



BigTime Analysis Report

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DAMOCLES LABS

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一、 Summary

BigTime was launched with its token on October 10, 2023, sparking a GameFi frenzy. Our team has been following BigTime since September, but due to lack of eligibility, we were unable to conduct an analysis. After the recent reduction in registration requirements, we began a series of security analysis and testing on BigTime, including testing for game client attribute tampering, malicious GameRPC invocation, and token contract auditing. Through an overall evaluation of the game, we found that its security is poor, with low cheating costs for malicious players and low difficulty in analyzing the game. If the project team intends to sustain the game's operation, prioritizing the improvement of game security and fairness should be paramount.

二、 Game Background

- Game Version: v0.28-CL#78459
- Genres & Engine: MMORPG, UE4.27
- Possible Issues in Gameplay:
 - Illegal Movement (malicious packet manipulation through RPC for teleportation, speed hacks, etc.)
 - Speed Hacks (manipulation of in-game world time and UE framework time functions)
 - One-Button Combos/Looping Skills
 - NFT Forging Speedup


- NFT Random Number Manipulation
- Multiple Settlements after Dungeon Completion

三、 Game Security Analysis

Game Code Protection:

Process Analysis:

1. Since different game engines have different analysis modes, it is necessary to determine the engine used by the game after obtaining the game EXE. By identifying the basic information of the game, we can confirm that the game was developed using UE4.27.2.



- After importing the game into IDA, it was observed that the game code was not obfuscated. Additionally, by utilizing feature code search specific to UE4.27, the GWorld variable could be quickly located.

```

ext:00000001407FD33D F3 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
ext:00000001407FD345 0F C9
ext:00000001407FD348 0F C9
ext:00000001407FD348 7D D0
ext:00000001407FD34D 4 3 3
ext:00000001407FD354 4 D
ext:00000001407FD357 7 B
ext:00000001407FD359 4 B
ext:00000001407FD35C 1 2
ext:00000001407FD35E 48 8P

movss xmm0, cs:dword_1407FD35E
xorps xmm1, xmm1
ucomiss xmm0, xmm1
jz short loc_1407FD35E
mov rbx, cs:Global_GWorld
test rbx, rbx
jz short loc_1407FD35E
mov r8b, 1
xor edx, edx
mov rcx, rbx

```

```

164 }
165 LOBYTE(v11) = dword_145ABC768 != 0;
166 sub_141847220(v12, v11);
167 if ( dword_145ABCF88 )
168     sub_143221300();
169 nullsub_2();
170 v17 = *(int *) (a1 + 3136);
171 v18 = 0;
172 LOBYTE(v3) = 0;
173 v68 = 0164;
174 v19 = 0164;
175 LODWORD(v70) = v3;
176 if ( (int)v17 > 0 )
177 {
178     v20 = *(_QWORD *) (a1 + 3128);
179     v21 = 0164;
180     while ( *(_QWORD *) (v20 + 640164) != Global_GWorld )
181     {
182         v19 = (unsigned int)(v19 + 1);
183         ++v21;
184         v20 += 8164;
185         if ( v21 >= v17 )
186             goto LABEL_37;
187     }
188     v68 = *(_QWORD *) (v20 + 640164) + 8164 * (int)v19 + 176164;
189 LABEL_37:
190     v22 = 0;
191     v23 = 0164;
192     v76 = 0;
193     v77[0] = 0164;
194     do
195     {
196         v24 = *(_QWORD *) (v23 + *(_QWORD *) (a1 + 3128));
197         v25 = *(_QWORD *) (v24 + 0x280);
198         if ( v25 && *(_BYTE *) (v25 + 270) & 0x10 != 0 )
199         {
200             Global_GWorld = *(_QWORD *) (v24 + 0x280);
201             (*void (__fastcall *) (__int64, __int64, __int64, __int64)) (*_QWORD *) a1 + 1112164)(a1, v24, v21, v19);
202             if ( !v4 )
203                 sub_143305290(*(_QWORD *) (v24 + 640), 2164);
204             if ( !byte_145869BC1 && (unsigned __int0) sub_143679E50(*(_QWORD *) (v24 + 640)) )
205             {
206                 sub_14318AF08(*(_QWORD *) (v24 + 640));
207                 sub_143182A50(*(_QWORD *) (v24 + 640), 0164, 0164, 0164);
208             }
209             v26 = *(_QWORD *) (v24 + 640);
210             v27 = *(_BYTE *) (v26 + 267);
211             if ( (v27 & 1) != 0 )
212             {
213                 *(_BYTE *) (v26 + 267) = v27 & 0xF5;
214                 v28 = *(_QWORD *) sub_14365E540(v24 + 208, L"causeevent=", 0164);
215                 if ( *(_QWORD *) (v24 + 536) )
216                     v29 = sub_14323AAA0();
217                 else
218                     v29 = 0164;
219                 v71 = v29;
220                 if ( v28 && v29 )
221                 {
222                     v66 = 0164;
223                     v67 = 0164;
224                     sub_140800400(&v66, 12164);
225                     v36 = HIDWORD(v67);

