

Thursday, July 6, 2023      Manuscript draft: please do not share without author permission.  
For replication, go to: <https://github.com/DamonCharlesRoberts/white-identity-sources>.

# Economic concerns appear to be weak predictors of white political identity\*

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**ABSTRACT** Do economic or political threats explain reported white identity? Overall, the social identity literature would suggest that white identity would increase in response to economic threats. However, a number of those that study white identity, specifically, argue that it results from concern about political influence. Considering what whiteness means historically and contemporaneously, I argue that we should expect that political threats reflect stronger associations with white identity. Using data from the 2012, 2016, and 2020 American National Election Study, I consider a single model using penalized regression containing proxies of economic and political threats. I find evidence suggesting that in the post-Trump era, white political identity is strongly associated with reported feelings of Whites' loss of political influence as opposed to economic threats, as some suggest and may expect.

**KEYWORDS** white identity; economic threat; cultural threat

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## **Introduction**

Are White identifiers those who are perceive economic threats or is it a backlash to a loss of influence over politics? The existing work offers an unclear answer to this question. This note attempts to provide an omnibus test to determine not only which of these questions has more empirical support but also which among common proxies of economic and political power in the United States appear to be reliable predictors of a White individual's expression of racial identity.

A common source of data and of measures for researchers in the United States is the American National Election Study. I use a penalized regression using data from the 2012, 2016, and 2020 American National Election Studies to examine the degree to which individual measures of economic and political influence explain an individual's uptake of White identity as well as to examine the degree to which changes in the political context may increase or decrease the explanatory power of these measures. I find that proxies reporting concerns about Whites' political influence are stronger explanatory factors than proxies of economic influence in the post-Trump era.

## **Identity and white political identity**

One perspective on what explains racial identity among Whites in the United States are that they are responding to threats to their economic status and power. Realistic Conflict Theory suggests that a racial identity and racial prejudice come as a response to a collective concern among members of a particular racial group about the loss of economic influence

and status a group holds relative to other racial groups (Blumer 1958; Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Some work in support of this perspective sees White racial identity as a response to concerns about increased job market competition through immigration (Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019). Other work finds support for this argument in lab experiments (Pérez et al. 2022) and in surveys (Lindsay 2023). In one of the most thorough treatments on the use of racial identity by Whites in politics, Jardina (2019) includes indicators of economic status and power in the primary model to predict White political identity.

Social identity theory, and its offshoots, would suggest that Whites expressing a racial identity are responding to political, cultural, and societal threats. While these threats are a bit more hard to define, there are a number of examples of Whites expressing prejudice towards other racial groups in response to these sorts of challenges to their power. Tesler (2016) demonstrates that Whites heavily racialized American politics in response to Barack Obama’s ascension to the White House. Other work demonstrates that the saliency and repercussions of aligning with competing racial groups drove non-White political candidates to distance themselves from their racial confederates in an attempt to appease Whites (Stephens-Dougan 2020). Some pundits on Fox News suggest that Whites are in direct competition for jobs with immigrants from South and Central America. Despite these claims, some evidence suggests that Whites’ hostility directed toward non-White immigrant groups depends on the degree to which they assimilate (Green and Staerklé 2013; see also Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). In terms of attitudes oriented toward the in-group, Dawson (1994) argues that Black Americans hold a strong racial identity that supercedes their class-based identity due to the persistent focus on Black individual’s race in their personal and political life. For Whites, their racial identity has long been central to their behavior and

the way in which they mobilize to shape legal and political institutions to maintain power (Rile Hayward 2013).

## Political versus economic threats

Identity is largely an elusive concept to operationalize. Though there are implicit measures of White identity (see Knowles and Peng 2005), the common and measure of white identity is a response to the question, “How important is being White to your identity?” This measure captures a significant feature of an identity: the centrality or the importance of that identity to an individual. Though a rather rough measure of something as complex as identity, it has been shown to produce similar results to more complex measures of white identity and holds a significant amount of face validity (Jardina 2019).

