Maximizing Representation and Accountability
in the Design of Electoral Systems

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Data Codebook, Version 2.0
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Variables

Case_no
Cases are parliamentary/legislative elections in all democratic countries since 1945.

Country
Country cases are all countries with populations of over 1 million and in periods when they had a Polity IV political freedom score of ≥ +6.

Cases: Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.

ISO3_code
International Organization for Standardization country code

Election_yr
Year of election. Most are from Golder (2005). Others from various web-based sources.

Tag
Combines ISO3_code with last two digits of election year.

Regime

Regime type / form of government. 0 = parliamentary, 1 = hybrid, 2 = presidential.
Source: mainly Cheibub, 2006. Nb. Switzerland coded as "hybrid".

Parl

Parliamentary system. 1 = parliamentary, 0 = other.

Hybrid

Hybrid (parliamentary-presidential, semi-presidential) system. 1 = hybrid, 0 = other.

Pres

Presidential system. 1 = presidential, 0 = other.

ES

Electoral system. 2 = Proportional, 1 = Modified, 0 = Majoritarian. For explanations see the next
three variables.

ES_maj

Dummy denotes majoritarian electoral system (including SMP, MRO, AV electoral systems). If
district magnitude (M) =1 for all districts, ES_maj = 1 ; otherwise = 0

Unless otherwise noted, values are from (Golder, 2005). Values for Bostwana, Ghana, Mauritius
and New Zealand are from the Center on Democratic Performance (No Date)

Values for all countries (unless otherwise noted) that are after 2000 are from the Center on
Democratic Performance (No Date)

ES_prop

Dummy denotes pure proportional system (including list PR with large districts, compensatory
MMP systems, or STV (if M high enough).

Values for Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Norway,
Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania are from Center on Democratic Performance (No Date).

Values from France for 1951 and 1956 from Sinopoli and Iannantuoni (2001)

Values for all countries (unless otherwise noted) that are after 2000 are from the Center on Democratic Performance (No Date)

ES_modified

Dummy denotes modified PR systems ((including PR with small districts, PR with high formal threshold, mixed-member parallel systems, or winner-bonus electoral systems)

ES_modified = 1 if:
- Median Magnitude (MedM) <= 8, OR
- Non-compensatory mixed member, OR
- Legal Threshold >= .05, OR
- Compensatory mixed member AND Prop_PR <= .333

Values for Albania, Armenia, Bolivia Fiji, Japan, Lesotho, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Russia are from Center on Democratic Performance (No Date).

Values for Guatamala from International IDEA, *Handbook of Electoral System Design* (1997)

Values for all countries (unless otherwise noted) that are after 2000 are from the Center on Democratic Performance (No Date)

Dist_magn

Mean district magnitude in the election.

Coding rules:
- PR: Size of chamber / # of PR districts
- Non-compensatory mixed system: Size of chamber / Sum of # of districts (of any sort)
- Compensatory mixed system: Size of chamber / # of PR districts
  - o In PR systems, compensatory upper tiers (e.g. Norway and Denmark) were counted as an additional PR district. Upper tiers that merely redistribute remainders were not counted.

Notes on specific cases for coding Dist_magn

Albania: 1992, 1997, 2001: compensatory mixed system, so (seats/PR districts): 140/1. (See Shvetsova 1999 and http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2001_B.htm and http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2001_01.htm). So (Seats/PR)=(140/1).
1996: non-compensatory mixed system, so (seats/SMD+1), with 1 for the PR district: 155/116, 155 total seats with 115 SMD.
Shvetsova gives the incorrect number of seats for 1997. See http://www.parlament.al/english/kuv-pop.html. She also incorrectly sees Albania as a non-compensatory system in 97 and 2001: (http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/1170_en.pdf.html) . Information in Golder is correct here (see also Birch 2001).

Armenia: 1999: non-compensatory mixed system, so (seats/SMD+PR) = (131/75+1) . See Birch 2001.

Austria:
- three tiers: local, regional and national; 43 local districts, 9 regional and 1 national.
- regional and national level both allocate remainders
- difficult to determine the size of the district as the size is always a potential size.

Benin, 1999: from Monroe and Rose data.

Bolivia: 1997 and 2002: compensatory mixed system. 130 seats; 68 in SMDs, 62 in 9 MMCs; regional list vote determines overall share, but there are no overhang seats, which weakens smaller parties (Nohlen 2005, p.131 and http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2037_B.htm for details). Magnitude: (seats/PR), so (130/9).

