TRAIL OF BITS

Introduction

Holistic ML Threat Models

Model security is all you need

- **Common strategy**
  - Augment standard threat models with model-level attacks
- **Misguided approach**
  - Agnostic to the inner workings of ML models
  - Misses the interplay between model and non-ML vulnerabilities
- **Leads to design flaws**

About me

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Threat modeling is a form of risk assessment that **models aspects of the attack and defense sides** of a particular logical entity [...] – NIST SP 800-53

AI model vulnerabilities: prompt injections



Adapted from GPTFUZZER: Red Teaming Large Language Models with Auto-Generated Jailbreak Prompts, 2023

~~Model security is all you need~~

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

TL;DR

ML threat models are complex

Because ML is complex, we need to address:

1. **The ML threat model concept**
2. **The ML supply chain**
3. **ML math and the ML ecosystem**



Component interactions in ML systems

- **Model vulnerabilities can also threaten systems!**
  - Sponge examples, malicious inputs leading to crashes
- **Emergent risks from system component interactions**

YOLOv7 threat model and code review

- **Academic prototype: not production ready/mature code**
- **Used in production systems with a large user base**
- **Findings: Multiple code execution/command injection**
- **Emergent behavior example: TorchScript differential**



Emergent Behavior: TorchScript differential

- Model **interpreted differently** due to operational edge cases
- Add a malicious module to a pre-trained model
- Attacker obtains a practical **model backdoor**

```
import torch

def foo(x, y):
    return 2 * x + y

traced_foo = torch.jit.trace(foo, (torch.rand(3),
torch.rand(3)))
@torch.jit.script
def bar(x):
    return traced_foo(x, x)
```

ML safety

- Safety typically not a concern of a security threat model
- Can have security consequences
- Safety-informed-security approach in ML threat models
- Anchor the safety evaluation in the business context

The Register

AI hallucinates software packages and devs download them – even if potentially poisoned with malware

Forbes

What Air Canada Lost In 'Remarkable' Lying AI Chatbot Case



Adversaries in ML threat modeling: privacy



The AI/ML life cycle



The ML tech stack

1	Frontend Modeling Framework	DNNs: TensorFlow/Grappler, PyTorch/Autograd Language: Python
2	Deployment Frameworks	APIs: MLFlow, Torch Serve, TensorFlow Serving Edge device: ExecuTorch, TensorFlow Lite
3	Backend ML Compiler	OpenXLA, Apache TVM, OpenAI Triton, Meta's Glow
4	Kernels and Firmware	Libraries: CUDA/cuDNN, OpenCL, Metal Language: C++
5	Hardware	GPU (Nvidia/AMD/Intel), CPU, Google TPU, Apple Neural Engine, Meta MTIA, Tesla Dojo

LeftoverLocals



ML math principles

- Many flaws like hallucinations are inherent to ML model math
- These flaws can't be directly fixed as with other vulnerabilities
- Need to be addressed early at the system design stage

Problem in ecosystem not in chair

- Quickly evolving field
- Limited security awareness
- Data and time constraints

=> ML engineers share models despite vulnerable file formats and untrusted data

Strategies for securing production ML systems

- Evaluate models in **context**: business, security, safety and privacy
- Anticipate **emerging risks** and assess the ML supply chain
- Design systems such that the model is **not a hard failure point**
- Understand and support ML practitioners with **secure options for model and data acquisition**

Useful resources for holistic ML security

- **ML vulnerability research at Trail of Bits**
  - ML hardware
  - ML file formats
- **Industry blogs and talks**
  - Joseph Lucas' Jupyter security work
  - Ariel Herbert Voss - Dont Red Team AI Like a Chump - DEF CON 27 Conference
- **Academic papers**
  - Sponge examples (Ilia Shumailov et al.)
  - Blind backdoors (Eugene Bagdasaryan and Vitaly Shmatikov)

Know ML and its ecosystem to secure ML systems

Discussed today:

1. ML Threat model concept
2. ML Supply chain
3. ML math and ecosystem

Questions?

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