Context Matters? Exploring the origin story of White Political Identity

Damon C. Roberts*

Abstract

Does the relative actual or perceived material status explain a white individual's proclivity to claim a white identity? Existing literature on white political identity demonstrates that the likelihood a white person claims and behaves in congruence with other whites in the United States is largely motivated by protecting one's self and group interests. This logic flows through the idea that social identity theory posits that a desire for group preservation stems from evaluations of relative status. In line with this argument, this paper demonstrates that whites who claim a white identity are concerned with economic well-being and a hierarchy where whites are more privileged than nonwhites. Using data from the 2012 and 2016 American National Election Studies and the 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016 American Community Surveys, I demonstrate that this is true to the extent that white identification is motivated by perceptions of status threat as opposed to actual status threat made observable by financial and demographic shifts in their Congressional District.

*Ph.D Student, Department of Political Science, University of Colorado Boulder, UCB 333, Boulder, CO 80309-0333. Damon.Roberts-1@colorado.edu.

Acknowledgements: First and foremost I want to thank Jennifer Wolak for her continued advice and for pushing me to make this project better. I would also like to thank Kathryn Schauer, Rachel O'Neal, Andrew McLeer, and Alexander L. Jensen, Tamar Malloy, and Andrew Q. Philips for their helpful advice and comments on my drafts.

1 Introduction

Whiteness has a long and complicated history (see Painter, 2010). This statement is particularly true in the United States where whiteness is still quite relevant. Recently scholars have been quite engaged with studying the manifestations of Americans acting on their white identity in the political realm. While it is not clear to what comparative extent whites are acting politically cohesive, as White, Laird, and Allen (2014); White and Laird (2020) have demonstrated with Black Americans, Berry, Ebner, and Cornelius (2019) argue that whites are increasingly recognizing a linked fate to one another - in particular for whites, this is guided by a shared history of privilege. Scholars have noted a number of political consequences from this. Tea Party support during the Obama administration largely fueled by racial resentment and increasing support for policies supporting white interests were driven by whites feeling status threats (Willer, Feinberg, & Wetts, 2016). Overall, whites who feel that their group are in economic decline were more likely to support Donald J. Trump in the 2016 election (Bunyasi, 2019). This is not exclusive to conservatives, though. For example, Schildkraut (2019) demonstrates that although white liberals tend to talk about institutional racism and their privilege more relative to their racially-conservative peers, they tend to be less supportive of promoting an anti-racist agenda.

While scholars are quite aware of the attitudinal, behavioral, legalistic, and policy consequences driven by white political behavior and identity, it still remains nebulous as to what drives white identity. In an attempt to determine where contemporary white political identity comes from, one first must acknowledge the historical roots of how the US has legalistically defined and societally treated whiteness. From this discussion, it is quite clear that, for whites, their identity, although not necessarily the most important

identity to them (see Schildkraut, 2019), their evaluations of their economic standing are quite wrapped up in delineating them from other racial groups.

Second, I discuss the ways in which white political identity, as conceptualized here, is primarily an in-group. While scholars have long addressed white policy preferences and their behavior by leaning on it deriving from racism or racial resentment, a growing number of scholars studying white identity recognize the rich explanatory power one leverages from studying it from the perspective that whites seek to defend their racial group and to maintain its status.

With these foundations established, I then explore a social psychological explanation for why white identity may originate from what is happening around them. More specifically, I argue that whites' relative status in their own communities move these abstract messages of the increasing diversity in the U.S. to a more immediate and tangible manifestation of perceived status loss for whites. By experiencing these rather tangible manifestations of their own, personal status slippage, we may expect that whites seek external explanations for this loss; thus, connecting national messages to those of their community. To model this theory, I use data from the 2012 and the 2016 American National Election Studies and the 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016 American Community Surveys.

