accountability.<sup>60</sup> In either situation, the actions of the gang-narco alliance have debilitating effects on democracy and associated institutions and tend to erode the ability of the state to carry out its legitimizing functions. This, in turn, can lead to the eventual erosion of governmental authority and to a process of state failure. The example of Haiti immediately comes to mind.

*The erosion of central governance and revisiting the process of state failure.* The primary implications of the complex and ambiguous situations described above are straightforward. The contemporary, chaotic global security environment reflects a general lack of legitimate governance and civil-military cooperation in many parts of the world. Instability thrives under those conditions. Instability, violence, terrorism, and criminal anarchy are the general consequences of inept, misguided, insensitive, and/or corrupt governance. Nevertheless, we must remember that, as important as instability might be in a national or transnational threat environment, it is only a symptom—not the threat itself. Rather, the ultimate threat is

"state failure." In that connection, probably the most insidious security problem facing the nations of the world centers on the threat to a given nation-state's ability and willingness to control its national territory and the nonstate actors who are seeking violent change within the borders of that nation-state.<sup>61</sup>

The violent, intimidating, disrupting, and corrupting activities of illegal nonstate actors can abridge or negate these powers. The situation in Central America is instructive. In Central America's "New War," it appears that commercial profit is the primary motivation for the various destabilizing gangs and their narco-trafficking allies. Like their narco-terrorist cousins in Colombia, Central American gangs and narco-traffickers are not particularly interested in taking de facto control of any one of the region's seven small republics, and they are not sending conventional military forces across national borders. What they are doing is ensuring they will have maximum freedom of movement and action within and between national territories.<sup>62</sup> Significantly, we must remember that this is the purview of legitimate sovereign governance.

In that regard, ample evidence clearly demonstrates that Central American and other states' authority and presence has diminished over large geographical portions of the Latin American region. However, contrary to popular perceptions, these areas are not "lawless" or "ungoverned" territories. In fact, they are governed by the gangs operating in the areas where state institutions are absent or only partially present. In this sense, the nexus is not simply criminal and commercial in nature. It is more far reaching. For its self-preservation, the gang-narco alliance in Central America and elsewhere has had little choice but to control states or parts of states. Thus, whether a third generation gang is a criminal or an insurgent organization is irrelevant. Its putative objective is to control the state to ensure its own ends, and that is definitely a serious political agenda.<sup>63</sup>

A state's failure to extend a sovereign presence throughout its national territory—for whatever reason—leaves a vacuum in which gangs, drug cartels, leftist insurgents, the political and narco-Right, and the government may compete for power. A brief description of the town of Tocache, in the Upper Huallaga Valley of Peru, at its most prosperous moment in the mid-1980s, illustrates this kind of situation. Many towns in Central America, the Caribbean Basin, Bolivia, Mexico, and elsewhere in the world are not unlike Tocache.

Tocache had six banks (for laundering money), six fax machines, several stereo dealerships, a discotheque, and one of the largest Nissan outlets in the country. Tocache also had no (and still does not have) paved streets, clean drinking water, or a sewage system. Whatever education that takes place in or around the town is controlled by *Sendero Luminoso* officials. Commerce between coca producers and narco-traffickers in the area is controlled by *Sendero Luminoso* officials. Tax collection, conflict adjudication, and general security functions in and around town are performed by *Sendero Luminoso* officials. In all, the nonstate entity with the strongest motivation, the best organization, and the most physical power in the area exercises political control of Tocache and the area around it. To be sure, the Peruvian government sends security forces and representatives into the area from time to time to provide "law and order" and a certain presence. But, the government has never exerted effective political control over that portion of the national territory.<sup>64</sup>

Whether conducted by insurgents or a third generation gang, this kind of activity is a real and substantive threat to national security and sovereignty, and it must be addressed as such.