Threat is also quite difficult to measure directly. However, we can make a number of reasonable guesses about who may feel economic and political threat. There are two key things that threats affect. Status and power. Status refers to the respectability of the group whereas power refers to the influence that the group has (Craig and Phillips 2023). Threat here refers to either a manifestation of economic or political challenges to the current racial hierarchy. I do not distinguish between these two sources of threat as common survey measures are too crude to distinguish between how the threat manifests. Here, I am focusing on what types of non-material threats activate White identity in the context of politics and will, as a shorthand refer to political, cultural, and societal threats as political threats.

A reasonable approach to measuring economic threat is to measure the economic circumstances that White individuals find themselves in. We may expect that Whites who are

facing bottom-up economic competition, will be those that experience the strongest desire to identify themselves with their racial group. As the dominant racial group in the United States, Whites that are unemployed, are surrounded by other Whites who are experiencing economic hardship and those who have limited capacity to switch careers are those that may be the most motivated to identify with the dominant racial group to defend Whites' influence and status in society (Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Therefore, measures of employment, finances, family finances, finances of those they know, and educational attainment all seem likely predictors of racial identity for Whites. This fits with measures that Dawson (1994) used to measure the influence of economics in Black American's identity. These measures also fit with Lindsay (2023) who found that many of these items predicted racial resentment among Whites.

Here I conceptualize of political threat as perceptions that politics and political institutions no longer serves White people. Existing work demonstrates that Whites who express a desire to maintain the racial status quo with Whites on top are more likely to express that Whites are discriminated against at similar levels as Blacks (Marshburn, Reinkensmeyer, and Knowles 2022). As Whiteness is often a central component of Whites' conceptualization of American society (see Green and Staerklé 2013), changes to "traditional American values" may reflect concern about changes to the influences of White values. Finally, a common finding is that expression of White identity is heavily wrapped up in the perception that racial stratifications are by meritocratic means (Lowery et al. 2012). As members of a dominant social group, when given information that either threatens one's belief that their merits are earned or that their group operates as a way to maintain inequality, we expect lower levels of expression in identification with that group. The classic items of racial resentment construct

capture these ideas in that they revolve around the idea that Blacks are not disadvantaged as the result of systematic oppression by Whites. Though many have often used racial resentment as a measure of prejudice which would be a possible outcome of White identity, some make the compelling argument that it is distinct as a concept and operationalization (Davis and Wilson 2022).

## Data

To examine whether whites' attitudes expressing concern about political threats are more robust correlates than their perceptions of the economy, I use the 2012, 2016, and 2020 American National Election Studies (ANES). The studies are nationally representative questions that capture several questions that lend themselves to testing the relationship between economic and political concerns while also asking white respondents to report how important being white is to their identity.

Though I am using the more crude measure of White identity and am limited in the predictors I can choose from, a larger concern is that the degree to which these threats may vary as a result of changes to the political landscape. Specifically, in 2008 the United States experienced a massive recession that lead hit the housing market quite hard. In 2012, the economy was still recovering. In 2016, Donald Trump became infamous for an election where he made race and gender extremely salient (Banda and Cassese 2022). Finally, in 2020, Trump had been in office for four years with an improving economy. Each of these three years reflect a different context and may offer the opportunity to observe how economic and political threats operate differently.

Question wording for each of the items in the following models are included in Table 1 which is located in the Supplementary Materials. I include descriptive statistics for the measures in these samples in Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4 located in the Supplementary Information.

## **Evidence from a penalized regression**

The primary contribution of this paper is to examine which of a number of competing measures of different types of threat may predict white identity for individuals. As this requires an omnibus test, I elect to use a penalized regression. I provide a more detailed discussion of the reasons why I use an estimator with an L2 regularization parameter, often referred to as a LASSO model in the supplementary materials. For a brief comment as to why I use this approach is because approach is designed to take models with a large number of predictors and to shrink the coefficients toward zero. In practice, this often means that predictors that has relatively fewer explanatory power have much smaller coefficients than the variables that do provide significant predictive power.


My measure of white identity is ordinal. Therefore, I apply a ordered logistic link function. Though it creates a more complicated computational task, it is a more appropriate model specification given the available measure and my assumptions about the concept (Liddell and Kruschke 2018).

To account for potential problems stemming from missing data, I impute my data by using multiple imputation with chained equations (MICE) where the particular model I use is a random forest model to allow for more flexibility and to reduce model dependence (Buuren

and Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011; Marbach 2022)).<sup>1</sup> I report the results of the model fitted using listwise deletion in the Supplementary Information.