2 Brief Overview of Whiteness in the U.S.

The history of how we have defined "whiteness" is a very long and complicated story. In short, whiteness is entirely subjective. More meaningfully, however, legalistic definitions of whiteness have had broad implications for a number of people. For example, in the early 19^{th} century, persecution against those deemed to not be saxton, were discrim-

inated against from gaining meaningful employment, were determined to be less-than in academic publishing, and experienced violence directed toward them. While definitions were somewhat dependent on what academic circles you were in, at that time, the Irish, Italians, those from Mediterranean countries, Jews, and Eastern Europeans were all considered non-saxton and therefore un-American (Painter, 2010). While these classifications seem confusing to contemporary Americans, many of these determinants were often considered to be heavily wrapped up on class (Painter, 2010). As abolitionist movements grew, these definitions of "whiteness" in the U.S. evolved some more. White southerners concerned about the social hierarchy that appeared to be disintegrating, broadened their definition to accept the Irish, who filled parts of their Confederate Army's ranks (Painter, 2010). This, in part, was due to the legalistic and political implications of emancipation, but it was also a way to ensure that the social hierarchy was not about class status, but about racial status (Painter, 2010). For freedmen who can now seek wage employment, many southerners were anxious about what would happen to the poor who were not previously enslaved - though they were not saxtons, they did not want them to be on the same rung of the social ladder as freedmen.

Moving into the early 20^{th} century, where nationalism was neck-breakingly high, the U.S. judicial system was of two minds on legalistically determining who was white. Some courts sought to follow taxonomic definitions of who was constituted as white and the others that saw this as a pragmatically fraught approach used the "common knowledge" rule (López, 2006). This "common knowledge" rule was incredibly subjective but yet was used to rule in cases like naturalization for immigration from the 1920's until the 1950's (López, 2006).

Scholarly debates of what whiteness is are still quite complex and nuanced. While legalistically it is somewhat unclear how they define whiteness, critical race theorists

have argued to stop seeking objective taxonomies for who is white. Instead, critical race theorists have advocated for the ways in which people present a narrative about themselves and who they are (Rile Hayward, 2013). In doing so, not only are we better able to understand the categorical explanations of who they are, but we also gather quite a bit of information about what delineates them from others. To build an identity, one must understand how ”whiteness” is different from other racial groups (Rile Hayward, 2013).

From the history of whiteness in the United States, we have a few important points to keep in mind relevant to my argument. First, whiteness is arbitrary and contemporaneously, it is dependent on the person which can be context dependent. Second, and perhaps most important to my theory, whiteness has severe economic and political implications. Those considered to be white were granted naturalization in the early 20^{th} century, were able to gain meaningful employment, were not subjugated to racial discrimination by employers, by local government for access to public goods, and by businesses in accessing trade. The transition in the 19^{th} century to emphasize ones status as a former slave or not over class still has implications today. For example, the hatred towards welfare in the United States does not come from a dislike of the policies but rather a dislike of Black people receiving tax dollars (Gilens, 1999). In other words, race, and in particular whiteness, is historically *and* contemporarily economic.

3 White identity and behavior as out-group animosity and in-group favoritism

Comparatively, when scholars have studied the politics of whiteness, it has been centered around whites and racism. In doing so, scholars are studying the effects of attitudes towards out-groups. One of the key measures that scholars have used to study white resentment of minorities is the "racial resentment" index developed by Kinder and Sanders (1996). Scholars use variations of this original racial resentment scale today. For example, Tesler (2016) uses the measure to show that racial attitudes toward Barack Obama had negative effects on people's opinions of his dog, Bo Obama.

Out-group animosity has severe policy implications. While the attitudes of white Americans are shaped by out-group evaluations on policies like health-care (Tesler, 2016), these evaluations go further to shape policy. In a seminal book, Gilens (1999) demonstrates that the hatred for social welfare among conservatives are not necessarily due to the policy itself. Rather, Gilens (1999) demonstrates that negative evaluations of welfare is due to people's evaluations of who receives it - Black people. This dislike of who receives social welfare has policy implications as well. Looking at who receives welfare and who often is deemed to be ineligible more or less fits with the reason for why the public dislike the policies (see Gilens, 1999, Chapter 8).

These racialized evaluations of social welfare policy are also driven by the media (van Doorn, 2015; Winter, 2008). Given that the public often receives most of their information about politics from the news, the way in which the news discuss a particular policy has severe implications. Welfare policy in particular has been shown to be heavily racialized. Scholars have shown when discussing policy of poverty, the media unrepresentatively covers Black poverty (Gilens, 1999; Winter, 2008; van Doorn,

2015).

The mechanism for which scholars have argued that social welfare policy derives from out-group attitudes towards Blacks is through status threat. Using 2008 ANES data, Wetts and Willer (2018) demonstrates that white racial resentment toward minorities drive their negative evaluations of social welfare policy. Their theory is that when whites perceive threats toward their relative economic status to Blacks, their levels of racial resentment increases. Further, in line with Gilens (1999), this increase in racial resentment is also associated with a decrease in support for social welfare policies. Not all scholars fully agree on this mechanism, however.