Gang phenomena-induced instability, the associated challenge to civil-military missions, the "silent challenge" to sovereignty, and the attempt to either control or depose governments are the most salient lessons that should have been learned through involvement in the contemporary global security arena. The consistency of these lessons derived from relatively recent experience—from the White Triangle

to Mexico and from Central America to Haiti and the rest of the Caribbean Basin—inspires confidence that the lessons are valid.<sup>65</sup> At the same time, more than half of the countries in the world are struggling to maintain their political, economic, and territorial integrity in the face of diverse direct and indirect nonstate (including criminal) challenges.<sup>66</sup>

State failure is an evolutionary process, not an outcome. It is a process by which the state loses the capacity and/or the will to perform its essential governance and security functions.<sup>67</sup> However, just because a state fails does not mean that it will simply go away. In fact, failing and failed states tend to linger and go from bad to worse. The longer they persist, the more they and their spillover problems endanger regional and global peace and security.<sup>68</sup> Ample evidence demonstrates that failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new “people’s democracies.”

## IMPLICATIONS

The primary implications of this monograph are clear. The abilities of “fragile,” “besieged,” “failing,” or “failed” governments to control, protect, and enhance their countries’ stability, sovereignty, and general well-being are severely threatened in the contemporary global security environment. A major challenge derives from street gangs that are allied with narco-trafficking or other criminal organizations (that is, again, third generation gangs or the gang phenomenon). The common denominator that clearly defines gangs as mutations of insurgents is the irrevocable need to depose or control an incumbent government to force a radical socio-economic-political restructuring of the nation-state and its governance. Thus, we reiterate that if third generation gangs look like ducks, walk like ducks, and act like ducks—they indeed are insurgent-type ducks.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRATEGIC LEADERS: A "PURPOSE-BUILT" BRIDGE TO THE FUTURE

The United States is embroiled in a world of dangerous uncertainty. Numerous political actors are exerting differing types and levels of power within a set of cross-cutting alliances; the playing field, rules, and players are more complex; and identifying the objectives of the game is more perplexing than in the past. Since the end of World War II—and especially since the ending of the Cold War—U.S. and other Western political and military leaders have been struggling with the “new” aspects of unconventional nonstate wars. Yet, the “Wizard’s Chess” nature of the contemporary conflict dilemma is still not well-understood. Strategic leaders often complain that a given asymmetrical conflict or complex emergency has been dealt with successfully from the military point of view but has been “lost” politically—as if these dimensions of conflict were not interdependent.

Those results are contrary to the popular wisdom of escalating the level of the conflict militarily to the point where victory is assured. That wisdom is based on the notion that the enemy military force is the primary center of gravity in a war of attrition. In order to win, one must have something like a 10-to-1 ratio of military manpower superiority. The problems are that an asymmetrical war or a complex emergency—or a confrontation with the gang phenomenon—is not a conventional war of attrition and that the center of gravity is not the “enemy” military force. Rather, as Carl von Clausewitz explained as early as 1832, two centers of gravity exist in this kind of situation—the personalities of the [enemy] leaders and public opinion.<sup>69</sup> In that context, there are other more effective ways “to render the enemy powerless” than to attack him militarily. The situation can be described as one where the United States or other Western powers have been busy conducting a war of attrition and alienating public opinion, while the nontraditional actors in asymmetric nonstate wars



are making political-psychological preparations to take control of the state.<sup>70</sup>

Victory in any kind of contemporary war is not simply the sum of the battles won or lost or the number of criminals jailed over the course of a conflict. The outcome of conflicts such as those postulated in this monograph—and the nearly 100 complex emergencies the UN Security Council has recognized since 1990 as destabilizing intrastate struggles—is determined by the qualitative leader judgments and the synergistic organizational processes established before, during, and after a nonstate war is politically recognized to have begun. These are the fundamental components of strategic clarity, which is essential to success in the new millennium.<sup>71</sup>

At a minimum, then, two strategic-level imperatives pertain to complex emergencies and unconventional conflicts in nonstate wars—and to the gang mutations of contemporary, commercial urban insurgency. The first imperative involves the political, coalitional, and multi-organizational partnership requirements that mandate doctrinal and organizational change for strategic clarity and greater effectiveness in conflict situations. This, in turn, depends on the second imperative: the professional civil-military leadership development that will ensure not just unity of military command, but also the relevance of all civil-military effort. These two organizational and educational imperatives transcend the lessons noted above and act as a strategic bridge to future civil-military success in contemporary complex conflict situations. In Clausewitzian terms, these are the bases of “all power and movement, on which everything depends.”<sup>72</sup> The recommended basic direction for such an effort to achieve strategic clarity is outlined as follows.