## Results

Figure 1 presents the estimates of my fitted ordinal models with the LASSO shrinkage prior.<sup>2</sup> These models are fit on 6 chains with 2000 iterations each. To examine the evidence of whether a particular predictor “matters” for predicting white political identity, I examine the estimated credible intervals, which report the probability that the true estimate falls within the estimated range. I construct these credible intervals by reporting estimates between the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles. This means that for a given credible interval, there is a two-tailed 95% probability that the true value falls within that range. For values outside the range of the credible interval, it is relatively implausible that the given value is the true value.



**Figure 1: Economic factors are weak predictors of white identity**

<sup>1</sup>I impute 10 datasets and simultaneously fit my Bayesian LASSO on each dataset and pool the results. Uncertainty reflected in my reported credible intervals not only reflects the uncertainty from one model, but my reported uncertainty also reflects the uncertainty generated from the imputation procedure. One drawback with this particular approach is that my normalized split- $\hat{R}$  will likely be greater than the widely recognized 1.01 cutoff that indicates model convergence due to the pooling of my multiply imputed datasets.

<sup>2</sup>The full tables of results are included in the Supplementary Information.



Examining the figure, it is readily apparent that in the face of indicators of attitudes about political status, economic attitudes inconsistently associate with white political identity. In all three years, reported attitudes about the nation's economy being better relative to the previous year, reported feelings about the nation's unemployment rate, income, concern about one's family finances, and knowing someone who lost a job are not meaningfully correlated with white political identity. For other indicators of economic threat, none appear to be consistently meaningful. Retrospective evaluations of one's financial situation and education matter in 2012, but these effects were not present in 2016 and 2020.

Turning to indicators of political threat, we still see significant inconsistency. In both 2012 and 2016, whether someone feels that new lifestyles are breaking society positively affects reported levels of white political identity. This relationship is meaningful in 2012 and 2016 (this question is not present in the 2020 questionnaire). In 2020, those who reported that the government favored Black Americans also reported a higher white political identity, and those who feel that whites are discriminated against; however, neither of these effects are meaningful in 2012 or 2016.

## **Discussion and conclusions**

Overall, these results suggest that the effects of economic threat on white political identity are more robust in the pre-Trump era. Again, this is not confirmatory as there is no test of a causal mechanism for either economic or political threats. The goal of this analysis is to examine whether, in an omnibus test, either of these threats appears to be a more plausible predictor of white political identity. Though the relationship between political threats is

inconsistent, their relationships appear more likely; particularly when we consider how many of these attitudes are explained by a rather complex data-generating process.

Economic threats tend to play a more significant part in explaining white identification in 2012. Political threats, however, appear to be a stronger predictor of white identification in the post-Trump era. In 2012, the U.S. economy was recovering from a massive recession and housing market collapse. However, as Obama’s administration continued, conservatives became more outspoken about Obama’s race (Tesler 2016). This shift to focus on Obama’s race continued through the 2016 Presidential election and may reflect a much more explicit message to whites about political threats (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018). Though in 2020, the global economy faced significant uncertainty due to the COVID-19 pandemic, economic factors appear to be relatively less important. These results suggest that white political identity results from perceptions of a political threat in the post-Trump era.

These findings provide a direction for scholars to take when examining the factors driving Whites to take on a white political identity. While this particular analysis is not causal, it provides a basis for those wondering whether, when put together, economic or political threats are more fruitful to engender a rise in white political identity.

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## **Supplementary Information**

### **Measures**

**Table 1:** ANES Measures

	Abbreviated question	ANES Coding	Author coding	Years
white identity	How important is	1 = Extremely important; 2	1 = Not at all important; 2	2012, 2016,
	being white to your	= Very important; 3 =	= A little important; 3 =	2020
	identity	Moderately important; 4 =	Moderately important; 4 =	
		A little important; 5 = Not	Very important; 5 =	
		at all important; <1 Missing,	Extremely important; NA =	
		not asked, etc	Missing, not asked, etc	
<b>Economics</b>				
Retrospective better off	How much better worse	1 = Much better; 2 =	-2 = Much worse; -1 =	2012, 2016,
	off than 1 year ago	Somewhat better; 3 = The	Somewhat worse; 0 = The	2020
		same; 4 = Somewhat worse;	same; 1 = Somewhat better;	
		5 = Much worse, < 1	2 = Much better; NA =	
		Missing, not asked, etc	Missing, not asked, etc	