A growing number of scholars studying white political attitudes are publishing on the in-group attitudes that white people have and whether those drive any attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. Jardina (2019) tests whether in-group favoritism among whites drives policy preferences. In doing so, Jardina (2019) demonstrates that when reminded that some social welfare policies benefit whites, those who claim a white identity often experience a rise in support for those policies. That is, for those who think their white identity is politically relevant and important to them, these white identifiers are more supportive of policies that realize gains for whites, regardless of whether that same policy benefits other racial groups. In doing so, this demonstrates that white identifiers are focused on supporting policies that provide benefits to whites - if it helps other racial groups, that is not important to them - so long as the benefits are higher for whites than other racial groups.

Not only is white in-group attitudes important for policy, but it is also important for driving candidate support. The presence of a black candidate raises white identity and as a result, in-group evaluations in the election become much more relevant (Petrow, Transue, & Vercellotti, 2018; Jardina, 2020). This demonstrates that not only are in-

group evaluations an important dimension for scholars to consider when analyzing white attitudes but also, as mentioned before, it demonstrates that white identification is quite contextual. This contextuality of white identity also appears for those who think whites are discriminated against and who recognize a linked fate to other whites (Takahashi & Jefferson, 2021). For those individuals, they are more likely to report that descriptive representation for whites matters - it is important to have a white candidate (Schildkraut, 2017).

The literature on the relevance of studying in-group attitudes among whites is not just a new movement among scholars concerned with the topic but are looking to assuage concerns of scholars generalizing that whites are racist. Not only did the scholars above make painstaking efforts to show that white in-group attitudes are becoming quite politically influential, but scholars for some time have recognized the power that in-group attitudes have in shaping white politically behavior and attitudes. In line with the narrative thesis of racial identity, whites often do not feel the need to claim a white identity as other racial groups do because their racial identity often has a number of relative advantages to it (McDermott & Samson, 2005). As time moved on and the radicalization of politics became evident (Tesler, 2016; Sides, Tesler, & Vavreck, 2018), however, a number of scholars have noted that whites have increasingly displayed psychological attachments to other whites (Schildkraut, 2017). This increase in psychological attachment is indeed associated with increases in reports of feeling status threats to whites more generally (Wong & Cho, 2005).

The historical context and the surveyed literature not only explains historical narrative as to how whiteness has been defined, expanded those definitions to exclude those who were formally enslaved, those who immigrated from poor countries, and how scholars and society have decreasingly relied on taxonomical classifications of race over time.

The political science literature demonstrates the fertile theoretical foundation that considering in-group attitudes provide when studying white identity. While the latter may be only associated with whites who express some form of racism, the former demonstrates the ways in which white people evaluate politics and behave in that sector of life to protect the interests of a group they likely rarely think much about. The discussion thus far intentionally still obscures how exactly one moves from recognizing the differences between racial groups to claiming an identity with a particular group and then converting that into an evaluative lens which later orients their behavior. The next section is aims to discuss such a mechanism.

4 Racial Ambivalence to White Identity to Protecting One's Group

From the survey of the literature above, it is quite clear that there is a point of inflection between when scholars studied white American's political attitudes as motivated by hostility toward non-whites and when scholars began to consider the role of favoritism towards their own group. While no published work has explicitly bridged the gap between how much of policy areas are in-group versus out-group evaluations for whites, a working paper is currently testing the claim that whites are more supportive of redistributive policies that benefit whites relative to Blacks - in contrast, racial resentment kicks in when those redistributive policies are relatively more helpful to nonwhite racial groups (Roberts, Engelhardt, & Utych, 2021). What caused this shift in attention for scholars?

In the January of 2009, a number of people felt that the United States were moving

into a post-racial era of politics. In 2016, those same people were back-peddling. Tesler (2016) demonstrates that between 2008 and 2016, politics did indeed become more racialized as opposed to move to this post-racial political world. It was so racialized, in fact, that Republican and Democratic voting coalitions were largely based on racial and ethnic identities (Sides et al., 2018). In short, race was salient. With this salience of race, there comes along with it, discussions of increasing diversity in the United States and the need for a more equitable criminal, political, and economic system. With this increased salience of race along with calls to bring about more equitable opportunities for non-whites, this presents itself as a status threat for those with long-held privileges (Takahashi & Jefferson, 2021). Salience and feelings of status threat among those who already recognize the distinctions between whites and nonwhites are pre-requisites for one to claim an identity (Huddy, 2001).

