



# **A Few Things**

QUIC Interim, Kista, June 2018

# Stateless Reset Oracles


Server loses state

Or there is a change in route

Packet arrives

Server sends a stateless reset

If an attacker can send a packet toward a server that doesn't have state, it gets a stateless reset that the client will accept



## Simple fix

Advise that configuring a cluster with a shared stateless reset key requires ensuring that routing uses connection ID

...and nothing that an attacker might control, such as source IP address or network location

## Better fix?

Add proof of receipt to the stateless reset?

Simple change:

- last 16 octets is the stateless reset token
- preceding 16 octets is the last 16 octets of the packet that triggered the reset

Problems:

- endpoints probably don't remember packet ciphertext
- man on the side wins

## Better, better fix?

Stateless reset is formed from:

- last 16 octets is  $H(\text{token})$
- preceding 16 octets is  $H(\text{token} || \text{last 16 octets of received})$

Defends against on-path attacker who never learns token

Doesn't fix the remembering issue though, but endpoints that don't remember can verify, like with RFC 5961

# Implicit Open (#1342)

Yes

Consistent order of opening on both sides

No gaps

Can write on bidirectional streams that are "skipped"

No

Just use identifiers

More code?



Can't write on bidirectional streams that are "skipped"

# Our oldest issue



## #58 - Frame Type Extensibility

No shortage of choices

1. Extension frame that embeds a type field
2. Registry for remaining types
3. Registry for remaining types + varint frame type
4. Each endpoint advertises frame types it accepts as a pair of type+semantic with (16+ bit) registry for semantics
5. Attach a list of frame types to every transport parameter, listing the frame types used



# Stated principles

Extension use needs to be negotiated

All extensions should have access to a one octet encoding

- not just standard ones
- this rules out 1, 2, and 3

So, if we agree that these are desirable properties,

...can we choose from the drawbacks of 4 and 5?

## Pick the least-worst

### Against 4

An extension that has parameters and frames uses two transport parameters and has two registrations

### Against 5

A transport parameter that isn't associated with the use of extension frames carries an empty list of frame types

Observation: extensions that want confidential negotiation can't use transport parameters anyway

# Negotiating Packet Number Protection (#1296)

Goal: disable packet number protection when it isn't needed

Goal (?): have servers (only) make this decision

Options:

1. Transport parameter
2. New version

Both workable, but with transport parameters, the Initial and Handshake can't be fixed\*\*

Clients could be forced to offer either, so servers can choose