	Abbreviated question	ANES Coding	Author coding	Years
Economy better	U.S. economy better worse off than 1 year ago	1 = Much better; 2 = somewhat better; 3 = Stayed about the same, 4 = Somewhat worse; 5 = Much worse; < 1 Missing, not asked, etc	-2 = Much worse; -1 = Somewhat worse; 0 = The same; 1 = Somewhat better; 2 = Much better; NA = Missing, not asked, etc	2012, 2016, 2020
Unemployment better	Unemployment better or worse than 1 year ago	1 = Much better; 2 = somewhat better; 3 = Stayed about the same, 4 = Somewhat worse; 5 = Much worse; < 1 Missing, not asked, etc	-2 = Much worse; -1 = Somewhat worse; 0 = The same; 1 = Somewhat better; 2 = Much better; NA = Missing, not asked, etc	2012, 2016, 2020

	Abbreviated question	ANES Coding	Author coding	Years
Education	Educational attainment	1 = < than High school; 2 = High school; 3 = Some post-High school; 4 = Bachelor's degree; < 1 Missing, not asked, etc	1 = < than High school; 2 = High school; 3 = Some post-High school; 4 = Bachelor's degree; NA = Missing, not asked, etc	2012, 2020
Education (2016)	Educational attainment	See ANES codebook	See ANES codebook; NA = Missing, not asked, etc	2016
Income	Total family income	See ANES codebook; < Missing, not asked, etc	See ANES codebook; NA = Missing, not asked, etc	2012, 2016, 2020
Worried about losing job	How worried about losing job in near future	1 = Not at all; 2 = A little; 3 = Moderately; 4 = Very; 5 = Extremely; < 1 Missing, not asked, etc	-2 = Not at all; -1 = A little; 0 = Moderately; 1 = Very; 2 = Extremely	2012, 2016, 2020

	Abbreviated question	ANES Coding	Author coding	Years
Immigrants take jobs	How likely immigration will take away jobs	1 = Extremely; 2 = Very; 3 = Somewhat; 4 = Not at all; < 1 Missing, not asked, etc	1 = Not at all; 2 = Somewhat; 3 = Very; 4 = Extremely; NA = Missing, not asked, etc	2012, 2016, 2020
Worried about family finances	Worry about family financial situation	1 = Extremely; 2 = Very; 3 = Moderately; 4 = A little; 5 = Not at all; < 1 Missing, not asked, etc	1 = Not at all, 2 = A little; 3 = Moderately; 4 = Very; 5 = Extremely; NA = Missing, not asked, etc	2012, 2016, 2020
Know someone lost job	Know someone who lost job	1 = Someone lost job; 2 = No one lost job; < 1 Missing, not asked, etc	0 = No one lost job; 1 = Someone lost job; NA = Missing, not asked, etc	2012, 2016, 2020

### Political

	Abbreviated question	ANES Coding	Author coding	Years
New lifestyles breaking society	Newer lifestyles	1 = Agree strongly; 2 =	-2 = Disagree strongly; -1 =	2012, 2016
	breaking down society	Agree somewhat; 3 =	Disagree somewhat; 0 =	
		Neither; 4 = Disagree	Neither, 1 = Agree	
		somewhat; 5 = Disagree	somewhat; 2 = Agree	
		strongly; < 1 Missing, not asked, etc	strongly	
Government biased against whites	Does the	1 = Favors whites; 2 =	-1 = Favors whites; 0 =	2012, 2016, 2020
	Administration favor	Favors Blacks; 3 = Treats	Treats both the same; 1 =	
	Blacks or whites (2012	both the same; < 1 Missing,	Favors Blacks; NA =	
	only)	not asked, etc	Missing, not asked, etc	
	Does the Federal Gov			
	treat Blacks or whites			
	Better			