```

Furthermore, it was also observed that the strings within the game were not encrypted.

```

rdata:00000000 C ComboNumber
rdata:00000001 C hIsComboFinisher
rdata:000000016 C PerComboHitDamageMult
rdata:000000017 C PerComboHitDamageTypes
rdata:000000018 C EndComboTriggeringState
rdata:00000001A C StartComboTriggeringState
rdata:000000024 C EETS_WeaponState: CAN_TRIGGER_COMBO
rdata:000000026 C ComboAnimTags
rdata:000000013 C ComboWayAnimTags
rdata:00000000C C ComboUIData
rdata:00000000E C TGComboUIData
rdata:000000029 C PerComboHitGASConfigGetForanMleeeOwner
rdata:000000025 C PerComboAnimateScaleModfierToOwner
rdata:000000012 C FinisherComboIcon
rdata:00000002C C FloatingTextDamageModifiers: ComboFinisher
rdata:000000018 C GetMainPrimaryComboAnim
rdata:000000011 C IncrementComboID
rdata:000000011 C IsOnLastComboIdx
rdata:00000000B C ResetComboID
rdata:000000016 C ToClient_ResetComboID
rdata:00000000B C ComboIndex
rdata:000000018 C ComboIndex_ForDmgSweeps
rdata:000000009 C ComboId
rdata:000000018 C GetComboFinisherCondOverride
rdata:000000012 C ComboArrow
rdata:00000000C C ComboButton
rdata:000000009 C ComboBox
rdata:00000001B C MessageEditingComboButton
rdata:000000015 C EditTableComboBox Add
rdata:000000018 C EditTableComboBox Delete
rdata:000000018 C EditTableComboBox Rename
rdata:000000018 C EditTableComboBox Accept
rdata:000000029 C ToolBar_SteelBarComboButtonLock Padding
rdata:00000002E C ToolBar_SteelBarComboButtonLock Padding
rdata:000000033 C ToolBar_SteelBarComboButtonLock ComboButton Color
rdata:000000026 C Menu_SteelBarComboButtonLock Padding
rdata:000000029 C Menu_SteelBarComboButtonLock Padding
rdata:000000030 C Menu_SteelBarComboButtonLock ComboButton Color
rdata:000000011 C ComboButtonStyle
rdata:00000000E C ComboBoxStyle
rdata:000000017 C MenuPlacement_ComboBox
rdata:00000001C C MenuPlacement_ComboBoxRight
rdata:00000000B C ComboButton
rdata:000000008 C E:\Jenkins\TimeGame_LiveBuild\workspace\Engine\Source\Runtime\Slat...
rdata:000000021 C SComboBoxC_TShareDPtr(QString) >
rdata:000000005 C E:\Jenkins\TimeGame_LiveBuild\workspace\Engine\Source\Runtime...
rdata:00000000F C SComboListType
rdata:000000016 C SComboListOptInType
rdata:000000024 C DMultiBlockType: ToolBarComboButton
rdata:000000062 C E:\Jenkins\TimeGame_LiveBuild\workspace\Engine\Source\Runtime\UM5...
rdata:000000014 C SComboBox(UObject)
rdata:000000068 C E:\Jenkins\TimeGame_LiveBuild\workspace\Engine\Source\Runtime\UM5...