Bulgaria, 1990: non-compensatory – see Shvetsova 2001. 200 runoff seats, 200 PR seats in 28 districts. (Seats/SMD+PR)=(400/228)

Chile: 60 2-member districts. (Added 2001 median magnitude). (Seats/districts)=(120/60)

Colombia: seats – 2001: 166, 1998: 161, 1994: 163 (different from Golder: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2067_94.htm), 1991: 161; 33 MMCs throughout. (Golder, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2067_B.htm and Nohlen 2005 agree).

Czech Republic: Seats in 1992: 150 for the lower house, 300 in total (EJPR, political data 1992), districts: 12 (Shvetsova 1999).

Denmark, 2001: information from Adam Carr's site. 175 seats, 40 in compensatory national tier (Birch 2001), rest in 17 constituences, so (175/18).
1947-1998: recalculated adding upper tier, but otherwise based on Golder (2005).

Dominican Republic: 2002 – 150 seats in 47 MMC districts (Nohlen, 2005: 245), so (150/47).

Ecuador: For elections in this database: two-tiered system, with a national, PR upper tier and a lower tier of PR MMCs. Non-compensatory. Formula: (Seats/MMCs+national PR)

El Salvador: Similar electoral system to Ecuador (PR in MMCs+national PR). Since 1991: 14 MMCs, with 3 to 16 seats, plus a nationwide constituency. Nohlen (2005, p.274; Monroe and Rose)

Germany: compensatory mixed system, so (seats/number of PR districts). 2002 seat information from: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2121_02.htm. 2002 district information from : http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/wahlen/bundestagswahl2002/deutsch/wkeint2002/btw2002/index_btw2002.htm.
16 PR districts (1990-2002), 11 (1957-1990) and 10 (1949-1957).

Formula (seats/number of PR districts).

Guatemala: for 1985, congress size is 100 (not in Golder: see Jones 1995 and Nohlen, 2005, 320). Number of districts is 23 (Jones, 1995). Seats in 2003: 158 (Nohlen 2005, p.320 and http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2129_03.htm). The system is non-compensatory, so (seats/all districts), i.e. (seats/MMCs+PR)

Honduras, 2001: plurality system in 2 SMCs and PR in 16 MMCs (each 2 to 23 seats). Seats allocated at constituency level. Nohlen, 2005: 405. According to IPU (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2139_B.htm), this system has been used since 1989; this supported by Golder data. Mean magnitudes correct.

Hungary: 386 deputies throughout; 176 SMDs+20 MMCs (146 deputies)+1 national list (64 deputies); in 1994 and 1998, the numbers were (176, 162, 58) (from Shvetsova 1999); in 2002, the numbers were (175, 152 ,58). Only the third level is connected to the other two, but this is still in essence a compensatory system. Massicote and Blais (1999) argue that Hungary is 'chiefly' a superposition system, with PR districts and SMD districts independent of each other, plus a correctional national tier. Thus the formula is (386/SMDs+MMCs+PR)= (386/197).

Ireland, 1997: mean magnitude follows Monroe and Rose data.

Italy: 1994-2001, compensatory mixed system. 630 seats, 475 SMDs, 155 PR (in 26 constituencies). The number of districts has not changed. So (seats/PR districts), i.e. (630/26).

Japan: Mixed-member system, non-compensatory, with 11 upper-tier districts and 300 SMDs. Size 500 in 1996, 480 in 2000. 311 total districts. Formula (500/311) and (480/311). More details in Mitchell and Gallagher, 2005 (ch. on Japan).

Latvia: from Adam Carr (http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/l/latvia/latvia20022.txt) – 100 seats, 5 districts – mean of 20.

Lesotho: Source: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2181_B.htm

National Assembly:
Mixed voting system:
- 80 deputies directly elected in single-member constituencies by absolute majority;
- 40 deputies directly elected by proportional representation and national party lists.

A compensatory system: http://eprints.ru.ac.za/478/01/Fox_The_general_election_in_Leso.pdf, http://www.ps.au.dk/elklit/Publikationer/JAE.pdf

Mean magnitude: seats/PR districts, i.e. 120/1.

Lithuania: 141 seats, 71 by SMD, 70 by PR (in one national district), non-compensatory, so (141/72).

Macedonia: Source: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2313_B.htm

All 120 members of the Sobranie are elected by party list proportional system, using closed lists for four-year terms. The country is divided into six election districts determined by law. Each district elects 20 members of parliament. Each voter votes for a list and seats are distributed on a proportional basis, according to the D'Hondt formula. This was the system used in 2002 (http://www.izbori.gov.mk/par2002/).