### **Unity of Effort.**

The United States is not the only political actor in the global security arena, and it is not the only player in more specific, smaller-scale contingency or complex emergency

operations. At the same time, the U.S. military is not the only actor in any kind of U.S. involvement in the international security environment. A bewildering array of U.S. civilian agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as coalition and host country civilian and military organizations, respond to complex emergencies and state collapse. For any degree of success in “going beyond declaring victory and going home” and actually providing the foundations of a sustainable and just peace, involvement must be understood to be a holistic process that relies on various U.S. and other civilian and military agencies and contingents, working together in an integrated fashion. The creation of unity of effort to gain ultimate success must be addressed at different levels.

- At the highest level, the primary parties to a given conflict situation must be in general agreement with regard to the threats, end-state, and associated set of operations designed to achieve a common political vision. Although such an agreement regarding a strategic or operational end-state is a necessary condition for unity of effort, it is not sufficient by itself. Sufficiency and clarity are achieved by adding appropriate policy implementation and military management structure—and “mind-state adjustments”—at the following three additional levels.
- An executive-level management structure that can and will ensure continuous cooperative planning and execution of policy among and between the relevant U.S. civilian and military agencies (that is, vertical coordination). That structure must also ensure that all civil-military action at the operational and tactical levels directly contributes to the achievement of the mutually agreed strategic political end-state. This requirement reflects a need to improve coordination and cooperation within the operational theater and between the theater commander and Washington.

- Steps must be taken to ensure clarity, unity, and effectiveness by integrating coalition military, international organizational, and nongovernmental organization processes with U.S. civil-military planning and implementing processes (that is, horizontal coordination). It has become quite clear that the political end-state is elusive, and operations suffer when there is no strategic planning structure empowered to integrate the key multinational and multi-organizational civil-military elements of a given operation. It is also clear that duplication of effort, an immediate consequence of the absence of such a strategic planning body, is costly in political, personnel, and financial terms. These lessons have been demonstrated over and over again in such diverse operations as the Hurricane Mitch natural disaster relief operation in Central America and the various man-made disaster relief operations in the former Yugoslavia.<sup>73</sup>
- At a base-level, however, unity of effort requires education as well as organizational solutions. Even with an adequate planning and organizational structure, ambiguity, confusion, tensions, and unwanted third and fourth order complications are likely to emerge. Only when the various civilian and military leaders involved in an operation can develop the judgment and empathy necessary to work cooperatively and collegially will they be able to plan and conduct operations that meet the needs of the host nation and use the appropriate capabilities of the U.S. interagency community, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and coalition military forces. Unity of effort ultimately entails the type of professional civilian and military education and leader development that engenders effective diplomacy and professional competence.

## Leader Development.

The study of the fundamental nature of conflict has always been the philosophical cornerstone for understanding conventional war. It is no less relevant to nontraditional war involving nonstate actors. In the past, some wars tended to be unrealistically viewed as providing traditional military solutions to conventional military problems. This view is too simplistic. At this time the complex realities of particular past conflicts must be understood as a holistic cooperative process that relies on various unconventional civilian and military solutions to nontraditional political-psychological-military problems. At a minimum, eight educational and cultural imperatives can be used to modify Cold War and ethnocentric mindsets and to develop the leader judgment needed to deal effectively with complex, politically dominated, multidimensional, multiorganizational, multinational, and multicultural contingencies.<sup>74</sup> They are:

- Concepts such as “enemy,” “war,” and “victory” should be reconsidered and redefined for intrastate conflicts. At the same time, leaders at all levels must understand how to apply all the instruments of national and international power—including the full integration of legitimate civil and military coalition partners—to achieve agreed political ends.
- Civilian and military leaders at all levels must learn the fundamental nature of subversion and insurgency, with particular reference to the way in which force can be employed to achieve political ends and the way in which political considerations affect the use of force. Additionally, leaders need to understand the strategic and political-psychological implications of operational and tactical actions.
- Civilian and military leaders at all levels must learn that power is not simply combat firepower directed at an

enemy military formation or industrial capacity. Power is multilevel and combines “hard” and “soft” political, psychological, moral, informational, economic, societal, military, police, and civil bureaucratic activity that can be brought to bear directly and indirectly within a given security environment.

- U.S. civilian and military personnel are expected to be able to operate effectively and collegially in coalitions or multinational contingents. They must also acquire the ability to deal collegially with civilian populations and local and global media. As a consequence, efforts that enhance interagency as well as international cultural awareness, such as civilian and military exchange programs, language training programs, and combined (multinational) exercises, should be revitalized and expanded.
- In that connection, planners and negotiators who will operate at the strategic and high operational levels should be nurtured to function in coalitional decisionmaking and planning situations that can blend U.S. deliberate planning processes with concurrent multinational and multiorganizational practices.
- Leaders must learn that an intelligence capability several steps beyond the usual is required for nonstate conflicts. This capability involves active utilization of intelligence operations as a dominant element of both strategy and tactics. Thus, commanders at all levels must be responsible for collecting and exploiting timely intelligence.
- Civilian and military leaders must understand the totality of small, intrastate wars. Negotiations, agreements, and accords notwithstanding, complex emergency situations are zero-sum games in which there can be only one winner or no winners.

- Finally, education and training for contemporary man-made or natural emergencies must prepare military “peacekeepers/enforcers” or “humanitarian relief providers” to be effective war fighters. The contemporary “savage wars of peace” will continue to put military forces into harm’s way.

## CONCLUSIONS

These are the essential components of strategic clarity. Even though every conflict situation differs in one way or another, none is ever truly unique. Throughout the universe of contemporary conflict in general—and complex emergencies involving nonstate actors in particular—there are analytical commonalities. The final outcomes of the “New Wars,” such as those ongoing in Central America, the Caribbean, Mexico, and the Andean Ridge of South America brought about by narco-traffickers and gangs, are not determined primarily by the skillful manipulation of violence on the battlefield. Control of these situations and their resolutions will be determined by the qualitative judgments and unity of effort established before, during, and after conflicts are politically recognized to have begun and ended.

Two common denominators underlie the discussion of the issues considered. The first is the need to understand and to behave as though the Cold War is over, combined with learning how to optimize capabilities in an ambiguous, nontraditional, global security environment. In colloquial terms, this first common denominator relates specifically to “mind-set,” and, in more formal terms, it refers to leader judgment. The second common denominator involves the political partnership requirements that will permit doctrinal and structural change related to coalitions and operations involving mixes of military and civilian organizations. This requirement is fundamental to maintaining unity of effort in unconventional nonstate

conflict. These common denominators are essential for success in complex emergencies. Thus, we must develop leaders and organizational structures that can generate strategic clarity and make it work—the sooner, the better.<sup>75</sup>

To dismiss the above recommendations as “too difficult,” “unrealistic,” or “simply impossible” is to accept the inevitability of unattractive alternatives. At best, international leadership can leave forces in place to maintain a de facto military occupation, as in Cyprus. Or, at worst, leadership can “declare victory and go home” with the sure knowledge that that particular set of problems will erupt again and again, and the time, treasure, and blood expended will have been for nothing.

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## AFTERWORD

The political-psychological issues of the urban gang phenomenon in the global security environment translate into constant subtle and not-so-subtle struggles for governmental power that dominate life throughout most of the world. This, in turn, leads to the slow but sure destruction of the state, its associated government, and the society. And, again, the basic threat devolves to that of state failure.