```

Therefore, with the confirmation that the GWorld variable can be located through feature code and the absence of encryption in the game, it is possible to extract the NamePool feature code and use SDK dumping tools for dumping.

```

2861 char pad_258[0x3]; // 0x258(0x03)
2862
2863 void UpdateMiniMapTexture(); // Function TimeGame.TG_LevelAnchor.UpdateMiniMapTexture // (Final|Native|Public|BlueprintCallable) // @
2864 bool CaptureMiniMapNavTexture(struct UWorld* World, struct UTexture2D*& out_Texture, struct FBox& out_LocalSpaceMapBounds); // Functio
2865
2866 // Class TimeGame.TG_LocalPlayer
2867 // Size: 0x280 (Inherited: 0x258)
2868 struct UTG_LocalPlayer : UBTLS_LocalPlayer {
2869     char pad_258[0x28]; // 0x258(0x28)
2870 };
2871
2872 // Class TimeGame.TG_MeleeWeaponBase
2873 // Size: 0x508 (Inherited: 0x248)
2874 struct ATG_MeleeWeaponBase : ABTS_MeleeWeaponBase {
2875     char pad_248[0x60]; // 0x248(0x60)
2876     struct UTG_SkillFreeComponent* MySkillFreeComp; // 0x308(0x08)
2877     struct FTGInventoryHandle MyInventoryData; // 0x318(0x18)
2878     struct UBTLS_AbilitySystemComponent* AbilitySystemComponent; // 0x4b8(0x08)
2879     struct UTG_InventoryItemAttributeSet* AttributeSet; // 0x4c8(0x08)
2880     int32_t ComboIndex; // 0x4d8(0x04)
2881     int32_t ComboIndex_ForDmgSweeps; // 0x4dc(0x04)
2882     bool DamagedSomethingThisSwing; // 0x4e0(0x01)
2883     bool HitsSomethingThisSwing; // 0x4d1(0x01)
2884     char pad_4D2[0x6]; // 0x4d2(0x06)
2885     struct USkeletalMeshComponent* SkelMeshComp; // 0x4d8(0x08)
2886     bool OnEquipmentCalled; // 0x4e0(0x01)
2887     char pad_4E1[0x7]; // 0x4e1(0x07)
2888     struct FSweepParameters ActiveSweepParameters; // 0x4e8(0x68)
2889     struct TArray<struct UMeshComponent*> SecondaryMeshesToCleanUp; // 0x550(0x18)
2890
2891     void ToClient_ResetComboID(bool AlsoResetDmgTypeIndex); // Function TimeGame.TG_MeleeWeaponBase.ToClient_ResetComboID // (Net|NetRelia
2892     void ResetComboID(bool AlsoResetDmgTypeIndex); // Function TimeGame.TG_MeleeWeaponBase.ResetComboID // (Final|Native|Public|BlueprintC
2893     void OnRep_MyInventoryData(); // Function TimeGame.TG_MeleeWeaponBase.OnRep_MyInventoryData // (Native|Public) // @ game+0x1779208
2894     void K2_OnEquipped(struct ABTS_CharacterBase* Wearer); // Function TimeGame.TG_MeleeWeaponBase.K2_OnEquipped // (Event|Public|Blueprint
2895     bool IsSocketUnlocked(int32_t SocketIdx); // Function TimeGame.TG_MeleeWeaponBase.IsSocketUnlocked // (Final|Native|Public|BlueprintCa
2896     bool IsOnLastComboIdx(); // Function TimeGame.TG_MeleeWeaponBase.IsOnLastComboIdx // (Final|Native|Public|BlueprintCallable|Blueprint
2897     void IncrementComboID(); // Function TimeGame.TG_MeleeWeaponBase.IncrementComboID // (Final|Native|Public|BlueprintCallable) // @ game
2898     struct FTGWeaponData GetWeaponData(); // Function TimeGame.TG_MeleeWeaponBase.GetWeaponData // (Final|Native|Public|BlueprintCallable)
2899     void GetTargetLockOnDistances(float& out_AcquiredDist, float& out_DesiredDist); // Function TimeGame.TG_MeleeWeaponBase.GetTargetLockOn
2900     int32_t GetNumPrimaryComboAnims(); // Function TimeGame.TG_MeleeWeaponBase.GetNumPrimaryComboAnims // (Final|Native|Public|BlueprintCa
2901     struct FTGInventoryHandle GetMyInventoryHandle(); // Function TimeGame.TG_MeleeWeaponBase.GetMyInventoryHandle // (Native|Public|Blueprint