From Shvetsova, 1999 and Birch, 2001:
- In 1994, Macedonia used SMD with runoff. 120 seats.
- In 1998, Macedonia used a mixed system: 2 tiers, lower tier SMD with runoff (85 seats) ; upper tier, D'Hondt PR with 5% threshold in one national district (35 seats). (According to http://www.izbori98.gov.mk/English/html/political_system.htm, this was a non-compensatory system.)

Mean Mag:
- 1994: 1
- 1998: 120/86
- 2002: 120/6

Madagascar: Source: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2193_B.htm
Electoral law from 1992:
- 82 single-member and 34 two-member constituencies
- Mixed system:
  o simple majority vote in 82 single-member constituencies
  o party-list proportional representation vote in 34 two-member constituencies, using the rule of highest average.

Note: These are the 2002 rules: the seat numbers changed again in 2007. Total districts: 116; seats: 160.

Seat numbers correct in Golder database. Seats in 2002: 160

System is non-compensatory.

Mean Mag:
1998 and 2002: (150/(82+34))

New Zealand: 120 seats (German-style *überhangmandate* possible, but never needed). 67 constituency seats. Upper tier is a national district, compensatory mixed system. So: 120/1. Info from: http://2002.electionresults.govt.nz/partystatus.html and Nohlen, G, H, 2001: 712f.

Panama: 40 constituencies (26 SMDs, 14 MMCs), median of 1 (Nohlen 2005, 516; Golder)

Paraguay: 18 constituences (4 SMDs, 14 MMCs). 80 seats. No compensation, so (seats/districts), i.e. (80/18) (Jones, 1995).

Philippines: 1998, 2001. seats: 260 in 1998 and 2001. SMDs + unusual PR element (Reilly 2007). This is essentially a non-compensatory mixed system, so (seats/districts), and since the lower tier seats number 208 (not 206 as Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann.2001 state), this is: (260/208).

Poland: data from Birch (2001) and Shvetsova (1999) (inclusion of upper tier seats and list).

Romania, 1996 (from Brancati data).

Russia: 2003. 225 single-member constituencies, 1 multi-member (225 seats) constituency (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2263_B.htm, confirmed by http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_legislative_election%2C_2003) . Non-compensatory, so (450/226).

Serbia and Montenegro: 138 seats (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2355_00.htm), 27 constituences (Birch 2001), 5% threshold (at constituency level). More information in Birch (2002). Regional PR system.

Slovakia: no change in 2002 – information added from http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2285_02.htm

South Korea: Seats: 273 in 2000, 299 in 1996, 1992, 1988. Districts: 253 SMDs in 88, 92, 96 and 227 in 2000; 1 46-seat national PR district. (from Hicken and Kasuya 2002 and Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann.2001: 417). The system changed a little in from 1996; before that the tiers were linked: "If one party won at least half of the directly elected seats, it was automatically entitled to two-thirds of the proportional seats; if it gained less, the strongest party was still awarded half of the national list seats." (from Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann.2001: 414). Either way, this could be called non-compensatory (since there is a winner's bonus instead).
For 1988-1996: (299/254); for 2000: (273/227)

Sweden, 2002: using 21 districts + one compensatory upper tier: 349/22 (see Adam Carr, http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/s/sweden/)
1970 – 1998: recalculated, adding the compensatory tier as an additional district, but otherwise based on Golder.

Taiwan: Nohlen, 2001: 533: "Plurality system in SMCs and single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in MMCs with an additional national constituency. There is also SNTV in two special nation-wide constituencies reserved for aborigine minorities and proportional representation in a MMC for overseas Chinese. Each elector is entitled to one single vote.
Among the 225 parliamentary seats, 168 are elected in four SMCs and 21 MMCs, ranging from two to 27 seats, (nine constituencies with 2–4; four constituencies with 6–7; six constituencies with 9–12; one constituency with 20 and 27 seats respectively, average size 7.8). 41 seats are distributed in proportion to the national total of votes, received by the party candidate in the SMCs and MMCs. A national threshold of five per cent is applied. Seat allocation follows the Hare-Niemeyer formula. Eight special seats for the aborigine minorities are elected in two nation-wide MMCs, with four seats each. Further eight seats for the overseas Chinese are elected in one

MMC. The system applied is proportional representation and the electoral formula for seat-allocation is Hare-Niemeyer."
So: non-compensatory, (4+21+1+2+1)=29 districts; formula: (225/29)

Thailand: 1996: Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann.2001, 269f.:In the 1996 elections there were 156 constituencies altogether (seven SMCs, 61 two-member and 88 three-member constituencies), in which the plurality system with multiple vote was applied. The voting age was lowered from 20 to 18 years.
Hicken and Kasuya 2002: pre-2001, the elections were MMCs only, no PR element, just as many votes as there are seats.