While these may be abstract national conversations to most people, those experiencing them locally are much more likely to recognize the truth to the fact that whites are not alone as Americans. Enos (2017) demonstrates that whites recognize demographic shifts in their communities and go further to adjust their preferences for local policy. That is, when whites notice more nonwhites in their commutes, at the grocery store, see more government provided housing, these whites often shift their attitudes toward policy - often these views become more prohibitive towards racial equity (Enos, 2017). As whites recognize the changes to their community and shape their attitudes and behaviors accordingly, it seems reasonable that so too does their willingness to claim their identity as a white person.

Social identity theory would suggest that those noticing demographic changes in their neighborhoods and change their behavior, it is a sign that they are clearly seeing distinctions between their racial groups and those not in their racial group (Howard,

2000). With these distinctions drawn, whites are faced with the fact that they may be becoming a minority within their community and will react accordingly (Enos, 2017). This change in behavior may demonstrate the recognition of a status threat among whites. As a result of this status threat is an increase in self-preservation for your self-esteem since people tend to want positive evaluations of themselves which, in turn, seek to protect those like them (Howard, 2000; Leach et al., 2008; Huddy, 2012). The key mechanism for this to occur is a psychological attachment or the presence of recognizing a linked fate with others in the group (Huddy, 2012). As noted earlier, whites do in fact have a sense of attachment to one another through their shared history of holding relatively higher social status because of their race (Howard, 2000; McDermott & Samson, 2005).

Furthermore, it seems likely that anxious whites are attuned to economic shifts as well. For example, the literature on economic political mobilization demonstrates that, in general, those experiencing economic loss are the most likely to seek participatory means in hopes to change their current trajectory (Burden & Wichowsky, 2014). This is quite deeply rooted in psychology. Albertson and Kushner Gadarian (2015) demonstrate that anxious individuals are much more likely to seek out more information about the threat and will cling much tighter to their beliefs. In this case, these results may be extrapolated to predict that individuals will seek to collect more information that supports the claim that whites are increasingly threatened to lose their racial status and to behave as such. Like economic factors are likely to trigger anxiety, and as a result, participate in more self-soothing behaviors, but Albertson and Kushner Gadarian (2015) demonstrates that so does presenting individuals with information about a racially-laden policy.

To summarize, whites have had ample opportunity since 2008 to see that the racial hierarchy that they've long enjoyed is changing. With this salience of race, whites who

are most cognizant of this change and feel the material effects of this are likely to be more motivated to preserve themselves and the status of other whites. The clearest way that whites may feel this is by changes in their community. While some of the literature cited above acknowledges demographic differences, class has long been associated with defining whiteness (Painter, 2010). This deeply-rooted distinction means that to be white is to also be economically advantaged. While this classification has lost relevance, the benefits that white people enjoy because of their race are partly economic. This means that not only demographic shifts are likely to be important for individuals to feel the need to identify and behaviorally shift with other whites, but also their relative material status is also likely relevant.

5 Methods

To test whether the material and racial context one might find themselves in determines their likelihood to assume a white political identity, I use observational data from the 2012 and 2016 American National Election Studies and data from the 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016 American Community Surveys conducted by the United States Census Bureau. Given that existing scholarly definitions of whiteness are based in a self-recognition and attachment to that racial group, those who claim that they are white in the ANES are the respondents of focus in the study. Speaking to the dependent variable, among those who claim that they are racially white, the white identity item common in both the 2012 and 2016 ANES is a question of whether being white is important to who they are. Using this measure, it fits with the more narrative-based definition of whiteness that we use today as opposed to a more rigid or taxonomic one. While the item fails to acknowledge the fluidity and contextuality by which identity or the importance

of it may present itself as, it does a good enough job as a valid measure (Jardina, 2020).