```

Once you have obtained the game SDK, it can expedite the analysis process.

Analysis of conclusion:

Based on the analysis, it is evident that BigTime has scored 0 in terms of game code protection. The game lacks any form of protection, such as custom encryption or code obfuscation, traditionally employed in games to safeguard their source code. The absence of robust code protection in BigTime lowers the barrier and cost for malicious players to analyze the game's code. This increases the risk of unfair advantages for players using cheats or hacks, which can significantly impact the game's economy.


The lack of code protection not only compromises the fairness of the game but also poses potential risks to the game's economic model. Without proper safeguards, malicious players can easily exploit vulnerabilities, manipulate game mechanics, or disrupt the balance of in-game resources. This can undermine the overall gameplay experience for legitimate players and damage the integrity of the game's economy.

To address these issues, it is crucial for the development team behind BigTime to implement robust code protection mechanisms. These measures can include code obfuscation, encryption, anti-tampering techniques, and other security measures to make it more challenging for malicious players to analyze and manipulate the game's code. By enhancing code protection, the game can provide a fairer and more secure environment for all players and mitigate potential risks to its economy.

Game Basic Anti-Cheat:

Process Analysis:

1. In terms of basic anti-cheat detection, we primarily conducted tests in two areas: anti-debugging and read/write protection.
2. While the game was running, we attempted to attach Cheat Engine (CE) and set breakpoints on common functions. However, we observed that the game did not terminate or display any error messages, indicating a lack of anti-debugging measures.



The screenshot shows the Memory Viewer tool with the following details:

- Current Thread:** 6CCC
- Function:** USER32.GetKeyState
- Registers:**
 - RAX: 0000000000000000
 - RBX: 00000195F5A713C0
 - RCX: 0000000000000014
 - RDX: 0000000000000000
 - RSI: 00000195F5A713C0
 - RDI: 0000000000000000
 - RBP: 0000009345F7DE99
 - RSP: 0000009345F7DDA8
 - R8: 0000009345F7DD78
 - R9: 0000009345F7DE99
 - R10: 0000000000000000
 - R11: 0000000000000246
 - R12: 0000000000000000
 - R13: 000001958298B980
 - R14: 0000000000000000
 - R15: 0000000000000006
 - RIP: 00007FF8E9D9FE100
- Segment Registers:**
 - CS: 0033
 - SS: 002B
 - DS: 002B
 - ES: 002B
 - FS: 0053
 - GS: 002B
- Assembly Code:**

```


40 53          push    rbx
48 83 EC 20    sub     rsp,20
65 48 8B 04 25 300000... mov     rax,gs:[00000030]
8B D9         mov     ebx,ecx
48 83 78 78 00 cmp     qword ptr [rax+78],00
0F84 52550200 je      USER32.SetWindowsHookExAW+DD3E
83 FB 20      cmp     ebx,20
72 1D        jbe     USER32.GetKeyState+3E
8B CB        mov     ecx,ebx
48 FF 15 CE3C0700 call    qword ptr [USER32.gapfnScSendMessage->win32u.NtUserGetKey
0F1F 44 00 00 nop     dword ptr [rax+rax+00]
44 0FB7 C8    movzx   r9d,ax
41 0FB7 C1    movzx   eax,r9w
48 83 C4 20    add     rsp,20
5B          pop     rbx
C3          ret
CC          int     3
65 4C 8B 04 25 300000... mov     r8,gs:[00000030]
48 8B 05 1A410900 mov     rax,[USER32.dll+B2268]
8B 88 4B1B0000 mov     ecx,[rax+00001B48]