	Abbreviated question	ANES Coding	Author coding	Years
whites influence	How much influence do	1 = Too much; 2 = Just	-1 = Too little; 0 = Just	2012, 2016,
politics	whites have on U.S.	about right; 3 = Too little; <	about right; 1 = Too much;	2020
	politics	1 Missing, not asked, etc	NA = Missing, not asked, etc	
whites are	Discrimination in U.S.	1 = A great deal; 2 = A lot;	1 = None at all; 2 = A little;	2012, 2016,
discriminated against	against whites	3 = A moderate amount; 4	3 = A moderate amount; 4 =	2020
		= A little; 5 = None at all;	A lot; 5 = A great deal; NA	
		< 1 Missing, not asked, etc	= Missing, not asked, etc	
<b>Controls</b>				
Racial Resentment	Standard, 4-item,	5-point Likert scale	Avg of four questions; NA =	2012, 2016,
	battery		Missing, not asked, etc	2020

	Abbreviated question	ANES Coding	Author coding	Years
Party ID	Standard battery	1 = Strong Dem; 2 = De; 3 = Leans Dem; 4 = Independent; 5 = Leans Rep; 6 = Rep; 7 = Strong Rep; < 1 Missing, not asked, etc	1 = Strong Democrat; 2 = Democrat; 3 = Leans Democrat; 4 = Independent/Neither; 5 = Leans Republican; 6 = Republican; 7 = Strong Republican; < 1 Missing, not asked, etc	2012, 2016, 2020
Female	Sex of respondent	1 = Male, 2 = Female; < 1 Missing, not asked, etc	0 = Male, 1 = Female; NA = Missing, not asked, etc	2012, 2016, 2020



**Table 2:** 2012 ANES Descriptive Statistics

	Unique (#)	Missing (%)	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max
White identity	6	7	2.8	1.3	1.0	3.0	5.0
Retrospective better off	6	1	-0.2	1.2	-2.0	-1.0	2.0
Economy better	6	1	-0.3	1.1	-2.0	0.0	2.0
Unemployment better	6	1	-0.3	1.1	-2.0	0.0	2.0
Education	6	1	3.1	1.1	1.0	3.0	5.0
Income	29	3	14.9	8.1	1.0	15.0	28.0
Worried about losing job	6	45	-1.2	1.0	-2.0	-1.0	2.0
Worried about family finances	6	7	2.7	1.2	1.0	3.0	5.0
Know someone lost job	3	7	0.4	0.5	0.0	0.0	1.0
New lifestyles breaking tradition	6	7	0.5	1.3	-2.0	1.0	2.0
Government biased against whites	4	8	0.3	0.5	-1.0	0.0	1.0
Whites influence politics	4	7	0.1	0.5	-1.0	0.0	1.0
Whites discriminated against	6	7	2.2	0.9	1.0	2.0	5.0
Racial resentment	18	7	0.0	0.5	-2.0	0.0	2.0
Party ID	8	0	4.2	2.1	1.0	4.0	7.0
Female	2	0	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0	1.0

NAs are included in Unique column.

Data source: 2012 American National Election Study, unweighted.

## Descriptive statistics

**Table 3: 2016 ANES Descriptive Statistics**

	Unique (#)	Missing (%)	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max
White identity	6	15	2.6	1.3	1.0	3.0	5.0
Retrospective better off	6	0	0.0	1.0	-2.0	0.0	2.0
Economy better	6	0	-0.2	1.0	-2.0	0.0	2.0
Unemployment better	6	0	0.0	1.0	-2.0	0.0	2.0
Education	18	0	11.9	7.1	1.0	11.0	95.0
Income	29	4	16.3	7.9	1.0	17.0	28.0
Worried about losing job	6	36	-1.3	1.0	-2.0	-2.0	2.0
Worried about family finances	6	14	2.6	1.2	1.0	3.0	5.0
Know someone lost job	3	13	0.4	0.5	0.0	0.0	1.0
New lifestyles breaking tradition	6	14	0.3	1.4	-2.0	1.0	2.0
Government biased against whites	4	15	-0.1	0.7	-1.0	0.0	1.0
Whites influence politics	4	15	0.2	0.5	-1.0	0.0	1.0
Whites discriminated against	5	18	2.0	0.8	1.0	2.0	4.0
Racial resentment	18	14	0.0	0.5	-2.0	0.0	2.0
Party ID	8	0	4.2	2.1	1.0	4.0	7.0
Female	3	1	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0	1.0

NAs are included in Unique column.