2001: 500 seats (http://www.ipu.org/english/parline/reports/arc/2311%5F01.htm)
Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann.2001, p.272: Segmented system. Of the 500 seats, 400 are elected according to the plurality system in single-member constituencies (SMCs). To this end, Thailand's 76 provinces (including the capital city of Bangkok) are divided into 400 constituencies of approx. 150,000 inhabitants each. The 100 national seats are distributed proportionally among closed and blocked party lists that have received at least five percent of the total number of votes. Seats are assigned according to Hare quota and largest remainder.

So, non-compensatory mixed system in 2001, after reform in 1997.
Mean Mag for 2001: (500/401); mean magnitude for other years follows Golder.

Turkey: seat numbers from Golder, except 1983 (from Nohlen 2001, 240). District numbers from Golder checked. PR in small MMCs with a threshold. 2002 information from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_general_election%2C_2002 and http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2323_02.htm .

1999: 10 TMCs, 17 three-member, 12 four-member, 5 five-member, 10 six-member, 6 seven-member, 3 eight-member, 3 nine-member, 4 ten-member, 2 eleven-member, 4 twelve-member, 3 fourteen-member, 2 sixteen-member, one 21-member, and two 24-member constituencies

Ukraine: seat numbers from Golder and http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2331_A.htm; non-comp in 1998, 225 seats each; 1994 just 450 SMDs; 2002: same system as in 1998 (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2331_02.htm)

Values from (Golder, 2005, avemag). Values for Bostwana, Paraguay, from Keefer

Dist_Mag_Medians
Median district magnitude in the election. This means the magnitude (M) of the district for which there are an equal number of districts with greater, and lesser, values on M.

N.B: Our measure of median M is different from the median M (MedMag) variable from Golder's (2005) widely cited dataset. Golder's codebook describes MedMag as 'the district magnitude associated with the median legislator in the lowest tier.' As we understand it, this mean identifying the median by *legislator* rather than by district – that is, as the legislator for whom there are an equal number of other legislators from districts of greater and or lesser M –

then assigning the value of MedMag as the M of that legislator's district. To see the difference, and how it can matter, consider an electoral system with 50 seats across 7 districts of the following M:

<p style="text-align:center">2, 3, 3, 5, 6, 14, 17</p>

The median magnitude (**Dist_Mag_Medians**) as defined in this dataset would be 5, because there is an equal number of districts with M>5 and M<5. Golder would code his MedMag by counting up to the 25th legislator (out of 50), who is in a 14-member district, and assigning MedMag=14. Note that Golder's method frequently yields MedMag>MeanMag (or AveMag, as in Golder's data). By contrast, with the method used in this dataset, **Dist_Mag_Medians <= Dist_magn** in almost all cases, insofar as the conventional format for districting is to have many low-M districts in rural areas, and fewer high-M districts in larger, metropolitan areas. (Under our method, the only way to get **Dist_magn > Dist_Mag_Medians** would be to have a larger number of high-M districts than low-M districts, but the demographic and districting conditions that might lead to such a configuration are unusual.)

Coding rules:
- PR: Median of all PR districts (including compensatory upper tier[s])
- Non-compensatory mixed system: Median of all districts (of any sort)
- Compensatory mixed system: Median of PR districts

Albania, 1992, 1997 and 2001: one compensatory tier, 140 seats

Argentina, 2001: median of 3 (from Nohlen, 2005: 65; election with 127 seats [Adam Carr's site]); 1999 from Monroe and Rose

Australia, 2001: 1 as usual

Austria, 1949-1990: from http://www.bmi.gv.at/Wahlen/nrw_history.asp

Belgium, 1968 to 1999 from http://www.ibzdgip.fgov.be/result/fr/search.php?type=year ; data incomplete for earlier elections.

Bolivia, 1997 and 2002, from http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/b/bolivia/, compensatory mixed system, so median of PR districts, in both cases 9.
From Brancati: 1989 and 1993
Corrected values from Carey 2005 & http://www.bolivian.com/cne/

Botswana: SMD system

Brazil: = 10, from Camara dos Deputados do Brasil (2007) http://www2.camara.gov.br/english

Bulgaria, 2001: 31 MMCs (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2045_B.htm). 2001 districts: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/b/bulgaria/bulgaria2.txt. median: 7, 1994 and 1999 medians (also 7) from http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/constituency.asp

Czech Republic, 2002: 12, from Adam Carr's site (http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/c/czechrepublic/czechrepublic20022.txt), 1996 (median: 22.5) from http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/constituency.asp

Costa Rica: from Brancati

Croatia: from Brancati.

