

Abyss World Security Analysis

2024.03.21

Senna

DAMOCLES LABS



Contents

- Summary(Game Security Ratings)
- > Game Background
 - **◆** Game Version
 - **♦** Genres & Engine
 - **♦** Possible Issues In GamePlay
- > Game Security Analysis
 - **♦** Game Code Protection
 - **◆ Game Basic Anti-Cheat**
 - **♦** Game Logic Issues
 - **◆** Game Protocol and Server Analysis
- > Web3 Security Analysis
 - **♦ Token Contract Security Analysis**
 - **◆** Game Economy System Security Analysis
- About Damocles

—、Summary

As an ARPG game, Abyssworld has a security level of 0 on its Client, WebServer, and Game Server. It is vulnerable to RCE (Remote Code Execution), replay attacks on settlement chests, and sensitive information leaks. There is also a risk of arbitrary user email brute-forcing for login and client cheating. However, due to its limited contract functionality, the on-chain risk is relatively low.

Security Rating:

二、 Game Background

- ➤ Game Version: ACT1
- Genres & Engine: ARPG, UE5
- Possible Issues in Gameplay:
 - Unauthorized movement (modifying local character attributes for speed enhancement).
 - Attack doubling
 - Instant teleportation
 - Damage reduction
 - Settlement replay attack
 - Modifying local character attributes such as jumping




三、 Game Security Analysis

Game Code Protection:

Analysis Process:

 Since different engines have different analysis modes, it is important to determine the game engine used after obtaining the game EXE. By analyzing the basic information of the game, we can determine that this game was developed using UE5.



 Using tools to dump the structure of UE (Unreal Engine) characters for fast positioning. Once located, indexing and modification can be done through UE's unique linked list structure.

```
enum class ALS_MovementMode ALS_MovementMode; // 0x7d7(0x01)
enum class ALS_MovementMode ALS_PrevMovementMode; // 0x7d8(0x01)
enum class CardinalDirection CardinalDirection; // 0x7d9(0x01)
char pad_7DA[0x6]; // 0x7da(0x06)
struct FRotator TargetRotation; // 0x7e0(0x18)
double WalkingSpeed; // 0x7f8(0x08)
double RunningSpeed; // 0x800(0x08)
double SprintingSpeed; // 0x808(0x08)
double CrouchingSpeed; // 0x810(0x08)
double WalkingAcceleration; // 0x818(0x08)
double RunningAcceleration; // 0x820(0x08)
double WalkingDeceleration; // 0x828(0x08)
double RunningDeceleration; // 0x830(0x08)
double WalkingGroundFriction; // 0x838(0x08)
double RunningGroundFriction; // 0x840(0x08)
struct FRotator JumpRotation; // 0x848(0x18)
double RotationOffset; // 0x860(0x08)
double RotationRateMultiplier; // 0x868(0x08)
double ForwardAxisValue; // 0x870(0x08)
double RightAxisValue; // 0x878(0x08)
enum class ALS_ViewMode ALS_ViewMode; // 0x880(0x01)
bool ALS_Aiming; // 0x881(0x01)
char pad_882[0x2]; // 0x882(0x02)
struct FName FirstPersonCameraSocket; // 0x884(0x08)
char pad_88C[0x4]; // 0x88c(0x04)
struct FALS_CameraSettings CurrentCameraSettings; // 0x890(0x20)
struct FALS_CameraSettings TargetCameraSettings; // 0x8b0(0x20)
struct UCurveFloat* CameraLerpCurve; // 0x8d0(0x08)
bool ShowTraces; // 0x8d8(0x01)
bool ShowSettings; // 0x8d9(0x01)
char pad_8DA[0x2]; // 0x8da(0x02)
struct FName PelvisBone; // 0x8dc(0x08)
struct FName RagdollPoseSnapshot; // 0x8e4(0x08)
bool RagdollOnGround; // 0x8ec(0x01)
char pad_8ED[0x3]; // 0x8ed(0x03)
struct FVector RagdollLocation; // 0x8f0(0x18)
struct FVector RagdollVelocity; // 0x908(0x18)
bool ManageCharacterRotation; // 0x920(0x01)
bool ALS_Sliding; // 0x921(0x01)
bool ALS_Fighting; // 0x922(0x01)
bool IsTalkWithNPC; // 0x923(0x01)
                                                                                                                   (i) Do you wa
bool IsComboFlashing; // 0x924(0x01)
                                                                                                                       Pack' exte
bool IsWading; // 0x925(0x01)
bool IsFightWithGiant; // 0x926(0x01)
void CharacterRotationDifference(double& Return Value Z (Yaw)); // Function ALS_BaseCharacter.ALS_Basecharacte
```