This contemporary political war situation is extremely volatile and dangerous and requires careful attention. In these terms, the United States, the other countries of the Western Hemisphere, and the entire global community must understand and cope with the threat imposed by diverse third generation gangs that are engaged in destabilizing and devastating violence, which is more and more often being called “terrorism,” “criminal anarchy,” “narco-terrorism,” or “complex emergency situations.” If the United States concentrates its efforts and resources elsewhere and ignores what is happening in Latin America and the Caribbean,

the expansion of gangs, of "lawless areas," and of general instability, as well as the compromise of effective national sovereignty and security could easily destroy the democracy, free market economies, and prosperity that have been achieved in recent years. In turn, that would profoundly affect the health of the U.S. economy—and U.S. concomitant power to act in the global security arena.

## ENDNOTES

1. To be fair, it must be noted that some scholars and journalists are beginning to understand this problem and are writing in these terms. See, as three examples, Anthony T. Bryan, *Transnational Organized Crime: The Caribbean Context*, Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami, The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center Press, 2002; Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege*, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997; and "El delito como una amenaza geopolítica," in *Clarín.com*, 3 de Julio de 2003. Related international relations theory may be found in Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 2nd ed., Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991; Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., *Critical Security Studies*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997; and Mohammed Ayoob, "Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective," in Krause and Williams, 1997, pp. 121-146.

2. One published map of the world emphasizes this particular point. See "World Conflict and Human Rights Map 2001/2002," prepared by PIOOM for IIMCR with the support of the Goals for Americans Foundation, St. Louis, MO, June 2003. It should also be noted that this idea was articulated earlier by Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994, pp. 72-76; and Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy*, New York: Random House, 2000, pp. 3-57.

3. This idea is not new. In the author's opinion, it was best stated by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, in *The Federalist Papers* [1787-1788], New York: Mentor, 1961.

4. Steven Metz and Raymond Millan, *Future Wars/Future Battle Space: The Strategic Role of American Landpower*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, pp. ix, 15-17.

5. Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, *Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definitions, Background, and Strategic Concepts*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, pp. 5-6. Also see Steven Metz, *The Future*



of *Insurgency*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993, pp. 13-15; and Steven Metz and Raymond Millan, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004, p. 15.

6. A very interesting and sobering analysis of this type of conflict may be found in Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999, p. 109.

7. John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, "Drug Cartels, Street Gangs, and Warlords," in Robert J. Bunker, ed., *Nonstate Threats and Future Wars*, London: Frank Cass, 2003, p. 42.

8. Max G. Manwaring, "The New Global Security Landscape: The Road Ahead," *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement*, Winter 2002, pp. 202-204.

9. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*, New York: Basic Books, 2004, p. 28. Also see Max G. Manwaring, *The Inescapable Global Security Arena*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002, p. 7; and Manwaring, "The New Global Security Landscape: The Road Ahead," 2002, pp. 202-204.

10. *Ibid.*

11. One of the first public officials in the United States to suggest this set of issues was a former Secretary of the Navy, Richard Danzig. See "Countering Traumatic Attacks," in Max G. Manwaring, ed., *Deterrence in the 21st Century*, London: Frank Cass, 2001, pp. 89-105.

12. Sullivan and Bunker, 2003, pp. 40-53.

13. FM 90-8, *Counter guerrilla Operations*, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1986.

14. Silvia Aguilar, Vice Minister of Justice, El Salvador, at a U.S. Army War College-Florida International University (USAWC/FIU) conference held at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) entitled "New Security Threats in the Western Hemisphere," Washington, DC, June 29, 2004.

15. Sullivan and Bunker, 2003, pp. 48-49.

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Ibid.*

18. John Mackinlay, "Warlords," *Defence and International Security*, April 1998, pp. 24-32. Also see "Beyond the Logjam: A Doctrine for Complex Emergencies," in Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel, eds., *Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder*, London: Frank Cass, 1998, pp. 114-131.