As my theory extrapolated from the literature suggests, white people who often receive economic advantages as a result of their whiteness may be more likely to recognize an economic status threat due to race than those who do not. As a result, measuring the relative status of these whites in their communities is significant. With access to each ANES respondent's congressional district, I used a few measures from the American Community Survey of the economy within each congressional district. Specifically, congressional district Gini coefficients may be able to give me a sense whether high levels of inequality have an effect on white ANES respondent's willingness to claim a white identity. High levels of inequality better clarify the boundaries of status in a community. Whites living in a district with a high Gini coefficient may be less concerned about their relative status due to the fact that there is little status threat they are faced with. Alternatively, Gini coefficients are somewhat biased to not overall inequality but a district may appear quite unequal if there are less than a handful of extremely wealthy households in a district while the rest of the district may have less variance from the median. Alternatively I include a measure of relative standing for the respondent's household income to the median household income in the district; which is the most direct measure of relative material status in their community. I also in models 3 and 4 use the percentage below the poverty line in the given district as opposed to the Gini coefficient as a robustness check for the wealthy outliers present in the Gini Coefficient. Finally, if a district is becoming more equitable in terms of income, we should expect to see the most change among those respondents. As a result, all four models look at the change in the two years prior to relative income as opposed to the static relative standing of the respondent's household.

Demographic changes are also important to my theory. I use demographic data from

the American Community Surveys to determine whether respondents in districts with the most change in the percentage of whites in a district become more or less likely to assume a white identity. As seen in Table 1, I also include a number of attitudinal measures to act as a foil for my theory. That is, my theory heavily rests on the assumption that white respondents recognize changes within their community and not just rely on attitudes developed from national trends they read in the news. Furthermore, people may also not recognize the percent changes in their district but may use evaluations about their personal economic standing as a way to evaluate what is happening around them as a heuristic. Thankfully, the ANES asks respondents a number of questions that get at this. Prospective and Retrospective evaluations of whether a respondent is doing better off and whether they were unemployed recently in the past are three useful variables which may shed light on the difference of effect on white identity between actual economic status changes and perceived economic status changes. Additionally, there is some support that people tend to nationalize politics and the economy, thus making their attitudes much more dependent on national events (Mackuen, Erikson, & Stimson, 1989; Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998; Hopkins, 2009, 2010, 2018).

For modeling my theory, I elect to use a multilevel model that interacts both relative income for a respondent along with race. The random effects give me a weighted average among all respondents within a given district and compares those weighted averages with those of other districts. In the model, both the slope and the constant vary. Interacting changes in income and race allows for me to test whether both demographic and economic changes in a district effect the the willingness for whites in that district to adjust their likelihood of assuming a white identity. These are likely to go hand-in-hand. Whites will not just simply become more conscious about their white identity if other wealthy whites move in or if extremely poor nonwhites move into their district; it will

most likely move the dependent variable when their relative status is threatened.

Model 1 and Model 3 show the effects of context and perception in 2012 and Models 2 and 4 show the effects in 2016. In 2012, the results demonstrate that the perception of the national economy's future is positively associated with white identification. That is, in 2012, those who saw the future of the economy as getting better were significantly more likely by about 0.29 points to claim a white identity. Additionally in 2012, those that had experienced unemployment in the past were about 0.2 points less likely to move up the white identity scale relative to those who had not experienced unemployment in the past. Finally, the third model demonstrates that those residing in districts with a higher share of those living under the poverty line were significantly less likely to assume a white identity by 0.01 points relative to those in a district with lower shares of poverty.

What we see in 2012 changes in 2016. Jardina, Kalmoe, and Gross (2020) demonstrates that those disgusted by Trump were less likely to claim a white identity. I replicate this finding in my 2016 models. The context for which white identifiers operated in certainly were politically different. The 2 models (2 and 4) demonstrate that the ideology of the respondent mattered. Those who were more conservative were about 0.008 points more likely to claim a white identity. The 2016 models also demonstrate that perception reigned supreme in predicting white identity over observed context. Those who felt that they were going to be better off in the next year were about 0.29 points less likely to assume a white identity than those who where more concerned about their future economic status. This provides yet more support for the hypothesis that white identifiers are concerned about their relative status.