Furthermore, during static code analysis using IDA, it was discovered that the game code structure is complete and lacks any protection measures.

```
v1 = *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 124);
while (1)
{
   v3 = 2048;
   if ( v1 != *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 120) )
    v3 = 0;
   v4 = v1 + v3;
   if ( (unsigned int)v4 > *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 120) )
  sub_14199C790(a1 + 112, v4, 1024i64);

v5 = *(unsigned int *)(a1 + 124);

v6 = (char *)(v5 + (*(_QWORD *)(a1 + 112) & 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFF64));

v7 = recv(*(_QWORD *)(a1 + 96), v6, *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 120) - v5, 0);
   v8 = v7;
   if ( v7 < 0 )
   {
     if ( WSAGetLastError() == 10035 )
       *( BYTE *)(a1 + 2) = 1;
       return 1i64;
v15 = "Error occurred on socket recv";
     goto LABEL_46;
   *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 124) += v7;
   v9 = 3;
   v1 = *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 124);
v10 = (char *)(*(_QWORD *)(a1 + 112) & 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF64);
   v11 = v6 - 3;
   v12 = 4;
   if (v6 - 3 < v10 + 24)
     v9 = 0;
   if ( v6 - 3 < v10 + 24 )
     v11 = v6;
   v13 = v7 + v9;
   if ( v13 >= 4 )
     while ( *(_DWORD *)&v11[v12 - 4] != 168626701 )
       v14 = 1;
       if (v11[v12 - 1] > 13)
        v14 = 4;
       v12 += v14;
if ( v12 > v13 )
         goto LABEL_18;
     if ( v12 >= 0 )
       break;
\BEL 18:
  i\bar{f} ( v1 > 0x2000 )
     v15 = "Headers have grown larger than expected";
     goto LABEL_46;
   if (!v8)
   {
     v15 = "ATHO.RecvMessage";
\BEL 46:
```

Therefore, it is possible to combine the dumped UE data structure

with IDA to perform basic static analysis of the game's code logic.:

□ Damocles


Analysis Conclusion:

Abyss World scores 0 in terms of game code protection. Its client code has no protection, which means there are no barriers or mechanisms to counteract malicious players.

Game Basic Anti-Cheat:

Analysis Process:

- In terms of basic anti-cheat detection, we primarily determine whether the game loads and executes external logic by replacing Lua files.
- 2. While attaching with Cheat Engine (CE) in the game's open state and setting breakpoints on common functions, it was observed that the game did not exit or provide any prompts..



3. It is possible to directly modify the in-game character attributes, and the Game Server (GS) does not perform any kick-out operations.



Analysis Conclusion:

- Abyss World has a basic protection level of 0 when it comes to anticheat measures, lacking effective countermeasures against dynamic
 debugging and analysis. This makes it easy for malicious players to
 engage in cheating activities at a low cost, while also lacking the ability
 to effectively detect players who are already cheating.
- 2. The reason for focusing only on anti-debugging and read/write protection testing is that for a cheat program, finding data and implementing desired functionalities can be achieved through debugging and memory manipulation. If the most fundamental protection measures in these two aspects are missing, other detection methods such as code injection and hooking become meaningless.



Game Logic Issues

Analysis Process:

Due to the fact that this game is a single-player game, all cheating methods can be attributed to local code issues. Since the game itself lacks any code protection, it is possible to manipulate the character's position by modifying coordinates, enabling teleportation, and so on. The extensive modifiability of single-player games allows for a wide range of actions. However, further demonstration will not be provided at this time.

Analysis Conclusion:


1. For a game, the security of its local logic is closely related to the judgment and security measures implemented by the Game Server (GS). However, Abyss World is a single-player game that only interacts with the GS once. As a result, many data cannot be validated by the server, allowing the client to freely modify the game logic with sufficient imagination. Due to the lack of security measures, the game logic security rating of Abyss World is 0.