Data source: 2016 American National Election Study, unweighted.

**Table 4: 2020 ANES Descriptive Statistics**

	Unique (#)	Missing (%)	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max
White identity	6	11	2.4	1.3	1.0	2.0	5.0
Retrospective better off	6	0	0.1	1.0	-2.0	0.0	2.0
Economy better	6	0	-0.7	1.3	-2.0	-1.0	2.0
Unemployment better	6	0	-1.1	1.3	-2.0	-2.0	2.0
Education	6	1	3.4	1.1	1.0	3.0	5.0
Income	23	3	12.3	6.6	1.0	13.0	22.0
Worried about losing job	6	33	-1.3	1.1	-2.0	-2.0	2.0
Worried about family finances	6	0	2.1	1.1	1.0	2.0	5.0
Know someone lost job	3	0	0.4	0.5	0.0	0.0	1.0
Government biased against whites	4	12	-0.3	0.7	-1.0	0.0	1.0
Whites influence politics	4	12	0.3	0.6	-1.0	0.0	1.0
Whites discriminated against	6	11	2.1	1.0	1.0	2.0	5.0
Racial resentment	18	10	0.0	0.5	-2.0	0.0	2.0
Party ID	8	0	4.2	2.3	1.0	4.0	7.0
Female	3	0	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0	1.0

NAs are included in Unique column.

Data source: 2020 American National Election Study, unweighted.

## Model

The literature surveyed above suggests that there are a small number of variables that do predict white political identity, and there are many others that have no effect. Imagining an assumed hypothesis about the distribution of coefficients, this implies that the L2 regularization parameter equals 0. This is because the L2 regularization parameter shrinks coefficients asymptotically toward zero. The L1 regularization parameter, however, does allow for a shrinkage parameter to pull coefficients to 0. Given this, it suggests that the more appropriate model to capture this debate would be the LASSO penalized regression.

Rather than use the classical LASSO with Leave One Out Cross Validation (LOOCV), I take advantage of a type of Markov Chain Monte Carlos (MCMC) called a Hamiltonian Monte Carlo for my LASSO due to a number of benefits outlined by Erp, Oberski, and Mulder (2019). As the literature leads me to hold *a priori* expectations about the distribution of predictors that meaningfully effect white political identity, I specify a Laplace distribution as my prior density function. I suspect that there are a large number of included predictors that have null effects and a relatively smaller proportion of predictors that *do* have an effect but am relatively unsure about how large their coefficients might be. This characterization of my prior fits with that of an L2 Shrinkage parameter specified in a LASSO regression. As I am not using LOOCV, I am able to interpret the results of the model through my credible intervals.

## Full tables of results

**Table 5:** Predictors of white Identity in 2012

	2012 LWD	2012
Economic		
Retrospective better off	0.101 [0.015, 0.190]	0.081 [0.021, 0.141]
Economy better	0.003 [−0.091, 0.099]	0.017 [−0.051, 0.095]
Unemployment better	−0.072 [−0.189, 0.024]	−0.063 [−0.146, 0.010]
Education	−0.156 [−0.242, −0.069]	−0.132 [−0.191, −0.074]
Income	0.004 [−0.008, 0.017]	0.004 [−0.004, 0.012]
Worried about losing job	−0.060 [−0.157, 0.019]	−0.056 [−0.127, 0.024]
Worried about family finances	0.083 [−0.001, 0.175]	0.054 [−0.003, 0.116]
Know someone lost job	−0.031 [−0.188, 0.086]	−0.072 [−0.196, 0.028]
Non-material		
New lifestyles breaking society	0.115 [0.038, 0.194]	0.137 [0.081, 0.191]
Gov. biased against whites	0.050 [−0.077, 0.231]	0.113 [−0.016, 0.266]
whites are discriminated against	0.041 [−0.041, 0.142]	0.014 [−0.050, 0.087]
Racial resentment	0.270 [0.064, 0.477]	0.404 [0.255, 0.549]
Demographics		
Party ID	−0.018 [−0.070, 0.028]	−0.023 [−0.061, 0.012]
Female	0.141 [−0.009, 0.322]	0.087 [−0.016, 0.208]
Thresholds		
Threshold 1	−1.175 [−1.677, −0.625]	−1.372 [−1.741, −1.001]
Threshold 2	−0.178 [−0.682, 0.365]	−0.426 [−0.793, −0.057]
Threshold 3	1.017 [0.514, 1.561]	0.765 [0.401, 1.137]
Threshold 4	2.169 [1.644, 2.730]	2.011 [1.641, 2.393]

Median estimate from fitted model with 6 chains and 2000 iterations.