Cyprus: 1991, 1995

Denmark, 2001: 7 (data from Adam Carr's site, non-compensatory upper tier included as for Sweden).

Dominican Republic, 2002: 3 (Nohlen, 2005: 245); Dominican Republic, 1998 (from Monroe and Rose)

El Salvador, 1997, from Monroe and Rose

Estonia, 1992, 1996 and 1999 from http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/constituency.asp

France, 2002: median of 1 as usual. France 1986 from Monroe and Rose.

Germany, 1949-2002, from Brancati, median of Land PR districts.

Guatemala, 2003: median magnitude for 2003 added based on Nohlen, 2005: 321. (1x1, 2x2, 7x3, 3x4, 2x5, 1x6, 1x7, 1x8, 2x9, 1x10, 1x11, 1x19) – plus a nationwide constituency of 31 – 4 is the median magnitude.

Honduras, 2001: median of 6.5, from Adam Carr (http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/h/honduras/hondurasleg2003.txt) and Nohlen, 2005: 405. Honduras, 1997 from Monroe and Rose.

Hungary: median of PR top-up seats is 6, from Benoit and Schiemann (2001).

Indonesia, 1999

Ireland, 2002: median of 4 (http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/i/ireland/20022.txt)

Italy, 1992 onwards: deleted median magnitude of 1 as compensatory mixed system. Median for PR regions added from http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/i/italy/ (1996), http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elezioni_politiche_italiane_del_1994/Eletti_camera_proporzionale (1994) and http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elezioni_politiche_italiane_del_2001/Eletti_camera_proporzionale (2001)

Jamaica, 2002: median of 1 as usual (FPTP system)

Latvia, 2002: median of 18 (http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/l/latvia/latvia20022.txt) ; 1998: 18 (http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/l/latvia/latvia1.txt)

Lesotho, 2002: 120. Source: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2181_B.htm
• Mixed voting system:
  80 deputies directly elected in single-member constituencies by absolute majority;
  40 deputies directly elected by proportional representation and national party lists.

A compensatory system: http://eprints.ru.ac.za/478/01/Fox_The_general_election_in_Leso.pdf, http://www.ps.au.dk/elklit/Publikationer/JAE.pdf

Madagascar, 2002: median of 1, as in 1998

Moldova 2002: pure PR, median as mean (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2215_B.htm)

Netherlands: one PR district

Norway: median magnitude for 2001 and 1997 from http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/n/norway/, checked with http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/00/01/10/nos_c710_en/tab/3.html . 1961 to 1993 from http://www.ssb.no/emner/00/01/10/stortingsvalg/histtab/tabeller.html (in Norwegian).

New Zealand, 1996, 1999, 2002: one compensatory tier, 53 seats.

Panama, 1999: from Monroe and Rose.

Papua New Guinea, 2002: FPTP as before, so median of 1

Paraguay: Median M=3 for both elections in the 1990s (Nohlen 2005, Vol.2, p.422)

Peru, 2001: median of 3 (see http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/p/peru/peru20012.txt), PR in 25 MMCs.

Poland, 2002: 41 MMCs (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2255_B.htm), PR in these. Median of 11.

Portugal, 1976 to 2002: information from Portuguese electoral commission website: "Mapa com o número de deputados e sua distribuição pelos círculos", accessible in Portuguese for each election at http://www.cne.pt/index.cfm?sec=0301000000

Romania, 1996 and 2000 (upper tier allocates remainders only and disregarded, see Birch 2001)

Russia 2003: non-compensatory, median 1

Sri Lanka, 2001: non-compensatory, 22 MMCs and one national tier. Info from
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/s/srilanka/srilanka20012.txt and see separate note. Median
for 2001: 8

Sweden, 1948-2002 from Brancati.

Switzerland, 1995, from http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/nrw95/broch.html, 1975-91 from
http://www.news-service.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/9565.pdf , 1971 from
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/nrwstat/stat1971.html, 1967 from
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/nrwstat/stat1967.html . Switzerland, 1999 from Monroe and
Rose.

Turkey, from Brancati.

Ukraine 2002: non-compensatory, median 1.