```
- Return Address and Parameters:**
 - Return Address: TimeGameClient-Win64-Shipping.exe+1BA4048
 - Parameters: F5A713C0,00000000,00000000,F5A713C0

3. We attempted to modify the in-game Health value using Cheat Engine (CE) and found that the modifications took effect without triggering any pop-up windows or notifications from the game. It's important to note that modifying the Health value in this manner is only for visual

purposes, as the actual Health value is typically stored on the server.

Therefore, any local modifications would not have any actual impact on the gameplay.




Analysis of conclusion:

1. Based on the assessment, BigTime scores 0 in terms of anti-cheat capabilities, indicating that it lacks effective measures to prevent cheating. This means that malicious users can exploit the game and engage in cheating activities without significant obstacles.
2. The reason for focusing on testing anti-debugging and read/write protection is that these two aspects are fundamental to cheat detection. For most cheat programs, data manipulation and functionality implementation can be achieved through debugging and memory read/write operations. If the basic protections in these two areas are absent, other detection methods such as injection and hooking become less meaningful or effective in preventing cheats.

Game Logic Issues

Process Analysis:


For MMO games developed using the Unreal Engine (UE), the potential benefits of tampering with local data are typically low due to the presence of robust synchronization mechanisms. These mechanisms are designed to synchronize various Actors and their attributes, as well as perform server-side validation. However, upon analyzing the source code of BigTime, it is evident that the game has not effectively implemented attribute synchronization mechanisms. Some data, such as the Combo Index feature, appears to be stored locally, allowing for potential manipulation. By setting breakpoints on the write functions related to the Combo Index and analyzing the code, it is possible to debug and manipulate the combo functionality. (Due to the specific operation will affect the fairness, so we do not demonstrate)



```

1  int64 __fastcall sub_141684550(__int64 a1)
2  {
3      int v2; // ebx
4      __int64 result; // rax
5      __int64 v4; // rbx
6      __int64 v5; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-20h] BYREF
7      __int64 v6; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-20h] BYREF
8      __int64 v7; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-10h] BYREF
9      __int64 v8; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-10h] BYREF
10
11     v5 = 0i64;
12     v6 = 0i64;
13     sub_140800400(&v5, 10i64);
14     LODWORD(v6) = v6 + 10;
15     if ( (int)v6 > SHDWORD(v6) )
16     {
17         sub_14080CFE0(&v5);
18         sub_140866820(v5, 10, (unsigned int)"Blueprint", 10, 63);
19         v2 = *(_DWORD *) (a1 + 1224) + 1;
20         *(_DWORD *) (a1 + 1224) = v2;
21         result = sub_141670350(a1);
22         if ( v2 >= *(_DWORD *) (result + 2048) )
23         {
24             v7 = 0i64;
25             v8 = 0i64;
26             sub_140800400(&v7, 0i64);
27             LODWORD(v8) = v8 + 9;
28             if ( (int)v8 > SHDWORD(v8) )
29             {
30                 sub_14080CFE0(&v7);
31                 v4 = v7;
32                 sub_140866820(v7, 9, (unsigned int)"Roller", 9, 63);
33                 *(_DWORD *) (a1 + 1224) = 0;
34                 result = *(__int64 *) (__fastcall *) (__int64) (*(_DWORD *) (a1 + 1224) + 1);
35                 if ( (BYTE)result )
36                 {
37                     result = sub_1417889E0(a1, 0i64);
38                     if ( v4 )
39                     {
40                         result = sub_141855700(v4);
41                     }
42                 }
43                 if ( v5 )
44                 {
45                     result = sub_141855700(v5);
46                 }
47             }
48             return result;
49         }
50     }
51 }

```



Analysis of conclusion:

1. In terms of overall game logic security, BigTime doesn't have significant vulnerabilities. However, there are still some security risks present, leading to a logic security score of 4 out of 10..
2. It is advisable to focus on implementing server-side encryption for sensitive attributes that lack synchronization mechanisms. By shifting the responsibility of encryption to the server, the game can enhance security and mitigate the risk of data tampering or unauthorized modifications.