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.* Also see Oscar Bonilla, "Current Situation of Gangs in El Salvador," unpublished paper for the *Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública*, El Salvador, November 2004; John P. Sullivan, "Third Generation Street Gangs: Turf, Cartels and Net Warriors," *Transnational Organized Crime*, Autumn 1997, p. 106; John P. Sullivan, "Urban Gangs Evolving as Criminal Netwar Actors," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Spring 2000, pp. 82-106; and Luis Bitencourt, "Brazil's Growing Urban Insecurity: Is It a Threat to Brazilian Democracy?" unpublished paper, nd.

21. Note: *Mara* is slang for "gang" and comes from a type of ant in Central America known for its ferocity. *Trucha* is literally a "trout" but is slang for a "shrewd Salvadoran." Thus, *Mara Salvatrucha* is a gang of shrewd Salvadorans.

22. See Bonilla, 2004; Ana Arana, "The New Battle for Central America," *Foreign Affairs*, November-December 2001, pp. 88-101; and Ana Arana, unpublished paper written for the author, October 2004.

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Panama News*, January 11, 2005.

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.* Also see Silvia Aguilar, 2004; John P. Sullivan, "Urban Gangs Evolving as Criminal Netwar Actors," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Spring 2000, pp. 82-96; and Max G. Manwaring, *Security in the Americas: Neither Evolution nor Devolution—Impasse*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004.

27. Daniel C. Esty, Jack Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, and Pamela T. Surko, "The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for U.S. Foreign Policy Planning," in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.

28. For greater detail, see Brian Freemantle, *The Fix: Inside the World Drug Trade*, New York: Tom Doherty Associates, Inc., 1986, p. 242.

29. Interview with former U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia Edwin G. Corr in Washington, DC, August 22, 1992.

30. David C. Jordan, *Drug Politics: Dirty Money and Democracies*, Norman, OkL: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999, pp. 132-137.

31. Author Interviews.

32. Sullivan and Bunker, 2003, pp. 45-53.

33. *Ibid.*

34. Liang and Xiangsui, p. 109.
35. Sullivan and Bunker, 2003, p. 42.
36. Esty, *et al.*, 1998; Jordan, 1999.
37. This statement is taken from Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege*, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, p. 1.
38. Anthony T. Bryan, *Transnational Organized Crime: The Caribbean Context*, Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami, The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center Press, 2002; Ivelaw L. Griffith, "Understanding Caribbean Security: Back to Basics and Building Blocks," in *Social & Economic Studies*, March 2004, pp. 1-33; and "El delito como una amenaza geopolítica," *Clarín.com*, 3 de Julio de 2003. Also see Max G. Manwaring, *Security in the Americas: Neither Evolution nor Devolution—Impasse*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004.
39. "Draft Declaration on Security in the Americas," approved by the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States at its regular session, held on October 22, 2003, in Mexico City, Mexico, pp. 1, 3, 8.
40. David Pion-Berlin, "A New Civil-Military Pragmatism in Latin America," unpublished manuscript, nd.
41. *Ibid.*; Francisco Rojas Aravena, "Nuevo contexto de seguridad internacional: nuevos desafíos, nuevas oportunidades?" in Francisco Rojas Aravena, ed., *La seguridad en America Latina pos 11 de Septiembre*, FLACSO-Chile, 2003, pp. 23-43; and author interviews.
42. These keys to security and civil-military relations were advocated in the strongest terms at a Conference on Hemispheric Security held at the University of Miami North-South Center, Coral Gables, FL, February 22-24, 1994; a Conference on Cooperative Security among Central American States, held at the National Defense University, Washington, DC, August 2-3, 1994; and subsequent conferences held at Carlisle, PA, December 10-11, 1998; and in Coral Gables, FL, 2000-04. In each conference, the author was a rapporteur or an organizer.
43. *Ibid.*; and author interviews.
44. These and subsequent assertions are consensus statements, based on a series of author interviews with more than 160 senior U.S. and Latin American officials and journalists. These interviews were conducted from October 1989 through July 1994, September 1996, December 1998, November 2000, February 2001, March 2002, February 2003, and March and August 2004. To allow anonymity for those who have an objection to their names being made public, these are cited as author interviews.