Table 1: 2012 and 2016 Effects of Context on assuming white political identity

	White Identity Importance			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Income	0.016	0.0002	0.006	−0.007
	(0.018)	(0.075)	(0.019)	(0.076)
Δ Race	−0.006	0.038	−0.006	0.038
	(0.003)	(0.035)	(0.003)	(0.035)
Gini Coefficient	0.223	−0.022		
	(1.113)	(1.608)		
% Below Poverty			−0.010*	−0.006
			(0.004)	(0.010)
Prospective Better Off	−0.104	−0.295*	−0.118	−0.292*
	(0.084)	(0.118)	(0.083)	(0.118)
Retrospective Better Off	−0.035	−0.126	−0.032	−0.128
	(0.057)	(0.116)	(0.057)	(0.116)
Economy - Past	−0.096	−0.035	−0.113	−0.033
	(0.092)	(0.124)	(0.092)	(0.124)
Economy - Future	0.293*	0.122	0.291*	0.121
	(0.085)	(0.132)	(0.084)	(0.131)
Unemployed in Past	−0.214*	0.057	−0.205*	0.061
	(0.089)	(0.125)	(0.088)	(0.125)
Partisanship	−0.056	0.052	−0.062	0.049
	(0.045)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.053)
Ideology	−0.001	0.008*	0.001	0.008*
	(0.064)	(0.003)	(0.063)	(0.003)
Disgust with Trump		−0.122		−0.125
		(0.093)		(0.093)
Δ Income *X* Δ Race	0.001	−0.021	0.001	−0.018
	(0.001)	(0.026)	(0.001)	(0.027)
Constant	2.734*	2.965*	3.102*	3.065*
	(0.559)	(1.007)	(0.225)	(0.667)
N	380	174	380	174
Adjusted R^2	0.046	0.135	0.065	0.137

Source: 2012 and 2016 American National Election Studies.
Ordinary Least Squares with Congressional District Random Effects Coefficients.
Standard Errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$

6 Discussion and conclusions

The results do not confirm my hypothesis. In fact, it supports that perception of financial positioning is more important for predicting white identification than the actual relative standing of whites. Specifically, the results demonstrate that in 2012, those who were more enthusiastically in agreement that the economy would do well in the future were also more likely to claim a white identity. In 2016, this national economic evaluation mattered less. Perception still mattered in 2016, however. Those who felt that they were personally going to be financially worse off in the future likely recognized a higher status threat and were more likely to move up the white identity scale. The models also pick up on the change in political environment that whites were experiencing in 2012 and 2016. The models demonstrate that the actual demographic and economic shifts within a district are less predictive of white identity but that a few different perceptions of economic status among whites do matter. While it is improper to compare why 2012's and 2016's predictors are different without testing its own theory, it appears that ideology became more important in 2016 - which reflects the anecdotal claims of a more cohesive movement after the 2016 GOP presidential primary among conservatives to protect white interests which was central to Trump's campaign.

These results further complicate the story of why whites assume a white identity. While exact reasons changed between 2012 and 2016, both results show that the perceptions of whites matter for explaining why they are behaviorally changing. Given that white identity is driven by perception, the next step for scholars is to better understand the role of frames about political and economic events that drive this white identity. In doing so, it should also elucidate to what extent different frames effect more personal economic perceptions mattered in 2016 and why more nationalized perceptions of the

economy mattered in 2012 for white identity development.

References

Albertson, B., & Kushner Gadarian, S. (2015). *Anxious Politics: Democratic Citizenship in a Threatening World*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Berry, J. A., Ebner, D., & Cornelius, M. (2019). White identity politics: linked fate and political participation. *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, *0*(0), 1–19. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2019.1615965 doi: 10.1080/21565503.2019.1615965

Bunyasi, T. L. (2019). The Role of Whiteness in the 2016 Presidential Primaries. *Perspectives on Politics*, *17*(3), 679–698. doi: 10.1017/S1537592719001427

Burden, B. C., & Wichowsky, A. (2014). Economic discontent as a mobilizer: Unemployment and voter turnout. *Journal of Politics*, *76*(4), 887–898. doi: 10.1017/S0022381614000437

Enos, R. D. (2017). *The Space Between Us: Social Geography and Politics*.

Gilens, M. (1999). *Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Green, D. P., Strolovitch, D. Z., & Wong, J. S. (1998). and Racially Motivated Crime 1. , *104*(2), 372–403.

Hopkins, D. J. (2009). Partisan reinforcement and the poor: The impact of context on explanations for poverty. *Social Science Quarterly*, *90*(3), 744–764. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6237.2009.00641.x

Hopkins, D. J. (2010). Politicized places: Explaining where and when immigrants provoke local opposition. *American Political Science Review*, *104*(1), 40–60. doi: 10.1017/S0003055409990360

Hopkins, D. J. (2018). *The Increasingly United States: How and Why American Politi-*

cal Behavior Nationalized. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.