Game RPC Analysis

Due to the sensitivity of RPC, the analysis is not carried out for lack of project authorization. The BigTime RPC security protection is currently 0, and for some RPC packages tested and found to be accepted by the server, the security rating

View 1 minute 0 seconds / 1

WEB3 Security Analysis:

Summary:

BigTime, as a blockchain game, can be divided into two parts in terms of Web3 design: the foundational BigTime token component and the in-game Web3 economic system component. This design is relatively separate compared to other games. The in-game component is responsible for token generation and NFT forging, while a fixed-circulation token contract is deployed on the Ethereum network.

Token Contract Security Analysis:

Token base information as below:

Address	0x64Bc2cA1Be492bE7185FAA2c8835d9b824c8a194
Symbol	BIGTIME
Owner	0xc3322716475fba83bfc057112247a43f1a1f2c4c(GnosisSafe)
TotalSupply	5,000,000,000

File 5 of 5 : BigTimeToken.sol

```
1 //SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicense
2 pragma solidity 0.8.4;
3
4 import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol";
5
6 contract BigTimeToken is ERC20 {
7     constructor(
8         string memory _name,
9         string memory _symbol,
10        uint _totalSupply,
11        address _owner
12    ) ERC20(_name, _symbol) {
13        _mint(_owner, _totalSupply * 10 ** decimals());
14    }
15 }
```

The BigTime token contract utilizes a multi-signature wallet to mint tokens and then deploys them with a fixed supply. Due to the simplicity of the current token

contract's functionality, the basic security of the contract is considered sufficient. By observing the transaction information of the Owner wallet, it can be seen that after acquiring the tokens, the Owner wallet transferred a portion of the tokens to several other wallets.

Latest 7 ERC-20 Token Transfer Events

Txn Hash	Method	Age	From	To	Value	Token
0xc751dc512ae532e1...	Exact Input V...	22 days 47 mins ago	Uniswap V2: BABYBigT...	0xC33227...1A1F2c4C	96,952,022.7685365	ERC-20: BAB...ime
0xb020bc506679a69f5...	Exec Transact...	24 days 7 hrs ago	0xC33227...1A1F2c4C	0x46950B...E1fd7D37	500,000,000	Big Time (BIGTIM...)
0x143212da4904b110...	Exec Transact...	27 days 12 hrs ago	0x549AD7...eF5AC1F5	0xC33227...1A1F2c4C	100	Big Time (BIGTIM...)
0x2ea518f26b17d3f9a...	Exec Transact...	27 days 21 hrs ago	0xC33227...1A1F2c4C	0x46950B...E1fd7D37	100	Big Time (BIGTIM...)
0x328624a5be5f0f736...	Exec Transact...	41 days 15 hrs ago	0xC33227...1A1F2c4C	0x549AD7...eF5AC1F5	500,000,000	Big Time (BIGTIM...)
0xb427253ccfb7c04a...	Exec Transact...	41 days 15 hrs ago	0xC33227...1A1F2c4C	0x772f5e...4c7f998A	65,000,000	Big Time (BIGTIM...)
0x8115989a2546c700...	0x60806040	48 days 5 hrs ago	Null: 0x000...000	0xC33227...1A1F2c4C	5,000,000,000	Big Time (BIGTIM...)

Most of these wallets are using Safe multi-signature wallets. Based on this, it can be observed that the overall security risks associated with the token mainly come from private key leaks and whether the project team has privileged accounts. Although multi-signature wallets are used, there is still a certain risk of funds being stolen if there is a leakage of the private key of a privileged account.