Game Protocol & Server Security Analysis

Local Game Protocol Analysis

AbyssWorld only interacts with the server once during the entire gameplay process, which occurs during the settlement phase. During this interaction, some local data is sent to the server. However, there is no data collection behavior throughout the gameplay. Therefore, it is possible to forge the packets sent during the settlement phase. However, since the reward distribution logic is not triggered in real-time and rewards are only given out on March 31st, it is difficult to determine the effectiveness of replaying the packets. However, based on the overall logic, there is a potential risk where rewards can be obtained by directly replaying the packets.





Game Sever Security Analysis

We conducted a shallow penetration test on the server assets related to AbyssWorld.games and discovered a series of issues. These include the exposure of an unused Admin service, open MySQL port, traversable S3 service, and the ability to brute-force login with arbitrary user registration codes. Among these issues, the arbitrary user registration code brute-forcing is the most severe, as it can potentially cause loss of user assets.

1. Summary of sensitive assets exposed to the public:

Django backend Public	https://abyssworld.games/admin/login/?next=/admin/
S3 storage bucket	http://bucket.portal.abyssworld.games/
Mysql port public	But now has fixed

2. Arbitrary user enumeration and brute-force login issue.

Example of arbitrary user login:

Upon capturing the login request, it was observed that the system verifies the existence of the email and the login verification code is not restricted. By performing a brute-force attack, an attacker can obtain the login credentials of a user and gain unauthorized access to their account.

Security issues identified:

- 1. User email enumeration
- Lack of restrictions on login verification code, allowing for brute-force attacks to obtain user login credentials


Vulnerability reproduction:

a) Using the API endpoint

"https://api.portal.abyssworld.games/user/email_exist" to check if a user

exists.


endpoint "https://www.abyssworld.games/user/email_login" and performing a brute-force attack, the attacker can obtain the user's JWT token.



c) Perform the login operation.


3. Spam email bombardment.

It is possible to use the game server's email sending interface to spam other users with unwanted emails. Although the level of harm is relatively low, it can still consume server resources.




Capture packets at the "send" action.

```
| POST / user/email_code HTTP/2 |
| Host: api.portal.abysserid.games |
| Content-Lappellt: 35 |
| Sae-On-Us: "Not AGrand:v="24", "Chromium":v="110" |
| Sae-On-Us: "Not AGrand:v="24", "Chromium":v="140", "Chromium":v="140", "Chromium":v="140", "Chromium":v="140", "Chromium":v="140", "Chromium":v="140", "Chromium":v="140", "Chromium:v="140", "Ch
```



And then the test email got 27 mails





WEB3 Security Analysis:

Summary:

The available reference material for Abyss World includes information about the

AWC and AWT tokens issued on Polygon

```
1411 - contract AWC is ERC20, ERC20Snapshot, Ownable {
1412 - constructor() ERC20("AWC", "AWC") {
               _mint(msg.sender, 20000000 * 10 ** decimals());
1413
1414
1415
1416 v function snapshot() public onlyOwner {
1417 _snapshot();
1418
1419
           function mint(address to, uint256 amount) public onlyOwner {
1420 +
              _mint(to, amount);
1421
1422
1423
1424
           // The following functions are overrides required by Solidity.
1426
           function _beforeTokenTransfer(address from, address to, uint256 amount)
           internal
override(ERC20, ERC20Snapshot)
1427
1428
1429 ▼ {
1430
                 super._beforeTokenTransfer(from, to, amount);
1431
1432 }
 File 1 of 12 : AWT.sol
  2 pragma solidity ^0.8.9;
      import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Burnable.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Snapshot.sol";
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol";
```

The AWC token carries the risk of inflation or increased issuance.

Game Economy System Security Analysis:

// The following functions are overrides required by Solidity.

function _beforeTokenTransfer(address from, address to, uint256 amount)
 internal
 override(ERC20, ERC20Snapshot)
{
 super._beforeTokenTransfer(from, to, amount);
}

Currently, there is no complete in-game economic system available. Please disregard this for now.

About Damocles

Damocles Labs is a security team established in 2023, specializing in security for the

Web3 industry. Their services include contract code auditing, business code

auditing, penetration testing, GameFi code auditing, GameFi vulnerability discovery,

GameFi cheat analysis, and GameFi anti-cheat measures. They are committed to

making continuous efforts in the Web3 security industry, producing as many

analysis reports as possible, raising awareness among project owners and users

about GameFi security, and promoting the overall security development of the

industry...

Twitter: https://twitter.com/DamoclesLabs

Discord: https://discord.gg/xd6H6eqFHz