45. *Ibid.*; and Peter A. Lupsha, "The Role of Drugs and Drug Trafficking in the Invisible Wars," in Richard Ward and Harold Smith, eds., *International Terrorism: Operational Issues*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 181; Peter A. Lupsha, "Towards an Etiology of Drug Trafficking and Insurgent Relations: The Phenomenon of Narco-Terrorism," *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice*, Fall 1989, pp. 70-74; and Stephen E. Flynn, *The Transnational Drug Challenge and the New World Order*, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993.

46. *Ibid.*; and William J. Olson, "International Organized Crime: The Silent Threat to Sovereignty," *The Fletcher Forum*, Summer/Fall 1997, pp. 75-78; and Roy Godson and William J. Olson, "International Organized Crime," *Society*, January/February 1995, pp. 18-29.

47. *Ibid.*; Jordan, 1999; and Max G. Manwaring, "Security of the Western Hemisphere: International Terrorism and Organized Crime," *Strategic Forum*, April 1998, pp. 2-5.

48. Olson, 1997, pp. 69-70.

49. John le Carré, *The Constant Gardener*, New York: Scribner, 2001, p. 137.

50. Esty, *et al.*, 1998.

51. *Ibid.*

52. Ana Maria Bejarano and Eduardo Pizarro, "Colombia: A Failing State?" *ReVista: Harvard Review of Latin America*, Spring 2003, pp. 1-6.

53. *Ibid.*; Esty, *et al.*, 1998; Jordan, 1999; Olson, 1997; and author interviews.

54. Robert H. Dorff, "Strategy, Grand Strategy, and the Search for Strategy," in Max G. Manwaring, Edwin G. Corr, and Robert H. Dorff, *The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-first Century*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003, pp. 127-140.

55. This observation was made by former Secretary of State George P. Shultz in an address before the Low-intensity Warfare Conference at the National Defense University on January 15, 1986, in Washington, DC.

56. Jordan, 1999, p. 19.

57. Arana, "The New Battle for Central America," *Foreign Affairs*, November-December 2001, pp. 88-101; Ana Arana, unpublished paper written for the author, October 2004; and author interviews.

58. *Ibid.*

59. Jordan, 1999, p. 21.

60. Sullivan and Bunker, 2003, pp. 47-48.

61. Esty, *et al.*, 1998.
62. Arana, 2001; Arana, 2004; and author interviews.
63. *Ibid.*
64. Author interviews and observations.
65. Author interview with General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, Ret., former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, June 22, 2001, in Washington, DC.
66. While it does not show many of the problems that Kaplan points up, one published map does emphasize this particular point. See "World Conflict and Human Rights Map 2001/2002," prepared by Berto Jongman with the support of the Goals for Americans Foundation, St. Louis, June 2003; *The State of the World Atlas*, 1997; and website for *Genocide Watch.com*, Dr. Greg Stanton, among other sources. Also see Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994, pp. 72-76; and Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy*, New York: Random House, 2000, pp. 3-57.
67. Esty. *et al.*, 1998; Jordan, 1999; and author interviews.
68. *Ibid.*; and Chester A. Crocker, "Engaging Failed States," *Foreign Affairs*, September-October 2003, pp. 32-44.
69. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, [1832, 1873] 1976, p. 596.
70. Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel, "Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Toward a New Analytical Approach," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Winter 1992, pp. 282-282.
71. *Ibid.*
72. Clausewitz, 1976, pp. 595-596.
73. See, as examples, Max G. Manwaring, "An Interview with General John R. Galvin, U.S. Army, Ret.," former NATO Commander and Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, August 6, 1997, in Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel, eds., *Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder*, London: Frank Cass, 1998, pp. 1-11; Max G. Manwaring, "Peace and Stability Lessons from Bosnia," *Parameters*, Winter 1998-99, pp. 28-38; Max G. Manwaring, "The U.S. Army Experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Challenges for Now and the Future," in Anthony James Joes, ed., *Saving Democracies: U.S. Intervention in Threatened Democratic States*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999, pp. 81-92; and author interviews.
74. *Ibid.*
75. *Ibid.*