Game Economy System Security Analysis:

In BigTime, players can enter the space of the Time Guardians to forge time hourglasses, charge them, and perform other actions that directly affect market balance. Some of this functionality is executed locally, although it is unclear how the game server (GS) is designed. However, this behavior is considered high-risk.

```

ristrator\Downloads\UnrealDumper-4.25-main\bin\Debug\Games\TimeGameClient-Win64-Shipping\DUMP\BP_StoryUIComponent_classes.h
void SpawnTestEncounter(struct FDataTableRowHandle Data, int32_t EnemyLevel); // Function BP_StoryUIComponent.BP_StoryUIComponent_C.Spawn
void SpawnTestEnemy(struct FDataTableRowHandle Data, int32_t EnemyLevel, int32_t EnemyAmount); // Function BP_StoryUIComponent.BP_StoryUIComponent_C.Spawn
void Server_CompleteObjective(); // Function BP_StoryUIComponent.BP_StoryUIComponent_C.Server_CompleteObjective // (Net|NetReliableNetServer)
void Server_DoOtherNamedAction(struct FString ActionString); // Function BP_StoryUIComponent.BP_StoryUIComponent_C.Server_DoOtherNamedAction
void Server_DialogueOptionChosen(struct AActor* DialogSource, int32_t Index); // Function BP_StoryUIComponent.BP_StoryUIComponent_C.Server
void GiveReward(float XPAmount, struct TArray<struct FTGItemGrantDatum>& Rewards); // Function BP_StoryUIComponent.BP_StoryUIComponent_C.GiveReward
void ShowVendorInventory(); // Function BP_StoryUIComponent.BP_StoryUIComponent_C.ShowVendorInventory // (Net|NetReliableNetServer|BlueprintCallable)
void TriggerQuestEvent(struct APawn* Instigator, struct FGameplayTag EventTag); // Function BP_StoryUIComponent.BP_StoryUIComponent_C.TriggerQuestEvent
void BeginQuest(struct UBTS_QuestDataBase* QuestData, struct ABTS_PlayerControllerBase* Player); // Function BP_StoryUIComponent.BP_StoryUIComponent_C.BeginQuest

