# Revisiting Topics

CIS 4930 / 5930. Offensive Computer Security. Spring 2014

### **Outline**

- Stack cookies
- SSL bugs this year
  - iOS GOTO FAIL
  - GNU Utils
  - OPENSSL...



- Akamai's private key leaked
- SSL, Certs, CA's and the rise of signed malware
- Big picture

### **Stack Cookies**

http://phrack.org/issues/67/13. html#article

l	
l	N - Argument for function
I	N-1 - Argument for function
l	•••
I	2 - Argument for function
	1 - Argument for function
I	Return Address
I	Frame Pointer
I	XXX
l	Canary
	Local Variables
_	


```
---[ 3.3 - Exploiting canaries remotely
Usually networks daemons create a new thread by calling clone() or a new
process by calling fork() to support a new connection. In the case of
fork() and depending on the daemon, the child process may or may not call
execve() which means that it will be in one the two situations:
1. without execve()
                              [mother]
                     ----> accept()
                                 | <- new connection</pre>
                              fork()
                         mother | | child
                                   read()
                                    ...
2. with execve()
                               [mother]
                      ----> accept()
                                 | <- new connection</pre>
                              fork()
                         mother | | child
                                  execve()
                                   read()
                                    . . .
```

As stated by the man page:

\*) the fork() system call creates a duplicate of the calling process which means that father and child share a same canary as this is a per-process-canary and not a per-function-canary mechanism. This is an interesting property as if for each attempt we were able to guess a little

of the canary then with a finite number of guesses we would be successful.

\*) when execve() is called "text, data, bss, and stack of the calling process are overwritten by that of the program loaded." This implies that the canary is different for each child. As a result, being able to guess a little of the child canary is most likely useless as this will result in a crash and any result wouldn't be applicable to the next child.



```
void foo(...)
{
stack_buffer_overflow()
}
```

### How to exploit this:

- 1. with stack cookies
- 2. + DEP
- 3. + ASLR

Require another bug/weakness?

4. Then think about how to further mitigate

```
void foo(...)
{
heap_buffer_overflow()
}
```

### How to exploit this:

(depends on heap algorithms)

- 1. with stack cookies
- 2. + DEP
- 3. + ASLR

Require another bug/weakness?

4. Then think about how to further mitigate

```
void foo(...)
{
integer_bug_+_arbitrary_write()
x[i] = blah
//x[-59] = new return address...
}
```

### How to exploit this:

- 1. with stack cookies
- 2. + DEP
- 3. + ASLR

- 4. Then think about other mitigations:
  - a. CFI
  - b. EMET suite

```
void foo(...)
{
// you only control upper half of an address
partial_arbitrary_byte()
}
```

### How to exploit this:

- 1. with stack cookies
- 2. + DEP
- 3. + ASLR

- 4. Then think about other mitigations:
  - a. CFI
  - b. EMET suite

```
void foo(...)
{
// you only control upper half of an address
use_after_free()
}
```

### How to exploit this:

- 1. with stack cookies
- 2. + DEP
- 3. + ASLR

- 4. Then think about other mitigations:
  - a. CFI
  - b. EMET suite

```
void foo(...)
{
// you only control upper half of an address
use_of_uninitialized_variables()
}
```

### How to exploit this:

- 1. with stack cookies
- 2. + DEP
- 3. + ASLR

- 4. Then think about other mitigations:
  - a. CFI
  - b. EMET suite

```
void foo(...)
{
// you only control upper half of an address
format_string_bugs()
}
```

### How to exploit this:

- 1. with stack cookies
- 2. + DEP
- 3. + ASLR

- 4. Then think about other mitigations:
  - a. CFI
  - b. EMET suite

# Going Further

### Now imagine each of these:

- Local priv esc, inside sandbox, against AV
  - What beats Signature based AV?
- Remote exploitation
  - Through firewall? Through WAF?
    - How does having to work with encoding affect exploitability for each?
      - Does it actually affect exploitability?
      - or just the payload execution/delivery???

# SSL Bugs

https://www.imperialviolet. org/2014/02/22/applebug. html

http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/03/criticalcrypto-bug-leaves-linux-hundreds-of-apps-opento-eavesdropping/

http://heartbleed.com/



# How Big?

http://mashable.com/2014/04/09/heartbleed-bug-websites-affected/

### **How Heartbleed Works**

http://xkcd.com/1354/

# Akamai hit by Heartbleed

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akamai\_Technologies



Had a custom patch for heartbleed; still vulnerable:

http://www.computerworld.

com/s/article/9247650/Akamai admits issuing faulty Ope nSSL patch reissues keys


- Attacked.
- Impact: over 30% of all internet traffic exposed.

# Digitally Signed Malware

over 1.5 digitally signed <u>NEW</u> malware in 2013:

https://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/digitally-signed-malware-just-what-can-

you-trust-now



# **Big Picture**


### Security

- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability

Exploitation / Hacking grants attackers Access

 DoS to replay attacks to remote code execution

### **Big Picture**



### Next Week

Social Engineering

Physical Security

Take Home Final Exam

# Questions?