Venezuela
- 1963-88, MEDIAN M=6. SOURCE: CONSEJO SUPREMO ELECTORAL, *Los partidos políticos y
  sus estadísticas electorales 1946-1984*. Tomo I. Caracas: Septiembre 87, p. 126; CONSEJO
  SUPREMO ELECTORAL, *Elecciones 1998*. Tomo I. Caracas: Septiembre 1990, p. 257
- 1998: MMD are M=1(1), 2(7), 3(7), 4(1), 5(1), 6(3), 8(1), 9(1), 12(1) for 88 list seats, plus
  88 SMD seats, plus 18 compensatory seats.
- 2000: MMDs are M=1(1), 2(14), 3(3), 4(4), 5(1), 6(1) for a total of 65 list seats, plus 100
  SMD seats
- http://www.cne.gov.ve/estadisticas1a.php

Legal_thresh
Legal threshold
Values from (Keefer, 2001). Value for Armenia is from Center on Democratic Performance. To
determine that minimal threshold in Brazil is the electoral quotient (votes/seats) and is relatively
low, used Mainwaring, 1991, p. 22

Eff_thresh
Lijphart formula: 75/(Dist_magn + 1)

Max Eff-Leg
Effective Threshold - the maximum of the legal threshold and Lijphart formula.

Prop_PR
The proportion of seats elected by PR for mixed-member systems.

Albania
Armenia
Bolivia
Czech Republic
Guatemala
Guyana
Hungary
Italy (1994-2001)
Japan (1996-2000)
Lesotho
Lithuania
Macedonia 2002
New Zealand
Russia
South Korea
Thailand
Ukraine

From Center on Democratic Performance.
Check: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Electionworld/Electionworld

Compensatory
Dummy to designate mixed SMD-PR systems in which seats in PR tier are allocated to compensate for disproportionalities in SMD tier.

> =1 if compensatory;
> =0 if SMD/PR non-compensatory (parallel);
> =MD if system is not SMD/PR

Pres_Gov_Crisis_LA
Dummy to denote governments in Latin American presidential systems that faced government crises during the term corresponding to the period of office of each legislature in the dataset.

> PGC=1 if a Latin American presidential regime experienced a government crisis during the legislative period identified by a given observation. Government crisis is 'any episode in which the chief executive threatens to dissolve Congress or supports a constitutional reform having that purpose, attempts a military coup against Congress, or "suspends" the term of the legislature ... until the next election. It also includes any situation in which congressional leaders announce a decision to ipeach the president, to declare him or her incapacitated, or to force his or her resignation; in which at least one hof the houses of Congress debates any of these alternatives; or in which Congress legitimizes a military or civilian uprising against the executive by accepting his "resignation" or by appointing a successor' (Perez-Linan 2007:44-45).

PGC=0 if a Latin American presidential regime did not experience government crisis during the legislative period identified by a given observation.

PGC = Missing Data for observations other than Latin American presidential regimes.

Source: Perez Linan 2007, Table 3.2.

Lat_Am_Pres
Dummy denotes Latin American Presidential regimes (those that take values other than Missing Data on Pres_Gov_Crisis_LA).

Disprop
Disproportionality index (Gallagher formula)

Unless otherwise noted, values are from Gallagher, 2007

Latin American elections were calculated from "Elections in the Americas" by Dieter Nohlen.

Certain African countries (Benin, Bostwana, Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique and Namibia) from Nunley, 2004.

Certain African countries (Benin, Botswana, Malawi, Mali, and Mauritius) also had data from Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut, 1999

Sources on additional miscellaneous elections:

- http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/CYPRUS_1970_E.PDF
- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Madagascar
- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mauritian_general_election,_2000
- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nepalese_legislative_election,_1999

Sng_pty_gvt
Single party Government - dummy variable - 1 if a single party government is formed after the election
Source: Przeworski, Cheibub, and Saiegh (2004)

PIG
Parties in Government. Variable denotes the total number of parties holding cabinet portfolios in first government formed after election.
Source: John Huber's "Government Composition" dataset, for Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,

Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. Data for all other cases calculated from information in *Keesing's Record of World Events*.

Minority_gvt
Minority government - dummy variable - 1 if minority government is formed after the election
Source: Przeworski, Cheibub, and Saiegh (2004)

Gvt_survival_days
Length of survival of government in days.
Source: John Huber's "Government Composition" dataset, for Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. Data for all other cases calculated from information in *Keesing's Record of World Events*.