Howard, J. A. (2000). Social psychology of identities. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *26*, 367–393. doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.367

Huddy, L. (2001). From social to political identity: A critical examination of social identity theory. *Political Psychology*, *22*(1), 127–156. doi: 10.1111/0162-895X.00230

Huddy, L. (2012). From Group Identitity to Political Cohesion and Commitment. In L. Huddy (Ed.), *The oxford handbook of political psychology* (pp. 737–773). Oxford University Press.

Jardina, A. (2019). *White Identity Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Jardina, A. (2020). In-Group Love and Out-Group Hate: White Racial Attitudes in Contemporary U.S. Elections. *Political Behavior*(0123456789). Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-020-09600-x doi: 10.1007/s11109-020-09600-x

Jardina, A., Kalmoe, N., & Gross, K. (2020). Disavowing White Identity: How Social Disgust can Change Social Identities. *Political Psychology*, *0*(0), 1–18. doi: 10.1111/pops.12717

Kinder, D. R., & Sanders, L. M. (1996). *Divided By Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Leach, C. W., van Zomeren, M., Zebel, S., Vliek, M. L., Pennekamp, S. F., Doosje, B., ... Spears, R. (2008). Group-Level Self-Definition and Self-Investment: A Hierarchical (Multicomponent) Model of In-Group Identification. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *95*(1), 144–165. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.95.1.144

López, I. H. (2006). *White By Law: The Legal Construction Of Race* (2nd ed.). New

York: New York University Press.

Mackuen, M. B., Erikson, R. S., & Stimson, J. A. (1989). Macropartisanship. *American Political Science Review*, *83*(4), 1125–1142.

McDermott, M., & Samson, F. L. (2005). White racial and ethnic identity in the United States. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *31*, 245–261. doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.31.041304.122322

Painter, N. I. (2010). *The History Of White People*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.

Petrow, G. A., Transue, J. E., & Vercellotti, T. (2018). Do White In-group Processes Matter, Too? White Racial Identity and Support for Black Political Candidates. *Political Behavior*, *40*(1), 197–222. doi: 10.1007/s11109-017-9422-8

Rile Hayward, C. (2013). *How Americans Make Race: Stories, Institutions, Spaces*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Roberts, D. C., Engelhardt, A. M., & Utych, S. M. (2021). *The Policy Preferences of White Identifiers.*

Schildkraut, D. J. (2017). White attitudes about descriptive representation in the US: the roles of identity, discrimination, and linked fate. *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, *5*(1), 84–106. doi: 10.1080/21565503.2015.1089296

Schildkraut, D. J. (2019). The Political Meaning of Whiteness for Liberals and Conservatives. *Forum (Germany)*, *17*(3), 421–446. doi: 10.1515/for-2019-0028

Sides, J., Tesler, M., & Vavreck, L. (2018). *Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Takahashi, K. J., & Jefferson, H. J. (2021). When the Powerful Feel Voiceless: White Identity and Feelings of Racial Voicelessness. *PsyArXiv Preprints*.

Tesler, M. (2016). *Post-Racial or Most-Racial?: Race and Politics In The Obama Era*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

van Doorn, B. W. (2015). Pre- and post-welfare reform media portrayals of poverty in the United States: The continuing importance of race and ethnicity. *Politics and Policy*, *43*(1), 142–162. doi: 10.1111/polp.12107

Wetts, R., & Willer, R. (2018). Privilege on the precipice: Perceived racial status threats lead white americans to oppose welfare programs. *Social Forces*, *97*(2), 793–822. doi: 10.1093/sf/soy046

White, I. K., & Laird, C. N. (2020). *Steadfast Democrats: How Social Forces Shape Black Political Behavior*. Princeton University Press.

White, I. K., Laird, C. N., & Allen, T. D. (2014). Selling out?: The politics of navigating conflicts between racial group interest and self-interest. *American Political Science Review*, *108*(4), 783–800. doi: 10.1017/S000305541400046X

Willer, R., Feinberg, M., & Wetts, R. (2016). Threats to Racial Status Promote Tea Party Support Among White Americans. *SSRN Electronic Journal*(416). doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2770186

Winter, N. J. G. (2008). *Dangerous Frames: How Ideas About Race & Gender Shape Public Opinion*. Chicago University Press.

Wong, C., & Cho, G. E. (2005). Two-headed coins or kandinskys: White racial identification. *Political Psychology*, *26*(5), 699–720. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2005.00440.x