**Table 6:** Predictors of white identity in 2016

	2016 LWD	2016
Economic		
Retrospective better off	0.002 [−0.078, 0.087]	0.010 [−0.055, 0.081]
Economy better	−0.077 [−0.191, 0.010]	−0.076 [−0.157, 0.000]
Unemployment better	−0.034 [−0.141, 0.044]	−0.015 [−0.091, 0.050]
Education	−0.015 [−0.035, 0.001]	−0.008 [−0.019, 0.003]
Income	−0.004 [−0.018, 0.009]	−0.012 [−0.022, −0.001]
Worried about losing job	−0.023 [−0.115, 0.041]	−0.023 [−0.115, 0.054]
Worried about family finances	0.027 [−0.036, 0.114]	0.026 [−0.028, 0.089]
Know someone lost job	−0.010 [−0.147, 0.095]	−0.120 [−0.270, 0.004]
Non-material		
New lifestyles breaking society	0.145 [0.064, 0.229]	0.159 [0.099, 0.219]
Gov. biased against whites	0.009 [−0.083, 0.113]	−0.007 [−0.099, 0.079]
whites are discriminated against	0.062 [−0.021, 0.178]	0.080 [−0.004, 0.181]
Racial resentment	0.174 [−0.002, 0.404]	0.385 [0.232, 0.535]
Demographics		
Party ID	0.035 [−0.014, 0.088]	0.019 [−0.016, 0.057]
Female	0.031 [−0.064, 0.182]	0.080 [−0.024, 0.211]
Thresholds		
Threshold 1	−0.689 [−1.209, −0.135]	−0.843 [−1.256, −0.379]
Threshold 2	0.175 [−0.341, 0.733]	−0.061 [−0.473, 0.392]
Threshold 3	1.371 [0.835, 1.931]	1.096 [0.684, 1.541]
Threshold 4	2.510 [1.963, 3.083]	2.282 [1.865, 2.730]

Median estimate from fitted model with 6 chains and 2000 iterations.

**Table 7:** Predictors of white identity in 2020

	2020 LWD	2020
Economic		
Retrospective better off	0.010 [−0.053, 0.077]	0.003 [−0.049, 0.057]
Economy better	0.107 [0.043, 0.174]	0.040 [−0.007, 0.093]
Unemployment better	−0.061 [−0.123, 0.000]	−0.035 [−0.083, 0.010]
Education	0.025 [−0.032, 0.090]	−0.003 [−0.049, 0.042]
Income	−0.008 [−0.019, 0.002]	−0.011 [−0.019, −0.003]
Worried about losing job	−0.077 [−0.144, −0.009]	−0.085 [−0.160, −0.026]
Worried about family finances	0.027 [−0.036, 0.099]	0.013 [−0.041, 0.070]
Know someone lost job	0.002 [−0.105, 0.110]	−0.040 [−0.138, 0.041]
Non-material		
Gov. biased against whites	0.137 [0.024, 0.248]	0.163 [0.078, 0.248]
whites are discriminated against	0.193 [0.115, 0.270]	0.154 [0.092, 0.215]
Racial resentment	0.204 [0.061, 0.350]	0.353 [0.244, 0.462]
Demographics		
Party ID	0.024 [−0.010, 0.060]	0.023 [−0.003, 0.049]
Female	0.299 [0.174, 0.426]	0.229 [0.130, 0.328]
Thresholds		
Threshold 1	0.217 [−0.187, 0.639]	−0.147 [−0.469, 0.194]
Threshold 2	1.137 [0.726, 1.557]	0.706 [0.380, 1.052]
Threshold 3	2.412 [1.997, 2.837]	1.870 [1.539, 2.221]
Threshold 4	3.556 [3.136, 4.005]	3.049 [2.713, 3.396]

Median estimate from fitted model with 6 chains and 2000 iterations.