ENPV
Effective number of (electoral) parties in the election, according to vote shares
Source: Golder, 2005, except:
       Australia 2001
       Austria 2002
       Bulgaria 2001
       Chile 2001
       Cyprus 2001
       Czech Republic 2002
       Denmark 2001
       France 2002
       Germany 2002
       Ireland 2002
       Italy 2001
       Latvia 2002
       Netherlands 2002
       New Zealand 2002
       Norway 2001
       Poland 2001
       Portugal 2002
       Slovakia 2002
       Sweden 2002
       UK 2001
       US 2002
from Gallagher data set

ENPS
Effective number of (legislative) parties in the election, according to lower chamber seat shares
Source: Golder (2005), except:
        Australia 2001
        Austria 2002
        Bulgaria 2001
        Chile 2001
        Cyprus 2001
        Czech Republic 2002
        Denmark 2001
        France 2002
        Germany 2002
        Ireland 2002
        Italy 2001
        Latvia 2002
        Netherlands 2002
        New Zealand 2002
        Norway 2001
        Poland 2001
        Portugal 2002
        Slovakia 2002
        Sweden 2002
        UK 2001
        US 2002
from Gallagher data set

Leg_eff
'Batting average' variable for executive legislative proposals. This variable denotes the proportion of legislative initiatives introduced to the legislature were approved.
Source: Sebastian Saiegh (UCSD) early release of data.

HS_clarity3
Clarity of responsibility measure. Scored 1 for high clarity elections, 0 otherwise.
Source: Hellwig and Samuels, 2007.

HS _govchng
Number of government changes (cabinet reshuffles) since last election.
Source: Hellwig and Samuels, 2007.

HS _pmchng
Number of changes of prime minister since last election.
Source: Hellwig and Samuels, 2007.

Age_dem
Age of democracy. Measured as election year minus the year in which the country first scored +6 or above on the Polity IV index, plus 1 (i.e. first year a country is democratic = 1).

Pol_freedom
Political freedom score (Polity IV)
Most values from Norris, 2005

Econ_freedom
Economic freedom score (Freedom House)
Most values from Norris, 2005. Data for early elections entered at value of earliest datapoint.

Federal
1 = country has a federal political structure, 0 = other.
Source: Source: Adserà, Boix and Paine. 2003.

Population
Population of a country in the year of the election, divided by 1 million. Source: UN Population Division annual estimates. Where data is missing, the estimated population for the nearest year is entered.

GDP_head
GDP per capita, 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars, divided by 1000.
Source: Maddison, 2007, except for Cyprus, from Groningen Growth and Development Centre data, http://www.ggdc.net, and Guyana and Papua New Guinea, from Norris, 2005.

Growth
Mean three-year GDP growth (two years prior to election year + election year).
Source: Calculated from data in Maddison, 2007, except for Cyprus, from Groningen Growth and Development Centre data, http://www.ggdc.net, and Guyana and Papua New Guinea, from Cheibub, 2006. One missing value (Israel 1949) entered as the mean value of the variable.

Gini
Gini index of economic inequality. Gini values with corresponding quality values that are either accept, nn, cs, ps, est, or wg are from Deininger, No Date.   Data imputed for missing values from nearest year where data are available.

Gini values with corresponding quality values that are either 1, 2, 3, or 4 are from United Nations University - World Institute for Development Economics Research. 2005. Data for Benin entered from the Worldbank Development Indicators 2007 dataset.

GiniQuality
Quality of the Gini value recorded. For Deininger values, the qualities mean:

accept included in the WB high quality data set
nn   based on a survey of less than natl coverage
cs   not included in wb set due to availability of estimate from a consistent source
ps   not included cuz no clear reference to primary source
est   based on natl accounts or surveys of less than full natl
wg   excluded cuz based on income earning population only or derived from non representative tax records

For United Nations University - World Institute for Development Economics Research. 2005, values, the qualities mean:

1   a) where the underlying concepts are known b) where the quality of the income concept and the survey can be judged as sufficient according to the criteria described above
2   for observations where the quality of either the income concept or the survey is problematic or unknown or we have not been able to verify the estimates (the sources were not available to us); the country information sheets will often give an indication of the specific problems
3   for observations where both the income concept and the survey are problematic or unknown
4   for observations classified as memorandum items; some of the observations origin from the older compilations of inequality data have been given this rating since the data lying behind the observations often are unreliable

Note - qualities of 3 or 4 are likely not based on the entire country (only accounts for urban areas, for example)

Pt_cgexp
Central government expenditures as a percentage of GDP, constructed using the item Government Finance - Expenditures in the IFS, divided by GDP at current prices and multiplied by 100.
Source: Persson and Tabellini. 2003.