```

```
void OnServer_FinishCraft(struct ATG_CraftingTable_NFWorkshopBase* Workshop, struct FString IDofActiveCraftToFinish); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.OnServer_FinishCraft // (Net)NativePublic[Blueprint]
void StartDeferredDLCurrencyBackendUpdate(); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.StartDeferredDLCurrencyBackendUpdate // (Final)NativePublic // @ game+0x1706a0
void StartDeferredDLBackendUpdate(); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.StartDeferredDLBackendUpdate // (Final)NativePublic // @ game+0x1706a0
void SetEquipmentReplicators(struct ATG_PlayerPawn* ForPawn, bool InHasStoredNFData); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.SetEquipmentReplicators // (Final)NativePublic // @ game+0x1706a0
void OnTimePieceChanged(struct UTG_InventorySetComponent* InventoryComp, struct TArray<int32_t*> ModifiedSlotIndexes); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.OnTimePieceChanged // (Final)NativePublic[HasOutParm]
void OnServer_NotifyReceivedOpenLootCurrency(struct FIGNFTOpenLootCurrencyBalanceDatum& CurrencyDatum, struct FIGInventoryItemStorageDatum& InventoryDatum); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.OnServer_NotifyReceivedOpenLootCurrency // (Native)Event[Public]
void OnRep_ShopInventoryComp(); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.OnRep_ShopInventoryComp // (Final)NativePublic // @ game+0x170620
void OnRep_ItemChildInventories(); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.OnRep_ItemChildInventories // (Final)NativePublic // @ game+0x170630
void OnRep_HeldSPACEInventoryComp(); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.OnRep_HeldSPACEInventoryComp // (Final)NativePublic // @ game+0x170620
void OnRep_HeldDECIInventoryComp(); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.OnRep_HeldDECIInventoryComp // (Final)NativePublic // @ game+0x170620
void OnRep_HeldCosmeticsInventoryComp(); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.OnRep_HeldCosmeticsInventoryComp // (Final)NativePublic // @ game+0x170620
void OnFollowerLongerOwnedByPlayer(struct FGuid ItemGUID); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.OnFollowerLongerOwnedByPlayer // (Final)Native[Protected][HasDefaults] // @ game+0x170620
bool OnClient_UpgradeWorkshop(struct ATG_CraftingTable_NFWorkshopBase* Workshop); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.OnClient_UpgradeWorkshop // (Final)NativePublic[BlueprintCallable] // @ game+0x170600
bool OnClient_UnlockRecipeRoll(struct ATG_CraftingTable_NFWorkshopBase* Workshop, struct FString RecipeSlug, int32_t RollIdx); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.OnClient_UnlockRecipeRoll // (Final)NativePublic
bool OnClient_StartCraftAllItemsCost(struct ATG_CraftingTable_NFWorkshopBase* Workshop, struct FString RecipeSlug, struct TArray<struct FIGInventorySlotItemData*> InputItemsToFeedTheRecipe, struct TArray<struct FIGItemData*> OutputItemsToFeedTheRecipe); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.OnClient_StartCraftAllItemsCost // (Final)NativePublic
bool OnClient_StartCraft(struct ATG_CraftingTable_NFWorkshopBase* Workshop, struct FString RecipeSlug, struct TArray<struct FIGInventorySlotItemData*> InputItemsToFeedTheRecipe); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.OnClient_StartCraft // (Final)NativePublic
bool OnClient_SpeedUp(struct ATG_CraftingTable_NFWorkshopBase* Workshop, struct FString IDofActiveCraftToSpeedUp); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.OnClient_SpeedUp // (Final)NativePublic[BlueprintCallable]
bool OnClient_ResetRolls(struct ATG_CraftingTable_NFWorkshopBase* Workshop, struct FString RecipeSlug); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.OnClient_ResetRolls // (Final)NativePublic[BlueprintCallable]
void OnClient_NotifyReceivedOpenLootCurrency(struct FIGNFTOpenLootCurrencyBalanceDatum& CurrencyDatum, struct FIGInventoryItemStorageDatum& InventoryDatum); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.OnClient_NotifyReceivedOpenLootCurrency // (Native)Event[Public]
void OnClient_NotifyReceivedDL(struct FIGNFTItemData NFItemData, struct FIGInventoryItemStorageDatum& InventoryDatum); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.OnClient_NotifyReceivedDL // (Net)NativePublic[Blueprint]
bool OnClient_LockRecipeRoll(struct ATG_CraftingTable_NFWorkshopBase* Workshop, struct FString RecipeSlug, int32_t RollIdx); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.OnClient_LockRecipeRoll // (Final)NativePublic
bool OnClient_GetNewRecipeRolls(struct ATG_CraftingTable_NFWorkshopBase* Workshop, struct FString RecipeSlug); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.OnClient_GetNewRecipeRolls // (Final)NativePublic[Blueprint]
bool OnClient_FinishCraft(struct ATG_CraftingTable_NFWorkshopBase* Workshop, struct FString IDofActiveCraftToFinish); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.OnClient_FinishCraft // (Final)NativePublic[Blueprint]
void OnAllInventoriesReplicated(); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.OnAllInventoriesReplicated // (Event)Public[BlueprintEvent] // @ game+0x170620
bool IsItemEquipable(struct FIGInventoryItemStorageDatum& StorageDatum); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.IsItemEquipable // (Final)NativePublic[HasOutParm][BlueprintCallable][BlueprintPure](const) // @ game+0x170610
bool IsAllowedToChangePocketMatches(); // Function TimeGame_10_PlayerController_InvBase.IsAllowedToChangePocketMatches // (Final)NativePublic[BlueprintCallable][BlueprintPure](const) // @ game+0x170610
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There are many RPC functions similar to this, and considering the high cost of testing, we currently do not perform any security testing. We hope that the project team can exercise strict judgment on this part of the content on the server.

About Damocles

Damocles Labs is a security team established in 2023, focusing on security in the Web3 industry. Their core services include contract code audits, business code audits, penetration testing, GameFi code audits, GameFi vulnerability discovery, GameFi cheat analysis, and GameFi anti-cheat solutions.

Their goal is to make continuous efforts in the Web3 security industry and generate as many analysis reports as possible. They aim to enhance the awareness of GameFi security among project teams and users, as well as promote the overall security development within the industry.