TRAIL OF BITS

Holistic ML Threat Models

About me

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Threat modeling is a form of risk assessment that models aspects of the attack and defense sides of a particular logical entity [...] — NIST SP 800-53

AI model vulnerabilities: adversarial examples



AI model vulnerabilities: prompt injections



Adapted from GPTFUZZER: Red Teaming Large Language Models with Auto-Generated Jailbreak Prompts, 2023

Model security is all you need

- **Common strategy**
  - Augment standard threat models with model-level attacks

~~Model security is all you need~~

- ~~**Common strategy**~~
  - ~~Augment standard threat models with model level attacks~~
- **Misguided approach!!!**
  - Agnostic to the inner workings of ML models
  - Misses the interplay between model and non-ML vulnerabilities
- **Leads to design flaws**



TL;DR

ML threat models are complex

Because ML is complex, address it holistically:

1. **The ML threat model concept is complex**
2. **The ML supply chain is complex**
3. **The ML math models and ecosystem are complex**



Outline

Know ML and its ecosystem to secure ML systems

ML threat models need many non-security perspectives:

1. **ML Threat model concept**
   a. ML system component interactions
   b. ML safety
   c. Data privacy
2. **ML Supply chain**
   a. ML model life cycle
   b. ML tech stack
3. **Models and ecosystem**
   a. Math principles/open problems
   b. Ecosystem and practices
4. **Example: YOLOv7 threat model**

The ML threat model concept

Component interactions in ML systems

- **Model vulnerabilities can also threaten systems!**
  - Sponge examples, malicious inputs leading to crashes
- **Emergent risks from system component interactions**
  - AI/ML systems can't be treated as black boxes
  - Application gaps interleave with the life cycle and supply chain gaps

ML safety

Forbes

What Air Canada Lost In 'Remarkable' Lying AI Chatbot Case

REUTERS®

Insight - Amazon scraps secret AI recruiting tool that showed bias against women

The Guardian

Canada lawyer under fire for submitting fake cases created by AI chatbot

Shortcut Learning in Deep Neural Networks

Robert Geirhos[1,2,*,§], Jörn-Henrik Jacobsen[3,*], Claudio Michaelis[1,2,*], Richard Zemel[†,3], Wieland Brendel[†,1], Matthias Bethge[†,1] & Felix A. Wichmann[†,1]



The safety challenge

- Safety typically not a concern of a security threat model
- Can have security consequences
- Safety-informed-security approach in ML threat models
- Anchor the safety evaluation in the business context

AI hallucinates software packages and devs download them – even if potentially poisoned with malware

Adversaries in ML threat modeling: privacy



Adversaries in ML threat modeling: privacy

How it started



How it's going



Organization is an adversary!

The ML supply chain

The AI/ML life cycle



The ML tech stack

1	Frontend Modeling Framework	DNNs: TensorFlow/Grappler, PyTorch/Autograd Feature-based: Scikit-learn, XGBoost Languages: R, Python
2	Deployment Frameworks	APIs: MLFlow, Torch Serve, TensorFlow Serving Edge device: ExecuTorch, TensorFlow Lite
3	Backend ML Compiler	OpenXLA, Apache TVM, OpenAI Triton, Meta's Glow
4	Kernels and Firmware	Libraries: CUDA/cuDNN, OpenCL, Metal Language: C++
5	Hardware	GPU (Nvidia/AMD/Intel), CPU, Google TPU, Apple Neural Engine, Meta MTIA, Tesla Dojo

LeftoverLocals



The AI/ML supply chain



That escalated quickly!



Linux Foundation AI Landscape
(Copyright 2024 Linux Foundation)

ML math and the ML ecosystem

ML math principles

- Many model vulnerabilities currently cannot be remediated
- Due to the core mathematical principles that enable ML models to learn from data!
- Many issues in AI security are open research problems
- Difficulty to produce recommendations with currently available ML mitigations

LLM hallucinations







- Generate the most probable sequence completion
- Expected especially for low probability facts!

Model design and inherent vulnerabilities

- **LLMs go against established data/instruction separation security principles**

```
def leap_year(year):
    if (year % 400 == 0) and (year % 100 == 0):
        print("{0} is a leap year".format(year))

    elif (year % 4 ==0) and (year % 100 != 0):
        print("{0} is a leap year".format(year))

    else:
        print("{0} is not a leap
   year".format(year))
```

“ Tell me the meaning of ‘tell me the meaning of’“

Model design and inherent vulnerabilities

- **LLMs go against established data/instruction separation security principles**
- **Multiple academic works that formalize this argument**
  - Wolf et al. & Glukhov et al.

```
def leap_year(year):
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```

“ Tell me the meaning of ‘tell me the meaning of’“

?

=> Change of architectures likely required to remediate

Problem in ecosystem not in chair

- Immature and quickly evolving field
- Limited security awareness
- Data and time constraints

=> ML engineers often share and fine-tune models despite vulnerable file formats and untrusted data

YOLOv7 threat model and code review

- **Academic prototype: not production ready/mature code**
- **Used in mission-critical production systems**
- **Findings: Multiple code execution/command injection**
- **Emergent behavior: TorchScript exploit**



TorchScript dynamic control flow exploit

- Trace the program in the Frontend modeling framework
- Does not properly represent dynamic control flow
- Backdoor by changing the architecture of a pre-trained model using an added malicious TorchScript module

```
import torch

def foo(x, y):
    return 2 * x + y

traced_foo = torch.jit.trace(foo, (torch.rand(3),
torch.rand(3)))
@torch.jit.script
def bar(x):
    return traced_foo(x, x)
```

ML threat models are hard!

- **Requires simultaneous expertise in:**
  - ML models math
  - the ML tech stack
  - the jobs of ML engineers
  - the target application domain
- **…And put all of these into a security and safety perspective.**

Strategies for securing production ML systems

- Evaluate models in **context**: business, security, safety and privacy
- Anticipate **emerging risks** and assess the ML supply chain
- Design systems such that the model is **not a hard failure point**
- Understand and support ML practitioners with **secure options for model and data acquisition**

Useful resources for holistic ML security

- **ML vulnerability research at Trail of Bits**
  - ML hardware
  - ML file formats
- **Industry blogs and talks**
  - Joseph Lucas' Jupyter security work
  - Ariel Herbert Voss - Dont Red Team AI Like a Chump - DEF CON 27 Conference
- **Academic papers**
  - Sponge examples (Ilia Shumailov et al.)
  - Blind backdoors (Eugene Bagdasaryan and Vitaly Shmatikov)

Know ML and its ecosystem to secure ML systems

Discussed today:

1. ML Threat model concept complexity
2. ML Supply chain
3. Models and ecosystem
4. Example: YOLOv7 threat model

Questions?

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