Pt_cgbgt_spl
Central government budget surplus (if positive) or deficit (if negative), as a percentage of GDP, constructed using the item Government Finance - Deficit and Surplus in the IFS, divided by the GDP at current prices and multiplied by 100.
Source: Persson and Tabellini. 2003.

Pt_ssw
Consolidated central government expenditures on social services and welfare as percentage of GDP, as reported in GFS Yearbook, divided by GDP and multiplied by 100.
Source: Persson and Tabellini. 2003.

Pt_trade
Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of GDP.
Source: Persson and Tabellini. 2003.

Pt_prop1564
Percentage of population between 15 and 64 years old in the total population.
Source: Persson and Tabellini. 2003.

Pt_prop65
Percentage of population over the age of 65 in the total population.
Source: Persson and Tabellini. 2003.

Ethnic_fract_fearon
Ethnic fractionalization index according to Fearon, 2003. The index includes ethnic, linguistic and religious groups, using data from CIA World Factbook, the Encyclopedia Britannica, relevant Library of Congress Country Studies, the Minorities at Risk dataset, national censuses, and various other sources. Fearon's data is from 1990 to 1995, but his numbers are constant values for this period. We have entered the same value for all elections in each country, which means that our coding of this variable only varies across countries and does not vary within countries. Two missing values (for Serbia and Montenegro and Taiwan) were entered as the mean value of this variable.

Ethnic_frag
Ethno-linguistic fragmentation index (ELF)
1960 values from (Easterly and Levine, 1997). 1961, 1985 values are from (Roeder, 2001).
Values from 1960-1982 averages are from (Annett, 2001)

Ethnic_frag_average_annett

Dummy variable, coded 1 If the ethnic_frag value is an average from 1960 to 1982, derived from Annett, 2001

Dist_equator

Distance of the capital city of a country from the equator, scaled between 0 (0˚) and 1 (either 90˚S or 90˚N).
Source: http://www.mapsofworld.com/utilities/world-latitude-longitude.htm. (accessed on 21 January 2008).

Latitude

Latitude of the capital city of a country (ranging from 90˚S to 90˚N), rescaled between 0 (90˚S) and 1 (90˚N). I.e. a measure of how far north a country is.
Source: http://www.mapsofworld.com/utilities/world-latitude-longitude.htm. (accessed on 21 January 2008).

W_europe

1 = state in Western Europe, 0 = other. Cases: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.

Americas

1 = state in North or South America, 0 = other. Cases: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Former_com

1 = former Communist state, 0 = other. Cases: Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Ukraine.

Pacific

1 = state in the Pacific region, 0 = other. Cases: Australia, Fiji, Japan, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan.

S_asia

1 = state in South, South East or Central Asia, 0 = other. Cases: Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand.

Africa_me
1 = state in Africa or Middle East, 0 = other. Cases: Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Israel, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,. Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Turkey.

Col_uk
1 = former colony of United Kingdom, 0 = other.
Source: Persson and Tabellini, 2003.

Col_sp_po
1 = former colony of Spain or Portugal, 0 = other.
Source: Persson and Tabellini, 2003.

Col_oth
1 = former colony of a country other than UK, Spain or Portugal, 0 = other.
Source: Persson and Tabellini, 2003.

HDI_score
United Nations Human Development Index.
Source: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/.

Cus_vgdist
Voter-government distance, based on 'center of gravity' in electorate and government, as calculated by Thomas Cusack. The data for the US are dropped, so that only data for parliamentary systems are entered.
Source: http://www.wzb.eu/alt/ism/people/misc/cusack/d_sets.en.htm

Cus_vpdist
Voter-parliament distance, based on 'center of gravity' in electorate and parliament, as calculated by Thomas Cusack. The data for the US are dropped, so that only data for parliamentary systems are entered.
Source: http://www.wzb.eu/alt/ism/people/misc/cusack/d_sets.en.htm

Kf_vgdist
Voter-government distance, based on location of median voter and median member of parliament, as calculated by HeeMin Kim and Richard Fording. The data for the US are dropped, so that only data for parliamentary systems are entered.
Source: Kim, Powell and Fording, 2008.

Kf_vpdist

Voter-government distance, based on location of median voter and median member of government, as calculated by HeeMin Kim and Richard Fording. The data for the US are dropped, so that only data for parliamentary systems are entered.
Source: Kim, Powell and Fording, 2008.

Kf_vgdist_maj

The "kf_vgdist" variable re-coded, with the cases of minority government dropped.

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